The Ahtisaari Plan and North Kosovo
The Ahtisaari Plan and North Kosovo
The Ahtisaari Plan and North Kosovo
Plan and
North Kosovo
Gerard M. Gallucci
a) The Courts
b) The Police
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c) Municipal Competences
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d) Finance
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e) Inter-Municipal Cooperation
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h) Mitrovica
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6) Conclusion
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Introduction
The current stalemate in northern Kosovo remains the main stumbling block preventing the
commencement of a genuine process of mutual accommodation between Serbia and Kosovo.
The two may continue to differ on the fundamental issue of Kosovos status with Serbia
withholding recognition of Kosovos independence for some time. Regularising relations on a
practical level in order to lower tensions and improve the daily lives of people, however, is
achievable even without agreement on status. For this to move forward in earnest, a political
framework must be found to accommodate the essential interests of both sides vis--vis the area
north of the Ibar River. The Ahtisaari Plan (Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status
Settlement) remains the best approach to accomplishing this objective, and agreement on its
implementation would avoid both the attempt to settle the problem of the north through the use
of force and the full separation of the north from Kosovo.
Mitrovica (2005-08) and Chief of Staff for the UN Mission in East Timor (2008-10). He taught
peacekeeping as an Adjunct Professor in the Graduate School for Public and International
Affairs, University of Pittsburgh (2011). Prior to government service, Gallucci was Assistant
Professor of Political Science, West Virginia Wesleyan College (1979) and Assistant Professor of
Political Science, University of Arkansas at Little Rock (1979). He was born in 1951 in Jersey
City, New Jersey and received a Ph.D. from the University of Pittsburgh in Political Science in
1978 and a BA at Rutgers University in 1973.
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In November 2005, the Contact Group in what was essentially its last gasp of consensus announced
guiding principles for resolving status. At the same time, the UN Secretary General asked former Finnish
President, Martti Ahtisaari, to lead the process of arriving at a status agreement. Ahtisaari faced a
daunting task because of differing positions on the question of Kosovos final status; positions that
reflected the opposing views of Belgrade and Pristina. In joint sessions and other meetings, he focused on
trying to draw out from the two sides elements of a possible compromise arrangement. He managed to
derive from these talks the elements for what came to be known as the Ahtisaari Plan.
By 2007, however, it was clear that there would not be a new UN Security Council resolution on Kosovo.
There were substantive issues between the Quint and Russia, with Moscow rejecting granting
Kosovo independence as a precedent for other disputed regions. There were also factors in the
bilateral relationship between Russia and the US that affected the dynamics. With Quint support
guaranteed, Kosovo declared independence in February 2008. The Ahtisaari Plan served as a basis for this
declaration and for a continuing international role; to be carried out by the International Civilian Office
(ICO) of the European Union Special Representative and the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX). During
the course of events, the Ahtisaari Plan was implemented in south Kosovo, including in several
municipalities with non-Albanian majorities. The north, however, remained outside Kosovo institutions
and the ICO, and the Ahtisaari Plan was not implemented there.
The Ahtisaari Plan derived a formula that would allow Kosovo Serbs to have their own local institutions
and communal life with continued linkages to Serbia, but within the framework of a multi-ethnic Kosovo.
The Plan called for new Serb-majority municipalities including North Mitrovica with important
elements of self-rule in health, education and social issues, plus a role in choosing the local police chief.
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These municipalities would have the right to their own funding, block grants from central government and
funding from Belgrade. They could form associations with other municipalities, including those in
Serbia. The intent was clear to allow Serbs in these municipalities to live in two worlds at once, in both
Kosovo and Serbia. However, there were issues left to be defined by further agreement or in practice.
Important details centered on exactly what role the central government would play in the linkages to
Belgrade, and on setting policy in areas such as education.
The Ahtisaari Plan remains a good framework for resolving the conflict over the north and maintaining
the territorial and political integrity of Kosovo while status remains disputed. It provides for minority
rights and participation in government, local self-rule and linkages between local municipalities (with
Serb majorities) and Belgrade. Together with the six-point plan of UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon,
the Ahtisaari Plan offers a number of pragmatic measures relating to policing, customs, the courts and
infrastructure, plus local autonomy in education and culture, and special features for Mitrovica (the
University and Hospital). The Plan also provides mechanisms for ensuring transparency in Belgrade's
support to Serb municipalities in Kosovo and for connecting the northern Serbs and their local institutions
with Pristina. The northern Serbs will need to look beyond simple rejection of the Ahtisaari Plan as
linked to Kosovo independence and re-examine it closely to see how it may address their concerns. The
Kosovo Albanians will have to consider how implementation of the Plan can be done in such a way as to
allay Serb concerns, whilst still providing political unity within a decentralized context. In a transitional
period, the international community the UN and/or the EU may need to play a supporting role so that
both sides can feel assured of mutual adherence to the Plan. This paper will suggest a possible approach
to implementing the Ahtisaari Plan that all parties might consider as a starting point for further discussion.
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1. Questions regarding the overall political status of Kosovo remain separate from any practical
arrangements made for regularizing life in the north and across the boundary lines between
Serbia and Kosovo, and between the north and south of Kosovo.
2. North Kosovo remains part of Kosovo, and that Kosovo's territorial and political integrity be
maintained.
3. The Serb-majority population north of the Ibar River maintains their own local administrations in
the existing four municipalities including North Mitrovica without unilateral influence from
Kosovo institutions south of the Ibar River.
4. The local institutions north of the Ibar River continue to be allowed to function in practical ways
as municipalities in Serbia.
5. Core rule of law institutions the courts and the police function in a manner consistent with
both local self-rule and overall coherence within a Kosovo-wide framework.
6. Kosovo Serbs in the north accept the responsibilities of participating in the central institutions of
Kosovo, and align their political practices as much as possible with those south of the Ibar River.
7. Issues not directly part of the Ahtisaari Plan including customs and the operation of telecoms
and energy companies in the north would also have to be resolved in a manner consistent with
the overall approach to the north and these other conditions.
8. An international role vis-a-vis the implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan in northern Kosovo may
be necessary until it can stand on its own i.e. in the hands of the two sides i.e. or until an
overall political solution is achieved.
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protection of the national or ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of all Communities and
their members. Article 4 provides for the right of return and to reclaim property. Article 6 provides for
local self-government and that municipalities shall have the right to inter-municipal and cross-border
cooperation on matters of mutual interest in the exercise of their responsibilities. The Plans Annexes
expand on these - Annex I (Article 8.3) gives municipalities the right to local sources of revenue and (8.4)
to inter-municipal and cross-border cooperation in the areas of their own and enhanced competencies.
Annex II (Article 4) provides communities the right to express, maintain and develop their language and
culture; receive pre-school, primary and secondary public education in their own language; establish and
maintain their own private schools (with public financing); display community symbols; and have their
own media (including TV). Annex I (Article 1.6) provides for the ability to maintain dual citizenship.
Annex III defines local government, decentralization and linkages to Belgrade. Article 3 of the Annex
gives municipalities full and exclusive powers for local economic development, land use, urban
regulation, public services and utilities, education, health care and social services, public housing,
licensing local services and naming of streets. Article 4 gives Serb-majority municipalities enhanced
participatory rights in the appointment of Police Station Commander and provides North Mitrovica with
extended competencies for university education and a hospital. Article 5 requires that the central
government delegate to municipalities responsibility for cadastral and civil registries, voter registration,
business registration and licensing, distribution of social assistance payments (excluding pensions) and
forestry protection. Annex III also allows for municipalities to cooperate with (Art. 10) and receive
funding from (Art. 11) Belgrade and to use educational material from Serbia in local schools (Art. 7).
Annex IV provides that municipalities will have their own local courts and (Art. 2.2) mandates that
Kosovo judicial institutions shall ... reflect the ethnic composition of their area of jurisdiction.
At the national level, the Ahtisaari Plan provides for reserved and protected minority participation in the
central government.
government. Article 3.3 requires a minimum of ten seats (out of 120) reserved for Kosovo Serbs in the
National Assembly, as well as minimum numbers for other national minorities. Article 3.7-9 provides for
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protected participation and voting majorities in the Assembly for issues affecting the non-majority
communities without reference to simple majority vote or referendum. Article 5 requires a minimum
number of Serb and other non-majority community representatives as ministers and deputy ministers and
mandates that the civil service reflect the diversity of the people of Kosovo. Annex I also gives the
non-majority representatives an enhanced role in choosing members of the Constitutional Court (Article
6) and in the process of amending the constitution (Article 10).
Thus the Ahtisaari Plan provides a framework for a functioning multi-ethnic democracy. As to its
functioning in fact, one may judge via analysis of the Plan's implementation south of the Ibar River.
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a) The Courts
President Ahtisaari designed the Kosovo judicial system as unitary and multi-ethnic.
In Kosovo,
however, both sides see the justice system courts and prosecutors as a tool to impose authority on the
other side. Finding a way to allow Serbs their own local courts within a district for the Serb-majority
north, will probably be essential to gaining Serb support for any agreement. This requires implementation
guidelines in three crucial areas which law would be applied, who can become judges and prosecutors
and how they are chosen? It would also be necessary to accommodate a northern district court within a
Kosovo-wide justice system.
A possible solution to the issue of law and establishment of a separate district court for the north would be
to allow the local courts and the northern district court to follow Serbian law, assuming it to be largely
consistent with UNMIK regulations, the former Yugoslav code and the law used south of the Ibar River.
A court of appeals would exist to settle disputes that arise due to substantive differences between codes,
and for cases crossing jurisdictions between north and south. This court could be treated as a Kosovo
court with equal membership drawn from the district court in the north and its equivalent from the south.
It would operate with a rotating presiding judge and would reach decisions by consensus. Its decisions
would be accepted as valid and binding throughout Kosovo (i.e., become part of common law). Where
consensus decisions cannot be reached, the case would be referred to the panel of three international
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Judges and prosecutors in the four northern municipalities at the basic and district court level would
be nominated under procedures contained in Annex IV, Article 4.4 after, and only after, indication by the
assemblies of the relevant municipalities and certification of qualification by the existing body of the
district court in north Mitrovica. Candidates would not be ineligible because of service in the justice
system of Serbia. At least one judge in each basic court and in the district court should be indicated from
the non-majority community. Appointment and service would otherwise be according to the provisions of
Article 3 and Article 4.5 except that dismissal would need the concurrence of the northern Kosovo district
court president.
b) The Police
Annex VIII governing the security sector provides for (Art. 2) a unified chain of command for the
Kosovo Police Service (KPS) but also that police districts should coincide with municipal boundaries.
The ethnicity of the local police should also reflect the municipalitys ethnic composition.
The
procedures for choosing the local commander (Art. 2.6) are somewhat complex and require give and take
between the municipality and central authorities:
In Kosovo Serb majority municipalities, the local Station Commanders shall be selected
according to the following procedure: The Municipal Assembly shall propose at least two names
for Station Commander fulfilling all minimum professional requirements as set forth by Kosovo
legislation. The Ministry of Internal affairs may then appoint one candidate from this list within
15 days upon receipt of the list. In the event none of the candidates are acceptable to the Ministry,
the Municipal Assembly shall provide a second list of at least two different candidates for
consideration by the Ministry, stemming from the existing Kosovo Police Service staff and
fulfilling all minimum professional requirements as set forth by Kosovo legislation. The Ministry
is then obliged to appoint one of the candidates from the second list within 15 days of its receipt.
To avoid the procedure breaking down if the Ministry refuses to finally choose a candidate from the
second list provided by the municipality, it would be mandated to make a choice within 15 days or the
final choice would revert to the municipality.
The KPS in the north would function as an element of the Kosovo Police with the same uniform and with
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full logistical, supply and communications support from the central police command. The four northern
stations would report to a northern district commander based in north Mitrovica and chosen from the
Kosovo Serb officers serving in the north and agreeable through process of consultation to the
northern municipal presidents. Both the northern and southern Kosovo Police districts would have a
deputy commander drawn from the non-majority community on that side of the Ibar River.
c) Municipal Competences
Annex III puts its extensive list of competencies to be reserved for municipalities and the extended
features for North Mitrovica into the context (Art. 4.2) of Kosovo legislation that would set standards to
be met. Participation of the northern Serbs in Kosovos legislative process, through participation in
elections and serving in the National Assembly, would help set those standards. Annex III (Article. 6)
provides for administrative review of municipal actions by central government. If the central government
and municipality disagreed, the matter would be decided by the Kosovo courts. In the case of delegated
competencies, the central government could suspend, change or revoke the municipalitys action. This
raises the prospect of a dispute between municipal authorities refusing to accept intervention by central
authorities in local competences. To avoid this, Article 6.2 would be amended to provide that in cases
where municipal decisions do not violate European standards, and where the decisions do not directly
have affect beyond the municipal boundaries, decision by the municipal assembly is final. Where these
conditions are believed not to be met, the President of Kosovo would be able to submit the issue to the
panel of three international judges chosen according to Annex I, Article 6.1.3 to bring the municipal
actions into accord with European standards or to limit their effect to municipal boundaries.
d) Finance
Annex III, Article 8 provides that municipalities shall establish their own budgets covering tasks falling
within their competencies and that central legislation shall set forth the basic public financial
management and accountability requirements applicable to all municipalities, in accordance with
international standards. Municipalities are entitled to financial resources of their own, which shall
include the authority to levy and collect local taxes, charges and fees. Municipalities are also to receive
primarily earmarked central grants though a fair and transparent block grant system, ensuring greater
municipal autonomy in the allocation and expenditure of central funds. Municipalities with extended
competencies (including north Mitrovica) would be entitled to extra funds from central government for
those services. In return, municipalities would submit to yearly independent and objective internal
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Under Article 11, municipalities are also entitled to receive financial donations from Serbia. Such
funds would be limited to what is required for a municipality to carry out its own competencies and must
be transparent and made public through inclusion in the published municipal budget. These funds
would be transferred through accounts in commercial banks, certified by the Central Banking Authority
of Kosovo and notified to Kosovo's Treasury. Receipt of funds from Serbia would not offset grants from
the central government, nor be subject to taxes, fees or surcharges of any kind imposed. Also, pensions
and other individualized transfers may be made by Serbia.
Annex III thus seems to allow Serbian-majority municipalities to retain full access to funding from
Serbia. To ensure clarity, however, it might be specified that the only role of the Central Banking
Authority of Kosovo would be to initially certify commercial banks, without being involved in actual
transfers.
e) Inter-Municipal Cooperation
Annex III, Article 9 allows municipalities to cooperate and form partnerships with other Kosovo
municipalities to carry out functions of mutual interest. Municipal responsibilities in the areas of their
own and extended own competencies may be exercised through municipal partnerships, with the
exception of the exercise of fundamental municipal authorities, such as election of municipal organs and
appointment of municipal officials, municipal budgeting, and the adoption of regulatory acts enforceable
on citizens in general.
representatives appointed by the assemblies of the participating municipalities and provide for an
administrative apparatus for carrying out its functions. Partnership decisions and activities shall be
subject to reporting requirements to the competent central authority and administrative review for
compliance with legislation. This would allow the four Serbian-majority municipalities in the north to
form a partnership and would, of course, allow a similar body to be formed including all Serb-majority
Kosovo communities. In cases where differences related to central government's administrative review
cannot be resolved by the two sides, the President of Kosovo would be able to submit the issue to the
panel of three international judges chosen according to Annex I, Article 6.1.3 for adjudication.
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The central government (Annex III, Article 7) may object to the curricula or books used in local Serbianlanguage schools or by the Serbian language university in North Mitrovica. Disputes would be settled by
independent commissions including equal numbers of Kosovo Serbs and those chosen by central
government and an international by majority vote. The international would have been chosen by the
International Community Representative (ICR).
substitute the ICR nominee with an agreed international education expert and require decisions be made
by consensus.
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h) Mitrovica
Article 13 of Annex III contains special provisions for the formally undivided municipality of Mitrovica.
It splits the municipality into Mitrovice/Mitrovica North and Mitrovice/Mitrovica South with
boundaries contained in a map drawn up by the Ahtisaari team. It provides for a Joint Board of the two
municipalities to carry out functional cooperation in the areas of their own competencies as agreed by
the municipalities. This Board would be made up of five members appointed by each municipality plus
an international chair chosen by the ICR. Article 13 also gives the ICR a role in overseeing North
Mitrovica until an election could be held.
The boundary drawn by the Ahtisaari team does not correspond to the Ibar River in the western part of
north Mitrovica. Rather, it seeks to include Albanian-majority areas northwest of the Ibar River in the
southern municipality. It also includes in that area a Serb-majority village. Not included is an area in
north Mitrovica that has been the scene of uncoordinated returns by Kosovo Albanians. Whether this line
makes sense or it would be better to draw the municipal boundary at the Ibar itself would have to be
decided. No line can be easily drawn to separate the two communities. Some mixing is inevitable and
may be desirable as providing both north and south opportunities for multi-ethnic reconciliation and
mutual accommodation.
A joint board to allow a forum on cooperation between north and south Mitrovica and across the Ibar in
general makes sense as many of the problems and opportunities in the region are shared. It might be
best configured, however, as a completely voluntary mechanism made up entirely of equal numbers of
representatives drawn from both sides of the Ibar River and including representatives of the nonAlbanian and non-Serbian communities without any international involvement. As north Mitrovica has
a functioning local administration, there need be no international role there either.
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Beyond rejecting the symbolism of allowing a Kosovo customs presence on the boundary, the northern
Kosovo Serbs would probably resist any collection of Kosovo customs fees in the north on good beings
used in the north. This leaves open the possibility of an agreement to allow Kosovo customs to record
information at the northern boundary in support of EULEX while carrying out actual control and
collection of fees in south Mitrovica for goods passing over the Ibar River. Longer term, however, an
agreement on collection of fees in the north for goods staying in the north (or channeled directly back to
the north) that might be offset by abolition of Serbian VAT and a proportionate reduction in the Kosovo
central government's block grant due north municipalities might be possible and desirable.
Leaving aside the issue of property claims by Serbian enterprises and an eventual liberalization in the
telecoms and energy sectors allowing Serbian companies to operate openly and legally in Kosovo, it will
probably be necessary to allow Serbian telecom and energy providers to operate freely in the north until
these larger issues are resolved. A way should also be found to allow Trepca North to function within the
context of any agreement between Serbia and Kosovo on customs. These measures would allow the
Serbian community in the north to feel more secure in accepting the implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan.
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municipalities themselves with monitoring and assistance from the OSCE until other agreed mechanisms
can function.) Northern Serbs would vote in and be open to service in central institutions including the
Assembly without necessary reference to the status of those institutions. Individual Kosovo Serbs
serving in the central government would forego any salary from Belgrade.
Funding from central government would be used, at least in part, to provide services for non-majority
communities in the north and to fund the operations of an office of deputy mayor for non-majority affairs.
This office would be headed by a deputy mayor to be elected in the regular elections. This deputy mayor
and his/her office could also be designated formally or informally as liaison with central institutions.
Officials of municipal administrations would meet regularly with officials of central government to
discuss appropriate matters.
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6) Conclusion
No mere document can deliver reconciliation, cooperation and progress. The Ahtisaari Plan, however,
could provide a framework to allow the current tense stalemate over the north to give way to a process of
normalization of life in the north and across ethnic lines. No document, however detailed, can guarantee
smooth implementation and clarity on all points. Some aspects would have to be worked out in practice.
However, providing mechanisms for all sides to begin acting and interacting in ways that do not challenge
basic interests or raise unnecessary concerns would provide a good start; so long as both sides approach
implementation with an understanding that continued conflict does not serve their interests.
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Gerard M. Gallucci
gerard.gallucci@transconflict.com
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