Io Handbook

Joint
Information Operations
Planning Handbook
July 2002
Joint Command, Control and
Information Warfare School
Joint Forces Staff College
Joint
Planning Handbook
Prepared and Maintained by the
Information Warfare Division

of the
Joint Forces Staff College

National Defense University
Norfolk,Virginia
Joint Information Operations Planning Handbook – July 2002
Table of Contents
Table of Contents .........................................................................................................................................i
Preface ....................................................................................................................................................iii
Planning Handbook Objectives ....................................................................................................... iii
Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................... iii
Changes Since the Last Edition ...................................................................................................... iii
Providing Feedback......................................................................................................................... iv
Chapter I – Basics of Information Operations ....................................................................................... I-1
Introduction.................................................................................................................................... I-1
Lessons Learned ........................................................................................................................... I-3
Objective......................................................................................................................................... I-3
Guidance ........................................................................................................................................ I-3
Organizations.................................................................................................................................. I-3
Timing and Phasing ........................................................................................................................ I-3
Coordination.................................................................................................................................... I-3
Resources....................................................................................................................................... I-4
Training and Education ................................................................................................................... I-4
Planning.......................................................................................................................................... I-4
Operations Security ........................................................................................................................ I-4
Psychological Operations ............................................................................................................... I-4
Military Deception ........................................................................................................................... I-5
Electronic Warfare .......................................................................................................................... I-5
Physical Attack / Destruction........................................................................................................... I-6
Computer Network Attack (CNA) .................................................................................................... I-6
Civil Affairs (CA).............................................................................................................................. I-6
Public Affairs (PA)........................................................................................................................... I-6
Counterintelligence (CI) .................................................................................................................. I-6
Counter-deception .......................................................................................................................... I-6
Counter-propaganda....................................................................................................................... I-7
Information Assurance (IA) ............................................................................................................. I-7
IO Objectives, Tasks, MOEs and Concept of Operations ............................................................. I-7
Purpose .......................................................................................................................................... I-7
Background..................................................................................................................................... I-7
How to Write an IO Objective.......................................................................................................... I-8
How to Write an IO Task................................................................................................................. I-9
How to Write an IO Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) ................................................................... I-10
How to Write an IO Concept of Operations................................................................................... I-10
Summarize the JFC’s Purpose for the Operation or Phase .......................................................... I-11
Chapter II – Organizing a Staff for Information Operations ................................................................ II-1
The Information Operations Cell .................................................................................................. II-1
Information Operations Cell Chief .................................................................................................. II-2
IO Cell Responsibilities .................................................................................................................. II-3
Information Coordination Board ................................................................................................... II-4
Information Operations Working Group (IOWG) .......................................................................... II-4
Targeting Integration .................................................................................................................... II-5
Methodology .................................................................................................................................. II-5
Lists related to targeting................................................................................................................. II-6
External Augmentation ................................................................................................................. II-7
Chapter III – Planning Joint Task Force Information Operations: Integrating Information
Operations in the Staff Planning Process ......................................................................... III-1
Information Operations Planning................................................................................................. III-1
Intelligence Support..................................................................................................................... III-6
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Offensive Information Operations ................................................................................................. III-6

Defensive Information Operations................................................................................................. III-6
Chapter IV – Integrating Information Operations in JOPES Deliberate/Crisis Action
Planning/Execution on a Unified Command Staff ............................................................ IV-1
Introduction.................................................................................................................................. IV-1
JOPES Deliberate Planning Process ........................................................................................ IV-13
JOPES Crisis Action Planning Process..................................................................................... IV-65
Executing the Plan..................................................................................................................... IV-69
Chapter V – Joint Information Operations Attack Planning Process ................................................ V-1
Introduction................................................................................................................................... V-1
The Five Steps of the Joint Information Operations Attack Planning Process............................. V-1
Step One: Identify the Offensive Information Operations Objectives........................................... V-3
Step Two: Generate the Offensive Information Operations Tasks .............................................. V-5
Step Three: Identify the Information Operations Targets ........................................................... V-10
Step Four: Identify the IO Assets, Derive the IO Sub-tasks, and Prepare the Candidate Master IO
Target List ................................................................................................................ V-13
Step Five: Conduct Equity Review ............................................................................................. V-18
Class Slides................................................................................................................................ V-18
Chapter VI – Joint Information Operations Defensive Planning Process ........................................ VI-1
Introduction.................................................................................................................................. VI-1
The Five Steps of the Joint Information Operations Defensive Planning Process ..................... VI-2
Step One: Identify the Defensive Information Operations Objectives......................................... VI-3
Step Two: Generate the Defensive Information Operations Tasks............................................. VI-6
Step Three: Identify Assets to be Protected and Conduct Risk Assessment ............................. VI-9
Step Four: Select Protection Measures and Derive Defensive Information Operations Sub-tasks
as Required ............................................................................................................. VI-11
Step Five: Prepare the Master Protection List and Conduct Equity Review ............................. VI-16
Class Slides............................................................................................................................... VI-17
Chapter VII – Annexes and Appendices................................................................................................ A-1
Annex A – Information Operations Estimate Process .................................................................. A-1
Appendix 1 – Operations Security..................................................................................................A-5
Appendix 2 – Psychological Operations.........................................................................................A-9
Appendix 3 – Deception...............................................................................................................A-13
Appendix 4 – Electronic Warfare..................................................................................................A-17
Appendix 5 – Physical Destruction...............................................................................................A-21
Appendix 6 – Information Assurance ...........................................................................................A-23
Appendix 7 – Computer Network Attack ......................................................................................A-25
Appendix 8 – Special Information Operations..............................................................................A-27
Annex B – Glossary...................................................................................................................... B-1
Abbreviations and Acronyms .........................................................................................................B-1
Joint Publication References .......................................................................................................B-12
Joint Publication Availability.........................................................................................................B-13
Match IO Effects Words with IO Capabilities and Related Activities ............................................B-13
IO Effects Definitions ...................................................................................................................B-14
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Preface
Planning Handbook Objectives

This planning Handbook is not doctrine. It is intended to be a collection of best practices, experiences
and lessons learned. Previous editions have been used as the basis for real-world planning. This
Handbook provides the following:
• Chapter I – Basics of Information Operations is a brief overview of the capabilities required to

successfully conduct Information Operations within the context of a Joint Task Force, and a summary
of some lessons learned. A new draft section on IO objectives, tasks, measures of effectiveness, and
concept of operations has been added.
• Chapter II – Organizing a Staff for Information Operations covers the JTF/Unified Command IO Cell,
Information Coordination Boards or cells and includes a discussion on the integration of IO into the
targeting process.
• Chapter III – Planning Joint Task Force Information Operations provides both doctrinal and emerging
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, a discussion of the Commander's responsibilities and presents
some thoughts on processes and priority setting.
• Chapter IV – Integrating Information Operations in JOPES Deliberate/Crisis Action
Planning/Execution on a Unified Command Staff is a step-by-step guide for Unified Command level
IO cells using JOPES.
• Chapter V – Joint Information Operations Attack Planning Process is a non-technical guide to
planning Offensive IO.
• Chapter VI – Joint Information Operations Defensive Planning Process is a non-technical guide to
planning Defensive IO.
• Chapter VII – Annexes and Appendices:
• Annex A – The Information Operations Estimate Process is a step-by-step guide to developing
IO estimates of supportability suited for JTF or Unified Command IO Cells.
• Annex B – Glossary of Abbreviations, Acronyms, References, Effects, and useful Definitions.
Since this is Handbook is not doctrine, it should not be construed as
Acknowledgements
The Information Warfare Division staff of the Joint Command, Control and Information Warfare School at
the Joint Forces Staff College would like the thank those members of the U.S. Joint Forces Command
staff whose work and ideas have been incorporated into this Handbook.
We would also like to thank the Joint Information Operations Center for providing the materials for
Chapter V on the Joint Information Operations Attack Planning Process and Chapter VI on the Joint
Information Operations Defensive Planning Process.
Changes Since the Last Edition

July 2002: This version consists primarily of typographical corrections and minor clarifications.
Additional acronyms were added to the Glossary. References to “CINC” were changed to “Combatant
Command,” “Combatant Commander,” or abbreviated as “C/C.” References to “NCA” were changed to
“SECDEF.”
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January 2002: This was a complete reissue of the Joint Information Operations Planning Handbook. The
previous edition was dated March 2001. The format has been changed to allow easier reading and the
inclusion of more material.
Chapter I has had a draft section added on “IO Objectives, Tasks, MOEs and Concept of
Operations”
Chapter II has been completely revised and updated
Chapter IV has had significant updates to match the JCIWS JIWSOC IO Planning Class and the
new Joint IO Planning Course
Chapter V on the Joint Information Operations Attack Planning Process is new and includes the
slides for the Joint IO Planning Course
Chapter VI (formerly Chapter V) has been modified to include slides from the inaugural session of
the Joint IO Planning Course
Chapter VII, Annex B Glossary has a significantly expanded list of acronyms as well as useful
definitions of IO Effects. Two essays previously included as Annexes C and D have been
removed until they can be updated.
Providing Feedback
Please provide us comments and feedback for additions, deletions or corrections to this Handbook.
CDR Mark Treadwell

JFSC/JCIWS/IW
7800 Hampton Blvd.
Norfolk, VA 23511-1702
DSN: 646-6350
Email: treadwellm@jfsc.ndu.edu (preferred)
jaitream@afsc.navy.smil.mil
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Chapter I – Basics of Information Operations
Introduction
Information Operations (IO) is critical during all phases of an operation across the spectrum of war. IO
involves actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending ones own
information and information systems. U.S. dependence on information and information systems exposes
the U.S. to a wide range of adversaries – hackers, criminals, vandals, terrorists, transnational groups and
nation states. Consequently, a coherent IO strategy, integrated with operations, is essential to counter
these asymmetrical adversaries.
The Information Operations and Information Warfare capabilities and related activities must be
synchronized, coordinated and integrated to effectively support a commander. Additionally, continuous
coordination with Intelligence (J2), Communications (J6), the Joint Planning Group, and the IO related
activities of Public Affairs and Civil Affairs is essential. Because of the tremendous coordination,
synchronization, and deconfliction required to make IO work, we commonly refer to IO as an “integrating
strategy” for planning and execution.
When the term Information Operations first came into common use, the emphasis was on emerging
technology and the systems that the two or more sides in a conflict or crisis might use against each other.
The operational center of gravity followed a Clausewitzian paradigm; that is the destruction of adversary
forces in the field, and confusing, blinding and degrading the adversary's command and control structure.
Lessons learned from joint exercises and real-world operations concluded that although the hardware
aspects of IO are important, the human dimension was not getting the emphasis it deserved. Recent IO
operations have included increased emphasis on the adversary decision-making process. Balancing the
efforts of both technology (hardware, software and systems) and the human aspects (perception
management) is critical to the operation's success.
The future that is conceptualized on the premise that modern and emerging technologies – particularly
information specific advances – should make possible a new level of joint operations capability.
Underlying a variety of technological innovations is information superiority – the capability to collect,
process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s
ability to do the same. U.S. forces must continue to explore innovative ways of applying the full range of
IO techniques and procedures in direct support of all operations as they counter increasing and
expanding adversaries.
This Handbook provides a quick reference that describes the significant impact Information Operations
can have on operations and provide some ideas on how to best use this methodology in the process of
planning and executing joint operations.
I-1
Civil Public
Offensive IO Defensive IO
Affairs Affairs
Computer Computer
Physical Counter- Counter-
Network C2W SIO Network
Security propaganda deception
Attack Defense
Military Electronic Counter

PSYOP OPSEC OPSEC
Deception Protection intelligence
Physical
EW
Destruction
Electronic
Electronic Electronic
Warfare
Attack Protection
Support
- IO Related Activities
- Continuous
- Mainly Done During Hostilities
Note: The division of the IO Cell into offensive and defensive sub-components is shown for the
purpose of highlighting the functions only. We do not advocate splitting the cell into
these two disciplinary areas.
I-2
Lessons Learned
Some lessons learned from Information Operations include the following:
Objective
Objective is a principal of war espoused by the great military thinker Carl von Clausewitz. Put simply, the
principle of objective means that every action in an operation should ultimately contribute towards the
accomplishment of a single aim. The commander’s objective(s) answer the “what” a commander wishes
to accomplish. The commander’s strategy answers the “how” the commander intends to accomplish his
objective. Every action planned by the IO Cell must be tied to accomplishing the commander’s
objective(s). Likewise, the commander’s objectives must be tied to national security objectives and the
National Security Strategy (NSS) given by the President. This is accomplished through the Strategy-to-
Task planning methodology. Along with stating his objectives to the IO Cell and other staff planners, the
commander should issue planning guidance.
Guidance
There are no established tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) for employing IO. The IO Cell must
have the guidance from the JTF Commander, the Combatant Commander, and the SECDEF in order to
function properly. The IO Cell should seek guidance early and continuously as the situation changes to
enable it to make the most efficient use of its valuable resources. Coordination within the IO Cell is
essential to ensure that all possible factors are given appropriate consideration. (e.g., the Joint Force Air
Component Commander (JFACC) might want to “take out” all the C2W nodes, the Joint PSYOP Task
Force (JPOTF) Commander might want to exploit some of them, and the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA)
says the Rules of Engagement (ROE) don’t support “taking out” any of them.)
Organizations
There are numerous organizations both internal and external to a Unified Command or Joint Task Force
(JTF) components that will have a direct impact on the success of the IO effort. (See Page II-1 for
discussion of the JTF IO Cell concept. See Page IV-1 and following, for a discussion of the Unified
Command IO concept.) Properly coordinating and utilizing these assets is a monumental task that should
not be underestimated. Obviously, one must include all those that are applicable, but care should be
taken not to include some just for the sake of inclusion. Ensuring proper representation by each of the
applicable organizations is the responsibility of the IO Cell Officer.
Timing and Phasing

Information Operations are most effective when they are begun during the early part of the decision
making process. Along with the complexity of the intelligence gathering required, the development and
implementation of the Information Operations plan as early as possible is critical. Just as traditional
planning includes considerations for specific events, responses and phases, so should IO planning. Each
phase of an operation should include a complete review of the IO plan. This should include changes in
ROE, commander’s intent, and the political, cultural and economic factors.
Coordination
Coordinating IO requirements within the operations plan is essential. The initial coordination should occur
within the IO cell and a significant portion of this coordination should be directed towards the Joint
Targeting Steering Group (JTSG), Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB) and the Joint Planning
Group (JPG). IO planners must be integrated into the JPG, as there is only one plan produced, into
which IO is carefully woven. Coordination may be divided into three types: initial organization and
planning, plan adjustment during execution, and transition back to peace. Because the focus of IO is on
peacetime operations, much of the coordination will take place outside of the Department of Defense
I-3
(DoD), in the interagency realm. A commander’s Information Operations may require coordination with
the Departments of State, Commerce, and Energy, just to name a few. There may also be requirements
for coordination with the CIA, FBI, Treasury Department, Justice Department and a host of others. For
this reason, the lead agency for IO may frequently be other than the DoD.
Resources
On one hand, one might argue that there are never enough assets to go around. On the other, IO assets
can be found at all levels of DoD and across the interagency environment. Remember that resources
include hardware, software, personnel, time, and many other examples, depending on the situation.
Proper use and protection of these assets is essential. Because some of the effects of IO may extend
beyond the C/C's AOR, the IO cell should consider collateral effects when planning.
Training and Education

This part is often left out of the overall IO plan. Training personnel on the IO plan and formalizing training
will strengthen teamwork. Do not let training and education take a back seat to operational requirements.
Without proper training and a solid understanding of IO by the IO team players, IO will fail.
Planning
IO planning must occur simultaneously with and integrated into operations planning. Staffs create single,
integrated plans and IO is an essential part of each plan. One of the keys to successful integration of IO
into the JOPES process is ensuring that coordination occurs at the interagency, Unified Command, Sub-
Unified Command, Functional Command, JTF, subordinate JTF, and component levels. This vertical
coordination is just as critical as the horizontal coordination is at each level. Chapter III describes in detail
the tasks required to integrate IO into JOPES at the JTF level. Chapter IV discusses integrating IO into
JOPES at the Unified Command level.
Operations Security
To prevent adversaries (or potential adversaries) from gaining valuable information about friendly
operations, the staff must include OPSEC in mission planning as early as possible and then make
revisions as necessary to support changes in current operations and adversaries. The OPSEC process
is comprised of five major activities:
• Identification of critical friendly information

• Analysis of adversaries
• Analysis of vulnerabilities
• Assessment of risk
• Application of appropriate OPSEC protective measures and countermeasures
Psychological Operations
PSYOP conveys selected bits of factual information to an adversary in order to manage his/her
perceptions and behavior. Goals in a PSYOP campaign should be to:
• Reduce efficiency of opposing forces

• Further the U.S. and/or multinational war effort by modifying or manipulating attitudes and
behavior of selected audiences
• Facilitate reorganization and control of occupied or liberated area in conjunction with civil-military
operations
• Obtain the cooperation of allies or coalition partners and neutrals in any PSYOP effort
• Support and enhance humanitarian assistance, foreign internal defense and/or foreign nation
assistance to military operations
I-4
Steps to accomplishing a successful PSYOP operation include:
• Development of a comprehensive PSYOP campaign

• Complete research and analysis of target audiences
• Development of methods to convey or deny information
• Establishing production development requirements
• Establishing dissemination plan
• Coordinating and deconflicting with all other applicable organizations (Public Affairs, Civil Affairs,
non-governmental organizations, etc.)
PSYOP and Perception Management – PSYOP is the very essence of perception management and
therefore is a key capability in any offensive IO operation. PSYOP must be carefully coordinated and
deconflicted with all Public Affairs messages. PSYOP messages and themes must be totally
complementary with the messages and themes conveyed by a joint commander’s Public Affairs system.
This supports the principle of objective and ensures that our adversaries do not receive mixed messages
from our perception management efforts that they might interpret incorrectly.
Military Deception
Deception is used to deliberately mislead adversary military decision-makers as to friendly military
capabilities, intentions, and operations. Successful deception plans normally include surprise, security,
mass and economy of force. Guidance for planning and executing deception operations are based on the
following six principles:
• Focus: Target the adversary decision-maker – not the intelligence system.

• Objective: To cause the adversary to take (or not to take) specific actions.
• Centralized Control: Deception must be directed and controlled by a single element.
• Security: Successful deception depends on the adversary not knowing he is being deceived.
This requires strict security – tied directly to the OPSEC effort.
• Timeliness: In deception, timing is everything. Time must be taken into account for the deception
to occur, the adversary’s intelligence system to collect, analyze, and report, for the adversary
decision maker to react, and for the friendly intelligence system to detect the action resulting from
the adversary’s decision.
• Integration: Deception planning must occur simultaneous with operation planning and must be
fully integrated. The deception must not be identifiable as the “one that doesn’t belong.”
In addition, deception operations should be closely coordinated with your PSYOP campaign and Civil
Affairs efforts so as not to inadvertently undermine the relationship with the civilian population or with the
host-nation military authorities.
Electronic Warfare
Electronic Warfare refers to any military action involving the use of electromagnetic or directed energy to
control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the adversary. EW includes three major subdivisions:
• Electronic Attack (EA): Using the electromagnetic spectrum or directed energy to attack
personnel, facilities or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing or destroying
adversary capabilities.
• Electronic Protection (EP): Actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any
effects of friendly or adversary employment of electronic warfare that degrade, neutralize or
destroy friendly combat capability.
• Electronic Support (ES): Under direct control of an operational commander, actions taken to
search for, intercept, identify and locate sources of intentional and unintentional radiated
electromagnetic energy for the purpose of adversary recognition.
I-5
In peacetime, government organizations, international treaties, and conventions control the use of the
electromagnetic spectrum. EW used in support of military operations other than war normally is restricted
to actions that do not violate the peacetime use of the spectrum. The only exception to this under
peacetime ROE apply when action is necessary to protect the forces. During military operations that
involve hostilities, control of the electromagnetic spectrum will often be contested and the full range of EW
actions may be available. The type and level of EW actions appropriate to a particular military operation
depend on the adversary which adversary forces pose, the reliance of adversary forces on the use of the
electromagnetic spectrum, and the objectives of the operation.
Physical Attack / Destruction

In theory, the last resort in the commander’s choice of assets, destruction should be considered, just like
the “soft kill” IO capabilities as a viable choice for conducting IO. Again, ROE will play a major role in
determining if destruction is available during a particular phase of an operation. Destruction must be
supported by other capabilities and related activities of IO. At a minimum, IO planners should consider
supporting destruction with PSYOP and Public Affairs.
Computer Network Attack (CNA)

Computer Network Attack is difficult to plan, requires extensive lead-time, and requires an incredible
amount of intelligence. Nevertheless, it is another IO option available to the commander. Even when all
is in place, CNA may be restricted by legal considerations. International law on CNA is not fully
developed and some countries may consider CNA as an act of war. A rule-of-thumb for employing CNA
is that it should only be employed when no other means of accomplishing the desired task is feasible.
Civil Affairs (CA)

As a related activity of IO, CA is a tool available to help support the commander’s IO objectives. CA is
used to gain and maintain support for United States’ operations in friendly, neutral, and hostile foreign
areas. Put in familiar terms, CA helps the U.S. military and the U.S. Government to “win the hearts and
minds” of governments and populations. Civil Affairs operations provide economy of force and may help
to reduce friction and deter hostile acts that could necessitate employing conventional military forces.
Public Affairs (PA)

PA provides both internal and external audiences the unblemished truth regarding DoD activities and
military operations. It is a related activity of IO that may be used to amplify the effects of CA activities and
all of the IO capabilities except deception, as it is against DoD policy to use PA to support disinformation.
Public Affairs should be coordinated closely with PSYOP to ensure consistency of messages and with a
command’s OPSEC program to ensure that critical friendly information is not inadvertently revealed. PA
can be an effective means to reduce the effect of adversary propaganda.
Counterintelligence (CI)
CI is information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence
activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements
thereof, foreign organizations, foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. Counterintelligence is
an integral part of IO. CI is a critical part of any commander’s education, training and awareness program
for IO. CI helps protect critical information and informs friendly personnel as to an adversary’s capabilities
and methodologies for collecting that information.
Counter-deception
Counter-deception includes those efforts to negate, neutralize, diminish the effects of, or gain advantage
from a foreign deception operation. Counter-deception does not include the intelligence function of
identifying foreign deception operations.
I-6
Counter-propaganda
Counter-propaganda activities identifying adversary propaganda contribute to situational awareness, and
serve to expose adversary attempts to influence friendly populations and military forces. Counter-
propaganda consists of specific PSYOP and/or Public Affairs activities aimed at countering hostile
PSYOP or propaganda directed towards the United States, its allies or coalition partners, their individual
and collective military forces, and friendly populations. Counter-propaganda activities must be carefully
formulated and closely coordinated between the joint force commander’s PSYOP and Public Affairs
organizations. In many cases, the correct response to hostile PSYOP or propaganda may be to totally
ignore it so as to avoid lending it credibility. In other instances, direct PSYOP and/or Public Affairs
messages may be developed to counter an adversary’s misinformation. The ultimate decision on how
best to respond will rest with the joint force commander based upon recommendations developed through
the close coordination of the IO Cell and the supporting PSYOP unit or Joint PSYOP Task Force
(JPOTF).
Information Assurance (IA)

IA protects and defends information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity,
identification and authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This includes providing for the
restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. IA
employs technologies and processes such as multilevel security, access controls, secure network
servers, and intrusion detection software. IA responsibility lies mainly within the realm of the J6
Communications Staff Officer and is not discussed in detail in this Handbook.
IO Objectives, Tasks, MOEs and Concept of Operations
Purpose
This section attempts to standardize critical attributes of key concepts that are taught at the Joint
Command, Control and Information Warfare School. The intent is to capture and incorporate best
practices into our classes. The following lays out a methodology for writing IO Objectives, tasks, MOEs
and the IO Concept of Operations. This section is a draft version. Comments are invited.
Background
The Joint Targeting School states: In the implementation of plans, objectives drive targeting. More
specifically, objectives determine the priorities for the targeting effort, establish restrictions for the
employment of forces, and provide damage criteria. In addition, objectives influence intelligence
requirements. Therefore, collection, exploitation and production efforts must be focused on the
objectives. Specific objectives are derived from broader campaign objectives that are, in turn, derived
from military strategy.
Objective Characteristics. A good, specific objective must be observable, be achievable (or attainable)
and be quantifiable (or measurable).
• Observable. The objective must strive for some visible change in an adversary’s behavior.
• Achievable. The assets and time available are sufficient to accomplish the objective.
• Quantifiable. The change in adversary behavior must be related to some quantifiable end goal.
The following nine questions should be answered when defining an objective:
1) What do we want to do? The specific goal (rather than a generalized or notional goal) must be
identified. For example, do we wish to modify the behavior of a political leader, military forces,
the civilian population, or any combination of the three?
2) Against whom? Identify the adversary activity that is to be affected, changed or modified.
I-7
3) How do we want to achieve the objective? Think of all the capabilities and related activities of IO.
In most cases, two can be combined.
4) Why do we want to achieve the objective? There is always a “why.” Not understanding the “why”
may result in analysis and recommendations that neither meet the commander’s needs nor are
effective as they could or should be.
5) How much (to what degree) do we want to affect adversary activity? State any criteria against
which progress and success will be measured. Criteria must use quantifiable terms and be
realistic.
6) Establishing measures of performance. Avoid the use of absolutes that are neither realistic nor
achievable.
7) When and for how long do we want to impact the objective?
8) Where do we want to affect adversary activity?
9) How much will it cost to achieve the objective and is it worth the cost?
How to Write an IO Objective

Writing an IO Objective is a 3-step process and it follows the EFFECT + TARGET + PURPOSE format.
Step 1: Determine the Effect You Want to Achieve
The effect is a clearly defined activity that you want individuals or organizations to achieve. The list to
choose from is provided with definitions in Annex B: IO Effects Definitions. If you decide to use another
“effect” word, you must define it to avoid confusion.
Step 2: Choose the Target
JIOC target categories are as follows:
• Hardware (e.g. physical targets such as C3 facilities, information systems, etc.)

• Software (e.g. programs that run on computers)
• Wetware (e.g. military and political decision makers, population groups)
• Information
Targets can also be grouped as follows:
• The physical space (e.g. traditional fixed and mobile targets)

• The electronic space (e.g. the airwaves, data that moves on the Internet and GCCS)
• The perception space (e.g. the decision making processes of military and political decision
makers and population groups)
Step 3: Determine the Purpose
The purpose is the “why” we want to achieve this objective. Just like kinetic targeting, every objective has
a “why.” By clearly stating the why, the IO planner ensures the linkage of the objective to an operational
reason. The purpose portion starts off with the phase “in order to” and then adds one of the following
words with an elaboration:
For example:
“In order to (choose one of the words from below) the (write why we are doing this).”
• Allow
• Cause
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• Create
• Enable
• Support
NOTE: The purpose in the IO objective statement can be omitted if the purpose of the objective is
glaringly obvious. For example, if the objective is “Deter NLAM aggression”, you might not need to write
out the purpose of the objective.
Examples of Good IO Objectives
To be promulgated
How to Write an IO Task

An IO task is a plain language statement that tells what the IO capability or related element is going to do
to support the accomplishment of the objective. The format for writing a task is EFFECT + TARGET +
PURPOSE + ELEMENT.
Step 1: Identify the Target
Identify the target. The IO planner needs to ID the critical node(s), decision-maker(s) or group(s) that the
IO capability or related activity is going to execute this task against.
Step 2: Identify the Effect
Identify the effect you want to achieve against this target. This will not necessarily match up with the
effect found in the IO objective. For example, to influence someone, you might expose something,
destroy something and destroy something else.
Step 3: Select the IO Capability or Related Activity
Select the IO capability or related activity that best achieves the effect you want to achieve with
regards to the target. The phrasing portion of the statement starts off with “by employing (fill in the IO
capability or related activity).”
Step 4: Fill in the “why” you are doing this task
This is normally a direct lift from the “why” found in the IO Objective statement.
Step 5: Putting it All Together
Remembering the format, EFFECT + TARGET + PURPOSE + ELEMENT, the IO task statement would
look like this:
(Fill in the effect you want to achieve) (fill the target statement) in order to (fill in the purpose) by
employing (fill in the IO capability or related activity).
Examples of IO Tasks
I-9
To be promulgated
How to Write an IO Measure of Effectiveness (MOE)

Step 1: Develop the MOE
Develop the MOE. An IO MOE is a statement that accomplishes the IO Objective you want to achieve.
The format is TARGET + EFFECT + PURPOSE. An IO MOE would look like this:
(Fill in the IO target) is (fill in the effect) (fill in the purpose).
This follows the JOPES format on how to write an MOE.
Step 2: Develop Potential Indicators
Develop potential indicators. Developing the MOE is the easy part. The harder part is to develop
indicators. Indicators are quantifiable signs that measure the progress of achieving the objective. The IO
planner should war game potential indicators that will assist in measuring the effectiveness of the IO
objective. This is normally done in conjunction with the J2 rep to the IO cell and other members of the
IOWG. The purpose of developing indicators is to:
1) Assist the J2 in determining intelligence collection requirements.
2) Focus the other members of the staff and the components to potential collection requirements.
3) Establish a baseline of activity from which success or lack of progress can be measured. All
MOEs have a baseline of activity from which to measure progress.
Indicators are physically quantifiable, e.g. the number of people who voted, the number of defectors
during a given period, or the functional, physical and target systems Battle Damage Assessment of fixed
and mobile targets.
The bottom line is that the J2 gets paid the big bucks to make assessments of the adversary’s future
intentions. The IO cell’s job is to make known your intelligence requirements and establish a mechanism
for tracking progress on accomplishing your objectives.
Examples of IO MOEs and Indicators
To be promulgated
How to Write an IO Concept of Operations

After you have finished with the Objectives, Tasks and MOEs, you can write the IO Concept of
Operations.
The IO Concept of Operations is a written statement that gives an overall picture of how IO will support
the operation. JOPES says that the IO planner should summarize how the commander visualizes the
execution of IO from the beginning to termination. Describe how IO will support the command’s
operational mission. Summarize the concepts for supervision and termination of IO. The concept of
operations may be a single paragraph or divided into two or more paragraphs depending on the
complexity of the operation. The concepts for offensive and defensive IO may be addressed in separate
paragraphs.
The following is one way to write an IO Conception of Operations:
I-10
To be promulgated
Summarize the JFC’s Purpose for the Operation or Phase

This is found in the first part of the JFC’s Intent paragraph.
State in general terms how IO will support the overall concept of operations / phase. This statement
should focus of the “what” (effects), not the “who” (IO capabilities and related activities). This portion of
the paragraph starts with “IO will support this by ___________.”
Summarize the JFC’s endstate for the operation or termination criteria for the phase.
POC for this draft section is LTC Boyd Gaines, DSN 646-6321.
I-11
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I-12
Chapter II – Organizing a Staff for Information Operations
The Information Operations Cell

A fully functional IO Cell integrates a broad range of potential IO actions and activities that contribute to
fulfilling the Joint Force Commander’s (JFC) objectives, guidance and intent (Purpose, Method, and End
State) within a Joint Operations Area (JOA). Ensuring that IO is an integral part of all joint military operations
requires extensive planning and coordination among all the elements of the staff. The IO cell is formed from
representatives from each staff element, component and supporting agencies responsible for integrating IO
capabilities and related activities into the overall campaign plan at a particular level of command. Care should
be taken to tailor the size and structure of the cell to meet the needs of the mission and Commander’s Intent.
Cells that are too large and over-manned can be just as detrimental to the success of the mission as those
that are undermanned. There are typically 3-6 resident members in a C/C IO Cell. During deliberate planning,
the IO cell chief will convene from time to time an Information Operations Working Group (IOWG). The
purpose of the IOWG is discussed later in this chapter. Below shows the doctrinal view of a Joint IO cell.
Typical Joint IO Cell

Joint
OPSEC
J-3 J2
Program
Military
Deception J5
Planners OPSEC J2 Rep
Program Rep
J5 Rep J6
Military J6 Rep
JPOTF Deception Rep J7
J7 Rep
PSYOP IO Officer PAO
Rep PAO Rep
EW
Planners EWO Legal Rep Staff Judge
Info Atk
Info Atk Rep IO Cell CISO
Advocate
Planners CI
STO Rep Program
Civil Affairs
STO Sp Ops Rep
CELL Targeting Component CA
Rep Reps Program
Other
JSOTF Rep / LNO
Targeting Service
Cell Components
Other
CISO Counterintelligence Support Officer PAO Public Affairs Officer

PSYOP Psychological Operations
JPOTF Joint Psychological Operations Task Force STO Special Technical Operations
OPSEC Operations Security
The size and composition of the IO Cell is determined by the scope of the operation. The J3 must decide on
which members will be resident (permanent) on the cell and which will be non-resident (on-call). Lessons
learned from Operation ALLIED FORCE called for the re-organization of the IO cell into functional areas. The
following graphic shows a possible IO cell organization during crisis.
II-1
IO Cell During Crisis

CINC IO Cell Chief*
IO Augment
Total Personnel: 25
Deputy
NCOIC IO Cell Chief*
PERCEPTION CNO TEAM

INTEL SUPPORT PHYSICAL
MANAGEMENT EFFECTS Team Leader:
TEAM
TEAM TEAM CNO Officer
Team Leader:
Team Leader: Team Leader:
Intel Sup Officer
Joint IO Plans Officer* CNO NCOIC
Joint IO Plans Officer*
PSYOP Officer Intel Sup NCO CNO NCO
EW Planner
Deception Officer
Targeteer WATCH TEAMS
PA Officer
JWAC Targeteer Port
*Special Technical
CA Officer STO Planner* Starboard
Operations
OPSEC Planner
4
The Commander normally assigns responsibilities for IO to the Operations Officer (or J3). To assist the J3 in
exercising joint IO responsibilities, the J3 may also appoint an IO officer as the IO Cell Chief. Some of the
generic responsibilities of the IO officer and IO cell resident members are listed below.
The J3, by doctrine, is responsible for integrating and synchronizing IO with all other elements of the
operation. To assist the J3 in exercising joint IO responsibilities, the J3 usually appoints an IO officer as the IO
Cell Chief. Some of the generic responsibilities of the IO officer and IO cell resident members are listed below.
Information Operations Cell Chief

Plans, coordinates, and integrates IO capabilities and activities among the various subordinate elements of a
command. A key to the success of the IO Cell is the success of the IO officer in integrating the commander's
guidance into planning meetings and directly facilitating coordination between the components. Additional
specific responsibilities include:
• Coordinating the overall IO effort for the command.

• Coordinating IO issues within the C/C’s staff and counterpart IO planners on the component staffs.
• Coordinating IO defensive and offensive concepts to support the commander's intent and concept of
operations.
• Establishing priorities to accomplish IO objectives.
• Determining the availability of resources to carry out IO plans.
• Recommending tasking to the J3 for joint organizations that plan and supervise the various capabilities
and related activities to be utilized. Consolidated J3 tasking ensures efficiency of effort in planning
and executing integrated IO.
• Serving as the primary “advocate” for IO targets nominated for attack throughout the target nomination
and review process established by the commander.
• Coordinating intelligence and assessment support to IO.
• Coordinating IO inputs from joint centers and agencies.
• Coordinating liaison with outside organizations such as the Joint Information Operations Center
(JIOC), Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) etc.
• Assist the J3 in integrating STO capabilities.
II-2
IO Cell Responsibilities
Intelligence Support Team
• Serve as the IO point of contact for all IO related intelligence requirements.
• Provide the IO cell the following information: (Note: This list is not all inclusive)
o Identify key adversary decision makers, both military and non-military. This may include
human factors analysis studies
o Identify the adversary’s information infrastructure and its critical vulnerabilities.
o Identify the adversary’s offensive IO capabilities and potential IO courses of action against the
Joint Force
o Identify adversary IO vulnerabilities
o Provide Psychological Operations profiles of adversary countries and population groups
• Serve as the IO red team cell chief during cell war games
Perception Management Team
• Provide dedicated IO planning support to the Joint Planning Group (JPG). Other planners (STO,
CNO, OPSEC, Deception, etc.) will support as required.
• Develop an IO plan that supports the selected COA.
• Write, with input from everyone, the IO appendix to the Operations annex.
• During crisis, coordinate with appropriate staff element (such as the Joint Fires Element) to provide
daily input into the targeting objectives and guidance promulgated to the components.
• Develop Measures of Effectiveness that support the accomplishment of stated IO objectives. In
conjunction with the J2 and J3 campaign analysis cell (if used), conduct assessment of the impact of
IO throughout the course of the operation.
• Host the daily IOWG
Physical Effects Team
• Develop a target plan (both non-lethal and lethal) that will support the accomplishment of the IO
objectives. Integrate all elements and related activities into the plan.
• Responsible for ensuring IO targets and activities are integrated into the joint targeting process. This
includes:
o Nominate targets as required for attack through the appropriate J3 staff element (such as the
JFE).
o Nominate targets as required for inclusion on the restricted and prohibited target lists to the
appropriate J2 or J3 staff element.
o Develop IO input to the daily Joint Targeting Coordination Board.
o Assist in developing MOEs.
Computer Network Operations Team
• Coordinate CNO actions that will support the overall JTF concept of operations.
• Assist the J6 and other staff sections a consolidated list of information networks and activities that
need to be protected
• Coordinate with higher headquarters for CNA options. De-conflict and integrate any planned CNA
actions with other elements of the operation.
Special Technical Operations
• Coordinate, de-conflict and synchronize any planned STO with all other elements of the operation.
Watch Standers
• Stationed in the Joint Operations Center (JOC).
• Monitor activities in the JOC that could impact on the IO plan and report them to the IO cell.
• Consolidate IO input to SITREPs as required and provide them to the JOC chief.
• Perform duties as required by the JOC chief.
PSYOP Planner
• Integrates PSYOP planning with other perception management activities.
II-3
• Member of the Perception Management Team.

Public Affairs Planner
• Coordinates media interface ensuring that press releases, etc. do not conflict with the JTF
Commander’s intent.
• Provides IO cell with analysis of open source media with regards to the current operation.
Civil Affairs Planner
• Provides the IO cell updates on what the IO, NGO and PVO organizations are doing in the AOR.
• Ensures consistency of CA activities in support of the IO objectives.
Information Coordination Board

The purpose of the Information Coordination Board (ICB) is to synchronize all the information flowing within
the headquarters and subordinate elements, ensuring all the information released from the headquarters are
complementary of each other, in consonance with the overall commander’s intent and information themes, and
focused on the critical audiences. This optional board is convened by the J3 upon the recommendation of the
IO cell chief.
Usually, chaired by the J3 (or representative) with participation from J2, J3, J7, PA, IO (especially PSYOP),
SJA, Political-Military Section, and political-military advisor (POLAD). This board should meet as required –
initially on a daily, scheduled basis.
Information Operations Working Group (IOWG)

The purpose of the Information Operations Working Group (IOWG) is to coordinate the Information Operations
activities across the staff, and synchronize activities and actions with higher headquarters and the
components. The IO cell chief needs to establish the requirement for an IOWG and ensure it is included the
Joint Force staff battle rhythm. By including the IOWG into the battle rhythm, it by necessity will be de-
conflicted with other staff meetings and will facilitate attendance by LNOs and other members of the staff.
The placement of the IOWG into the staff battle rhythm is predicated on when the higher headquarters IO VTC
(if any) is scheduled, as well as when the deliverables are due to other staff sections or components.
The IO cell chief with the approval of the J3 sets the agenda of the IOWG. A typical agenda is a follows:
• Current Operations Update

• Future Operations Update
• Future Plans Update
• Review Status of Previous Taskers
• Review of actions of the IO cell by discipline
• Review of actions by higher headquarters and components
• Determination of future IO cell actions
The deliverables of an IO cell vary. Normally, during a planning evolution, the focus will be supported the J5
or Joint Planning Group (JPG). During crisis, the IO cell will be responding to variety of internally and
externally generated tasking.
II-4
Targeting Integration
Joint Targeting Process IW

IW
Objectives,
Guidance, &
Intent
Target
Combat Development,
Assessment Validation,
Nomination &
Priorization
Mission Capabilities
Planning & / Force Analysis
Execution
Cdr’s Decision &
Force
Assignment JP 3-0
The joint targeting process (See above) is the process used by the Information Operations Cell.
Methodology
The joint targeting process as described in Joint Pub 3-09 and Joint Pub 3-0 is a six-step process: Objectives,
Guidance and Intent, Target Development, Validation, Nomination, and Prioritization, Capabilities Analysis
(Weaponeering), Commanders Decision and Force Assignment, Mission Planning and Force Execution, and
Combat Assessment. The associated functions of each step are accomplished at a variety of levels, from
national organizations down to tactical units. The primary responsibility for targeting at the operational level of
war resides with JTF, if designated. The JFC’s objectives, guidance and intent direct and focus operational
planning and targeting to support the concept of operations.
a. Objectives, Guidance and Intent. The development and dissemination of objectives, guidance and
intent marks the first step in the target process and is arguably the most critical. Objectives and
guidance must identify what is to be achieved and under what conditions and parameters the end is
pursued. That is, objectives and guidance must clearly spell out the task, purpose and measurable
endstate of targeting process to the overall campaign plan. An objective must be observable,
attainable, and measurable. Part and parcel with the development of objectives, the IO planner must
develop Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) and indicators to guide the intelligence collection effort and
combat assessment when the plan is executed. Lastly the JFC’s Intent is continually checked to
ensure that the objectives and guidance match the end state of the operation.
b. Target Development, Validation, Nomination, and Prioritization. During the first part of this
process the target development is done by a collaborated operations, intelligence and interagency
team that identifies a variety of “effects based” options to the warfighter. Effects based targeting is the
method that identifies the most efficient set of targets that produces a specific effect consistent with
the JFC’s objectives. Targets can be physical (fixed or mobile), electronic (e.g. links between
communications systems) or perception (influencing key decision makers). Targets nominated for
inclusion on the Joint Target List (JTL) need to be validated by the Intelligence Community and the
Supported C/C. Once targets are validated, the IO cell for attack can nominate them. Normally,
physical targets are forwarded to the Guidance, Apportionment and Targeting (GAT) cell located at the
II-5
Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC) where they are “racked and stacked” in accordance with the
priorities set forth by the JFC. During this meeting, all of the component and JTF target nominations
are rank-ordered in accordance with CJTF targeting guidance and priorities. The cut line (a staff
estimate of which targets are mostly likely to be attacked based upon the number of fully mission
capable aircraft available for that ATO day) is then established in accordance with the JTF
Commander’s apportionment recommendation. The end result of this meeting is a draft Joint
Integrated Prioritized Target List (JIPTL). This list of targets is normally forwarded to the Joint Force
Headquarters to be reviewed by the Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB) for approval. The
JTCB is a decision making board, normally chaired by the Deputy Joint Force Commander. The IO
cell chief and PSYOP LNO should have a seat at the table for the JTCB. The JTCB Chairman
normally will ask the board members for comments concerning the JIPTL and then takes a voice vote
of concurrence or non-concurrence. To ensure this is a meaningful vote, it is essential the component
liaison elements (including the IO rep) at the JAOC keep their commanders, staffs, and JTCB board
members aware of the status of their target nominations as the GAT process progresses. The JFACC
staff (Combat Plans Division) uses the approved JIPTL to develop the Master Air Attack Plan (MAAP)
and then to issue the Air Tasking Order (ATO).
c. Capabilities Analysis (Weaponeering). Weaponeering (or weapons pairing) is the process whereby
the number and type of munitions needed to achieve a specific effect against a target is determined.
Weaponeering takes into account target vulnerabilities, weapons effects and reliability, delivery
accuracy, delivery conditions, and damage criteria. The process of weaponeering is equally
applicable to the employment of both lethal and non-lethal weapons.
d. Commanders Decision and Force Assignment. During the force assignment step, lethal and/or
non-lethal forces are selected for a particular joint attack. Component commanders – in accordance
with the JFC’s guidance – conduct force application planning to fuse target, weapon system,
munitions, and non-lethal force options together. This step results in the coordinated selection of
forces and associated weapons systems or platforms.
e. Execution. During the execution planning/force execution step, component staffs prepare input for
and support the actual tasking, construction and subsequent execution of missions for weapons
systems. The input includes all data concerning the target, the weaponeering calculations,
employment parameters, and tactics.
f. Combat Assessment. During this step, component staffs determine whether or not the effectiveness
that particular cycle’s joint fires. There are three components to combat assessment: battle damage
assessment (BDA), munitions effectiveness assessment (MEA), and re-attack recommendations.
MEA concerns the actual performance of the weapon during the attack. BDA consists of three
phases: Physical, functional and target system analysis. Phase I BDA, or physical damage
assessment, is the initial assessment on whether or not the munition hit the target. This accomplished
by looking at the Cockpit video, imagery analysis and pilot debriefing. Phase II BDA, or functional
damage assessment, is the combining of Phase I BDA with other intelligence reports to determine if
the activity or installation is still functioning. Phase III BDA, or target system analysis, is the
intelligence assessment on the impact of the target system (e.g. IADS, telecommunications, POL) as a
whole. Finally staffs prepare re-attack recommendations after analyzing desired effects against BDA
and MEA.
Finally, the IO cell needs to be aware that not all IO activities will fit neatly into the ATO time line. For
example, Computer Network Attack (CNA) and Special Technical Operations (STO) will certainly need to be
integrated and synchronized with the ATO process. CNA and STO have their own timelines and approval
processes. Additionally, PSYOP product approval and dissemination can take anywhere from a few days to
weeks to implement.
Lists related to targeting

• Joint Target List (JTL) – The master target list of all targets in the area of operations. Normally
maintained by the J2.
II-6
• Prohibited Target List – Targets such as churches, schools, hospitals, or special interest facilities,
which planners do not want to target or damage.
• Restricted Target List – Targets that cannot be attacked unless coordinated with the established
agency or component. Typical type targets include communications sites that have Intelligence Gain /
Loss (IGL) concerns and fixed facilities that the friendly force intends to use in the future and does not
want struck.
• Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List (JIPTL) – A prioritized list of targets that need to be acted on to
meet the JFC’s overall objective.
• High Payoff Target List (HPTL) – Categorized and prioritized list, including lethal and non-lethal
means, sent to components as guidance.
• Joint Restricted Frequency List – Deconflicts friendly use of the RF spectrum.
External Augmentation
Resident expertise on the IO staff can always use augmentation. As such, knowledge of organizations
external to your staff can provide that expertise. The following is a short list of some of the more significant
organizations available to JTFs.
• Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC). The JIOC supports the integration of OPSEC,
PSYOP, military deception, EW and destruction throughout the planning and execution phases of
operations. They also provide direct support to unified commands, JTFs, functional and service
components, and subordinate combat commanders. Manning includes specialized expertise in C2
systems engineering, operational applications, capabilities and vulnerabilities.
o URL: http://www.jiolink.jioc.smil.mil
• Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC). The JWAC provides support for analysis of engineering data
and scientific data. This data is also integrated with intelligence data to support targeting.
o URL: http://www.jwac.jfcom.smil.mil
• Joint Program Office for Special Technology Countermeasures (JPO-STC). JPO-STC has the
ability to assess a command’s infrastructure dependencies and the potential impact on operations
resulting from disruptions to key infrastructure components.
o URL: http://www.jpo-stc.nswcdd.navy.smil.mil/
• Joint COMSEC Monitoring Activity (JCMA). JCMA provides communications security monitoring
and analysis support.
o URL: http://www.nsa.smil.mil/producer/jcma/
• Joint Spectrum Center (JSC). The JSC maintains expertise in the following areas: spectrum
planning, electromagnetic compatibility/vulnerability, electromagnetic environmental effects,
information systems, modeling and simulation, operations support, and system acquisition to provide
spectrum-related services to the CINCs, military services and other governmental organizations.
o URL: http://jsc.js.smil.mil
• Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE). The JCSE is a JCS asset designed to provide
tactical / operational communications support to a JTF. They also provide planners to assist to
developing communications structures.
o URL: http://jcse.nmcc.smil.mil/
• USJFCOM Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC). USJFCOM’s JWFC, in conjunction with the Joint
Training, Analysis, and Simulation Center (JTASC), provides training support to C/C staffs and Joint
and Combined JTF’s. In addition to providing Computer Assisted Simulation exercises in support of
warfighters, they also provide deployable training team support to real world operations.
o URL: http://www.jwfc.jfcom.smil.mil/
II-7
• Joint Command, Control and Information Warfare School (JCIWS), Joint Forces Staff College.
The JCIWS offers three courses that are essential for educating the personnel of an IO Cell. The
“Joint Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence Staff and Operations Course"
(JC4ISOC) covers topics such as: fundamentals of command and control, fundamentals of
communications, national emergency management system, national military command organization,
orbital mechanics, C4I for the warrior, and the Global Command and Control System (GCCS). The
Joint Information Warfare Staff and Operations Course (JIWSOC) approaches IO as a broad,
integrating strategy in accordance with Joint Publication 3-13 (Information Operations). The course
focuses on national IO organization, offensive and defensive information warfare, critical infrastructure
protection, IO planning and execution, computer network attack, Information Assurance, and service
component IW capabilities. The Joint Information Operations Planning Course (JIOPC) offers an in-
depth look at IO planning using the Joint IO Planning Process developed by the JIOC.
o URL: http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/jciws/jciws.htm
• U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) – USSPACECOM provides Computer Network Defense

(CND) and Computer Network Attack (CNA) support for the DoD. The CND mission is executed
through the JTF for Computer Network Operations (JTF-CNO). Each military service has a
component Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) subordinate to the JTF-CNO.
o URL: http://www.usspace.spacecom.smil.mil
• Air Force Information Warfare Center (AFIWC). AFIWC develops, maintains and deploys
information warfare/command and control warfare capabilities in support of operations, campaign
planning, acquisition and testing. Providing technical expertise for computer and communications
security, AFIWC is the focal point for tactical deception and operations security training. AFIWC
provides the U.S. Air Force component of the JTF-CNO.
o URL: http://www.afiwc.aia.kelly.af.smil.mil
• Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA). LIWA provides Information Operations support to Army
units and Army headquarters designated as JTF headquarters. Its focus is on field support teams that
deploy worldwide to support U.S. Army operations. LIWA also provides the Army component of the
JTF-CNO.
o URL: http://www.liwa.army.smil.mil
• Fleet Information Warfare Center (FIWC). FIWC provides IW support to Navy and Marine Corps
units worldwide. Its focus is providing training support and personnel augmentation to the IW staff of
aircraft carrier battle groups and monitoring U.S. Navy computer networks.
o URL: http://www.fiwc.navy.smil.mil
II-8
Chapter III – Planning Joint Task Force Information

Operations: Integrating Information Operations in the Staff
Planning Process
“Master the mechanics and techniques; understand the art and profession; and
be smart enough to know when to deviate from it.”
GEN Zinni, CINCCENT
Information Operations Planning

The figure below depicts some of the “mechanics and techniques” of joint planning which GEN Zinni
refers to in the above quote. This is a dynamic process that requires close cooperation and involvement
between the C/C and staff and is proportionally more efficient with greater Commander involvement. This
process is used in crisis action planning by a JTF and interfaces with the strategic level Crisis Action
Planning (CAP) process used by the C/C and the SECDEF. To be successful, IO planning must be
integrated into this process. The following pages provide a summary of how IO planning should
parallel the overall JTF planning process. Annex A provides more details about IO planning (including
planning considerations for each IO capability and related activity).
C/C Staff C/C

Mission Mission
Analysis Analysis
Mission
Review Analysis
Situation
Brief
Planning
Warning Guidance
Orders
Staff COA
COA
Estimate
Development Development
Process Continuous
COA COA
Analysis Analysis
COA COA
Comparison Comparison
COA
Decision
Brief
COA
Selection
Plan or
Plan/Order
Order Commander’s
Development
Estimate to
Conduct CINC
Rehearsals
III-1
IO Planning CJTF’s Actions

Mission
from CINC
Determine known facts, current status, and Conduct CJTF mission analysis.
conditions of IO capabilities
Develop assumptions to replace missing facts As appropriate, provide:
Analyze CINC’s mission and intent from an IO
• Guidance as a result of direct
perspective
interaction with the CINC
Determine IO limitations
Develop enemy and own IO centers of gravity and
• Amount of time for the staff to
decisive points conduct mission analysis
Identify tasks (specified, implied and subsidiary) for • Areas/topics for special emphasis
Mission IO forces during the staff’s mission analysis
Analysis Analyze initial IO force structure requirements • Operational centers of gravity (own
(Page A-1) Assess initial IO risks and enemy’s). Guidance for the
Determine the IO objectives/end state JIPB process.
Assist in developing the JTF’s mission statement • Any Commander’s Critical
Present IO aspects of the mission analysis brief
Information Requirements (CCIRs)
Mission
Analysis
Brief
Guidance focuses the staff and As appropriate, provide:
components’ planning efforts • Comments of approval/additions/deletions
The degree of specificity depends on concerning the staff’s mission analysis
time available, staff’s proficiency, and • Initial Commander’s intent (purpose,
the amount of flexibility the CINC has method, end state)
provided • Priority of planning effort
Guidance is provided throughout the • Ranges of COAs to be developed and
planning process, but this is a good those that should not be developed
time for formal guidance
• Sequencing guidance (simultaneous or
Initial After mission analysis briefing, ensure
IO aspects are included in the
sequential employments, etc.)
Planning
Commander's Guidance • Command and control guidance:
Guidance
(Page A-2)
àJTF organization
àJTF command relationships
àRelationships with other U.S.
Government agencies/NGOs/other
nations
• Concepts of force closure (gradual vs
rapid, early vs. late “presence”)
• Battlespace geometry guidance
• Information Operations guidance
• Topics to be included in a warning order
• Revised/new CCIRs
III-2
Initial
Planning
Guidance IO Planning CJTF’s Actions
Review mission analysis and CJTF’s

As appropriate, provide:
guidance on IO • Tasks for components
Provide IO options that answer: • Definition of the “main effort” (by
à What IO tasks are to be accomplished? phase, etc.)
à Who (type of forces) will execute the • Priority of fires
tasks? • Priorities of protection (e.g., defended
à When are the IO tasks to occur? assets list)
à Where are the IO tasks to occur? • Transportation lift priorities
à Why will each force conduct its part of the • Size of desired JTF reserve
operation? • Rules of engagement (ROE) guidance
• Modified/refined commander’s intent
à How will the JTF employ the IO
(purpose/method/end state)
COA capabilities to accomplish the tasks?
• Guidance on acceptable risks
Development All valid IO options should be suitable, • COA selection criteria
(Page A-3) feasible, acceptable, varied, and complete
• Type of “Commander’s Estimate” to be
Coordinate ROE with the SJA/J3
presented to the CINC (e.g., briefing,
Recommend options for IO command and
message, VTC, etc.)
control
• Any specific topics to be included in a
Promulgate in a warning order (optional)
warning order (if sent)
• Desired location of the Headquarters
• Refined/new CCIRs
• Refined Commander’s Intent
Warning
Order (Optional)
Serves to amplify the initial COAs, show As appropriate, provide:

strengths and weaknesses, and further identify • Priorities of the war gaming effort:
elements of execution of the COAs Which adversary COAs to war game
à
The adversary’s most likely and most Order of friendly COAs to war game
à
dangerous COAs should be used to war game Key events to war game (e.g.,
à
COA the friendly COAs employment actions)
Analysis Wargame the actions of the JTF two command Time allowed for war game (base on
à
(Page A-4) levels down for increased fidelity when a decision is required).
Should help to synchronize JTF component • Additional guidance and decisions as
actions required throughout the war game
• Revised/new CCIRs
III-3
COA
Analysis IO Planning CJTF’s Actions
(Wargaming)
Determine comparison criteria. Good sources

include:
• Additional comparison criteria
àCINC’s intent statement
(any supplements to the criteria
àCJTF’s intent statement
already provided to the staff
àSignificant factors relating to the operation (e.g.
need for speed, security, etc.)
through the Commander’s Intent
COA
àPrincipal staff members’ own factors
statement or other means)
Comparison • Additional guidance and
(Page A-4) àPrinciples of War
decisions as required
àElements of operational art. Compare each
friendly COA with enemy COAs IAW the • Refined/new CCIRs
comparison criteria
Determine which COA has the highest possibility
for successful accomplishment of the mission.
Provides a staff briefing in which the following As appropriate, provide:

should be presented: • Comments of approval, additions,
àKnown threat situation deletions, etc. concerning the staff’s
àCurrent friendly situation COA recommendations
àCINC’s mission and intent statements • Results of CJTF’s own COA
àCJTF’s mission and intent statements comparisons
COA àAny changes to assumptions, limitations, • Decision on final COA to be
Selection centers of gravity, etc. developed into the OPLAN/OPORD
(Page A-4)
àCOA statements/sketches • Decision on branches/sequels to be
àResults of the war games (including developed (provide priority of
recommended branches/sequels) planning)
àCOA comparisons • Final guidance on the type of
àRecommended COA “Commander’s Estimate” to be
Brief recommended COA to CJTF. presented to the CINC (e.g., briefing,
Prepare Commander’s Estimate document. message, VTC, etc)
• Final guidance on the type, location,
and time for the back-briefs and
rehearsals
• Refined/new CCIRs
COA Commander’s
Decision Estimate to
Brief CINC
III-4
COA IO Planning CJTF’s Actions

Selection
• Approval of final mission statement and
Provide format for order/plan
Commander’s Intent paragraph
Determine who is responsible for the
“base plan” and the various annexes of • Guidance on obtaining and exercising
the OPORD logistics “directive authority” for support
Write the OPORD • Guidance on combat identification
Develop the Time-Phased Force measures
Deployment Data (TPFDD) • Guidance on force protection policies
• Succession of command guidance
OPORD • Direction on whether OPORD formats will
& TPFDD be standardized throughout the JTF (i.e.,
Development will JOPES be mandated for the
components?)
• Guidance concerning when to assume
responsibility for the Joint Operations
Area
• Lift priorities based on the concept of
operations.
Brief/obtain approval for the final draft As appropriate, provide:

OPORD • Comments of approval, additions,
Brief OPORD to components/other staff deletions, etc. concerning the final
Publish/transmit final draft OPORD
draft OPORD
Obtain component supporting plans
• Final determination of scope and
Issue / Conduct crosswalks and backbriefs as
directed content of desired back-briefs
Synchronize
OPORD Modify OPORD as necessary and • Comments of approval, additions,
publish/transmit deletions, etc. concerning the
presentation of the back-briefs
• Approval of the final OPORD
OPORD
Prepare for rehearsals: As appropriate, provide:

àDetermine type • Final guidance on type of
Rehearsal àDetermine roles/responsibilities of rehearsal desired
participants • Approval of any changes to the
àAssemble personnel plan
Conduct rehearsals
III-5
Intelligence Support
Intelligence support is critical to the planning and execution of an effective IO campaign. Intelligence
support to IO may require significant lead-time; consequently, early coordination must be established
between the IO cell and the J2 staff. Intelligence data produced by the joint Intelligence Preparation of
the Battlespace (IPB) process must be readily available on a near real-time basis. Intelligence
information systems collect, process, disseminate, and display data that is essential to the IO cell. All
members of the IO cell should understand the sources and methods of intelligence support to fully utilize
the capabilities of the J2 staff and the intelligence community.
Offensive Information Operations

Intelligence to support offensive IO requires: knowledge of the technical requirements of a wide array of
an adversary’s information systems; knowledge of political, economic, social, and cultural influences; the
ability to develop templates used to portray the battlespace and refine targets and methods for offensive
IO courses of action (COAs); an understanding of the adversary’s decision-making process; an in-depth
understanding of the biographical background and psychological makeup of key adversary leaders,
decision-makers, communicators and their advisors to include motivating factors and leadership style;
knowledge of the area of responsibility/joint operations area’s geographic, atmospheric, and littoral
influences on adversary and friendly operations; and knowledge of offensive IO measures of
effectiveness (MOE) in order to conduct effective assessment of the effectiveness of friendly offensive IO.
Defensive Information Operations

Intelligence to support defensive IO requires: knowledge of an adversary’s intelligence interests and
methods of intelligence collection; an understanding of the adversary to friendly information and
information systems posed by a particular adversary, including their intent and their known and assessed
capabilities; and an ability to provide indications and warning of impending offensive information
operations attacks by an adversary. The following is a sequential overview of intelligence support to IO
targeting:
• Identify system’s value, use, flow and vulnerabilities

• Identify specific targets
• Develop target set
• Determine most effective IO capabilities against that target
• Predict the consequences
• Perform a technology cost/benefit analysis for the IO tool to be used
• Monitor friendly Information Operations
• Establish assessment/feedback mechanisms
• Evaluate the outcome
• Provide battle damage assessment (BDA) for the IO
III-6
Chapter IV – Integrating Information Operations in JOPES

Deliberate/Crisis Action Planning/Execution on a Unified
Command Staff
This chapter is intended to be a basic introduction of the Joint Operational Planning and Execution
System (JOPES) using an IO-related example. It is based on materials from the JIWSOC IO Planning
class.
We will start with a brief discussion of theater engagement planning as an introduction. Then we will
spend most of the chapter focusing on IO in Deliberate Planning. Then we will look at Crisis Action
Planning only as it differs from Deliberate Planning.
Introduction
In this section, we will cover
• Basic IO policy
• Applicability of IO to theater engagement
• Provide some useful principles
• The “Strategy-to-Task” methodology
These slides are from the JIWSOC IO Planning Class. Exercise content of the following slides is for
instructional use only.
IV-1
DoD Policy on IO Planning
Policy: (U) DoD activities shall be organized,

trained, equipped, and supported to plan
and execute IO
-- DoD Directive S-3600.1
Goal: (U) The goal of IO is to secure peacetime
national security objectives, deter conflict,
protect DoD information systems, and to
shape the information environment.
-- DoD Directive S-3600.1
New DoD Directive 3600.1 is

out for signature
Why do we plan for IO?
DoD Directive S-3600.1 Information Operations is the basic policy document for IO in the DoD. It directs
us to plan IO for the goal shown here. IO, by its nature, lends itself to peacetime engagement. It has
therefore been incorporated into the Theater Security Cooperation Plans of the Regional CINCs.
As of the date of publication, the revised directive is out for final signature.
IV-2
Peacetime IO Engagement
Peacetime Information Engagement: The coordinated and synchronized

use of public affairs, civil affairs, military deception, PSYOP, OPSEC and
and other IO elements and capabilities to cause an adversary, through
perception management, to act in a manner favorable to U.S. objectives.
ELECTRONIC
}
OPSEC
WARFARE
CNA
and
Perception
PSYCHOLOGICAL
OPERATIONS + Destruction
as Management
Required
CIVIL AFFAIRS
MILITARY
PUBLIC AFFAIRS DECEPTION
This definition of “peacetime information engagement” was in one of the early draft versions of JP 3-13,
but was not included in the final version. We have retained it because of the importance of IO in
peacetime engagement. As you may surmise, CNA and Destruction are not key players in peacetime
due to legal constraints.
IV-3
Principles of IO Planning
Centralize Control
Objective
Speak with One Voice
Know the Target
Audience
Support a Principle
Don’t Raise Unattainable PRINCIPLES
Expectations OF Exploit the Opponent’s
INFORMATION Willingness to Compromise
CAMPAIGN
Leverage the Truth PLANNING
Strive to Win Local
Popular Support
Use Multiple Means to
Convey Information
Integrate and Synchronize Efforts
Identify Key Audiences,

Means and Methods
These are non-doctrinal principles of IO planning that we’ve developed through the school of hard knocks
with much input from C/C IO cells. The three highlighted principles are key to successful IO. Centralized
control is key. Speaking with one voice is the whole idea behind IPI and PDD-68. As you may
remember, objective is a principle of war as espoused by Clausewitz. Supporting a principle involves
working with a religious, moral or political theme appropriate with the target audience.
IV-4
Plan Objective
“War plans cover every aspect of a war,

and weave them all into a single operation
that must have a single, ultimate objective
in which all particular aims are reconciled.”
Carl Maria von Clausewitz
STRATEGY-TO-TASK
PLANNING METHODOLOGY
Under the principle of objective, all actions must ultimately support the objectives (desired end-
state/vision) of the Commander. To ensure we adhere to this principle, the IO community has adopted a
planning methodology called “Strategy-to-Task”. We will use this methodology extensively.
IV-5
“Strategy-to-Task” Methodology
Developed at Rand in the late 1980s
Initially used to justified AF resource

decisions by linking resources to
operational tasks to national strategy
Concept gradually modified and used in planning
The Strategy-to-Task Resource Management framework, developed at RAND during the late 1980s, is a
decision-support process for linking resources to the National Security Strategy. When used correctly,
the framework links resource decisions to specific military tasks that require resources, which in turn are
linked hierarchically to higher-level operational and national security objectives. The framework
establishes the downward connection from strategies to programs and tasks, as well as the upward
connection from tasks up through strategies.
IV-6
“Strategy-to-Task” Methodology
Enhance Our
National Security Objective Security
USPACOM Objective Maintain Regional

Peace & Stability
Defend South Korea

USFK Objective Using Combined
Forward Defense
Destroy Tactical
Operational Task Ballistic &
Cruise Missiles
Purchase B-1
Resource Decision Bombers
The “Strategy-to-Task” methodology was built like this.

The initial derivation was in reverse, and started with the resource decision to purchase B-1 bombers. In
a desire to link the bomber purchase to a national security objective, the authors looked for qualifying
operational tasks for which the bomber was suited. An example is shown. This was then linked to a
regional and then a C/C objective. The C/C objective was then linked to a national security objective.
Building the chain from the bottom up ensured that the thought process irrevocably linked national
security to the bomber purchase.
During the sales pitch for the bombers, the derivation of the linkages was presented from the top down.
IV-7
Remember!
Don’t forget to plan for

OPSEC and Deception!
Both OPSEC and Deception can easily be forgotten as planning goes on. There should be an active
planning element responsible for maintaining emphasis towards these important IO capabilities.
Theater Security Cooperation Plan
• The Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) in 1997

directed the regional Combatant Commanders to
document their peacetime engagement strategies
looking out five years “down the road”
• Since extended to seven years
• This allows IO the proper / necessary lead-time to
develop intelligence and do proper Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB)
• The degree to which IO has been used varies from
Combatant Commander to Combatant Commander –
IO can help shape a theater and thereby avoid conflict
• Where we need work is finding a way to seamlessly
link our peacetime engagement IO to the IO activities
written into our CONPLANs and OPLANs.
• Renamed in 2002 from Theater Engagement Plan
IV-8
Planning Basics
What Do Objective and Strategy Mean?
• Objective:
• Target
• Aim
• Goal
• Ends
• Answers the Question: What
• Strategy:
• Plan
• Method
• Means
• Answers the Question: How
Combatant Commander’s
Theater Strategy
A Combatant Commander’s strategy for attaining the the
U.S. national objectives for a country or region may be
stated in terms of IO as an integrating strategy.
Example: “I want to employ IO to help maintain WHAT
stability during the elections in Mandura and to assist in
the peaceful transition of government following the
elections. We will accomplish this by:
- Informing the public of the benefits of a HOW
democratically elected government
- Influencing potentially disruptive groups to refrain
from interfering with the election
- Reassuring the public of continuity of government and
public services during the post-election, transition
period.”
Now let’s take a close look at the strategy-to-task planning methodology. In the example shown here, the
C/C, as allowed by doctrine, has chosen to use IO as the main effort in formulating his peacetime
engagement strategy. In the example, the “what” portion is the C/C’s objective, and the “how” portion is
his strategy.
IV-9
What is a Concept of Operations?
• CJCSM 3122.03 (JOPES Vol II):

– Summarizes how the commander
visualizes execution of the
operation from beginning to end
– Describes how the IO will support

the command’s operational
mission
– Summarizes the concepts for

supervision and termination of IO
What is a Concept of Operations?
• Format:
– May be a single paragraph or divided into two or
more paragraphs depending on operation
complexity
– When an operation involves various phases, the

concept of operations should be prepared in sub-
paragraphs describing the role of IO in each
phase
– The concepts for IO-offense and IO-defense may

be addressed in separate sub-paragraphs
IV-10
Integrating IO in
Deliberate Planning
• IO is best suited to deliberate

planning due to the occasionally
long periods of time required to
develop sources and access to an
adversary’s information and
information systems
Plans
• Operation (OPLAN)
– Any plan, except for the SIOP, for the
conduct of military operations.
– Prepared in either a complete format
(OPLAN) or as a concept plan (CONPLAN)
IV-11
Plans
• Functional
– Plans involving the conduct of military
operations in a peacetime or permissive
environment developed by combatant
commanders to address requirements such
as disaster relief, nation assistance,
logistics, communications, surveillance,
protection of U.S. citizens, nuclear weapon
recovery and evacuation, and continuity of
operations or other discrete tasks.
Plans
• Concept (CONPLAN)
– An operation plan in an abbreviated
format that would require considerable
expansion or alteration to convert it into
an OPLAN or OPORD. A CONPLAN
contains the Combatant Commander’s
strategic concept and those annexes and
appendices deemed necessary by the
combatant commander to complete
planning.
• Contingency
– A plan for major contingencies that can
reasonably be anticipated in the principal
geographic sub-areas of the command.
IV-12
JOPES Deliberate Planning Process
JOPES Deliberate
Planning Overview
JOPES Functions
Threat Detailed
Identification Strategy COA Implementation
Determination Development Planning
& Assessment
Approved for
Further Planning
JSCP Phase III

Plan
Development
Deliberate
Phase II Phase IV
Planning Concept Plan
Process Development Review
Phase I Phase V
Initiation Supporting
Plans
Crisis Action
Planning Warning Planning Alert Execute
Process Order Order Order Order
Situation Crisis COA COA Execution

Development Assessment Development Selection Planning Execution
Phase I Phase II Phase III Phase IV Phase V Phase VI
1. The Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES). JOPES is the system used by DoD to
plan and execute joint operations. JOPES consists of two planning systems, one for Deliberate (long-
range) Planning and one for Crisis Action (time-sensitive) planning. Deliberate planning normally results
in an operations plan (OPLAN), a concept plan (CONPLAN) with or without Time-Phased Force
Deployment Data (TPFDD), or a functional plan. These plans must be approved by the Joint Staff and are
then held until needed for execution or further planning. Crisis Action planning results in an operations
order (OPORD) for immediate execution and may result in a series or related operations called a
campaign plan. The definitions of the types of plans are found in Joint Publication 1-02.
2. Lead Time for IO Planning and Execution. Due to the sometimes-long periods of time required to
develop sources and access to an adversary’s information and information systems, IO is not well suited
for Crisis Action Planning. Ideally, IO planning will be part of the C/C’s Theater Security Cooperation Plan
(TSCP) for peacetime engagement activities. A good TSCP integrates IO into the C/C’s peacetime
engagement strategy, thereby giving intelligence personnel and IO personnel sufficient lead-time to gain
the necessary access and conduct the activities and coordination necessary for successful information
operations.
3. Purpose of this section of the Joint IO Planning Handbook. This section provides a recommended
approach for integrating IO planning into JOPES, on a step-by-step basis. The emphasis is on deliberate
planning, for the reasons discussed in the preceding paragraph. The discussion herein is most applicable
to a Unified Command IO Cell.
IV-13
JOPES Deliberate
Planning Process
Phase I Initiation
Assign tasks; apportion major
JSCP
JSCP forces and strategic lift
Phase II Concept Development

Analyze mission; develop and select
COA; formulate Combatant Commander’s
Strategic Concept
Phase IIA CJCS Strategic Concept Review
Phase III Plan Development

Expand Concept of Ops; formally
document in an Operation Plan
Phase IV Plan Review OPLAN

OPLAN
Review and approve CONPLAN
CONPLAN
Operation Plan
Phase V Supporting Plans FUNCTIONAL

FUNCTIONAL PLANS
PLANS
Complete, document, and
approve supporting plans
4. Deliberate Planning. The five phases of deliberate planning are shown here. The following discussion
will look at each phase in detail.
4.a. Phase I of the Deliberate Planning process is the Initiation Phase. The deliberate planning process
is normally initiated by the assignment of a mission to a unified command through the Joint Strategic
Capabilities Plan (JSCP).
IV-14
IO
Deliberate
Planning
Joint Pub 3-13

Page V-7
The table is from JP 3-13 Figure V-3, page V-7.
4.a(1) The following discussion of IO planning provides enhanced detail of the general guide to IO
planning found in JP 3-13. As stated in JP 3-13, “The figure may be adapted for similar IO planning
guidance at the subordinate joint force and component levels as required. When IO planning is being
conducted below the combatant command level, the IO cell should keep the IO cell at the next higher
level of command fully apprised of all IO deliberate planning activities which may require synchronization,
coordination, or deconfliction.”
IV-15
JIOAPP
Attack Module Core Process
SECDEF Mission
C/C Objectives – What must be done to accomplish SECDEF mission?
Specified, Implied, Subsidiary Tasks – (QA) How can IO help?
IO Objectives – What will we do from an IO perspective?

Intelligence / Tools
Activities and Functions – (QA) Where will we focus our efforts? (e.g. SIAM)
General Effects and Elements – How will we shape the info Environment?
C/C IO Tasks – Focused on Centers of Gravity
JFC Intelligence & Engineering Tools

High Value IO Targets – (QA) What are best Targets in COGs? (DIODE / ADVERSARY)
JTF
Specific Effects and Assets – (QA) What are best Assets to Weaponeering and Engineering
Tools (CNMTE)
induce Effect desired?
High Payoff IO Targets – (QA) What are best combos of Decision Tools
Target / Asset?
IO Sub-tasks – Plain language statement of purpose
Actions – Coordinated Targets with Timing QA = Quantitative Analysis
JIOAPP – A Closer Look

C/C Objectives / Tasks
Operational Very
IO Objectives – General
What to do, who or what is
Level
to be affected?
IO Tasks –
Where in opposition
force structure
Very will we focus
our efforts?
Collaborative,
Tactical
What Effect do we want?

Level
Information
Intensive IO Sub-tasks –
What specific Targets?
What IO Assets?
Equities Review
Very
Specific
Attack Timing
IV-16
Phase I: Initiation
GATHER THE
IO CELL
4.a(2) To begin the planning process, notify the IO cell of a planning requirement and assemble the
members. Consider special augmentation for the cell, such as representatives from the JIOC, JWAC or
service component IO planning staffs. Be imaginative. For example, if the Area of Operations is in an
Islamic country, consider bringing a Chaplain into the planning to provide guidance on cultural and
religious considerations. If the mission is disaster relief, a Surgeon may be desirable on the planning
team. See Chapter II of this Handbook for a discussion of organizing an IO cell. Once the cell is
assembled, the staff estimate process begins. The staff estimate process is discussed in Chapter III of
this Handbook.
IV-17
Supporting Organizations
IOTC NSA
• Resource center • INFOSEC support CIA
• Tool development & guidance • Intel support
• Analysis • Computer • IO capabilities
JTF-CNO & DISA Network
• Coordinate CND monitoring
incident reporting • Intel support DIA
• Find and ‘close’ holes • All-source
• Search for exploitations fused intel
• Restore sites & systems • CNA I&W
• Identify risks
NRO
JIOC Combatant • System support
• CND support Commander
• EW Planning
• IO augmentation JPO-STC
• Infrastructure
JSC protection &
• Spectrum assessment
Management JCS Service Centers /
• Coordinate Activities
DOD support • FIWC & NIWA JWAC
to JTF • LIWA • Infrastructure
• Facilitate • AFIWC targeting and
interagency • Component Support analysis
process
Do not work your planning in a vacuum. There are many planning organizations that will help you if you
ask. Some of them are listed here, but this is certainly not an exhaustive list.
IV-18
Phase II: Concept Development

Step 1 – Mission Analysis
Plan
STEP 6 Development
CJCS Phase
CONCEPT
REVIEW
STEP 5
C/C’S
STRATEGIC
CONCEPT
CONPLAN / OPLAN
STEP 4 Functional Plan
COMMANDER’S
ESTIMATE
STEP 3
STAFF
ESTIMATES
STEP 2
Initiation
PLANNING
Phase GUIDANCE
STEP 1 Purpose:
MISSION TO ANALYZE ASSIGNED TASKS IN ORDER TO
ANALYSIS DETERMINE THE MISSION AND TO PREPARE
GUIDANCE FOR SUBORDINATES
JSCP
4.b. Phase II of the Deliberate Planning process is the Concept Development Phase. This phase
consists of six steps, which are discussed individually.
4.b(1) Step 1 of the Concept Development phase is Mission Analysis. The purpose of this step is to
analyze assigned tasks in order to determine the mission and to prepare guidance for subordinate
elements.
IV-19
Scenario
• Typhoons inundate Mandura

• Thousands homeless
• Hundreds feared dead
• Embattled Manduran government
requests U.S. assistance
• Local insurgents threaten increased
violence and kidnappings if U.S.
presence in country increases
Mission Statement
When directed, the JTF will deploy to

Mandura to support force protection
measures in the AOR and help deter
aggression against U.S. military forces
and support disaster relief operations in
support of U.S. and host nation
government and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs).
This sample mission statement will be used to illustrate the deliberate planning process.
IV-20
Mission Analysis
• Combatant Commander reviews JCS guidelines

– Specified and implied tasks
– Assumptions, constraints, and restraints
• Analyzes
– Friendly forces
– Terrain and weather
– Adversary
• Forces and capabilities
• IO systems
• Develop PIRs and RFIs
• Determine restated mission and Combatant
Commander’s objectives
• The JIOPP begins here
4.b(1)(a) First, a review of any JCS guidelines provided in the JSCP is conducted. Then specified tasks
from the SECDEF mission are identified. Finally, any implied tasks not specifically, stated but which must
be completed to accomplish the mission, are identified. Assumptions are made only if it is impossible to
continue planning without them. Assumptions are always kept to a minimum. Constraints deal with
factual limitations, such as a time limit placed on an operation or a supply limitation, (for example, “This
operation will not exceed 30 days” or “There is sufficient POL only for 15 days of operations.”). Restraints
are limitations that have been imposed by the planning directive, such as ROE or specific limiting
instructions (for example, “Do not violate adversary airspace.”)
Analyze the friendly forces apportioned for the mission (done by the J3), the terrain and impact of weather
on military operations (done by the J2), the enemy/adversary forces and capabilities (done by the J2) and
enemy/adversary IO systems (done by the J2, with support by the IO cell).
During the course of the analysis, the IO cell should develop any proposed Priority Intelligence
Requirements (PIRs) specifically supporting the IO mission and develop Requests for Information (RFIs)
to fill any intelligence gaps.
The final step of Mission Analysis is to determine a restated mission and the proposed C/C mission
objectives for the C/C’s approval. The next page shows the restated mission and proposed mission
objectives taken from our example mission statement.
The Joint IO Planning Process (JIOPP) that is discussed in Chapters V and VI begins here and runs in
parallel with the JOPES planning process.
IV-21
Combatant Commander Objective(s)
When directed by the SECDEF, the JTF will deploy forces to

Mandura in order to support force protection measures in the
AOR, help deter aggression against U.S. military forces,
coordinate operations with Manduran forces, support disaster
relief operations, and establish a CMOC in support of U.S. and
host nation government and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs).
Combatant Commander’s Restated Mission
SUPPORT
DETER AGGRESSION DISASTER RELIEF
OPERATIONS
Combatant Commander’s Objective(s)
4.b(1)(b) The restated mission will be used as the mission statement for developing the plan. The C/C’s
objectives will be used to focus planning, using a methodology known as “Strategy-to-Task” (also
sometimes called “Objective-to-Task”). The C/C’s objectives generally answer the question “what” the
C/C desires to accomplish, while the strategy answers the “how” the objectives will be accomplished.
IV-22

Step 1 – Mission Analysis
IO Cell Action:
Step 1
IO Cell conducts IO Mission
Analysis, identifies RFIs needed
for mission planning, and assists
in developing C/C objectives
Miss Products:
Ana ion Restated mission
lysis statement, C/C
objectives, RFIs
In review, we have just discussed Mission Analysis, which is the first step in the Concept Development
phase. The graphic summarizes the preceding discussion.
IV-23

Step 2 – Planning Guidance
Plan
STEP 6 Development
CJCS Phase
CONCEPT
REVIEW
STEP 5
C/C’S
STRATEGIC
CONCEPT
CONPLAN / OPLAN
COMMANDER’S
ESTIMATE
STEP 3
STAFF
ESTIMATES
Purpose:
STEP 2
Initiation TO ISSUE C/C’s GUIDANCE, INFORM ALL
PLANNING PLANNING PARTICIPANTS, AND DEVELOP
Phase GUIDANCE
COURSES OF ACTION
STEP 1
MISSION
ANALYSIS
JSCP
4.b(2) Step 2 of the Concept Development phase is the formulation and dissemination of the C/C’s
planning guidance to the staff. The purpose of this step is to inform all participants of the restated
mission and C/C’s objective(s), to issue any specific planning guidance from the C/C, and to develop
possible courses of action for accomplishing the mission. The staff will normally develop a minimum of
three proposed courses of action. The C/C may specify one or more courses of action that he wants the
staff to develop. The following pages discuss Planning Guidance.
IV-24
Planning Guidance
• Consider Offensive vs. Defensive IO

– Particular emphasis?
– Desired effects?
• Ensure Commander’s intent and COAs

include IO issues
• Develop IO Objectives and Sub-objectives
• Develop C/C’s informational themes
4.b(2)(a) The C/C’s planning guidance is normally developed by the staff and submitted to the C/C for
approval. He may accept the proposed guidance as is, modify it, or reject it completely and provide other
guidance. The C/C’s planning guidance should consider both offensive and defensive IO. The C/C may
desire to place particular emphasis on one or the other. Ideally, the planning guidance for IO will be
stated using the possible effects of IO, for example, “deny, disrupt, degrade, destroy, influence, exploit,”
etc.
The IO Cell chief should strive to ensure that the Commander’s stated intent and all developed courses of
action include IO issues.
During the development of planning guidance, the IO cell will develop proposed IO objectives and sub-
objectives, using the “Strategy-to-Task” methodology. The next page shows an example of this, using
one of the sample C/C objectives developed earlier.
IV-25
IO Objectives
C/C Objective
DETER INSURGENT AGGRESSION
C/C Implied / Specified Tasks

Degrade Insurgent Combat Power Maintain Regional Stability
IO Objectives
Inform regional populations

Degrade insurgent leadership of the humanitarian relief
confidence in their forces operation
4.b(2)(b) Using the C/C Objective of “Deter Insurgent Aggression” which was developed earlier, two
supporting IO Objectives have been developed and are shown here. On the following page, we take the
IO Objective shown in the box and break it further down into IO Sub-objectives, using the “Strategy-to-
Task” methodology.
IV-26
IO Sub-objectives
C/C Objective DETER INSURGENT AGGRESSION
C/C Implied / Degrade Insurgent Combat Power

Specified Task
Degrade insurgent leadership

IO Objective confidence in their forces
IO Influence
Disrupt C2 Disrupt Support Morale
Sub-
objectives
Begin consideration of Measures of Effectiveness and establish baselines
4.b(2)(c) In this example, the IO Objective developed in the previous step was broken it down into three
IO Sub-objectives, using the “Strategy-to-Task” methodology. At this point, the planners need to begin
consideration of what measures of effectiveness they want to apply when determining if the C/C IO
Objectives and Sub-objectives have been achieved. The following page summarizes the steps the IO cell
takes in developing the C/C’s Planning Guidance.
IV-27

Step 2 – Planning Guidance
IO Cell Action:
Step 2
Assist in development of C/C’s IO
planning guidance, determine IO
Objectives / Sub-objectives, and
ensure they are included in the COAs
Product:
P l an
n
Guid ing IO Planning
anc Guidance and
e IO Objectives /
Sub-objectives
This completes the discussion of Planning Guidance, which is Step 2 in the Concept Development phase.
Now on to Step 3, the Staff Estimates of Supportability.
IV-28

Step 3 – Staff Estimates
Plan
STEP 6 Development
CJCS Phase
CONCEPT
REVIEW
STEP 5
C/C’S
STRATEGIC
CONCEPT
CONPLAN / OPLAN
COMMANDER’S
ESTIMATE
Purpose:
STEP 3
TO DETERMINE SUPPORTABILITY OF
STAFF COURSES OF ACTION BY APPROPRIATE
ESTIMATES
STAFF DIRECTORATES
STEP 2
Initiation
PLANNING
Phase GUIDANCE
STEP 1
MISSION
ANALYSIS
JSCP
4.b(3) Step 3 of the Concept Development phase is conducting Staff Estimates of Supportability. In this
step, each staff element, including the IO cell, compares and contrasts each proposed course of action in
order to prioritize the courses of action in the order of supportability from most supportable to least
supportable. Depending upon the desires of the J3, the IO Cell may develop its own staff estimate of
supportability or it may contribute to the J3 estimate. The following pages describe the actions that all
staff elements must take during the estimate process.
IV-29
Staff Estimates of Supportability
• Each staff element, including the IO Cell, must:

– Review the mission and situation from its own
narrow functional perspective
– Examine the factors for which it is the responsible
staff
– Analyze each COA from its staff functional
perspective
– Compare each COA based on its staff functional
analysis
– Conclude whether the mission can be supported
and which COA can best be supported from its
particular staff functional perspective
4.b(3)(a) This describes some basic considerations for conducting a Staff Estimate of Supportability.
Regardless of whether the IO Cell develops it’s own estimate or contributes to the J3 estimate,
consideration must be given to whether each course of action is supportable from the IO perspective. It is
important that the IO Cell participate in the development of the Intelligence and Communication staff
estimates, as these functions will provide support to Information Operations. The following page gives a
summary.
IV-30

Step 3 – Staff Estimates
IO Cell Action:
Step 3
Develop IO estimate of
supportability and assist in the
development of intelligence,
operations, and communications
staff estimates
Products:
S taf
f IO staff estimate (if
Esti required) and IO
m ates portions of other
staff estimates
This completes the discussion of developing the Staff Estimates of Supportability, which is Step 3 in the
Concept Development phase. Now on to Step 4, the Commander’s Estimate.
IV-31

Step 4 – Commander’s Estimate
Plan
STEP 6 Development
CJCS Phase
CONCEPT
REVIEW
STEP 5
C/C’S
STRATEGIC
CONCEPT
Purpose: CONPLAN / OPLAN
TO FORMALLY COMPARE COURSES STEP 4 Functional Plan
COMMANDER’S
OF ACTION FOR C/C TO MAKE HIS ESTIMATE
CONCEPT OF OPS DECISION
STEP 3
STAFF
ESTIMATES
STEP 2
Initiation
PLANNING
Phase GUIDANCE
STEP 1
MISSION
ANALYSIS
JSCP
4.b(4) Step 4 of the Concept Development Phase is the Commander’s Estimate. The purpose of this
step is to formally compare the proposed courses of actions by means of a decision briefing to the C/C.
At the end of the decision briefing, the C/C is asked to select a course of action for which the staff will
proceed to develop the plan. The C/C may select one of the proposed courses of action as is, select a
course of action with modifications, or choose an entirely different course of action.
IV-32

Step 4 – Commander’s Estimate
IO Cell Action:
Assists in comparing COAs and Step 4
transforming staff estimates into
the Commander’s Estimate
Commander’s
Estimate
Product:
IO portions of the
Commander’s
Estimate
The IO Cell will assist in comparing courses of action and transforming staff estimates into the
Commander’s Estimate. If the IO Cell is required to prepare a separate Staff Estimate of Supportability,
the Cell will normally brief (or have briefed) it’s estimate to the C/C as part of the overall decision briefing.
The Commander’s Estimate process is complete when the C/C selects a course of action.
IV-33

Step 5 – C/C’s Strategic Concept
Plan
STEP 6 Development
CJCS Phase
CONCEPT
REVIEW
Purpose: STEP 5
TO FORMALLY DEVELOP AND DISTRIBUTE C/C’S
C/C’S DECISION AND GUIDANCE TO ALL STRATEGIC
PARTICIPANTS CONCEPT
CONPLAN / OPLAN
COMMANDER’S
ESTIMATE
STEP 3
STAFF
ESTIMATES
STEP 2
Initiation
PLANNING
Phase GUIDANCE
STEP 1
MISSION
ANALYSIS
JSCP
4.b(5) Step 5 of the Concept Development Phase is Developing the C/C’s Strategic Concept. The
purpose of this step is to formally develop and distribute the C/C’s course of action selection and further
guidance to all participants in the planning process. Amongst the guidance disseminated with the C/C’s
Strategic Concept should be IO themes to be used in support of Public Affairs, Civil Military Operations,
and PSYOP for each phase of the operation. The themes for each of these areas should be totally
complementary so as to avoid sending mixed messages that might cause an adversary to respond in a
manner that was not anticipated.
IV-34

Step 5A – C/C’s Strategic Concept
A. Select IO capabilities and related

activities
4.b(5)(a) With a course of action selected, it’s now time to begin adding some detail to the planning. To
do this, the IO Cell continues using the “Strategy-to-Task” methodology and selects specific IO
capabilities and related activities to support the IO Sub-objectives developed previously.
IV-35
Select IO Capabilities and

Related Activities
C/C Implied /
Specified Task Degrade Insurgent Combat Power

IO Objective
confidence in their forces
IO Sub-objective Influence
Morale
Applicable IO
Capabilities and PSYOP PA CA
Related Activities
4.b(5)(b) To accomplish the IO Sub-objective “Degrade Morale,” the IO Cell has elected to employ the
capabilities of psychological operations, public affairs, and civil affairs. Other capabilities and related
activities could have been chosen as well, depending upon the capabilities and forces available to the
command.
IV-36

Step 5B – C/C’s Strategic Concept

activities
B. Determine priority of IO effort
4.b(5)(c) Having selected the applicable IO capabilities and related activities, the IO Cell must determine
the priority of effort for each capability or related activity. The priority of effort may change for each phase
of an operation. The next page shows an example of a priority of effort matrix that may serve as a useful
tool in visually depicting the IO priorities for each IO capability and related activity.
IV-37
Priority of Effort Matrix
C/C Objective Deter Insurgent Aggression
IO Objective Degrade Insurgent Leadership

Confidence in Their Forces
IO Sub-objective CA PA OPSEC PSYOP DECP EW DEST
Disrupt C2 S S S P2 P1
Disrupt Support S S P2 P1
Reduce Morale and Loyalty S S P1 P2 S
Exploit C2 S P2 P1
Publicize poor Insurgent tech vs. US P2 S P1 S S
Publicize lack of internal support S P1 P2
Reduce confidence in intel S P2 P1 S
Publicize lack of external support P1 P2 S
4.b(5)(d) Using the “Strategy-to-Task” methodology, this example reduces the C/C Objective “Deter
Insurgent Aggression” to an IO Objective and associated IO Sub-objectives.
The matrix shows which capability or related activity will have primacy in supporting each IO Sub-
objective. “P1” indicates the primary effort. “P2” represents the secondary effort. “S” indicates a
supporting effort. A blank space indicates that a given capability or related activity is not tasked in the
effort to accomplish the specific IO Sub-objective.
(Note: Computer Network Attack was intentionally omitted from this example.)
IV-38

Step 5C – C/C’s Strategic Concept

activities
C. Consider coordination or conflict
4.b(5)(e) Having established the priority of effort for IO capabilities and related activities, the IO Cell must
now consider coordination and potential conflict between the capabilities and related activities.
IV-39
Deconflicting IO
Example of what could go wrong

Destruction ATO / ITO is published and all SIGINT sites are targeted
EW COMPASS CALL tasked to jam frequencies from 61.95 MHz to

92.45 MHz
Psychological COMMANDO SOLO tasked to transmit messages on

Operations 62.35 MHz. Uncoordinated leaflet drop to the front of the
notional Corps Hqs that supports the deception plan.
Military Notional Corps Hqs broadcasting on frequencies 62.00 MHz to

Deception 69.95 MHz
OPSEC Discussion of integration problems over unsecured lines could

lead to the comprise of the overall plan
PA PA release discloses presence of COMMANDO SOLO
CA CA developing civilian emergency communication net to

transmit over 63 MHz
4.b(5)(f) Capabilities and related activities can be mutually supportive or be directly opposed to one
another. Gain/loss must be considered when doing deconfliction. (Note: Computer Network Attack was
deliberately omitted from this example.)
IV-40

Step 5D – C/C’s Strategic Concept

activities
D. Determine IO tasks
4.b(5)(g) Having conducted coordination and deconfliction of the IO capabilities and related activities, the
IO Cell should now determine specific tasks for each capability and related activity.
IV-41
Determine IO Tasks
C/C Implied /
Degrade Insurgent Combat Power
Specified Task

IO Objective confidence in their forces
Influence
IO Sub-objective
Morale
Applicable IO
PSYOP
Capability
IO Tasks Broadcasts Support with other Direct

on Manduran IO capabilities and contact
national radio related activities messages
Choose tasks that are appropriate for the chosen IO capability.
IV-42

Step 5E – C/C’s Strategic Concept

activities
D. Determine IO tasks
E. Synchronize IO capabilities
4.b(5)(h) Once the IO tasks have been determined, it is time for the IO cell to begin the last step in
helping develop the Commander’s strategic concept. This step involves synchronizing the IO capabilities
and related activities to achieve a synergy from their combined effects.
IV-43
Synchronization Matrix VII

II III IV
V VI DECISIVE
PRE-DEPLOYMENT DEPLOYMENT PRESENCE PHASE HOSTILITIES JFE BUILD-UP OPS
Apr May D-DAY D+1 D+2 D+3 D+4 D+5 D+6 D+7 D+8 D+9
21-24 Apr 25 26 27 28 29 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
C-DAY
g
COMSEC MONITORING
Bi e
CCJTF VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
OPSEC OPSEC ISO OPSEC ISO
OPSEC ISO UK TRANSLANT (NOTIONAL) AMPHIB DECEPT/ASLT
e
ABN RAID
r
Th ictu
DECEPT ISO
OPP ARG TRANS
DECEPTION ISO UK TRANSIT (NOTIONAL) DECEPT PLAN DECEPT ISO DECEPT ISO
REFINEMENT AMPHIB ASLT ABN ASLT
DECEPTION
P
DECEPT ISO
RANGER RAID TACTICAL DECEPT
ISO RNGR FT PICKETT
NATIONAL PSYOP CAMPAIGN (NOTIONAL)

OPERATIONAL PSYOP PSYOP IS O TPT’S ASHORE/PSYOP BN ASHORE
NO-FL Y
FWD DEPLOY TPT ISO NEO LEAFLETS/
PSYOP CAMP BLANDING
LEAFLETS/
HANDBILLS
EPW
LEAFLETS
HANDBILLS
LEAFLETS
HANDBILLS
LEAFLETS/
C-SOLO (NOTIONAL) HANDBILLS HANDBILLS
TGT PLANNING
TGT BRIEF TO JTF/JFACC

C2W STRIKE
BDA ANALYSIS
DESTRUCTION TGT NOMS TO JFACC PSYOP/DECPT BRF TO JTF/JFACC
C2W TGT PRIORITIES SET PRE-ABN ASLT
PRESENCE DA SOF DA NODAL ANALYSIS
SURVEILLANCE
SEAD/EA
EW COMPASS CALL OPS
JRFL INPUTS COMPASS CALL OPS
COMPASS CALL ASLT SPT
ARG CV MTW SOCEX/NEO CVBG REDEP MTW

U/W U/W U/W RTP
DIS-
MCC (ENTBATGRU) UKTF UKTG NASS OPPOSED ARG EST ARG REDEP
DPLY CHOP U/W TRANSIT ASLT ASLT
RHSL AOA
JFLCC PRAC
II MEF ASLT
SOCEX/NEO JFLCC-II MEF JFLCC-XVIII ABN
FWD
HQ 82ND
XVIII ABN CORPS OPS ABN
ASLT LINK-UP
RAID ABN EXPAND/
UK (GRND) RHSL MCKL CHOP ASLT DEFEND
ABN BRIGADE DPLY CHOP HELO FORCE BUILD-UP CLJ XVIII CDO
CCJTF TALO ABN
3 CDO BRIGADE ASSLT
MCKL
ASSLT
RNGR RAID SAS/RNGR RAID SBS/SEAL RAID
CSOTF FT BRAGG
SR/DA/FID/UW
FT PICKETT HURLBURT
NO-FLY
JFACC (8TH AF) JFMCC ATO JFACC ATO
ZONE
This example, taken from a Joint Task Force Exercise, shows how a synchronization matrix might be
used. Entered across the top are the phases of the operation that are broken down into days. Down the
left side are the IO capabilities and related activities and the major forces apportioned to support the
OPLAN.
This sample matrix is completed to indicate the activities of the major forces at any given time during the
operation in the bottom portion. The upper portion includes the actions of the IO capabilities and related
activities that will support the operation. This simple use of a synchronization matrix will help ensure that
the necessary IO support is planned for and available during the execution of the plan.
IV-44

Step 5 – C/C’s Strategic Concept
IO Cell Action:
Assist in developing the selected Step 5
COA into a CONOPs, and
determine applicable IO
capabilities / related activities
and tasks
Product:
Combatant
Commander’s Select IO Capabilities,
Strategic Priority of Effort Matrix,
Concept Synchronization Matrix
and IO portion of C/C’s
Strategic Concept
This is a summary of the development of the C/C’s Strategic Concept.
IV-45

Step 6 – CJCS Concept Review
Purpose: Plan
TO DETERMINE IF SCOPE AND CONOPS STEP 6 Development
ARE SUFFICIENT TO ACCOMPLISH CJCS Phase
TASKS, ASSESS VALIDITY OF ASSUMPTIONS, CONCEPT
REVIEW
AND EVALUATE COMPLIANCE WITH CJCS
TASK ASSIGNMENTS AND GUIDANCE STEP 5
C/C’S
STRATEGIC
CONCEPT
CONPLAN / OPLAN
COMMANDER’S
ESTIMATE
STEP 3
STAFF
ESTIMATES
STEP 2
Initiation
PLANNING
Phase GUIDANCE
STEP 1
MISSION
ANALYSIS
JSCP
4.b(6) Step 6 of the Concept Development phase is developing the CJCS Concept Review. The purpose
of this step is to formally examine the submitted plan for completeness and to ensure that unapproved
objectives or tasks are not included.
IV-46
Phase IIA: CJCS Concept Review
IO Cell Action:
Continue planning
selected COA
Con CJCS
cep Product:
t Re
view
None
This step involves a “wait and see” period for the CJCS Concept Review. Of course, a good IO Cell will
be continue to plan based upon the assumption that the CJCS review of the C/C’s Strategic Concept will
be favorable. Next comes Phase III of the Deliberate Planning Process, the Plan Development Phase.
IV-47
Concept Review Results
• Approved - Goes back to Combatant

Commander for further plan
development
• Disapproved - Requires significant

change prior to re-submission and must
be corrected within 30 days
IV-48
Phase III: Plan Development
Concept Step 1 – Force Planning Plan

Development Step 2 – Support Planning Review
Phase Step 3 – Chemical / Nuclear Planning Phase
Step 4 – Transportation Planning
Step 4a – NEO Planning Functional
Plan
Step 5 – Shortfall Identification
Step 6 – Transportation Feasibility
PS
CONO Analysis CONPLAN
Step 7 – TPFDD Refinement
Step 8 – Documentation
OPLAN
TPFDD
CJCSM 3122.01, JOPES Volume I, Figure C-4
4.c. Phase III of the Deliberate Planning process is the Plan Development Phase. During this phase, all
staff elements, including the IO Cell, begin to work the fine details of their particular aspect of the plan
and coordinate this with other applicable staff elements. The IO Cell must pay particular attention to
coordination with the Intelligence, Communications, and Legal staff elements, without overlooking any of
the IO capabilities or related activities.
IV-49
IV V VI D ECI
HOSTIL ITIES JFE BUILD-UP OP
D-DA Y D+1 D+2 D+3 D+4 D+5 D+6 D +7
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
0800 RECCE
1500
(5 Sorties/day)
BOM B
0900 1500
RUNS
(4 Sorties/day)
BREAK-OUT THE DETAILS

ARG Transit ARG Covert Transit
OF YOUR PLANS to False BLS. to Actual Aslt Area
TBD TBD
Commence Amphibious Aslt
H-Hour
Imitative Comm unications at False BLS
AKE DOW N
INSTALL RETRIEVE
EW 5
0100 CTT’S CTT’S
REQUIRED FORCES/ASSETS TAKEDOW N
CDCM B
BEACH DECEPTION
0900
2300 2300
TIMELINES 0500
1200
TAKEDOW N
CDCM GSH
IDENTIFY SHOW STOPPERS

UK C VB G R
REDEP
DIS-
PPO SE D A RG A SLT EST A RG R EDE P
TR AN SIT R HSL ASL T
AOA
JFLCC-II M EF JFLCC-X
HQ 82ND
CONTINUOUSLY UPDATE O PS AB N
AS LT LINK-
CAMPAIGN PLAN RA ID ABN EXPAN
RHSL M CKL CHOP ASLT DEFEN
HELO FO RCE BUILD -UP CLJ XVIII
CDO
F TALO ABN ASSLT
A SL T MCKL

FT BRAGG FT PICKET T HURLBURT
SR/DA /FID /UW
4.c(1) This example, also from a Joint Task Force Exercise, shows some areas of particular concern.
The IO Cell must develop specific details of the IO plan, to include required forces/assets, timelines, and
any showstoppers that must be paid particular attention. For example, failure to effectively shut down a
particular air defense missile site may be a showstopper that could affect the command’s ability to
accomplish the mission if not reconciled. The IO Cell must remain keenly aware of changes in the
OPLAN that will require changes in the IO planning.
IV-50
Psychological Operations Timeline VII

II III IV V VI DECISIVE
PRE-DEPLOYMENT DEPLOYMENT PRESENCE PHASE HOSTILITIES JFE BUILD-UP OPS
Apr May D-DAY D+1 D+2 D+3 D+4 D+5 D+6 D+7 D+8 D+9
21-24Apr 25 26 27 28 29 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
C-DAY
RADIO
BROADCASTS
FALSE BLS ONSLOW

BEACH
led
LEAFLET
i
JPOTF
DROPS
a
ONSLOW
t
BEACH
De Plan
MC-130 SUPPORT
TV
BROADCASTS
NOTIONAL
ACTUAL
ARG CV MTW
SOCEX/NEO UK CVBG REDEP MTW
U/W U/W REDEP RTP
U/W
DIS-
MCC (ENTBATGRU)
UKTF UKTG NASS OPPOSED ARG EST
CHOP ARG REDEP
DPLY U/W TRANSIT ASLT
RHSL ASLT
AOA
JFLCC PRAC
II MEF FWD ASLT
SOCEX/NEO JFLCC-II MEF JFLCC-XVIII ABN
HQ 82ND
XVIII ABN CORPS OPS ABN
ASLT LINK-UP
RAID ABN EXPAND/
UK (GRND) RHSL MCKL CHOP ASLT DEFEND
ABN BRIGADE DPLY CHOP HELO FORCE BUILD-UP CLJ XVIII
CDO
CCJTF TALO ABN
3 CDO BRIGADE ASLT
ASSLT
MCKL
CSOTF FT BRAGG
SR/DA/FID/UW
FT PICKETT HURLBURT
NO-FLY
JFACC (8TH AF) JFMCC ATO JFACC ATO
ZONE
4.c(2) A sample JTFEX synchronization matrix for a PSYOP operation is presented. During the Concept
Development Phase, a single synchronization matrix depicted all of the IO capabilities and related
activities. During the Plan Development Phase, the detailed planning will necessitate developing a
separate synchronization matrix for each IO capability and related activity. Only PSYOP is shown in the
example.
IV-51
IO Planning Worksheet
IO PLANNING WORKSHEET - BOSNIACS

TARGET GROUP VITAL INTERESTS ACTION, THEMES, & MEDIUMS PRESSURE POINTS
TO ACHIEVE VITAL INTEREST
Regain territory lost Conduct an aggressive DPRE
Influence refugee flow
National Politicians during the war campaign
(number, timing & location)
Expose political corruption

Use the ballot box to win political
Monitor Elections
control over selected areas
Influence the international

Counter Bosniac propaganda
community to favor the Bosniac
& disinformation
position
Control movement across the

Render the IEBL politically Use right of return and freedom of
Zone of Separation (ZOS)
untenable as a border movement to dispel the notion the
IEBL is an international border
One sure way to get the target’s attention is influence

something that is linked to one of their vital interests!
A “Pressure Point” is an important, essential, or primary

factor that can be influenced to control behavior.
4.c(3) In order to develop the degree of detail necessary during the Plan Development Phase, it is
necessary to use some information management tools.
The Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) at Fort Belvoir, VA developed the technique shown in the
graphic for use in Bosnia. This and the following worksheet show examples of a consolidated IO
worksheet. You should note that supporting worksheets showing the details for each capability and
related activity are also necessary. In this particular example, the National Politicians of the ethnic groups
in Bosnia are the targets. Their vital interests are shown in the second column. The third column shows
methods the target group may employ to achieve their vital interests. The last column shows “pressure
points” the C/C may use as leverage as part of an IO plan to manage the perception of the particular
target group.
The next page shows how this “pressure point” methodology is used to develop additional details for the
IO plan.
IV-52
Develop Details of the Execution Plan
IO Planning Worksheet Execution Matrix

TARGET: National-Level Bosniac Politicians
PRESSURE POINT: Influence refugee flow (number, timing, location)
OBJECTIVE: Cause Bosniac politicians to promote resettlement in less contentious areas
Phase I Phase II Phase III Phase IV
(14 Dec 96 - 1 Jan 97) (2 - 28 Jan 97) (29 Jan - 28 Feb 97 (1 Mar - 15 Apr 97
1. Radio & TV Spots 1. Press Releases 1. Posters & Handbills 1. Civil Works
2. PAO & PSYOP 2. PAO 2. PSYOP 2. G5/Div. Engineer
3. 14-21 Dec 96 3. 5-20 Jan 97 3. 29 Jan - 28 Feb 97 3. 5-30 Mar 97
4. Prepare radio & TV spots 4. Distribute information 4. Distribute materials 4. Arrange improvements
stressing it is irrespon- about mines & other stressing the importance to roads & bridges in
sible for elected officials hazards in some areas of following approved selected areas
to encourage refugees to 5. Discourage resettlement resettlement procedures 5. Encourage return/
return to certain areas in selected areas 5. Slow the rate of resettlement to areas
5. Place public pressure on return/resettlement favorable to friendly
elected officials objectives
1. Coordination with IOs 1. Meetings w/Gov’t Reps 1. Town Hall Meetings 1. Press Coverage
2. G5 - Civil Affairs 2. POLAD/Cmd Group 2. TF Commanders 2. PAO/G5
3. 14-31 Dec 96 3. 14 Jan 97 3. 12-28 Feb 97 3. 5-30 Mar 97
4. Ask IOs to scrutinize 4. Meet with RS gov’t 4. Hold town hall style 4. Publicize infrastructure
all resettlement/return officials to discuss meetings in sector improvements in selected
applications resettlement policy 5. Encourage populations areas
5. Influence the pace of 5. Stress the benefits of to hold gov’t officials 5. Encourage resettlement
resettlement/return cooperation accountable in selected areas
1=What; 2=Who Engages; 3=When; 4=Action; 5=Purpose
4.c(4) In this example, the target group from the previous worksheet has been narrowed to a specific
ethnic group, “Bosniac Politicians” (as opposed to Serb or Croat politicians). Specific IO activities have
been planned based upon the phases of the operation. During the actual execution of the plan, the
activities shown on this worksheet would be transferred to a daily execution checklist. The daily
execution checklist is discussed later in this section. Although this type matrix is not the only means of
managing the detailed planning necessary for IO, each IO cell must develop some means of managing its
planning information. An SOP and database are essential to the operation.
IV-53
Add Additional Detail to the

Execution Plan
IO cell representatives complete an IO Implementation Worksheet listing details of
each IO action.
The IO Implementation
IO IMPLEMENTATION WORKSHEET
Worksheet is used by
Category When Action Target(s) Primary Themes
(See Codes) (Date) (See Codes)
Purpose
members of the IO
1 14 Dec 96 Broadcast taped National-level Bosniac DP1 & DP5 Use public opinion Cell to provide
commentary from the politicians; specifically to pressure Bosniac
Bosniac radio station in Petro Drko, Minister of officials to comply specific details
Tuzla every 2 hours Refugees with the Dayton
Peace Accord (DPA) on how they will
implement the action
2 30 Jan 97 Distribute handbills in Bosniac mayors of DP2 & DP4 Encourage targets
Tuzla, Garli & Tranbil Tuzla, Garli & Tranbil not to support Vio- reflected on the
lent demonstrations
Synchronization Matrix
CATEGORY CODES
1. PSYOP RADIO MESSAGE (COMMENTARY) 10. CIVIL AFFAIRS APPROVED THEMES As you see, the
2. PSYOP RADIO MESSAGE (THEMATIC BURST) 11. JMC MEETING
3. PSYOP HANDBILL 12. JMC BILAT example identifies
4. PSYOP LOUDSPEAKER 13. 2D BRIGADE MESSAGES FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS
5. PRESS CONFERENCE 14. TF 1/18
MESSAGES FOR MILITARY LEADERS
a specific date,
6. PRESS RELEASE 15. TF 1/26
7. PRESS GUIDANCE 16. IPTF MESSAGES FOR POLICE & SPECIAL POLICE target, and info
8. PUBLIC AFFAIRS RADIO SPOT 17. COMMAND GROUP
9. POLAD MEETING MESSAGES FOR THE GENERAL PUBLIC themes
4.c(5) Continuing from the previous example, the IO Implementation Worksheet above adds yet another
level of detail to the IO Planning Worksheet. In this case, specific IO tasks are identified for execution at
a specific date and time. The planners have not only identified the task, but the target, specific themes,
and the purpose behind the task. These details will be transferred to a daily IO execution checklist.
IV-54
Plan
Plan Development
Development Phase
Phase

Plan
PS
OPLAN
TPFDD
4.c(6) Although the refinement of the Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) is not the
responsibility of the IO Cell, it is important that the IO Cell Chief review the TPFDD to ensure that the
necessary IO forces have the appropriate place in the flow of forces into the C/C’s area of responsibility.
This is particularly important for forces that have a low density in the active component, such as PSYOP,
and Civil Affairs or forces that are found only in the reserve component, such as Commando Solo. The
deployment and employment of these low-density forces will require some degree of micro-management.
As a rule of thumb, the C/C will want to have the Civil Affairs and PSYOP units placed early in the flow of
forces into theater.
IV-55
Plan Development Phase

Plan
PS
OPLAN
TPFDD
4.c(7) The last step of plan development is to document everything that has been planned. This is done
using the formats found in Volume II of JOPES.
IV-56
JOPES Manuals
CJCSM 3122.01 CJCSM 3122.03A CJCSM 3122.02B
JOPES JOPES JOPES

VOLUME I VOLUME II VOLUME III
PLANNING PLANNING CRISIS ACTION
POLICIES FORMATS TPFDD
AND AND EXECUTION
PROCEDURES GUIDANCE
25 May 2001 6 September 2000 25 May 2001
4.c(8) For the purpose of IO planning, the focus will be on three volumes of JOPES.
Volume I sets forth planning policies and procedures to govern the joint activities and performance of the
Armed Forces of the United States. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by
combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and prescribes doctrine and selected joint
tactics, techniques, and procedures for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use
by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It discusses planning policies and procedures
and addresses some aspects of IO specifically.
Volume II sets forth administrative instructions and formats to govern the development of joint operation
plans submitted for review to the CJCS. It contains the basic format for an OPLAN and its related
annexes and appendices.
Volume III sets forth procedures for the development of Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data
(TPFDD) and for the deployment and redeployment of forces within the context of the Joint Operation
Planning and Execution System (JOPES) in support of joint military operations. Military guidance for the
exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders for joint operations
and training using JOPES.
JOPES manuals may be downloaded from the limited CJCSM page accessible from
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/.
IV-57
Operation Plan Annexes

A Task Organization L Environmental Considerations
B Intelligence M Geospatial Information and
Services
C Operations
N Space Operations
D Logistics
P Host-Nation Support
E Personnel
Q Medical Services
F Public Affairs
S Special Technical
G Civil Affairs Operations
H Meteorological and T Consequence
Oceanographic Operations Management
J Command Relationships
V Interagency Coordination
K Command, Control,
X Execution Checklist
Communications and
Computer Systems Z Distribution
4.c(9) The majority of the IO information in the OPLAN will be located in Annex C, Operations.
Annex B will contain all intelligence information, to include that specifically related to IO. Annex C,
Appendix 3 should direct the reader to those paragraphs in Annex B that applies specifically to IO.
Annex F will contain all public affairs information, to include that specifically related to IO. Annex C,
Appendix 3 should direct the reader to those paragraphs in Annex F that applies specifically to IO.
Annex G will contain all civil affairs information, to include that specifically related to IO. Annex C,
Appendix 3 should direct the reader to those paragraphs in Annex G that applies specifically to IO.
Annex K will contain all C3 information. Annex C, Appendix 3 should direct the reader to those
paragraphs in Annex K that applies specifically to IO.
Annex N will contain SPACE information related to IO to include CND and CNA operations.
Annex S will contain compartmented information on computer network attack.
Annex T is a new annex that provides guidance for planning and executing consequence management
operations (NBC only).
Annex V is a relatively new annex. It contains information on interagency coordination and addresses
any interagency participation/action desired to execution the IO portion of the plan. The annex is not
directive in nature, so close coordination is essential to ensure interagency support for the C/C’s IO.
IV-58
Information Operations Appendix
• Appendix 3 to Annex C
• Contains 6 (or 7) Tabs
– Tab A - Military Deception
– Tab B - Electronic Warfare
– Tab C - Operations Security
– Tab D - Psychological Operations
– Tab E - Physical Attack / Destruction
– Tab F - Computer Network Attack
– Tab G - Defensive Information Operations
4.c(10) In Annex C, you will find Appendix 3, Information Operations (formerly called the C2W
Appendix), containing the following tabs:
Tab A – Military Deception
Tab B – Electronic Warfare (EW)
Tab C – Operational Security (OPSEC)
Tab D – Psychological Operations (PSYOP)
Tab E – Physical Destruction
Tab F – Computer Network Attack (may also be in Annex S (STO))
Tab G – Defensive Information Operations
IV-59
Phase III: Plan Development
IO Cell Action:
Develops complete IO plan and
coordinates with appropriate staff
sections, operational units, and
supporting agencies for each of the IO
capabilities and related activities
AN
PL
TH
E Product:
IO Appendix to Annex C
and inputs to Annexes B,
F, G, K, N, S, T, and V
This summarizes the IO Cell actions for Phase III of the Deliberate Planning Process. Once the plan is
fully developed, the next phase begins ... the review of the OPLAN by the Joint Staff.
IV-60
Phase IV: Plan Review by the

Joint Staff
IO Cell Action:
Modify / refine plan as necessary
if plan is disapproved
Product:
An approved plan
4.d. Phase IV of the Deliberate Planning Process is the Plan Review by the Joint Staff. If the plan is
disapproved, modifications as noted by the Joint Staff will be made and the plan will be resubmitted.
Once the plan has been approved by the Joint Staff, it’s time for the final step of the Deliberate Planning
Process.
IV-61
Developing Supporting Plans
CJCS
PRODUCES JSCP
XXX
UNIFIED PRODUCES
OPLAN
COMBATANT
COMMAND
XXX
SUPPORTING
PLANS
COMPONENT PRODUCE
JTF
COMMANDS
A N AF XXX
SUPPORTING
PLANS
DOD MAY PRODUCE
AGENCIES
SUPPORTING PRODUCE XXX
SUPPORTING
COMMANDS PLANS
ORGANIZATIONS PRODUCE
XXX
SUPPORTING
and PLANS
UNITS
UNIT
MOBILITY
PLANS
INDIVIDUAL
SERVICE MEMBERS
(OMNIBUS)
4.e. Phase V (the final phase) of the Deliberate Planning Process is the Development of Supporting
Plans. Supporting plans are normally developed by supporting Combatant Commands, Component
Commands, and DoD agencies tasked to support the plan. Normally, these organizations will conduct
parallel planning while the C/C’s staff is developing the OPLAN, so the process of developing supporting
plans is usually well underway by the time the Joint Staff approves an OPLAN. The IO Cell should be
prepared to aid in the development and review of supporting plans. Supporting plans should be
submitted within 60 days of the Joint Staff approving an OPLAN. The supported C/C approves
supporting plans. Supporting plans will focus on:
•Mobilization
•Deployment
•Employment
•Sustainment
•Redeployment
The planners must consider IO to support each of these activities.
IV-62
Phase V: Supporting Plans
IO Cell Action:
Coordinate / assist subordinates in
preparing their own IO plans
Subor
Suppodinate
rt i
Plans ng
Product:
Supporting plans
This summarizes the IO Cell actions during the development of supporting plans.
IV-63
JOPES Deliberate
Planning Process
Phase I Initiation
Assign tasks; apportion major
JSCP
JSCP forces and strategic lift
Phase II Concept Development

Analyze mission; develop and select
COA; formulate Combatant Commander’s
Strategic Concept
Phase IIA CJCS Strategic Concept Review
Phase III Plan Development

Expand Concept of Ops; formally
document in an Operation Plan
Phase IV Plan Review OPLAN

OPLAN
Review and approve CONPLAN
CONPLAN
Operation Plan
Phase V Supporting Plans FUNCTIONAL

FUNCTIONAL PLANS
PLANS
Complete, document, and
approve supporting plans
5. Here is a review of the five phases of deliberate planning.
IV-64
JOPES Crisis Action Planning Process
Crisis Action
Planning Equation
Deliberate Planning
+ A Crisis
Crisis Action Planning
This is admittedly a simplification, but it illustrates the point that if you learn to do deliberate planning, you
can flex to do crisis action planning.
IV-65
IO Crisis
Action
Planning
Joint Pub 3-
3-13
Page V-
V-8
The table is from JP 3-13 Figure V-4, page V-8.
In contrast to deliberate planning, crisis action planning normally takes place in a compressed time
period. In crisis action planning, coordination of the IO plan is even more crucial than in deliberate
planning. This section provides a general guide to IO planning as an integrated part of the JOPES crisis
action planning at the combatant command level. This figure may be adapted as required for similar IO
planning guidance at the subordinate joint force and component levels.
IV-66
Minimum JOPES
Execute
Order
Crisis
III IV V
I II VI
Course of Course of
Situation Crisis Action Execution Execution
Action
Development Assessment Development Selection Planning
This is the absolute minimum execution flow that will occur during crisis action planning. An execute
order is required for all circumstances.
IV-67
Full JOPES
Report
I II Warning Planning
Situation Crisis Order Order
Development Assessment
C/C
Assessment III IV
COA Alert
COA Order
Development Selection
Commander’s
Estimate
V Execute
Execution Order
Planning
OPORD
VI
Execution
6. Crisis Action Planning. In the beginning of this section, it was noted that Information Operations, by
their very nature, do not lend themselves to Crisis Action (time-sensitive) planning. However, it is
inevitable that some future situations will necessitate crisis action planning. So let’s look at how we can
adapt the IO Cell actions we used in deliberate planning in order to support crisis action planning.
6.a. Situation Development. Situation development may take place over a period of days, months or
even years. It mainly entails intelligence personnel monitoring the situation in the C/C’s AOR, with a
focus on the C/C’s priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and with an eye for any developments with
the potential to destabilize the AOR. If any of the developments in the AOR convince the C/C that there
is a potential crisis developing, the C/C will issue an OPREP-3 report to through the JCS to the SECDEF,
stating his assessment of the situation. At this stage, it’s time for the IO Cell to begin monitoring the
situation, identifying intelligence gaps necessary for IO and formulating RFIs to be submitted to the J2.
6.b. Crisis Assessment. After reviewing the C/C’s assessment, the SECDEF will either direct the C/C to
continue monitoring or they will issue a warning order through the JCS, directing the C/C to begin
planning. The warning order may prescribe one or more courses of action to be considered and will
apportion forces to the C/C for planning purposes. The IO Cell should submit it’s initial RFIs to the J2
upon receiving a warning order.
6.c. Course of Action Development. The staff will develop courses of action and produce Staff Estimates
of Supportability as was discussed for Deliberate Planning. The IO Cell’s actions for this process are the
same as was discussed for Deliberate Planning. Unlike Deliberate Planning, however, the C/C does not
select the COA for Crisis Action Planning. Instead, a Commander’s Estimate, describing each course of
action and recommending a specific course of action is submitted to the SECDEF through the Joint Staff.
The SECDEF will select the course of action.
6.d. Course of Action Selection. The SECDEF will select the course of action and then do one of three
things. The first and most desirable option is to direct the C/C to continue planning and to continue
monitoring the situation. The second possibility is to issue an alert order, allowing all players involved in
the operation to begin preparing to execute the mission. The last and least desirable possibility is that the
SECDEF considers the situation so dire that they decide to issue an immediate execution order. In any
event, as soon as a course of action is selected, the IO Cell must commence planning to produce a fully
developed IO plan as was done in Deliberate Planning, developing the necessary synchronization
matrices, IO planning worksheets, and execution checklists. Now let’s take a look at executing the
Operations Order (OPORD).
IV-68
Executing the Plan
Phase V
Execution Planning
IO Cell Action:
Develops complete IO plan and coordinates
with appropriate staff sections, operational
units, and supporting agencies for each of
the IO capabilities / related activities
Product:
AN
E
PL Strategy-to-Task Model,
TH
Synchronization Matrix,
detailed plans, IO Appendix
to Annex C and inputs to
Annexes B, F, G, K, N, S, T,
and V of OPORD
6.e. Since the previous four planning steps are identical to deliberate planning, we will not go into more
detail. With Phase V Execution Planning, we enter a realm that does not exist during deliberate planning.
We are now able to add the detail, due to current events and real-time intelligence, which is not possible
with an OPLAN.
IV-69
Phase VI
Execution
• IO Cell Action
– Via established feedback channels,
monitor IO operations and adapt IO
objectives and daily activities to
support developments in the ever
changing situation
• Products
– Daily Execution Checklist and briefing
products for the Combatant
Commander
6.f. Executing the OPLAN. The discussion in this section applies to both Deliberate and Crisis Action
Planning. At some time in the future, it may be necessary to execute what was previously planned. In
the case of Deliberate Planning, this will mean pulling a completed plan off of the shelf and converting it
to an OPORD. For Crisis Action Planning, the execution is the last step of the process. In any case, at
some point the staff will be required to convert their planning into OPORD and then to execute the
OPORD. The following discussion covers the converting of IO planning into IO execution.
IV-70
Executing the OPORD
IO cell representatives complete an IO Implementation

Worksheet listing details of each IO action.
The IO Implementation
IO IMPLEMENTATION WORKSHEET
Worksheet is used by
Category When Action Target(s) Primary Themes
(See Codes) (Date) (See Codes)
Purpose
members of the IO
1 14 Dec 96 Broadcast taped National-level Bosniac DP1 & DP5 Use public opinion Cell to provide
commentary from the politicians; specifically to pressure Bosniac
Bosniac radio station in Petro Drko, Minister of officials to comply specific details
Tuzla every 2 hours Refugees with the Dayton
Peace Accord (DPA) on how they will
implement the action
2 30 Jan 97 Distribute handbills in Bosniac mayors of DP2 & DP4 Encourage targets
Tuzla, Garli & Tranbil Tuzla, Garli & Tranbil not to support Vio- reflected on the
lent demonstrations
Synchronization Matrix
CATEGORY CODES
1. PSYOP RADIO MESSAGE (COMMENTARY) 10. CIVIL AFFAIRS APPROVED THEMES As you see, the
2. PSYOP RADIO MESSAGE (THEMATIC BURST) 11. JMC MEETING
3. PSYOP HANDBILL 12. JMC BILAT example identifies
4. PSYOP LOUDSPEAKER 13. 2D BRIGADE MESSAGES FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS
5. PRESS CONFERENCE 14. TF 1/18
MESSAGES FOR MILITARY LEADERS
a specific date,
6. PRESS RELEASE 15. TF 1/26
7. PRESS GUIDANCE 16. IPTF MESSAGES FOR POLICE & SPECIAL POLICE target, and info
8. PUBLIC AFFAIRS RADIO SPOT 17. COMMAND GROUP
9. POLAD MEETING MESSAGES FOR THE GENERAL PUBLIC themes
6.f(1) Building IO Execution Worksheets. Recall that during the OPLAN formulation, the IO cell
developed IO synchronization matrices and IO planning worksheets (see above graphic) for each IO
capability and related activity. In order to execute the IO plan, these must be converted to a daily IO
Execution Worksheet. The first stage is to develop an execution sheet for each IO capability and related
activity. Examples of a Daily IO Execution Worksheet are shown on the following two pages.
IV-71
Execution Checklist
F ORWARD
PRE S ENCE AND

RE SP ONS E
CC JTF 95 0
PRE-DEPLOYMENT
21-24 Apr
RADIO
CJTF 96 JFIWC PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS TIMELINE
C-DAY
II
CJTF 96 JFIWC
FORW ARD
RE SP ONSE
CCJ T F 95 0
PRE-DEPLOYMENT
Apr
25 26
III
DEPLOYMENT
27 28
21-24 Apr
PSYCHOLOGICAL
REVISED 21 MARCH 1996
CJTF 96 JFIWC
P RE SE NCE AND
IV
29 30
Apr
1 2
25PRE-DEPLOYMENT
C-DAY
26
3
27 28 29
OPERATIONS TIMELINE
REVISEDPSYCHOLOGICAL
21 MARCH 1996
F ORW ARD
P RE SE NCE AND
RE SP ONSE
II
PRESENCE
CCJ T F 95 0
May
DEPLOYMENT
OPERATIONS
PHASE
21-24 Apr
VII TIMELINE
Apr
25 26
4
May
30DEPLOYMENT
1 2
7
3
27
III
HOSTILITIES
PRESENCE PHASE
5 II 6
28 29
8
4
30
9
D -DAY
5PRESENCE
M ay
1
6
V REVISED 21 MARCH
JFE IV
HOSTILITIES
D+1
2
7
D+2
PHASE 8
D+ 3
3
9
VI
BUILD-UP
10 III11 12 13 14 15 IV16 17
V
1996
D+4 JFED +5
D -DAY D +1
4 5
D+ 6
D+2
10 HOSTILITIES
DECISIVE
D+
D+3
OPS
7
11 12 13 14 JFE
VI
BUILD-UP
6
D +8
18 19
D +4
D +9
VD+ 5
15
7 8 9
D -DAY
10
D +1
11
D+6
16
12
D+2
D+7
VII
DECISIVE
OPS
D+3
13
VID+ 8 D+ 9
17BUILD-UP
18 19
D +4
14
D+ 5
15
D+6
16
VII
DECISIVE
OPS
D+7
17
D+ 8
18
D+ 9
19
Convert the synchronized
plan to an Executable Checklist
BROADCASTS RADIO
C
-DAY
BROADCASTS
RADIO
FAL SE BL S ON SLOW
BROADCASTS
BEACH
FALSE BLS ON SL OW
BEAC H
LEAFLET
FALSE BLS ONSL OW
DRO PS LEAFLET ON SLOW
BEAC H
JPOTF
BEACH
DROPS ON SL OW MC-130 SUPPORT
JPOTF
LEAFLET BEAC H
DROPS ONSL OW MC-130 SUPPORT
JPOTF
BEAC H
LOUDSPEAKER MC-130 SUPPORT
TEAMS LOUDSPEAKER
TEAMS
LOUDSPEAKER
TEAMS
N OTION AL
N OTION AL
AC TU AL
AC TU AL N OTIONAL
ARG CV MT W SOCE X/NEO UK C VB G R E DE P M TW
U/AC
W TUAL R ED EP
U/W U/W M TW
RT P
ARG CV SOCEX /N EO DIS-
MCC (ENTBATGRU ) U KTG U/W U/ W
UK
RE DE P
C VB G R ED EP MT W
UKT F U/W NA SS OPP OSE D AR G EST AR G R E DE P RT P
CH OP DIS-
MCC (E NT B AT GR U)
DPL Y U /W ARG
UK TG CV TR A NSIT A SLT M TW
A SO CEX /N EO UK C V B G R ED EP MT W
U KT F NAS S RH SL WSLT
OU/PPO SE D A R G E ST AR G R ED EP RE DE P
U/W U/W AOA R TP
JFLCC D PL Y C HOP U /W T R AN SIT AS LT DIS-
MCC (E NT B AT GR U)
PR AC
U KT F UKT G NAS S R HS L
A SL T
AOA E ST
II MEF FWD JFLCC ASL T O PPO SE D A R G AR G R ED EP
SOCEX/NE
P RDAC
PL Y O C HOP U/ W JFLCC -II
T RME
ANF SIT ASJFLC
LT C-XV II I A B N
II M EF FWD A SL T A SLT
R HS L AOAJFLC C-XV III A BN
JFLCC SOCEX/NEO HQ 82ND JFLCC -II MEF
P R AC
XVIII ABN CORPS II M EF FWD A SL T OP S ABN
SOCEX/NEO HQ 82ND JFLCC-II MEF JFLC C-XV III A BN
XVIII ABN CO RPS ASL T L INK-UP
OPS ABN
R A ID ABN E XPAN D/ ASLT
H Q LINK-UP 82ND
UK (GRND) XV III ABN CORPS RHSL M C KL C HOP ASL T DE FE ND OPS EXPAND/
C HOP ABN
ABN BRIGADE D PLY HELO FORCE BUIL D-UP CLJ
R AID XV II I ABN
UK (GRND) ASLT
ASLT DEFEND LINK-UP
TALO CDO
3 CDO BRIGADE
C C JT F RHSL MC K LAB N AS SLT CH OP
C HOP ASL T FORCE
MCKLBUILD-UP CLJ EXPAND/
ABN BRIGADE DP LY HELO R AID
XVI II
CDO ABN
C C JT F TALO ABN
3 CDO BRIGADE UK (GRND) RNGR RAID S AS/RNGR RAID RHSL
SBS/SEAL RAID MC KL
ASS LT
CH OP ASLT DEFEND
AF SL TK ETT MCKL
CSOTF ABN BRIGADE DPL Y F T BRAG G C HOP T PIC HURLBURT
HELO
SASTALO
FORCE BUILD-UP CLJ XVI II
CDO
3 CDO BRIGADE SR/DA/FID/UW C C JTRAID
RNGR F /RNG RRAID SBS /SEAL RAID ABN ASS LT
CSOTF FT BRAGG F T P ICKETT
A SL T
HURLBURT
MCKL
SR/DA/FID/U W
JF ACC (8TH A F) JFMCC ATO JFACC ATO
NO-F LY RNG RRAID SAS /RNGR RAID SBS /SEAL RAID
CSOTF ZO NE
NO-F LY
FT BRAGG F T P ICKETT HURLBURT
JFACC (8TH A F) JFMCC ATO JFAC C ATO SR/DA/FID /U W

ZO NE
JFACC (8TH AF ) JFMCC ATO JFAC C ATO

NO-FL Y
ZO NE
EVENT DESCRIPTION EVENT TYPE DATE LOCATION

PSYOP Radio Broadcast Notional PSYOP 4/26/96 Various Notional. Check with
SOF DA against POL pump station DA001/C2W01 5/1/96 Ft. Pickett, VA SOF support to JFIW
EP-3E on Station Non-organic ES 5/2/96 As Assigned Liaise with C2Wcell
Air SUPREQ for MC-130 Mission (3 May) ATO Input 5/3/96 Camp Blanding Input to JFACC for 3
Air SUPREQ for TARPS missions over false BLS NA 5/3/96 Cape Hatteras 6 May ATO
ARSOF DA against fiber optic node DA002/C2W02 5/3/96 Harvey Pt, N.C. ARSOF support to JF
6.f(2) The execution worksheet is used to monitor the progress of daily IO activities. As each event on
the worksheet is executed, the worksheet should be so annotated. Any show stoppers must be
highlighted on the daily worksheet and particular attention should be given to these activities, as the J3
and other affected staff elements will have to be notified whenever a show stopper IO event is not
executed as planned.
IV-72
Daily Execution Checklist

E V E N T D E S C R IP T IO N E V E N T T Y P E D A T E L O C A T IO N R E M A R K S ST A T U S
P S Y O P R a d io B r o a d c a s t N o t io n a l P S Y O P 4 /2 6 /9 6 V a r io u s N o t io n a l . C h e c k w it h I n t e l e a c h d a y f o r in d ic a t io n s o f e ffe c t
ion
S O F D A a g a in s t P O L p u m p s t a t io n D A 0 0 1 /C 2 W 0 1 5 /1 /9 6 F t. P ic k e tt, V A S O F s u p p o rt to J F IW C
P S Y O P R a d io B r o a d c a s t N o t io n a l P S Y O P 5 /1 /9 6 V a r io u s N o t io n a l . C h e c k w it h I n t e l e a c h d a y f o r in d ic a t io n s o f e ffe c t
is
E P -3 E o n S ta tio n N o n -o rg a n ic E S 5 /2 /9 6 A s A s s ig n e d L i a is e w it h C 2 W c e ll f o r la s t e s t c o m in t / e li n t u p d a t e s
A ir S U P R E Q f o r M C - 1 3 0 M i s s i o n ( 3 M a y ) A T O In p u t 5 /3 /9 6 C a m p B la n d in g In p u t to J F A C C fo r 3 M a y A T O
ec
A ir S U P R E Q f o r T A R P S m is s io n s o v e r f a ls e B L S N A 5 /3 /9 6 C a p e H a tte r a s 6 M a y A T O
A R S O F D A a g a in s t f i b e r o p t ic n o d e D A 0 0 2 /C 2 W 0 2 5 /3 /9 6 H a rv e y P t, N .C . A R S O F s u p p o rt to J F IW C
Pr Plan
L e a f le t D r o p I S O N E O C 2W 03 5 /3 /9 6 C a m p B la n d in g A c t u a l le a f le t d r o p c a m p b l a n d in g
A ir S U P R E Q S f o r T A R P S o n f a ls e B L S N A 5 /4 /9 6 C a p e H a tte r a s 7 M ay A T O
T a r g e t n o m i n a t io n s t o J F A C C f o r f a ls e B L S B o m b in g D e c e p t io n S u p p o r t 5 /4 /9 6 D a re C o u n ty O ffs e t 7 M a y A T O : C D C M S it e B a n d G r a d e d S it e H o t
L e a f le t D r o p N o t io n a l P S Y O P 5 /4 /9 6 V ic in it y o f N E O N o t io n a l . C h e c k w it h I n t e l e a c h d a y f o r in d ic a t io n s o f e ffe c t
L e a f le t D r o p N o t io n a l P S Y O P 5 /4 /9 6 V ic in it y o f N E O N o t io n a l . C h e c k w it h I n t e l e a c h d a y f o r in d ic a t io n s o f e ffe c t
T P T A c t i v it y ( A c t u a l) T a c t ic a l P S Y O P 5 /4 /9 6 V ic in it y o f N E O T P T 's d e p lo y e d t o M E U , m o n it o r I n t e l f o r e f f e c t s
A ir S U P R E Q f o r L e a f le t D r o p I S O D e c e p t io n D T -0 2 5 /5 /9 6 C a m p B la n d in g 8 M a y A T O
A ir S U P R E Q S f o r T A R P S m is s io n o v e r f a l s e B L S N A 5 /5 /9 6 C a p e H a tte r a s 8 M a y A T O
A ir S U P R E Q S f o r T A R P S m is s io n o v e r f a l s e B L S N A 5 /6 /9 6 C a p e H a tte r a s 9 M ay A T O
D A a g a in s t E W s i t e 5 D A 0 3 /D T -0 3 5 /6 /9 6 O re g o n In le t P M m is s io n , o f f s e t t o P a r is I s la n d , S . C .
S O F L a z e o f S A -5 s ite fo r T A C A IR T G D A -0 3 /C 2 W 0 4 5 /6 /9 6 D a r e C o u n t y / P in e y I s la n d E n s u r e t h is t a r g e t i s h ig h - p r i f o r t h is m is s io n
T a r g e t n o m i n a t io n s t o J F A C C f o r f a ls e B L S B o m b in g D e c e p t io n S u p p o r t 5 /6 /9 6 D a re C o u n ty O ffs e t 9 M a y A T O : J a h la h l B r id g e / C D C M S t o r a g e
T a k e d o w n o f C D C M S ite B N o t io n a l D e c e p t S u p p 5 /6 /9 6 3 515 N 0 75 31 W N o t io n a l t a r g e t f o r C S O T F
T a k e d o w n o f C D C M G r a d e d S it e H N o t io n a l D e c p t S u p p 5 /6 /9 6 3 512 N 0 75 42 W N o t io n a l t a r g e t f o r C S O T F
R iv e t J o i n t o n S t a t io n N o n -o rg a n ic E S 5 /6 /9 6 A s A s s ig n e d L i a is e w it h C 2 W c e ll f o r la s t e s t c o m in t / e li n t u p d a t e s
A ir S U P R E Q S f o r T A R P S m is s io n o v e r f a l s e B L S N A 5 /7 /9 6 C a p e H a tte r a s 9 M a y A T O
B o m b in g M is s io n s D e c e p t io n S u p p o r t 5 /7 /9 6 D a re C o u n ty C D C M B a n d C D C M G r a d e d S it e H
S O F D A a g a in s t E W s i t e 7 T G D A 0 0 6 /D T -0 5 5 /7 /9 6 C a p e H a tte r a s O f f s e t t o H a r v e y P o in t , S . C .
S O F p la c e m e n t o f s a tc h e l c h a r g e s a t fa ls e B L S D e c e p t io n S u p p o r t 5 /7 /9 6 C a p e H a tte r a s O ffs e t to C o re B a n k s (S o u th o f H a tte ra s )
T a r g e t n o m i n a t io n s t o J F A C C f o r f a ls e B L S B o m b in g D e c e p t io n S u p p o r t 5 /7 /9 6 D a re C o u n ty 10 M ay A T O : Q A S R F A L A H a nd S U F A U K N A T L
L e a f le t D r o p ( A c t u a l) D e c e p t io n S u p p o r t 5 /8 /9 6 C a p e H a tte r a s O f f s e t t o C a m p B l a n d in g
S A I P A N A R G t r a n s it t o f a ls e A m p h ib A s s lt S it e D e c e p t io n S u p p o r t 5 /8 /9 6 C a p e H a t t e r a s v ic in it y
T A R P S M is s io n o v e r f a l s e B L S D e c e p t io n S u p p o r t 5 /8 /9 6 C a p e H a tte r a s
T P T A c iv i t y ( N o t io n a l) N o t io n a l T a c t P S Y O P 5 /8 /9 6 V ic in it y o f A m p h i b A s s lt T P T 's d e p lo y e d to M E U , m o n it o r I n t e l f o r e f f e c t s
U -2 o n S ta tio n N o n -o rg a n ic E S 5 /8 /9 6 A s A s s ig n e d L i a is e w it h C 2 W c e ll f o r la s t e s t c o m in t / e li n t u p d a t e s
B o m b in g M is s io n s v ic in it y o f f a ls e B L S D e c e p t io n S u p p o r t 5 /9 /9 6 C a p e H a tte r a s O ffs e t to D a re C o u n ty : J a h la h l , C D C M S o r t a g e F a c i
S A I P A N A R G c o v e r t t r a n s b a c k t o r e a l a s s l t s it e D e c e p t io n S u p p o r t 5 /9 /9 6 T o O n s lo w B e a c h a r e a
T A R P S M is s io n o v e r f a l s e B L S D e c e p t io n S u p p o r t 5 /9 /9 6 C a p e H a tte r a s
T P T A c iv i t y ( N o t io n a l) N o t io n a l T a c t P S Y O P 5 /9 /9 6 V ic in it y o f A m p h i b A s s lt T P T 's d e p lo y e d t o M E U , m o n it o r I n t e l f o r e f f e c t s
U -2 o n S ta tio n N o n -o rg a n ic E S 5 /9 /9 6 A s A s s ig n e d L i a is e w it h C 2 W c e ll f o r la s t e s t c o m in t / e li n t u p d a t e s
A ir S U P P R E Q f o r M C - 1 3 0 s u p p o r t P S Y O P I S O a ir a s s lt 5 /1 0 /9 6 C a m p B la n d in g 1 3 M a y A T O : O f f s e t t o C a m p B l a n d in g
B o m b in g M is s io n s v ic in it y o f f a ls e B L S D e c e p t io n S u p p o r t 5 /1 0 /9 6 C a p e H a tte r a s O ffs e t to D a re C o u n ty : Q A S R F A L A H a n d S U F A U K N A T L
T P T A c t i v it y ( A c t u a l) T a c t ic a l P S Y O P 5 /1 0 /9 6 V ic in it y o f A m p h i b A s s lt T P T 's d e p lo y e d t o M E U , m o n it o r I n t e l f o r e f f e c t s
E P -3 E o n S ta tio n N o n -o rg a n ic E S 5 /1 0 /9 6 A s A s s ig n e d L i a is e w it h C 2 W c e ll f o r la s t e s t c o m in t / e li n t u p d a t e s
A R S O F In s ta ll o f C T T 's D A 0 1 4 /D T - 1 6 5 /1 2 /9 6 C a p e H a tte r a s O f f s e t t o F t . P ic k e t t , V A
L e a f le t D r o p ( A c t u a l) P S Y O P I S O a ir a s s lt 5 /1 3 /9 6 F o rt B ra g g O f f s e t t o C a m p B l a n d in g
S O F M is s io n a g a i n s t S A - 8 s it e D e c e p t io n S u p p o r t 5 /1 3 /9 6 C a p e H a t t e r a s v ic in it y O f f s e t t o F t . P ic k e t t ; C A S b y A C - 1 3 0 ; F r a g g e d b y
L e a f le t D r o p N o t io n a l P S Y O P 5 /1 3 /9 6 V ic in it y o f A ir A s s lt N o t io n a l . C h e c k w it h I n t e l e a c h d a y f o r in d ic a t io n s o f e ffe c t
U -2 o n S ta tio n N o n -o rg a n ic E S 5 /1 3 /9 6 A s A s s ig n e d L i a is e w it h C 2 W c e ll f o r la s t e s t c o m in t / e li n t u p d a t e s
T P T A c t i v it y ( A c t u a l) T a c t ic a l P S Y O P 5 /1 5 /9 6 V ic in it y o f A ir A s s lt T P T 's d e p lo y e d t o M E U , m o n it o r I n t e l f o r e f f e c t s
U -2 o n S ta tio n N o n -o rg a n ic E S 5 /1 5 /9 6 A s A s s ig n e d L i a is e w it h C 2 W c e ll f o r la s t e s t c o m in t / e li n t u p d a t e s
L e a f le t D r o p N o t io n a l P S Y O P 5 /1 6 /9 6 V ic in it y o f A ir A s s lt N o t io n a l . C h e c k w it h I n t e l e a c h d a y f o r in d ic a t io n s o f e ffe c t
6.f(3) There is no prescribed format for the daily worksheet; this should be a matter of local SOP. The
daily worksheet should be compiled in database format for correlating daily activities with feedback on the
IO campaign. It is essential that the IO Cell be able to do this in order to assess the effectiveness of the
IO campaign. At the IO Cell update meetings, the daily execution worksheet should be reviewed and the
IO plan adjusted accordingly.
IV-73
IO Briefing Products
Graphically display the executions using an IO Implementation Graphic (Sample Entries)
Spring Resettlement
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
PSYOP RADIO IPTF ACTION

(COMMENTARY)
PRESS RELEASE JMC
PSYOP RADIO PRESS GUIDANCE JMC BILAT

(THEMATIC BURSTS)
PSYOP HANDBILL PUBLIC AFFAIRS RADIO SPOT JMC WCM
PSYOP LOUDSPEAKER POLAD MEETING W/POL LDRS TF 1/26
PRESS CONFERENCE G5 - CIVIL AFFAIRS TF 1/18
6.g. IO Briefing Products. It will be necessary for the IO Cell to develop briefing products to periodically
update the Commander on IO activities. There is no prescribed method to do this. Local SOP will
probably direct the briefing method and products with guidance from the J3. The example shown in the
graphic above is a method developed by a LIWA field support team in Bosnia.
IV-74
IO Feedback
Aggressively seek feedback and update IO plans
Sources
¾ HUMINT, PSYOP and Civil Affairs Teams
¾ Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)
¾ Internet (Newsgroups, etc.)
¾ SIGINT
¾ Contact with the public
¾ Press inquiries and comments
¾ DoS Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Gathering feedback (INR) surveys
is a continuous process ¾ FBIS reporting
¾ NGOs, PVO, International Organizations
¾ POLAD meetings
¾ Intel assessments
6.h. Monitoring the Success of the IO Campaign. Finally, it is incumbent upon the IO Cell team to
monitor feedback on the success of the IO campaign. Feedback may come from a myriad of sources,
only a few of which are shown in the graphic above. Developing metrics by which to assess the
effectiveness of IO activities is a difficult task and an area in which little work has been done to date.
Primary emphasis must be on conducting initial assessments for the purpose of making immediate
adjustments to the daily IO execution checklist. The more difficult task, however, is to monitor the
effectiveness of the IO campaign over time to ensure that it promotes the C/C’s vision and objectives.
This is the only available method of determining if your IO plan is working. The feedback should be very
closely linked with the measures of effectiveness. Other possible ideas include:
•Pre-established contracts with local (host-nation) polling organizations

•Others?
IV-75
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IV-76
Chapter V – Joint Information Operations

Attack Planning Process
The Joint Forces Staff College would like to thank the Joint Information Operations Center for providing
the materials for this chapter. Slides illustrating main points start at page V-19.
Introduction
The Joint Information Operations Attack Planning Process (JIOAPP) is a five-step method for conducting
Information Operations (IO) Attack Planning. The JIOAPP is part of the Joint IO Planning Process
(JIOPP), which includes, in addition to the JIOAPP, the Joint IO Defensive Planning Process (JIODPP).
The JIOPP provides a logical, structured method for integrating Information Operations planning into the
Joint Operations Planning process.
The JIOAPP facilitates planning at two levels – that conducted by the Unified Commands, as well as the
subordinate Component Commands. Unified Command IO Planning usually has as its objective the
construction of detailed IO task statements that are provided to the Components for further planning.
Component-level planning strives to determine the optimum match between the Combatant Commanders
(C/C's) Objectives and targets, as well as IO Assets (weapons) and targets. Since the IO planning
process is information-intensive, it can also be highly collaborative in nature. Thus, information and
expertise from sources and staffs outside the IO Planning Cell will probably be needed to apply the
JIOAPP most effectively. Further, the responsibility for conducting contingency planning is shared among
the Unified Commands and their Components, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Department of Defense
Agencies and Centers. The CINCs of the various Unified Commands bear the primary responsibility for
executing those plans and therefore have the lead in plan development. The Joint Information
Operations Center (JIOC) assists the Unified Command staffs in developing IO concepts, integrating
these into contingency plans, and assisting in their execution.
The guidelines presented above regarding the roles of and boundaries between Unified Command,
Component, and other planners may regularly shift. Planners at all levels should not hesitate to contact
persons or staffs (or consult on-line sources) that can provide or acquire needed information, because at
some point in this collaborative process, your expertise will be solicited as well!
The following information will assist you in using the JIOAPP to conduct IO planning in support of C/C
objectives. The purpose of each form will be explained and amplifying information provided as needed to
help you complete the form. Because each planning situation is different, more forms than are provided
in the initial package may be needed to complete a particular step. If more forms are needed, they can
be easily acquired.
The Five Steps of the Joint Information Operations

Attack Planning Process
The five major steps of the JIOAPP are listed below. There are a series of sub-steps associated with
each of the major steps. The Steps and Sub-steps are as follows.
1. Identify the IO Objectives
a. Review/Identify C/C objectives

b. Identify Specified, Implied and subsidiary tasks associated with the C/C objectives
V-1
c. Pair Specified, Implied and subsidiary tasks with IO methods and techniques that may help
accomplish the tasks
d. Evaluate the Specified, Implied and subsidiary tasks, taking into account the associated IO
methods and techniques, and select the tasks that IO can play a significant role in accomplishing
e. Write an IO Objective statement for tasks selected using associated IO methods and techniques;
establish phasing of IO Objectives
f. Derive and write IO Sub-objectives as necessary based on selected IO methods and techniques,
opposition centers of gravity (COG), and potential COG vulnerabilities to IO methods and
techniques; phase IO Sub-objectives as required
2. Generate the IO Tasks Associated with IO Objectives and Sub-objectives
a. Identify the opposition Activity(ies) that, if affected, will help accomplish the associated IO
Objectives/Sub-objectives
b. Identify the Functions that most contribute to the opposition's conduct of the Activity
(1) Evaluate the Functions to determine their importance to the Activity's success; select the
most important Functions
c. Identify the Effects desired on the selected Functions
d. Deconflict the Effects desired on the selected Functions
e. Identify the Element most suitable to achieve the Effect desired on the selected Functions
f. Write and establish phasing for an IO Task Statement based on: opposition Activity and Function
selected, Effect desired, and Element to be applied to achieve the Effect
g. Determine which Functional area and Component has the best capability to accomplish the IO
Task/Sub-task; distribute the IO task to the Component(s)
3. Identify the IO Targets
a. Identify the IO targets – characterized as hardware, software, wetware or data targets – which
can be attacked to achieve the Effect desired on the opposition Function
(1) Evaluate and select the hardware, software, wetware and data targets associated with the
Function to identify the ones most critical to the Function's success
(2) Evaluate the selected targets further to identify the ones most vulnerable to attack
b. Confirm or refine Effects desired on selected targets
c. De-conflict Effects desired on selected targets
4. Identify the IO Assets, derive the IO Sub-tasks, and prepare the candidate Master IO Target
List
a. Identify the IO Assets most appropriate for achieving the Effect desired on selected critical and
vulnerable IO targets
(1) Evaluate the selected IO targets against the IO Assets most capable of achieving Effect
desired; select Asset-Target pairs
b. Evaluate selected Asset-Target pairs in light of cost-risk-benefit criteria to derive and write IO
Sub-tasks
c. Prepare the candidate Master IO Target List
5. Conduct Equity Review
a. Review IO Sub-tasks in light of appropriate checklists to ensure various equities are properly
considered
FORMS – GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS: To facilitate planners' ability to orient them when using this
"paper process," the top of each form will display the major step of the JIOAPP to which the form pertains.
The bottom of the form will display a sentence succinctly stating what information is to be recorded on the
form.
V-2
Step One: Identify the Offensive Information Operations Objectives
FORM 1. Identify the IO Objectives. Write the C/C Objectives. The purpose of this form is to record the
C/C objectives. In many instances, the IO planning cell will be provided the C/C Objectives. In other
cases, the IO Planning Cell may be involved in deriving the C/C Objectives. The exact way by which
C/C Objectives will be determined will probably vary by C/C staff and conflict scenario. The most
important point here is to capture and record all C/C Objectives.
FORM 2. Identify the IO Objectives. Identify Specified, Implied and subsidiary tasks associated with
the C/C Objectives. The purpose of this form is to record the Specified, Implied and subsidiary tasks.
Upon receipt of a mission, the commander (in concert with his staff) begins his mission analysis by asking
himself specific questions about higher headquarters or SECDEF purpose, intent, the area of operations,
available assets, constraints, restrictions, risk, and time. The commander will subsequently disseminate
the results of his analysis in his restated mission description, objectives, and concept of operations. The
staff continues the mission analysis by asking additional questions, the most important of which is:
"What tasks must the command perform to accomplish the assigned mission successfully?"
To answer this question, extract all (with no consideration of IO) specified, implied or subsidiary tasks
from the commander's objectives, concept of operations, mission statement and rules of engagement.
SPECIFIED TASKS are those tasks the commander spells out in the mission description, his
operational objectives, his concept of operations and other guidance. They are what the
commander wants accomplished.
IMPLIED TASKS are those additional major tasks that are necessary to accomplish the mission,
but which are not specifically spelled out in the commander's guidance. They should not be
routine, standing operating procedure-type tasks, or inherent responsibilities of the commander;
e.g. providing flank protection for his own unit. Limit the implied tasks to major tasks that are
"essential" to the accomplishment of the mission. Use available task lists (Uniform Joint Task List,
Mission Essential Task List, etc.) to assist in this process.
SUBSIDIARY TASKS are any other tasks that could be viewed as supporting the mission.
FORM 3. Identify the IO Objectives. Pair Specified, Implied and subsidiary tasks with IO Methods
and Techniques that may help accomplish the tasks. In this step, first examine the specified, implied
and subsidiary tasks to determine what role IO may be able to play in accomplishing the tasks. Ask: can
the IO methods and techniques listed on the form help accomplish the tasks? Pair specified, implied and
subsidiary tasks with the IO Method or Technique that can best help accomplish the task, and enter these
on the form along with the task.
FORM 4. Identify the IO Objectives. Evaluate the Tasks according to the criteria. The next step is to
evaluate how well the specified/implied/subsidiary tasks can be accomplished using IO methods and
techniques. To do this, assess the ability of IO Methods and Techniques to help accomplish the
designated task according to these criteria: Capability, Feasibility, Constraints and Adversary
Vulnerability.
CAPABILITY = Degree to which IO has the capability to accomplish or support the objective. Capability
has two sub-components that can be considered when making the assessment. These are:
EFFICIENCY = Efficiency of IO in accomplishing the mission;

SUCCESS = Probability of success associated with IO in achieving the objective.
V-3
RATING SYSTEM for Capability
LOW = IO cannot accomplish or support accomplishment of the objective.
MEDIUM = IO may be able to accomplish or support accomplishment of the objective.
HIGH = IO can definitely accomplish or support accomplishment of the objective.
CONSTRAINTS = Degree to which constraints favor use of IO. Constraints have three sub-components
that can be considered when making the assessment. These are:
POLITICAL = Degree to which political constraints favor use of IO

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT = Degree to which ROE favor use of IO
CULTURAL = Degree to which cultural (religion, etc.) constraints favor use of IO
RATING SYSTEM for Constraints
LOW = constraints preclude the use of IO.
MEDIUM = constraints permit the use of IO.
HIGH = constraints cause preference for use of IO.
FEASIBILITY = Degree to which IO is a feasible method for accomplishing or supporting the objective.
Feasibility has three sub-components that can be considered when making the assessment. These are:
TECHNICAL = Technical feasibility of IO method/technique against opposition information and

information processes
RESOURCES = Degree to which resources are available to implement IO capabilities
TIME = Degree to which sufficient time exists to implement and achieve IO results
RATING SYSTEM for Feasibility
LOW = using IO is NOT feasible.
MEDIUM = using IO may be feasible.
HIGH = using IO is feasible.
ADVERSARY VULNERABILITY = Degree to which opposition is vulnerable to IO capabilities.
RATING SYSTEM for Adversary Vulnerability
LOW = opposition vulnerability to IO capabilities is limited.
MEDIUM = opposition is moderately vulnerable to IO capabilities.
HIGH = opposition is extremely vulnerable to IO capabilities.
Evaluate the list of specified, implied and subsidiary tasks against the provided criteria to determine the
applicability of IO to successful task accomplishment. Use the weighting scheme provided (Default
scheme is: Capability, Feasibility, Constraints and Vulnerability are weighted at .25 each; the value for
Low = .2; Medium = .5; and High = .8) to make the calculations indicated on the form to arrive at a
numerical total. The higher the total, the greater the potential contribution of IO is to accomplishing the
task. Choose the highest value tasks for continued planning.
V-4
FORM 5. Identify the IO Objectives. Write an IO Objective statement for Tasks selected. Enter the IO
Objective Statement on the form. The IO Objective statement should clearly indicate how an IO method
or technique, or the Effect created by an IO Method or Technique, would accomplish or help accomplish
the specified, implied or subsidiary task. The IO Objective statement can include the general target class
or audience to be impacted, and may state what the desired outcome may be. An example is shown in
the following chart:
Attack Example
MAINTAIN SEA LINES

OF COMMUNICATION (SLOC)
Implied Task
Prevent opposition naval
forces from interdicting SLOCs
IO Objective
Influence adversary leadership
to believe that the U.S. possesses
overwhelming naval superiority
in region
Can IO Help?
SAMPLE IO OBJECTIVE DERIVATION
FORM 6. Identify the IO Objectives. Establish time phasing of IO Objectives. On this form, assign the
accomplishing of IO Objectives to the desired phase of the campaign. Assign start and end dates for the
IO Objective and reference the phasing in relation to D-Day. The opportunity will be provided to review
and refine the phasing data throughout the planning process.
FORM 7. Identify the IO Objectives. Derive and write IO Sub-objectives as necessary. NOTE: The
derivation of IO sub-objectives is optional. Sometimes, the further breakdown of IO Objectives into sub-
objectives is warranted to identify more specifically impacts desired or to delineate target classes further.
Continuing the example given in the chart for Form 5, an IO Sub-objective could perhaps specify distinct
groups to influence within the opposition leadership – the intelligence leadership or the foreign ministry
leadership. The sub-objective derivation would consider the IO Methods and Techniques available and
the opposition centers of gravity that are vulnerable to these. Any IO Sub-objectives derived should be
phased.
Step Two: Generate the Offensive Information Operations Tasks
FORM 8. Generate the IO Tasks. Examine the IO Objectives/Sub-objectives and consider what
opposition Activities will be affected. On this form, list opposition Activities to be affected by friendly
IO. There are two techniques that can be employed when trying to identify the best opposition Activities
to affect. The first technique departs from the perspective of a friendly IO planner. This planner
knows the friendly IO Objective to be achieved, and asks, "To which adversary Activity (where in the
V-5
adversary "system") must I apply IO Methods and Techniques to achieve the IO Objective?" The second
technique involves the friendly IO planner assuming the role of the adversary. Using this
technique, the planner speculates that adversary planners have anticipated the friendly IO Objectives,
and will take necessary steps to thwart their accomplishment. Using this technique, the friendly planner
assuming the adversary role asks "what Activities would the adversary conduct if they anticipated the
friendly IO Objective and wanted to defeat it? I will generate my IO tasks to affect those adversary
Activities." Either technique, or the two in combination, may be employed to select opposition Activities to
be affected by friendly IO.
FORM 9. Generate the IO Tasks. Identify the Functions that most contribute to the Opposition's
conduct of the Activity. An Activity can be broken down into its component parts, known as
"Functions" in the JIOAPP. The successful accomplishing of the adversary activity will depend more on
some of these Functions than on others. On this form, list those Functions that most contribute to the
adversary's successfully accomplishing the Activity. It is these Functions that friendly IO strives to affect.
Refer to the chart below to see examples of Functions associated with an Opposition Activity.
FORM 9A. Generate the IO Tasks. Evaluate the Functions to identify those that contribute most to
the Activity's success. This is an optional step. To evaluate the Functions, use these criteria:
Contribution, Impact, and Uniqueness.
Opposition Activities and Functions

Adversary Activities Adversary Functions
Process and analyze

signals intelligence
Gather information
Collect signals
regarding
intelligence
disposition of U.S. forces
Disseminate signals
intelligence
information to units
Other functions
Opposition Centers of Gravity

CONTRIBUTION = Contribution made by the Function to the successful conduct of the activity.
Contribution has two sub-components that can be considered when making the assessment; these are:
ROLE = Role the Function plays in accomplishing an Activity

VALUE = Value the Function adds to accomplishing an Activity
RATING SYSTEM for Contribution
LOW = The Activity can be successfully accomplished without the Function.
MEDIUM = The Activity's success would be hindered without the Function.
V-6
HIGH = The Activity cannot be successfully accomplished without the Function (is required for
successful accomplishment of the Activity).
IMPACT = Degree to which the mission and/or economic impact resulting from the loss of the Function
affects the adversary's ability to conduct the selected Activity. Impact has two sub-components that can
be considered when making the assessment; these are:
ECONOMIC = The cost associated with loss of the Function in terms of lost investment, reconstitution
cost, etc.
MISSION = Degree to which mission can be completed without execution of the Function
RATING SYSTEM for Impact
LOW = No or marginal impact on the opposition's ability to accomplish its Activity.
MEDIUM = Moderate impact on the opposition's ability to accomplish its Activity.
HIGH = Severe impact on opposition's ability to accomplish its Activity.
UNIQUENESS = Degree to which the Function is one-of-a-kind or can be readily duplicated, and/or the
degree to which it can be recovered if loss occurs. Uniqueness has two sub-components that can be
considered when making the assessment; these are:
REDUNDANCY = Degree to which the Function is one-of-a-kind

RECOVERABILITY = Degree of difficulty associated with recovering the Function after a loss occurs in
time to contribute to accomplishment of the Activity
RATING SYSTEM for Uniqueness
LOW = the Function is highly redundant and/or easily recovered.
MEDIUM = the Function is moderately redundant and/or it can be recovered with moderate effort
within the required time frame.
HIGH = the Function is one-of-a-kind and/or it cannot be recovered in the required time frame.
Use the weighting scheme provided (Default scheme is: Contribution, Impact, and Uniqueness are
weighted at .33 each; the value for Low = .2; Medium = .5; and High = .8) to make the calculations
indicated on the form to arrive at a numerical total. The higher the total, the more important the
contribution of the Function is to the Activity's success.
FORM 10. Generate the IO Tasks. Identify the Effect desired on the selected Functions. On this
form, select the Effect desired on the opposition Functions. The types of Effects are displayed on the
form and are explained below.
V-7
IO Effects Continuum
Permanent
Degrade Destroy
Partial Complete
Disrupt Deny
Temporary
Influence Mislead
Exploit
Destroy = Damage done to the Function is permanent, and all aspects of the Function have been
affected OR A Function's operation is permanently impaired, and the damage extends to all facets of the
Function's operation.
Deny = Damage done to the Function is only temporary, but all aspects of the Function were affected OR
A Function's operation is impaired over the short term, but the damage extends to all facets of the
Degrade = Damage done to the Function is permanent, but only portions of the Function were affected;
that is, the Function still operates, but not fully OR A Function's operation is permanently impaired, but the
damage does not extend to all facets of the Function's operation.
Disrupt = Damage done to the Function is temporary, and only portions of the Function were affected OR
A Function's operation is impaired over the short term and the damage does not extend to all facets of the
Mislead = creation of a false perception which leads the opposition to act in a manner detrimental to
mission accomplishment while benefiting accomplishment of friendly objectives.
Influence = selected projection or distortion of the truth to persuade the opposition to act in a manner
detrimental to mission accomplishment while benefiting accomplishment of friendly objectives.
Other = There may be other Effects desired, and this field is designed to allow for "write in" Effects.
FORM 11. Generate the IO Tasks. De-conflict the Effects desired on the selected Function. This
form allows you to review and de-conflict the effect(s) assigned to each opposition Function. The most
important part of this form is your careful scrutiny of each Effect for accuracy and conflicts.
1. Review each opposition Function and determine if the selected Effects are correct and desirable.
Remember that the form should reflect your choices correlated with one of the six standard verbs
(disrupt, degrade, deny, destroy, mislead and influence) or your write-in selection. These "Effect
V-8
verbs" will become part of the applicable IO Task Statement.
2. Next, review your selections for opportunities to synchronize effects. You should be thinking here, as
you will later on when examining available Elements, about the relative merit of sequencing IO effects
(e.g., mislead, then destroy) or "massing" on the IO objective/target. Massing in this context infers a
mutually supporting strategy to use different Effects in rapid sequence to confuse or delay adversary
response. Remember that having multiple Effects on Functions is acceptable, and may in fact be
desirable. Make sure, however, that the Effects do not conflict with each other (for example, insure
that the Effects are induced in different phases of the campaign), and are induced in the desired order
(for example, it's difficult to induce a Mislead Effect on a target already Destroyed!).
FORM 12. Generate the IO Tasks. Identify the Element most suitable to achieve the Effect desired.
On this form, list the Function to be affected and the Effect desired. Now select the IO Element most
suitable for achieving the desired Effect.
There are general groupings of IO Elements capable of producing Effects desired.
Deception Elements will cause the Mislead Effect.
PSYOP Elements will induce the Influence Effect.
Destruction Elements (concussion – bombs; kinetic – bullets; or radio frequency – pulse) can
cause the Destroy Effect (NOTE: There are other Elements that can cause the Destroy Effect as
well).
Deny, Disrupt and Degrade Effects can be achieved using Destruction Assets applied precisely
to the portion of the adversary Function to be affected. Also, for example, electronic jamming
(EW Element) of a transient nature may induce the Deny or Disrupt Effects on adversary
Functions. A high power radio frequency pulse or laser pulse (EW Element) may induce a
Degrade Effect. Computer Network Attack Elements might possibly induce multiple Effects
separately or sequentially.
FORM 13. Generate the IO Tasks. Write the IO Task Statements. On this form combine the Opposition
Activity and Function to be affected, the Effect desired, and the IO Element that is most suitable for
achieving the Effect and combine them to write an IO Task Statement. The chart shows examples of
properly completed IO Task Statements.
V-9
Opposition Activities, Functions and

IO Tasks
Adversary Activities Adversary Functions IO Tasks
Influence opposition
Process and analyze
collection effort gathering
information on U.S. force
disposition to believe that
U.S. has overwhelming
Gather information naval forces in region by
Collect signals
regarding employing PSYOP
intelligence
Disseminate signals Mislead opposition

intelligence signals intelligence
information to units collection effort gathering
Other functions
naval forces in region by
employing Deception

FORM 14. Generate the IO Tasks. Assign the IO Tasks to the Components. On this form, write in the
IO Tasks. Determine primary and supporting responsibilities (e.g., Army primary, Air Force supporting).
Fill in the Function blocks associated with the tasks by entering the Component selected and a "P" or an
"S" to denote primary or supporting. Example: under the Deception Heading for Task 1 would be "Navy -
P" if the Navy were the most appropriate/capable Component to accomplish the IO Task. If supporting
responsibilities were to be assigned, this notation would also be made in the block, e.g., "Air Force - S."
Step Three: Identify the Information Operations Targets
Form 15: Identify the IO Targets. Identify the IO Targets – characterized as Hardware, Software,
Wetware or Data targets – that can be attacked to achieve the Effect desired on the opposition
Function. On this form, write in the hardware, software, wetware or data targets associated with the
Function to be attacked. Target selection is, more often than not, a collaborative process. The
participants in the process may include the J3, J2T, the Services, agencies such as the Joint Warfare
Analysis Center and Information Operations Technology Center, and others.
Many factors must be assessed when selecting targets. Ideally, the targets identified for further analysis
should be known to play an important role in the successful operation of the Function to be affected. The
following chart illustrates the generic types of targets that can be found in the hardware, software,
wetware and data categories.
V-10
Information Target Categories
Hardware
Receiver Transmitter Power Antenna

Software
Wetware
Info
1010001 0110 1010001 0110 1010001 0110 1010001 0110
FORM 16: Identify the IO Targets. Evaluate and select the hardware, software, wetware and data
targets associated with the Function to identify the ones most critical to the Function’s success;
evaluate further to identify the ones most vulnerable to attack. Determining how critical a given
target is to a Function’s success should include an examination of three factors:
• What is the contribution of this target to the successful operation of the Function?
• What would be the impact on the successful operation of the Function if the target were struck?
• How unique is the target’s contribution to the Function’s successful operation?
Determining how vulnerable a target is should include an examination of another three factors:
• Is the target accessible?

• Is the target susceptible to attack?
• Is it feasible to attack the target?
After evaluating targets in each of the categories as to their criticality and vulnerability, select the ones
desired and write them on the form.
FORM 16A: Identify the IO Targets. Evaluate and select the hardware, software, wetware and data
targets associated with the Function to identify the ones most critical to the Function’s success;
Evaluate further to identify the ones most vulnerable to attack. This is an optional step. Criteria-
based analyses can be done on this step if desired. To refine the evaluation and selection of the targets
most critical to the Function's success as well as most vulnerable, apply the same criteria used in STEP
9A, plus the vulnerability criterion, but this time to targets. To evaluate the targets, use these criteria:
Contribution, Impact, Uniqueness, and Vulnerability.
CONTRIBUTION = Contribution made by the Target to the successful conduct of the Function.
Contribution has two sub-components that can be considered when making the assessment; these are:
ROLE = Role the Target plays in accomplishing the Function

VALUE = Value the Target adds to accomplishing the Function
V-11
RATING SYSTEM for Contribution
LOW = The Function can be successfully accomplished without the Target.
MEDIUM = The Function’s success would be hindered without the Target.
HIGH = The Function cannot be successfully accomplished without the Target (is required for
successful accomplishment of the Function).
IMPACT = Degree to which the mission and/or economic impact resulting from the loss of the Target
affects the adversary's ability to conduct the selected Function.
Impact has two sub-components that can be considered when making the assessment; these are:
ECONOMIC = The cost associated with loss of the Target in terms of lost investment, reconstitution cost,
etc.
MISSION = Degree to which mission can be completed without execution of the Target
RATING SYSTEM for Impact
LOW = No or marginal impact on the opposition's ability to accomplish its Function.
MEDIUM = Moderate impact on the opposition's ability to accomplish its Function.
HIGH = Severe impact on opposition's ability to accomplish its Function.
UNIQUENESS = Degree to which the Target is one-of-a-kind or can be readily duplicated, and/or the
degree to which it can be recovered if loss occurs. Uniqueness has two sub-components that can be
considered when making the assessment; these are:
REDUNDANCY = Degree to which the Target is one-of-a-kind

RECOVERABILITY = Degree of difficulty associated with recovering the Target after a loss occurs in time
to contribute to accomplishment of the Function
RATING SYSTEM for Uniqueness
LOW = the Function is highly redundant and/or easily recovered.
MEDIUM = the Function is moderately redundant and/or it can be recovered with moderate effort
within the required time frame.
HIGH = the Function is one-of-a-kind and/or it cannot be recovered in the required time frame.
VULNERABILITY = Degree to which a target is "open" to attack. Vulnerability has three sub-components
that can be considered when making the assessment; these are:
ACCESSIBILITY = Degree to which the target can be "reached" by an attacking system

FEASIBILITY = A measure of the feasibility associated with the attacking of the target
SUSCEPTIBILITY = Degree to which the target is susceptible to attack
V-12
RATING SYSTEM for Vulnerability
LOW = target is open to attack only to a limited degree at best.
MEDIUM = target is open to attack.
HIGH = target is very open to attack
Use the weighting scheme provided (Default scheme is: Contribution, Impact, Uniqueness and
Vulnerability are weighted at .25 each; the value for Low = .2; Medium = .5; and High = .8) to make the
calculations indicated on the form to arrive at a numerical total. The higher the total, the more important
the Target is in assuring the Function's success.
FORM 17: Identify the IO Targets. Confirm or Refine Effects desired on targets selected. Use this
form to confirm or refine the effects desired on the targets selected. The form contains analysis aids that
facilitate planners’ review of Effects and allow the charting of “influence paths” when mapping the
relationships among potential wetware targets. Use the "IO Effects" chart as an aid to confirm or refine
Effects desired on selected targets. Use the "Derive Actor" chart to map command or reporting
relationships between echelons or hierarchies, or within high-level staffs. After the review, complete the
form by writing in the targets selected and the corresponding Effect desired.
FORM 18: Identify the IO Targets. De-Conflict Effects desired on selected targets. On this form,
write the targets selected along with the Effects proposed for each. Insure the Effects do not conflict with
each other (e.g., targets selected for both Influence and Destroy Effects) or that, if conflicts do exist, they
are acceptable (e.g., a target is slated for two Effects, Influence from D -1 to D +2, and then Destroy on D
+3).
Step Four: Identify the IO Assets, Derive the IO Sub-tasks, and

Prepare the Candidate Master IO Target List
FORM 19: Identify the IO Asset, derive the IO Sub-tasks, and prepare the candidate IO Master Target
List. Identify the specific IO Asset most appropriate for achieving the Effects desired on the
selected critical and vulnerable targets; evaluate to select the one most capable of producing the
desired Effect on the target. There may be a variety of Assets capable of producing the Effect desired
on a given target; there may also be only one or two. In this step, planners will need to consider not only
the technical ability of an IO Asset to produce the Effect desired, but also whether or not that IO Asset is:
• Apportioned
• Assigned
• Allocated
• Deployed
• In-commission (not battle-damaged or destroyed)
• Otherwise available
Planners also must consider the adequacy and availability of allied and special IO Assets to accomplish
the desired Effect on the target selected. Planners can think of IO in terms of their ability to cause a
broad range of Effects or very specific Effects. For example, planners may want to begin their search for
the most appropriate IO Asset to apply by grouping Assets in categories by IO specialty, i.e., Electronic
Warfare Assets, Destruction Assets, Deception Assets, Computer Network Attack Assets, and etc. Then,
within these categories, planners can search for Assets that will induce the desired Effect, i.e., Deny,
Destroy, Degrade, Disrupt, Influence, Mislead or any other Effect desired (some examples of other
potential effects are corrupt, sever, confuse, and so forth). Planners may also choose to further
V-13
categorize their search by Assets available from each component. Some factors to consider when
evaluating IO Assets to select the one best capable of achieving the Effect desired include the following:
Availability – How readily can the Assets be made available to use against the target;
Duration – What is the duration of the Effect caused by the IO Assets;
Delivery Error – Can the IO Assets be delivered to the target within acceptable accuracy limits;
Probability of Effect – What is the probability that the Effect will be achieved; and
Asset Reliability – How reliable is the IO Asset to be applied?
Once the best Asset is selected to cause the Effect desired, write the Target, Effect, and Asset on the
form.
FORM 19A: Identify the IO Asset, derive the IO Sub-tasks, and prepare the candidate IO Master Target
List. Identify the specific IO Asset most appropriate for achieving the Effects desired on the
selected critical and vulnerable targets; evaluate to select the one most capable of producing the
desired Effect on the target. This is an optional step. These forms allow the planner to refine the
evaluations made in the previous step by allowing for weighted mathematical analysis to derive the best
IO Asset to apply to induce the Effect desired. The criteria to be employed are:
• Availability
• Probability of Achieving Effect
• Duration
• Weapon Reliability
• Delivery Error
AVAILABILITY = Availability of an IO Asset for applying an Effect to a Target during a specific time
frame.
RATING SYSTEM for Availability
LOW = IO Asset will be in limited availability, or will not be available.
MEDIUM = IO Asset will be available to apply the desired Effect against the specified Target.
HIGH = IO Asset is available. Availability of the Asset may extend beyond the required time
frame and/or is available in more than sufficient supply.
PROBABILITY OF EFFECT = Degree to which IO Asset can induce desired Effect.
RATING SYSTEM for Probability of Effect
LOW = probability of achieving Effect is low.
MEDIUM = probability of achieving Effect is moderate.
HIGH = probability of achieving Effect is high.
NOTE: Probability of achieving Effect Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) may be available in

engineering tools off-line. These MOEs may facilitate the evaluation of IO Assets.
DURATION = Degree to which the duration of damage caused by the IO Asset meets mission
requirements
RATING SYSTEM for Duration
LOW = duration does not meet mission requirements
V-14
MEDIUM = duration meets mission requirements
HIGH = duration exceeds mission requirements
ASSET RELIABILITY = Degree to which the IO Asset is reliable against the type of target
RATING SYSTEM for Asset Reliability
LOW = reliability is low
MEDIUM = reliability is moderate
HIGH = reliability is high
DELIVERY ERROR = Probability and percentage of error associated with IO Asset delivery
RATING SYSTEM for Delivery Error
LOW = error rate is high
MEDIUM = error rate is moderate
HIGH = Error rate is low
Evaluate the list of IO Assets against the provided criteria (Default scheme is: Availability, Probability of
Effect, Duration, Asset Reliability and Delivery Error are weighted at .20 each; the value for Low = .2;
Medium = .5; and High = .8) to determine the best IO Asset to apply to the target to achieve the desired
Effect. Use the weighting scheme provided to make the calculations indicated on the form to arrive at a
numerical total. The higher the total, the greater the potential for the IO Asset is to achieve the desired
Effect.
FORM 20: Identify the IO Asset, derive the IO Sub-tasks, and prepare the candidate IO Master Target
list. Evaluate the selected Asset-Target Pairs in light of Cost-Risk-Benefit criteria and select the
final Asset-Target pairs. The results of accomplishing the previous steps yielded a listing of:
• Hardware, software, wetware or data targets most critical to the success of an adversary’s Function,
and most vulnerable to friendly IO Assets
• A reconfirmation and de-confliction of Effects desired on the targets selected
• The selection of an IO Asset best able to cause the Effect desired
In this step, the planner will evaluate the list of targets and Assets to select, based on a cost-risk-benefit
evaluation, the best ones to attack.
Factors that can be considered when conducting the cost-risk-benefit evaluation include the following:
Cost - in terms of number, value, and consequences
Risk - in terms of probability of failure, consequences of failure, capability compromise, and

collateral damage
Benefit - in terms of impact, probability of success, confidence, political consequence, cost

to reconstitute
After completing the evaluation, select the final Asset-Target pairs and write them on the form.
V-15
FORMS 20A and 20B: Identify the IO Asset, derive the IO Sub-tasks, and prepare the candidate IO
Master Target list. Evaluate the selected Asset-Target Pairs in light of Cost-Risk-Benefit criteria and
select the final Asset-Target pairs. This is an optional step. In this step, there are two forms: one for
the cost, risk, and benefit calculation, and one to make the final calculation to derive the best Asset-
Target pairs. These forms allow the planner to refine the evaluations made in the previous step by using
weighted mathematical analysis to derive the best Asset-Target pairs. The criteria (Default scheme is:
Cost, Risk, and Benefit are weighted at .33 each; the value for Low = .2; Medium = .5; and High = .8) to
be employed are:
• Cost
• Risk
• Benefit
COST = Aggregate costs of using the IO Asset being evaluated on the target in question. Cost has three
sub-components that can be assessed when making the calculation:
CONSEQUENCES = Political consequences of weapon use/target choice

NUMBER = Number of weapons required to accomplish mission
VALUE = Monetary value/cost of weapon
RATING SYSTEM for Cost
LOW = Aggregate costs of IO weapon employment on this target are low
MEDIUM = Aggregate costs of IO weapon employment on this target are medium
HIGH = Aggregate costs of IO weapon employment on this target are high
RISK = Aggregate risk incurred when using this IO weapon on this target. Risk has four components that
can be assessed when making this calculation:
PROBABILITY OF FAILURE = Probability that the attempt to employ this IO weapon on this target will fail
to produce the Effect desired
CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE = Consequences if the attempt to use this IO Asset on this target fails
CAPABILITY COMPROMISE = Risk of compromising sensitive capabilities (technical prowess, delivery
Asset, intelligence sources, etc.) when using this IO Asset against this target
COLLATERAL DAMAGE = Potential for collateral damage if this IO Asset is used on this target
RATING SYSTEM for Risk
LOW = Aggregate risk of employing this IO weapon on this target is low
MEDIUM = Aggregate risk of employing this IO weapon on this target is medium
HIGH = Aggregate risk of employing this IO weapon on this target is high
BENEFIT = Aggregate benefit accruing when using this IO Asset on this target. Benefit has five
components that can be assessed when making this calculation.
PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS = Probability that the attempt to employ this IO Asset on this target will
succeed in causing the Effect desired
POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY = Political acceptability of using this IO Asset on this target
CONFIDENCE = Confidence that use of this IO Asset on this target will meet the friendly operational
requirements and objectives
IMPACT = Impact on opposition of use of this IO Asset on this target
RECONSTITUTION = Cost to opposition of reconstitution if this IO Asset is applied to this target
V-16
RATING SYSTEM for Benefit
LOW = Aggregate benefit of employing this IO weapon on this target is low
MEDIUM = Aggregate benefit of employing this IO weapon on this target is medium
HIGH = Aggregate benefit of employing this IO weapon on this target is high
After deriving the numerical values for cost, risk and benefit, use the formula on FORM 20B to determine
overall target value. This value can be a principal consideration when assembling a prioritized list of
targeting options.
FORM 21: Identify the IO Asset, derive the IO Sub-tasks, and prepare the candidate IO Target List;
Derive and write IO Sub-tasks. The IO Sub-task statement is intended to be a clear statement of what
is to occur. The IO Sub-task should include the following:
• The IO Objective
• The Effect to be induced
• The Function to be affected
• The specific Target to be affected
• The specific IO Asset to be applied
The Chart below illustrates one such completed IO Sub-task:
Combining IO Effects, Assets and

Targets to Derive the IO Sub-task
Wetware
Perceived
Opposition collection system operators
False traffic generation
IO Sub-task - Use naval system X to generate radio

traffic that misleads opposition collection system
Actual
operators at site Q to believe that a large U.S. naval
force is operating in the region
FORM 22: Identify the IO Asset, derive the IO Sub-tasks, and prepare the candidate Master IO Target
List. Prepare the candidate Master IO Target List. On this form, the candidate Master IO Target list is
assembled. On the form, list the target name; the Basic Encyclopedia number if assigned; the category
code; the coordinates/location; and the IO Asset to be applied. Gather the information specified and write
the information on the form.
V-17
Step Five: Conduct Equity Review
FORM 23: Conduct Equity Review. Review IO Sub-tasks in light of appropriate checklists to ensure
various equities are properly considered. The review of equities is the final step in the Joint IO Attack
Planning Process. On this form, the various IO Sub-tasks are reviewed to ensure that they are checked
against other factors that may bear on the attack of IO targets. These other factors include the following.
1. Operational gain versus intelligence loss – This dilemma is well known to most planners. Another
way of stating the issue is “Do we shoot (or watch), or listen?” Though processes exist for conducting
the reviews of the equities involved among the interested parties in both the intelligence and
operational communities, the group of those involved usually grows larger when IO are involved. This
is because the SECDEF is the ultimate IO “warfighter” and equity review may well include review at
the SECDEF level for not only this category, but others as well.
2. Joint Restricted Frequency Lists – The Joint Spectrum Center is principally responsible for the
construction of these lists. The J6 will also be involved, as well as the J2. The IO planner is ensuring
here that IO will not impact friendly attack or defensive communications or other operations
negatively.
3. Security Compromise – This factor may become crucial if sensitive, perishable, high cost
technologies are to be employed in the hope of achieving a specific war-fighting goal. The question
here is “does the expected operational outcome justify the potential exposure of high cost, technically
perishable technologies?” Alternatively, this factor could include an assessment of the risk of
exposing IO methods and techniques that are or have been extremely effective, and whose utility
may be completely neutralized if exposed.
4. No Strike – This factor is designed to search for targets that, if struck with any given IO Asset, would
cause an unacceptable level of unintended damage to another Function or structure. The simplest
example is one where an IO target is next to a hospital, school, or other non-combatant structure.
Another example may be where a given IO Asset is used to affect an adversary’s joint military-civil-
commercial communications network that friendly forces may wish to preserve for other purposes.
5. Service – Service equities can be considered when finalizing IO plans. The assigning of destroy
Effects on adversary air defense systems to one Service or Component day after day, with
concomitant probability of recurring high casualty rates, is sufficient to warrant close review of
equities.
6. Once the equities are reviewed and adjusted, the candidate Master IO target list will be forwarded for
de-confliction/integration with the Air Tasking order and other attack orders. Once de-conflicted and
integrated, it becomes the Master IO Target List.
Class Slides
The following slides illustrate the key points of this chapter and are used as part of the Joint IO Planning
Course class that covers IO planning.
V-18
JIOPP Background
• Joint IO Planning Process (JIOPP) developed in

response to JCS / Unified Command J3 need for a
formal, standardized, integrated IO planning process
common to all planning echelons
– Clearly show how IO helps accomplish Combatant
Commander objectives
• Planners do the thinking, computers “keep the
books” and allow access to tools
• Provides a needed, repeatable, verifiable process
• Development process has highlighted need for more
and different products to support IO planning
The JIOC has developed two formalized planning processes for IO. Combined, these processes are
called the Joint IO Planning Process (JIOPP). The JIOPP has distinct offensive and defensive modules
as shown here.
The JIODPP is a fully developed and validated process that is used by JIOC C/C support teams to plan
defensive IO for the Unified Commanders.
The JIOAPP is still under evaluation, but has already proven its value in both exercise and operational
use.
The ultimate goal of the JIOC is to fully integrate both processes into the Global Command and Control
System software suite.
V-19
JIOPP Background
• There are two JIOPP planning modules -- attack and defense

– Joint IO Attack Planning Process (JIOAPP) has been used to
conduct exercise and operational IO planning
– Computer application that implements JIOAPP – called IO
Navigator (ION) – in use since January 2000
• Improved ION Release 2 operational 30 April 2001
– Joint IO Defensive Planning Process (JIODPP) has
completed IO community review / validation; development of
JIODPP portion of ION started August 2001
– Integration of both modules in progress
• Risk management-based approach incorporates Combatant
Commander objectives and values, accounts for adversary
capabilities, and facilitates cost-risk-benefit analysis among D-
IO methods / techniques
• JIOC will continue refining JIOPP based upon ongoing
operational employment of the process
• Long-term goal – integrate JIOPP into GCCS
Why a Special Planning Process for IO?
SECDEF and
C/C Standard
C/C IO Cell Planning
IO Objective
Objectives
Process
IO Task
Subtask
Unless there is a repeatable process, an IO cell must
reinvent the approach it uses to approach the new
problems and issues of each new contingency. Action
IO Sub-task
The JIOPP process is designed to help make IO

planning easier while maximizing flexibility and
IO Action
creativity.
While each step of the process should be performed, Plan Elements

the process may be done to whatever degree of detail
is desired based upon the available time for planning.
So why did we develop a special planning process for IO? The answer is really simple. It was necessary
to give IO planners a method that would allow them to approach each new problem in a standard manner
without hindering their flexibility or creativity. The JIODPP was the answer. The added benefit of having
a standardized process was that it lends itself to being automated. The JIOAPP has been incorporated
into the JIOC’s IO planning software called the IO Navigator (ION). The JIODPP module for ION is still
under development.
V-20
Permanent
Degrade Destroy
Partial Complete
Disrupt Deny
Temporary
Influence Mislead
Exploit
JIOAPP
Five Major Steps
1. Identify the IO Objectives
2. Generate / Allocate IO Tasks
3. Identify the IO Targets
4. ID Means / Derive Sub-tasks and Target Lists
5. Conduct Equity Review
The equity review needs to be done at the C/C level, and then again down at the JTF/component level.
V-21
JIOAPP
Attack Module Core Process
SECDEF Mission
C/C Objectives – What must be done to accomplish NCA mission?
Specified, Implied, Subsidiary Tasks – (QA) How can IO help?
IO Objectives – What will we do from an IO perspective?
Activities and Functions – (QA) Where will we focus our efforts? Intelligence / Tools
(e.g. SIAM)
General Effects and Elements – How will we shape the info Environment?
C/C IO Tasks – Focused on Centers of Gravity
JFC High Value IO Targets – (QA) What are best Targets in COGs? Intelligence & Engineering Tools
(DIODE / ADVERSARY)
JTF
Specific Effects and Assets – (QA) What are best Assets to Weaponeering and Engineering
induce Effect desired? Tools (CNMTE)
High Payoff IO Targets – (QA) What are best combos of

Decision Tools
Target / Asset?
IO Sub-tasks – Plain language statement of purpose
Actions – Coordinated Targets with Timing

QA = Quantitative Analysis
JIOAPP Process Can IO

List Specified, Methods/Techniques Write an
Flow IO Objective - state
Implied and be used to help
subsidiary tasks accomplish Specified, what to do and who
CinC Objectives
associated with Implied & subsidiary or what is to be
CinC Objectives tasks? If yes, then... affected
Next, examine Determine what

opposition force Opposition Effect to have on
Time-phase Objectives; structure to Activities the most important
derive sub-objectives if determine where and Functions; identify
necessary to focus friendly associated the IO Element that
efforts to accomplish Functions can best achieve
IO Objective. Look for... the Effect
Within Confirm and

Combine Activity, Opposition Functions,
Function, Effect de-conflict Effects
look for hardware desired on target
and Element and Select the best
software, selected; select
write an IO Task Asset-Target
wetware and data specific IO Asset
Statement; assign pairs to attack
targets; pick the most to be used
tasks to Components critical and vulnerable
Write the IO sub-task; include specific Target to be affected, Compile Review

Effect to be achieved and specific IO Asset to be employed Target list Equities
V-22
JIOAPP – A Closer Look

CINC Objectives / Tasks
Very
Operational
IO Objectives – General
What to do, who or what is
Level
to be affected?
IO Tasks –
Where in opposition
force structure
Very will we focus
our efforts?
Collaborative,
Tactical
What Effect do we want?
Level
Information
Intensive IO Sub-tasks –
What specific Targets?
What IO Assets?
Equities Review
Very
Specific
Attack Timing
Attack Example #1
MAINTAIN SEA LINES

OF COMMUNICATION (SLOC)
Implied Task
Prevent opposition naval
forces from interdicting SLOCs
IO Objective
Influence adversary leadership
to believe that the U.S. possesses
overwhelming naval superiority
in region
Can IO Help?
V-23

IO Tasks
Process and analyze
Gather information naval forces in region by
Collect signals
regarding employing PSYOP
intelligence
Disseminate signals Mislead opposition

intelligence signals intelligence
information to units collection effort gathering
Other functions
employing Deception
Deriving IO Targets
IO Task Wetware
Mislead adversary
employing Deception
Opposition Center of Gravity - Target Level

Collection system operators
V-24
IO Assets
Combining IO Effects, Assets and

Targets to Derive the IO Sub-task
Wetware
Perceived
Opposition collection system operators
IO Sub-task - Use naval system X to generate radio

traffic that misleads opposition collection system
Actual
operators at site Q to believe that a large U.S. naval
force is operating in the region
V-25
Attack Example #2
ATTAIN / MAINTAIN
AIR SUPERIORITY
Implied Task Prevent opposition

air defense forces from interfering
with friendly air operations
IO Objective
Prevent adversary air forces from
acquiring information necessary
to oppose friendly air
operations
Can IO Help?

IO Tasks
air defense personnel
Air Intercept
directing interceptors
against friendly aircraft
to believe that U.S.
stealth attack aircraft
Air Defense Early Warning can “disappear” at will
by employing PSYOP
Command and Control

Deny opposition air
defense units the
Engagement ability to engage
friendly aircraft by
employing Electronic
Warfare
Other functions
Adversary Centers of Gravity
V-26
ID Assets and
Allocate to Targets
• Which Assets best accomplish the Effect we

wish to have on target?
• Which Assets . . .
– Apportioned?
– Available?
– Deployed?
– Special?
– Allied?
• Synergistic Assets?
• Relationship to defensive actions?
Conduct Equity Review
Ops gain / Security No

Intel loss JRFL Compromise Service
strike
Sub-task 1
Sub-task 2 X X
Sub-task 3
Sub-task 4
Sub-task 5
Review IO Sub-tasks in light of appropriate checklists

to ensure various equities are properly considered
V-27
V-28
Chapter VI – Joint Information Operations

Defensive Planning Process
The Joint Forces Staff College would like to thank the Joint Information Operations Center for providing
the materials for this chapter. Slides illustrating main points start at page VI-18.
Introduction
Much attention has been given in recent years to planning the technical aspects of Defensive IO, namely
Information Assurance (IA) and Computer Network Defense (CND). The responsibility for these functions
is often given to a C/C’s J6. A look at the recent literature on defensive IO leaves one with the distinct
impression that Defensive IO equals IA and CND. Too little has been written on planning full-spectrum
defensive IO. This chapter focuses primarily on the non-technical disciplines involved in deliberate,
defensive IO planning. The methodology discussed is the Joint IO Defensive Planning Process
(JIODPP). Personnel of the Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC) in San Antonio, Texas developed
the JIODPP.
The JIODPP discussed in this chapter is a five-step methodology for conducting Defensive IO Planning.
The JIODPP is part of the Joint IO Planning Process (JIOPP). The JIOPP includes, in addition to the
JIODPP, the Joint IO Attack Planning Process (JIOAPP), the attack planning complement to the JIODPP.
The JIOPP provides a logical, structured method for integrating Information Operations (IO) planning into
the Joint Planning Process.
The JIODPP facilitates planning at two levels – that conducted by the Unified Commands, as well as the
subordinate Component Commands. Unified Command defensive IO planning usually has as its
objective the construction of detailed defensive IO task statements that are provided to the Components
for further planning. Component-level planning strives to determine the optimum balance among the
Combatant Commander's (C/C's) Objectives, assets to be protected and D-IO Means. Since the
defensive IO planning process is information-intensive, it can also be highly collaborative in nature. Thus,
information and expertise from sources and staffs outside the CinC's IO Planning Cell will be needed to
apply the JIODPP most effectively. Further, the responsibility for conducting contingency planning is
shared among the Unified Commands and their Components, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Department of
Defense Agencies and Centers. The CINCs of the various Unified Commands bear the primary
responsibility for executing those plans and therefore have the lead in plan development. The JIOC
assists the Unified Command staffs in developing IO concepts, integrating these into contingency plans,
and assisting in their execution.
The guidelines presented above regarding the roles of and boundaries between Unified Command,
Component, and other planners may regularly shift. Planners at all levels should not hesitate to contact
persons or staffs (or consult on-line sources) that can provide or acquire needed information.
The following information will assist you in using the JIODPP "paper process" to conduct defensive IO
planning in support of C/C objectives. The purpose of each form will be explained and amplifying
information provided as needed to help you complete the form. Because each planning situation is
different, more forms than are provided in the initial package may be needed to complete a particular
step. If more forms are needed, they can be easily acquired.
VI-1
The Five Steps of the Joint Information Operations

Defensive Planning Process
The five major steps of the JIODPP are listed below. There are a series of sub-steps associated with
each of the major steps. The major steps and sub-steps are as follows.
1. Identify the Defensive IO (D-IO) Objectives
a. Import/write C/C objectives

b. Identify Specified, Implied and subsidiary tasks associated with the C/C objectives
c. Pair Specified, Implied and subsidiary tasks with defensive IO methods and techniques that may
help accomplish the tasks
d. Evaluate the ability of defensive IO methods and techniques to help accomplish the Specified,
Implied and subsidiary tasks
e. Write a defensive IO Objectives statement for tasks selected; establish phasing of defensive IO
Objectives; derive and phase defensive IO Sub-objectives as required
2. Generate the D-IO Tasks
a. For each conflict phase, write the friendly Activity that must be protected to satisfy the defensive
IO Objective
b. For each activity, identify the functions that most contribute to the friendly activity
(1) Evaluate the functions to determine their importance to the activity's success; select the
most important functions
c. Identify the Effects an opponent may attempt to induce on the selected functions
d. Review the range of Effects possible on the selected functions
e. Identify the Defensive IO Means Sets most suitable to protect against the Effects possible
f. Write and establish phasing for a defensive IO Task Statement based on: friendly activity and
function to be protected, Effect to be defeated, and defensive IO Means to be applied to achieve
protection from the Effect
g. Determine which Component has the best capability to accomplish the IO Task/Sub-task;
distribute the IO task to the Component(s)
3. Identify Assets to be protected and conduct Risk Analysis
a. Identify the IO assets – characterized as hardware, software, wetware or data assets--that must
be protected to defeat/prevent the Effect an opponent is attempting to induce on the friendly
function
b. Confirm or refine Effects possible on assets to be protected
c. Evaluate and select the hardware, software, wetware and data assets associated with the
function to identify the ones most critical to the function's success; evaluate the assets further to
identify the ones most vulnerable to enemy attack
(1) Evaluate the Assets according to the criteria for impact of loss (critical)
(2) Plot the impact of loss value for the evaluated asset on the chart
(3) Evaluate the assets according to the criteria for probability of loss (vulnerable)
(4) Plot the probability of loss value for the evaluated asset on the chart
(5) Plot the combined value for the evaluated asset on the chart
4. Select Protection Measures and derive the Defensive IO Sub-tasks
a. Identify the specific defensive IO Means most appropriate for diminishing the risk posed by
adversary-induced Effects on the selected critical and vulnerable IO assets
b. Evaluate to select those most capable of diminishing the adversary-induced Effect on the Asset
(1) Evaluate the D-IO Means according to the criteria for diminishing impact of loss of a critical
Asset
VI-2
(2) Plot the reduction in Impact of Asset Loss conferred by the Defensive IO Means
(3) Evaluate the Defensive IO Means according to the criteria for diminishing probability of loss
of a vulnerable Asset
(4) Plot the reduction in probability of Asset loss conferred by the Defensive IO Means
(5) Plot the overall reduction in risk to the Asset conferred by the Defensive IO Means
c. Select Defensive IO Means-Asset combinations to minimize risk of adversary-induced Effect
d. Identify costs associated with the selected Means-Asset combinations in light of cost criteria
e. Select the final Means-Asset combinations by calculating protection value according to the
formula
f. Derive and write the Defensive IO Sub-tasks
5. Prepare the Master Protection List and conduct Equity Review
a. Prepare candidate Defensive IO Master Protection List

b. Review Defensive IO Sub-tasks in light of appropriate checklists to ensure various equities are
properly considered
FORMS – GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS: To facilitate planners' ability to orient themselves when using
this "paper process," the bottom of the form will display a statement succinctly stating what information is
to be recorded on the form. The top of each form will display the major step of the JIODPP to which the
form pertains.
Step One: Identify the Defensive Information Operations Objectives
FORM 1. Identify the Defensive IO Objectives. Write the C/C Objectives. The purpose of this form is to
record the C/C objectives. In many instances, the IO planning cell will be provided the C/C Objectives.
In other cases, the IO Planning Cell may be involved in deriving the C/C Objectives. Further, C/C
defensive objectives may be identified as a consequence of C/C attack planning, and may be "imported"
from the IO attack-planning module. The exact way by which C/C Objectives will be determined will
probably vary by C/C staff and conflict scenario. The most important point here is to capture and record
all C/C Objectives.
FORM 2. Identify the Defensive IO Objectives. Identify Specified, Implied and subsidiary tasks
associated with the C/C Objectives. The purpose of this form is to record the Specified, Implied and
subsidiary tasks. Upon receipt of a mission, the commander (in concert with his staff) begins his mission
analysis by asking himself specific questions about higher headquarters or SECDEF purpose, intent, the
area of operations, available assets, constraints, restrictions, risk, and time. The commander will
subsequently disseminate the results of his analysis in his restated mission description, objectives, and
concept of operations. The staff continues the mission analysis by asking additional questions, the most
important of which is:
"What tasks must the command perform to accomplish the assigned mission successfully?"
To answer this question, extract (with no consideration of IO) specified, implied or subsidiary tasks from
the commander's objectives, concept of operations, mission statement and rules of engagement.
SPECIFIED TASKS are those tasks the commander spells out in the mission description, his operational
objectives, his concept of operations and other guidance. They are what the commander wants
accomplished.
IMPLIED TASKS are those additional major tasks that are necessary to accomplish the mission, but
which are not specifically spelled out in the commander's guidance. They should not be routine, standing
operating procedure type tasks, or inherent responsibilities of the commander; e.g. providing flank
VI-3
protection for his own unit. Limit the implied tasks to major tasks that are "essential" to the
accomplishment of the mission. Use available task lists (Uniform Joint Task List, Mission Essential Task
List, etc.) to assist in this process.
SUBSIDIARY TASKS are any other tasks that could be viewed as supporting the mission.
FORM 3. Identify the Defensive IO Objectives. Pair Specified, Implied and subsidiary tasks with
Defensive IO Methods and Techniques that may help accomplish the tasks; select the ones that
will best help accomplish the tasks. In this step, first examine the specified, implied and subsidiary
tasks to determine what role Defensive IO may be able to play in accomplishing the tasks. Ask: can the
Defensive IO methods and techniques listed on the form help accomplish the tasks? Pair specified,
implied and subsidiary tasks with the IO Method or Technique that can best help accomplish the task, and
enter these on the form along with the task.
FORM 4. Identify the Defensive IO Objectives. Evaluate the ability of Defensive IO Methods and
Techniques to help accomplish the Specified, Implied and subsidiary tasks. The next step is to
evaluate how well the specified/implied/subsidiary tasks can be accomplished using Defensive IO
methods and techniques. To do this, assess the ability of Defensive IO Methods and Techniques to help
accomplish the designated task according to these criteria: Capability, Feasibility, and Constraints.
CAPABILITY = Degree to which Defensive IO has the capability to accomplish or support the objective.
Capability has two sub-components that can be considered when making the assessment. These are:
EFFICIENCY = Efficiency of D-IO in accomplishing the mission

SUCCESS = Probability of success associated with D-IO in achieving the objective
LOW = D-IO cannot accomplish or support accomplishment of the objective.
MEDIUM = D-IO may be able to accomplish or support accomplishment of the objective.
HIGH = D-IO can definitely accomplish or support accomplishment of the objective.
CONSTRAINTS = Degree to which constraints favor or disfavor use of D-IO. Constraints have three sub-
components that can be considered when making the assessment. These are:
POLITICAL = Degree to which political constraints favor or disfavor use of D-IO

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT = Degree to which ROE favor or disfavor use of D-IO
CULTURAL = Degree to which cultural (religion, etc.) constraints favor or disfavor use of D-IO
RATING SYSTEM for Constraints
LOW = constraints preclude the use of D-IO.
MEDIUM = constraints permit the use of D-IO.
HIGH = constraints cause preference for use of D-IO.
Evaluate the list of specified, implied and subsidiary tasks against the provided criteria to determine the
applicability of D-IO to successful task accomplishment. Use the weighting scheme provided (Default
scheme is: Capability, Feasibility and Constraints are weighted at .33 each; the value for Low = .2;
Medium = .5; and High = .8) to make the calculations indicated on the form to arrive at a numerical total;
the higher the total, the greater the potential contribution of D-IO to accomplishing the task.
VI-4
FEASIBILITY = Degree to which D-IO is a feasible means for accomplishing or supporting the objective.
Feasibility has three sub-components that can be considered when making the assessment. These are:
TECHNICAL = Technical feasibility of D-IO method/technique to protect against potential opposition-

induced Effects
RESOURCES = Degree to which resources are available to implement D-IO capabilities
TIME = Degree to which sufficient time exists to implement and achieve D-IO results
LOW = using D-IO is NOT feasible.
MEDIUM = using D-IO may be feasible.
HIGH = using D-IO is feasible.
FORM 5. Identify the Defensive IO Objectives. Write a D-IO Objective statement for Tasks selected.
Enter the Defensive IO Objective Statement on the form. The Defensive IO Objective statement can
include the general class of assets or audience to be protected, and may state what the desired outcome
may be. An example is shown in the following chart:
SAMPLE DEFENSIVE IO OBJECTIVE DERIVATION
Defensive Example
PROTECT U.S. FORCES

FROM ATTACK
Implied Task
Protect friendly air
forces from attack
D-IO Objective
Prevent opposition air forces from
interfering with friendly
air operations
Can IO Help?
FORM 6. Identify the IO Objectives. Establish time phasing of Defensive IO Objectives. On this
form, assign the accomplishing of Defensive IO Objectives to the desired phase of the campaign. Assign
start and end dates for the Defensive IO Objective and reference the phasing in relation to D-Day. The
opportunity will be provided to review and refine the phasing data throughout the planning process.
FORM 7. Identify the IO Objectives. Derive and write Defensive IO Sub-objectives as necessary.
NOTE: The derivation of Defensive IO Sub-objectives is optional. Sometimes, the further breakdown of
Defensive IO Objectives into sub-objectives is warranted to identify more specifically protection desired or
VI-5
to further delineate classes of assets to be protected. Continuing the example given in the chart for Form
5, a defensive IO Sub-objective could perhaps specify distinct classes of assets to protect within the
friendly air operations structure – the air intelligence leadership or the air defense leadership, for example
– or a specific air defense sector. The sub-objective derivation would consider the Defensive IO Methods
and Techniques available and the friendly centers of gravity to be protected. Any Defensive IO Sub-
objectives derived should be phased.
Step Two: Generate the Defensive Information Operations Tasks
FORM 8. Generate the Defensive IO Tasks. For each conflict phase, write the Friendly Activity that
must be protected to satisfy the Defensive IO Objective.
On this form, list friendly Activities to be protected by Defensive IO Means. The planner should ask,
"What friendly Activities are most important to protect if the D-IO Objective is to be achieved?" The
planner can base his evaluation on these factors: C/C defensive guidance and values provided
specifically for use in constructing the plan; or a review of previous plans and situations that contain
information that can be adapted to the plan under construction. Of course, the individual planners' or
planning teams' expertise provide an excellent basis for evaluation as well. Refer to the
Activities/Functions section for a list of sample friendly Activities.
FORM 9. Generate the Defensive IO Tasks. For each Activity, identify the Functions that most
contribute to the conduct of the Friendly Activity. An Activity can be broken down into its component
parts, known as "Functions" in the JIODPP. The successful accomplishing of the friendly activity will
depend more on some of these Functions than on others. On this form, list those Functions that most
contribute to the activity's successful accomplishment. It is these Functions that Defensive IO strives to
protect. Refer to the Activities/Functions section for a list of sample friendly Functions. Refer to the chart
below to see examples of Functions associated with a Friendly Activity.
Friendly Activities, Functions and

D-IO Tasks
Protected Friendly Activities Valued Friendly Functions D-IO Tasks
Air Intercept Prevent adversary from

exploiting information
on air intercept aspects
Early Warning of friendly air defense
activities by employing
Information Assurance
Air Defense Command and Control measures
Engagement Prevent adversary air

forces from denying
engagement aspects of
friendly air defense by
employing Electronic
Other functions
Protection measures
Friendly Centers of Gravity
VI-6
FORM 10. Generate the Defensive IO Tasks. Identify the Effect that an opponent may try to induce
on the selected function. The range of Effects an opponent may attempt to induce on friendly Functions
is summarized in the following:
Permanent
Degrade Destroy
Partial Complete
Disrupt Deny
Temporary
Influence Mislead
Exploit
Destroy = Damage done to the function is permanent, and all aspects of the function have been affected
OR A function's operation is permanently impaired, and the damage extends to all facets of the function's
operation.
Deny = Damage done to the function is only temporary, but all aspects of the function were affected OR
A function's operation is impaired over the short term, but the damage extends to all facets of the
function's operation.
Degrade = Damage done to the function is permanent, but only portions of the function were affected;
that is, the function still operates, but not fully OR A function's operation is permanently impaired, but the
damage does not extend to all facets of the function's operation.
Disrupt = Damage done to the function is temporary, and only portions of the function were affected OR
A function's operation is impaired over the short term and the damage does not extend to all facets of the
function's operation.
Mislead = creation of a false perception which leads the opposition to act in a manner detrimental to
mission accomplishment while benefiting accomplishment of friendly objectives.
Influence = selected projection or distortion of the truth to persuade the opposition to act in a manner
detrimental to mission accomplishment while benefiting accomplishment of friendly objectives.
Exploit = attempts to gather information that will enable opposition ability to conduct operations to induce
other Effects.
Other = There may be other Effects desired, and this field is designed to allow for "write in" Effects.
VI-7
FORM 11. Generate the Defensive IO Tasks. Review the Effects possible on the selected Function.
This form allows you to review and assess the Effect(s) an opponent may attempt to induce on friendly
Functions. It allows planners to get some sense of the magnitude of the overall problem confronting the
Defensive IO planning effort.
1. Review each friendly function and determine if the selected adversary-induced Effects are
appropriate. These Effects will become part of the Defensive IO Task Statement.
2. Next, review your selections to assess how the opponent may attempt to sequence or synchronize
Effects. You should be considering how an opponent may attempt to sequence IO Effects (e.g.,
mislead, then destroy) or mass Effects on the IO objective/target. Massing in this context infers a
mutually supporting strategy to use different Effects in rapid sequence to confuse or delay friendly
response.
FORM 12. Generate the Defensive IO Tasks. Identify the Defensive IO Means Sets most suitable to
protect against the Effects possible. On this form, list the Function to be protected and the Effect to be
defeated. Now select the general Defensive IO Means Set most suitable for protecting against the
Effects possible.
There are several general categories of Defensive IO means. These include:
Information Assurance
Operations Security
Physical Security
Counter-deception
Counter-propaganda (Psychological Operations)
Counterintelligence
Electronic Warfare
Special Information Operations
These general groupings of Defensive IO Means Sets are capable of defending against certain Effects.
Counter-Deception Means will defend against the Mislead Effect.
Counter-Propaganda (Psychological) Operations Means will defend against the Influence

Effect.
Counterintelligence Means will defend against the Exploit Effect.
Information Assurance, Operations Security, Physical Security, Electronic Warfare and SIO
Means can defend against the Disrupt, Deny, Degrade, and Destroy Effects.
A combination of Defensive IO Means sets may be necessary to defeat the array of Effects an adversary
may attempt to induce.
FORM 13. Generate the Defensive IO Tasks. Write a Defensive IO Task Statement. On this form write
a Defensive IO Task Statement based on the Friendly Activity and Function to be protected, the Effect to
be defeated, and the Defensive IO Means that is most suitable for defending against the Effect an
opponent may attempt to induce. The chart shows examples of properly completed Defensive IO Task
Statements.
FORM 14. Generate the Defensive IO Tasks. Assign the Defensive IO Tasks to the Components. On
this form, write in the Defensive IO Tasks. Determine primary and supporting responsibilities (e.g., Army
primary, Air Force supporting). Fill in the function blocks associated with the tasks by entering the
Component selected and a "P" or an "S" to denote primary or supporting. Example: under the Counter-
deception Heading for Task 1 would be "Navy - P" if the Navy were the most appropriate/capable
VI-8
Component to accomplish the Defensive IO Task. If supporting responsibilities were to be assigned, this
notation would also be made in the block, e.g., "Air Force - S."
Step Three: Identify Assets to be Protected and

Conduct Risk Assessment
Form 15: Identify the IO Assets to be Protected and Conduct Risk Analysis. Identify the IO Assets –
characterized as Hardware, Software, Wetware or Data assets – that must be protected to
defeat/prevent the Effect an Opponent is attempting to induce on the Friendly Function. On this
form, write in the hardware, software, wetware or data assets associated with the function to be
protected. Asset selection is, more often than not, a collaborative process. The participants in the
process may include the J6, J3, J2, Services, agencies such as the Defense Information Systems
Agency, Joint Warfare Analysis Center and others.
Many factors must be assessed when selecting assets. Ideally, the assets identified for further analysis
should be known to play an important role in the successful operation of the function to be protected. The
following chart illustrates the generic types of assets that can be found in the hardware, software,
wetware and data categories.
FORM 16: Identify Assets to be Protected and Conduct Risk Analysis. Confirm or refine Effects
possible on Assets to be protected. Use this form to refine the Effects an opponent may attempt to
induce on the Assets to be protected. The analysis should consider the complete array of Effects
possible (perhaps as a consequence of the physics involved) as well as Effects most likely to be induced
because a given opponent has the capability to do so. The form contains analysis aids that facilitate
planners’ review of Effects and allow the charting of “influence paths” when mapping the relationships
among potential wetware Assets. Use the "IO Effects" chart as an aid to confirm or refine Effects an
opponent may attempt to induce on selected Assets. Use the "Derive Actor" chart to map command or
reporting relationships between echelons or hierarchies, or within high-level staffs. After the review,
complete the form by writing in the assets selected and the corresponding Effect to be defeated.
FORM 17: Identify Assets to be Protected and Conduct Risk Analysis. Evaluate and select the
hardware, software, wetware and data Assets associated with the function to identify the ones
most critical to the function’s success. Evaluate further to identify the ones most vulnerable to
attack.
Determining how critical a given asset is to a function’s success should include an examination of three
factors: availability, reliability and timeliness.
• How would the availability of this function be impaired if this Asset were affected?
• How would the reliability of this function be impaired if this Asset were affected?
• How would the timeliness of this function be impaired if this Asset were affected?
AVAILABILITY = Degree to which the Asset, if affected, would impair the availability of the Function.
LOW = The function's availability would be minimally impaired if this asset were affected.
MEDIUM = The Function's availability would be impaired if this asset were affected.
HIGH = The Function's availability would be seriously impaired if this asset were affected.
RELIABILITY = Degree to which the Asset, if affected, would impair the reliability of the Function.
RATING SYSTEM for Reliability
VI-9
LOW = The Function's reliability would be minimally impaired if this asset were affected.
MEDIUM = The Function's reliability would be impaired if this asset were affected.
HIGH = The Function's reliability would be seriously impaired if this asset were affected.
TIMELINESS = Degree to which the Asset, if affected, would impair the timeliness of the Function.
RATING SYSTEM for Timeliness
LOW = The Function's timeliness would be minimally impaired if this asset were affected.
MEDIUM = The Function's timeliness would be impaired if this asset were affected.
HIGH = The Function's timeliness would be seriously impaired if this asset were affected.
FORM 18: Identify Assets to be Protected and Conduct Risk Analysis. Evaluate the assets according
to the criteria for impact of loss (critical). Use the form to conduct the evaluations for the selected
assets and derive values.
FORM 19: Identify Assets to be Protected and Conduct Risk Analysis. Plot the "impact of loss" value
for the evaluated Asset on the chart. Use the form to plot the values derived for the selected assets.
FORM 20: Identify Assets to be Protected and Conduct Risk Analysis. Evaluate the Assets according
to the criteria for probability of loss (vulnerable). Vulnerability is the degree to which a target is
"open" to attack. Use the form to conduct the evaluations for the selected assets and derive values.
Determining how vulnerable a given Asset is to an opponent's attack should include an examination of
five factors:
• Is the Asset accessible?

• Is the Asset susceptible to attack?
• Is it feasible to attack the Asset?
• What is the Opponent's capability to attack the Asset?
• What is the Opponent's intent with respect to an attack on the Asset?
ACCESSIBILITY = Degree to which the Asset can be "reached" by an attacking system.
RATING SYSTEM for Accessibility
LOW = access to Asset would be difficult to obtain.
MEDIUM = access to Asset can be gained.
HIGH = access to Asset is easily gained
SUSCEPTIBILITY = Degree to which the Asset can be affected.
RATING SYSTEM for Susceptibility
LOW = Asset can be affected by an attack to a limited degree at best.
MEDIUM = Asset can be affected by an attack.
HIGH = Asset can be highly affected by an attack
VI-10
FEASIBILITY = An attack on this Asset can be accomplished; a measure of the feasibility associated with
the attacking of the Asset.
LOW = The feasibility of attacking the Asset is low.
MEDIUM = The feasibility of attacking the Asset is medium.
HIGH = The feasibility of attacking the Asset is high.
CAPABILITY = A measure of the Opponent's ability to employ weapons systems/techniques to achieve a

desired Effect on the Asset.
LOW = The opponent's capability to attack the asset is low.
MEDIUM = The opponent's capability to attack the target is medium.
HIGH = The opponent's capability to attack the target is high.
INTENT = A measure of the opponent's level of purpose in regards to attack on Friendly Assets. When
assessing an Opponent's intent to attack an Asset, two factors can be considered:
STATEMENTS OF PURPOSE: Does the Opponent's public or official statements of policy or doctrine
indicate that it would as a matter of course conduct attacks on these Assets; and
RELATED ACTIVITIES: Do related Opponent activities (troop movements, political activities, civil defense
preparations, etc.) indicate that the Opponent intends to attack the Asset?
RATING SYSTEM for Intent
LOW = The opponent's intent to attack the asset is low.
MEDIUM = The opponent's intent to attack the asset is medium.
HIGH = The opponent's intent to attack the asset is high
FORM 21: Identify Assets to be Protected and Conduct Risk Analysis. Plot the probability of loss
value for the evaluated asset on the chart. Use the form to plot the values derived for the selected
assets.
FORM 22: Identify Assets to be protected and conduct Risk Analysis. Plot the values derived for the
selected asset during the Impact of loss/Probability of loss evaluations on their respective axes to
display an overall value for risk. Plot the values derived on Forms 18 and 20 for the selected asset
onto Form 22. The impact of loss value from Form 18 is plotted on the "y" axis; the probability of loss
value from Form 20 is plotted on the "x" axis. Where the two values would intersect on the chart, draw a
star. The star represents graphically the combined numerical quantification of Risk posed to the asset.
Step Four: Select Protection Measures and Derive Defensive

Information Operations Sub-tasks as Required
FORM 23: Select Protection Measures and Derive the Defensive IO Sub-tasks. Identify the Specific
Defensive IO Means most appropriate for diminishing the Risk posed by adversary-induced
VI-11
Effects on the selected critical and vulnerable assets; evaluate to select those most capable of
diminishing the adversary-induced Effect on the asset. On this form, write the asset to be protected
and the Effect to be defeated. Select specific D-IO assets that can diminish the adversary-induced Effect
on the asset.
FORM 24: Select Protection Measures and Derive the Defensive IO Sub-tasks. Evaluate the Defensive
IO Means according to the criteria for diminishing impact of loss of a critical asset. On this form,
evaluate the ability of the D-IO Means to diminish the impact of the asset's loss on the availability,
reliability, and timeliness of the associated Function. Write the D-IO asset to be employed at the top of
the form. Evaluate the D-IO Mean's ability to diminish the impact of the Asset's loss on the availability,
reliability and timeliness of the associated Function by using the criteria on the form. Use the form to
conduct the evaluations and derive the values.
Determining the ability of a defensive IO Means to diminish the impact of the Asset's loss will again
include an examination of three factors: availability, reliability, and timeliness.
• How would the D-IO Means diminish the impact of the Asset's loss on the availability of this
function?
• How would the D-IO Means diminish the impact of the Asset's loss on the reliability of this
function?
• How would the D-IO Means diminish the impact of the Asset's loss on the timeliness of this
function?
AVAILABILITY = Degree to which the D-IO Means, when applied to the Asset, would improve the
availability of the Function.
LOW = The Function's availability would be minimally improved if this D-IO Means were
employed on this Asset.
MEDIUM = The Function's availability would be improved if this D-IO Means were employed on
this Asset.
HIGH = The Function's availability would be significantly improved if this D-IO Means were
RELIABILITY = Degree to which the D-IO Means, when applied to the Asset, would improve the reliability
of the Function.
RATING SYSTEM for Reliability
LOW = The Function's reliability would be minimally improved if this D-IO Means were employed
on this Asset.
MEDIUM = The Function's reliability would be improved if this D-IO Means were employed on this
Asset.
HIGH = The Function's reliability would be significantly improved if this D-IO Means were
TIMELINESS = Degree to which the D-IO Means, when applied to the Asset, would improve the
timeliness of the Function.
RATING SYSTEM for Timeliness
VI-12
LOW = The Function's timeliness would be minimally improved if this D-IO Means were employed
on this Asset.
MEDIUM = The Function's timeliness would be improved if the is D-IO Means were employed on
this Asset.
HIGH = The Function's timeliness would be significantly improved if this D-IO Means were
FORM 25: Select Protection Measures and Derive the Defensive IO Sub-tasks. Plot the reduction in
the impact of asset loss conferred by the D-IO Means. On this form, plot the reduction in impact of
loss. To do so, subtract the value derived for the reduction in impact of asset loss (Form 24) from the
impact of asset loss value derived on Form 18 for the same asset. Plot this value on the chart.
FORM 26: Select Protection Measures and Derive the Defensive IO Sub-tasks. Evaluate the D-IO
Means according to the criteria for diminishing probability of loss of a vulnerable Asset. On this
form, calculate the reduction in probability of loss. Write the D-IO means being evaluated on the form.
Evaluate the D-IO Mean's ability to diminish the feasibility, susceptibility, and accessibility of attack by
the opponent; evaluate as well the D-IO Mean's ability to diminish the Opponent's capability and intent
to attack the Asset. Use the form to conduct the evaluations and derive the values.
Determining how a specific D-IO Means will diminish an asset's probability of loss should include an
examination of five factors:
• How will the D-IO Means diminish the Opponent's accessibility to the Asset?
• How will the D-IO Means diminish the susceptibility of the Asset to Opponent attack?
• How will the D-IO Means diminish the feasibility of the Opponent's attacking the Asset?
• How will the D-IO Means diminish the Opponent's capability to attack the Asset?
• How will the D-IO Means diminish the Opponent's intent to attack the Asset?
ACCESSIBILITY = Degree to which the opponent's ability to "reach" the asset can be diminished.
RATING SYSTEM for Accessibility
LOW = D-IO Means would not significantly diminish opponent accessibility to the Asset.
MEDIUM = D-IO means would diminish Opponent accessibility to Asset.
HIGH = D-IO Means would significantly diminish Opponent's accessibility to asset.
SUSCEPTIBILITY = Degree to which the Asset's ability to be affected by an Opponent's attack can be
diminished.
RATING SYSTEM for Susceptibility
LOW = D-IO Means will not significantly diminish the Asset's susceptibility to attack.
MEDIUM = D-IO Means will diminish the Asset's susceptibility to attack.
HIGH = D-IO Means will significantly diminish the Asset's susceptibility to attack.
FEASIBILITY = Degree to which the feasibility of an attack on this asset can be diminished. When
assessing a D-IO Means' ability to diminish the feasibility of an Opponent's attacking an Asset, three
factors can be considered:
VI-13
TECHNICAL: Does the D-IO Means diminish the Opponent's technical capabilities for attacking the
Asset;
RESOURCES: Does the D-IO Means diminish the Opponent's ability to attack the asset with the
minimum forces needed to be effective; and
TIME: Does the D-IO Means cause the Opponent to increase the time needed to attack the asset
successfully?
LOW = The D-IO Means will not significantly diminish the feasibility of the Opponent's attacking
the Asset.
MEDIUM = The D-IO Means will diminish the feasibility of the Opponent's attacking the Asset.
HIGH = The D-IO Means will significantly diminish the feasibility of the Opponent's attacking the
Asset.
CAPABILITY = Degree to which an Opponent's capability to attack an Asset will be diminished. It is a

measure of the Opponent's ability to employ weapons systems/techniques to achieve a desired Effect on
the Asset. When assessing a D-IO Mean's ability to diminish an Opponent's capability to attack an Asset,
two factors can be considered:
EFFICIENCY: Does the D-IO Means diminish the Opponent's ability to attack the Asset efficiently; and
SUCCESS: Does the D-IO Means diminish the Opponent's ability to attack the target successfully?
LOW = The D-IO Means will not significantly diminish the opponent's capability to attack the
asset.
MEDIUM = The D-IO Means will diminish the opponent's capability to attack the asset.
HIGH = The D-IO Means will significantly diminish the opponent's capability to attack the asset.
INTENT = Degree to which an Opponent's level of purpose in regards to attack on Friendly Assets can be
diminished. When assessing a D-IO Mean's ability to diminish an Opponent's intent to attack an Asset,
two factors can be considered:
STATEMENTS OF PURPOSE: Does the D-IO Means alter the Opponent's public or official statements of
policy or doctrine such that the potential for an attack on the Asset is diminished; and
RELATED ACTIVITIES: Does the D-IO Means seem to cause changes in related activities (troop
movements, political activities, civil defense preparations, etc.) such that the Opponents intent to
attack and Asset appears to be diminished?
RATING SYSTEM for Intent
LOW = The D-IO Means will not significantly alter the opponent's intent to attack the asset.
MEDIUM = The D-IO Means can alter the opponent's intent to attack the asset.
HIGH = The D-IO Means has a significant potential to alter the opponent's intent to attack the
asset.
FORM 27: Select Protection Measures and Derive the Defensive IO Sub-tasks. Plot the reduction in the
probability of asset loss conferred by the D-IO Means. On this form, plot the reduction in probability
of asset loss. To do so, subtract the value derived for the reduction in probability of asset loss (Form 26)
VI-14
from the probability of asset loss value derived on Form 20 for the same asset. Plot this value on the
chart.
FORM 28: Select Protection Measures and Derive the Defensive IO Sub-tasks. Plot the overall
reduction in risk to the Asset conferred by the D-IO Means. Plot the values derived on Forms 25 and
27 for the selected asset onto Form 28. The value representing the reduction in impact of Asset loss from
Form 25 is plotted on the "y" axis; the value representing the reduction in probability of Asset loss from
Form 27 is plotted on the "x" axis. Where the two values would intersect on the chart, draw a star. The
star represents graphically the combined numerical quantification indicating the overall Reduction in Risk
posed to the asset based on the D-IO Means applied.
FORM 29: Select Protection Measures and Derive the Defensive IO Sub-tasks. Select Defensive IO
Means-Asset combinations to minimize the Risk of Opponent-induced Effect. On this form, pair
Assets to be protected with the D-IO Means that most reduce the risk of Opponent-induced Effect.
FORM 30: Select Protection Measures and Derive the Defensive IO Sub-tasks. Evaluate the selected
Means-Asset combinations in light of Cost criteria. On this form, use the criteria to derive a value
representing the costs to protect the Asset with the D-IO Means identified.
Determining the value for cost to protect a specific Asset with a specific D-IO Means should include an
examination of three factors:
• What are the monetary costs?

• What are the political costs?
• What are the human costs?
MONETARY = Dollar cost of employing D-IO Means.
RATING SYSTEM for Monetary
LOW = D-IO Means for protecting the Asset is low in cost.
MEDIUM = D-IO means for protecting the Asset is moderate in cost.
HIGH = D-IO Means for protecting the Asset is high in cost.
POLITICAL = Political cost of employing the D-IO Means.
RATING SYSTEM for Political
LOW = Political cost of employing the D-IO Means is low.
MEDIUM = Political cost of employing the D-IO means is moderate.
HIGH = Political cost of employing D-IO Means is high.
HUMAN = Human cost (casualties) of employing D-IO Means.
RATING SYSTEM for Human
LOW = Human cost of employing D-IO Means for protecting the Asset is low.
MEDIUM = Human cost of employing D-IO means for protecting the Asset is moderate.
HIGH = Human cost of employing D-IO Means for protecting the Asset is high.
VI-15
FORM 31: Select Protection Measures and Derive the Defensive IO Sub-tasks. Select the final Means-
Asset combinations by calculating Protection Value according to the formula as given on the
form. Use the form to make the calculation and determine the best Means-Asset combinations. The
value for cost was derived in Form 30; Risk on Form 22; and Benefit on Form 28.
FORM 32: Select Protection Measures and Derive the Defensive IO Sub-tasks. Derive and Write D-IO
Sub-tasks. The D-IO Sub-task statement is intended to be a clear statement of what is to occur. The IO
Sub-task should include the following:
• The Effect to be defeated?

• The specific Asset to be protected?
• The specific D-IO Means to be applied?
The Chart below illustrates one such completed IO Sub-task:
Defensive IO Sub-tasks
• Prevent opposition air forces from

destroying XX Division air defense
antennas by using camouflage netting
to conceal antenna locations
• Prevent opposition air forces from
destroying sector Air Defense CPs by
erecting multiple false CPs transmitting
AD data
Step Five: Prepare the Master Protection List and

Conduct Equity Review
FORM 33: Prepare the Master Protection List and Conduct Equity Review. Prepare the candidate D-IO
Master Protection List. On this form, the candidate D-IO Master Protection List is assembled. On the
form, list the Asset name; the coordinates/location; the IO Means to be applied; and the entity responsible
for implementing the protective measures. Gather the information specified and write the information on
the form.
FORM 34: Prepare the Master Protection List and Conduct Equity Review. Review Defensive IO Sub-
tasks in light of appropriate checklists to ensure that various equities are properly considered.
The review of equities is the final step in the Joint IO Defensive Planning Process. On this form, the
various D-IO Sub-tasks are reviewed to ensure that they are checked against other factors that may bear
on the defense of IO Assets. These other factors include the following.
VI-16
Offensive versus Defensive – This dilemma is well known to most planners. An opponent may observe
the “plugging” of friendly “holes” for defensive purposes. The opponent may then realize that the same or
similar holes exist in his force structure. Opponent action to fix these holes will result in the loss of
Friendly avenues of attack. The opposite situation is also true. Friendly exploiting of Opponent "holes"
may cause an Opponent response on similar holes existing in Friendly force structure. Offense/Defense
equities must be carefully balanced to insure that the net overall advantage accruing to friendly forces is
as great as possible.
Joint Restricted Frequency Lists – The Joint Spectrum Center is principally responsible for the
construction of these lists. The J6 will also be involved, as well as the J2. The IO planner is ensuring
here that D-IO will not impact friendly attack communications or other operations negatively.
Security Compromise. This factor may become crucial if sensitive, perishable, high cost technologies
are to be employed in the hope of achieving a specific defensive goal. The question here is “does the
expected operational outcome justify the potential exposure of high cost, technically perishable
technologies?” Alternatively, this factor could include an assessment of the risk of exposing D-IO
methods and techniques that are or have been extremely effective, and whose utility may be completely
neutralized if exposed.
No Strike. This factor is designed to search for assets that, if defended, would cause an unacceptable
level of unintended damage to another function or structure. The simplest example is one where an IO
asset being defended is next to a hospital, school, or other non-combatant structure. An active defense
or decoy may be employed that will cause the opponent to miss the Asset, but possibly cause collateral
damage. Another example may be where a given D-IO Means is used to affect an adversary’s joint
military-civil-commercial communications network that friendly forces may wish to preserve for other
purposes.
Service. Service equities must be considered when finalizing D- IO plans. When D-IO Means are
limited, a C/C may choose to allocate defensive resources from one component to another where most
needed.
Once the equities are reviewed and adjusted, the candidate Master D-IO Protection List will be forwarded
for de-confliction/integration with the Air Tasking Order and other attack orders. Once de-conflicted and
integrated, it becomes the Master D-IO Protection List.
Class Slides
The following slides illustrate the key points of this chapter and are used as part of the Joint IO Planning
Course class that covers IO planning.
VI-17
JIODPP
Five Major Steps
1. Identify the Defensive IO Objectives
2. Generate the Defensive IO Tasks
Identify Assets to be Protected

3.
and Conduct Risk Analysis
4. Select Protection Measures and

Derive the Defensive IO Sub-tasks
Prepare the Master Protection List

5. and Conduct Equity Review
Now let’s take a look at the JIODPP. The JIODPP is extremely flexible. While all five steps of the
process should be accomplished, the level of detail, particularly in the third and fourth steps, may be
varied based upon the amount of time available for planning.
VI-18
JIODPP
Defensive Module Core Process
SECDEF Mission
C/C Objectives – What must be done to accomplish NCA mission?
Specified, Implied, Subsidiary Tasks – (QA) How can D-IO help?
D-IO Objectives – What will we do from an D-IO perspective?
Friendly Activities and Functions – (QA) Where will we focus our defensive efforts?
General Effects and Elements – How will we mitigate adversary efforts? What Effects can the
adversary induce?
D-IO Tasks – Focused on our Centers of Gravity
High Value D-IO Targets – (QA) What resources within our COGs Risk Identification
must be protected?
Specific Effects and Assets – (QA) What are best D-IO Assets to Risk Mitigation
mitigate Effect expected?
Risk-managed IO Resources – (QA) What are best combos of Risk Acceptance /

Rejection
Resources / Assets?
D-IO Sub-tasks – Plain language statement of purpose
Actions – Sequence / Timing Assigned

QA = Quantitative Analysis
Putting the entire process on one chart, it looks something like this. We’ll look at each of these steps.
VI-19
JIODPP – A Closer Look

C/C Objectives
Very
D-IO Objectives – General
How will D-IO help accomplish C/C objectives?
D-IO Tasks –
Which friendly activities and functions are to be protected?
Which adversary-induced Effects are to be mitigated?
Very Risk Management Methodology –

Collaborative, Translates general D-IO Tasks into specific D-IO
Sub-tasks by identifying D-IO Means to
Information manage risk to high-value assets
Intensive D-IO Sub-tasks –

Best D-IO Means
to manage risk
Equities Review
Very
Specific
Defense / attack integration must occur throughout process
As you go through the JIODPP you will be required to identify high-value friendly information systems and
then assess their vulnerability to attack by an adversary. This assessment will be used to conduct risk
management.
VI-20
JIODPP
Risk Management - Components of Risk
Impact of Asset Loss

depends primarily
on YOU and YOUR RELIANCE on
information, information-based
HIGH
processes, information systems, and
Impact of Loss (critical) the mind...
Probability of Asset Loss depends primarily

MEDIUM
on your ENEMY and your ENEMY’S

ability to DELIVER MEANS to result
in EFFECTs on your information,
information-based processes,
information systems, and mind . . .
LOW
LOW MEDIUM HIGH
Probability of Loss (vulnerable)
Once you identify the high value assets requiring protection, you must conduct risk management in order
to prioritize your defensive IO activities and to develop means of defending your high-value assets. In
conducting risk management you will consider two factors. The first factor is the impact of loss, which is
shown on the Y-axis. The second factor is the probability of loss, shown on the X-axis.
VI-21
JIODPP Combining and Plotting the

Components to ID Risk
HIGH
LOW PROB + HIGH IMP MED PROB + HIGH IMP HIGH PROB + HIGH IMP
Impact of Loss (critical)

MEDIUM
LOW PROB + MED IMP MED PROB + MED IMP HIGH PROB + MED IMP
LOW
LOW PROB + LOW IMP MED PROB + LOW IMP HIGH PROB + LOW IMP
LOW MEDIUM HIGH

= Valuable Friendly Information Assets
The JIODPP describes how to plot a risk assessment for each high value asset requiring protection that
you identify. By plotting the risk for each high value asset, you will be better able to prioritize which
assets require protection.
VI-22
JIODPP
Reducing Probability of Loss
Reduce Threat
Reduce Opposition Perception

of Value
Increase Opposition Perception of

Another Target in Vicinity
Reduce Targetability
Harden to Certain Means Sets
LOW MEDIUM HIGH
Probability of Loss
Once you prioritize the high value assets requiring protection, there are a number of measures that can
be applied to reduce risk to teach system by reducing the probability of losing the asset. These measures
include both physical protective measures and perception management measures.
VI-23
JIODPP
Reducing Impact of Loss
HIGH
• Backup Systems
Impact of Loss
MEDIUM
• Recoverable Information
• Distributed Functions
• Improved Reliability
LOW
Likewise, there are measures you may take to reduce the impact of the loss of a high value asset.
JIODPP
Applying D-IO Methods / Techniques to
Reduce Risk
HIGH
LOW PROB + HIGH IMP MED PROB + HIGH IMP HIGH PROB + HIGH IMP
Impact of Loss (critical)
MEDIUM
LOW PROB + MED IMP MED PROB + MED IMP HIGH PROB + MED IMP
LOW
LOW PROB + LOW IMP MED PROB + LOW IMP HIGH PROB + LOW IMP
LOW MEDIUM HIGH
= Valuable Friendly Information Assets
By reducing the probability of loss and the impact of loss for your high value assets, you can reduce the
overall risk to the assets.
VI-24
JIODPP Equity Review
Defense /
Offense / Security Open
Intel JRFL Compromise Asst Service
Sub-task 1
Sub-task 2 X X
Sub-task 3
Sub-task 4
Sub-task 5
Review D-IO Sub-tasks to ensure various equities

are properly considered
The review of equities is the final step in the Joint IO Defensive Planning Process. On this form, the various D-IO
Sub-tasks are reviewed to ensure that they are checked against other factors that may bear on the defense of IO
Assets. These other factors include the following.
Offensive versus Defensive. This dilemma is well known to most planners. An opponent may observe the
“plugging” of friendly “holes” for defensive purposes. The opponent may then realize that the same or similar holes
exist in his force structure. Opponent action to fix these holes will result in the loss of Friendly avenues of attack.
The opposite situation is also true. Friendly exploiting of Opponent "holes" may cause an Opponent response on
similar holes existing in Friendly force structure. Offense/Defense equities must be carefully balanced to insure that
the net overall advantage accruing to friendly forces is as great as possible.
Joint Restricted Frequency Lists. The Joint Spectrum Center is principally responsible for the
construction of these lists. The J6 will also be involved, as well as the J2. The IO planner is ensuring here that D-IO
will not impact friendly attack communications or other operations negatively.
Security Compromise. This factor may become crucial if sensitive, perishable, high cost technologies are
to be employed in the hope of achieving a specific defensive goal. The question here is “does the expected
operational outcome justify the potential exposure of high cost, technically perishable technologies?” Alternatively,
this factor could include an assessment of the risk of exposing D-IO methods and techniques that are or have been
extremely effective, and whose utility may be completely neutralized if exposed.
No Strike. This factor is designed to search for assets that, if defended, would cause an unacceptable level
of unintended damage to another function or structure. The simplest example is one where an IO asset being
defended is next to a hospital, school, or other non-combatant structure. An active defense or decoy may be
employed that will cause the opponent to miss the Asset, but possibly cause collateral damage. Another example
may be where a given D-IO Means is used to affect an adversary’s joint military-civil-commercial communications
network that friendly forces may wish to preserve for other purposes.
Service. Service equities must be considered when finalizing D-IO plans. When D-IO Means are limited, a
C/C may choose to allocate defensive resources from one component to another where most needed.
Once the equities are reviewed and adjusted, the candidate Master D-IO Protection List will be forwarded for de-
confliction/integration with the Air Tasking Order and other attack orders. Once de-conflicted and integrated, it
becomes the Master D-IO Protection List.
VI-25
Defensive Example
PROTECT U.S. FORCES

FROM ATTACK
Implied Task
Protect friendly air
forces from attack
D-IO Objective
Prevent opposition air forces from
interfering with friendly
air operations
Can IO Help?
VI-26
IO Navigator (ION)
• Written in Java
• ION technically platform-independent, but
optimized for PC-based Windows NT
• Uses ORACLE database
• Designed as a distributed, collaborative
planning tool for networked use, but can be
used in a stand-alone mode
• JWICS or SIPRNET communications
backbones
• Runs best on a 266 MHz or faster processor;
128 MB or more of RAM is preferred
• ION release 2.0 operational 30 April 2001
VI-27
VI-28
Chapter VII – Annexes and Appendices
Annex A – Information Operations Estimate Process

Within a JTF context, the JOPES Crisis Action Planning process will likely be used. The following is a list
of activities that should be accomplished during this planning process. This system was developed by
USACOM (now USJFCOM). While designed for a JTF, the system is generally applicable at the Unified
Command level as well.
1. Contribute to JTF’s overall mission analysis OPSEC CA PA

a. Determine known facts, current status, or conditions of PSYOP MA
joint IO/IW capabilities. Determine the size, Deception Brief
capabilities, and status of IO/IW forces already
provided in the C/C’s planning document. EW
IO/IW JTF Mission
b. Contribute to Intelligence Preparation of the Phy. Situation
Destruct. Analysis
Battlespace by: Analysis
Phy.
(1) Conducting analysis for offensive IO/IW. Seek Security Understanding the
JTF’s mission
to increase JTF initiative in time and space by CNA
corrupting and/or disrupting adversary CI
information and decision making capability. SIO IA
(a) Identify adversary information, C2, and C4I
systems that enable the adversary to proactively attack the JTF, or react to JTF
initiatives.
(b) In coordination with the J2, JIOC and JWAC, conduct nodal analysis of the information,
C2 and C4I systems -- identify critical information and vulnerable nodes.
(c) Develop consolidated list of critical and vulnerable adversary information, C2 and C4I
system nodes/entities.
(d) Profile adversary C2 (leadership) for vulnerabilities and access.
(e) Prioritize consolidated list of critical and vulnerable adversary information, C2 nodes and
C4I system nodes/entities.
1 Reflect priority on offensive IO and active defensive IO requirements adjusted for
current JTF ROE.
2 Determine desired effect on each node/entity: deny information to the node/entity,
influence the node/entity, disrupt or destroy the node/entity.
3 Determine effect on critical adversary information.
(2) Conduct analysis of JTF information, C2, and C4I systems for defensive IO considerations.
(a) Analyze JTF defensive IO awareness (e.g., OPSEC, COMSEC, COMPUSEC,
Information Assurance, etc.).
(b) Identify friendly, information, C2 and C4I vulnerabilities.
(c) Prioritize consolidated list of critical and vulnerable friendly information, C2 nodes and
C4I system nodes/entities. Reflect priority on defensive IO requirements.
(d) Profile friendly C2 (leadership) for vulnerabilities and access.
(e) Analyze adversary offensive IO capability to identify systems that could be used to attack
or influence friendly information, C2 and C4I:
1 Adversary intelligence systems.
2 Adversary staff facilities.
3 Adversary component units, equipment, facilities that would employ the tools of IW
against friendly C2 and C4I.
(f) In conjunction with J2/JIOC/JWAC, conduct nodal analysis of above systems; identify
critical and vulnerable nodes.
(g) Identify appropriate defensive IO/Information Assurance measures.
c. Develop assumptions to replace missing or unknown facts concerning C/C IO and JTF IW
operations.
(1) Status of forces at probable execution.
A-1
(2) Available time.

(3) Other as appropriate.
d. Analyze C/C’s mission and intent from a JTF IW perspective.
e. Determine IW limitations.
(1) Things the JTF IW must do (constraints).
(2) Things the JTF IW cannot do (restraints).
(3) Others (e.g., political, weather, terrain, etc.).
f. Determine adversary and own center(s) of gravity (COGs) and tentative decisive points.
(1) Determine IW-based approaches to adversary COGs.
(2) Determine ways for IW to assist in protecting friendly force COGs.
g. Identify tasks to be performed by JTF IW forces.
(1) Determine specified tasks.
(2) Determine implied tasks.
(3) Determine subsidiary tasks.
(4) From (1), (2) and (3) above, determine essential tasks or goals.
(a) Establish broad offensive IO goals.
(b) Establish broad defensive IO goals.
h. Conduct initial JTF IW force structure analysis to determine if sufficient IW assets are available to
do the tasks.
i. Conduct an initial risk assessment.
j. Determine end state from an IW perspective.
k. Assist in development of JTF mission statement.
l. Assist in development of mission analysis briefing for the CJTF.
2. Receive CJTF planning guidance CJTF should provide guidance at this point. Planning guidance
should be disseminated to the IO/IW Cell’s personnel and the components. If needed, ask the CJTF
for any guidance necessary for continued planning.
A-2
3. Develop IO/IW options to support the JTF’s COAs

OPSEC CA PA
The JTF staff should now develop multiple friendly PSYO
COAs. P
Deceptio
a. Develop IO/IW options for initial JTF COAs.
(1) Review mission analysis and CJTF’s EW JTF COA
guidance. Phy.
Develo Development
(2) Develop IO/IW options, as necessary, to p
Destruct
IO/IW
support the JTF’s COAs from the beginning Phy. Ways to accomplish
of the operation to the end in the following Securit the mission
areas: CNA
(a) Identify options (use of specific elements) CI
for accomplishing offensive IO goals. SIO IA
1 Operations Security (OPSEC)
2 Psychological Operations (PSYOP)
3 Deception
4 Electronic warfare (EW)
5 Physical Destruction
6 Computer Network Attack (CNA)
7 Special Information Operations (SIO)
8 Civil Affairs
9 Public Affairs
(b) Identify options (use of specific elements) for accomplishment of defensive IO goals.
1 OPSEC
2 Counter-PSYOP
3 Counter-deception
4 Electronic Protection (EP)
5 Physical Security
6 Counter-Intelligence (CI)
7 Special Information Operations (SIO)
8 Information Assurance (IA)
9 Public Affairs
b. Coordinate ROE with JTF ROE cell for each IW element (or tool, if required) as specific details
become apparent.
c. Recommend options for the IO/IW command and control.
d. Plan to incorporate IO/IW forces in the JTF information architecture.
e. Test each COA input for validity.
f. Provide input to JTF COA statement and sketches.
4. Participate in COA analysis (war gaming) Be

prepared to contribute to the process of war-gaming by OPSEC
CA PA
mentally “fighting the battle” in time and space. The PSYOP
process may use the structure of action-reaction- Deception JTF COA
counteraction sequences for critical events (e.g. D-Day Analysis
actions). Key elements the staff is determining include EW
Analyze
more details about: Phy.
Destruct.
IO/IW
Options
a. Specific tasks for components with IO/IW
Phy.
capabilities. Security War-gaming
b. Command relationships. CNA
c. Decision points for IO/IW.
CI
d. Operational support needed. SIO IA
e. Identification of branches (what if) and sequels
(what then).
A-3
5. Participate in COA comparison

a. Participate in determining the criteria to be used for CA PA
comparing COAs. Criteria for IO/IW operations could come OPSEC
PSYOP
from: JTF COA
(1) Commander’s Intent. Deception Comparison
(2) Factors of METT-T (+). EW
(a) Mission accomplishment. Phy.
Compare
Destruct. IO/IW
(b) Adversary. Options
Comparing
(c) Terrain. Phy.
Security COAs against
(d) Troops available. a selected set of
CNA
(e) Time available. criterion
(f) Political. CI
SIO IA
b. Ensure recommendations for IO/IW operations have been
coordinated with the components of the JTF.
6. Receive CJTF’s decision on COAs. The CJTF may select or modify the recommended COA.
Based on that decision, the Commander’s Estimate document (or slides) will normally be sent/briefed
to the C/C for approval.
CA PA
7. Provide input/develop IO/IW perspective in JTF plan/order.
After the COA is selected, the plan/order is physically developed. OPSEC JTF Plan/
Most of the information needed for this task should have already PSYOP Order Devel
been developed through the estimate process (mission analysis Deception
Plan or
through COA selection). IO/IW operations input can be in many Order
sections of the plan/order, however, the primary areas for writing EW
Develop
IO/IW information are in the following portions per JOPES (see Phy. IO/IW
Destruct.
Input Writing
CJCSM 3122.03): Phy. & issuing
a. Information Operations – Appendix 3 (Information Security
directives
Operations) to Annex C (Operations). CNA
b. Deception Operations – Tab A (Military Deception) of CI
Appendix 3 to Annex C. SIO IA
c. Electronic Warfare – Tab B (Electronic Warfare) of Appendix
3 to Annex C.
d. Operations Security – Tab C (Operations Security) of Appendix 3 to Annex C.
e. Psychological Operations – Tab D (Psychological Operations) of Appendix 3 to Annex C.
f. Physical Destruction – Tab E (Physical Attack/Destruction) of Appendix 3 to Annex C.
g. Computer Network Attack – Tab F (CNA) of Appendix 3 to Annex C, and/or Annex S (STO).
h. Defensive IO/IW – Tab G (Defensive Information Operations) of Appendix 3 to Annex C.
i. Other areas in which IO/IW is included in the plan/order include:
(1) Intelligence – Annex B (Intelligence)
(2) Public Affairs – Annex F (Public Affairs)
(3) Civil Affairs – Annex G (Civil Affairs)
(4) Communications – Annex K (Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems)
(5) Space Operations – Annex N (Space)
(6) Consequence Management – Annex T (Consequence Management)
(7) Interagency – Annex V (Interagency Coordination)
A-4
Appendix 1 – Operations Security
1. Contribute to JTF’s overall mission analysis

a. Determine known facts, current status, or conditions of joint OPSEC as defined in the C/C’s
planning document (Planning Order, Operations Order, etc.).
b. Identify “critical information.”
(1) Determine Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI).
(2) Determine “critical information” (a subset of EEFI). This is the information vitally needed by
the adversary and focuses the remainder of the OPSEC planning process (see JP 3-54,
Appendix A for examples).
c. Analyze the adversary. Work with intelligence and counterintelligence staffs to answer the
following:
(1) Who is the adversary? (Those with intent and capability to take action against the planned
operation.)
(2) What are the adversary’s goals?
(3) What is the adversary’s strategy for opposing the planned operation?
(4) What critical information does the adversary already know about the operation?
(5) What are the adversary’s intelligence collection capabilities (or Hostile Intelligence System
(HOIS) collection capabilities?
d. Analyze vulnerabilities (see JP 3-54, Appendix C for “OPSEC Indicators”).
(1) What indicators (friendly actions and open source information) of critical information not
known to the adversary will be created by the friendly activities generated by the planned
operation?
(2) What is the adversary’s ability to collect against these indicators?
(3) What indicators will the adversary be able to use to the disadvantage of friendly forces?
(4) Friendly indicators of EEFI.
(a) Signatures.
(b) Associations.
(c) Profiles.
(d) Contrasts.
(e) Exposure.
e. Conduct a risk assessment. Review risk assessment done by the entire JPG. The following
questions should be asked continuously throughout the planning process.
(1) What risk to effectiveness is likely to occur if a particular OPSEC measure is implemented?
(2) What risk to mission success is likely to occur if an OPSEC measure is not implemented?
(3) What risk to mission success is likely if an OPSEC measure is not implemented or fails?
f. Develop assumptions to replace missing or unknown facts concerning OPSEC.
g. Determine OPSEC limitations.
(1) Things that OPSEC must do (constraints).
(2) Things OPSEC cannot do (restraints).
h. Identify OPSEC tasks to be performed by JTF forces.
i. Assist in development of JTF mission statement, if appropriate.
j. Assist in development of mission analysis briefing for the CJTF.
k. Integrate all efforts through coordination with other members of the IO/IW Cell.
2. Receive CJTF planning guidance. CJTF should provide guidance at this point. Planning guidance
should be disseminated to OPSEC personnel and the components. If needed, ask the CJTF for any
guidance necessary for continued planning.
A-5
3. Develop OPSEC options to support the JTF’s COAs. The JTF staff should now develop multiple
friendly COAs.
a. Develop OPSEC options for initial JTF COAs. OPSEC
(1) Review mission analysis and CJTF’s guidance. Options
(2) Develop specific OPSEC measures to support JTF COA
Develop
the JTF’s COAs from the beginning of the IO/IW Development
operation to the end in the following areas (see Options
JP 3-54, Appendix D): Ways to accomplish
the mission
(a) Operational measures.
(b) Logistics measures.
(c) Technical measures.
(d) Administrative measures.
(e) Military deception in support of OPSEC.
(f) Physical destruction in support of OPSEC.
(g) Electronic warfare in support of OPSEC.
b. Coordinate ROE with JTF ROE cell for each OPSEC measure.
c. Plan to incorporate OPSEC elements in the JTF information architecture.
d. Develop the general concept for implementation of OPSEC measures. Describe by operational
phase and major activity (maneuver, logistics, communications, etc.).
e. Determine coordination requirements for:
(1) OPSEC coordination measures between JTF components.
(2) Public affairs coordination.
(3) Guidance on termination of OPSEC-related activities.
(4) Guidance on declassification and public release of OPSEC-related activities.
(5) Administrative and logistics support of OPSEC-related activities.
(6) Command and control measures.
(a) Feedback mechanisms.
1 Monitoring the effectiveness of OPSEC measures during execution.
2 Specific intelligence requirements for feedback.
(b) OPSEC surveys.
(c) After-action reports.
(d) Signals. OPSEC-related communications requirements.
4. Participate in COA analysis (war gaming). Be prepared

to contribute to the process of war-gaming by mentally Analysis
“fighting the battle” in time and space. The process may use of OPSEC JTF COA
measures
the structure of action-reaction-counteraction sequences for Analysis
critical events (e.g., D-Day actions). Key elements the staff Analyze
is determining include more details about: IO/IW
Options
a. Specific tasks for components in the OPSEC area.
b. Decision points for OPSEC measures. War-gaming
c. Operational support needed.
d. Identification of branches (what if) and sequels (what
then).
5. Participate in COA comparison.

a. Participate in determining the criteria for comparing JTF Compare
JTF COA
COAs. Criteria for OPSEC measures could come from: OPSEC
measures Comparison
(1) Commander’s Intent.
(2) Factors of METT-T. Compare
(a) Mission accomplishment. IO/IW
Comparing
(c) Terrain. COAs against
criterion
(e) Time available.
A-6
b. Ensure recommendations for OPSEC measures have been coordinated with the components of
the JTF.
6. Receive CJTF’s decision on COAs.

The CJTF may select or modify the recommended COA. Based on that decision, the Commander’s
Estimate document (or slides) will normally be sent/briefed to the C/C for approval.
7. Provide input/develop OPSEC perspective in JTF plan/order. After the COA is selected, the
plan/order is physically developed. Most of the information needed for this task should have already
been developed through the estimate process (mission
analysis through COA selection). OPSEC input can be in JTF Plan/
many sections of the plan/order, however, the primary areas OPSEC Order Devel
input to
for writing OPSEC information are found in the following areas plan/order Plan or
of JOPES (see CJCSM 3122.03): Order
a. Paragraph 3 (Execution) of Appendix 3 (Information Develop
IO/IW
Operations) to Annex C (Operations). Input Writing
b. Tab C (Operations Security) of Appendix 3 to Annex C & issuing
(Operations). directives
A-7
A-8
Appendix 2 – Psychological Operations

a. Determine known facts, current status, or conditions of joint PSYOP forces as defined in the
C/C’s planning document (Planning Order, Operations Order, etc.).
b. In coordination with the J2, conduct analysis of the adversary’s:
(1) Decision makers and staff.
(a) Decision makers who can direct development or allocation of adversary resources.
(b) Decision makers’ characteristics.
(c) Decision makers’ perceptions/preconceived notions about friendly operations.
(2) Intelligence Systems. Intelligence systems that support the adversary.
(3) Target audiences.
(a) Groups that can influence plans, decisions, and operational effectiveness of the
adversary?
(b) Goals of these groups.
(c) Susceptibility of these groups to PSYOP.
(4) Adversary command systems.
(a) C4 structures of the adversary.
(b) Adversary structures vulnerable to PSYOP jamming or attacking.
c. Analyze C/C’s mission and PSYOP objectives.
d. Develop assumptions to replace missing or unknown facts concerning JTF PSYOP operations.
e. Determine PSYOP limitations.
(1) Things that PSYOP must do (constraints).
(2) Things PSYOP cannot do (restraints).
(1) Determine PSYOP-based approaches to adversary COGs.
(2) Determine ways for PSYOP to assist in protecting friendly force COGs.
g. Identify PSYOP tasks to be performed by JTF forces.
h. Conduct initial JTF IW force structure analysis to determine if sufficient IW assets are available to
do the tasks.
i. Conduct a risk assessment. Review risk assessment done by the entire JPG. The following
questions should be asked continuously throughout the planning process.
(1) What risk to effectiveness is likely to occur if a particular PSYOP measure is implemented?
(2) What risk to mission success is likely to occur if a PSYOP measure is not implemented?
(3) What risk to mission success is likely if a PSYOP measure fails to be effective?
j. Determine end state from an IW perspective.
m. Integrate all efforts through coordination with other members of the IO/IW Cell.
should be disseminated to PSYOP personnel and the components. If needed, ask the CJTF for any
guidance necessary for continued planning. Guidance should be sought on:
a. Valid PSYOP themes to be promoted.
b. Valid or invalid PSYOP themes to be avoided or discouraged.
A-9
3. Develop PSYOP options to support the JTF’s COAs. The JTF staff should now develop multiple
friendly COAs.
a. Develop PSYOP options for initial JTF COAs. PSYOP
Options
(1) Review mission analysis and CJTF’s guidance.
(2) Develop specific PSYOP options that include: Develop JTF COA
(a) Target audience. IO/IW Development
(b) PSYOP objectives, overall themes, and specific Options
themes. Ways to accomplish
the mission
(c) Provisions for testing, producing, stocking, and
disseminating PSYOP materials.
(d) Means to measure PSYOP effectiveness.
(e) Command and control arrangements.
(f) Logistics support requirements.
(g) OPSEC provisions to maintain secrecy of the commander’s PSYOP intent.
(3) Develop specific tasking to the JTF’s components.
b. Coordinate ROE with JTF ROE cell for each PSYOP measure.
c. Plan to incorporate PSYOP elements in the JTF information architecture.
d. Develop the general concept for implementation of PSYOP measures. Describe by operational
phase and major activity (maneuver, logistics, communications, etc.).
e. Determine coordination requirements for:
(1) PSYOP coordination measures between JTF components.
(2) Public affairs coordination.
(3) Guidance on termination of PSYOP-related activities.
(4) Guidance on declassification and public release of PSYOP-related activities.
(5) Administrative and logistical support of PSYOP-related activities.
(6) Command and control measures.
(a) Feedback mechanisms.
1 Monitoring the effectiveness of PSYOP measures during execution.
2 Specific intelligence requirements for feedback.
(b) Signals. PSYOP-related communications requirements and code words.
4. Participate in COA analysis (war gaming). Be prepared to

contribute to the process of war-gaming by mentally “fighting the Analysis
of PSYOP JTF COA
battle” in time and space. The process may use the structure of options
Analysis
action-reaction-counteraction sequences for critical events (e.g.
D-Day actions). Key elements the staff is determining include Analyze
IO/IW
more details about: Options
a. Specific tasks for components in the PSYOP area.
War-gaming
b. Decision points for PSYOP measures.
c. Operational support needed.
d. Identification of branches (what if) and sequels (what then).

a. Participate in determining the criteria for comparing JTF COAs. Compare
Criteria for PSYOP measures could come from: PSYOP JTF COA
measures Comparison
(2) Factors of METT-T.
Compare
(a) Mission accomplishment. IO/IW
Comparing
(c) Terrain. COAs against
(e) Time available. criterion
b. Ensure recommendations for PSYOP measures have been
coordinated with the components of the JTF.
A-10
7. Provide input/develop PSYOP perspective in JTF plan/order. After the COA is selected, the
plan/order is physically developed. Most of the information
needed for this task should have already been developed JTF Plan/
through the estimate process (mission analysis through COA PSYOP Order Devel
selection). PSYOP input can be in many sections of the input to
plan/order Plan or
plan/order, however, the primary areas for writing PSYOP Order
information are found in the following portions of JOPES (see Develop
CJCSM 3122.03): IO/IW
Writing
Input
a. Para 3 (Execution) of Appendix 3 (Information Operations) & issuing
to Annex C (Operations). directives
b. Tab D (Psychological Operations) of Appendix 3 to Annex
C.
A-11
A-12
Appendix 3 – Deception

a. Determine known facts, current status, or conditions of joint forces capable of deception
operations as defined in the C/C’s planning document (Planning Order, Operations Order, etc.).
b. In coordination with the J2, conduct analysis of the adversary.
(1) General adversary capabilities relating directly to the planning of deception.
(2) Deception targets.
(3) Deception target biases and predispositions.
(4) Probable adversary courses of action.
c. Develop assumptions to replace missing or unknown facts concerning deception operations.
(2) Available time.
d. Analyze C/C’s mission and intent from a deception perspective.
e. Determine deception operations limitations.
(1) Things the deception operations must do (constraints).
(2) Things the deception operations cannot do (restraints).
(1) Determine deception-based approaches to adversary COGs.
(2) Determine ways for deception to assist in protecting friendly force COGs.
g. Identify tasks to be performed by deception capable JTF forces.
(1) Determine specified deception tasks.
(2) Determine implied deception tasks.
(3) Determine subsidiary deception tasks.
(4) From (1), (2) and (3) above, determine essential deception tasks or goals.
(a) Establish broad deception (offensive) goals.
(b) Establish broad counter-deception (defensive) goals.
h. Conduct initial JTF force structure analysis to determine if sufficient assets are available to do the
tasks.
i. Conduct an initial deception risk assessment. Review risk assessment done by the entire JPG.
The following questions should be asked continuously throughout the planning process.
(1) Deception is successful. What will be the adversary’s likely response? Subsequent impact
on friendly forces?
(2) Deception fails. What will the impact be if the deception target ignores the deception or
fails to take the intended actions?
(3) Deception is compromised. What will be the impact?
j. Determine end state from a deception perspective.
2. Receive CJTF planning guidance. CJTF should provide guidance at this point (see Task 202).
Planning guidance should be disseminated to the deception personnel and the components. If
needed, ask the CJTF for any guidance necessary for continued planning.
3. Develop deception options to support the JTF’s COAs. The JTF staff should now develop
multiple friendly COAs.
a. Develop deception options for initial JTF COAs. Deception
Options
(2) Develop deception options to support the JTF’s Develop JTF COA
COAs from the beginning of the operation to IO/IW Development
Options
the end by accomplishing the following:
Ways to accomplish
(a) Determine desired perception.
the mission
A-13
1 Reinforce existing belief/establish new belief.

2 Create perception of favorable opportunity.
3 Identify observables that create perception.
(b) Develop military deception COAs in support of overall IW concept in support of JTF
operations COA.
1 Meet criteria of suitability, feasibility, acceptability, distinguishability (or
separateness), and completeness.
2 Develop military deception story -- believable/verifiable/consistent.
3 Determine actions to support story -- observable/believable.
4 Determine means to support the story.
a Physical
b Technical
c Administrative
(c) Plan military deception in support of offensive IW.
1 Cause adversary operational commander to employ adversary forces in ways
advantageous to friendly forces.
2 Cause adversary commander to reveal strengths, dispositions, and future intentions.
3 Overload adversary intelligence and analysis capability to create confusion over
friendly intentions and achieve surprise.
4 Condition adversary to friendly patterns of behavior that can be exploited.
5 Cause adversary to waste combat power with inappropriate or delayed actions.
(d) Plan military deception for protection of friendly C2 and C4I (D-IO).
1 Use military deception to degrade adversary IW -- offensive use of deception.
2 Use military deception in support of OPSEC to help neutralize adversary.
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) efforts and feed
adversary incorrect combat information -- defensive use of military deception.
(e) Do not portray different military deception stories for O-IW and D-IO. Same story should
accomplish both objectives.
b. Coordinate ROE with JTF ROE cell for each IW element (or tool, if required) as specific details
become apparent.
c. Recommend options for the deception command and control.
d. Plan to incorporate deception forces in the JTF deception information architecture.
e. Test each COA input for validity (see Task 204).

contribute to the process of war-gaming by mentally “fighting Analysis
the battle” in time and space. The process may use the of Deception JTF COA
measures
structure of action-reaction-counteraction sequences for Analysis
critical events (i.e. D-Day actions). Analyze deception Analyze
concept; war game within the context of other IW operations IO/IW
Options
COAs and the overall JTF operational COA (actual COAs
developed by operational planners may provide basis for War-gaming
military deception COAs). Determine:
a. More specific forces required.
b. More specific assets/resources required.
c. Possible branches (what if) and sequels (what then) to military deception requirements.
d. Assess military deception risks.
(1) Deception failure.
(2) Exposure of means or feedback channels.
e. Unintended effects.
f. Provide input to Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) development to facilitate
execution of deception plan in accordance with the overall JTF plan.
A-14

a. Participate in determining the criteria for comparing
COAs. Criteria for deception operations could come Analysis
of Deception JTF COA
from: options
Analysis
(2) Factors of METT-T. Analyze
IO/IW
(a) Mission accomplishment. Options
(b) Adversary.
War-gaming
(c) Terrain.
(d) Troops available.
(e) Time available.
b. Ensure recommendations for deception operations have been coordinated with the components
of the JTF.
7. Provide input/develop deception perspective in JTF JTF Plan/

Deception Order Devel
plan/order. After the COA is selected, the plan/order is input to
physically developed. Most of the information needed for plan/order Plan or
Order
this task should have already been developed through the
Develop
estimate process (mission analysis through COA selection). IO/IW
Deception operations input can be in many sections of the Input Writing
& issuing
plan/order, however, the primary areas for writing deception directives
operations information are found in the following portions of
JOPES (see CJCSM 3122.03):
a. Para. 3 (Execution) of Appendix 3 (Information Operations) to Annex C (Operations).
b. Tab A (Deception) of Appendix 3 to Annex C.
A-15
A-16
Appendix 4 – Electronic Warfare

a. Determine known facts, current status, or conditions of EW
MA
joint forces capable of EW operations as defined in the Situation
Brief
Analysis
C/C’s planning document (Planning Order, Operations
Order, etc.). IO/IW
b. In coordination with the J2, conduct analysis of the Situation
JTF Mission
Analysis
adversary. Analysis
(1) Determine adversary dependence on use of the Understanding the
electromagnetic spectrum. JTF’s mission
(2) Determine adversary EW capability.
(3) Determine Hostile Intelligence System (HOIS)
collection capability (see deception and OPSEC mission analysis).
(4) Determine adversary vulnerabilities related to use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
(5) Determine friendly vulnerabilities related to use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
c. Develop assumptions to replace missing or unknown facts concerning EW operations.
(2) Available time.
d. Analyze C/C’s mission and intent from an EW perspective.
e. Determine EW operations limitations.
(1) Things the EW operations must do (constraints).
(2) Things the EW operations cannot do (restraints).
(1) Determine EW-based approaches to adversary COGs.
(2) Determine ways for EW to assist in protecting friendly force COGs.
g. Identify tasks to be performed by EW forces (Electronic Warfare Support (ES), Electronic Attack
(EA), Electronic Protection (EP)).
(1) Determine specified EW tasks.
(2) Determine implied EW tasks.
(3) From (1) and (2) above, determine essential EW tasks or goals.
h. Conduct initial JTF EW force structure analysis to determine if sufficient assets are available to do
the tasks.
i. Conduct an initial EW risk assessment. Review risk assessment done by the entire JPG.
j. Determine end state from an EW perspective.
should be disseminated to EW personnel and the components. If needed, ask the CJTF for any
guidance necessary for continued planning.
3. Develop EW options to support the JTF’s COAs. The JTF staff should now develop multiple
friendly COAs.
a. Develop EW options for initial JTF COAs. EW
(1) Review mission analysis and CJTF’s guidance. Options
(2) Develop EW options to support the JTF’s COAs
JTF COA
for Electronic Warfare Support (ES). Develop
IO/IW Development
(a) Plan ES for IW-O. Options
1 Develop combat information for Ways to accomplish
immediate targeting of adversary the mission
emitters.
A-17
2 Develop combat information for rapid feedback of effectiveness of joint force counter-
IW operations.
3 Develop combat information for further analysis as SIGINT.
(b) Plan ES for protection of friendly information, C2 and C4I (IW-D).
1 Develop combat information for immediate targeting of adversary IW-O means.
2 Use ES to support Indications and Warning (I&W) of adversary attack and adversary
avoidance.
(3) Plan Electronic Attack (EA) in support of IW.
(a) Protect (IW-D) friendly use of the Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS), by planning
aggressive tactical jamming operations to cumulatively degrade adversary RSTA
capability and other use of the EMS.
(b) Plan electromagnetic deception in support of military deception operations to confuse
adversary RSTA efforts for both IW-O and IW-D.
(c) Plan EA, using Anti-Radiation Munitions (ARM) to degrade, neutralize or destroy
adversary personnel or equipment for both IW-O and IW-D.
1 Establish/recommend high priority targets for component use of destructive EA
means.
2 Integrate ARMs with jamming, stealth, Precision Guided Munitions (PGM), and Direct
Action (DA) missions to counter adversary radar defenses.
(4) Plan Electronic Protection (EP) in support of IW (coordinate with the Information Assurance
plan).
(a) Plan EP for IW to include Signals Security (SIGSEC) to prevent adversary exploitation of
friendly use of the EMS.
(b) Use equipment that maximizes efficiency of friendly use of the EMS.
(c) Develop and implement procedures that promote operational efficiency in use of the
EMS.
(d) Coordinate with the J6/frequency manager for development of the Joint Restricted
Frequency List (JRFL).
contribute to the process of war-gaming by mentally “fighting Analysis
of EW
the battle” in time and space. The process may use the options
JTF COA
structure of action-reaction-counteraction sequences for Analysis
critical events (e.g., D-Day actions). Analyze EW concept; Analyze
war game within the context of other IW operations COAs IO/IW
Options
and the overall JTF operational COA (actual COAs
developed by operational planners may provide basis for EW War-gaming
COAs). Determine:
c. Possible branches (what if) and sequels (what then) to military EW requirements.
d. Assess military EW risks.
execution of EW plan in accordance with the overall JTF plan.

a. Participate in determining the criteria for comparing COAs. Criteria for EW operations could
come from: Compare
JTF COA
(1) Commander’s Intent. EW
Comparison
measures
(2) Factors of METT-T.
(a) Mission accomplishment. Compare
(b) Adversary. IO/IW
(c) Terrain. Options
Comparing
(d) Troops available. COAs against
(e) Time available. a selected set of
criterion
A-18
b. Ensure recommendations for EW operations have been coordinated with the components of the
JTF.
7. Provide input/develop EW perspective in JTF plan/order. After the COA is selected, the
needed for this task should have already been developed
JTF Plan/
through the estimate process (mission analysis through COA EW Order Devel
selection). EW operations input can be in many sections of input to
the plan/order, however, the primary areas for writing EW plan/order Plan or
Order
operations information are found in the following portions of
Develop
JOPES (see CJCSM 3122.03): IO/IW
a. Para 3 (Execution) of Appendix 3 (Information Input Writing
& issuing
Operations) to Annex C (Operations). directives
b. Tab B (Electronic Warfare) of Appendix 3 to Annex C.
A-19
A-20
Appendix 5 – Physical Destruction

a. Determine known facts, current status, or conditions
of joint forces capable of physical destruction. Phy Destr
Situation MA
b. In coordination with the J2, conduct analysis of the Analysis Brief
adversary.
c. Develop assumptions to replace missing or unknown IO/IW
JTF Mission
facts concerning physical destruction operations. Situation Analysis
Analysis
d. Analyze C/C’s mission and intent from an physical
Understanding the
destruction perspective. JTF’s mission
e. Determine physical destruction operations
limitations.
(1) Things the physical destruction operations must do (constraints).
(2) Things the physical destruction operations cannot do (restraints).
(1) Determine approaches to adversary COGs.
(2) Determine ways to assist in protecting friendly force COGs.
g. Identify tasks to be performed by physical destruction forces.
(1) Determine specified physical destruction tasks.
(2) Determine implied physical destruction tasks.
(3) Determine subsidiary physical destruction tasks.
(4) From (1), (2) and (3) above, determine essential physical destruction tasks or goals.
h. Conduct initial JTF physical destruction force structure analysis to determine if sufficient assets
are available to do the tasks.
i. Conduct an initial physical destruction risk assessment. Review risk assessment done by the
entire JPG.
j. Determine end state from an physical destruction perspective.
should be disseminated to IO/IW Cell personnel and the components. If needed, ask the CJTF for
any guidance necessary for continued planning.
3. Develop physical destruction options to support the JTF’s courses of action. The JTF staff
should now develop multiple friendly COAs.
a. Develop physical destruction options for initial JTF COAs.
(2) Develop physical destruction options to support the JTF’s COAs.
(a) Plan destruction operations for IW-O
(coordinate with J3, J2T and J3 fires Phy Destr
Options
element on overall JTF targeting plan).
Plan destruction against adversary Develop JTF COA
information, C2 and C4I. IO/IW Development
1 Target adversary commanders, staff, Options
communications and intelligence Ways to accomplish
the mission
production facilities, consistent with
military deception objectives.
2 Destruction is timed for when adversary needs assets in decision cycle.
3 Target control nodes to degrade effective support of decision cycles or dissemination
of information.
4 Target information (C2, and C4I) that indirectly affects specific control nodes.
A-21
(b) Plan destruction operations for protection of friendly, information, C2, C4I(IW-D);
integrate destruction with other IW elements to preclude disruption or contradiction of
other operations (coordinate with J3, J2T and J3 fires element on overall JTF targeting
plans).

Analysis
contribute to the process of war-gaming by mentally “fighting the of Phy Destr JTF COA
battle” in time and space. The process may use the structure of measures
Analysis
action-reaction- counteraction sequences for critical events
(e.g., D-Day actions). Analyze physical destruction concepts; Analyze
IO/IW
war game within context of other IW operations COAs and the Options
overall JTF operational COA (actual COAs developed by War-gaming
operational planners may provide basis for physical destruction
COAs). Determine:
c. Possible branches (what if) and sequels (what then) to military physical destruction requirements.
d. Assess military physical destruction risks.
execution of physical destruction plan in accordance with the overall JTF plan.

a. Participate in determining the criteria for comparing Analysis
COAs. Criteria for physical destruction operations of Phy Destr JTF COA
options
could come from: Analysis
(1) Commander’s Intent. Analyze
(2) Factors of METT-T. IO/IW
Options
(a) Mission accomplishment.
(b) Adversary. War-gaming
(c) Terrain.
(e) Time available.
b. Ensure recommendations for physical destruction operations have been coordinated with the
components of the JTF.
7. Provide input/develop physical destruction perspective in JTF plan/order. After the COA is
selected, the plan/order is physically developed. Most of the
information needed for this task should have already been
JTF Plan/
developed through the estimate process (mission analysis Phy Destr Order Devel
through COA selection). Physical destruction operations input to
plan/order Plan or
input can be in many sections of the plan/order, however, Order
the primary areas for writing physical destruction operations Develop
information are found in the following portions of JOPES IO/IW
Input Writing
(see CJCSM 3122.03): & issuing
a. Para 3 (Execution) of Appendix 3 (Information directives
Operations) to Annex C (Operations).
b. Tab E (Physical Attack/Destruction) of Appendix 3 to Annex C.
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Appendix 6 – Information Assurance

a. Determine known facts, current status, or conditions of
IA
joint forces capable of IA. Situation MA
Analysis Brief
b. In coordination with the J2, conduct analysis of the
adversary.
(1) Determine adversary dependence on use of the IO/IW
JTF Mission
Situation
electromagnetic spectrum. Analysis
Analysis
(2) Determine adversary communications attack Understanding the
and computer network attack capability. JTF’s mission
collection capability (see deception and OPSEC
mission analysis).
(4) Analyze friendly C2 and C4I for vulnerabilities related to use of the computer network attack
and communications attack.
c. Develop assumptions to replace missing or unknown facts concerning IA.
d. Analyze C/C’s mission and intent from an IA perspective.
e. Determine IA operations limitations.
(1) Things IA must do (constraints).
(2) Things IA cannot do (restraints).
g. Identify tasks to be performed by IA forces.
(1) Determine specified IA tasks.
(2) Determine implied IA tasks.
(3) Determine subordinate IA tasks.
(4) From (1), (2) and (3) above, determine essential IA tasks or goals.
h. Conduct initial JTF IA force structure analysis to determine if sufficient assets are available to do
the tasks.
i. Conduct an initial IA risk assessment. Review risk assessment done by the entire JPG.
j. Determine end state from an IA perspective.
3. Develop IA options to support the JTF’s COAs. The JTF staff should now develop multiple
friendly COAs.
a. Develop IA options for initial JTF COAs. IA
(1) Review mission analysis and CJTF’s Options
guidance. JTF COA
Develop
(2) Develop IA options to support the JTF’s IO/IW Development
COAs. Plan IA operations for protection of Options
friendly C2 and C4I. Integrate IA with Ways to accomplish
other IW elements to preclude disruption the mission
of JTF information, C2 and C4I.
(a) In conjunction with J3IM and J6, plan JTF Information Plan (IMP) and C4I architecture.
1 Develop JTF Information system protection (INFOSEC) plan.
2 Develop JTF Computer Security (COMPUSEC) plan.
A-23
3 Coordinate with J3IW EW officer on EW Electronic protection (EP) plan.

(b) In conjunction with J3IM, J6IM, and J2CI (Counterintelligence), develop JTF information,
C2 and C4I attack detection process.
4. Participate in COA analysis (war gaming). Be prepared to contribute to the process of war-gaming
by mentally “fighting the battle” in time and space. The
Analysis
process may use the structure of action-reaction-counteraction of IA JTF COA
sequences for critical events (e.g., D-Day actions). Analyze IA measures
Analysis
concepts; war game within the context of other IW operations
COAs and the overall JTF operational COA (actual COAs Analyze
IO/IW
developed by operational planners may provide basis for IA Options
COAs). Determine: War-gaming
c. Possible branches (what if) and sequels (what then) to
military IA requirements.
d. Assess military IA risks.
execution of IA plan in accordance with the overall JTF plan.

a. Participate in determining the criteria for Analysis
comparing COAs. Criteria for IA operations of IA JTF COA
could come from: options
Analysis
Analyze
(a) Mission accomplishment. Options
(c) Terrain.
(e) Time available.
b. Ensure recommendations for IA operations have been coordinated with the components of the
JTF.
7. Provide input/develop IA perspective in JTF plan/order. After the COA is selected, the plan/order
is physically developed. Most of the information needed for this task should have already been
developed through the estimate process (mission analysis through COA selection). IA operations
input can be in many sections of the plan/order, however,
the primary areas for writing IA operations information are JTF Plan/
found in Tab G (Defensive Information Operations) to IA Order Devel
Appendix 3 (Information Operations) to Annex C input to
plan/order Plan or
(Operations) per JOPES (see CJCSM 3122.03). Order
Develop
IO/IW
Input Writing
& issuing
directives
A-24
Appendix 7 – Computer Network Attack

a. Determine known facts, current status, or conditions of CNA
joint forces capable of CNA. Situation MA
Analysis Brief
adversary.
IO/IW
(1) Determine adversary dependence on use of the Situation
JTF Mission
Analysis
electromagnetic spectrum. Analysis
(2) Determine adversary communications attack and Understanding the
CNA capability. JTF’s mission
collection capability (see deception and OPSEC
mission analysis).
(4) Analyze friendly C2 and C4I for vulnerabilities related to use of the CNA and
communications attack (see IA mission analysis).
c. Develop assumptions to replace missing or unknown facts concerning CNA.
d. Analyze C/C’s mission and intent from a CNA perspective.
e. Determine CNA operations limitations.
(1) Things CNA must do (constraints).
(2) Things CNA cannot do (restraints).
(3) Others (e.g., political, legal, diplomatic, etc.).
g. Identify tasks to be performed by CNA.
(1) Determine specified CNA tasks.
(2) Determine implied CNA tasks.
(3) Determine subordinate CNA tasks.
(4) From (1), (2) and (3) above, determine essential CNA tasks or goals.
h. Conduct initial JTF CNA force structure analysis to determine if sufficient assets are available to
do the tasks.
i. Conduct an initial CNA risk assessment. Review risk assessment done by the entire JPG.
j. Determine end state from a CNA perspective.
3. Develop CNA options to support the JTF’s COAs. The JTF staff should now develop multiple
friendly COAs.
a. Develop CNA options for initial JTF COAs.
(2) Develop CNA options to support the JTF’s CNA
COAs. Options
(a) Plan CNA in support of IW-O.
Develop JTF COA
1 Plan CNA against selected adversary Development
IO/IW
networks; target C2, intelligence, logistics Options
as required to influence the adversary in Ways to accomplish
the desired direction. the mission
2 In conjunction with the J2, develop
feedback on CNA operations.
A-25
(b) Plan CNA for protection of friendly C2 and C4I. Integrate CNA with other IW elements to
preclude disruption of JTF information, C2 and C4I.
1 Plan CNA operations against adversary IW-O capabilities to preclude attacks on
friendly information, C2 and C4I.
2 Coordinate with J2 for feedback on active defense operations.
4. Participate in COA analysis (war gaming). Be prepared to contribute to the process of war-gaming
by mentally “fighting the battle” in time and space. The
process may use the structure of action-reaction- Analysis
of CNA JTF COA
counteraction sequences for critical events (e.g., D-Day measures
Analysis
actions). Analyze CNA concepts. War game within context
of other IW operations COAs and the overall JTF operational Analyze
IO/IW
COA (actual COAs developed by operational planners may Options
provide basis for CNA COAs). Determine:
War-gaming
c. Possible branches (what if) and sequels (what then) to
military CNA requirements.
d. Assess military CNA risks.
execution of CNA plan in accordance with the overall JTF plan.

a. Participate in determining the criteria for comparing Analysis
COAs. Criteria for CNA operations could come of CNA JTF COA
options
from: Analysis
(1) Commander’s Intent. Analyze
Options
(a) Mission accomplishment.
(c) Terrain.
(e) Time available.
b. Ensure recommendations for CNA operations have been coordinated with the components of the
JTF.
7. Provide input/develop CNA perspective in JTF plan/order. After the COA is selected, the
through the estimate process (mission analysis through COA CNA Order Devel
selection). CNA operations input can be in many sections of input to
plan/order Plan or
the plan/order, however, the primary areas for writing CNA Order
information are found in JOPES (see CJCSM 3122.03): Develop
a. Paragraph 3 (Execution) of Appendix 3 (Information IO/IW
Input Writing
Operations) to Annex C (Operations). & issuing
b. Tab F (CNA) to Appendix 3 to Annex C. directives
A-26
Appendix 8 – Special Information Operations

a. Determine known facts, current status, or conditions
SIO
of joint forces capable of Special Information Situation MA
Analysis Brief
Operations (SIO).
adversary. IO/IW
JTF Mission
Situation
c. Develop assumptions to replace missing or unknown Analysis
Analysis
facts concerning SIO. Understanding the
d. Analyze C/C’s mission and intent from an SIO JTF’s mission
perspective.
e. Determine operations limitations.
(1) Things SIO must do (constraints).
(2) Things SIO cannot do (restraints).
f. Determine adversary/ own centers of gravity (COGs) and tentative decisive points.
(2) Determine ways SIO can assist in protecting friendly force COGs.
g. Identify tasks to be performed by SIO.
(1) Determine specified SIO tasks.
(2) Determine implied SIO tasks.
(3) Determine subsidiary SIO tasks.
(4) From (1), (2) and (3) above, determine essential SIO tasks or goals.
h. Conduct initial JTF SIO force structure analysis to determine if sufficient assets are available to
do the tasks.
i. Conduct an initial SIO risk assessment. Review risk assessment done by the entire JPG.
j. Determine end state from an SIO perspective.
2. Receive CJTF planning guidance. CJTF should provide guidance. Planning guidance should be
disseminated to IO Cell personnel and the components. If needed, ask the CJTF for any guidance
necessary for continued planning.
3. Develop SIO options to support the JTF’s COAs. The JTF staff should now develop multiple
friendly COAs. Develop SIO options for initial JTF COAs.
a. Review mission analysis and CJTF’s guidance.
b. Develop SIO options to support the JTF’s COAs. SIO
Options
4. Participate in COA analysis (war gaming). Be prepared Develop JTF COA
to contribute to the process of war-gaming by mentally IO/IW Development
Options
“fighting the battle” in time and space. The process may
Ways to accomplish
use the structure of action-reaction-counteraction”
the mission
sequences for critical events (e.g. D-Day actions).
Analyze SIO concepts. War game within context of other
IW operations COAs and the overall JTF operational COA (actual COAs developed by operational
planners may provide basis for SIO COAs). Determine:
c. Possible branches (what if) and sequels (what then) to SIO requirements.
d. Assess military risks.
A-27
execution of SIO plan in accordance with the overall JTF plan.
Analysis
5. Participate in COA comparison of SIO JTF COA
a. Participate in determining the criteria for comparing options
Analysis
COAs. Criteria for SIO could come from:
Analyze
(1) Commander’s Intent. IO/IW
(2) Factors of METT-T. Options
(a) Mission accomplishment. War-gaming
(b) Adversary.
(c) Terrain.
(d) Troops available. Compare
(e) Time available. SIO JTF COA
measures Comparison
b. Ensure recommendations for SIO have been coordinated
with the components of the JTF.
Compare
IO/IW
6. Receive CJTF’s decision on COAs. The CJTF may select or Options
Comparing
modify the recommended COA. Based on that decision, the COAs against
Commander’s Estimate document (or slides) will normally be a selected set of
sent/briefed to the C/C for approval. criterion
7. Provide input/develop SIO perspective in JTF plan/order. After the COA is selected, the
through the estimate process (mission analysis through COA SIO Order Devel
selection). SIO input can be found in a separate classified iput to
plan/order Plan or
Annex S (STO) per JOPES (see CJCSM 3122.03). Order
Develop
IO/IW
Input Writing
& issuing
directives
A-28
Annex B – Glossary
Abbreviations and Acronyms
Abbreviation / Acronym Definition

AADC Area Air Defense Commander
AAV Amphibious Assault Vehicle
ACA Airspace Control Authority
ACE Air Control Element
AD Air Defense
ADA Air Defense Area
ADCON Administrative Control
AFB Air Force Base
AFFOR Air Force Forces
AFS Air Force Squadron
AFSOF Air Force Special Operations Forces
AFIWC Air Force Information Warfare Center
AIA Air Intelligence Agency
AIS Automated Information Systems
ALO Air Liaison Officer
ALSA Air, Land, Sea Operations
AMC U.S. Air Mobility Command
AME Air Mobility Element
Amph Amphibious
AO Area of Operations
AOR Area of Responsibility
APC Armored Personnel Carrier
APOD Aerial Port of Debarkation
APOE Aerial Port of Embarkation
ARCENT Army Forces Central Command
ARFOR Army Forces
ARG Amphibious Ready Group
ARSOF Army Special Operations Forces
ASD(C3I) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence
ASD(PA) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
ASD(SOLIC) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict
ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System
ATF Amphibious Task Force
ATM Asynchronous Transfer Mode
ATO Air Tasking Order
AVN Aviation
BCD Battlefield Coordination Detachment
BDA Battle Damage Assessment
Bde Brigade
BLT Battalion Landing Team
B-1

BIOSG Bilateral Information Operations Steering Group
BIOWG Bilateral Information Operations Working Group
Bn Battalion
BPT Be Prepared To
C/C Combatant Commander; Combatant Command
C2 Command and Control
C2W Command and Control Warfare
C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence
C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
CA Civil Affairs
CAAP Critical Asset Assurance Program
CALCM Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile
CAG Civil Affairs Group
CAP Crisis Action Planning
CAS Close Air Support
CCIR Commander’s Critical Information Requirements
CCS Command and Control Squadron
CD Civil Defense; Counter Deception
C-Day Unnamed day on which a deployment operation begins
CDCM Coastal Defense Cruise Missile
Cdr Commander
CENTCOM U.S. Central Command
CERT Computer Emergency Response Team
CEP Circular Error Probability
CFACC Combined Force Air Component Commander
CFC Combined Forces Command (Korea)
CFH Contingency Forward Headquarters
CFLCC Combined Force Land Component Commander
CFMCC Combined Force Maritime Component Commander
CFSOTF Combined Forces Special Operations Task Force
CG Cruiser, Guided Missile
CHE Cargo or Container Handling Equipment
CI Counterintelligence
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CIAO Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office
CINC Commander-in-Chief (generally referred to as Combatant Commander)
CIP Critical Infrastructure Protection
CIPIS Critical Infrastructure Protection Integration Staff
CIPWG CIP Working Group
CIRT Computer Incident Response Team
CIS Communications and Information Systems
CISO Counterintelligence Support Officer
CITAC Computer Investigation and Infrastructure Threat Center
Civ Civilian
Civ-Mil Civilian-Military
CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
B-2

CJCSM Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual
CJTF Commander, Joint Task Force (U.S.); Combined Joint Task Force (NATO)
CM Consequence Management
CMO Civil-Military Operations
CMOC Civil-Military Operations Center; Civil-Military Operations Cell
CNA Computer Network Attack
CND Computer Network Defense
CNE Computer Network Exploitation
CNN Cable News Network
CNR Computer Network Reconnaissance
COA Course of Action
COCOM Combatant Command
COG Center of Gravity
COLISEUM Community On-Line Intelligence System for End-Users and Managers
COMCARGRU Commander, Carrier Group
COMDESRON Commander, Destroyer Squadron
Comm Communications
COMSEC Communications Security
COMM Z Communication Zone
CONOPS Concept of Operations
CONPLAN Concept Plan
COP Common Operational Picture
CoS Chief of Staff
COSCOM Corps Support Command
CPG Contingency Planning Guidance
CSA Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
CSAR Combat Search and Rescue
CSC C/C’s Strategic Concept
CSS Combat Service Support
CSSA Combat Service Support Area
CSSE Combat Service Support Element (of MAGTF)
CVBG Aircraft Carrier Battle Group
CVN Aircraft Carrier (Nuclear Powered)
CVW Aircraft Carrier Air Wing
CW Chemical Warfare
CWO Communications Watch Officer
DA Direct Action
DAL Defended Asset List
DARSS Daily Airborne Reconnaissance and Surveillance Syndicate
DART Disaster Assistance Response Team
DASD S&IO Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security and Information Operations
DAT Defense Attaché
DC Deputies Committee
DCI Director of Central Intelligence
DCJTF Deputy Commander, Joint Task Force
DCM Deputy Chief of Mission
B-3

DD Destroyer
D-Day Day on which operations commence or are scheduled to commence
DDG Destroyer, Guided Missile
DDIO Deputy Director for Information Operations (U.S. Joint Staff)
DDO Director of Operations
DepCJTF Deputy Commander, Joint Task Force
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
DIAP Defense-Wide Information Assurance Program
DIAPSG Defense-Wide Information Assurance Program Steering Group
DII Defense Information Infrastructure
DIOC Defense Information Operations Council
DIRLAUTH Direct Liaison Authorized
DIRMOBFOR Director of Mobility Forces
DIRNSA Director, National Security Agency
DISA Defense Information Systems Agency
DISN Defense Information Systems Network
Div Division
DJTFAC Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell
DLA Defense Logistics Agency
DoC Department of Commerce
DOCC Deep Operation Coordination Cell
DoD Department of Defense
DoDIP DoD Intelligence Plan
DoE Department of Energy
DoJ Department of Justice
DoS Department of State
DP Displaced Person
DPRE Displaced Person / Refugee
DTRA Defense Transportation Regulation; Defense Threat Reduction Agency
EA Electronic Attack
ECOA Enemy Course of Action
ECS Electronic Combat Squadron
EEFI Essential Elements of Friendly Information
ELINT Electronic Intelligence
EP Electronic Protection
ES Electronic Support
EUCOM U.S. European Command
EW Electronic Warfare; Early Warning
F2C2 Friendly Force Coordination Center or Cell
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FDO Flexible Deterrent Option
FEDCIRC Federal Computer Incident Response Capability
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FFG Frigate, Guided Missile
FFIR Friendly Force Information Requirements
FID Foreign Internal Defense
B-4

FIE Fly-In Echelon
FIRST Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams
FISINT Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence
FIWC Fleet Information Warfare Center
FLOT Forward Line of Own Troops
FOB Forward Operations Base
FP Force Protection
FPWG Force Protection Working Group
FRAGO, FRAGORD Fragmentary Order
FS Fighter Squadron
FSB Forward Staging Base
FSCL Fire Support Coordination Line
FSCM Fire Support Coordination Measure
FSE Fire Support Element
FSSG Force Service Support Group (of MAGTF)
FUNCPLAN Functional Plan
FW Fighter Wing
G-2 Army or Marine Corps Component Intelligence Staff Officer
G-3 Army or Marine Corps Component Operations Staff Officer
GAT Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting
GCC Gulf Coordination Council
GCCS Global Command and Control System
GNOSC Global Network Operations Security Center
GPS Global Positioning System
GTN Global Transportation Network
GSA General Services Administration
HA Humanitarian Assistance
HACC Humanitarian Action Coordination Center
HAST Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team
HCA Humanitarian and Civic Assistance
HET Heavy Equipment Transporter
HLD Homeland Defense
HLS Homeland Security
HN Host Nation
HNS Host Nation Support
HUMINT Human Intelligence
IA Interagency; Information Assurance
IADS Integrated Air Defense System
IATAC Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center
IAW In Accordance With
IC Intelligence Community
ICC Information Coordination Center
ICE Interdiction Control Element
ICSB Intelligence Collection Synchronization Board; Interim Command Switch Board
IM Information Management
IMINT Imagery Intelligence
B-5

IMI International Military Information
IMO Information Management Officer
Info Information
INFOCON Information Condition
INMARSAT International Maritime Satellite
INR Bureau of Intelligence and Research (DoS)
IO Information Operations; International Organization
ION Information Operations Navigator
IO S&I Information Operations Strategy and Integration
IOSS Interagency OPSEC Support Staff
IOTC Information Operations Technology Center
IOTF Information Operations Task Force
IOWG Information Operations Working Group
IPB Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
IPI International Public Information
IPTF Infrastructure Protection Task Force
ISB Intermediate Staging Base
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
IW Information Warfare
IWSC Information Warfare Support Center
JAC Joint Analysis Center
JAG Judge Advocate General
JAOC Joint Air Operations Center
JCB Joint Coordination Board
JCCC Joint Communications Control Center
JCIWS Joint Command, Control, and Information Warfare School
JCMA Joint COMSEC (Communications Security) Monitoring Activity
JCMOTF Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCSE Joint Communications Support Element
JDISS Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System
JDLC Joint Distributed Learning Center
JDOC Joint Defense Operations Center
JFACC Joint Force Air Component Commander
JFAST Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation
JFC Joint Force Commander
JFCOM U.S. Joint Forces Command
JFSC Joint Forces Staff College
JFE Joint Fires Element
JFHQ Joint Forces Headquarters (UK)
JFLCC Joint Force Land Component Commander
JFMCC Joint Force Maritime Component Commander
JFSOCC Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander
JGAT Joint Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting (Cell)
JIB Joint Information Bureau
JIC Joint Intelligence Center
B-6

JICO Joint Interface Control Officer
JIMB Joint Information Management Board
JIOC Joint Information Operations Center
JIOPC Joint Information Operations Planning Course
JIPB Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
JIPTL Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List
JISE Joint Intelligence Support Element
JITC Joint Interoperability Test Command
JIVA Joint Intelligence Virtual Architecture
JIWSOC Joint Information Warfare Staff and Operations Course
JLRC Joint Logistics Readiness Center
JMC Joint Movement Center
JMD Joint Manning Document
JMETL Joint Mission Essential Task List
JOA Joint Operations Area
JOC Joint Operations Center
JOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JP Joint Publication
JPEC Joint Planning and Execution Community
JPG Joint Planning Group
JPO-STC Joint Program Office for Special Technology Countermeasures
JPOTF Joint Psychological Operations Task Force
JPRA Joint Personnel Recovery Agency
JPRC Joint Personnel Reception Center
JRA Joint Rear Area
JRAC Joint Rear Area Coordinator
JRFL Joint Restricted Frequency List
JRSOI Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration
JRVIO Joint Reserve Virtual Information Operations
JS Joint Staff
JSC Joint Spectrum Center
JSOA Joint Special Operations Area
JSOTF Joint Special Operations Task Force
JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSRC Joint Search and Rescue Center
JSTARS Joint Surveillance and Targeting Attack Radar System
JTASC Joint Training, Analysis and Simulation Center
JTAV Joint Total Asset Visibility
JTB Joint Transportation Board
JTCB Joint Targeting Coordination Board
JTF Joint Task Force
JTF-CNO Joint Task Force for Computer Network Operations
JTSG Joint Targeting Steering Group
JTTP Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
JVB Joint Visitors Bureau
JWAC Joint Warfare Analysis Center
B-7

JWFC Joint Warfighting Center
JWICS Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System
LAN Local Area Network
LCC Land Component Commander; Launch Control Center
LHA Amphibious Assault Ship (General Purpose)
LHD Amphibious Assault Ship (Multi-Purpose)
LIWA Land Information Warfare Activity
LNO Liaison Officer
LOC Line of Communication; Logistics Operations Center
LPD Amphibious Transport Dock
LRC Logistics Readiness Center
LRPE Long Range Planning Element
LSD Landing Ship Dock
MAAP Master Air Attack Plan
MACG Marine Air Control Group
MAG Marine Air Group
MAGTF Marine Air, Ground Task Force
MARFOR Marine Forces
MARLO Marine Liaison Officer
MASINT Measurement and Signature Intelligence
MAW Marine Air Wing
MB Megabytes
MCM Mine Countermeasures Ship
MCMRON Mine Countermeasures Squadron
MEB Marine Expeditionary Brigade
MEF Marine Expeditionary Force
METT-TC Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops, Time Available, and Civilians
MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit
MHE Materials Handling Equipment
MI Military Intelligence
MINERVA Military Information Nexus Enabling Relevant and Valid Analysis
MIO Maritime Interdiction Operations
MOE Measure of Effectiveness
MOG Maximum (aircraft) on the Ground
MOOTW Military Operations Other Than War
MPSRON Maritime Patrol Squadron; Maritime Pre-positioned Ship Squadron
MSCA Military Support to Civil Authorities
MSR Main Supply Route
MTG Master Training Guide
MWSG Marine Wing Support Group
NAF Numbered Air Force
NALE Naval Amphibious Liaison Element
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVFOR Navy Forces
NAVSOF Navy Special Operations Forces
NBC Nuclear, Biological, Chemical
B-8

NCA National Command Authorities (use POTUS or SECDEF)
NCOIC Noncommissioned Officer-in-Charge
NCS National Communications Systems
NCTF-CND Navy Component Task Force for Computer Network Defense
NEO Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NIAP National Infrastructure Assurance Partnership
NIPC National Infrastructure Protection Center
NIST National Intelligence Support Team
NIWA Naval Information Warfare Activity
NORTHCOM U.S. Northern Command
NOSC Network Operations Security Center
NSA National Security Agency
NSC National Security Council
NSIRC National Security Incident Response Center
NSOC / IPC National Security Operations Center / Information Protect Cell
NSPD National Security Presidential Directive
NSS National Security Strategy
NSTAC National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
NSTC National Science and Technology Council
NSTISSC National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Council
NSWTG Navy Special Warfare Task Group
NTIA National Telecommunications and Information Assurance
NWAG Naval Warfare Analysis Group
OAF Operation ALLIED FORCE
OEF Operation ENDURING FREEDOM
OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OGA Other Government Agencies
OJE Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR
OMB Office of Management and Budget
ONDCP Office of National Drug Control Policy
OODA Observe Orient Decide Act
OOTW Operations Other Than War
OPCEN Operations Center
OPCON Operational Control
OPE Operations Planning Element
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OPFOR Opposition Force
OPG Operations Planning Groups
OPLAN Operations Plan
OPORD Operations Order
OPR Office of Primary Responsibility
OPSEC Operations Security
OPT Operations Planning Team
OPTASK Operational Tasking Order
OPTEMPO Operational Tempo
B-9

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSINT Open Source Intelligence
OSTP Office of Science and Technology Policy
PA Public Affairs
PACOM U.S. Pacific Command
PAO Public Affairs Officer
PC Patrol Craft; Principles Committee
PCAST President’s Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology
PCC Policy Coordination Committee
PCCIP President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection
PD Public Diplomacy
PDD Presidential Decision Directive
PfP Partnership for Peace
PID Plan Identification Number
PIR Priority Intelligence Requirements
PJHQ Peacetime Joint Headquarters (UK)
PMO Program Management Office
POAS PSYOP Automated System
POD Port of Debarkation
POE Port of Embarkation
POG Psychological Operations Group
POLAD Political Advisor
POTF Psychological Operations Task Force
POTUS President of the United States
POW Prisoner of War
PPBS Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
PR Personnel Recovery; Public Relations
PSYOP Psychological Operations
PTG Patrol Boat Guided Missile
Pub Publication
PVO Private Voluntary Organization (replaced by NGO)
PWRMS Prepositioned War Reserve Material Stocks
R&D Research and Development
RCC Rescue Coordination Center
RFI Request for Information
RPP Regional Program Plan
ROE Rules of Engagement
RW Reconnaissance Wing; Rotary Wing
SA Situational Awareness
SAG Surface Action Group
SAP Special Access Program
SAR Search and Rescue
SAT Situational Assessment Team; Satellite
SATCOM Satellite Communications; Satellite Command
SEAD Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
SEAL Sea−Air−Land (team)
B-10

SECDEF Secretary of Defense
SERE Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape
SHORAD Short Range Air Defense
SIGINT Signals Intelligence
SIO Special Information Operations
SITREP Situation Report
SJA Staff Judge-Advocate
SLAM Stand-off Land Attack Missile
SLOC Surface Line of Communication
SOAR Special Operations Aviation Regiment
SOC Special Operations Command
SOCOM U.S. Special Operations Command
SOF Special Operations Force
SOFA Status of Forces Agreement
SOLE Special Operations Liaison Element
SOP Standing Operating Procedures
SOUTHCOM U.S. Southern Command
SPACECOM U.S. Space Command
SPECOPS Special Operations
SPOD Sea Port of Debarkation
SPOE Sea Port of Embarkation
SR Special Reconnaissance
SRIG Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group
SROE Standing Rules of Engagement
SSM Surface-to-Surface Missile
SSN Attack Submarine (Nuclear)
STO Special Technical Operations
STRATCOM U.S. Strategic Command
STU Secure Telephone Unit
TAA Tactical Assembly Area
TACAIR Tactical Air
TACON Tactical Control
TACSAT Tactical Satellite
TALCE Tactical Air Lift Control Element
TCF Tactical Combat Force
TECHINT Technical Intelligence
TEL Transporter/Erector/Launcher
TEP Theater Engagement Plan (replaced by TSCP)
TLAM Tomahawk Land-Attack Missile
TMD Theatre Missile Defense
TPFDD Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data
TRANSCOM U.S. Transportation Command
TRAP Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel
TSCP Theater Security Cooperation Plan
TST Time-Sensitive Target
TV Television
B-11

TWI Transnational Warfare Interests
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UCCE Unintended Civilian Casualty Estimate
UCP Unified Command Plan
UJTL Universal Joint Task List
ULN Unit Line Number
UN United Nations
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USD(P) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
USG United States Government
USTR United States Trade Representative
UTC Unit Type Code
VP Maritime Control Squadron
VTC Video Teleconference
WARNORD Warning Order
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
Joint Publication References

Although numerous Joint Publications provide additional information on the topics presented in this
Handbook, the following publications provide the majority of information on Information Operations and
are recommended for review.
Joint Publications:
Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer
0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)
1 Joint Warfare
1-0 Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations
2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations
2-01.1 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Intelligence Support to Targeting
2-01.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of
the Battlespace (JIPB)
3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations
3-13 Joint Doctrine for Information Operations
3-33 Joint Force Capabilities
3-35 Joint Deployment and Redeployment Doctrine
3-51 Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare
3-53 Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations
3-54 Joint Doctrine for Operations Security
3-56 Command and Control Doctrine for Joint Operations
3-57 Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs
3-58 Joint Doctrine for Military Deception
3-60 Doctrine for Joint Targeting
3-61 Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations
3-56.1 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations
4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations
4-01.8 Joint Reception, Staging, On-ward Movement and Integration Doctrine
5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations
5-00.2 Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures
B-12
Joint Publications:
6-0 Doctrine for Command. Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems
Support to Joint Operations
CJCS Manuals:
3122.01 Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume I, Planning
Policies and Procedures
3122.02 Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume III, Crisis
Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment
Execution
3122.03 Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume II, Planning
Formats and Guidance
3500.05 Joint Task Force Headquarters Master Training Guide (JTF HQ MTG)
Joint Publication Availability

The above publications may be obtained through several sources:
• Joint Electronic Library - Either CD-ROM from the Joint Warfighting Center, Doctrine Division, in
Portsmouth, VA or online at http://www.jwfc.js.smil.mil/
• DTIC Website (available in Adobe Acrobat .pdf format): http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/
Match IO Effects Words with IO Capabilities and Related Activities

The following table was created by scanning JP 3-13 for usage of various “effects” words (verbs). A “D”
in the table means that the effect is referenced by doctrine; “S” means there is a suggested reference
based on current usage. Effects words with an asterisk have expanded definitions that are provided in
the next section. The JCIWS faculty uses this technique to easily match a desired IO effect with doctrinal
IO capabilities and related activities.
Safeguard *
Convince *
Influence *
Diminish *
Neutralize
Degrade *
Mislead *
Destroy *
Prevent *
Expose *
Protect *
Disrupt *
Exploit *
Shape *
Inform *
Defend
Negate
Deny *
Civil Affairs D D S
CNA D D D D
Counter-deception D S D D
Counterintelligence D D
Counter-propaganda D
Destruction D
Electronic Warfare D D D D D D D D
Information D D D S
Assurance
INFOSEC D D D
Military Deception S D D
OPSEC D S
PHYSEC D D
PSYOP S D D
Public Affairs S S D S
B-13
IO Effects Definitions
The JCIWS faculty has found it convenient to gather a set of both doctrinal and non-doctrinal definitions
of terms for IO effects we wish to achieve.
To overcome by argument
Convince
To bring to belief, consent, or a course of action
Damage done to the function is permanent, but only portions of the function were
affected; that is, the function still operates, but not fully.
Degrade
A function's operation is permanently impaired, but the damage does not extend to
all facets of the function's operation.
Damage done to the function is only temporary, but all aspects of the function were
affected.
Deny
A function's operation is impaired over the short term, but the damage extends to all
facets of the function's operation.
Damage done to the function is permanent, and all aspects of the function have been
affected.
Destroy
A function's operation is permanently impaired, and the damage extends to all facets
of the function's operation.
To make less or cause to appear less.
Diminish To reduce the effectiveness of an activity. This is similar to degrade without the
kinetic overtones.
Damage done to the function is temporary, and only portions of the function were
affected.
Disrupt
A function's operation is impaired over the short term and the damage does not
extend to all facets of the function's operation.
Attempts to gather information that will enable opposition ability to conduct
Exploit
operations to induce other Effects.
To make known or cause to be visible to public view.
Expose
To make visible, to reveal something undesirable or injurious.
Selected projection or distortion of the truth to persuade the opposition to act in a
manner detrimental to mission accomplishment while benefiting accomplishment of
Influence
friendly objectives.
To cause a change in the character, thought, or action of a particular entity.
Inform To impart information or knowledge.
Creation of a false perception that leads the opposition to act in a manner detrimental
Mislead
to mission accomplishment while benefiting accomplishment of friendly objectives.
To deprive of hope or power of acting or succeeding.
Prevent
To keep from happening, to avert.
To cover or shield from exposure, damage, or destruction.
Protect
To keep from harm, attack, injury or exploitation.
Safeguard
To maintain the status or integrity of.
Negate To render ineffective, invalid or unable to perform a particular task or function.
Neutralize To counteract the activity or effect of.
To determine or direct the course of events.
Shape To modify behavior by rewarding changes that tend toward a desired response.
To cause to conform to a particular form or pattern.
B-14

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Joint

Prepared and Maintained by the

Information Warfare Division

Joint Forces Staff College

Table of Contents .........................................................................................................................................i

Offensive Information Operations ................................................................................................. III-6

Planning Handbook Objectives

• Chapter I – Basics of Information Operations is a brief overview of the capabilities required to

Since this is Handbook is not doctrine, it should not be construed as

Changes Since the Last Edition

CDR Mark Treadwell

Chapter I – Basics of Information Operations

Military Electronic Counter

- Mainly Done During Hostilities

Some lessons learned from Information Operations include the following:

Timing and Phasing

Training and Education

• Identification of critical friendly information

• Reduce efficiency of opposing forces

Steps to accomplishing a successful PSYOP operation include:

• Development of a comprehensive PSYOP campaign

• Focus: Target the adversary decision-maker – not the intelligence system.

Physical Attack / Destruction

Computer Network Attack (CNA)

Civil Affairs (CA)

Public Affairs (PA)

Information Assurance (IA)

IO Objectives, Tasks, MOEs and Concept of Operations

The following nine questions should be answered when defining an objective:

How to Write an IO Objective

Step 1: Determine the Effect You Want to Achieve

Step 2: Choose the Target

JIOC target categories are as follows:

• Hardware (e.g. physical targets such as C3 facilities, information systems, etc.)

Targets can also be grouped as follows:

• The physical space (e.g. traditional fixed and mobile targets)

Step 3: Determine the Purpose

Examples of Good IO Objectives

How to Write an IO Task

Step 1: Identify the Target

Step 2: Identify the Effect

Step 3: Select the IO Capability or Related Activity

Step 4: Fill in the “why” you are doing this task

Step 5: Putting it All Together

How to Write an IO Measure of Effectiveness (MOE)

(Fill in the IO target) is (fill in the effect) (fill in the purpose).

This follows the JOPES format on how to write an MOE.

Step 2: Develop Potential Indicators

1) Assist the J2 in determining intelligence collection requirements.

Examples of IO MOEs and Indicators

How to Write an IO Concept of Operations

The following is one way to write an IO Conception of Operations:

Summarize the JFC’s Purpose for the Operation or Phase

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Chapter II – Organizing a Staff for Information Operations

The Information Operations Cell

Typical Joint IO Cell

CISO Counterintelligence Support Officer PAO Public Affairs Officer

IO Cell During Crisis

PERCEPTION CNO TEAM

• Chapter I – Basics of Information Operations is a brief overview of the capabilities required to

Chapter I – Basics of Information Operations

• Focus: Target the adversary decision-maker – not the intelligence system.

Step 4: Fill in the “why” you are doing this task

Summarize the JFC’s Purpose for the Operation or Phase

Chapter II – Organizing a Staff for Information Operations

• Joint Restricted Frequency List – Deconflicts friendly use of the RF spectrum.

• U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) – USSPACECOM provides Computer Network Defense

Chapter III – Planning Joint Task Force Information

IO Planning CJTF’s Actions

Review mission analysis and CJTF’s

Serves to amplify the initial COAs, show As appropriate, provide:

Determine comparison criteria. Good sources

Provides a staff briefing in which the following As appropriate, provide:

COA IO Planning CJTF’s Actions

Brief/obtain approval for the final draft As appropriate, provide:

Prepare for rehearsals: As appropriate, provide:

• Identify system’s value, use, flow and vulnerabilities

Chapter IV – Integrating Information Operations in JOPES

“War plans cover every aspect of a war,

The “Strategy-to-Task” methodology was built like this.

Don’t forget to plan for

• The Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) in 1997

• CJCSM 3122.03 (JOPES Vol II):

– Describes how the IO will support

– Summarizes the concepts for

– When an operation involves various phases, the

– The concepts for IO-offense and IO-defense may

• IO is best suited to deliberate

Specified, Implied, Subsidiary Tasks – (QA) How can IO help?

IO Objectives – What will we do from an IO perspective?

C/C IO Tasks – Focused on Centers of Gravity

IO Sub-tasks – Plain language statement of purpose

Actions – Coordinated Targets with Timing QA = Quantitative Analysis

JIOAPP – A Closer Look

• Typhoons inundate Mandura