Macasiano vs Diokno GR

97764 (August 10, 1992)

Posted on October 19, 2012

211 SCRA 464

G.R. No. 97764
August 10, 1992
Facts:
Respondent Municipality passed Ordinance No. 86 which authorized the closure
of J.Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets and
the establishment of a flea market thereon. This was passed pursuant to MMC
Ordinance No.2 and was approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority on July
20, 1990.
On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and Palanyag entered into a
contract agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain & manage the
flea markets and/or vending areas in the aforementioned streets with the
obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the municipal government of
Paraaque.
On September 13, 1990 Brig. Gen. Macasiano ordered the destruction and
confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz & Gabriel Street in Baclaran. He also wrote
a letter to Palanyag ordering the destruction of the flea market.
Hence, respondent filed a joint petition praying for preliminary injunction. The
trial court upheld the assailed Ordinance and enjoined petitioner from enforcing
his letter-order against Palanyag.

Issues:
WON an ordinance/resolution issued by the municipal council of Paraaque
authorizing the lease & use of public streets/thoroughfares as sites for the flea
market is valid.

Held:
No.
J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets are
local roads used for public service and are therefore considered public properties
of respondent municipality. Properties of the local government devoted to public
service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress.
Hence, local governments have no authority to control/regulate the use of public
properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress.
Sec. 10, Chapter II of the LGC should be read and interpreted in accordance with
basic principles already established by law.
The closure should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other
public property from public use when circumstances show that such property is
no longer intended/necessary for public use/service. Once withdrawn, the
property then becomes patrimonial property of the LGU concerned and only
then can said LGU use the property as an object of an ordinary contract. Roads
and streets available to the public and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are
still considered public property devoted to public use. The LGU has no power to
use it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to private persons.
Also, the disputed ordinance cannot be validly implemented because it cant be
considered approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority due to noncompliance with the conditions it imposed for the approval of said ordinance.
The powers of an LGU are not absolute, but subject to the limitations laid down
by the Constitution and laws such as the Civil Code. Every LGU has the sworn
obligation to enact measures that will enhance the public health, safety &
convenience, maintain peace & order and promiote the general prosperity of the
inhanbitants pf the local units.
As in the Dacanay case, the general public have the right to demand the
demolition of the illegally constructed stalls in public roads & streets. The
officials of the respondent municipality have the corresponding duty arising from

public office to clear the city streets and restore them to their specific public
purpose.
The ordinance is void and illegal for lack of basis in authority in laws applicable
during its time.

City Government of QC vs
Judge Ericta & Himlayang
Pilipino
November 23, 2010
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Police Power Not Validly Exercised

Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled ORDINANCE REGULATING THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE

CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND

PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF. The law basically provides
that at least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set
aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of
Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City
Authorities. QC justified the law by invoking police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid.
HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no reasonable
relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private
cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health,
morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a
taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers
who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public
cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.

SPS. GUANIO VS MAKATI SHANGRI-LA HOTEL

7 February 2011
Facts: Petitioner spouses, Luigi M. Guanio and Anna Hernandez-Guanio, booked respondent Makati Shangri-La
Hotel for their reception. However, during the wedding itself and even during the initial food tasting they encountered
bad service from the employees of the hotel. Due to that, the Guanio spouses sent a letter-complaint to Makati
Shangri-La wherein the latter responded with an apology. Despite that, the Guanio spouses still filed a Complaint for
breach of contract to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. The Guanio spouses contends that the apology is an
admission of the bad service the hotel has rendered to them. On the other hand, Makati Shangri-La denies it stating
that their apology is only a standard followed by their employees to express empathy in reference to the
inconvenience experienced by their dissatisfied customers.
Issue: Whether or not the apology made by Makati Shagri-La is considered anadmission of breach of contract
Ruling: For their wedding reception on July 28, 2001, spouses Luigi M. Guanio and Anna Hernandez-Guanio
booked at the Shangri-la Hotel Makati. Scheduled food tastings were made prior to the event. The parties eventually
agreed on a final price at P1,150 per person. On July 27, 2001, the parties finalized and forged their contract.
Petitioners claim that during the reception, respondents representatives, Catering Director Bea Marquez and Sales
Manager Tessa Alvarez, did not show up despite their assurance that they would; their guests complained of the
delay in the service of the dinner; certain items listed in the published menu were unavailable; the hotels waiters

were rude and unapologetic when confronted about the delay; and despite Alvarezs promise that there would be no
charge for the extension of the reception beyond 12:00 midnight, they were billed and paid P8,000 per hour for the
three-hour extension of the event up to 4:00 A.M. the next day. Petitioners further claim that they brought wine and
liquor in accordance with their open bar arrangement, but these were not served to the guests who were forced to
pay for their drinks.
Petitioners thus sent a letter-complaint to the Makati Shangri-la Hotel and Resort, Inc. and received an apologetic
reply from Krister Svensson, the hotels Executive Assistant Manager in charge of Food and Beverage. They
nevertheless filed a complaint for breach of contract and damages before the RTC of Makati City.
Issue: Whether or not the apology made by Makati Shagri-La is considered anadmission of breach of contract.
Ruling:What applies in the present case is Article 1170 of the Civil Code which reads: Art. 1170. Those who in the
performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the
tenor thereof, are liable for damages. RCPI v. Verchez, et al. enlightens: In culpa contractual x x x the mere proof of
the existence of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. The
law, recognizing the obligatory force of contracts, will not permit a party to be set free from liability for any kind of
misperformance of the contractual undertaking or a contravention of the tenor thereof. A breach upon the contract
confers upon the injured party a valid cause for recovering that which may have been lost or suffered. The remedy
serves to preserve the interests of the promissee that may include his expectation interest , which is his interest in
having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been
performed, or his reliance interest ,which is his interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the
contract by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract not been made; or
hisrestitution interest, which is his interest in having restored to him any benefit that he has conferred on the other
party. Indeed, agreements can accomplish little, either for their makers or for society, unless they are made the basis
for action. The effect of every infraction is to create a new duty, that is, to make RECOMPENSE to the one who has
been injured by the failure of another to observe his contractual obligation unless he can show extenuating
circumstances, like proof of his exercise of due diligence or of the attendance of fortuitous event to excuse him from
his ensuing liability.

DURBAN APARTMENTS VS. PIONEER INSURANCE

Facts: July 22, 2003, Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corp, by right of subrogation, filed with the RTC of Makati a
Complaint for Recovery of Damages against Durban ApartmentsCorp (or City Garden Hotel) and defendant before
the RTC, Vicente Justimbaste. Respondent averred that it is the insurer for loss and damage of Jeffrey S. Sees 2001
Suzuki Grand Vitara in the amount of P1,175,000.00. On April 30, 2002, See arrived and checked in at the City
Garden Hotel before midnight, and its parking attendant, Justimbaste got the key to said Vitara from See to park it.On
May 1,2002, at about 1:00 am, See received a phone call where the Hotel Chief Security Officer informed him that his

Vitara was carnapped while it was parked unattended at the parking area of Equitable PCI Bank. See went to see the
Security Officer, thereafter reported the incident to the Operations Division of the Makati City Police Anti-Carnapping
Unit, and a flash alarm was issued. The police investigated Hotel Security Officer, Ernesto T. Horlador, Jr. and
Justimbaste. See gave his Sinumpaang Salaysay to the police investigator, and filed a Complaint Sheet with the PNP
Traffic Management Group in Camp Crame. It paid the P1,163,250.00 money claim of See and mortgagee ABN
AMRO Savings Bank,Inc. as indemnity for the loss of the Vitara.
Issue: Whether or not Durban Apartments is liable for damages.
Ruling: Yes. The Vitara was lost due to the negligence of Durban Apartments and Justimbaste because it was
discovered during the investigation that this was the second time that a similar incident of carnapping happened in
the valet parking service and no necessary precautions were taken to prevent its repetition. Durban Apartments was
wanting in due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees particularly defendant Justimbaste. Both
failed and refused to pay its valid, just, and lawful claim despite written demands.

ARTURO SARTE FLORES V. SPOUSES LINDO

G.R. No. 183984 April 13, 2011

Facts: Edna Lindo obtained a loan from Arturo Flores amounting to Php 400,000.00 with monthly interest and
surcharge in case of late payment. Edna executed a deed of real mortgage and promissory note to secure the said
loan. Edna issued three checks as partial payments which were dishonored later for insufficiency of funds. This
prompted petitioner to file a complaint for the foreclosure of mortgage with damages against the respondents. RTC
branch 33 held that Flores was not entitled to judicial foreclosure of the mortgage because it found out that the Deed
was executed by Edna without her husbands consent. Special Power of Attorney by Enrico was only constituted days
after the Deed. However, it further ruled that petitioner Flores was not precluded from recovering the loan from Edna
as he could file a personal action against her. Petitioner then filed a complaint for Sum of Money with damages
against respondents. It was raffled to Branch 42. Respondents admitted their loan but in the tune of Php340,000.00
and prayed for dismissal on the grounds of improper venue, res judicata, and forum shopping. RTC Branch 42 denied
the motion to dismiss. CA set aside decision of RTC Branch 42 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
CA ruled in general that the creditor may institute two alternative remedies: either a personal action for the collection
of debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage, but not both.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner can no longer file complaint for collection of sum of money onthe ground of
multiplicity of suits

Ruling: The Court ruled that generally, it is true that the mortgage-creditor has the option of either filing a personal
action for collection of sum of money or instituting a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security. An election of
the first bars recourse to the second,
otherwise there would be multiplicity of suits in which the debtor would be tossed from one venue to another
depending on the location of the mortgaged properties and the residence of the parties.
In this case, however, there are circumstances that the Court takes into consideration. Accordingly since the Deed
was executed by respondent Edna without the consent and authority of her husband, it is void pursuant to Article 96
of the Family Code.
Any disposition or encumbrance without the written consent shall be void. However, both provisions also state that
the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person,
and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse x x x before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors. The execution of the SPA is the acceptance by the other spouse that perfected
the continuing offer as a binding contract between the parties, making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid
contract.
However, as the Court of Appeals noted, petitioner allowed the decisions of the RTC, Branch 33 and the RTC, Branch
93 to become final and executor without asking the courts for an alternative relief. The Court of Appeals stated that
petitioner merely relied on the declarations of these courts that he could file a separate personal action and thus
failed to observe the rules and settled jurisprudence on multiplicity of suits, closing petitioners avenue for recovery of
the loan. Nevertheless, petitioner still has a remedy under the law.
In Chieng v. Santos, this Court ruled that a mortgage-creditor may institute against the mortgage-debtor either a
personal action for debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. The Court ruled that the remedies are alternative
and not cumulative and held that the filing of a criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was in effect a
collection suit or a suit for the recovery of the mortgage-debt. In that case, however, this Court pro hac vice, ruled that
respondents could still be held liable for the balance of the loan, applying the principle that no person may unjustly
enrich himself at the expense of another.
The principle of unjust enrichment is provided under Article 22 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains
money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience. The
principle of unjust enrichment
requires two conditions: (1) that a person is benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that such benefit is
derived at the expense of another.
The main objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is to prevent one from enriching himself at the expense
of another without just cause or consideration. The principle is applicable in this case considering that Edna admitted
obtaining a loan from petitioners, and the same has not been fully paid without just cause. The Deed was declared
void erroneously at the instance of Edna, first when she raised it as a defense before the RTC, Branch 33 and
second, when she filed an action for declaratory relief before the RTC, Branch 93. Petitioner could not be expected to
ask the RTC, Branch 33 for an alternative remedy, as what the Court of Appeals ruled that he should have done,

because the RTC, Branch 33 already stated that it had no jurisdiction over any personal action that petitioner might
have against Edna.
Considering the circumstances of this case, the principle against unjust enrichment, being a substantive law, should
prevail over the procedural rule on multiplicity of suits. The Court of Appeals, in the assailed decision, found that Edna
admitted the loan, except that she claimed it only amounted to P340,000. Edna should not be allowed to unjustly
enrich herself because of the erroneous decisions of the two trial courts when she questioned the validity of the
Deed. Moreover, Edna still has an opportunity to submit her defenses before the RTC, Branch 42 on her claim as to
the amount of her indebtedness.

Drilon v. Lim
G.R. No. 112497. August 4, 1994
FACTS:
Pursuant to Section 187 of the Local Government Code, the Secretary of
Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer, declared
Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and
void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of
tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and
public policy. In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the RTC
declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional
because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of control over
local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in
the Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the
President of the Philippines only the power of supervision over local
governments. In this case, Judge Rodolfo C. Palattao declared Section 187
unconstitutional insofar as it empowered the Secretary of Justice to review
tax ordinances. He cited the familiar distinction between control and
supervision, the first being "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter," while the second
is "the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their
functions in accordance with law.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 187 of the Local Government Code is constitutional

and whether or not the Secretary of Justice can exercise control, rather than
supervision, over the local government
HELD:
Yes. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the
constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke
it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets
aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own
judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the
measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did
not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. What he
found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure
was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in
accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the
enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government
under the Local Government Code. As the court sees it, that was an act not
of control but of mere supervision. Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila
Revenue Code only on two grounds, to wit, the inclusion therein of
certain ultra vires provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed
procedure in its enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not
the wisdom or reasonableness, of the tax measure.
As regards the issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the
enactment of the Manila Revenue Code, the Court has carefully examined
every one of the exhibits and agree with the trial court that the procedural
requirements have indeed been observed. Notices of the public hearings
were sent to interested parties. The minutes of the hearings are found in the
exhibits and such show that the proposed ordinances were published.

Abbas vs Comelec (179 SCRA 287)

Posted on June 30, 2013 by winnieclaire

Standard
Facts: The arguments against R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners may generally be categorized into either of the
following:

(a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and
(b) that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.
Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous region in Mindanao, contrary to
the aforequoted provisions of the Constitution on the autonomous region which make the creation of such region
dependent upon the outcome of the plebiscite.
In support of his argument, petitioner cites Article II, section 1(1) of R.A. No. 6734 which declares that [t]here is
hereby created the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to be composed of provinces and cities voting favorably
in the plebiscite called for the purpose, in accordance with Section 18, Article X of the Constitution. Petitioner
contends that the tenor of the above provision makes the creation of an autonomous region absolute, such that even if
only two provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an autonomous region would still be created composed of the two
provinces where the favorable votes were obtained.
The matter of the creation of the autonomous region and its composition needs to be clarified.
Held: Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect only
when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces and
cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous region. The provinces and
cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall not be included in the autonomous region. It may be that even if an
autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1
(2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein. The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No.
6734 will therefore be determinative of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2)
which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it.
It will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on the total majority
vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the constituent units and the proviso
underscores this. for if the intention of the framers of the Constitution was to get the majority of the totality
of the votes cast, they could have simply adopted the same phraseology as that used for the ratification of
the Constitution, i.e. the creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose.
It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes approving the organic
Act in individual constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put together,
as well as in the individual constituent units.
More importantly, because of its categorical language, this is also the sense in which the vote requirement in the
plebiscite provided under Article X, section 18 must have been understood by the people when they ratified the
Constitution