Final Report MV Blue Star

Collision between M/V BLUE STAR & MODU THE 205
Ing. Luka A. Frankovic

_____________ Accidents Investigator
PANAMA MARITIME AUTHORITY
INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES

SURROUNDING THE ALLISION BETWEEN THE
M/V BLUE STAR

AND THE MODU THE 205
ON DECEMBER 24TH 2006, IN THE APPROACH TO

VERACRUZ, MEXICO WITH NO INJURIES,
NO LOSS OFF LIFE AND NO POLLUTION.
1
Panama Maritime Authority
Directorate General of Merchant Marine
Navigation and Marine Security Department
Investigation of Wrecks and Maritime Accidents Section
Panama, Republic of Panama

Accident Reporting and Investigation

The fundamental purpose of investigating an accident under these Regulations is
To determine its circumstances and the cause with the aim of improving the safety
of life at sea and the avoidance of accidents in the future. It is not the purpose to
apportion liability, nor, except so as is necessary to achieve the fundamental
purpose, to apportion blame.
2

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
BACKGROUND OF EVENTS
4/5
SECTION 1 FACTUAL INFORMATION

1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
Particulars of the MV Blue Star and Accident Details

Particulars of the MODU The 205
Background (all times UTC less 6 hours, Ships Time)
The Crew
Environmental Conditions
1.5.1 Beaufort Scale (reference)
Narrative
6/7
7
8
8
9
9
10
SECTION 2 ANALYSIS
2.1
2.2
2.3
Aim
How the MV Blue Star collided with the MODU The 205
Attempt to Avoid the Collision
11
11
11
SECTION 3 CONCLUSIONS
3.1
3.2
Findings
Cause
12
12
12/13
SECTION 4 RECOMMENDATIONS
APPENDIX
A1
A2
A3
A4
A5
Chart Copy (Showing positions from anchorage to allision)

Chart Copy (Showing positions from anchorage to allision)
NKK Damage Survey Report
Diagram showing location of damage
Photographs of Damage
3
14
15
16/17
18
19

BACKGROUND OF EVENTS :
On December 24th, 2006, the MV Blue Star allided with the Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit
(MODU) 205 while jacked up near the approach to Veracruz harbor. The investigation was
ordered by the Panama Maritime Authority and entrusted to Bellem Marine Bureau Inc. Capt
Luka A. Frankovic to determine the facts surrounding the incident and report on the same. The
Marine Surveyor Eng. John Pope was lead investigating surveyor.
The following is the preliminary entry factual information:
Eng. John Pope arrived on board the vessel on January 5th 2007 at about 8;50 AM. The vessel
was securely moored starboard side alongside the Veracruz dry-dock (Astileros Navales) .Her
draft was observed as Fwd. 3.20 M and Aft. 5.4 M.
On December 21st, 2006, the bulk carrier M.V. Blue Star completed discharging at the Port of
Veracruz, Mexico .Same day s/v proceeded to the Veracruz Anchorage where she was to
complete Class annual surveys.
The vessel anchored at (see map A-1) which was within Veracruz anchorage limits (see
enclosed navigation chart for reference).
On December 24th,2006, at 07:10 AM light weather conditions, as reported and as per ships
records ,started deteriorating rapidly. Northerly / NWly wind speed increased initially from 25
to 30 kts with wind gust of 35 kts. Vessels only deployed port anchor (4 schls in water) began
dragging.
On the December 23rd. 2007 PM HRS LT, the offshore drilling vessel MODU 205 arrived and
was jacked-up out of the water at position approximately 1.3 N/M SSE from the MV Blue Star .
She was assisted by 3 tugs. These tugs remained, as reported, in a nearby vicinity.
At the time of incident MODU The 205 was jacked-up and immobile.
We found no records or plotting information that would show that the crew on board the MV
Blue Star recorded The MODU 205s arrival time and or position.
The master of the Blue Star was called upon the bridge. Once on bridge and situation was
assessed, and the Master called the Chief Engineer and ordered to prepare the engine, and to
be prepared for emergency maneuvering. This was subsequently recorded as done at about
07:12 AM LT.
In the mean time, the Master ordered the bosun and mate to the fcstle deck and ordered the
anchor to be slacked in order to get better holding, that did not help and the Blue Star
continued to drag her anchor and was closing in on the stationary MODU 205.
The Master ordered the bosun to start heave up the anchor in attempt to maneuver the vessel
away from the MODU 205 using the ships engine. The anchor chain was reported 11 oclock
and hardly coming up.
4

At 0743 AM LT master engaged main engine with SLOW AHEAD in attempt to ease up on
anchor chain, which would ultimately allow him to gain headway and depart from collision
course with MODU 205.
Vessel reportedly was able only to make speed of 2 kts in rough seas.
At 0811 AM LT the anchor was aweigh at SLOW AHEAD, the vessel started to move ahead,
when the wind speed increased drastically.
At 0813 AM LT the Master engaged the main engine to HALF AHEAD, but the vessel could not
increase its distance away from the MODU 205.
At 0815 AM LT the Master engaged the main engine to FULL AHEAD, on the telegraph but it
was too late.
At 0818 AM LT the Blue Star allied with the MODU 205 causing substantial damage to both
vessels.
Note : All times indicated in this report are expressed as local Central Standard Time,
on the Twenty four hour clock.
5

M/V BLUE STAR

SECTION 1 FACTUAL INFORMATION
1.1
VESSEL PARTICULARS OF MV BLUE STAR

Name :
Flag :
Classification :
Class No. :
IMO No. :
Call Sign :
Type of Vessel :
Gross Tons:
Net Tons :
Deadweight (DWT) :
Length (LOA) :
Breadth (Moulded) :
Depth (Moulded) :
Date Built :
Place Built :
Owner :
Operator :
BLUE STAR
Panama
Nippon Kaiji Kyokai (NKK)
854048
8306852
3 ECO 7
Bulk / Log Carrier
14,889
8,920
25,694 MT
159.46 M
26.00 M
13.60 M
1985
Imabari, Japan
Atlas Shipping Company
53 Street, Swiss Tower
16th Floor, Panama
Tradeline LLC
839 Office Tower,
6


Al Ghurair City, Deira, Dubai

Diesel Direct
5,080 @ 119 rpm
Jesia Rusi Yezdi
Propulsion :
Horsepower :
Master :
ACCIDENT DETAILS
Time and Date :
Approximately 08:18 AM LT Ships time on 24th

December 2006
Location of the Allision :
Veracruz Anchorage
Persons Onboard :
22 Crew Members
Injuries / Fatalities :
None
Damages :
to the Blue Star
No. 4 WBT (Top Side) starboard from frames No. 32 to

70.
Upper Deck iwo Hatch No. 4 Starboard.
Hatch Cover No. 4
Cargo Hold No. 4
Cargo Crane No. 3
Starboard Boat Deck
Starboard Access Gangway
to the MODU The 205
The extent of the damages to the MODu is unknown

at this time
1.2 PARTICULARS OF THE MOBILE OFFSHORE DRILLING UNIT THE 205

Name :
Flag :
Class :
IMO No. :
Call Sign :
Service :
Rig Type :
Gross Tons:
MODU THE 205

USA
ABS
8755390
WDB5532
MODU
JACKUP
5,340
7
Length (LOA) :
Breadth (Moulded) :
Depth (Moulded) :
Date Built :
Place Built :
Owner :
Operator :
Propulsion :
Master :

150.70 FT
132.00 FT
18.00 FT
1979
Bethlehem Steel, Beaumont, Texas Shipyard
TODCO
2000 W. Sam Houston Pkwy S. Suite 800
Houston, Texas 77042, USA
Same as Owner
None
Unknown
1.3 VESSEL BLUE STAR

The vessel Blue Star(ex Refioglu) is a geared bulk/log carrier owned by Atlas Shipping
Company and operated by Tradeline LLC. The vessel was built 1985 in Japan flying the
Panamanian Flag. The vessels main propulsion engine is a single 2 stroke diesel engine
rated 5,080 hp @ 119 rpm. For maneuvering purposes (arrivals /departures) vessel uses
MDO . Maintenance records were found all to date with no reports of major problems.
The class quarterly machinery report showed no remaining outstanding
recommendations.
From the previous records it is observed that engine preparations take normally an
average of 25-30 minutes.
At the time of incident , the vessel was in ballasted condition. Class NKK had just
completed all statutory annual surveys on the 26th. December 2006.
All regulatory and statutory as well as Class certificates were found valid and all annual
endorsements were found up to date . The vessel was found to be in compliance with the
Panamanian Minimum Safe Manning certificate. The ISM (SMC/DOC) and ISPS(ISSC)
certification was also valid and the Safety Management manual was found on board .
1.4 THE CREW

The Master of the MV BLUE STAR Captain Jesia Rusi Yezdi is Indian national.
Captain Yezdi is licensed by the governments of Britain and has an endorsement issued
by Panama as a Master (F.G) (Foreign-Going).
8

Captain Yezedis Provisional Panamanian Masters and provisional G.M.D.S.S.

endorsements both expired on December 21st 2006. The Masters National COC and
GMDSS GO, was found valid through to 7/2011 .
The Master sailed as a 3rd Officer in 1990. He has been sailing as a Master since 2nd
April 2002, with a total sea time of approximately 26 months excluding the current Blue
Stars voyage. His sea time experience as master includes 5 bulk carriers (3 Panamax and
2 Handymax size).
It should be noted , with the exception of the Ch/Eng, that all of the officers and ratings
are holding expired provisional Panamanian endorsements .(validity three months). Their
National certificates of competencies were all found valid .
1.5 ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS(MARINE WEATHER)

On the day of the incident ,as per the masters statement, the weather conditions
deteriorated rapidly . The wind speed and sea state were recorded by the crew of the MV
Blue Star during the day of December 24th, 2006 as follows :
Watch
0000 - 0600
0600 - 1200
1200 - 1600
1600 - 2000
2000 - 2400
Wind
Lt Air
NW 7/8
NW 7/8
NW 7/8
NW 7/8
Sea State
3
6
6
6
6
Barometer
1015
1017
1018
1021
1021
Please note that we find quite unusual that barometric preasure was rising with wind /
seas conditions worsening .
THE FOLLOWING IS THE BEAUFORT SCALE
(FOR REFERENCE ONLY)
Force
Mean
Speed(knots)
Description
State of sea
Ashore
9
Probable
Wave Height
(m)
Probable
Max Wave
Height
0-1
Calm
Flat
Smoke rises vertically
1-3
Light air
Ripples
Smoke shows wind direction
0.1
4-6
Light breeze
Small wavelets, non breaking
Leaves rustle
0.2
0.3
7-10
Gentle breeze
Large wavelets, crests

breaking
Wind extends small flag,

leaves in motion
0.6
11-16
Moderate breeze
Fairly frequent white horses
Small branches begin to

move
1.5
Fresh breeze
Moderate waves, many white

horses, some spray
Small trees begin to sway
2.5
Large branches move
1.6

17-21
22-27
Strong breeze
Large waves, white foam

crests, some spray
28-33
Near gale
White foam blows from crests
Branches move, difficult to

walk against the wind
5.5
34-40
Gale
Mod high waves, foam in

streaks along surface
Twigs break off trees
5.5
7.5
41-47
Strong gale
High waves, tumbling crests,

dense streaks of foam, much
spray
Slates, chimneys begin to

be moved
10
10
48-55
Storm
Very high waves with long

overhanging crests, heavy
tumbling sea
Trees uprooted, structural

damage to buildings
12.5
11
56-63
Violent storm
Sea completely covered with

long white foam patches
Wide spread damage to

buildings etc
11.5
16
12
64 +
Hurricane
Air filled with foam and

driving spray. Visibility very
seriously affected
As above
14
Above 16
NARRATIVE (All times UTC less 6 hrs)
On December 21st 2006 the bulk carrier MV Blue Star completed discharging at the Port of Veracruz
and shortly thereafter proceeded to Veracruz anchorage to complete the class inspections.
At 07:10 hrs on December 24th, 2006, the Chief Officer S. Hamidur Rahman was at watch on
thenavigational bridge when he noticed that the winds began to increase from Nly 5-10 kts to
Nly/NWly 20-25 kts. This soon resulted with vessel dragging its port anchor.
The Master was informed and was asked to come on the bridge. Few minutes later master was on the
bridge and have been briefed by Chief Officer. Wind speed at this time was recorded at 25 knots. At
this time the MODU The 205 was approximately 1.3 miles off the starboard aft quarter.
At about 07:12 AM LT the Master informed the Chief Engineer and the engine crew to prepare the main
engine for emergency maneuvering . By all accounts this took approximately 25 minutes. At about
07:16 AM LT the Master reacted by ordering bosun to paid out 2 shackles on the port anchor. This
10

resulted in vessel holding position for short period of time. The distance to the MODU The 205 was
now reported as approximately 0.7 N/M off the starboard aft quarter.
Meantime at about 07:20 hrs LT the Veracruz Vessel Traffic Services(VTS) called the vessel on CH
10 informing the MV Blue Star that they were dragging their anchor.
At 07:43 hrs the Master informed the Bosun to begin heaving the anchor and at the same time engaged
the main engine to SLOW AHEAD with intention to ease up on the anchor chain. By now wind has
increased, as per ships deck log book records, went up to 30-35 gusting 40 kts. The vessel was dragging
its port anchor again.
At 08:11 hrs the Master had the port anchor aweigh and vessels main engine was engaged from slow
ahead to half ahead(o8:13 AM LT and full ahead @ 08:15 AM. LT).At this time the 3rd Officer informed
the Master, that the wind speed has increased again and that the MODUs 205 was now only 0.4 miles
off the starboard aft quarter and decreasing rapidly.
Even , as reported , with the vessels main engine now in a Full Ahead mode the vessels speed was not
increasing . The Ships bow was heading due North and ships speed was reported as 2 kts or less.
At approximately 08:18 hrs, the MV Blue Star allided with the MODU The 205. As the result of
impact the helipad cut loose from the MODU205 and landed on the starboard side No. 4 hatch cover
of the MV Blue Star, causing substantial damage to the Blue Stars starboard side hull, bulwark and
timber posts and ballast tank. Substantial damage was caused to MODU The 205 as well.
We did not visite the MODU and do not have confirmed information on the extent of the damages
sustained.
Following instructions provided by VTS vessel proceeded in steering Ely course and at about10:50 AM
LT cleared out to open seas making approximately speed of 10 Kts through the water. The weather
conditions persisted, reportedly, for another 24-30 hrs.
Please note that master has produced and presented two quite different chart plottings of the vessel
position on the day of the incident. The second chart shows only four positions and was produced
several days after the incident?
SECTION 2 - ANALYSIS
2.1
AIM
The purpose of the analysis is to determine the contributory causes and circumstances of
the accident, as a basis for making recommendations to prevent similar accidents from
occurring in the future.
2.2
HOW THE MV BLUE STAR ALLIDED WITH THE MODU THE 205
11

In this case, the Blue Star allided with the stationary Jacked Up Mobile Offshore
Drilling Unit The 205, without any loss of life, injuries or pollution. Once the Blue Star
began dragging its anchor the strong winds and seas prevented the vessel from being able
to maneuver away from the collision course with the MODU The 205using her own
main engine.
It must be also noted that the M.V. Blue Star was in ballast condition giving the vessel a
large sail area upon which the storm force wind exerted it forces.Further more it must be
noted that engineers on board Blue Star were given not enough time to properly prepare
main engine for emergency maneuvering .
2.3
THE ATTEMPT TO AVOID CONTACT WITH THE RIG.

The Captain and crew following master orders attempted to re-set the port anchor when it
first started dragging but they never attempted to drop the second anchor?
Realizing that one anchor was not sufficient to hold the vessel position the Captain heaved
in the anchor time while going slow ahead with the main engine. This took time and
decision of doing so was brought to late ?
It appears that the Master did not realize that danger of a collision was imminent, and
therefore, never raised an emergency distress call Mayday, which would as per Intl.
regulations, brought him assistance of tugs and vessels in nearby vicinity . There were
reported several available in the nearby vicinity.
Several attempts were made but all seamed to be a little bit too late. There is also
noticeable factor of insufficient decisiveness. After the vessel allided with the MODU the
vessels rudder was ordered to HARD STARBOARD which helped the vessel to break
free and away from the MODU . This attempt was successful.
SECTION 3 - CONCLUSIONS
3.1
FACTS
12

1. The MV Blue Star was properly manned and the vessel was fully certified by Class
prior to the allison.
2. The winds and seas ,prior to the time of the allison ,deteriorated rapidly.
3. Master was not fully aware of the upcoming weather conditions and therefore, he did
not take adequate precautionary measures including and not limited to the decision to
set sail to open seas to meet stormy weather.
4. The wind, seas followed by strong tidal currents ultimately contributed to this
accident.
5. The propulsion, steering and navigation equipment on the BLUE STAR were found
operating properly. There was no records of any mechanical failures that we can
attribute to this incident. It appears that the order to prepare the machinery was given
too late.
This would mean that master failed to follow company procedures for Emergency
Situations and Response Actions .
6. Lack of communication between the VTS (Vessel Traffic Services) Veracruz, Mexico,
the MODU The 205 and the MV Blue Star also have contributed to the allison.
3.2
CAUSE
As per above presented facts we are of the opinion that human factor directly contributed
to this incident. Master of the vessel did not prepare the vessel in a timely manner .
Weather reports and warnings that were available should have been properly evaluated
.Since that was note done and because of that vessel and its crew were caught off guard un
prepared .We have not been presented with any evidence that would steer us thinking
otherwise.
Subsequently cause of the vessel finally alliding with MUDU should be attributed to the
human factor as well . The lack of experience of the ships master in handling this and
similar situations directly contributed to the results of this incident .
Also we may say that lack of effective communication between the M.V. Blue Star, VTS
and
MODU The 205 also contributed to final result of this incident
as well.
SECTION 4 - RECOMMENDATIONS
1.
Operators of the s/v are recommended to amend the shipboard emergency procedure
manual by adding additional entries specifically addressing procedures to be taken in the
case of expected and un-expected weather deteriorating factors that may presents danger
to the crew and property (vessel) . This sections should include more detailed
communication procedures to be taken when vessel is at anchorage and adverse weather is
13

expected and or it occurs suddenly and unexpectedly. This section should also include
instructions to the officers on watch to positively establish radio contact with any
vessel/unit anchored in a nearby vicinity.
2.
The Captains should ensure that weather facts are closely monitored and constantly
evaluated and continuously brought to his attention. The Master should be trained to be
more decisive, and to use all the means at his disposal when facing adverse weather
conditions or any other situation that presents danger to his crew and vessel.
3.
The Captain should have taken an immediate decision to drop both of the vessels anchors
when he realized that the port anchor was dragging and would not hold. He also should
have been using full capacity of his engine even if that would have resulted in loosing one
or both of the vessel anchors .
4. If communication was failing with VTS and nearby vessels or if the reply was not as
expected the Captain should have immediately called out a distress call requesting
assistance from all available vessels in a nearby vicinity .
5.
The Officer on Watch should have had communicated with VTS immediately upon
realizing
that the vessel was dragging his anchor and he was heading toward another
vessel. The ships position ,engine status with time needed to have engine ready for operation
and number of anchors in the water immediately should have been transmitted to VTS along
with request for immediate assistance. If such would be refused emergency distress call should
have been followed right away instead when it was to late.
6. Complete and detailed weather conditions should been always recorded in the vessels
official
deck log book including temperatures(air, water),barometric pressure, wind / seas direction /
force/state. When noticing significant changes in any of the above listed entries OOW
should
have taken readings and made entries on a more frequently basis (15-30 minutes intervals)
and report changes to the master at once.
The above survey report is submitted by the undersigned independent marine surveyor at the
request of AMP . The undersigned reserves the right to amend this survey, should and when
further information become available.
14
Signed :

Capt.Luka A. Frankovic
Principal Surveyor , BMB Inc.,
Eng. John Pope
Investigating Surveyor , BMB Inc.,
This report is intended for the sole use of the person or organization to whom it
is addressed and no liability of any nature whatsoever shall be assumed to any
other party in respect of its contents. This document does not make any
warranty expressed or implied concerning any inaccuracy in any document
issued. As to the addressee, neither the Company nor the undersigned shall be
held liable for any loss or damage whatsoever suffered by virtue of any act,
omission or default (whether arising by negligence or otherwise) by the
undersigned, the Company or any of its servants.
APPENDIX
A1
BA chart 374, showing where the MV Blue Star was anchored and eventually allided
with the MODU The 205.
15

This map was produced on Jan 7, 2007 long after

Eng. J. Pope left the vessel ???
A2
BA chart 374, showing where the MV Blue Star was anchored and eventually
allided with the MODU The 205.
This was the original map showing vsls movement on Dec 24th. 2007
A3
DAMAGE SUSTAINED FROM ALLISION

NKK SURVEY REPORT OF DAMAGE TO MV BLUE STAR
16

17
A4

REFERENCE DIAGRAM SHOWING LOCATION OF DAMAGE
18
A5

PHOTOS OF DAMAGE TO M/V BLUE STAR
Damage to No. 3 Crane Catwalk
Damage to No. 4 TST & Cargo Hold
Damage to Starboard Bulwark
Damage to Main Deck
Damage to Hatch Covers
Damage to Fwd Corner of Boat Deck

19


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What was the incident being investigated?

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What types of damage did the MV Blue Star sustain in the allision?

Collision between M/V BLUE STAR & MODU THE 205

Ing. Luka A. Frankovic

PANAMA MARITIME AUTHORITY

INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES

M/V BLUE STAR

ON DECEMBER 24TH 2006, IN THE APPROACH TO

Collision between M/V BLUE STAR & MODU THE 205

Ing. Luka A. Frankovic

Accident Reporting and Investigation

Collision between M/V BLUE STAR & MODU THE 205

Ing. Luka A. Frankovic

SECTION 1 FACTUAL INFORMATION

Particulars of the MV Blue Star and Accident Details

Chart Copy (Showing positions from anchorage to allision)

Collision between M/V BLUE STAR & MODU THE 205

Ing. Luka A. Frankovic

Collision between M/V BLUE STAR & MODU THE 205

Ing. Luka A. Frankovic

Collision between M/V BLUE STAR & MODU THE 205

Ing. Luka A. Frankovic

M/V BLUE STAR

VESSEL PARTICULARS OF MV BLUE STAR

Panama Maritime Authority

Collision between M/V BLUE STAR & MODU THE 205

Ing. Luka A. Frankovic

Al Ghurair City, Deira, Dubai

Approximately 08:18 AM LT Ships time on 24th

Location of the Allision :

No. 4 WBT (Top Side) starboard from frames No. 32 to

to the MODU The 205

The extent of the damages to the MODu is unknown

1.2 PARTICULARS OF THE MOBILE OFFSHORE DRILLING UNIT THE 205

MODU THE 205

Collision between M/V BLUE STAR & MODU THE 205

Ing. Luka A. Frankovic

1.3 VESSEL BLUE STAR

1.4 THE CREW

Collision between M/V BLUE STAR & MODU THE 205

Ing. Luka A. Frankovic

Captain Yezedis Provisional Panamanian Masters and provisional G.M.D.S.S.

1.5 ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS(MARINE WEATHER)

Collision between M/V BLUE STAR & MODU THE 205

Smoke rises vertically

Smoke shows wind direction

Small wavelets, non breaking

Large wavelets, crests

Wind extends small flag,

Fairly frequent white horses

Small branches begin to

Moderate waves, many white

Small trees begin to sway

Large branches move

Ing. Luka A. Frankovic

Large waves, white foam