THE CHANGING ROLES OF IMF

A PROJECT REPORT ON

CHANGING ROLES OF IMF

SUBMITTED BY
MR. ABHISHEK NANDALAL MISHRA
ROLL NO: 6281.
M.Com. SEM- II
(ADVANCE ACCOUNTANCY)
ACADEMIC YEAR: 2015-16

Under the guidance of PROJECT GUIDE

PROF. ARJUN LAKHE

SUBMITTED TO UNIVERSITY OF MUMBAI

MULUND COLLEGE OF COMMERCE
S N ROAD, MULUND (WEST)
MUMBAI 400080

THE CHANGING ROLES OF IMF

Declaration from the Student

I, ABHISHEK NANDALAL MISHRA R. No. 6281 Student of Mulund College Of Commerce,
S. N. Road, Mulund (West) 400080, studying in M.Com Part- I hereby declare that I have
completed the project on CHANGING ROLES OF IMF under the guidance of project
guide Prof. ARJUN LAKHE during the academic year 2015-16. The information submitted is true
to the best of my knowledge.

Date:

Signature

Place:

THE CHANGING ROLES OF IMF

CERTIFICATE
I, Prof. ARJUN LAKHE, hereby certify that Mr. ABHISHEK NANDALAL MISHRA R.No. 6281
of Mulund College of Commerce, S. N. Road, Mulund (West), Mumbai -400080 of M.com Part I
(Advanced Accountancy) has completed her project on CHANGING ROLES OF IMF
during the academic year 2015-16. The information submitted is true and original to the best of
my knowledge.

____________________

___________________

Project Guide

External guide

_____________________

___________________

Co-coordinator

Principal

Date:

THE CHANGING ROLES OF IMF

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Principal of Mulund College of

Commerce DR. (Mrs.) Parvathi Venkatesh, Course - Coordinator Prof. Rane and our project
guide Prof. ARJUN LAKHE, for providing me an opportunity to do my project work on
CHANGING ROLES OF IMF. I also wish to express my sincere gratitude to the
non - teaching staff of our college. I sincerely thank to all of them in helping me to carrying
out this project work. Last but not the least, I wish to avail myself of this opportunity,
to express a sense of gratitude and love to my friends and my beloved parents for their
mutual support, strength, help and for everything.

PLACE:

Signature

DATE:

THE CHANGING ROLES OF IMF

THE CHANGING ROLES OF IMF

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Globalisation brings with it serious challenges, requiring ever-changing national policy responses
and, crucially, international cooperation. Key to the success of the latter is ensuring the Bretton
Woods Institutions are best equipped to deal with problems facing the global economy today.
Specifically, important questions have been raised about the International Monetary Funds (IMF)
ability, in its current form, to fulfil the roles originally envisaged for it, or indeed if it has a role at
all anymore. It has been argued that failure to institute effective reform, part of which would
involve greater developing country representation in key decision-making bodies, will pose serious
threats to the IMFs legitimacy and relevance in managing global economic affairs.

Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the mid-1970s the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the World Bank, have helped the world avoid the horrors of a systemic collapse.
However, when we look at the volatility in financial markets, the growing imbalances in the global
economy, the increasing income inequality both within and between countries, the facts that nearly
half the worlds population lives on less than $2 per day and about 22% live on less than $1 per
day, and that hundreds of millions of people live without safe sources of running water, shelter,
education or health care, it is clear that they are failing in their mandate to reduce poverty, promote
and maintain high levels of employment and real income, a stable international monetary system,
and shorten the duration and lessen the degree of payments disequilibria.

This project also examines the role of IMF-supported programs in Crisis Prevention; specifically,
whether, conditional on an episode of intense market pressures, IMF financial support can help
prevent a capital account crisis. While there are a number of studies on the catalytic effects of IMFsupported programs, this literature uses the term catalytic to describe a situation in which IMF
financing has a multiplier effect on official and private capital inflows (so that, for each dollar of
IMF support, the country receives more than one dollar in total inflows) and, in general, finds
mixed evidence of such effects. This paper, by contrast, focuses on whether IMF lending helps to
prevent a crisis from erupting in the first place. This can be termed a catalytic effect inasmuch as
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one dollar of IMF support results in more than one dollar of net inflows relative to the
counterfactual in which private capital would have exited.

Empirical evidence states that IMF support may help prevent a crisis is necessarily elusive. Beyond
the inherent difficulties of identifying empirical regularities from a limited number of capital
account crises, finding an effect of IMF support on crisis prevention depends on being able to
establish the counterfactual scenario in which the country was at risk of a crisis and then showing
that IMF support lowered the crisis likelihood.

THE CHANGING ROLES OF IMF

OBJECTIVES
The objective of this project is to explore the changing roles of IMF and their Global Impact. It
firstly addresses the reasons for the IMFs failure to adequately carry out its mandate, while the
suitability of the IMFs policies and the appropriate scope of its activities are certainly open to
debate, an important and often under-emphasized cause of its unsatisfactory performance is its
failure to adapt its structure and operating practices to its changing functions. In fact, without
correcting this latter set of problems it will never be able to effectively perform its responsibilities.

Later on the project reviews the role of IMF-supported programs in Crisis Prevention, programs
that provides financial support to assist member countries in addressing their balance of payments
needs, in exchange, the member country commits to implement policies and reforms that would
help in restoring external viability

FIVE DISTORTIONS IN THE IMF:

The three legal issues:

o Lack of uniformity, as its services are utilized by only developing countries.
o The political prohibition clause in its articles of agreement.
o The problematic nature of its standby agreements.

The IMF and the supplier countries

The IMF and the consumer countries

The IMF and how it relates to the citizens of its member states

The IMF and its relationship with other international organizations

DRIVERS OF DISTORTIONS:

There is a disconnect between power and responsibility as supplier countries, especially

the G7, are unaccountable to those affected by their decisions

Lack of accountability as a result of the complex nature of its structure and the fact that
most developing countries are only indirectly represented on the board of directors
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The relationship with other international organizations and the interpretation of its Articles
of Agreement

APPROACHES TO RESOLVING THE PROBLEMS:

The IMF should be abolished; or

Change the policies of the IMF to reflect its original mandate; or

Institute a comprehensive structural reform based on the existing circumstances

IMF SUPPORT AND CRISIS PREVENTION

The hope is that IMF support has a catalytic role, either by restoring confidence and supporting
the return of private capital or by serving as a framework for the provision of bilateral and
multilateral official financing. A number of studies examine the catalytic role of IMF financing in
helping to restore confidence and a resumption of private capital flows following a crisis, generally
finding mixed results. Crisis prevention is rather different, not least because it refers to what does
not happen to private capital flows. Still, the existing literatures online provides a useful point of
departure since some channels through which IMF support may help restore capital inflows
following a crisis are likely similar to those through which it may help prevent outflows in the first
place.

One question, for example, is whether it is the existence of an IMF-supported program or the
amount of financing (or both) that matters. Most studies focus on the existence of an IMFsupported program (a dummy variable-based approach), though there are exceptions. For example,
Mody and Saravia (2004) examine the impact of IMF resource commitments on the issuance
spreads of bonds by emerging market economies, and Eichengreen et al. (2005) use a regression
that is based on IMF resource commitments.

THE CHANGING ROLES OF IMF

INTRODUCTION
ABOUT THE IMF
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is an organization of 188 countries, working to foster
global monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate international trade, promote high
employment and sustainable economic growth, and reduce poverty around the world.
Created in 1945, the IMF is governed by and accountable to the 188 countries that make up its
near-global membership.

WHY THE IMF WAS CREATED AND HOW IT WORKS

The IMF, also known as the Fund, was conceived at a UN conference in Bretton Woods, New
Hampshire, United States, in July 1944. The 44 countries at that conference sought to build a
framework for economic cooperation to avoid a repetition of the competitive devaluations that had
contributed to the Great Depression of the 1930s.
The IMF's responsibilities: The IMF's primary purpose is to ensure the stability of the international
monetary systemthe system of exchange rates and international payments that enables countries
(and their citizens) to transact with each other. The Fund's mandate was updated in 2012 to include
all macroeconomic and financial sector issues that bear on global stability.

IMF AND GLOBAL ECONOMIC STABILITY

Why is global economic stability important?
Promoting economic stability is partly a matter of avoiding economic and financial crises, large
swings in economic activity, high inflation, and excessive volatility in foreign exchange and
financial markets. Instability can increase uncertainty, discourage investment, impede economic
growth, and hurt living standards. A dynamic market economy necessarily involves some degree
of volatility, as well as gradual structural change. The challenge for policymakers is to minimize
instability in their own country and abroad without reducing the economys ability to improve
living standards through rising productivity and employment.
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Economic and financial stability is both a national and a multilateral concern. As recent financial
crises have shown, countries have become more interconnected. Vulnerabilities can spread more
easily across sectors and national borders.
How does the IMF help?
The IMF helps countries to implement sound and appropriate policies through its key functions of
surveillance, technical assistance, and lending.

Surveillance:
Every country that joins the IMF accepts the obligation to subject its economic and
financial policies to the scrutiny of the international community. The IMFs mandate is to
oversee the international monetary system and monitor the economic and financial policies
of its 188 member countries. This process, known as surveillance, takes place at the global
level and in individual countries and regions. The IMF assesses whether domestic policies
promote countries own stability by examining risks they might pose to domestic and
balance of payments stability and advises on needed policy adjustments. It also proposes
alternatives when countries policies promote domestic stability but could adversely affect
global stability.

Technical assistance:
The IMF helps countries strengthen their capacity to design and implement sound
economic policies. It provides advice and training in areas of core expertiseincluding
fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies; the regulation and supervision of financial
systems; statistics; and legal frameworks.

Lending:
Even the best economic policies cannot completely eradicate instability or avert crises. If
a member country faces a balance of payment crisis, the IMF can provide financial
assistance to support policy programs that will correct underlying macroeconomic
problems, limit disruption to both the domestic and the global economy, and help restore
confidence, stability, and growth. The IMF also offers precautionary credit lines for
countries with sound economic fundamentals for crisis prevention.

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AT A GLANCE - INDIA AND THE ROLE OF IMF

India joined the IMF on December 27, 1945, as one of the IMF's original members.

India accepted the obligations of Article VIII Article VIII of the IMF Articles of Agreement
on current account convertibility on August 20, 1994.

India subscribes to the IMF's Special Data Dissemination Standard. Countries belonging
to this group make a commitment to observe the standard and to provide information about
their data and data dissemination practices.

Financial Assistance
While India has not been a frequent user of IMF resources, IMF credit has been instrumental in
helping India respond to emerging balance of payments problems on two occasions. In 1981-82,
India borrowed SDR 3.9 billion under an Extended Fund Facility, the largest arrangement in IMF
history at the time. In 1991-93, India borrowed a total of SDR 2.2 billion under two stand by
arrangements, and in 1991 it borrowed SDR 1.4 billion under the Compensatory Financing
Facility.
Technical Assistance
In recent years, the Fund has provided India with technical assistance in a number of areas,
including the development of the government securities market, foreign exchange market reform,
public expenditure management, tax and customs administration, and strengthening statistical
systems in connection with the Special Data Dissemination Standards. Since 1981 the IMF
Institute has provided training to Indian officials in national accounts, tax administration, balance
of payments compilation, monetary policy, and other areas.
AT A GLANCE - THE ROLE OF IMF IN EUROPE
The IMF provides economic analysis and policy advice as part of its standard surveillance process
for individual advanced and emerging European economies that culminates in regular (usually
annual) consultations with individual member countries. The final bilateral surveillance staff
reports from these consultations include assessments of the economic outlook, and economic and
financial stability.

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In addition to its policy discussions with the 19 individual members of the euro area, IMF staff
also holds consultations annually for the euro area as a whole, similar to those held for other
currency unions. Here, IMF staff exchange views with counterparts from the ECB, the EC and
other European institutions in a number of areas, including monetary and exchange rate policies
and area-wide fiscal policies, financial sector supervision and stability, trade and cross-border
capital flows, as well as other structural policies. An assessment of the economic outlook, external
and fiscal position of the euro area as a whole, as well as financial stability assessments is also
included in the final staff report as part of the overall assessment.
As part of the consultation, staff presents the IMFs views on the economic outlook and policies
of the euro area to the Euro group, comprising the 19 finance ministers of the euro area.

Euro area Integration & Crisis Management

The IMF pays considerable attention to progress in fostering integration within the euro area to
ensure the effective operation of the monetary union. The first-ever EU wide Financial Sector
Assessment Program (FSAP), in March 2013, outlined important progress in addressing the
financial crisis in Europe, but also argued for fast and sustained progress toward a Single
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). In addition, the IMF published papers arguing for a Banking
Union to strengthen the EU financial oversight framework and sever bank-sovereign feedback
loops; making the case for a Fiscal Union to help address a number of gaps in the euro areas
architecture; proposing measures to achieve the dual objectives of restoring external and internal
balance; and recommending solutions to the address high youth unemployment problem in the
region.
Providing financing
Since the start of the global financial crisis, a number of emerging European countries have
requested financial support from the IMF to help them overcome their fiscal and external
imbalances. Four members of the euro areaGreece, Portugal, Ireland, and Cyprusalso
accessed IMF resources.

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Access to IMF resources for Europe is being provided through Stand-By Arrangements (SBA),
the Flexible Credit Line (FCL), the Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL), and the Extended
Fund Facility (EFF). Irelands and Portugals EFFs concluded in December 2013 and June 2014,
respectively, and they then entered into Post-Program Monitoring (PPM).
As of March 23, 2015, the IMF had arrangements with 8 countries in Europe (see table) with
commitments totaling about 71.3 billion or $78.8 billion.
Most of the first wave of IMF-supported programs in 2008-09 was for countries in emerging
Europe. The IMF provided front-loaded, flexible, and high levels of financing for many emerging
European countries. In most EU countriesincluding in Hungary, Latvia, and Romaniathis
financing was provided in conjunction with the EU, while Poland has a Flexible Credit Line
arrangement with the Fund. The IMF also provided financing to Iceland when its banking system
collapsed in late 2008.
The experience developed with the joint programs in Central and Eastern Europe proved useful
when euro area countries requested IMF support. At that stage, the collaboration was further
extended to include another partnerthe ECB. This enhanced cooperation between the IMF, the
EC, and the ECB in euro area program countries has become known as the Troika.

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PROBLEM AT HAND - THE EVOLUTION IN THE IMF OPERATIONS

At the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, the 44 participating countries, agreed to surrender some
of their monetary sovereignty to the IMF in exchange for the benefits of a rules based monetary
system. The states agreed that the postwar international monetary system would be based on a
fixed link between gold and the US dollar. Every other participating country would set the value
of its currency, known as its par value, in terms of the US dollar. The participants created the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to oversee the system. Its primary function was to ensure that
members were following economic policies that were consistent with maintenance of the par value
they had established for their currency. The countries also agreed that they would not let the value
of their currency change, more than a specified amount, without the permission of the IMF. To
encourage the participating countries to comply with these obligations and as part of the benefits
of membership in the IMF, it was empowered to provide financial support to any member state
that was experiencing balance of payments problems.
In order to perform its oversight functions, the IMF was required, pursuant to Article IV of its
Articles of Agreement, to conduct an annual consultation with each of its member states. During
these annual consultations, sometimes referred to as surveillance missions, the IMF focused its
attention on those macroeconomic variables that influenced the ability of the country to maintain
the par value of its currency. Thus, the primary focus of the IMF was on such macroeconomic
variables as exchange rates, interest rates, inflation rates, the balance of payments, and growth in
money supply and credit. Given the nature of its interest, it made sense for the member states to
stipulate in the IMFs Articles of Agreement, that the IMF should limit its interactions with its
member states to the states Central Bank and Ministry of Finance. These were the two agencies
in the member country that had jurisdiction over the variables of interest to the IMF.
The IMFs specialized international monetary mission also placed limits on the conditions it would
attach to the financing it offered its member countries. These conditions were limited to such issues
as the size of the currency devaluation, the required cut in the budget deficit, and the expected
limits on the growth in money supply and credit. The fact that the conditions were focused on
macroeconomic issues meant that the recipient state was free to choose the precise policy measures
for meeting these conditions. During the period of the par value system many countries, including
the United States, made use of the IMFs services.
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Since the IMF was designed to be a monetary and not a development institution, it operated on the
basis of uniform treatment for all member states. The justification for this was that all states were
participants in the same monetary system that the ability of each state to maintain its par value was
influenced by the same variables, and they were all vulnerable to the same types of balance of
payments problems. Thus, the IMF offered each member state access to its financing facilities on
the same terms and conditions. Similarly, the IMFs annual consultations with each member state
covered essentially the same ground. The IMF concretized this uniformity of treatment by adopting
a principle of uniformity as one of its key operating principles.
The IMFs original governance structure was designed on the assumption that in an international
monetary system based on par values all countries could potentially run into balance of payments
problems and need to make use of the IMFs financing facilities. Thus, even though the IMFs
system of weighted voting meant that some countries had more influence in the IMF than others,
they all had an interest in developing policies that were acceptable to states that actually used the
IMFs services. Since even the most powerful states could one day need the IMFs support, they
were unlikely to advocate policies that were unduly burdensome for member states. They
understood that the policies they supported in the IMF could one day directly affect their own
citizens and they could be held accountable for them.
The governance structure was also build around the expectation that the IMFs Board of Executive
Directors would exercise firm control over the IMFs management and staff. The Board would,
thus, hold the staff and management accountable for their actions and decisions. During the period
of the par value system, this expectation was realistic because the number of IMF programs was
relatively small and the scope of the programs was limited to the key macroeconomic variables
relevant to the par value system.
After the collapse of the par value system, which was formalized with the adoption of the Second
Amendment to the IMFs Articles of Agreement in 1978, the IMF lost its well-defined monetary
mission. The Second Amendment gave each member state the right to choose its own exchange
rate policy. This created a problem for the IMF. If the member state was not expected to maintain
any particular value for its currency and could choose its own exchange rate policy, then what was
the IMF supposed to be monitoring in its annual consultations with the country?

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The amended Article IV provides only limited guidance. It requires each member state to
endeavor to direct its economic and financial policies toward...fostering orderly economic
growth and to seek to promote stability by fostering orderly underlying economic and
financial conditions and to follow exchange rate policies compatible with the undertakings of
Article IV. The lack of specificity of this language suggests, as in fact has become the case, that
the IMF needs to look at any aspect of the member states economic and financial policies that
could affect its orderly economic growth, its external balance of payments and the value of its
currency.16 In other words, the Second Amendment resulted in the IMF dramatically expanding
the scope of its Article IV consultations.
It also has resulted in an expansion in the range of conditions that the IMF attaches to the financing
it provides to member states. In fact, in some cases in the late 1990s IMF financing arrangements
contained over 100 conditions covering such issues as privatization, reform of tax administration,
adoption of new laws such as bankruptcy codes, and budgetary allocations for health and
education, in addition to the more traditional macroeconomic conditions. However, since the
introduction of the new IMF policy of conditionality in 2002, there has been some reduction in the
average number of conditions attached to IMF financial programs.
The Second Amendment had disparate impacts on different groups of IMF member states. The
IMF lost its significance in the case of those countries, all of which were industrialized countries
that knew that they would not need to use or had no intention of using the IMFs services in the
foreseeable future. On the other hand, if the country knew that it needed or may need the IMFs
financial support, it necessarily had to pay careful attention to the views of the IMF and the advice
it offered during the annual Article IV consultations. These views would inform the conditions
that the IMF would attach to the financing it would offer the member state. Thus, an unintended
effect of the Second Amendment was to create a, de facto, distinction between those countries that
used or intended using IMF financing and those that did not.
In fact, for most of the period since the Second Amendment, IMF member states can be classified
into two groups. The first group, which can be called IMF supplier states, consists of those
countries which, because of their wealth, their access to alternate sources of funds and for political
reasons, have no intention of using the IMFs services in the foreseeable future. These countries
do not need to pay particular attention to the views of the IMF21. For these countries, the most
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important of which are the G-7 countries, the Second Amendment meant that they regained their
monetary sovereignty from the IMF and escaped from its control. These countries, in fact, do not
seem to pay much attention to the IMFs advice. For example, since 2000 the IMF has consistently
and ineffectively called for the US to reduce its budget and trade deficits. Similarly, its advice on
such issues as interest rates and exchange rates in the G-7 countries do not appear to have had any
real influence over the policies these countries adopt. Instead, these countries rely on their own
judgments and the discussions that take place among themselves in making policies on these
issues.
The second group, which consists of those member states that need or know they may need IMF
financing in the foreseeable future can be called the IMF consumer countries. These states must
pay careful attention to the views of the IMF because they will influence the conditions that the
IMF will attach to the funds it provides the state. The IMF can also influence these countries
access to other sources of funds.
In recent years, a third group of states may be emerging. This group consists of developing
countries that have accumulated sufficiently large reserves that they can effectively self-insure
against the risk of payments and capital account crises. Examples of states in this position are
China, and India and states like Korea that after their experience with the IMF in the late 1990s,
decided that they never wanted to experience an IMF program again. The states in this group, like
the IMF supplier states, are seeking to buy their independence from the IMF.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE IMF: THE FIVE DISTORTIONS

The IMF has attempted to fulfill its current expanded range of activities without making any
significant changes in its governance arrangements. It has also allowed its new role to develop
without any serious public debate over the institutional and legal implications of this development.
The result is that the IMF has forced its new broader functions into its existing decision-making
structures and governance arrangements and its existing interpretation of its mandate. This has
resulted in five distortions that are undermining the effectiveness of its operations and are
increasing hostility to the IMF around the world.

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These five distortions are:

Three legal issues;

The IMFs relations with the industrialized countries, in particular the G-7;

The IMFs relations with developing countries that utilize or expect to utilize its financial
services;

The IMFs relations with the citizens of its member countries; and

The IMFs relations with other international organizations.

Each of these problem areas is discussed in more detail below.

ISSUE 1: THREE LEGAL ISSUES
According to its Articles of Agreement, some of the IMFs primary purposes are:

To promote international monetary cooperation;

to facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of trade and to contribute thereby to the
promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and real income and the
development of the productive resources of all members;

to assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments in respect of current

transactions; and

to provide financial resources to member countries experiencing balance of payments

difficulties so that they can overcome these difficulties without resorting to measures that
are destructive of international or national prosperity.

As was explained above, the IMF, in implementing this mandate, developed the principle of
uniformity. This principle results in the IMF granting all states equal access to its financing and
other services without drawing any distinctions between its member states based on their wealth,
size, level of development, or importance in the international monetary system. Thus, unlike the
World Bank, the WTO or the United Nations, the IMF does not divide its membership into
different categories based on their wealth or level of economic development. The uniformity
principle has had the effect of protecting the richest countries from having to grant special
treatment to developing countries in the use of the IMFs general resources. It has also offered

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developing countries some protection against being discriminated against by the richer member
states.
The Articles of Agreement also require the IMF, when conducting its annual consultations with its
member states and when designing the conditions it attaches to its funding, to pay due regard to
social and political conditions in the country. The IMF has historically interpreted this requirement
as prohibiting it from being influenced by political (that is noneconomic) considerations in its
dealings with its member states.
These two interpretations of its legal mandate pose a number of problems for the IMF. First, the
principle of uniformity made sense when the IMF functioned purely as a monetary institution and
all its member states, in fact, were utilizing its services. However, it does not make sense when its
services are only being utilized by its developing country member states.

Case 1: Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF):

An example of the problems that this creates is the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF).
When the IMF decided that it needed to create a special facility exclusively for the poorest of its
member states, it could not do so with its general resources but had to create a special fund for this
purpose. Since this requires contributions from all member states, the PRGF has inevitably become
politicized, subject to multiple demands and, as indicated by the external review of the Enhanced
Structural Adjustment Facility, the PRGFs predecessor, impaired in its functioning. This suggests
that the IMF would be better off if it could treat different categories of its member states differently
in regard to all its services and resources. For example, it would enable the IMF to more easily
design facilities for which only certain member states are eligible.
It would also allow it to consider whether or not it needs to restructure some of its decision making
procedures to make them more responsive to the needs of its poorer and weaker member states.

Similarly, the IMFs interpretation of the requirement that it pay due regard to social and political
conditions in its member countries may have made sense when the IMFs operations were limited
to monetary issues. However, it is neither prudent nor principled for an organization that attaches
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conditions to its funding that relate to governance, corruption, budgetary allocations and
privatization to pretend that it should not be influenced by social and political considerations. The
only function that the current interpretation serves is to obscure what political considerations the
IMF does view as relevant to its operations, what principles it applies in making these judgments
and what process it follows in reaching these decisions. The lack of clarity on this issue also leaves
undefined the outer limits of the IMFs specialized economic mandate.

Case 2: Human Rights Issues

There are occasions when the IMF will take human rights into account, for example in Indonesia
in 1997. But there are also occasions in which it does not do so, for example in Mexico in 1994 or
in Turkey in 2000. In all three of these cases the country was experiencing serious human rights
problems. Furthermore, it is not clear that in Indonesia the human rights problems themselves were
worse than in the other two cases or that they were causing more serious economic problems than
in the other cases. However, since there are no clear principles that stipulate how the IMF should
incorporate political issues like human rights into its calculations. Without such principles, the
decisions of the IMF appear arbitrary or determined by the interests of its richer and more powerful
member states. This inevitably undermines confidence in the fairness of the IMF.
A third legal problem for the IMF arises from the IMFs characterization of the legal nature of the
standby arrangement through which it provides much of its financing to its member states. The
standard documentation used in these transactions are a letter of intent, usually written by the
government of the member state to the IMF, and the decision of the IMFs Executive Board. For
many years the IMF has argued that this arrangement is sui generis and is not a legal contract30.
Consequently, the IMF does not treat the arrangement as an international agreement. This means
that a member state that does not meet the performance criteria or other requirements of the standby
arrangement will not incur any legal liability. Until a few years, the IMF also relied, in part, on
this characterization to avoid publicizing the member states Letter of Intent

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ISSUE 2: RELATIONS BETWEEN THE IMF AND THE INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES

Since the adoption of the Second Amendment to the IMF Articles of Agreement in 1978, the
industrial countries have relied on their own resources and the private financial markets to meet
their financial needs. They have in effect concluded that the IMF is not a politically or
economically feasible source of funds for them. The embarrassment of having to accept the
conditions attached to IMF financing is viewed as politically unacceptable to these countries and
financially too costly in terms of its impact on their future access to private financial markets. The
fact that these countries do not intend using the IMFs financing facilities has freed them from any
need to defer to any advice the IMF may offer them in their annual consultations.
This means that they are free to choose their own exchange rate system and manage (or
mismanage) it as they choose. In other words, they have regained from the IMF the sovereignty
that they surrendered to the IMF at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944. This does not, however,
mean that they have regained full monetary sovereignty. The worlds economy has become too
integrated for that. Instead these countries, particularly the G-7 (i.e. the G-8 countries minus
Russia) have, in effect, decided to resolve all monetary and financial issues that may arise between
them in an alternate set of international fora. These issues are now resolved through the G-7, the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Bank for International
Settlement (BIS) and the Committee of Bank Regulators associated with it and the International
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO).
Case 3: Financial Stability Forum
After the Asian financial crisis and the near bankruptcy of Long Term Capital Management in
1998, the G-7 became concerned about the regulatory framework for the international financial
markets. These countries decided that they needed a mechanism through which they could
coordinate national regulation of financial markets and financial institutions. Consequently, they
created the Financial Stability Forum in which the regulators of the banking, securities and
insurance industries of major industrial countries and financial centers meet together with
representatives of the IMF, the World Bank and the BIS to discuss regulatory issues of mutual
concern. They also created the G-2036, which consists of the G-7 plus some other key industrial
and emerging market countries. The purpose of this group is to ensure that the regulatory

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frameworks existing in all countries that participate in the international financial markets are
consistent with the demands of the increasingly integrated international financial market.

Since the industrialized countries that participate in these fora have no need for the IMFs services,
it is reasonable to question the purpose of having the IMF participate in the meetings of these fora.
It would seem that the IMFs function is to ensure that those countries not invited to participate in
these fora undertake the necessary economic and regulatory adjustments to enable them to
participate in the international financial system being shaped by the richest and most powerful
countries.
ISSUE 3: RELATIONS BETWEEN THE IMF AND ITS CONSUMER MEMBER STATES
Since 1978 all the states which have utilized the financial services of the IMF are developing
countries or the so-called transitional countries. For present purposes these countries can be
divided into two groups. The first group consists of those countries that are classified as emerging
markets and, under normal circumstances, have access to private financial markets.
Many countries in this group need the IMFs support to satisfy private investors that they have
adopted and are implementing good macroeconomic policies and that they are suitable for
private investment. Thus even though this group of countries only needs IMF funding when they
are unable to raise sufficient funds from private sources because of a debt or some other financial
crisis, they are dependent on the IMF giving their economic policy performance a favorable
review. This in turn is influenced by how they respond to the advice the IMF gives them in their
annual consultations. Mexico, Argentina, Russia, and Thailand are examples of this group of
countries.
The second group consists of those countries which because of their poverty or unstable political
conditions are dependent on official sources of funds. This group, in addition to needing the IMFs
financial support, depends on the IMFs approval of their policies because their other official
funders tend to rely on the IMFs advice in making their funding decisions. Uganda, Malawi, Haiti,
Laos are good examples of countries in the second group. In addition to being a source of funds
for all the consumer member states, the IMF has effectively become a gatekeeper who regulates
access to other possible sources of external financing for these countries.
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While there are significant differences both within and between the countries in these two groups
of IMF consumer states, they all share a common characteristic. Although the challenges that these
countries face have a macroeconomic dimension, the primary cause of their social and economic,
including macroeconomic, problems lies in the governance of their societies. In particular their
problems are caused by weaknesses in their institutional arrangements and technical capacities
which limit their ability to effectively make and implement policy.
Although these structural issues are outside the scope of the IMFs specialized area of competence
it has attempted to address them. This means that increasingly in both its policy advice and in the
conditions that it attaches to its financing, the IMF is addressing non-monetary and non-macroeconomic issues like bankruptcy laws, legal and judicial reform, allocations of public budgets,
privatization, environmental issues, social safety nets, and banking reform. The specificity and
micro nature of these requirements highlight the evolution of the IMF from a monetary institution
to a development financing organization.
ISSUE 4: IMF RELATIONS WITH THE CITIZENS OF ITS MEMBER STATES
The creators of the IMF, like the creators of most international organizations, believed that it was
not necessary for the IMF to have any direct interaction with non-state actors. This belief was
premised on the sovereignty of its member states. It was also based on the belief that for the IMF
to effectively perform its specialized monetary responsibilities it only needed to interact with each
member states Central Bank and Ministry of Finance. Restricting the IMFs interactions with its
member states to these two institutions had the added benefit of reinforcing the limits on the extent
to which the IMF could impinge onto the sovereignty of its member states.
The creators of the IMF also assumed that they had built sufficient accountability into the IMF by
making sure that it would be accountable to its member states governments through their
representatives on the Board of Governors and the Executive Board. The creators also assumed
that these representatives could be held accountable by their governments and, through elections,
by their citizens. This indirect form of IMF accountability to non-state actors was deemed to be
sufficient.
These beliefs about the relationship of the IMF to non-state actors are no longer valid. Given, as
was shown above, that the IMF is now an active participant in the policy making processes of
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those member states that utilize its resources, it is no longer adequate for the IMF to limit its
interactions to their Central Banks and the Ministries of Finance. For the IMF to be an effective
actor in the policy making process it must consult with both other governmental agencies and nongovernmental actors. This means that the IMF is now effectively entering into direct interactions
with non-state actors and the policies it is helping to make are directly affecting these non-state
actors.
ISSUE 5: IMFS RELATIONS WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
The original conception of the creators of the specialized agencies of the United Nations system
was that each agency would exercise its authority within the limited scope of its specialization and
that the U.N. Economic and Social Council would be the forum in which their activities would be
coordinated. Each specialized agency, in part to facilitate coordination, entered into a relationship
agreement with the United Nations. This relationship agreement ostensibly clarified the fact that
the specialized agency was subordinate to the United Nations and clarified how it would relate to
the UN. The relationship agreement between the IMF and the UN however amounts to a
declaration of independence. While it acknowledges that the IMF is a specialized agency of the
UN, it relieves the IMF of any significant responsibilities to the UN and denies the UN any
meaningful role in the affairs of the IMF.
The effective independence of the IMF from the UN has become a problem as the scope of the
IMFs operations has expanded beyond its original monetary function. Now that the IMF is
involved in such issues as law reform, poverty alleviation, labor issues, social welfare,
environment, and trade liberalization, its operations are encroaching into the jurisdiction of other
specialized international organizations like the World Bank, the WTO, the ILO, WHO, and
UNICEF.
ROLE OF IMF IN CRISIS PREVENTION
The findings above suggest that IMF might have structural inefficiencies but its financing has a
significant effect on the likelihood of a crisis. Before concluding that increasing the provision of
IMF financing could help prevent crises, however, one important caveat is needed. Specifically,
the crisis probability depends on the amount of IMF financing that can be provided and the

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countrys own fundamentals (the other covariates in the logit regressionsuch as the level of
external debt, the exchange rate regime, short-term debt-to-reserves ratio, and economic policies).
With the above caveat in mind, below Figure provides a snapshot (in period t-1) of the probability
of crisis with and without IMF financing for countries that were receiving IMF financial support
before market pressures erupted. The crisis probability is determined by the contribution of IMF
financing and assuming other covariates remain constant. Within the group of countries that
ultimately avoided a crisis, in a number of cases the model predicts that an episode of high market
pressure had over a 50 percent chance of developing into a capital account crisis in the absence of
IMF financing. However, with IMF financial support, this crisis probability was lowered
substantially. In other cases, while the crisis probability was below 50 percent, IMF financing
helped reduce this probability to negligible levels. Conversely, while the model suggests that IMF
financing contributed to lower crisis probabilities in (some) of the countries that ultimately faced
a capital account crisis, it also shows that the crisis probability still remained high in these cases.

Even if the countrys other covariates (including its policies) do not change as a result of changes
in IMF financing, the marginal effect of that financing depends upon the average level of those
covariates.
Conceptually, IMF support may contribute to crisis prevention by engendering sound policies (and
signaling these to markets) and by increasing the liquidity available to the country. Most of the
empirical literature has focused only on whether an IMF arrangement is in place, regardless of the
amount disbursed or whether the program is off-track, and of the handful of studies that look at
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IMF financing, all have been limited to IMF lending commitments rather than available
resources. The IMF financing regression might remain statistically significant because of stronger
policies under an IMF-supported program that are not controlled for (or captured) by other policy
regression. In addition, given that the estimation controls for gross reserves, then it has to be the
case that IMF financing provides more than liquidity.

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A PROPOSED SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE FIVE

DISTORTIONS
There are three basic approaches that could be taken to resolving the problems with the IMF. The
first is to conclude that the IMF is irredeemably flawed and should be abolished. The second is to
conclude that the IMF is a necessary organization in todays integrated global economy but that
the policies that it advocates are flawed and must be changed. Implicit in this view is the belief
that if the IMF changed its policies the distortions identified in this paper would lose their
significance. The third approach builds on the second approach and argues that changes in the
IMFs policies alone, while necessary, are not sufficient to ensure that the IMF will effectively
fulfill its responsibilities in the world. It argues that policy reform is unlikely to be sustainable
unless the IMF first undergoes substantial structural reform.
APPROACH 1: THE IMF SHOULD BE ABOLISHED
There are two different groups who advocate this approach. The first argues that the market is the
most efficient and best means for allocating resources and that all state interventions into the
market merely impair its functions. Consequently, they oppose all state sponsored interventions in
the functioning of the market. From their perspective the operations of the IMF are merely a form
of state intervention and are per se suspect. This group further argues that their only effect is to
create a moral hazard problem. The IMF is accused of doing so by leading both investors and
governments to believe that they can engage in excessively risky economic activities because the
IMF will bail them out if they fail.
The opponents of the current power relations in the world comprise the second group. They
contend that international organizations are merely a reflection of these power relations and that
they will always be used by the rich and powerful nations to keep poorer and weaker developing
countries in their place. These groups also argue that developing countries would be better off
if they followed more independent policies that did not rely so heavily on international
organizations that are controlled by the G-7.
While the political perspectives of these two groups are clearly very different, they both believe
that the IMF, as currently constituted, is irredeemably flawed. Consequently, they agree that the
IMF should be abolished. These groups can draw support for their position from the mutation of
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the IMF from a monetary organization into a development financing one. They can argue that the
IMFs record as a development financing organization is not impressive, citing the controversial
record of the IMFs involvement in Russia, Argentina, the Asian countries, and in the countries
that have used the IMFs Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility as evidence. In recent years,
they have obtained some additional support from the reports of the IMFs own Independent
Evaluation Office, which have tended to be somewhat critical of the IMF.
While these arguments raise important issues and have persuasive power, they are ultimately
unrealistic. The increasingly integrated global financial system needs international organizations
which have the specialized mandate to help those countries that are either, de facto, not full
participants in the global financial system because of their extreme poverty or that are experiencing
monetary and financial difficulties that have adverse effects either globally or on their neighbors
and regions. It is not politically or economically feasible for the richest and most powerful states
to directly control them or to directly force all of them to adjust to their economic and political
requirements. The industrialized states have also conclusively demonstrated that they are not
willing and may not have the capacity to help these countries address the complex development
challenges that they face.
Consequently, there is an absolute need for international organizations that can fund development
in the poorest countries, and work with emerging markets to help them gain secure and adequate
access to the financial resources available from the international capital markets. There is also a
need for international financial organizations that can provide a forum where the developed and
the developing countries can communicate about issues of mutual concern relating to the global
financial system.
ALTERNATIVE 2: CHANGE THE POLICIES OF THE IMF
Those supporting this position accept that conditions have changed and that the IMF must change
to fit the new conditions. They however believe that what must change is the substance of the
IMFs policies and its modus operandi. Those who advocate for this position can be divided into
two sub-groups. The first sub-groups argument with the IMF is over the expanding range of its
operations. They contend that the IMF was established as a specialized organization with a
mandate to focus on macroeconomic issues and that the IMF should not let its scope of operations
expand beyond this set of issues. In their eyes any conditions relating to issues such as governance,
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legal reform, or regulatory issues that the IMF attaches to its financing are illegitimate. These
issues either fall within the mandate of the World Bank or within the sovereign prerogatives of the
member state. This group therefore argues for a reduction in the scope of the IMF operations and
a return to its original focus on macroeconomic issues.
This second approach is more realistic than the abolish the IMF approach. Its call for more
critical assessment of IMF policies and the scope of IMF operations is important and needs to be
heeded if the IMFs performance is to begin improving. In fact, any coherent approach to
reforming and improving the IMF must include this as at least one element of the reform agenda.
However, this reform the policies approach is ultimately inadequate. It is addressing the
symptom rather than the real cause. The policies of the IMF arise from the power relations within
the organization and from its policy and decision-making structure. Without changing these
structural features, the IMF will always adopt policies that are heavily biased towards the interests
of its industrialized member states and that are insufficiently responsive to the needs of its
consumer member states. Thus, policy changes that leave the basic structural features of the IMF
intact will ultimately fail to achieve their intended results.
ALTERNATIVE 3: REFORM THE IMF
The third approach argues for a comprehensive reform program for the IMF which has as its
primary focus correcting the structural problems with the IMF. This approach accepts the necessity
for an inter-governmental financial institution like the IMF but contends that it must be structured
and must function according to the same principles of good governance transparency,
participation, effectiveness and accountability -- that the IMF advocates should apply at the
national and sub-national level. This means that the IMF must be reformed so that its basic
structures and operating policies and principles are transparent. In addition, those who are most
directly affected by its policies and actions must be able to participate in the IMFs policy making
processes and must be able to hold its decision makers accountable for their decisions and the
actions based on those decision. It also means that there should be appropriate checks and balances
on the power of the IMF. The proponents of this approach argue that if the structural problems
with the IMF are corrected, the organization will be more responsive to the needs of its consumer
member states and their citizens. This should result in the IMF being viewed as more legitimate
by all its stakeholders; and in greater acceptance of its policies by its consumer states. This, in turn,
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should lead to an enhanced likelihood of its policies being adopted and implemented successfully
by its consumer states.
The appeal of this reform option is further strengthened by the reality of international power
relations and the inherent difficulties of making changes at the international level. This reality
leads to the conclusion that before we reject the existing international organizations we need to be
confident that we have exhausted all feasible possibilities for reforming them. In the case of the
IMF, very little effort has been made to reform it. Consequently it is relatively easy to identify a
program of reform that has the potential to correct the problems identified in this paper.
Given the complexity of the nature of the relations between international organizations and their
member states and the current hostility to international organizations in such key countries as the
United States, it is likely that carrying out all the structural reforms being advocated in this paper
will be a long term project. However, it is possible to divide this reform program into short-,
medium- and long-term components. The distinction between these categories is not only based
on how possible it is to achieve these proposals but also on the basis of who must act to implement
the reform proposal. Thus, short-term items are those which only require action by the IMF staff
and Executive Board acting on their own authority. Medium term items are those that are more
politically difficult and will require the participation of the Governors of the IMF. The third
category includes those items that will require an amendment to the Articles of Agreement or at
least will require the agreement of each of the member states, including the agreement of their
legislatures. It should be noted that the IMF has begun to implement at least some aspects of the
proposed reform agenda.

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CONCLUSION
The IMF is suffering from serious structural distortions that have slowly developed since the
Second Amendment to the Articles of Agreement. These problems create a substantial barrier to
the effective functioning by the IMF. They can only be corrected through a broad ranging reform
program that will overhaul the structure and operating principles of the IMF. Without undertaking
this reform program, it is unclear if the IMF will ever be able to effectively make any useful
contributions to solving the complex problems of poverty, inequality and inadequate governance
which plague developing countries today.
Unfortunately the problems that exist in the IMF are only the most extreme version of a problem
that exists in all international organizations. All those organizations that have great economic
power in the developing world -- the World Bank, the regional development banks and the WTO
-- share, although maybe in less extreme forms, the same problems. Those UN specialized agencies
that lack adequate resources, influence and power-- such as UNESCO, FAO, UNICEF, WHO -often suffer from the reverse problem. They lack influence and power because they are deemed to
be too sensitive to developing countries. The result is that industrialized countries loose interest in
them. If international organizations are to perform the global governance functions that were
envisaged for them and if they are to play an effective role in dealing with the complex problems
that exist in the developing countries and the extreme inequalities of power and wealth that exist
between developing and developed countries, they will need to undergo their own reform
programs, that will be complimentary to the one this paper proposes for the IMF.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOK

The Changing Role of the IMF in the Governance of the Global Economy - Professor Daniel D.
Bradlow

INTERNET

www.google.com
www.imf.org

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