G.R. No.

83820 May 25, 1990

JOSE B. AZNAR (as Provincial Chairman of PDP Laban in Cebu), petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EMILIO MARIO RENNER OSMEA, respondents.
Rufino B. Requina for petitioner.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:
Before Us is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated June 11,
1988, which dismissed the petition for the disqualification of private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea as candidate for
Provincial Governor of Cebu Province.
The facts of the case are briefly as follows:
On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC
for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections.
On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council (Cebu-PDP Laban, for short), as represented by petitioner
Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the
disqualification of private respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United
States of America.
On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificate issued by the then Immigration and
Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that private respondent is an American and is a holder of
Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. B-21448 and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at
Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958, respectively. (Annex "B-1").
The petitioner also filed a Supplemental Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order to
temporarily enjoin the Cebu Provincial Board of Canvassers from tabulating/canvassing the votes cast in favor of private
respondent and proclaiming him until the final resolution of the main petition.
Thus, on January 28, 1988, the COMELEC en banc resolved to order the Board to continue canvassing but to suspend the
proclamation.
At the hearing before the COMELEC (First Division), the petitioner presented the following exhibits tending to show that
private respondent is an American citizen: Application for Alien Registration Form No. 1 of the Bureau of Immigration
signed by private respondent dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "B"); Alien Certificate of Registration No. 015356 in the
name of private respondent dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "C"); Permit to Re-enter the Philippines dated November 21,
1979 (Exh. "D"); Immigration Certificate of Clearance dated January 3, 1980 (Exh. "E"). (pp. 117-118, Rollo)
Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the legitimate child of Dr.
Emilio D. Osmea, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmea, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting
Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March 25, 1987; that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines
since birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six months; and that he has been a registered voter in the
Philippines since 1965. (pp. 107-108, Rollo)
On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) directed the Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winning candidates.
Having obtained the highest number of votes, private respondent was proclaimed the Provincial Governor of Cebu.

Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition for disqualification for not having been
timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen.
Hence, the present petition.
The petition is not meritorious.
There are two instances where a petition questioning the qualifications of a registered candidate to run for the office for
which his certificate of candidacy was filed can be raised under the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), to wit:
(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides that:
'Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively
on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is
false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after the notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election.
and
(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz:
'Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. Any voter contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten
days after the proclamation of the results of the election.
The records show that private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy on November 19, 1987 and that the petitioner
filed its petition for disqualification of said private respondent on January 22, 1988. Since the petition for disqualification
was filed beyond the twenty five-day period required in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that said
petition was filed out of time.
The petition for the disqualification of private respondent cannot also be treated as a petition for quo warrantounder
Section 253 of the same Code as it is unquestionably premature, considering that private respondent was proclaimed
Provincial Governor of Cebu only on March 3, 1988.
However, We deem it is a matter of public interest to ascertain the respondent's citizenship and qualification to hold the
public office to which he has been proclaimed elected. There is enough basis for us to rule directly on the merits of the
case, as the COMELEC did below.
Petitioner's contention that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen and, therefore, disqualified from running for and
being elected to the office of Provincial Governor of Cebu, is not supported by substantial and convincing evidence.
In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct proof that private respondent had lost his
Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in
a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmea did not lose his
Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship.
In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the United States of America, the petitioner
merely relied on the fact that private respondent was issued alien certificate of registration and was given clearance and
permit to re-enter the Philippines by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. Petitioner assumed that because of
the foregoing, the respondent is an American and "being an American", private respondent "must have taken and sworn to
the Oath of Allegiance required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws." (p. 81, Rollo)

Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and who are not. Whether or not a person is
considered an American under the laws of the United States does not concern Us here.
By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private respondent is a Filipino remains. It was
incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that private respondent had lost his Philippine citizenship. As earlier stated,
however, the petitioner failed to positively establish this fact.
The cases of Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo v. COMELEC et al, (G.R. No. 87193, June 21, 1989) and Ramon L. Labo v.
COMELEC et al (G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989) are not applicable to the case at bar.
In the Frivaldo case, evidence shows that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per certification
from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P.
Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
Frivaldo expressly admitted in his answer that he was naturalized in the United States but claimed that he was forced to
embrace American citizenship to protect himself from the persecution of the Marcos government. The Court, however,
found this suggestion of involuntariness unacceptable, pointing out that there were many other Filipinos in the United
States similarly situated as Frivaldo who did not find it necessary to abandon their status as Filipinos.
Likewise, in the case of Labo, records show that Labo was married to an Australian citizen and that he was naturalized as
an Australian citizen in 1976, per certification from the Australian Government through its Consul in the Philippines. This
was later affirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs.
The authenticity of the above evidence was not disputed by Labo. In fact, in a number of sworn statements, Labo
categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia.
In declaring both Frivaldo and Labo not citizens of the Philippines, therefore, disqualified from serving as Governor of the
Province of Sorsogon and Mayor of Baguio City, respectively, the Court considered the fact that by their own admissions,
they are indubitably aliens, no longer owing any allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines since they have sworn their
total allegiance to a foreign state.
In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the United States (p. 81,
Rollo). He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the electoral
process in this country since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as a candidate (pp. 107-108, Rollo). Thus, private
respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.
In the learned dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, he stresses the fact that because Osmea obtained Certificates of
Alien Registration as an American citizen, the first in 1958 when he was 24 years old and the second in 1979, he, Osmea
should be regarded as having expressly renounced Philippine citizenship. To Our mind, this is a case of non sequitur (It
does not follow). Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he
has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. Thus, by way of analogy, if a
person who has two brothers named Jose and Mario states or certifies that he has a brother named Jose, this does not mean
that he does not have a brother named Mario; or if a person is enrolled as student simultaneously in two universities,
namely University X and University Y, presents a Certification that he is a student of University X, this does not
necessarily mean that he is not still a student of University Y. In the case of Osmea, the Certification that he is an
American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed,
there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said
citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express", it stands to
reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine 'citizenship when there is no renunciation either "'express" or
"implied".
Parenthetically, the statement in the 1987 Constitution that "dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest
and shall be dealt with by law"(Art. IV, Sec. 5) has no retroactive effect. And while it is true that even before the 1987
Constitution, Our country had already frowned upon the concept of dual citizenship or allegiance, the fact is it actually

existed. Be it noted further that under the aforecited proviso, the effect of such dual citizenship or allegiance shall be dealt
with by a future law. Said law has not yet been enacted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and the Resolution of the COMELEC is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 86564 August 1, 1989

RAMON L. LABO, JR., petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) EN BANC AND LUIS L. LARDIZABAL, respondents
Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioner.
Rillera and Quintana for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner asks this Court to restrain the Commission on Elections from looking into the question of his citizenship as
a qualification for his office as Mayor of Baguio City. The allegation that he is a foreigner, he says, is not the issue. The
issue is whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction to conduct any inquiry into this matter, considering that the
petition for quo warranto against him was not filed on time.
It is noteworthy that this argument is based on the alleged tardiness not of the petition itself but of the payment of the
filing fee, which the petitioner contends was an indispensable requirement. The fee is, curiously enough, all of P300.00
only. This brings to mind the popular verse that for want of a horse the kingdom was lost. Still, if it is shown that the
petition was indeed filed beyond the reglementary period, there is no question that this petition must be granted and the
challenge abated.
The petitioner's position is simple. He was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City, on January 20, 1988. The petition
for quo warranto was filed by the private respondent on January 26, 1988, but no filing fee was paid on that date. This fee
was finally paid on February 10, 1988, or twenty-one days after his proclamation. As the petition by itself alone was
ineffectual without the filing fee, it should be deemed filed only when the fee was paid. This was done beyond the
reglementary period provided for under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code reading as follows:
SEC. 253. Petition for quo warranto. Any voter contesting the election of a Member of the Batasang Pambansa,
regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall
file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the result of the
election.
The petitioner adds that the payment of the filing fee is required under Rule 36, Section 5, of the Procedural Rules of the
COMELEC providing that

Sec. 5. No petition for quo warranto shall be given due course without the payment of a filing fee in the amount of Three
Hundred Pesos (P300.00) and the legal research fee as required by law.
and stresses that there is abundant jurisprudence holding that the payment of the filing fee is essential to the timeliness of
the filling of the petition itself. He cites many rulings of the Court to this effect, specificallyManchester v. Court of
Appeals. 1
For his part, the private respondent denies that the filing fee was paid out of time. In fact he says, it was fliedahead of time.
His point is that when he filed his "Petition for Quo Warranto with Prayer for Immediate Annulment of Proclamation and
Restraining Order or Injunction" on January 26, 1988, the COMELEC treated it as a pre-proclamation controversy and
docketed it as SPC Case No. 88-288. No docket fee was collected although it was offered. It was only on February 8,
1988, that the COMELEC decided to treat his petition as solely for quo warranto and re-docketed it as EPC Case No. 8819, serving him notice on February 10, 1988. He immediately paid the filing fee on that date.
The private respondent argues further that during the period when the COMELEC regarded his petition as a preproclamation controversy, the time for filing an election protest or quo warranto proceeding was deemed suspended under
Section 248 of the Omnibus Election Code. 2 At any rate, he says, Rule 36, Section 5, of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure cited by the petitioner, became effective only on November 15, 1988, seven days after publication of the said
Rules in the Official Gazette pursuant to Section 4, Rule 44 thereof. 3 These rules could not retroact to January 26,1988,
when he filed his petition with the COMELEC.
In his Reply, the petitioner argues that even if the Omnibus Election Code did not require it, the payment of filing fees
was still necessary under Res. No. 1996 and, before that, Res. No. 1450 of the respondent COMELEC, promulgated on
January 12, 1988, and February 26, 1980, respectively. To this, the private respondent counters that the latter resolution
was intended for the local elections held on January 30, 1980, and did not apply to the 1988 local elections, which were
supposed to be governed by the first-mentioned resolution. However, Res. No. 1996 took effect only on March 3, 1988,
following the lapse of seven days after its publication as required by RA No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral
Reform Law of 1987, which became effective on January 5, 1988. Its Section 30 provides in part:
Sec. 30. Effectivity of Regulations and Orders of the Commission. The rules and regulations promulgated by the
Commission shall take effect on the seventh day after their publication in the Official Gazette or in at least (2) daily
newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.
The Court has considered the arguments of the parties and holds that the petition for quo warranto was filed on time. We
agree with the respondents that the fee was paid during the ten-day period as extended by the pendency of the petition
when it was treated by the COMELEC as a pre-proclamation proceeding which did not require the payment of a filing fee.
At that, we reach this conclusion only on the assumption that the requirement for the payment of the fees in quo
warranto proceedings was already effective. There is no record that Res. No. 1450 was even published; and as for Res.
No. 1996, this took effect only on March 3, 1988, seven days after its publication in the February 25, 1988 issues of the
Manila Chronicle and the Philippine Daily Inquirer, or after the petition was filed.
The petitioner forgets Ta;ada v. Tuvera 4 when he argues that the resolutions became effective "immediately upon
approval" simply because it was so provided therein. We held in that case that publication was still necessary under the
due process clause despite such effectivity clause.
In any event, what is important is that the filing fee was paid, and whatever delay there may have been is not imputable to
the private respondent's fault or neglect. It is true that in the Manchester Case, we required the timely payment of the
filing fee as a precondition for the timeliness of the filing of the case itself. In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v.
Asuncion, 5 however this Court, taking into account the special circumstances of that case, declared:

This Court reiterates the rule that the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the prescribed
filing fee. However, the court may allow the payment of the said fee within a reasonable time. In the event of noncompliance therewith, the case shall be dismissed.
The same idea is expressed in Rule 42, Section 18, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure adopted on June 20, 1988, thus:
Sec. 18. Non-payment of prescribed fees. If the fees above prescribed are not paid, theCommission may refuse to take
action thereon until they are paid and may dismiss the action or the proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court notes that while arguing the technical point that the petition for quo warranto should be dismissed for failure to
pay the filing fee on time, the petitioner would at the same time minimize his alleged lack of citizenship as "a futile
technicality," It is regrettable, to say the least, that the requirement of citizenship as a qualification for public office can be
so demeaned. What is worse is that it is regarded as an even less important consideration than the reglementary period the
petitioner insists upon.
This matter should normally end here as the sole issue originally raised by the petitioner is the timeliness of thequo
warranto proceedings against him. However, as his citizenship is the subject of that proceeding, and considering the
necessity for an early resolution of that more important question clearly and urgently affecting the public interest, we shall
directly address it now in this same action.
The Court has similarly acted in a notable number of cases, thus:
From the foregoing brief statement of the nature of the instant case, it would appear that our sole function in this
proceeding should be to resolve the single issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the motion for
new trial of the GSIS in question should indeed be deemedpro forma. But going over the extended pleadings of both
parties, the Court is immediately impressed that substantial justice may not be timely achieved, if we should decide this
case upon such a technical ground alone. We have carefully read all the allegations and arguments of the parties, very ably
and comprehensively expounded by evidently knowledgeable and unusually competent counsel, and we feel we can better
serve the interests of justice by broadening the scope of our inquiry, for as the record before us stands, we see that there is
enough basis for us to end the basic controversy between the parties here and now, dispensing, however, with procedural
steps which would not anyway affect substantially the merits of their respective claims. 6
xxx
While it is the fault of the petitioner for appealing to the wrong court and thereby allowing the period for appeal to lapse,
the more correct procedure was for the respondent court to forward the case to the proper court which was the Court of
Appeals for appropriate action. Considering, however, the length of time that this case has been pending, we apply the
rule in the case of Del Castillo v. Jaymalin, (112 SCRA 629) and follow the principle enunciated in Alger Electric, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, (135 SCRA 37) which states:
... it is a cherished rule of procedure for this Court to always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding
leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. No useful purpose will be served if this case is remanded to
the trial court only to have its decision raised again to the Intermediate Appellate Court and from there to this Court. (p.
43)
Only recently in the case of Beautifont, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 50141, January 29, 1988), we
stated that:
... But all those relevant facts are now before this Court. And those facts dictate the rendition of a verdict in the petitioner's
favor. There is therefore no point in referring the case back to the Court of Appeals. The facts and the legal propositions
involved will not change, nor should the ultimate judgment. Considerable time has already elapsed and, to serve the ends
of justice, it is time that the controversy is finally laid to rest. (See Sotto v. Samson, 5 SCRA 733; Republic v. Paredes,
108 Phil. 57; Lianga Lumber Co. v. Lianga Timber Co., Inc., 76 SCRA 197; Erico v. Heirs of Chigas, 98 SCRA 575;

Francisco v. City of Davao, 12 SCRA 628; Valencia v. Mabilangan, 105 Phil. 162).lwph1.t Sound practice seeks to
accommodate the theory which avoids waste of time, effort and expense, both to the parties and the government, not to
speak of delay in the disposal of the case (cf. Fernandez v. Garcia, 92 Phil. 592, 597). A marked characteristic of our
judicial set-up is that where the dictates of justice so demand ... the Supreme Court should act, and act with finality.' (Li
Siu Liat v. Republic, 21 SCRA 1039, 1046, citing Samal v. CA, 99 Phil. 230 and U.S. v. Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74). In this
case, the dictates of justice do demand that this Court act, and act with finality. 7
xxx
Remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the court is in a position to
resolve the dispute based on the records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the public interest and the expeditious
administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of remanding them to the trial court for further
proceedings, such as where the ends of justice would not be subserved by the remand of the case or when public interest
demands an early disposition of the case or where the trial court had already received all the evidence of the parties. 8
This course of action becomes all the more justified in the present case where, to repeat for stress, it is claimed that a
foreigner is holding a public office.
We also note in his Reply, the petitioner says:
In adopting private respondent's comment, respondent COMELEC implicitly adopted as "its own" private respondent's
repeated assertion that petitioner is no longer a Filipino citizen. In so doing, has not respondent COMELEC effectively
disqualified itself, by reason of prejudgment, from resolving the petition for quo warranto filed by private respondent still
pending before it? 9
This is still another reason why the Court has seen fit to rule directly on the merits of this case.
Going over the record, we find that there are two administrative decisions on the question of the petitioner's citizenship.
The first was rendered by the Commission on Elections on May 12, 1982, and found the petitioner to be a citizen of the
Philippines. 10 The second was rendered by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation on September 13, 1988, and
held that the petitioner was not a citizen of the Philippines. 11
The first decision was penned by then COMELEC Chigas, Vicente Santiago, Jr., with Commissioners Pabalate Savellano
and Opinion concurring in full and Commissioner Bacungan concurring in the dismissal of the petition "without prejudice
to the issue of the respondent's citizenship being raised anew in a proper case." Commissioner Sagadraca reserved his vote,
while Commissioner Felipe was for deferring decision until representations shall have been made with the Australian
Embassy for official verification of the petitioner's alleged naturalization as an Australian.
The second decision was unanimously rendered by Chairman Miriam Defensor-Santiago and Commissioners Alano and
Geraldez of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. It is important to observe that in the proceeding before the
COMELEC, there was no direct proof that the herein petitioner had been formally naturalized as a citizen of Australia.
This conjecture, which was eventually rejected, was merely inferred from the fact that he had married an Australian
citizen, obtained an Australian passport, and registered as an alien with the CID upon his return to this country in 1980.
On the other hand, the decision of the CID took into account the official statement of the Australian Government dated
August 12, 1984, through its Consul in the Philippines, that the petitioner was still an Australian citizen as of that date by
reason of his naturalization in 1976. That statement 12 is reproduced in full as follows:
I, GRAHAM COLIN WEST, Consul of Australia in the Philippines, by virtue of a certificate of appointment signed and
sealed by the Australian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs on 19 October 1983, and recognized as such by Letter of
Patent signed and sealed by the Philippines Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs on 23 November 1983, do hereby provide
the following statement in response to the subpoena Testificandum dated 9 April 1984 in regard to the Petition for

disqualification against RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO (SPC No. 84-73), and do hereby certify that the statement is
true and correct.
STATEMENT
A) RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO, date of birth 23 December 1934, was married in the Philippines to an Australian
citizen. As the spouse of an Australian citizen, he was not required to meet normal requirements for the grant of
citizenship and was granted Australian citizenship by Sydney on 28 July 1976.
B) Any person over the age of 16 years who is granted Australian citizenship must take an oath of allegiance or make an
affirmation of allegiance. The wording of the oath of affirmation is: "I ..., renouncing all other allegiance ..." etc. This
need not necessarily have any effect on his former nationality as this would depend on the citizenship laws of his former
country.
C) The marriage was declared void in the Australian Federal Court in Sydney on 27 June 1980 on the ground that the
marriage had been bigamous.
D) According to our records LABO is still an Australian citizen.
E) Should he return to Australia, LABO may face court action in respect of Section 50 of Australian Citizenship Act 1948
which relates to the giving of false or misleading information of a material nature in respect of an application for
Australian citizenship. If such a prosecution was successful, he could be deprived of Australian citizenship under Section
21 of the Act.
F) There are two further ways in which LABO could divest himself of Australian citizenship:
(i) He could make a declaration of Renunciation of Australian citizenship under Section 18 of the Australian Citizenship
Act, or
(ii) If he acquired another nationality, (for example, Filipino) by a formal and voluntary act other than marriage, then he
would automatically lose as Australian citizenship under Section 17 of the Act.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I HAVE HEREUNTO SET MAY HAND AND SEAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
MANILA, THIS 12th DAY OF APRIL 1984. DONE AT MANILA IN THE PHILIPPINES.
(Signed) GRAHAM C. WEST Consul
This was affirmed later by the letter of February 1, 1988, addressed to the private respondent by the Department of
Foreign Affairs reading as follows: 13
Sir:
With reference to your letter dated 1 February 1988, I wish to inform you that inquiry made with the Australian
Government through the Embassy of the Philippines in Canberra has elicited the following information:
1) That Mr. Ramon L. Labo, Jr. acquired Australian citizenship on 28 July 1976.
2) That prior to 17 July 1986, a candidate for Australian citizenship had to either swear an oath of allegiance or make an
affirmation of allegiance which carries a renunciation of "all other allegiance.
Very truly yours, For the Secretary of Foreign Affairs: (SGD) RODOLFO SEVERINO, JR. Assistant Secretary
The decision also noted the oath of allegiance taken by every naturalized Australian reading as follows:
OATH OF ALLEGIANCE

I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, swear by Almighty God that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her
Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia, Her heirs and successors according to law, and that I will faithfully
observe the laws of Australia and fulfill my duties as an Australian citizen. 14
and the Affirmation of Allegiance, which declares:
AFFIRMATION OF ALLEGIANCE
I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, solemnly and sincerely promise and declare that I will be faithful and bear true
allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia, Her heirs and successors according to law, and that I
will faithfully observe the Laws of Australia and fulfill my duties as an Australian citizen. 15
The petitioner does not question the authenticity of the above evidence. Neither does he deny that he obtained Australian
Passport No. 754705, which he used in coming back to the Philippines in 1980, when he declared before the immigration
authorities that he was an alien and registered as such under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-323985. 16 He later
asked for the change of his status from immigrant to a returning former Philippine citizen and was granted Immigrant
Certificate of Residence No. 223809. 17 He also categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia in a number of
sworn statements voluntarily made by him and. even sought to avoid the jurisdiction of the barangay court on the ground
that he was a foreigner. 18
The decision of the COMELEC in 1982 quaintly dismisses all these acts as "mistakes" that did not divest the petitioner of
his citizenship, although, as earlier noted, not all the members joined in this finding. We reject this ruling as totally
baseless. The petitioner is not an unlettered person who was not aware of the consequences of his acts, let alone the fact
that he was assisted by counsel when he performed these acts.
The private respondent questions the motives of the COMELEC at that time and stresses Labo's political affiliation with
the party in power then, but we need not go into that now.
There is also the claim that the decision can no longer be reversed because of the doctrine of res judicata, but this too
must be dismissed. This doctrine does not apply to questions of citizenship, as the Court has ruled in several
cases. 19 Moreover, it does not appear that it was properly and seasonably pleaded, in a motion to dismiss or in the answer,
having been invoked only when the petitioner filed his reply 20 to the private respondent's comment. Besides, one of the
requisites of res judicata, to wit, identity of parties, is not present in this case.
The petitioner's contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not automatically divest him of
Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of
that marriage. He became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such through a formal and positive process,
simplified in his case because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for such naturalization, he formally
took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance, both quoted above. Renouncing all other
allegiance, he swore "to be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia ..."
and to fulfill his duties "as an Australian citizen."
The petitioner now claims that his naturalization in Australia made him at worst only a dual national and did not divest
him of his Philippine citizenship. Such a specious argument cannot stand against the clear provisions of CA No. 63, which
enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among these are: (1) naturalization in a foreign
country; (2) express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or
laws of a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner. It is also worth mentioning in this connection that
under Article IV, Section 5, of the present Constitution, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and
shall be dealt with by law."
Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization in Australia was annulled after it was found that his
marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous, that circumstance alone did not automatically restore his Philippine

citizenship. His divestiture of Australian citizenship does not concern us here. That is a matter between him and his
adopted country. What we must consider is the fact that he voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine citizenship and
willingly and knowingly embraced the citizenship of a foreign country. The possibility that he may have been
subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not mean that he has been automatically reinstated as a citizen of
the Philippines.
Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired
Philippine citizenship by any of these methods. He does not point to any judicial decree of naturalization as to any statute
directly conferring Philippine citizenship upon him. Neither has he shown that he has complied with PD No. 725,
providing that:
... (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship may reacquire Philippine citizenship through
repatriation by applying with the Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if
their applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which
they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall
thereupon cancel their certificate of registration. (Emphasis supplied.)
That is why the Commission on Immigration and Deportation rejected his application for the cancellation of his alien
certificate of registration. And that is also the reason we must deny his present claim for recognition as a citizen of the
Philippines.
The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the local elections on January 18, 1988, a citizen of the Philippines. In
fact, he was not even a qualified voter under the Constitution itself because of his alienage. 21 He was therefore ineligible
as a candidate for mayor of Baguio City, under Section 42 of the Local Government Code providing in material part as
follows:
Sec. 42. Qualifications. An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-three years of age
on election day, a qualified voter registered as such in the barangay, municipality, city or province where he proposes to
be elected, a resident therein for at least one year at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy, and able to read
and write English, Filipino, or any other local language or dialect.
The petitioner argues that his alleged lack of citizenship is a "futile technicality" that should not frustrate the will of the
electorate of Baguio City, who elected him by a "resonant and thunderous majority." To be accurate, it was not as loud as
all that, for his lead over the second-placer was only about 2,100 votes. In any event, the people of that locality could not
have, even unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local Government Code and the Constitution. The electorate
had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual
owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the
Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.
The probability that many of those who voted for the petitioner may have done so in the belief that he was qualified only
strengthens the conclusion that the results of the election cannot nullify the qualifications for the office now held by him.
These qualifications are continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during incumbency, title to the office itself is
deemed forfeited. In the case at bar, the citizenship and voting requirements were not subsequently lost but were not
possessed at all in the first place on the day of the election. The petitioner was disqualified from running as mayor and,
although elected, is not now qualified to serve as such.
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo warranto petition, can replace the
petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the
election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio city.

The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections 22 decided in 1985. In that case, the
candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a
turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregarded as stray. In effect, the second placer won by default. That
decision was supported by eight members of the Court then 23 with three dissenting 24 and another two reserving their
vote. 25 One was on official leave. 26
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of the earlier case
ofGeronimo v. Ramos, 27 Which represents the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine
first announced in 1912 in Topacio vs. Paredes 28 was supported by ten members of the Court 29 without any dissent,
although one reserved his vote, 30 another took no part 31 and two others were on leave. 32 There the Court held:
... it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate
who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a
constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in
the election for that office, and it is a fundamental Idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared
elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for
the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of
votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may
not be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts
a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was
alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.
It remains to stress that the citizen of the Philippines must take pride in his status as such and cherish this priceless gift
that, out of more than a hundred other nationalities, God has seen fit to grant him. Having been so endowed, he must not
lightly yield this precious advantage, rejecting it for another land that may offer him material and other attractions that he
may not find in his own country. To be sure, he has the right to renounce the Philippines if he sees fit and transfer his
allegiance to a state with more allurements for him. 33 But having done so, he cannot expect to be welcomed back with
open arms once his taste for his adopted country turns sour or he is himself disowned by it as an undesirable alien.
Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily recovered after its renunciation. It may be restored only
after the returning renegade makes a formal act of re-dedication to the country he has abjured and he solemnly affirms
once again his total and exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This may not be accomplished by election to
public office.
WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is hereby declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore
DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as Mayor of Baguio City. He is ordered to VACATE his office and surrender
the same to the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City, once this decision becomes final and executory. The temporary restraining
order dated January 31, 1989, is LIFTED.
Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Gri;oAquino Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-21289 October 4, 1971

MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM and LAU YUEN YEUNG, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, respondent-appellee.
Aruego, Mamaril & Associates for petitioners-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Frine' C. Zaballero and Solicitor Sumilang V.
Bernardo for respondent-appellee.

BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the following decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 49705 entitled Moy Ya
Lim Yao, etc., et al. vs. The Commissioner of Immigration which, brief as it is, sufficiently depicts the factual setting of
and the fundamental issues involved in this case thus:
In the instant case, petitioners seek the issuance of a writ of injunction against the Commissioner of Immigration,
"restraining the latter and/or his authorized representative from ordering plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung to leave the Philippines
and causing her arrest and deportation and the confiscation of her bond, upon her failure to do so."
The prayer for preliminary injunction embodied in the complaint, having been denied, the case was heard on the merits
and the parties submitted their respective evidence.
The facts of the case, as substantially and correctly stated by the Solicitor General are these:
On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant. In the
interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that
she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit
her great (grand) uncle Lau Ching Ping for a period of one month (Exhibits "l," "1-a," and "2"). She was permitted to
come into the Philippines on March 13, 1961, and was permitted to stay for a period of one month which would expire on
April 13, 1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among
others that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized
period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized
representative might properly allow. After repeated extensions, petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the
Philippines up to February 13, 1962 (Exhibit "4"). On January 25, 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao
alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of respondent to confiscate
her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought this
action for injunction with preliminary injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it
was admitted that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung could not write either English or Tagalog. Except for a few words, she
could not speak either English or Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one,
Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law.
Under the facts unfolded above, the Court is of the considered opinion, and so holds, that the instant petition for injunction
cannot be sustained for the same reason as set forth in the Order of this Court, dated March 19, 1962, the pertinent
portions of which read:
First, Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law provides:
Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of
the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.

The above-quoted provision is clear and its import unequivocal and hence it should be held to mean what it plainly and
explicitly expresses in unmistakable terms. The clause "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" incontestably implies
that an alien woman may be deemed a citizen of the Philippines by virtue of her marriage to a Filipino citizen only if she
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications specified in the law, because these are the explicit
requisites provided by law for an alien to be naturalized. (Lee Suan Ay, Alberto Tan and Lee Chiao vs. Emilio Galang,
etc., G. R. No. L-11855). However, from the allegation of paragraph 3 of the complaint, to wit:
3. That plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung, Chinese by birth, who might herself be lawfully naturalized as a Filipino citizen (not
being disqualified to become such by naturalization), is a Filipino citizen by virtue of her marriage on January 25, 1962 to
plaintiff MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM, under the Naturalization Laws of the Philippines.
it can be deduced beyond debate that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung while claiming not to be disqualified, does not and
cannot allege that she possesses all the qualifications to be naturalized, naturally because, having been admitted as a
temporary visitor only on March 13, 1961, it is obvious at once that she lacks at least, the requisite length of residence in
the Philippines (Revised Naturalization Law, Sec. 2, Case No. 2, Sec. 3, Case No. 3).
Were if the intention of the law that the alien woman, to be deemed a citizen of the Philippines by virtue of marriage to a
Filipino citizen, need only be not disqualified under the Naturalization Law, it would have been worded "and who herself
is not disqualified to become a citizen of the Philippines."
Second, Lau Yuen Yeung, a temporary Chinese woman visitor, whose authorized stay in the Philippines, after repeated
extensions thereof, was to expire last February 28, 1962, having married her co-plaintiff only on January 25, 1962, or just
a little over one month before the expiry date of her stay, it is evident that said marriage was effected merely for
convenience to defeat or avoid her then impending compulsory departure, not to say deportation. This cannot be permitted.
Third, as the Solicitor General has well stated:
5. That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a temporary alien visitor on the strength of a deliberate and
voluntary representation that she will enter and stay only for a period of one month and thereby secured a visa, cannot go
back on her representation to stay permanently without first departing from the Philippines as she had promised. (Chung
Tiao Bing, et al. vs. Commissioner of Immigration, G. R. No. L-9966, September 29, 1956; Ong Se Lun vs. Board of
Commissioners, G. R. No. L-6017, September 16, 1954; Sec. 9, last par., Phil. Immigration Law).
The aforequoted argument of the Solicitor General is well buttressed not only by the decided cases of the Supreme Court
on the point mentioned above, but also on the very provisions of Section 9, sub-paragraph (g) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940 which reads:
An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the Philippines permanently. To obtain permanent
admission, a non-immigrant alien must depart voluntarily to some foreign country and procure from the appropriate
Philippine Consul the proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by the Officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a
Philippine port of entry for determination of his admissibility in accordance with the requirements of this Act. (This
paragraph is added by Republic Act 503). (Sec. 9, subparagraph (g) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940).
And fourth, respondent Commissioner of Immigration is charged with the administration of all laws relating to
immigration (Sec. 3, Com. Act No. 613) and in the performance of his duties in relation to alien immigrants, the law gives
the Commissioner of Immigration a wide discretion, a quasi-judicial function in determining cases presented to him
(Pedro Uy So vs. Commissioner of Immigration CA-G. R. No. 23336-R, Dec. 15, 1960), so that his decision thereon may
not be disturbed unless he acted with abuse of discretion or in excess of his jurisdiction.
It may also be not amiss to state that wife Lau Yuen Yeung, while she barely and insufficiently talk in broken Tagalog and
English, she admitted that she cannot write either language.

The only matter of fact not clearly passed upon by His Honor which could have some bearing in the resolution of this
appeal is the allegation in the brief of petitioners-appellants, not denied in the governments brief, that "in the hearing ..., it
was shown thru the testimony of the plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung that she does not possess any of the disqualifications for
naturalization." Of course, as an additional somehow relevant factual matter, it is also emphasized by said appellants that
during the hearing in the lower court, held almost ten months after the alleged marriage of petitioners, "Lau Yuen Yeung
was already carrying in her womb for seven months a child by her husband."
Appellants have assigned six errors allegedly committed by the court a quo, thus:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CLAUSE "WHO MIGHT HERSELF BE LAWFULLY
NATURALIZED" (OF SECTION 15, REVISED NATURALIZATION LAW) INCONTESTABLY IMPLIES THAT AN
ALIEN WOMAN MAY BE DEEMED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES BY VIRTUE OF HER MARRIAGE TO A
FILIPINO CITIZEN, ONLY IF SHE POSSESSES ALL THE QUALIFICATIONS AND NONE OF THE
DISQUALIFICATIONS SPECIFIED IN THE LAW.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A WOMAN FOREIGNER WHO DOES NOT POSSESS ANY
OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR CITIZENSHIP AND WHO MARRIED A FILIPINO CITIZEN IS STILL
CONSIDERED AN ALIEN EVEN AFTER SUCH MARRIAGE AS TO FALL WITHIN THE REQUIREMENT OF
SECTION 9, SUB-PARAGRAPH (9) OF THE PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1940.
III
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG'S MARRIAGE TO A FILIPINO CITIZEN
WAS ONLY FOR CONVENIENCE, MERELY BECAUSE THE SAME WAS CELEBRATED JUST OVER A MONTH
BEFORE THE EXPIRY DATE OF HER AUTHORIZED STAY.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION ACTED
WITH ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION WHEN SAID OFFICER THREATENED
TO SEND OUT OF THE COUNTRY PLAINTIFF LAU YUEN YEUNG WITH WARNING THAT HER FAILURE TO
DO SO WOULD MEAN CONFISCATION OF HER BOND, ARREST AND IMMEDIATE DEPORTATION, IN SPITE
OF THE FACT THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG IS NOW A FILIPINO CITIZEN.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS' COMPLAINT AND IN REFUSING
TO PERMANENTLY ENJOIN THE COMMISSIONER FROM ORDERING PLAINTIFF LAU YUEN YEUNG TO
LEAVE THE PHILIPPINES AS A TEMPORARY VISITOR WHICH SHE IS NOT.
VI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION EMBODIED IN THEIR COMPLAINT, IN AN ORDER DATED MARCH 19, 1962.
(PAGES 36-41, RECORD ON APPEAL) .
We need not discuss these assigned errors separately. In effect, the above decision upheld the two main grounds of
objection of the Solicitor General to the petition in the court below, viz:

That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a temporary alien visitor on the strength of a deliberate and
voluntary representation that she will enter and stay only for a period of one month and thereby secured a visa, cannot go
back on her representation to stay permanently without first departing from the Philippines as she had promised. (Chung
Tiao Bing, et al. vs. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-9966, September 29, 1956; Ong Se Lun vs. Board of
Commissioners, G.R. No. L-6017, Sept. 16, 1954, Sec. 9, last par. Phil. Immigration Law);
That the mere marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer on the latter Philippine citizenship.
The alien wife must possess all the qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization and none
of the disqualifications. (Lee Suan Ay, Alberto Tan and Lee Chiao vs. Galang, etc., G. R. No. L-11855, Dec. 25, 1959)
It is obvious from the nature of these objection that their proper resolution would necessarily cover all the points raised in
appellants' assignments of error, hence, We will base our discussions, more or less, on said objections.
I
The first objection of the Solicitor General which covers the matters dealt with in appellants' second and fourth
assignments of error does not require any lengthy discussion. As a matter of fact, it seem evident that the Solicitor
General's pose that an alien who has been admitted into the Philippines as a non-immigrant cannot remain here
permanently unless he voluntarily leaves the country first and goes to a foreign country to secure thereat from the
appropriate Philippine consul the proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by officers of the Bureau of Immigration
at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his admissibility in accordance with the requirements of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, as amended by Republic Act 503, is premised on the assumption that petitioner Lau Yuen
Yeung is not a Filipino citizen. We note the same line of reasoning in the appealed decision of the court a quo.
Accordingly, it is but safe to assume that were the Solicitor General and His Honor of the view that said petitioner had
become ipso facto a Filipina by virtue of her marriage to her Filipino husband, they would have held her as entitled to
assume the status of a permanent resident without having to depart as required of aliens by Section 9 (g) of the law.
In any event, to set this point at rest, We hereby hold that portion of Section 9 (g) of the Immigration Act providing:
An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the Philippines permanently. To obtain permanent
admission, a non-immigrant alien must depart voluntarily to some foreign country and procure from the appropriate
Philippine consul the proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by the officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a
Philippine port of entry for determination of his admissibility in accordance with the requirements of this Act.
does not apply to aliens who after coming into the Philippines as temporary visitors, legitimately become Filipino citizens
or acquire Filipino citizenship. Such change of nationality naturally bestows upon their the right to stay in the Philippines
permanently or not, as they may choose, and if they elect to reside here, the immigration authorities may neither deport
them nor confiscate their bonds. True it is that this Court has vehemently expressed disapproval of convenient ruses
employed by alien to convert their status from temporary visitors to permanent residents in circumvention of the
procedure prescribed by the legal provision already mentioned, such as in Chiong Tiao Bing vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, 99 Phil. 1020, wherein, thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, the Court, reiterating the ruling in Ong Se Lun vs.
Board of Immigration Commissioners, 95 PMI. 785, said:
... It is clear that if an alien gains admission to the Islands on the strength of a deliberate and voluntary representation that
he will enter only for a limited time, and thereby secures the benefit of a temporary visa, the law will not allow him
subsequently to go back on his representation and stay permanently, without first departing from the Philippines as he had
promised. No officer can relieve him of the departure requirements of section 9 of the Immigration Act, under the guise of
"change" or "correction", for the law makes no distinctions, and no officer is above the law. Any other ruling would, as
stated in our previous decision, encourage aliens to enter the Islands on false pretences; every alien so permitted to enter
for a limited time, might then claim a right to permanent admission, however flimsy such claim should be, and thereby
compel our government to spend time, money and effort to examining and verifying whether or not every such alien really
has a right to take up permanent residence here. In the meanwhile, the alien would be able to prolong his stay and evade

his return to the port whence he came, contrary to what he promised to do when he entered. The damages inherent in such
ruling are self-evident.
On the other hand, however, We cannot see any reason why an alien who has been here as a temporary visitor but who has
in the meanwhile become a Filipino should be required to still leave the Philippines for a foreign country, only to apply
thereat for a re-entry here and undergo the process of showing that he is entitled to come back, when after all, such right
has become incontestible as a necessary concomitant of his assumption of our nationality by whatever legal means this
has been conferred upon him. Consider for example, precisely the case of the minor children of an alien who is
naturalized. It is indubitable that they become ipso facto citizens of the Philippines. Could it be the law that before they
can be allowed permanent residence, they still have to be taken abroad so that they may be processed to determine
whether or not they have a right to have permanent residence here? The difficulties and hardships which such a
requirement entails and its seeming unreasonableness argue against such a rather absurd construction. Indeed, as early as
1957, in Ly Giok Ha vs. Galang, 101 Phil. 459, Mr. Justice Concepcion, our present Chief Justice, already ruled thus:
... (P)etitioners allege that, upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly Giok Ha became also a citizen of the Philippines. Indeed, if
this conclusion were correct, it would follow that, in consequence of her marriage, she had been naturalized as such
citizen, and, hence the decision appealed from would have to be affirmed, for section 40(c) of Commonwealth Act 613
provides that "in the event of the naturalization as a Philippine citizen ... of the alien on whose behalf the bond deposit is
given, the bond shall be cancelled or the sum deposited shall be returned to the depositor or his legal representative." (At.
pp. 462-463)
In other words, the applicable statute itself more than implies that the naturalization of an alien visitor as a Philippine
citizen logically produces the effect of conferring upon him ipso facto all the rights of citizenship including that of being
entitled to permanently stay in the Philippines outside the orbit of authority of the Commissioner of Immigration vis-a-vis
aliens, if only because by its very nature and express provisions, the Immigration Law is a law only for aliens and is
inapplicable to citizens of the Philippines. In the sense thus discussed therefore, appellants' second and fourth assignments
of error are well taken.
II
Precisely, the second objection, of the Solicitor General sustained by the trial judge is that appellant Lau Yuen Yeung's
marriage to appellant Moya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo whose Filipino citizenship is not denied did not have the
effect of making her a Filipino, since it has not been shown that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized," it appearing
clearly in the record that she does not possess all the qualifications required of applicants for naturalization by the Revised
Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473, even if she has proven that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications thereunder. In other words, the Solicitor General implicitly concedes that had it been established in the
proceedings below that appellant Lau Yuen Yeung possesses all the qualifications required by the law of applicants for
naturalization, she would have been recognized by the respondent as a Filipino citizen in the instant case, without
requiring her to submit to the usual proceedings for naturalization.
To be sure, this position of the Solicitor General is in accord with what used to be the view of this Court since Lee Suan
Ay, et al. v. Emilio Galang, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-11855, promulgated December 23, 1959, 106 Phil., 706,713, 1 for it
was only in Zita Ngo Burca vs. Republic, G.R. NO. L-24252 which was promulgated on January 30, 1967 (19 SCRA 186),
that over the pen of Mr. Justice Conrado Sanchez, this Court held that for an alien woman who marries a Filipino to be
deemed a Filipina, she has to apply for naturalization in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Revised
Naturalization Law and prove in said naturalization proceeding not only that she has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided in the law but also that she has complied with all the formalities required thereby like any other
applicant for naturalization, 2 albeit said decision is not yet part of our jurisprudence inasmuch as the motion for its
reconsideration is still pending resolution. Appellants are in effect urging Us, however, in their first and second
assignments of error, not only to reconsider Burca but to even reexamine Lee Suan Ay which, as a matter of fact, is the
prevailing rule, having been reiterated in all subsequent decisions up to Go Im Ty. 3

Actually, the first case in which Section 15 of the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473, underwent judicial
construction was in the first Ly Giok Ha case, 4 one almost identical to the one at bar. Ly Giok Ha, a woman of Chinese
nationality, was a temporary visitor here whose authority to stay was to expire on March 14, 1956. She filed a bond to
guaranty her timely departure. On March 8, 1956, eight days before the expiration of her authority to stay, she married a
Filipino by the name of Restituto Lacasta. On March 9, 1956, her husband notified the Commissioner of Immigration of
said marriage and, contending that his wife had become a Filipina by reason of said marriage, demanded for the
cancellation of her bond, but instead of acceding to such request, the Commissioner required her to leave, and upon her
failure to do so, on March 16, 1956, the Commissioner confiscated her bond; a suit was filed for the recovery of the bond;
the lower court sustained her contention that she had no obligation to leave, because she had become Filipina by marriage,
hence her bond should be returned. The Commissioner appealed to this Court. In the said appeal, Mr. Justice Roberto
Concepcion, our present Chief Justice, spoke for the Court, thus:
The next and most important question for determination is whether her marriage to a Filipino justified or, at least, excused
the aforesaid failure of Ly Giok Ha to depart from the Philippines on or before March 14, 1956. In maintaining the
affirmative view, petitioners alleged that, upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly Giok Ha became, also, a citizen of the
Philippines. Indeed, if this conclusion were correct, it would follow that, in consequence of her marriage, she had been
naturalized as such citizen, and, hence, the decision appealed from would have to be affirmed, for section 40(c) of
Commonwealth Act No. 613 provides that "in the event of the naturalization as a Philippine citizen ... of the alien on
whose behalf the bond deposit is given, the bond shall be cancelled or the sum deposited shall be returned to the depositor
or his legal representative." Thus the issue boils down to whether an alien female who marries a male citizen of the
Philippines follows ipso facto his political status.
The pertinent part of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, upon which petitioners rely, reads:
Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Pursuant thereto, marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife, unless she "herself
may be lawfully naturalized." As correctly held in an opinion of the Secretary of Justice (Op. No. 52, series of 1950),* this
limitation of section 15 excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being
naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473, namely:
(a) Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach
doctrines opposing all organized governments;
(b) Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success
and predominance of their ideas;
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
(e) Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
(f) Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or
who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;
(g) Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the ... Philippines are at war, during the period of such war;
(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States, whose laws does not grant Filipinos the right to
become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.

In the case at bar, there is neither proof nor allegation in the pleadings that Ly Giok Ha does not fall under any of the
classes disqualified by law. Moreover, as the parties who claim that, despite her failure to depart from the Philippines
within the period specified in the bond in question, there has been no breach thereof, petitioners have the burden of
proving her alleged change of political status, from alien to citizen. Strictly speaking, petitioners have not made out,
therefore a case against the respondents-appellants.
Considering, however, that neither in the administrative proceedings, nor in the lower court, had the parties seemingly felt
that there was an issue on whether Ly Giok Ha may "be lawfully naturalized," and this being a case of first impression in
our courts, we are of the opinion that, in the interest of equity and justice, the parties herein should be given an
opportunity to introduce evidence, if they have any, on said issue. (At pp. 462-464.) .
As may be seen, although not specifically in so many words, no doubt was left in the above decision as regards the
following propositions: .
1. That under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, the marriage of an alien woman to
a Filipino makes her a Filipina, if she "herself might be lawfully naturalized";
2. That this Court declared as correct the opinion of the Secretary of Justice that the limitation of Section 15 of the
Naturalization Law excludes from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, only those disqualified from being
naturalized under Section 4 of the law qouted in the decision;
3. That evidence to the effect that she is not disqualified may be presented in the action to recover her bond confiscated by
the Commissioner of Immigration;
4. That upon proof of such fact, she may be recognized as Filipina; and
5. That in referring to the disqualification enumerated in the law, the Court somehow left the impression that no inquiry
need be made as to qualifications, 5 specially considering that the decision cited and footnotes several opinions of the
Secretary of Justice, the immediate superior of the Commissioner of Immigration, the most important of which are the
following:
Paragraph (a), section 13 of Act No. 2927, as amended, (now section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 473), provided that
"any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines." A similar provision in the naturalization law of the United States
has been construed as not requiring the woman to have the qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in the case
of naturalization by judicial proceedings, but merely that she is of the race of persons who may be naturalized. (Kelly v.
Owen [Dist. Col. 1868] 7 Wall 496, 5F, 11, 12; ex parte Tryason [D. C. Wash. 1914] 215 F. 449, 27 Op. Atty. Gen. 507).
(Op. No. 168, s. 1940 of Justice Sec. Jose Abad Santos.)
In a previous opinion rendered for your Office, I stated that the clause "who might herself be lawfully naturalized", should
be construed as not requiring the woman to have the qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in cases of
naturalization by judicial proceedings, but merely that she is of the race of persons who may be naturalized. (Op. No. 79, s.
1940)
Inasmuch as the race qualification has been removed by the Revised Naturalization Law, it results that any woman who
married a citizen of the Philippines prior to or after June 17, 1939, and the marriage not having been dissolved, and on the
assumption that she possesses none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473,
follows the citizenship of her husband. (Op. No. 176, s. 1940 of Justice Sec. Jose Abad Santos.)
From the foregoing narration of facts, it would seem that the only material point of inquiry is as to the citizenship of Arce
Machura. If he shall be found to be a citizen of the Philippines, his wife, Mrs. Lily James Machura, shall likewise be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to the provision of Section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 473, which reads in
part as follows:

Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
The phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized", as contained in the above provision, means that the woman who
is married to a Filipino citizen must not belong to any of the disqualified classes enumerated in Section 4 of the
Naturalization Law (Ops., Sec. of Jus., No. 28, s. 1950; No. 43, s. 1948, No. 95, s. 1941; Nos. 79 and 168, s. 1940). Under
the facts stated in the within papers, Mrs. Machura does not appear to be among the disqualified classes mentioned in the
law.
It having been shown that Arce Machura or Arsenio Guevara was born as an illegitimate of a Filipino mother, he should
be considered as a citizen of the Philippines in consonance with the well-settled rule that an illegitimate child follows the
citizenship of his only legally recognized parent, the mother (Op., Sec. of Jus., Nos. 58, 98 & 281, s. 1948; No. 96, s.
1949). Her husband being a Filipino, Mrs. Machura must necessarily be deemed as a citizen of the Philippines by
marriage (Sec. 15, Com. Act No. 473.) (Op. No. 52, s. 1950 of Justice Sec. Ricardo Nepomuceno.)
The logic and authority of these opinions, compelling as they are, must have so appealed to this Court that five days later,
on May 22, 1957, in Ricardo Cua v. The Board of Commissioners, 101 Phil. 521, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, reiterated the
same ruling on the basis of the following facts:
Tjioe Wu Suan, an Indonesian, arrived in Manila on November 1, 1952, but it turned out that her passport was forged. On
December 10, 1953, a warrant was issued for her arrest for purpose of deportation. Later, on December 20, 1953, she
married Ricardo Cua, a Filipino, and because of said marriage, the Board of Special Inquiry considered her a Filipina.
Upon a review of the case, however, the Board of Immigration Commissioners insisted on continuing with the deportation
proceedings and so, the husband filed prohibition and mandamus proceedings. The lower court denied the petition.
Although this Court affirmed said decision, it held, on the other hand, that:
Granting the validity of marriage, this Court has ruled in the recent case of Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, supra, p. 459, that the
bare fact of a valid marriage to a citizen does not suffice to confer his citizenship upon the wife. Section 15 of the
Naturalization Law requires that the alien woman who marries a Filipino must show, in addition, that she "might herself
be lawfully naturalized" as a Filipino citizen. As construed in the decision cited, this last condition requires proof that the
woman who married a Filipino is herself not disqualified under section 4 of the Naturalization Law.
No such evidence appearing on record, the claim of assumption of Filipino citizenship by Tjioe Wu Suan, upon her
marriage to petitioner, is untenable. The lower court, therefore, committed no error in refusing to interfere with the
deportation proceedings, where she can anyway establish the requisites indispensable for her acquisition of Filipino
citizenship, as well as the alleged validity of her Indonesian passport. (Ricardo Cua v. The Board of Immigration
Commissioners, G. R. No. L-9997, May 22, 1957, 101 Phil. 521, 523.) [Emphasis supplied] .
For emphasis, it is reiterated that in the above two cases, this Court expressly gave the parties concerned opportunity to
prove the fact that they were not suffering from any of the disqualifications of the law without the need of undergoing any
judicial naturalization proceeding. It may be stated, therefore, that according to the above decisions, the law in this
country, on the matter of the effect of marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino is that she thereby becomes a Filipina, if it
can be proven that at the time of such marriage, she does not possess any of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4
of the Naturalization Law, without the need of submitting to any naturalization proceedings under said law.
It is to be admitted that both of the above decisions made no reference to qualifications, that is, as to whether or not they
need also to be proved, but, in any event, it is a fact that the Secretary of Justice understood them to mean that such
qualifications need not be possessed nor proven. Then Secretary of Justice Jesus Barrera, who later became a
distinguished member of this Court, 6 so ruled in opinions rendered by him subsequent to Ly Giok Ha, the most illustrative
of which held: .

At the outset it is important to note that an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen needs only to show that she "might
herself be lawfully naturalized" in order to acquire Philippine citizenship. Compliance with other conditions of the statute,
such as those relating to the qualifications of an applicant for naturalization through judicial proceedings, is not necessary.
(See: Leonard v. Grant, 5 Fed. 11; 27 Ops. Atty. Gen [U.S.] 507; Ops. Sec. of Justice, No. 776, s. 1940, and No. 111, s.
1953.
This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al. v. Galang et al., G.R. No. L-10760, promulgated May 17, 1957,
where the Supreme Court, construing the abovequoted section of the Naturalization Law, held that "marriage to a male
Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife," unless she "herself may be lawfully naturalized," and
that "this limitation of Section 15 excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being
naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under Section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473." In other words,
disqualification for any of the causes enumerated in Section 4 of the Act is the decisive factor that defeats the right of the
foreign wife of a Philippine citizen to acquire Philippine citizenship.
xxx xxx xxx
Does petitioner, Lim King Bian, belong to any of these groups The Commissioner of Immigration does not say so but
merely predicates his negative action on the ground that a warrant of deportation for "overstaying" is pending against the
petitioner.
We do not believe the position is well taken. Since the grounds for disqualification for naturalization are expressly
enumerated in the law, a warrant of deportation not based on a finding of unfitness to become naturalized for any of those
specified causes may not be invoked to negate acquisition of Philippine citizenship by a foreign wife of a Philippine
citizen under Section 15 of the Naturalization Law. (Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius) (Op. No. 12, s. 1958 of Justice
Undersec. Jesus G. Barrera.)
Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine
citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for
the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that she is married to a Filipino citizen
and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to section 4 of Commonwealth Act No.
473, as amended. Upon the filing of said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the
petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the
cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen (please see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau of Immigration
conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or denying the petition. (Op. No. 38, s.
19058 of Justice Sec. Jesus G. Barrera.)
This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al., v. Galang et al. (G.R. No. L-10760, promulgated May 17, 1957),
where the Supreme Court, construing the above-quoted section in the Revised Naturalization Law, held that "marriage to a
male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife, unless she herself may be lawfully naturalized," and
that "this limitation of Section 15 excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being
naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under Section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473." In other words,
disqualification for any of the causes enumerated in section 4 of the Act is the decisive factor that defeats the right of an
alien woman married to a Filipino citizen to acquire Philippine citizenship. (Op. 57, s. 1958 of Justice Sec. Jesus G.
Barrera.)
The contention is untenable. The doctrine enunciated in the Ly Giok Ha case is not a new one. In that case, the Supreme
Court held that under paragraph I of Section 15 Of Commonwealth Act No. 473, 'marriage to a male Filipino does not vest
Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife unless she "herself may be lawfully naturalized"', and, quoting several earlier
opinions of the Secretary of Justice, namely: No. 52, s. 1950; No. 168, s. 1940; No. 95, s. 1941; No. 63, s. 1948; No. 28. s.
1950, "this limitation of section 15 excludes from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being

naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473." (Op. 134, s. 1962 of
Justice Undersec. Magno S. Gatmaitan.)
It was not until more than two years later that, in one respect, the above construction of the law was importantly modified
by this Court in Lee Suan Ay, supra, in which the facts were as follows:
Upon expiration of the appellant Lee Suan Ay's authorized period of temporary stay in the Philippines (25 March 1955),
on 26 March 1955 the Commissioner of Immigration asked the bondsman to present her to the Bureau of Immigration
within 24 hours from receipt of notice, otherwise the bond will be confiscated(Annex 1). For failure of the bondsman to
comply with the foregoing order, on 1 April 1955. the Commissioner of Immigration ordered the cash bond confiscated
(Annex E). Therefore, there was an order issued by the Commissioner of Immigration confiscating or forfeiting the cash
bond. Unlike in forfeiture of bail bonds in criminal proceedings, where the Court must enter an order forfeiting the bail
bond and the bondsman must be given an opportunity to present his principal or give a satisfactory reason for his inability
to do so, before final judgment may be entered against the bondsman,(section 15, Rule 110; U.S. v. Bonoan, 22 Phil. 1.) in
forfeiture of bonds posted for the temporary stay of an alien in the Philippines, no court proceeding is necessary. Once a
breach of the terms and conditions of the undertaking in the bond is committed, the Commissioner of Immigration may,
under the terms and conditions thereof, declare it forfeited in favor of the Government. (In the meanwhile, on April 1,
1955, Lee Suan Ay and Alberto Tan, a Filipino, were joined in marriage by the Justice of the Peace of Las Pias, Rizal.)
Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla speaking for a unanimous court which included Justices Concepcion and Reyes who had
penned Ly Giok Ha, and Ricardo Cua, ruled thus:
The fact that Lee Suan Ay (a Chinese) was married to a Filipino citizen does not relieve the bondsman from his liability
on the bond. The marriage took place on 1 April 1955, and the violation of the terms and conditions of the undertaking in
the bond failure to depart from the Philippines upon expiration of her authorized period of temporary stay in the
Philippines (25 March 1955) and failure to report to the Commissioner of Immigration within 24 hours from receipt of
notice were committed before the marriage. Moreover, the marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not
automatically confer Philippine citizenship upon the latter. She must possess the qualifications required by law to become
a Filipino citizen by naturalization.* There is no showing that the appellant Lee Suan Ay possesses all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications provided for by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization.
Pertinently to be noted at once in this ruling, which, to be sure, is the one relied upon in the appealed decision now before
Us, is the fact that the footnote of the statement therein that the alien wife "must possess the qualifications required by law
to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization" makes reference to Section 15, Commonwealth Act 473 and precisely, also
to Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, supra. As will be recalled, on the other hand, in the opinions of the Secretary of Justice
explicitly adopted by the Court in Ly Giok Ha, among them, Opinion No. 176, Series of 1940, above-quoted, it was
clearly held that "(I)n a previous opinion rendered for your Office, I stated that the clause "who might herself be lawfully
naturalized", should be construed as not requiring the woman to have the qualifications of residence, good character, etc.,
as in cases of naturalization by judicial proceedingsbut merely that she is of the race by persons who may be naturalized.
(Op. No. 79, s. 1940)
Since Justice Padilla gave no reason at all for the obviously significant modification of the construction of the law, it
could be said that there was need for clarification of the seemingly new posture of the Court. The occasion for such
clarification should have been in Kua Suy, etc., et al. vs. The Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-13790, October
31, 1963, penned by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who had rendered the opinion in Ricardo Cua,supra, which followed that in
Ly Giok Ha, supra, but apparently seeing no immediate relevancy in the case on hand then of the particular point in issue
now, since it was not squarely raised therein similarly as in Lee Suan Ay, hence, anything said on the said matter would at
best be no more than obiter dictum, Justice Reyes limited himself to holding that "Under Section 15 of the Naturalization
Act, the wife is deemed a citizen of the Philippines only if she "might herself be lawfully naturalized," so that the fact of
marriage to a citizen, by itself alone, does not suffice to confer citizenship, as this Court has previously ruled in Ly Giok
Ha v. Galang, 54 O.G. 356, and in Cua v. Board of Immigration Commissioners, 53 O.G. 8567; and there is here no

evidence of record as to the qualifications or absence of disqualifications of appellee Kua Suy", without explaining the
apparent departure already pointed out from Ly Giok Ha and Ricardo Cua. Even Justice Makalintal, who wrote a separate
concurring and dissenting opinion merely lumped together Ly Giok Ha, Ricardo Cua and Lee Suan Ay and opined that
both qualifications and non-disqualifications have to be shown without elucidating on what seemed to be departure from
the said first two decisions.
It was only on November 30, 1963 that to Mr. Justice Roberto Regala fell the task of rationalizing the Court's position.
In Lo San Tuang v. Galang, G.R. No. L-18775, November 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 638, the facts were simply these: Lo San
Tuang, a Chinese woman, arrived in the Philippines on July 1, 1960 as a temporary visitor with authority to stay up to
June 30, 1961. She married a Filipino on January 7, 1961, almost six months before the expiry date of her permit, and
when she was requested to leave after her authority to stay had expired, she refused to do so, claiming she had become a
Filipina by marriage, and to bolster her position, she submitted an affidavit stating explicitly that she does not possess any
of the disqualifications enumerated in the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473. When the case reached the court,
the trial judge held for the government that in addition to not having any of the disqualifications referred to, there was
need that Lo San Tuang should have also possessed all the qualifications of residence, moral character, knowledge of a
native principal dialect, etc., provided by the law. Recognizing that the issue squarely to be passed upon was whether or
not the possession of all the qualifications were indeed needed to be shown apart from non-disqualification, Justice Regala
held affirmatively for the Court, reasoning out thus: .
It is to be noted that the petitioner has anchored her claim for citizenship on the basis of the decision laid down in the case
of Leonard v. Grant, 5 Swy. 603, 5 F 11, where the Circuit Court of Oregon held that it was only necessary that the
woman "should be a person of the class or race permitted to be naturalized by existing laws, and that in respect of the
qualifications arising out of her conduct or opinions, being the wife of a citizen, she is to be regarded as qualified for
citizenship, and therefore considered a citizen." (In explanation of its conclusion, the Court said: "If, whenever during the
life of the woman or afterwards, the question of her citizenship arises in a legal proceeding, the party asserting her
citizenship by reason of her marriage with a citizen must not only prove such marriage, but also that the woman then
possessed all the further qualifications necessary to her becoming naturalized under existing laws, the statute will be
practically nugatory, if not a delusion and a share. The proof of the facts may have existed at the time of the marriage, but
years after, when a controversy arises upon the subject, it may be lost or difficult to find.")
In other words, all that she was required to prove was that she was a free white woman or a woman of African descent or
nativity, in order to be deemed an American citizen, because, with respect to the rest of the qualifications on residence,
moral character, etc., she was presumed to be qualified.
Like the law in the United States, our former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927, as amended by Act No. 3448) specified
the classes of persons who alone might become citizens of the Philippines, even as it provided who were disqualified.
Thus, the pertinent provisions of that law provided:
Section 1. Who may become Philippine citizens Philippine citizenship may be acquired by (a) natives of the Philippines
who are not citizens thereof under the Jones Law; (b) natives of the Insular possessions of the United States; (c) citizens of
the United States, or foreigners who under the laws of the United States may become citizens of said country if residing
therein.
Section 2. Who are disqualified. The following cannot be naturalized as Philippine citizens: (a) Persons opposed to
organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all
organized government; (b) persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or
assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas; (c) polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; (d)
persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; (e) persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable
contagious diseases; (f) citizens or subjects of nations with whom the United States and the Philippines are at war, during
the period of such war.

Section 3. Qualifications. The persons comprised in subsection (a) of section one of this Act, in order to be able to
acquire Philippine citizenship, must be not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of their petition.
The persons comprised in subsections (b) and (c) of said section one shall, in addition to being not less than twenty-one
years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition, have all and each of the following qualifications:
First. Residence in the Philippine Islands for a continuous period of not less than five years, except as provided in the next
following section;
Second. To have conducted themselves in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of their residence
in the Philippine Islands, in their relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in which they
are living;
Third. To hold in the Philippine Islands real estate worth not less than one thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or have
some known trade or profession; and
Fourth. To speak and write English, Spanish, or some native tongue.
In case the petitioner is a foreign subject, he shall, besides, declare in writing and under oath his intention of renouncing
absolutely and perpetually all faith and allegiance to the foreign authority, state or sovereignty of which he was a native,
citizen or subject.
Applying the interpretation given by Leonard v. Grant supra, to our law as it then stood, alien women married to citizens
of the Philippines must, in order to be deemed citizens of the Philippines, be either (1) natives of the Philippines who were
not citizens thereof under the Jones Law, or (2) natives of other Insular possessions of the United States, or (3) citizens of
the United States or foreigners who under the laws of the United States might become citizens of that country if residing
therein. With respect to the qualifications set forth in Section 3 of the former law, they were deemed to have the same for
all intents and purposes.
But, with the approval of the Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No. 473) on June 17, 1939, Congress has
since discarded class or racial consideration from the qualifications of applicants for naturalization (according to its
proponent, the purpose in eliminating this consideration was, first, to remove the features of the existing naturalization act
which discriminated in favor of the Caucasians and against Asiatics who are our neighbors, and are related to us by racial
affinity and, second, to foster amity with all nations [Sinco, Phil. Political Law 502 11 ed.]), even as it retained in
Section 15 the phrase in question. The result is that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" must be
understood in the context in which it is now found, in a setting so different from that in which it was found by the Court
in Leonard v. Grant.
The only logical deduction from the elimination of class or racial consideration is that, as the Solicitor General points out,
the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" must now be understood as referring to those who under Section 2
of the law are qualified to become citizens of the Philippines.
There is simply no support for the view that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" must now be
understood as requiring merely that the alien woman must not belong to the class of disqualified persons under Section 4
of the Revised Naturalization Law. Such a proposition misreads the ruling laid down in Leonard v. Grant. A person who is
not disqualified is not necessarily qualified to become a citizen of the Philippines, because the law treats "qualifications"
and "disqualifications" in separate sections. And then it must not be lost sight of that even under the interpretation given to
the former law, it was to be understood that the alien woman was not disqualified under Section 2 of that law. Leonard v.
Grant did not rule that it was enough if the alien woman does not belong to the class of disqualified persons in order that
she may be deemed to follow the citizenship of her husband: What that case held was that the phrase "who might herself
be lawfully naturalized, merely means that she belongs to the class or race of persons qualified to become citizens by
naturalization the assumption being always that she is not otherwise disqualified.

We therefore hold that under the first paragraph of Section 15 of the Naturalization Law, an alien woman, who is married
to a citizen of the Philippines, acquires the citizenship of her husband only if she has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided by law. Since there is no proof in this case that petitioner has all the qualifications and is not in
any way disqualified, her marriage to a Filipino citizen does not automatically make her a Filipino citizen. Her affidavit to
the effect that she is not in any way disqualified to become a citizen of this country was correctly disregarded by the trial
court, the same being self-serving.
Naturally, almost a month later in Sun Peck Yong v. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-20784, December 27,
1963, 9 SCRA 875, wherein the Secretary of Foreign Affairs reversed a previous resolution of the preceding
administration to allow Sun Peck Yong and her minor son to await the taking of the oath of Filipino citizenship of her
husband two years after the decision granting him nationalization and required her to leave and this order was contested in
court, Justice Barrera held:
In the case of Lo San Tuang v. Commissioner of Immigration (G.R. No. L-18775, promulgated November 30, 1963; Kua
Suy vs. Commissioner of Immigration, L-13790, promulgated October 31, 1963), we held that the fact that the husband
became a naturalized citizen does not automatically make the wife a citizen of the Philippines. It must also be shown that
she herself possesses all the qualifications, and none of the disqualifications, to become a citizen. In this case, there is no
allegation, much less showing, that petitioner-wife is qualified to become a Filipino citizen herself. Furthermore, the fact
that a decision was favorably made on the naturalization petition of her husband is no assurance that he (the husband)
would become a citizen, as to make a basis for the extension of her temporary stay.
On the same day, in Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21136, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 876, Justice Barrera reiterated
the same ruling and citing particularly Lo San Tuang and Kua Suy, held that the marriage of Tong Siok Sy to a Filipino on
November 12, 1960 at Taichung, Taiwan and her taking oath of Filipino citizenship before the Philippine Vice-Consul at
Taipeh, Taiwan on January 6, 1961 did not make her a Filipino citizen, since she came here only in 1961 and obviously,
she had not had the necessary ten-year residence in the Philippines required by the law.
Such then was the status of the jurisprudential law on the matter under discussion when Justice Makalintal sought a
reexamination thereof in Choy King Tee v. Galang, G.R. No. L-18351, March 26, 1965, 13 SCRA 402. Choy King Tee's
husband was granted Philippine citizenship on January 13, 1959 and took the oath on January 31 of the same year. Choy
King Tee first came to the Philippines in 1955 and kept commuting between Manila and Hongkong since then, her last
visa before the case being due to expire on February 14, 1961. On January 27, 1961, her husband asked the Commissioner
of Immigration to cancel her alien certificate of registration, as well as their child's, for the reason that they were Filipinos,
and when the request was denied as to the wife, a mandamus was sought, which the trial court granted. Discussing anew
the issue of the need for qualifications, Justice Makalintal not only reiterated the arguments of Justice Regala in Lo San
Tuang but added further that the ruling is believed to be in line with the national policy of selective admission to
Philippine citizenship. 7
No wonder, upon this authority, in Austria v. Conchu, G.R. No. L-20716, June 22, 1965, 14 SCRA 336, Justice J.P.
Bengzon readily reversed the decision of the lower court granting the writs of mandamus and prohibition against the
Commissioner of Immigration, considering that Austria's wife, while admitting she did not possess all the qualifications
for naturalization, had submitted only an affidavit that she had none of the disqualifications therefor. So also did Justice
Dizon similarly hold eight days later in Brito v. Commissioner, G.R. No. L-16829, June 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 539.
Then came the second Ly Giok Ha case 8 wherein Justice J. B. L. Reyes took occasion to expand on the reasoning of Choy
King Tee by illustrating with examples "the danger of relying exclusively on the absence of disqualifications, without
taking into account the other affirmative requirements of the law." 9
Lastly, in Go Im Ty v. Republic, G.R. No. L-17919, decided on July 30, 1966, 10 Justice Zaldivar held for the Court that an
alien woman who is widowed during the dependency of the naturalization proceedings of her husband, in order that she
may be allowed to take the oath as Filipino, must, aside from proving compliance with the requirements of Republic Act

530, show that she possesses all the qualifications and does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under the
Naturalization Law, citing in the process the decision to such effect discussed above, 11 even as he impliedly reversed pro
tanto the ruling in Tan Lin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-13786, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 383.
Accordingly, in Burca, Justice Sanchez premised his opinion on the assumption that the point now under discussion is
settled law.
In the case now at bar, the Court is again called upon to rule on the same issue. Under Section 15 of the Naturalization
Law, Commonwealth Act 473, providing that:
SEC. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. Any woman, who is now or may hereafter be married to a
citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall be considered citizens
thereof.
A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the naturalization of the parent, shall
automatically become a Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born child, who is not in the Philippines at the time the parent is
naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless he begins to reside permanently in the
Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.
A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall be considered a Philippine citizen unless
within one year after reaching the age of majority he fails to register himself as a Philippine citizen at the American
Consulate of the country where he resides, and to take the necessary oath of allegiance.
is it necessary, in order that an alien woman who marries a Filipino or who is married to a man who subsequently
becomes a Filipino, may become a Filipino citizen herself, that, aside from not suffering from any of the disqualifications
enumerated in the law, she must also possess all the qualifications required by said law? if nothing but the unbroken line
from Lee Suan Ay to Go Im Ty, as recounted above, were to be considered, it is obvious that an affirmative answer to the
question would be inevitable, specially, if it is noted that the present case was actually submitted for decision on January
21, 1964 yet, shortly after Lo San Tuang, Tong Siok Sy and Sun Peck Yong, all supra, and even before Choy King
Tee, supra, were decided. There are other circumstances, however, which make it desirable, if not necessary, that the
Court take up the matter anew. There has been a substantial change in the membership of the Court since Go Im Ty, and
of those who were in the Court already when Burca was decided, two members, Justice Makalintal and Castro concurred
only in the result, precisely, according to them, because (they wanted to leave the point now under discussion open in so
far as they are concerned. 12 Truth to tell, the views and arguments discussed at length with copious relevant authorities, in
the motion for reconsideration as well as in the memorandum of the amici curae 13 in the Burca case cannot just be taken
lightly and summarily ignored, since they project in the most forceful manner, not only the legal and logical angles of the
issue, but also the imperative practical aspects thereof in the light of the actual situation of the thousands of alien wives of
Filipinos who have so long, even decades, considered themselves as Filipinas and have always lived and acted as such,
officially or otherwise, relying on the long standing continuous recognition of their status as such by the administrative
authorities in charge of the matter, as well as by the courts. Under these circumstances, and if only to afford the Court an
opportunity to consider the views of the five justices who took no part in Go Im Ty (including the writer of this opinion),
the Court decided to further reexamine the matter. After all, the ruling first laid in Lee Suan Ay, and later in Lo San Tuang,
Choy King Tee stand the second (1966) Ly Giok Ha, did not categorically repudiate the opinions of the Secretary of
Justice relied upon by the first (1959) Ly Giok Ha. Besides, some points brought to light during the deliberations in this
case would seem to indicate that the premises of the later cases can still bear further consideration.
Whether We like it or not, it is undeniably factual that the legal provision We are construing, Section 15, aforequoted, of
the Naturalization Law has been taken directly, copied and adopted from its American counterpart. To be more accurate,
said provision is nothing less than a reenactment of the American provision. A brief review of its history proves this
beyond per adventure of doubt.

The first Naturalization Law of the Philippines approved by the Philippine Legislature under American sovereignty was
that of March 26, 1920, Act No. 2927. Before then, as a consequence of the Treaty of Paris, our citizenship laws were
found only in the Organic Laws, the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Act of the United States Congress of March 23, 1912 and
later the Jones Law of 1916. In fact, Act No. 2927 was enacted pursuant to express authority granted by the Jones Law.
For obvious reasons, the Philippines gained autonomy on the subjects of citizenship and immigration only after the
effectivity of the Philippine Independence Act. This made it practically impossible for our laws on said subject to have
any perspective or orientation of our own; everything was American.
The Philippine Bill of 1902 provided pertinently: .
SECTION 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside herein who were Spanish subjects on the
eleventh day of April, eighteen-hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection
of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance
with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight.
This Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 was amended by Act of Congress of March 23, 1912, by adding a provision
as follows:
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of
other insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would
become citizens of the United States, under the laws of the United States, if residing therein.
The Jones Law reenacted these provisions substantially: .
SECTION 2. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April,
eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be
deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to
the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed
at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such others as have since become citizens of some
other country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for
the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing
provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine
Islands who are citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States if residing therein.
For aught that appears, there was nothing in any of the said organic laws regarding the effect of marriage to a Filipino
upon the nationality of an alien woman, albeit under the Spanish Civil Code provisions on citizenship, Articles 17 to 27,
which were, however, abrogated upon the change of sovereignty, it was unquestionable that the citizenship of the wife
always followed that of the husband. Not even Act 2927 contained any provision regarding the effect of naturalization of
an alien, upon the citizenship of his alien wife, nor of the marriage of such alien woman with a native born Filipino or one
who had become a Filipino before the marriage, although Section 13 thereof provided thus: .
SEC. 13. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have died. In case a petitioner should die before the final
decision has been rendered, his widow and minor children may continue the proceedings. The decision rendered in the
case shall, so far as the widow and minor children are concerned, produce the same legal effect as if it had been rendered
during the life of the petitioner.
It was not until November 30, 1928, upon the approval of Act 3448, amending Act 2977, that the following provisions
were added to the above Section 13:

SECTION 1. The following new sections are hereby inserted between sections thirteen and fourteen of Act Numbered
Twenty-nine hundred and Twenty-seven:
SEC. 13(a). Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippine Islands and who might
herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippine Islands.
SEC. 13(b). Children of persons who have been duly naturalized under this law, being under the age of twenty-one years
at the time of the naturalization of their parents, shall, if dwelling in the Philippine Islands, be considered citizens thereof.
SEC. 13(c). Children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippine Islands after the
naturalization of their parents shall be considered citizens thereof.
When Commonwealth Act 473, the current naturalization law, was enacted on June 17, 1939, the above Section 13
became its Section 15 which has already been quoted earlier in this decision. As can be seen, Section 13 (a) abovequoted
was re-enacted practically word for word in the first paragraph of this Section 15 except for the change of Philippine
Islands to Philippines. And it could not have been on any other basis than this legislative history of our naturalization law
that each and everyone of the decisions of this Court from the first Ly Giok Ha to Go Im Ty, discussed above, were
rendered.
As stated earlier, in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in the first Ly Giok Ha, it was quite clear that for an alien
woman who marries a Filipino to become herself a Filipino citizen, there is no need for any naturalization proceeding
because she becomes a Filipina ipso facto from the time of such marriage, provided she does not suffer any of the
disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473, with no mention being made of whether or not the
qualifications enumerated in Section 2 thereof need be shown. It was only in Lee Suan Ay in 1959 that the possession of
qualifications were specifically required, but it was not until 1963, in Lo San Tuang, that Justice Regala reasoned out why
the possession of the qualifications provided by the law should also be shown to be possessed by the alien wife of a
Filipino, for her to become a Filipina by marriage.
As may be recalled, the basic argument advanced by Justice Regala was briefly as follows: That "like the law in the
United States, our Naturalization Law specified the classes of persons who alone might become citizens, even as it
provided who were disqualified," and inasmuch as Commonwealth Act 473, our Naturalization Law since 1939 did not
reenact the section providing who might become citizens, allegedly in order to remove racial discrimination in favor of
Caucasians and against Asiatics, "the only logical deduction ... is that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully
naturalized" must now be understood as referring to those who under Section 2 of the law are qualified to become citizens
of the Philippines" and "there is simply no support for the view that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully
naturalized" must now be understood as requiring merely that the alien woman must not belong to the class of disqualified
persons under Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law." 14
A similar line of reasoning was followed in Choy King Tee, which for ready reference may be qouted:
The question has been settled by the uniform ruling of this Court in a number of cases. The alien wife of a Filipino citizen
must first prove that she has all the qualifications required by Section 2 and none of the disqualifications enumerated in
Section 4 of the Naturalization Law before she may be deemed a Philippine citizen (Lao Chay v. Galang, L-190977, Oct.
30, 1964, citing Lo San Tuang v. Galang, L-18775, Nov. 30, 1963; Sun Peck Yong v. Commissioner of Immigration, L20784, December 27, 1963; Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, L-21136, December 27, 1963). The writer of this opinion has
submitted the question anew to the court for a possible reexamination of the said ruling in the light of the interpretation of
a similar law in the United States after which Section 15 of our Naturalization Law was patterned. That law was section 2
of the Act of February 10, 1855 (Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the U.S.). The local law, Act No. 3448, was
passed on November 30, 1928 as an amendment to the former Philippine Naturalization Law, Act No. 2927, which was
approved on March 26, 1920. Under this Naturalization Law, acquisition of Philippine citizenship was limited to three
classes of persons, (a) Natives of the Philippines who were not citizens thereof; (b) natives of the other insular possessions
of the United States; and (c) citizens of the United States, or foreigners who, under the laws of the United States, may

become citizens of the latter country if residing therein. The reference in subdivision (c) to foreigners who may become
American Citizens is restrictive in character, for only persons of certain specified races were qualified thereunder. In other
words, in so far as racial restrictions were concerned there was at the time a similarity between the naturalization laws of
the two countries and hence there was reason to accord here persuasive force to the interpretation given in the United
States to the statutory provision concerning the citizenship of alien women marrying American citizens.
This Court, however, believes that such reason has ceased to exist since the enactment of the Revised Naturalization Law,
(Commonwealth Act No. 473) on June 17, 1939. The racial restrictions have been eliminated in this Act, but the provision
found in Act No. 3448 has been maintained. It is logical to presume that when Congress chose to retain the said provision
that to be deemed a Philippine citizen upon marriage the alien wife must be one "who might herself be lawfully
naturalized," the reference is no longer to the class or race to which the woman belongs, for class or race has become
immaterial, but to the qualifications and disqualifications for naturalization as enumerated in Sections 2 and 4 of the
statute. Otherwise the requirement that the woman "might herself be lawfully naturalized" would be meaningless
surplusage, contrary to settled norms of statutory construction.
The rule laid down by this Court in this and in other cases heretofore decided is believed to be in line with the national
policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship, which after all is a privilege granted only to those who are found
worthy thereof, and not indiscriminately to anybody at all on the basis alone of marriage to a man who is a citizen of the
Philippines, irrespective of moral character, ideological beliefs, and identification with Filipino ideals, customs and
traditions.
Appellee here having failed to prove that she has all the qualifications for naturalization, even, indeed, that she has none
of the disqualifications, she is not entitled to recognition as a Philippine citizen.
In the second Ly Giok Ha, the Court further fortified the arguments in favor of the same conclusion thus:
On cross-examination, she (Ly Giok Ha) failed to establish that: (1) she has been residing in the Philippines for a
continuous period of at least (10) years (p. 27, t.s.n., id.); (2) she has a lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation (p.
13, t.s.n., id.); and (3) she can speak and write English, or any of the principal Philippine languages (pp. 12, 13, t.s.n., id.).
While the appellant Immigration Commissioner contends that the words emphasized indicate that the present
Naturalization Law requires that an alien woman who marries a Filipino husband must possess the qualifications
prescribed by section 2 in addition to not being disqualified under any of the eight ("a" to "h") subheadings of section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, in order to claim our citizenship by marriage, both the appellee and the court below (in its
second decision) sustain the view that all that the law demands is that the woman be not disqualified under section 4.
At the time the present case was remanded to the court of origin (1960) the question at issue could be regarded as not
conclusively settled, there being only the concise pronouncement in Lee Suan Ay, et al. v. Galang, G. R. No. L-11855,
Dec. 23, 1959, to the effect that:
The marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer Philippine citizenship upon the latter. She
must possess the qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization.
Since that time, however, a long line of decisions of this Court has firmly established the rule that the requirement of
section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 (the Naturalization Act), that an alien woman married to a citizen should be one
who "might herself be lawfully naturalized," means not only woman free from the disqualifications enumerated in section
4 of the Act but also one who possesses the qualifications prescribed by section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473 (San Tuan v.
Galang, L-18775, Nov. 30, 1963; Sun Peck Yong v. Com. of Immigration, L-20784, Dee. 27, 1963; Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo,
L-21136, Dec. 27, 1963; Austria v. Conchu, L-20716, June 22, 1965; Choy King Tee v. Galang, L-18351, March 26, 1965;
Brito v. Com. of Immigration, L-16829, June 30, 1965).

Reflection will reveal why this must be so. The qualifications prescribed under section 2 of the Naturalization Act, and the
disqualifications enumerated in its section 4 are not mutually exclusive; and if all that were to be required is that the wife
of a Filipino be not disqualified under section 4, the result might well be that citizenship would be conferred upon persons
in violation of the policy of the statute. For example, section 4 disqualifies only
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; and
(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude,
so that a blackmailer, or a maintainer of gambling or bawdy houses, not previously convicted by a competent court would
not be thereby disqualified; still, it is certain that the law did not intend such person to be admitted as a citizen in view of
the requirement of section 2 that an applicant for citizenship "must be of good moral character."
Similarly, the citizen's wife might be a convinced believer in racial supremacy, in government by certain selected classes,
in the right to vote exclusively by certain "herrenvolk", and thus disbelieve in the principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution; yet she would not be disqualified under section 4, as long as she is not "opposed to organized government,"
nor affiliated to groups "upholding or teaching doctrines opposing all organized governments", nor "defending or teaching
the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success or predominance of their ideas." Et
sic de caeteris.
The foregoing instances should suffice to illustrate the danger of relying exclusively on the absence of disqualifications,
without taking into account the other affirmative requirements of the law, which, in the case at bar, the appellee Ly Giok
Ha admittedly does not possess.
As to the argument that the phrase "might herself be lawfully naturalized" was derived from the U.S. Revised Statutes
(section 1994) and should be given the same territorial and racial significance given to it by American courts, this Court
has rejected the same in Lon San Tuang v. Galang, L-18775, November 30, 1963; and in Choy King Tee v. Galang, L18351, March 26, 1965.
It is difficult to minimize the persuasive force of the foregoing rationalizations, but a closer study thereof cannot bat
reveal certain relevant considerations which adversely affect the premises on which they are predicated, thus rendering the
conclusions arrived thereby not entirely unassailable.
1. The main proposition, for instance, that in eliminating Section 1 of Act 2927 providing who are eligible for Philippine
citizenship, the purpose of Commonwealth Act 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, was to remove the racial
requirements for naturalization, thereby opening the door of Filipino nationality to Asiatics instead of allowing the
admission thereto of Caucasians only, suffers from lack of exact accuracy. It is important to note, to start with, that
Commonwealth Act 473 did away with the whole Section 1 of Act 2927 which reads, thus:
SECTION 1. Who may become Philippine citizens. Philippine citizenship may be acquired by: (a) natives of the
Philippines who are not citizens thereof under the Jones Law; (b) natives of the other Insular possessions of the United
States; (c) citizens of the United States, or foreigners who under the laws of the United States may become citizens of said
country if residing therein.
and not only subdivision (c) thereof. Nowhere in this whole provision was there any mention of race or color of the
persons who were then eligible for Philippine citizenship. What is more evident from said provision is that it reflected the
inevitable subordination of our legislation during the pre-Commonwealth American regime to the understandable stations
flowing from our staffs as a territory of the United States by virtue of the Treaty of Paris. In fact, Section 1 of Act 2927
was precisely approved pursuant to express authority without which it could not have been done, granted by an
amendment to Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 introduced by the Act of the United States Congress of March 23,
1912 and which was reenacted as part of the Jones Law of 1916, the pertinent provisions of which have already been
footed earlier. In truth, therefore, it was because of the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth and in the exercise

of our legislative autonomy on citizenship matters under the Philippine Independence Act that Section 1 of Act 2927 was
eliminated, 15 and not purposely to eliminate any racial discrimination contained in our Naturalization Law. The
Philippine Legislature naturally wished to free our Naturalization Law from the impositions of American legislation. In
other words, the fact that such discrimination was removed was one of the effects rather than the intended purpose of the
amendment.
2. Again, the statement in Choy King Tee to the effect that "the reference in subdivision (c) (of Section 1 of Act 2927) to
foreigners who may become American citizens is restrictive in character, for only persons of certain specified races were
qualified thereunder" fails to consider the exact import of the said subdivision. Explicitly, the thrust of the said
subdivision was to confine the grant under it of Philippine citizenship only to the three classes of persons therein
mentioned, the third of which were citizens of the United States and, corollarily, persons who could be American citizens
under her laws. The words used in the provision do not convey any idea of favoring aliens of any particular race or color
and of excluding others, but more accurately, they refer to all the disqualifications of foreigners for American citizenship
under the laws of the United States. The fact is that even as of 1906, or long before 1920, when our Act 2927 became a
law, the naturalization, laws of the United States already provided for the following disqualifications in the Act of the
Congress of June 29, 1906:
SEC. 7. That no person who disbelieves in or who is opposed to organized government, or who is a member of or
affiliated with any organization entertaining and teaching such disbelief in or opposition to organized government, or who
advocates or teaches the duty, necessity, or propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any officer or officers, either
of specific individuals or of officers generally, of the Government of the United States, or of any other organized
government, because of his or their official character, or who is a polygamist, shall be naturalized or be made a citizen of
the United States.
and all these disqualified persons were, therefore, ineligible for Philippine citizenship under Section 1 of Act 2927 even if
they happened to be Caucasians. More importantly, as a matter of fact, said American law, which was the first "Act to
Establish a Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization and to provide for a Uniform Rule for Naturalization of Aliens
throughout the United States" contained no racial disqualification requirement, except as to Chinese, the Act of May 6,
1882 not being among the expressly repealed by this law, hence it is clear that when Act 2927 was enacted, subdivision (e)
of its Section 1 could not have had any connotation of racial exclusion necessarily, even if it were traced back to its origin
in the Act of the United States Congress of 1912 already mentioned above. 16 Thus, it would seem that the rationalization
in the qouted decisions predicated on the theory that the elimination of Section 1 of Act 2927 by Commonwealth Act 473
was purposely for no other end than the abolition of racial discrimination in our naturalization law has no clear factual
basis. 17
3. In view of these considerations, there appears to be no cogent reason why the construction adopted in the opinions of
the Secretary of Justice referred to in the first Ly Giok Ha decision of the Chief Justice should not prevail. It is beyond
dispute that the first paragraph of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 is a reenactment of Section 13(a) of Act 2927, as
amended by Act 3448, and that the latter is nothing but an exact copy, deliberately made, of Section 1994 of the Raised
Statutes of the United States as it stood before its repeal in 1922. 18 Before such repeal, the phrase "who might herself be
lawfully naturalized" found in said Section 15 had a definite unmistakable construction uniformly foIlowed in all courts of
the United States that had occasion to apply the same and which, therefore, must be considered, as if it were written in the
statute itself. It is almost trite to say that when our legislators enacted said section, they knew of its unvarying construction
in the United States and that, therefore, in adopting verbatim the American statute, they have in effect incorporated into
the provision, as thus enacted, the construction given to it by the American courts as well as the Attorney General of the
United States and all administrative authorities, charged with the implementation of the naturalization and immigration
laws of that country. (Lo Cham v. Ocampo, 77 Phil., 635 [1946]; Laxamana v. Baltazar, 92 Phil., 32 [1952]; Hartley v.
Commissioner, 295 U.S. 216, 79 L. ed. 1399, 55 S Ct. 756 [19353; Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 L ed. 52, 59 S
Ct. 45 [1938]; Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 83 L ed. 536, 59 S Ct. 423 [1939]. [p. 32, Memo
of Amicus Curiae]).

A fairly comprehensive summary of the said construction by the American courts and administrative authorities is
contained in United States of America ex rel. Dora Sejnensky v. Robert E. Tod, Commissioner of Immigration, Appt., 295
Fed. 523, decided November 14, 1922, 26 A. L. R. 1316 as follows:
Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes (Comp. Stat. 3948, 2 Fed. Sta. Anno. 2d ed. p. 117) provides as follows: "Any
woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the United States, and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen."
Section 1944 of the Revised Stat. is said to originate in the Act of Congress of February 10, 1855 (10 Stat. at L. 604, chap.
71), which in its second section provided "that any woman, who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws,
married, or who shall be married to a citizen of the United States, shall be deemed and taken to be a citizen."
And the American Statute of 1855 is substantially a copy of the earlier British Statute 7 & 8 Vict. chap. 66, s 16, 1844,
which provided that "any woman married, or who shall be married, to a natural-born subject or person naturalized, shall
be deemed and taken to be herself naturalized, and have all the rights and privileges of a natural born subject."
The Act of Congress of September 22, 1922 (42 Stat. at L. 1021, chap. 411, Comp. Stat. 4358b, Fed. Stat. Anno. Supp.
1922, p. 255), being "An Act Relative to the Naturalization and Citizenship of Married Women," in 2, provides "that any
woman who marries a citizen of the United States after the passage of this Act, ... shall not become a citizen of the United
States by reason of such marriage ..."
Section 6 of the act also provides "that 1994 of the Revised Statutes ... are repealed."
Section 6 also provides that `such repeal shall not terminate citizenship acquired or retained under either of such
sections, ..." meaning 2 and 6. So that this Act of September 22, 1922, has no application to the facts of the present case,
as the marriage of the relator took place prior to its passage. This case, therefore, depends upon the meaning to be attached
to 1994 of the Revised Statutes.
In 1868 the Supreme Court, in Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 498, 19 L. ed. 283, 284, construed this provision as found in
the Act of 1855 as follows: "The term, "who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws," only limits the
application of the law to free white women. The previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time, only required that the
person applying for its benefits should be "a free white person," and not an alien enemy."
This construction limited the effect of the statute to those aliens who belonged to the class or race which might be lawfully
naturalized, and did not refer to any of the other provisions of the naturalization laws as to residence or moral character, or
to any of the provisions of the immigration laws relating to the exclusion or deportation of aliens.
In 1880, in Leonard v. Grant (C. C.) 5 Fed. 11, District Judge Deady also construed the Act of 1855, declaring that "any
woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the United States, and might herself be lawfully naturalized,
shall be deemed a citizen." He held that "upon the authorities, and the reason, if not the necessity, of the case," the statute
must be construed as in effect declaring that an alien woman, who is of the class or race that may be lawfully naturalized
under the existing laws, and who marries a citizen of the United States, is such a citizen also, and it was not necessary that
it should appear affirmatively that she possessed the other qualifications at the time of her marriage to entitle her to
naturalization.
In 1882, the Act of 1855 came before Mr. Justice Harlan, sitting in the circuit court, in United States v. Kellar, 13 Fed. 82.
An alien woman, a subject of Prussia came to the United States and married here a naturalized citizen. Mr. Justice Harlan,
with the concurrence of Judge Treat, held that upon her marriage she became ipso facto a citizen of the United States as
fully as if she had complied with all of the provisions of the statutes upon the subject of naturalization. He added: "There
can be no doubt of this, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United, States in Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496,
19 L. ed. 283." The alien "belonged to the class of persons" who might be lawfully naturalized.

In 1904, in Hopkins v. Fachant, 65 C. C. A. 1, 130 Fed. 839, an alien woman came to the United States from France and
entered the country contrary to the immigration laws. The immigration authorities took her into custody at the port of New
York, with the view of deporting her. She applied for her release under a writ of habeas corpus, and pending the
disposition of the matter she married a naturalized American citizen. The circuit court of appeals for the ninth Circuit held,
affirming the court below, that she was entitled to be discharged from custody. The court declared: "The rule is well
settled that her marriage to a naturalized citizen of the United States entitled her to be discharged. The status of the wife
follows that of her husband, ... and by virtue of her marriage her husband's domicil became her domicil." .
In 1908, the circuit court for the district of Rhode Island in Re Rustigian, 165. Fed. 980, had before it the application of a
husband for his final decree of naturalization. It appeared that at that time his wife was held by the immigration authorities
at New York on the ground that she was afflicted with a dangerous and contagious disease. Counsel on both sides agreed
that the effect of the husband's naturalization would be to confer citizenship upon the wife. In view of that contingency
District Judge Brown declined to pass upon the husband's application for naturalization, and thought it best to wait until it
was determined whether the wife's disease was curable. He placed his failure to act on the express ground that the effect
of naturalizing the husband might naturalize her. At the same time he express his opinion that the husband's naturalization
would not effect her naturalization, as she was not one who could become lawfully naturalized. "Her own capacity (to
become naturalized)," the court stated "is a prerequisite to her attaining citizenship. If herself lacking in that capacity, the
married status cannot confer it upon her." Nothing, however, was actually decided in that case, and the views expressed
therein are really nothing more than mere dicta. But, if they can be regarded as something more than that, we find
ourselves, with all due respect for the learned judge, unable to accept them.
In 1909, in United States ex rel. Nicola v. Williams, 173 Fed. 626, District Judge Learned Hand held that an alien woman,
a subject of the Turkish Empire, who married an American citizen while visiting Turkey, and then came to the United
States, could not be excluded, although she had, at the time of her entry, a disease which under the immigration laws
would have been sufficient ground for her exclusion, if she bad not had the status of a citizen. The case was brought into
this court on appeal, and in 1911 was affirmed, in 106 C. C. A. 464, 184 Fed. 322. In that case, however at the time the
relators married, they might have been lawfully naturalized, and we said: "Even if we assume the contention of the district
attorney to be correct that marriage will not make a citizen of a woman who would be excluded under our immigration
laws, it does not affect these relators."
We held that, being citizens, they could not be excluded as aliens; and it was also said to be inconsistent with the policy of
our law that the husband should be a citizen and the wife an alien. The distinction between that case and the one now
before the court is that, in the former case, the marriage took place before any order of exclusion had been made, while in
this the marriage was celebrated after such an order was made. But such an order is a mere administrative provision, and
has not the force of a judgment of a court, and works no estoppel. The administrative order is based on the circumstances
that existed at the time the order of exclusion was made. If the circumstances change prior to the order being carried into
effect, it cannot be executed. For example, if an order of exclusion should be based on the ground that the alien was at the
time afflicted with a contagious disease, and it should be made satisfactorily to appear, prior to actual deportation, that the
alien had entirely recovered from the disease, we think it plain that the order could not be carried into effect. So, in this
case, if, after the making of the order of exclusion and while she is permitted temporarily to remain, she in good faith
marries an American citizen, we cannot doubt the validity of her marriage, and that she thereby acquired, under
international law and under 1994 of the Revised Statutes, American citizenship, and ceased to be an alien. There upon, the
immigration authorities lost their jurisdiction over her, as that jurisdiction applies only to aliens, and not to citizens.
In 1910, District Judge Dodge, in Ex parte Kaprielian, 188 Fed. 694, sustained the right of the officials to deport a woman
under the following circumstances: She entered this country in July, 1910, being an alien and having been born in Turkey.
She was taken into custody by the immigration authorities in the following September, and in October a warrant for her
deportation was issued. Pending hearings as to the validity of that order, she was paroled in the custody of her counsel.
The ground alleged for her deportation was that she was afflicted with a dangerous and contagious disease at the time of
her entry. One of the reasons assigned to defeat deportation was that the woman had married a citizen of the United States

pending the proceedings for her deportation. Judge Dodge declared himself unable to believe that a marriage under such
circumstances "is capable of having the effect claimed, in view of the facts shown." He held that it was no part of the
intended policy of 1994 to annul or override the immigration laws, so as to authorize the admission into the country of the
wife of a naturalized alien not otherwise entitled to enter, and that an alien woman, who is of a class of persons excluded
by law from admission to the United States does not come within the provisions of that section. The court relied wholly
upon the dicta contained in the Rustigian Case. No other authorities were cited.
In 1914, District Judge Neterer, in Ex parte Grayson, 215 Fed. 449, construed 1994 and held that where, pending
proceedings to deport an alien native of France as an alien prostitute, she was married to a citizen of the United States, she
thereby became a citizen, and was not subject to deportation until her citizenship was revoked by due process of law. It
was his opinion that if, as was contended, her marriage was conceived in fraud, and was entered into for the purpose of
evading the immigration laws and preventing her deportation, such fact should be established in a court of competent
jurisdiction in an action commenced for the purpose. The case was appealed and the appeal was dismissed. 134 C. C. A.
666, 219 Fed. 1022.
It is interesting also to observe the construction placed upon the language of the statute by the Department of Justice. In
1874, Attorney General Williams, 14 Ops. Atty. Gen. 402, passing upon the Act of February 10, 1855, held that residence
within the United States for the period required by the naturalization laws was riot necessary in order to constitute an alien
woman a citizen, she having married a citizen of the United States abroad, although she never resided in the United States,
she and her husband having continued to reside abroad after the marriage.
In 1909, a similar construction was given to the Immigration Act of May 5, 1907, in an opinion rendered by Attorney
General Wickersham. It appeared an unmarried woman, twenty-eight years of age and a native of Belgium, arrived in
New York and went at once to a town in Nebraska, where she continued to reside. About fifteen months after her arrival
she was taken before a United States commissioner by way of instituting proceedings under the Immigration Act (34 Stat.
at L. 898, chap. 1134, Comp. Stat. 4242, 3 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 637) for her deportation, on the ground that she had
entered this country for the purpose of prostitution, and had been found an inmate of a house of prostitution and practicing
the same within three years after landing. It appeared, however, that after she was taken before the United States
commissioner, but prior to her arrest under a warrant by the Department of Justice, she was lawfully married to a nativeborn citizen of the United States. The woman professed at the time of her marriage an intention to abandon her previous
mode of life and to remove with her husband to his home in Pennsylvania. He knew what her mode of life had been, but
professed to believe in her good intentions. The question was raised as to the right to deport her, the claim being advance
that by her marriage she bad become an American citizen and therefore could not be deported. The Attorney General ruled
against the right to deport her as she had become an American citizen. He held that the words, "who might herself be
lawfully naturalized," refer to a class or race who might be lawfully naturalized, and that compliance with the other
conditions of the naturalization laws was not required. 27 Ops. Atty. Gen. 507.
Before concluding this opinion, we may add that it has not escaped our observation that Congress, in enacting the
Immigration Act of 1917, so as to provide, in 19, "that the marriage to an American citizen of a female of the sexually
immoral classes ... shall not invest such female with United States citizenship if the marriage of such alien female shall be
solemnized after her arrest or after the commission of acts which make her liable to deportation under this act."
Two conclusions seem irresistibly to follow from the above change in the law:
(1) Congress deemed legislation essential to prevent women of the immoral class avoiding deportation through the device
of marrying an American citizen.
(2) If Congress intended that the marriage of an American citizen with an alien woman of any other of the excluded
classes, either before or after her detention, should not confer upon her American citizenship, thereby entitling her to enter
the country, its intention would have been expressed, and 19 would not have been confined solely to women of the
immoral class.

Indeed, We have examined all the leading American decisions on the subject and We have found no warrant for the
proposition that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" in Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes was meant
solely as a racial bar, even if loose statements in some decisions and other treaties and other writings on the subject would
seem to give such impression. The case of Kelley v. Owen, supra, which appears to be the most cited among the first of
the decisions 19 simply held:
As we construe this Act, it confers the privileges of citizenship upon women married to citizens of the United States, if
they are of the class of persons for whose naturalization the previous Acts of Congress provide. The terms "married" or
"who shall be married," do not refer in our judgment, to the time when the ceremony of marriage is celebrated, but to a
state of marriage. They mean that, whenever a woman, who under previous Acts might be naturalized, is in a state of
marriage to a citizen, whether his citizenship existed at the passage of the Act or subsequently, or before or after the
marriage, she becomes, by that fact, a citizen also. His citizenship, whenever it exists, confers, under the Act, citizenship
upon her. The construction which would restrict the Act to women whose husbands, at the time of marriage, are citizens,
would exclude far the greater number, for whose benefit, as we think, the Act was intended. Its object, in our opinion, was
to allow her citizenship to follow that of her husband, without the necessity of any application for naturalization on her
part; and, if this was the object, there is no reason for the restriction suggested.
The terms, "who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws," only limit the application of the law to free white
women. The previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time only required that the person applying for its benefits should
be "a free white person," and not an alien enemy. Act of April 14th, 1802, 2 Stat. at L. 153.
A similar construction was given to the Act by the Court of Appeals of New York, in Burton v. Burton, 40 N. Y. 373; and
is the one which gives the widest extension to its provisions.
Note that write the court did say that "the terms, "who might lawfully be naturalized under existing laws" only limit the
application to free white women" 20 it hastened to add that "the previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time, ...
required that the person applying for its benefits should be (not only) a "free white person" (but also) ... not an alien
enemy." This is simply because under the Naturalization Law of the United States at the time the case was decided, the
disqualification of enemy aliens had already been removed by the Act of July 30, 1813, as may be seen in the
corresponding footnote hereof anon. In other words, if in the case of Kelly v. Owen only the race requirement was
mentioned, the reason was that there was no other non-racial requirement or no more alien enemy disqualification at the
time; and this is demonstrated by the fact that the court took care to make it clear that under the previous naturalization
law, there was also such requirement in addition to race. This is impotent, since as stated in re Rustigian, 165 Fed. Rep.
980, "The expression used by Mr. Justice Field, (in Kelly v. Owen) the terms "who might lawfully be naturalized under
existing laws" only limit the application of the law to free white women, must be interpreted in the application to the
special facts and to the incapacities under the then existing laws," (at p. 982) meaning that whether or not an alien wife
marrying a citizen would be a citizen was dependent, not only on her race and nothing more necessarily, but on whether or
not there were other disqualifications under the law in force at the time of her marriage or the naturalization of her
husband.
4. As already stated, in Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and the second Ly Giok Ha, the Court drew the evidence that
because Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated by Commonwealth Act 473, it follows that in place of the said eliminated
section particularly its subdivision (c), being the criterion of whether or not an alien wife "may be lawfully naturalized,"
what should be required is not only that she must not be disqualified under Section 4 but that she must also possess the
qualifications enumerated in Section 2, such as those of age, residence, good moral character, adherence to the underlying
principles of the Philippine Constitution, irreproachable conduct, lucrative employment or ownership of real estate,
capacity to speak and write English or Spanish and one of the principal local languages, education of children in certain
schools, etc., thereby implying that, in effect, sails Section 2 has been purposely intended to take the place of Section 1 of
Act 2927. Upon further consideration of the proper premises, We have come, to the conclusion that such inference is not
sufficiently justified.

To begin with, nothing extant in the legislative history, which We have already explained above of the mentioned
provisions has been shown or can be shown to indicate that such was the clear intent of the legislature. Rather, what is
definite is that Section 15 is, an exact copy of Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which, at the time
of the approval of Commonwealth Act 473 had already a settled construction by American courts and administrative
authorities.
Secondly, as may be gleaned from the summary of pertinent American decisions quoted above, there can be no doubt that
in the construction of the identically worded provision in the Revised Statutes of the United States, (Section 1994, which
was taken, from the Act of February 10, 1855) all authorities in the United States are unanimously agreed that the
qualifications of residence, good moral character, adherence to the Constitution, etc. are not supposed to be considered,
and that the only eligibility to be taken into account is that of the race or class to which the subject belongs, the conceptual
scope of which, We have just discussed. 21 In the very case ofLeonard v. Grant, supra, discussed by Justice Regala in Lo
San Tuang, the explanation for such posture of the American authorities was made thus:
The phrase, "shall be deemed a citizen" in section 1994 Rev. St., or as it was in the Act of 1855,supra, "shall be deemed
and taken to be a citizen" while it may imply that the person to whom it relates has not actually become a citizen by
ordinary means or in the usual way, as by the judgment of a competent court, upon a proper application and proof, yet it
does not follow that such person is on that account practically any the less a citizen. The word "deemed" is the equivalent
of "considered" or "judged"; and, therefore, whatever an act of Congress requires to be "deemed" or "taken" as true of any
person or thing, must, in law, be considered as having been duly adjudged or established concerning "such person or thing,
and have force and effect accordingly. When, therefore, Congress declares that an alien woman shall, under certain
circumstances, be "deemed' an American citizen, the effect when the contingency occurs, is equivalent to her being
naturalized directly by an act of Congress, or in the usual mode thereby prescribed.
Unless We disregard now the long settled familiar rule of statutory construction that in a situation like this wherein our
legislature has copied an American statute word for word, it is understood that the construction already given to such
statute before its being copied constitute part of our own law, there seems to be no reason how We can give a different
connotation or meaning to the provision in question. At least, We have already seen that the views sustaining the contrary
conclusion appear to be based on in accurate factual premises related to the real legislative background of the framing of
our naturalization law in its present form.
Thirdly, the idea of equating the qualifications enumerated in Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473 with the eligibility
requirements of Section 1 of Act 2927 cannot bear close scrutiny from any point of view. There is no question that
Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473 is more or less substantially the same as Section 3 of Act 2927. In other words,
Section 1 of Act 2927 co-existed already with practically the same provision as Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473. If it
were true that the phrase "who may be lawfully naturalized" in Section 13 (a) of Act 2927, as amended by Act 3448,
referred to the so-called racial requirement in Section 1 of the same Act, without regard to the provisions of Section 3
thereof, how could the elimination of Section 1 have the effect of shifting the reference to Section 3, when precisely,
according to the American jurisprudence, which was prevailing at the time Commonwealth Act 473 was approved, such
qualifications as were embodied in said Section 3, which had their counterpart in the corresponding American statutes, are
not supposed to be taken into account and that what should be considered only are the requirements similar to those
provided for in said Section 1 together with the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4?
Fourthly, it is difficult to conceive that the phrase "who might be lawfully naturalized" in Section 15 could have been
intended to convey a meaning different than that given to it by the American courts and administrative authorities. As
already stated, Act 3448 which contained said phrase and from which it was taken by Commonwealth Act 473, was
enacted in 1928. By that, time, Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States was no longer in force because it
had been repealed expressly the Act of September 22, 1922 which did away with the automatic naturalization of alien
wives of American citizens and required, instead, that they submit to regular naturalization proceedings, albeit under more
liberal terms than those of other applicants. In other words, when our legislature adopted the phrase in question, which, as
already demonstrated, had a definite construction in American law, the Americans had already abandoned said

phraseology in favor of a categorical compulsion for alien wives to be natural judicially. Simple logic would seem to
dictate that, since our lawmakers, at the time of the approval of Act 3448, had two choices, one to adopt the phraseology
of Section 1994 with its settled construction and the other to follow the new posture of the Americans of requiring judicial
naturalization and it appears that they have opted for the first, We have no alternative but to conclude that our law still
follows the old or previous American Law On the subject. Indeed, when Commonwealth Act 473 was approved in 1939,
the Philippine Legislature, already autonomous then from the American Congress, had a clearer chance to disregard the
old American law and make one of our own, or, at least, follow the trend of the Act of the U.S. Congress of 1922, but still,
our legislators chose to maintain the language of the old law. What then is significantly important is not that the
legislature maintained said phraseology after Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated, but that it continued insisting on using
it even after the Americans had amended their law in order to provide for what is now contended to be the construction
that should be given to the phrase in question. Stated differently, had our legislature adopted a phrase from an American
statute before the American courts had given it a construction which was acquiesced to by those given upon to apply the
same, it would be possible for Us to adopt a construction here different from that of the Americans, but as things stand,
the fact is that our legislature borrowed the phrase when there was already a settled construction thereof, and what is more,
it appears that our legislators even ignored the modification of the American law and persisted in maintaining the old
phraseology. Under these circumstances, it would be in defiance of reason and the principles of Statutory construction to
say that Section 15 has a nationalistic and selective orientation and that it should be construed independently of the
previous American posture because of the difference of circumstances here and in the United States. It is always safe to
say that in the construction of a statute, We cannot fall on possible judicial fiat or perspective when the demonstrated
legislative point of view seems to indicate otherwise.
5. Viewing the matter from another angle, there is need to emphasize that in reality and in effect, the so called racial
requirements, whether under the American laws or the Philippine laws, have hardly been considered as qualifications in
the same sense as those enumerated in Section 3 of Act 2927 and later in Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473. More
accurately, they have always been considered as disqualifications, in the sense that those who did not possess them were
the ones who could not "be lawfully naturalized," just as if they were suffering from any of the disqualifications under
Section 2 of Act 2927 and later those under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473, which, incidentally, are practically
identical to those in the former law, except those in paragraphs (f) and (h) of the latter. 22 Indeed, such is the clear
impression anyone will surely get after going over all the American decisions and opinions quoted and/or cited in the
latest USCA (1970), Title 8, section 1430, pp. 598-602, and the first decisions of this Court on the matter, Ly Giok Ha
(1959) and Ricardo Cua, citing with approval the opinions of the secretary of Justice. 23 Such being the case, that is, that
the so-called racial requirements were always treated as disqualifications in the same light as the other disqualifications
under the law, why should their elimination not be viewed or understood as a subtraction from or a lessening of the
disqualifications? Why should such elimination have instead the meaning that what were previously considered as
irrelevant qualifications have become disqualifications, as seems to be the import of the holding in Choy King Tee to the
effect that the retention in Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 of the same language of what used to be Section 13 (a)
of Act 2927 (as amended by Act 3448), notwithstanding the elimination of Section 1 of the latter, necessarily indicates
that the legislature had in mind making the phrase in question "who may be lawfully naturalized" refer no longer to any
racial disqualification but to the qualification under Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473? Otherwise stated, under Act
2927, there were two groups of persons that could not be naturalized, namely, those falling under Section 1 and those
falling under Section 2, and surely, the elimination of one group, i.e. those belonging to Section 1, could not have had, by
any process of reasoning, the effect of increasing, rather than decreasing, the disqualifications that used to be before such
elimination. We cannot see by what alchemy of logic such elimination could have convicted qualifications into
disqualifications specially in the light of the fact that, after all, these are disqualifications clearly set out as such in the law
distinctly and separately from qualifications and, as already demonstrated, in American jurisprudence, qualifications had
never been considered to be of any relevance in determining "who might be lawfully naturalized," as such phrase is used
in the statute governing the status of alien wives of American citizens, and our law on the matter was merely copied
verbatim from the American statutes.

6. In addition to these arguments based on the applicable legal provisions and judicial opinions, whether here or in the
United States, there are practical considerations that militate towards the same conclusions. As aptly stated in the motion
for reconsideration of counsel for petitioner-appellee dated February 23, 1967, filed in the case of Zita Ngo Burca v.
Republic, supra:
Unreasonableness of requiring alien wife to prove "qualifications"
There is one practical consideration that strongly militates against a construction that Section 15 of the law requires that
an alien wife of a Filipino must affirmatively prove that she possesses the qualifications prescribed under Section 2,
before she may be deemed a citizen. Such condition, if imposed upon an alien wife, becomes unreasonably onerous and
compliance therewith manifestly difficult. The unreasonableness of such requirement is shown by the following:
1. One of the qualifications required of an Applicant for naturalization under Section 2 of the law is that the applicant
"must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten years." If this requirement is applied to
an alien wife married to a Filipino citizen, this means that for a period of ten years at least, she cannot hope to acquire the
citizenship of her husband. If the wife happens to be a citizen of a country whose law declares that upon her marriage to a
foreigner she automatically loses her citizenship and acquires the citizenship of her husband, this could mean that for a
period of ten years at least, she would be stateless. And even after having acquired continuous residence in the Philippines
for ten years, there is no guarantee that her petition for naturalization will be granted, in which case she would remain
stateless for an indefinite period of time.
2. Section 2 of the law likewise requires of the applicant for naturalization that he "must own real estate in the Philippines
worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or
lawful occupation." Considering the constitutional prohibition against acquisition by an alien of real estate except in cases
of hereditary succession (Art. XIII, Sec. 5, Constitution), an alien wife desiring to acquire the citizenship of her husband
must have to prove that she has a lucrative income derived from a lawful trade, profession or occupation. The income
requirement has been interpreted to mean that the petitioner herself must be the one to possess the said income. (Uy v.
Republic, L-19578, Oct. 27, 1964; Tanpa Ong vs. Republic, L-20605, June 30, 1965; Li Tong Pek v. Republic, L-20912,
November 29, 1965). In other words, the wife must prove that she has a lucrative income derived from sources other than
her husband's trade, profession or calling. It is of common knowledge, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that
most wives in the Philippines do not have gainful occupations of their own. Indeed, Philippine law, recognizing the
dependence of the wife upon the husband, imposes upon the latter the duty of supporting the former. (Art. 291, Civil
Code). It should be borne in mind that universally, it is an accepted concept that when a woman marries, her primary duty
is to be a wife, mother and housekeeper. If an alien wife is not to be remiss in this duty, how can she hope to acquire a
lucrative income of her own to qualify her for citizenship?
3. Under Section 2 of the law, the applicant for naturalization "must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any
of the public schools or private schools recognized by the Office of the Private Education of the Philippines, where
Philippine history, government and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum during the entire period
of residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen."
If an alien woman has minor children by a previous marriage to another alien before she marries a Filipino, and such
minor children had not been enrolled in Philippine schools during her period of residence in the country, she cannot
qualify for naturalization under the interpretation of this Court. The reason behind the requirement that children should be
enrolled in recognized educational institutions is that they follow the citizenship of their father. (Chan Ho Lay v. Republic,
L-5666, March 30, 1954; Tan Hi v. Republic, 88 Phil. 117 [1951]; Hao Lian Chu v. Republic, 87 Phil. 668 [1950]; Yap
Chin v. Republic, L-4177, May 29, 1953; Lim Lian Hong v. Republic, L-3575, Dec. 26, 1950). Considering that said
minor children by her first husband generally follow the citizenship of their alien father, the basis for such requirement as
applied to her does not exist. Cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex.
4. Under Section 3 of the law, the 10-year continuous residence prescribed by Section 2 "shall be understood as reduced to
five years for any petitioner (who is) married to a Filipino woman." It is absurd that an alien male married to a Filipino

wife should be required to reside only for five years in the Philippines to qualify for citizenship, whereas an alien woman
married to a Filipino husband must reside for ten years.
Thus under the interpretation given by this Court, it is more difficult for an alien wife related by marriage to a Filipino
citizen to become such citizen, than for a foreigner who is not so related. And yet, it seems more than clear that the
general purpose of the first paragraph of Section 15 was obviously to accord to an alien woman, by reason of her marriage
to a Filipino, a privilege not similarly granted to other aliens. It will be recalled that prior to the enactment of Act No.
3448 in 1928, amending Act No. 2927 (the old Naturalization Law), there was no law granting any special privilege to
alien wives of Filipinos. They were treated as any other foreigner. It was precisely to remedy this situation that the
Philippine legislature enacted Act No. 3448. On this point, the observation made by the Secretary of Justice in 1941 is
enlightening:
It is true that under, Article 22 of the (Spanish) Civil Code, the wife follows the nationality of the husband; but the
Department of State of the United States on October 31, 1921, ruled that the alien wife of a Filipino citizen is not a
Filipino citizen, pointing out that our Supreme Court in the leading case of Roa v. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315)
held that Articles 17 to 27 of the Civil Code being political have been abrogated upon the cession of the Philippine Islands
to the United States. Accordingly, the stated taken by the Attorney-General prior to the envictment of Act No. 3448, was
that marriage of alien women to Philippine citizens did not make the former citizens of this counting. (Op. Atty. Gen.,
March 16, 1928) .
To remedy this anomalous condition, Act No. 3448 was enacted in 1928 adding section 13(a) to Act No. 2927 which
provides that "any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippine Islands, and who might
herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippine Islands. (Op. No. 22, s. 1941; emphasis ours).
If Section 15 of the, Revised Naturalization Law were to be interpreted, as this Court did, in such a way as to require that
the alien wife must prove the qualifications prescribed in Section 2, the privilege granted to alien wives would become
illusory. It is submitted that such a construction, being contrary to the manifested object of the statute must be rejected.
A statute is to be construed with reference to its manifest object, and if the language is susceptible of two constructions,
one which will carry out and the other defeat such manifest object, it should receive the former construction. (In re
National Guard, 71 Vt. 493, 45 A. 1051; Singer v. United States, 323 U.S. 338, 89 L. ed. 285. See also, U.S. v. Navarro,
19 Phil. 134 [1911]; U. S. v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 [1910).
... A construction which will cause objectionable results should be avoided and the court will, if possible, place on the
statute a construction which will not result in injustice, and in accordance with the decisions construing statutes, a
construction which will result in oppression, hardship, or inconveniences will also be avoided, as will a construction
which will prejudice public interest, or construction resulting in unreasonableness, as well as a construction which will
result in absurd consequences.
So a construction should, if possible, be avoided if the result would be an apparent inconsistency in legislative intent, as
has been determined by the judicial decisions, or which would result in futility, redundancy, or a conclusion not
contemplated by the legislature; and the court should adopt that construction which will be the least likely to produce
mischief. Unless plainly shown to have been the intention of the legislature, an interpretation which would render the
requirements of the statute uncertain and vague is to be avoided, and the court will not ascribe to the legislature an intent
to confer an illusory right. ... (82 C.J.S., Statutes, sec. 326, pp. 623-632).
7. In Choy King Tee and the second Ly Giok Ha, emphasis was laid on the need for aligning the construction of Section
15 with "the national policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship." But the question may be asked, is it
reasonable to suppose that in the pursuit of such policy, the legislature contemplated to make it more difficult if not
practically impossible in some instances, for an alien woman marrying a Filipino to become a Filipina than any ordinary
applicant for naturalization, as has just been demonstrated above? It seems but natural and logical to assume that Section
15 was intended to extend special treatment to alien women who by marrying a Filipino irrevocably deliver themselves,

their possessions, their fate and fortunes and all that marriage implies to a citizen of this country, "for better or for worse."
Perhaps there can and will be cases wherein the personal conveniences and benefits arising from Philippine citizenship
may motivate such marriage, but must the minority, as such cases are bound to be, serve as the criterion for the
construction of law? Moreover, it is not farfetched to believe that in joining a Filipino family the alien woman is somehow
disposed to assimilate the customs, beliefs and ideals of Filipinos among whom, after all, she has to live and associate, but
surely, no one should expect her to do so even before marriage. Besides, it may be considered that in reality the extension
of citizenship to her is made by the law not so much for her sake as for the husband. Indeed, We find the following
observations anent the national policy rationalization in Choy King Tee and Ly Giok Ha (the second) to be quite
persuasive:
We respectfully suggest that this articulation of the national policy begs the question. The avowed policy of "selectives
admission" more particularly refers to a case where citizenship is sought to be acquired in a judicial proceeding for
naturalization. In such a case, the courts should no doubt apply the national policy of selecting only those who are worthy
to become citizens. There is here a choice between accepting or rejecting the application for citizenship. But this policy
finds no application in cases where citizenship is conferred by operation of law. In such cases, the courts have no
choice to accept or reject. If the individual claiming citizenship by operation of law proves in legal proceedings that he
satisfies the statutory requirements, the courts cannot do otherwise than to declare that he is a citizen of the Philippines.
Thus, an individual who is able to prove that his father is a Philippine citizen, is a citizen of the Philippines, "irrespective
of his moral character, ideological beliefs, and identification with Filipino ideals, customs, and traditions." A minor child
of a person naturalized under the law, who is able to prove the fact of his birth in the Philippines, is likewise a citizen,
regardless of whether he has lucrative income, or he adheres to the principles of the Constitution. So it is with an alien
wife of a Philippine citizen. She is required to prove only that she may herself be lawfully naturalized, i.e., that she is not
one of the disqualified persons enumerated in Section 4 of the law, in order to establish her citizenship status as a fact.
A paramount policy consideration of graver import should not be overlooked in this regard, for it explains and justifies the
obviously deliberate choice of words. It is universally accepted that a State, in extending the privilege of citizenship to an
alien wife of one of its citizens could have had no other objective than to maintain a unity of allegiance among the
members of the family. (Nelson v. Nelson, 113 Neb. 453, 203 N. W. 640 [1925]; see also "Convention on the Nationality
of Married Women: Historical Background and Commentary." UNITED NATIONS, Department of Economic and Social
Affairs E/CN, 6/399, pp. 8 et seq.). Such objective can only be satisfactorily achieved by allowing the wife to acquire
citizenship derivatively through the husband. This is particularly true in the Philippines where tradition and law has placed
the husband as head of the family, whose personal status and decisions govern the life of the family group. Corollary to
this, our laws look with favor on the unity and solidarity of the family (Art. 220, Civil Code), in whose preservation of
State as a vital and enduring interest. (See Art. 216, Civil Code). Thus, it has been said that by tradition in our country,
there is a theoretic identity of person and interest between husband and wife, and from the nature of the relation, the home
of one is that of the other. (See De la Via v. Villareal, 41 Phil. 13). It should likewise be said that because of the theoretic
identity of husband and wife, and the primacy of the husband, the nationality of husband should be the nationality of the
wife, and the laws upon one should be the law upon the other. For as the court, in Hopkins v. Fachant (9th Cir., 1904) 65
C.C.A., 1, 130 Fed. 839, held: "The status of the wife follows that of the husband, ... and by virtue of her marriage her
husband's domicile became her domicile." And the presumption under Philippine law being that the property relations of
husband and wife are under the regime of conjugal partnership (Art. 119, Civil Code), the income of one is also that of the
other.
It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family unity and identity that a husband should be a citizen
and the wife an alien, and that the national treatment of one should be different from that of the other. Thus, it cannot be
that the husband's interests in property and business activities reserved by law to citizens should not form part of the
conjugal partnership and be denied to the wife, nor that she herself cannot, through her own efforts but for the benefit of
the partnership, acquire such interests. Only in rare instances should the identity of husband and wife be refused
recognition, and we submit that in respect of our citizenship laws, it should only be in the instances where the wife suffers

from the disqualifications stated in Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law. (Motion for Reconsideration, Burca vs.
Republic, supra.)
With all these considerations in mind, We are persuaded that it is in the best interest of all concerned that Section 15 of
the Naturalization Law be given effect in the same way as it was understood and construed when the phrase "who may be
lawfully naturalized," found in the American statute from which it was borrowed and copied verbatim, was applied by the
American courts and administrative authorities. There is merit, of course in the view that Philippine statutes should be
construed in the light of Philippine circumstances, and with particular reference to our naturalization laws. We should
realize the disparity in the circumstances between the United States, as the so-called "melting pot" of peoples from all
over the world, and the Philippines as a developing country whose Constitution is nationalistic almost in the come.
Certainly, the writer of this opinion cannot be the last in rather passionately insisting that our jurisprudence should speak
our own concepts and resort to American authorities, to be sure, entitled to admiration, and respect, should not be
regarded as source of pride and indisputable authority. Still, We cannot close our eyes to the undeniable fact that the
provision of law now under scrutiny has no local origin and orientation; it is purely American, factually taken bodily from
American law when the Philippines was under the dominating influence of statutes of the United States Congress. It is
indeed a sad commentary on the work of our own legislature of the late 1920's and 1930's that given the opportunity to
break away from the old American pattern, it took no step in that direction. Indeed, even after America made it patently
clear in the Act of Congress of September 22, 1922 that alien women marrying Americans cannot be citizens of the
United States without undergoing naturalization proceedings, our legislators still chose to adopt the previous American
law of August 10, 1855 as embodied later in Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of 1874, Which, it is worth reiterating,
was consistently and uniformly understood as conferring American citizenship to alien women marrying Americansipso
facto, without having to submit to any naturalization proceeding and without having to prove that they possess the special
qualifications of residence, moral character, adherence to American ideals and American constitution, provided they show
they did not suffer from any of the disqualifications enumerated in the American Naturalization Law. Accordingly, We
now hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating otherwise notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of
Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina
provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien
woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the
moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said
Section 4.
As under any other law rich in benefits for those coming under it, doubtless there will be instances where unscrupulous
persons will attempt to take advantage of this provision of law by entering into fake and fictitious marriages or mala
fide matrimonies. We cannot as a matter of law hold that just because of these possibilities, the construction of the
provision should be otherwise than as dictated inexorably by more ponderous relevant considerations, legal, juridical and
practical. There can always be means of discovering such undesirable practice and every case can be dealt with
accordingly as it arises.
III.
The third aspect of this case requires necessarily a re-examination of the ruling of this Court in Burca, supra, regarding
the need of judicial naturalization proceedings before the alien wife of a Filipino may herself be considered or deemed a
Filipino. If this case which, as already noted, was submitted for decision in 1964 yet, had only been decided earlier, before
Go Im Ty, the foregoing discussions would have been sufficient to dispose of it. The Court could have held that despite
her apparent lack of qualifications, her marriage to her co-petitioner made her a Filipina, without her undergoing any
naturalization proceedings, provided she could sustain, her claim that she is not disqualified under Section 4 of the law.
But as things stand now, with the Burca ruling, the question We have still to decide is, may she be deemed a Filipina
without submitting to a naturalization proceeding?
Naturally, if Burca is to be followed, it is clear that the answer to this question must necessarily be in the affirmative. As
already stated, however, the decision in Burca has not yet become final because there is still pending with Us a motion for

its reconsideration which vigorously submits grounds worthy of serious consideration by this Court. On this account, and
for the reasons expounded earlier in this opinion, this case is as good an occasion as any other to re-examine the issue.
In the said decision, Justice Sanchez held for the Court:
We accordingly rule that: (1) An alien woman married to a Filipino who desires to be a citizen of this country must apply
therefore by filing a petition for citizenship reciting that she possesses all the qualifications set forth in Section 2 and none
of the disqualifications under Section 4, both of the Revised Naturalization Law; (2) Said petition must be filed in the
Court of First Instance where petitioner has resided at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition; and
(3) Any action by any other office, agency, board or official, administrative or otherwise other than the judgment of a
competent court of justice certifying or declaring that an alien wife of the Filipino citizen is also a Filipino citizen, is
hereby declared null and void.
3. We treat the present petition as one for naturalization. Or, in the words of law, a "petition for citizenship". This is as it
should be. Because a reading of the petition will reveal at once that efforts were made to set forth therein, and to prove
afterwards, compliance with Sections 2 and 4 of the Revised Naturalization law. The trial court itself apparently
considered the petition as one for naturalization, and, in fact, declared petitioner "a citizen of the Philippines."
In other words, under this holding, in order for an alien woman marrying a Filipino to be vested with Filipino citizenship,
it is not enough that she possesses the qualifications prescribed by Section 2 of the law and none of the disqualifications
enumerated in its Section 4. Over and above all these, she has to pass thru the whole process of judicial naturalization
apparently from declaration of intention to oathtaking, before she can become a Filipina. In plain words, her marriage to a
Filipino is absolutely of no consequence to her nationality vis-a-vis that of her Filipino husband; she remains to be the
national of the country to which she owed allegiance before her marriage, and if she desires to be of one nationality with
her husband, she has to wait for the same time that any other applicant for naturalization needs to complete, the required
period of ten year residence, gain the knowledge of English or Spanish and one of the principle local languages, make her
children study in Filipino schools, acquire real property or engage in some lawful occupation of her own independently of
her husband, file her declaration of intention and after one year her application for naturalization, with the affidavits of
two credible witnesses of her good moral character and other qualifications, etc., etc., until a decision is ordered in her
favor, after which, she has to undergo the two years of probation, and only then, but not before she takes her oath as
citizen, will she begin to be considered and deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines. Briefly, she can become a Filipino
citizen only by judicial declaration.
Such being the import of the Court's ruling, and it being quite obvious, on the other hand, upon a cursory reading of the
provision, in question, that the law intends by it to spell out what is the "effect of naturalization on (the) wife and
children" of an alien, as plainly indicated by its title, and inasmuch as the language of the provision itself clearly conveys
the thought that some effect beneficial to the wife is intended by it, rather than that she is not in any manner to be
benefited thereby, it behooves Us to take a second hard look at the ruling, if only to see whether or not the Court might
have overlooked any relevant consideration warranting a conclusion different from that complained therein. It is
undeniable that the issue before Us is of grave importance, considering its consequences upon tens of thousands of
persons affected by the ruling therein made by the Court, and surely, it is for Us to avoid, whenever possible, that Our
decision in any case should produce any adverse effect upon them not contemplated either by the law or by the national
policy it seeks to endorse.
AMICI CURIAE in the Burca case, respectable and impressive by their number and standing in the Bar and well known
for their reputation for intellectual integrity, legal acumen and incisive and comprehensive resourcefulness in research,
truly evident in the quality of the memorandum they have submitted in said case, invite Our attention to the impact of the
decision therein thus:
The doctrine announced by this Honorable Court for the first time in the present case -- that an alien woman who marries
a Philippine citizen not only does not ipso facto herself become a citizen but can acquire such citizenship only through

ordinary naturalization proceedings under the Revised Naturalization Law, and that all administrative actions "certifying
or declaring such woman to be a Philippine citizen are null and void" has consequences that reach far beyond the
confines of the present case. Considerably more people are affected, and affected deeply, than simply Mrs. Zita N. Burca.
The newspapers report that as many as 15 thousand women married to Philippine citizens are affected by this decision of
the Court. These are women of many and diverse nationalities, including Chinese, Spanish, British, American, Columbian,
Finnish, Japanese, Chilean, and so on. These members of the community, some of whom have been married to citizens for
two or three decades, have all exercised rights and privileges reserved by law to Philippine citizens. They will have
acquired, separately or in conjugal partnership with their citizen husbands, real property, and they will have sold and
transferred such property. Many of these women may be in professions membership in which is limited to citizens. Others
are doubtless stockholders or officers or employees in companies engaged in business activities for which a certain
percentage of Filipino equity content is prescribed by law. All these married women are now faced with possible
divestment of personal status and of rights acquired and privileges exercised in reliance, in complete good faith, upon a
reading of the law that has been accepted as correct for more than two decades by the very agencies of government
charged with the administration of that law. We must respectfully suggest that judicial doctrines which would visit such
comprehensive and far-reaching injury upon the wives and mothers of Philippine citizens deserve intensive scrutiny and
reexamination.
To be sure, this appeal can be no less than what this Court attended to in Gan Tsitung vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-20819,
Feb. 21, 1967, 19 SCRA 401 when Chief Justice Concepcion observed:
The Court realizes, however, that the rulings in the Barretto and Delgado cases although referring to situations the
equities of which are not identical to those obtaining in the case at bar may have contributed materially to the
irregularities committed therein and in other analogous cases, and induced the parties concerned to believe, although
erroneously, that the procedure followed was valid under the law.
Accordingly, and in view of the implications of the issue under consideration, the Solicitor General was required, not only,
to comment thereon, but, also, to state "how many cases there are, like the one at bar, in which certificates of
naturalization have been issued after notice of the filing of the petition for naturalization had been published in the
Official Gazette only once, within the periods (a) from January 28, 1950" (when the decision in Delgado v. Republic was
promulgated) "to May 29, 1957" (when the Ong Son Cui was decided) "and (b) from May 29, 1957 to November 29,
1965" (when the decision in the present case was rendered).
After mature deliberation, and in the light of the reasons adduced in appellant's motion for reconsideration and in the reply
thereto of the Government, as well as of the data contained in the latter, the Court holds that the doctrine laid down in the
Ong Son Cui case shall apply and affect the validity of certificates of naturalization issued after, not on or before May 29,
1957.
Here We are met again by the same problem. In Gan Tsitung, the Court had to expressly enjoin the prospective
application of its construction of the law made in a previous decision, 24 which had already become final, to serve the ends
of justice and equity. In the case at bar, We do not have to go that far. As already observed, the decision in Burca still
under reconsideration, while the ruling in Lee Suan Ay, Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and others that followed them have
at the most become the law of the case only for the parties thereto. If there are good grounds therefor, all We have to do
now is to reexamine the said rulings and clarify or modify them.
For ready reference, We requote Section 15:
Sec. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a
citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall be considered citizens
thereof.

A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of naturalization of the parents, shall automatically
become a Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born minor child, who is not in the Philippines at the time the parent is
naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless he begins to reside permanently in the
Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.
A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall be considered a Philippine citizen,
unless within one year after reaching the age of majority, he fails to register himself as a Philippine citizen at the
American Consulate of the country where he resides, and to take the necessary oath of allegiance.
It is obvious that the main subject-matter and purpose of the statute, the Revised Naturalization Law or Commonwealth
Act 473, as a whole, is to establish a complete procedure for the judicial conferment of the status of citizenship upon
qualified aliens. After laying out such a procedure, remarkable for its elaborate and careful inclusion of all safeguards
against the possibility of any undesirable persons becoming a part of our citizenry, it carefully but categorically states the
consequence of the naturalization of an alien undergoing such procedure it prescribes upon the members of his immediate
family, his wife and children, 25 and, to that end, in no uncertain terms it ordains that: (a) all his minor children who have
been born in the Philippines shall be "considered citizens" also; (b) all such minor children, if born outside the Philippines
but dwelling here at the time of such naturalization "shall automatically become" Filipinos also, but those not born in the
Philippines and not in the Philippines at the time of such naturalization, are also redeemed citizens of this country
provided that they shall lose said status if they transfer their permanent residence to a foreign country before becoming of
age; (c) all such minor children, if born outside of the Philippines after such naturalization, shall also be "considered"
Filipino citizens, unless they expatriate themselves by failing to register as Filipinos at the Philippine (American)
Consulate of the country where they reside and take the necessary oath of allegiance; and (d) as to the wife, she "shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines" if she is one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized". 26
No doubt whatever is entertained, so Burca holds very correctly, as to the point that the minor children, falling within the
conditions of place and time of birth and residence prescribed in the provision, are vested with Philippine citizenship
directly by legislative fiat or by force of the law itself and without the need for any judicial proceeding or declaration. (At
p. 192, 19 SCRA). Indeed, the language of the provision, is not susceptible of any other interpretation. But it is claimed
that the same expression "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" in reference to the wife, does not necessarily
connote the vesting of citizenship status upon her by legislative fiat because the antecedent phrase requiring that she must
be one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" implies that such status is intended to attach only after she has
undergone the whole process of judicial naturalization required of any person desiring to become a Filipino. Stated
otherwise, the ruling in Burca is that while Section 15 envisages and intends legislative naturalization as to the minor
children, the same section deliberately treats the wife differently and leaves her out for the ordinary judicial naturalization.
Of course, it goes without saying that it is perfectly within the constitutional authority of the Congress of the Philippines
to confer or vest citizenship status by legislative fiat. (U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 42 L ed. 890 [1898]; See, 1
Taada & Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines 152 [1961 ed.]) In fact, it has done so for particular individuals, like
two foreign religious prelates, 27 hence there is no reason it cannot do it for classes or groups of persons under general
conditions applicable to all of the members of such class or group, like women who marry Filipinos, whether native-born
or naturalized. The issue before Us in this case is whether or not the legislature hag done so in the disputed provisions of
Section 15 of the Naturalization Law. And Dr. Vicente G. Sinco, one of the most respect authorities on political law in the
Philippines 28 observes in this connection thus: "A special form of naturalization is often observed by some states with
respect to women. Thus in the Philippines a foreign woman married to a Filipino citizen becomes ipso facto naturalized, if
she belongs to any of the classes who may apply for naturalization under the Philippine Laws." (Sinco, Phil. Political Law
498-499 [10th ed. 1954]; emphasis ours; this comment is substantially reiterated in the 1962 edition, citing Ly Giok Ha
and Ricardo Cua, supra.)
More importantly, it may be stated, at this juncture, that in construing the provision of the United States statutes from
which our law has been copied, 28a the American courts have held that the alien wife does not acquire American
citizenship by choice but by operation of law. "In the Revised Statutes the words "and taken" are omitted. The effect of

this statute is that every alien woman who marries a citizen of the United States becomes perforce a citizen herself,
without the formality of naturalization, and regardless of her wish in that respect." (USCA 8, p. 601 [1970 ed.], citing
Mackenzie v. Hare, 1913, 134 P. 713, 165 Cal. 766, affirmed 36 S. Ct. 106, 239 U.S. 299, 60 L ed. 297.) .
We need not recount here again how this provision in question was first enacted as paragraph (a) of Section 13, by way of
an insertion into Act 2927 by Act 3448 of November 30, 1928, and that, in turn, and paragraph was copied verbatim from
Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which by that time already had a long accepted construction
among the courts and administrative authorities in that country holding that under such provision an alien woman who
married a citizen became, upon such marriage, likewise a citizen by force of law and as a consequence of the marriage
itself without having to undergo any naturalization proceedings, provided that, it could be shown that at the time of such
marriage, she was not disqualified to be naturalized under the laws then in force. To repeat the discussion We already
made of these undeniable facts would unnecessarily make this decision doubly extensive. The only point which might be
reiterated for emphasis at this juncture is that whereas in the United States, the American Congress, recognizing the
construction, of Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes to be as stated above, and finding it desirable to avoid the effects of
such construction, approved the Act of September 22, 1922 Explicitly requiring all such alien wives to submit to judicial
naturalization albeit under more liberal terms than those for other applicants for citizenship, on the other hand, the
Philippine Legislature, instead of following suit and adopting such a requirement, enacted Act 3448 on November 30,
1928 which copied verbatim the aforementioned Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes, thereby indicating its preference to
adopt the latter law and its settled construction rather than the reform introduced by the Act of 1922.
Obviously, these considerations leave Us no choice. Much as this Court may feel that as the United States herself has
evidently found it to be an improvement of her national policy vis-a-vis the alien wives of her citizens to discontinue their
automatic incorporation into the body of her citizenry without passing through the judicial scrutiny of a naturalization
proceeding, as it used to be before 1922, it seems but proper, without evidencing any bit of colonial mentality, that as a
developing country, the Philippines adopt a similar policy, unfortunately, the manner in which our own legislature has
enacted our laws on the subject, as recounted above, provides no basis for Us to construe said law along the line of the
1922 modification of the American Law. For Us to do so would be to indulge in judicial legislation which it is not
institutionally permissible for this Court to do. Worse, this court would be going precisely against the grain of the implicit
Legislative intent.
There is at least one decision of this Court before Burca wherein it seems it is quite clearly implied that this Court is of the
view that under Section 16 of the Naturalization Law, the widow and children of an applicant for naturalization who dies
during the proceedings do not have to submit themselves to another naturalization proceeding in order to avail of the
benefits of the proceedings involving the husband. Section 16 provides: .
SEC. 16. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have died. In case a petitioner should die before the final
decision has been rendered, his widow and minor children may continue the proceedings. The decision rendered in the
case shall, so far as the widow and minor children are concerned, produce the same legal effect as if it had been rendered
during the life of the petitioner.
In Tan Lin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-13706, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 383, this Court held:
Invoking the above provisions in their favor, petitioners-appellants argue (1) that under said Sec. 16, the widow and minor
children are allowed to continue the same proceedings and are not substituted for the original petitioner; (2) that the
qualifications of the original petitioner remain to be in issue and not those of the widow and minor children, and (3) that
said Section 16 applies whether the petitioner dies before or after final decision is rendered, but before the judgment
becomes executory.
There is force in the first and second arguments. Even the second sentence of said Section 16 contemplate the fact that the
qualifications of the original petitioner remains the subject of inquiry, for the simple reason that it states that "The
decision rendered in the case shall, so far as the widow and minor children are concerned, produce the same legal effect as

if it had been rendered during the life of the petitioner." This phraseology emphasizes the intent of the law to continue the
proceedings with the deceased as the theoretical petitioner, for if it were otherwise, it would have been unnecessary to
consider the decision rendered, as far as it affected the widow and the minor children.
xxx xxx xxx
The Chua Chian case (supra), cited by the appellee, declared that a dead person can not be bound to do things stipulated
in the oath of allegiance, because an oath is a personal matter. Therein, the widow prayed that she be allowed to take the
oath of allegiance for the deceased. In the case at bar, petitioner Tan Lin merely asked that she be allowed to take the oath
of allegiance and the proper certificate of naturalization, once the naturalization proceedings of her deceased husband,
shall have been completed, not on behalf of the deceased but on her own behalf and of her children, as recipients of the
benefits of his naturalization. In other words, the herein petitioner proposed to take the oath of allegiance, as a citizen of
the Philippines, by virtue of the legal provision that "any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of
the Philippines and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines. Minor children
of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof." (Section
15, Commonwealth Act No. 473). The decision granting citizenship to Lee Pa and the record of the case at bar, do not
show that the petitioning widow could not have been lawfully naturalized, at the time Lee Pa filed his petition, apart from
the fact that his 9 minor children were all born in the Philippines. (Decision, In the Matter of the Petition of Lee Pa to be
admitted a citizen of the Philippines, Civil Case No. 16287, CFI, Manila, Annex A; Record on Appeal, pp. 8-11). The
reference to Chua Chian case is, therefore, premature.
Section 16, as may be seen, is a parallel provision to Section 15. If the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino,
who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization preceeding, in order to be considered as a
Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. This is plain
common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them differently.
Additionally, We have carefully considered the arguments advanced in the motion for reconsideration in Burca, and We
see no reason to disagree with the following views of counsel: .
It is obvious that the provision itself is a legislative declaration of who may be considered citizens of the Philippines. It is
a proposition too plain to be disputed that Congress has the power not only to prescribe the mode or manner under which
foreigners may acquire citizenship, but also the very power of conferring citizenship by legislative fiat. (U. S. v. Wong
Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 42 L. Ed. 890 [1898] ; see 1 Taada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines 152 [1961 ed.])
The Constitution itself recognizes as Philippine citizens "Those who are naturalized in accordance with law" (Section 1[5],
Article IV, Philippine Constitution). Citizens by naturalization, under this provision, include not only those who are
naturalized in accordance with legal proceedings for the acquisition of citizenship, but also those who acquire citizenship
by "derivative naturalization" or by operation of law, as, for example, the "naturalization" of an alien wife through the
naturalization of her husband, or by marriage of an alien woman to a citizen. (See Taada & Carreon, op. cit. supra, at
152, 172; Velayo, Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization 2 [1965 ed.]; 1 Paras, Civil Code 186 [1967 ed.]; see also 3
Hackworth, Digest of International Law 3).
The phrase "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" found in Section 14 of the Revised Naturalization Law clearly
manifests an intent to confer citizenship. Construing a similar phrase found in the old U.S. naturalization law (Revised
Statutes, 1994), American courts have uniformly taken it to mean that upon her marriage, the alien woman becomes by
operation of law a citizen of the United States as fully as if she had complied with all the provisions of the statutes upon
the subject of naturalization. (U.S. v. Keller, 13 F. 82; U.S. Opinions of the US Attorney General dated June 4, 1874 [14
Op. 4021, July 20, 1909 [27 Op. 507], December 1, 1910 [28 Op. 508], Jan. 15, 1920 [32 Op. 2091 and Jan. 12, 1923 [23
398]).
The phrase "shall be deemed a citizen," in Section 1994 Revised Statute (U.S. Comp. Stat. 1091, 1268) or as it was in the
Act of 1855 (10 Stat. at L. 604, Chapt. 71, Sec. 2), "shall be deemed and taken to be a citizens" while it may imply that the

person to whom it relates has not actually become a citizen by the ordinary means or in the usual way, as by the judgment
of a competent court, upon a proper application and proof, yet it does not follow that such person is on that account
practically any the less a citizen. The word "deemed" is the equivalent of "considered" or "judged," and therefore,
whatever an Act of Congress requires to be "deemed" or "taken" as true of any person or thing must, in law, be
considered as having been duly adjudged or established concerning such person or thing, and have force and effect
accordingly. When, therefore, Congress declares that an alien woman shall, under certain circumstances, be "deemed" an
American citizen, the effect when the contingency occurs, is equivalent to her being naturalized directly by an Act of
Congress or in the usual mode thereby prescribed. (Van Dyne, Citizenship of the United States 239, cited in Velayo,
Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization 146-147 [1965 ed.]; emphasis ours).
That this was likewise the intent of the Philippine legislature when it enacted the first paragraph of Section 15 of the
Revised Naturalization Law is shown by a textual analysis of the entire statutory provision. In its entirety, Section 15
reads:
(See supra).
The phrases "shall be deemed" "shall be considered," and "shall automatically become" as used in the above provision, are
undoubtedly synonymous. The leading idea or purpose of the provision was to confer Philippine citizenship by operation
of law upon certain classes of aliens as a legal consequence of their relationship, by blood or by affinity, to persons who
are already citizens of the Philippines. Whenever the fact of relationship of the persons enumerated in the provision
concurs with the fact of citizenship of the person to whom they are related, the effect is for said persons to become ipso
facto citizens of the Philippines. "Ipso facto" as here used does not mean that all alien wives and all minor children of
Philippine citizens, from the mere fact of relationship, necessarily become such citizens also. Those who do not meet the
statutory requirements do not ipso factobecome citizens; they must apply for naturalization in order to acquire such status.
What it does mean, however, is that in respect of those persons enumerated in Section 15, the relationship to a citizen of
the Philippines is the operative fact which establishes the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by them. Necessarily, it also
determines the point of time at which such citizenship commences. Thus, under the second paragraph of Section 15, a
minor child of a Filipino naturalized under the law, who was born in the Philippines, becomes ipso facto a citizen of the
Philippines from the time the fact of relationship concurs with the fact of citizenship of his parent, and the time when the
child became a citizen does not depend upon the time that he is able to prove that he was born in the Philippines. The
child may prove some 25 years after the naturalization of his father that he was born in the Philippines and should,
therefore, be "considered" a citizen thereof. It does not mean that he became a Philippine citizen only at that later time.
Similarly, an alien woman who married a Philippine citizen may be able to prove only some 25 years after her marriage
(perhaps, because it was only 25 years after the marriage that her citizenship status became in question), that she is one
who might herself be lawfully naturalized." It is not reasonable to conclude that she acquired Philippine citizenship only
after she had proven that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized." It is not reasonable to conclude that she acquired
Philippine citizenship only after she had proven that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized."
The point that bears emphasis in this regard is that in adopting the very phraseology of the law, the legislature could not
have intended that an alien wife should not be deemed a Philippine citizenunless and until she proves that she might
herself be lawfully naturalized. Far from it, the law states in plain terms that she shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines if she is one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized." The proviso that she must be one "who might herself
be lawfully naturalized" is not a condition precedent to the vesting or acquisition of citizenship; it is only a condition or a
state of fact necessary to establish her citizenship as a factum probandum, i.e., as a fact established and proved in evidence.
The word "might," as used in that phrase, precisely replies that at the time of her marriage to a Philippine citizen, the alien
woman "had (the) power" to become such a citizen herself under the laws then in force. (Owen v. Kelly, 6 DC 191 [1867],
aff'd Kelly v. Owen, 76 US 496, 19 L ed 283 [1869). That she establishes such power long after her marriage does not
alter the fact that at her marriage, she became a citizen.
(This Court has held) that "an alien wife of a Filipino citizen may not acquire the status of a citizen of the
Philippines unless there is proof that she herself may be lawfully naturalized" (Decision, pp. 3-4). Under this view, the

"acquisition" of citizenship by the alien wife depends on her having proven her qualifications for citizenship, that is, she is
not a citizen unless and until she proves that she may herself be lawfully naturalized. It is clear from the words of the law
that the proviso does not mean that she must first prove that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized" before she shall be
deemed (by Congress, not by the courts) a citizen. Even the "uniform" decisions cited by this Court (at fn. 2) to support its
holding did not rule that the alien wife becomes a citizen only after she has proven her qualifications for citizenship. What
those decisions ruled was that the alien wives in those cases failed to prove their qualifications and therefore they failed to
establish their claim to citizenship. Thus in Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, 101 Phil. 459 [l957], the case was remanded to the
lower court for determination of whether petitioner, whose claim to citizenship by marriage to a Filipino was disputed by
the Government, "might herself be lawfully naturalized," for the purpose of " proving her alleged change of political
status from alien to citizen" (at 464). In Cua v. Board, 101 Phil. 521 [1957], the alien wife who was being deported,
claimed she was a Philippine citizen by marriage to a Filipino. This Court finding that there was no proof that she was not
disqualified under Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law, ruled that: "No such evidence appearing on record, the
claim of assumption of Philippine citizenship by Tijoe Wu Suan, upon her marriage to petitioner, is untenable." (at 523) It
will be observed that in these decisions cited by this Court, the lack of proof that the alien wives "might (themselves) be
lawfully naturalized" did not necessarily imply that they did not become, in truth and in fact, citizens upon their marriage
to Filipinos. What the decisions merely held was that these wives failed to establish their claim to that status as a proven
fact.
In all instances where citizenship is conferred by operation of law, the time when citizenship is conferred should not be
confused with the time when citizenship status is established as a proven fact. Thus, even a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, whose citizenship status is put in issue in any proceeding would be required to prove, for instance, that his
father is a citizen of the Philippines in order to factually establish his claim to citizenship.* His citizenship status
commences from the time of birth, although his claim thereto is established as a fact only at a subsequent time. Likewise,
an alien woman who might herself be lawfully naturalized becomes a Philippine citizen at the time of her marriage to a
Filipino husband, not at the time she is able to establish that status as a proven fact by showing that she might herself be
lawfully naturalized. Indeed, there is no difference between a statutory declaration that a person is deemed a citizen of the
Philippines provided his father is such citizen from a declaration that an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen of the
Philippines provided she might herself be lawfully naturalized. Both become citizens by operation of law; the former
becomes a citizen ipso facto upon birth; the later ipso facto upon marriage.
It is true that unless and until the alien wife proves that she might herself be lawfully naturalized, it cannot be said that she
has established her status as a proven fact. But neither can it be said that on that account, she did not become a citizen of
the Philippines. If her citizenship status is not questioned in any legal proceeding, she obviously has no obligation to
establish her status as a fact. In such a case, the presumption of law should be that she is what she claims to be. (U.S. v.
Roxas, 5 Phil. 375 [1905]; Hilado v. Assad, 51 O.G. 4527 [1955]). There is a presumption that a representation shown to
have been made is true. (Aetna Indemnity Co. v. George A. Fuller, Co., 73 A. 738, 74 A. 369, 111 ME. 321).
The question that keeps bouncing back as a consequence of the foregoing views is, what substitute is them for
naturalization proceedings to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled
and established so that she may not have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter in to a
transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos? The ready answer to such question is that as the laws
of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure, but such paucity is no proof that
the citizenship under discussion is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the
case may be, for the truth is that the same situation objections even as to native-born Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship
of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to
be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. This, as We view it, is the sense in which Justice Dizon
referred to "appropriate proceeding" in Brito v. Commissioner, supra. Indeed, only the good sense and judgment of those
subsequently inquiring into the matter may make the effort easier or simpler for the persons concerned by relying
somehow on the antecedent official findings, even if these are not really binding.

It may not be amiss to suggest, however, that in order to have a good starting point and so that the most immediate
relevant public records may be kept in order, the following observations in Opinion No. 38, series of 1958, of then Acting
Secretary of Justice Jesus G. Barrera, may be considered as the most appropriate initial step by the interested parties:
Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine
citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for
the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that she is married to a Filipino,
citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to section 4 of Commonwealth
Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint
affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups
disqualified by the cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen (please see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau
of Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or denying the petition.
Once the Commissioner of Immigration cancels the subject's registration as an alien, there will probably be less difficulty
in establishing her Filipino citizenship in any other proceeding, depending naturally on the substance and vigor of the
opposition.
Before closing, it is perhaps best to clarify that this third issue We have passed upon was not touched by the trial court,
but as the point is decisive in this case, the Court prefers that the matter be settled once and for all now.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court a quo dismissing appellants' petition for injunction is
hereby reversed and the Commissioner of Immigration and/or his authorized representative is permanently enjoined from
causing the arrest and deportation and the confiscation of the bond of appellant Lau Yuen Yeung, who is hereby declared
to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to her co-appellant Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto
Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen on January 25, 1962. No costs.
Dizon, Castro, Teehankee and Villamor, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 153675

April 19, 2007

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the Philippine

Department of Justice, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUOZ, Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Manila (presided by respondent Judge
Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil Case No. 99-95773. These are: (1) the Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing
Juan Antonio Muoz, private respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order dated April 10, 2002 denying the motion to
vacate the said Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
represented by the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The petition alleges that both Orders were issued
by respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in
the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.

The facts are:

On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an
"Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20, 1997.
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the Peoples Republic of China and became the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region.
Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an
advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He
also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On
August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of
seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest
of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn,
filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest of private respondent.
On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent. That same day,
the NBI agents arrested and detained him.
On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition
andmandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning the
validity of the Order of Arrest.
On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the Order of Arrest void.
On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 140520,
praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed.
On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and sustaining the validity of the
Order of Arrest against private respondent. The Decision became final and executory on April 10, 2001.
Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of
Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95733, raffled off to Branch 10,
presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private respondent filed, in the same case,- a petition for
bail which was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there
is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk."
On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil Case No. 99-95733. It was then
raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.
On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail.
This was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing private respondent to post bail, thus:
In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accuseds further erosion of civil liberties. The petition for bail is granted
subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer
the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court,
will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the
government;

2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;

3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure order
before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the nearest office,
at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of
accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his
undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted
therein accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by respondent judge
in his Order dated April 10, 2002.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law
providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights
extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of ones
liberty.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be impaired, thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by
law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
bail shall not be required.
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the first time that this Court
has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may be granted bail.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42,
and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court, speaking through then Associate Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. It
is "available only in criminal proceedings," thus:
x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as
Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of
Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings because extradition courts do not render judgments
of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should
not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond
reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando, J., later CJ). It follows that
the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at
issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in
criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusfinds application

"only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion" (Sec. 18, Art.
VIII, Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail
in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in
extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondents case. However, this Court cannot ignore the
following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international law who,
in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the
international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their
treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one
hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and the
sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject of international
law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited only to states was
dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World
War II resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as violations of the laws of
war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have
been persecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. These significant
events show that the individual person is now a valid subject of international law.
On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations and states gave recognition and
importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every person were
proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as customarily
binding upon the members of the international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,2 this Court, in
granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution,3 the principles set forth in that Declaration
are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights which the Philippines signed and ratified. Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights
of every person to life, liberty, and due process.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human
rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our
Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty
and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to
decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine
authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their
fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited
the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving
recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Courts ruling
in Purganan is in order.
First, we note that the exercise of the States power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to
criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine,4 have likewise been
detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine
jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail
persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in

detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines
under international conventions to uphold human rights.
The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing deportation for failure to secure the
necessary certificate of registration was granted bail pending his appeal. After noting that the prospective deportee had
committed no crime, the Court opined that "To refuse him bail is to treat him as a person who has committed the most
serious crime known to law;" and that while deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of the machinery used "is the
machinery of criminal law." Thus, the provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation proceedings.
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration,7 this Court ruled that foreign nationals
against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the finality of an order of
deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining
the detainees right to bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases.
Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why
it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the
person detained is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various
treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these
treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of
every individual is not impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the
removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable
the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the
execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government."
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one
accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender
him to the demanding state.8 It is not a criminal proceeding.9 Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition
proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow
extradition.10 It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations.11 It is not a trial
to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee.12Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is
merely administrative in character.13 Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to
secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.14
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty
on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also "the
machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which
mandates the "immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the interest of
justice." We further note that Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional arrest
of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and that release from provisional arrest "shall not
prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A
potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the
demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the process of
extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable.

Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until December 20,
2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for over two (2) years
without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious
deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the
extradition court to grant him bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting
him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings. In the latter, the
standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused. As Purganancorrectly points out, it
is from this major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose
of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the
possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from
justice.15 Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears theonus probandi of showing that he or she is not a
flight risk and should be granted bail.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the
Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these
obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily
mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees rights to life,
liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by
international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right
to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the
proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases.
While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply
given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his
Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard
which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to
him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The
potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the
orders and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk.
Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail
on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether private
respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the trial court should order the
cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with
dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-4352

September 28, 1951

VICTOR BOROVSKY, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION and THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondents.
Victor Borovsky in his own behalf.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto Gianzon and Solicitor Florencio Villamor for respondents.
TUASON, J.:
This is a second petition for habeas corpus filed by the petitioner with this Court, first having been denied in a decision
promulgated on June 30, 1949.
Victor A. Borovsky, the petitioner, claims to be a stateless citizen, born in Shanghai, China, of Russian parentage. He
came to the Philippines in 1936 and had resided therein ever since, if the period of his detention be included.
On June 24, 1946, by order of the Commissioner of immigration of the Philippines the petitioner was arrested for
investigation as to his past activities. Following his arrest, a warrant for deportation was issued by the Deportation Board,
which is said to have been found him an undesirable alien, a vagrant and habitual drunkard. The petitioner protests that he
was not given a hearing, nor informed of the charges preferred against him. This point however is unimportant in this
proceeding.
In May, 1947, the petitioner was put on board a ship which took him to Shanghai, but he was not allowed to land there
because he was not a national of China and was not provided with an entry visa. He was therefore brought back to Manila
and was confined to the new Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa until December 8, 1947, when he was granted provisional
release by the President through Secretary of Justice for a period of six months. Before the expiration of that period,
namely, on March 20, 1948, the Commissioner of Immigration caused his rearrest and he has been in confinement in the
above-mentioned prison ever since.
In his return to the writ, the Solicitor General in behalf of the respondents alleges that the Commissioner of Immigration
"has availed of every opportunity presented to carry out the deportation order as shown by the fact that when the petitioner
was enjoying his provisional release after the unsuccessful attempt to deport him to Shanghai, China, he was again rearrested and flown to Cebu for the purpose of placing him on board a Russian vessel which he has called at the port, with
a view to carrying out the deportation order issued against him, but said deportation was not carried out for the reason that
the captain of the said boat refused to take on board the herein petitioner on the ground that he had no permission from the
Russian government to take on board the petitioner." It is further alleged that "the immigration officials have taken steps
regarding the disposition of those foreigners subject to deportation while awaiting availability of transportation or
arrangements to the place where they may be sent."
In this Court's majority decision on the first application it was observed that the applicant's detention was temporary, and
it was held that "temporary detention is a necessary step in the process of exclusion or expulsion of undesirable aliens and
that pending arrangements for his deportation, the Government has the right to hold the undesirable alien under for a
reasonable length of time." It took note of that "this Government desires to expel the alien, and does not relish keeping
him at the people's expense . . . making efforts to carry out the decree of exclusion by the highest officer of the land." No
period was fixed within which the immigration authorities were to carry out the contemplated deportation beyond the
statement that "The meaning of `reasonable time' depends upon the circumstances, specially the difficulties of obtaining a
passport, the availability of transportation, the diplomatic arrangements with the governments concerned and the efforts
displayed to send the deportee away," but the Court warned that "under established precedents, too long a issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus."
Mr. Justice Paras, now Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Feria, Mr. Justice Perfecto, and the writer of this decision dissented. Mr.
Justice Feria and Mr. Justice Perfecto voted for outright discharge of the prisoner from custody. Mr. Justice Paras
qualified his dissent by stating that he might agree "to a further detention of the herein petitioner, provided that he be

released if after six months, the Government is still unable to deport him." This writer joined in the latter dissent but
thought that two months constituted reasonable time.
Over two years having elapsed since the decision aforesaid was promulgated, the Government has not found ways and
means of removing the petitioner out of the country, and none are insight, although, it should be in justice to the
deportation authorities, it was through no fault of theirs that no ship or country would take the petitioner.
Aliens illegally staying in the Philippines have no right of asylum therein (Soewapadji vs. Wixon, Sept. 13, 1946, 157 F.
ed., 289, 290), even if they are "stateless," which the petitioner claims to be. It is no less true however, as impliedly stated
in this court's decision, supra, and numerous American decisions, that foreign nationals, not enemy, against whom no
criminal charges have been formally made or judicial order issued, may not indefinitely be kept in detention. The
protection against deprivation of liberty, without due process of law and except for crimes committed against the laws of
the land is not limited to Philippine citizens but extends to all residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality.
Whether an alien who entered the country in violation of its immigration laws may be detained for as long as the
Government is unable to deport him, is beside the point and we need not decide. There is no allegation that the petitioner's
entry into the Philippines was not lawful; on the contrary, the inference from the pleadings and the Deportation Board's
findings is that he came to and lived in this country under legal permit.
Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, sec. 3) the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law
as part of the law of Nation." And in a resolution entitled "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" and approved by the
General Assembly of the United Nations of which the Philippines is a member, at its plenary meeting on December 10,
1948, the right to life and liberty and all other fundamental rights as applied to all human beings were proclaimed. lt was
there resolved that "All human beings are born free and equal in degree and rights" (Art. 1); that "Everyone is entitled to
all the rights and freedom set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, nationality or social origin, property, birth, or other status (Art. 2) ; that "Everyone has
the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him
by the Constitution or by law" (Art. 8); that "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile" (Art. 9) etc.
In U. S. vs. Nichols, 47 Fed. Supp., 201, it was said that the court "has the power to release from custody an alien who has
been detained an unreasonably long period of time by the Department of justice after it has become apparent that although
a warrant for his deportation has been issued, the warrant cannot be effectuated;" that "the theory on which the court is
given the power to act is that the warrant of deportation, not having been able to be executed, is functus officio and the
alien is being held without any authority of law." The decision cited several cases which, it said, settled the matter
definitely in that jurisdiction, adding that the same result had been reached in innumerable case elsewhere. The cases
referred to were United States ex rel. Ross vs. Wallis, 2 Cir. 279 F. 401, 404; Caranica vs. Nagle, 9 Cir., 28 F. 2d 955;
Saksagansky vs. Weedin, 9 Cir., 53 F. 13, 16 last paragraph; Ex parte Matthews, D.C.W.D. Wash., 277 F. 857;
Moraitis vs. Delany, D.C. Md. Aug. 28, 1942, 46 F. Supp. 425.
The most recent case, as far as we have been able to find, was that of Staniszewski vs. Watkins (1948) 80 Fed. Supp. 132,
which is nearly foursquare with the case at hand. In that case a stateless person, formerly a Polish national, resident in the
United States since 1911 and many times serving as a seaman on American vessels both in peace and in war, was ordered
excluded from the United States and detained at Ellis Island at the expense of the steamship company, when he returned
from a voyage on which he shipped from New York for one or more European ports and return to the United States. The
grounds for his exclusion were that he had no passport or immigration visa, and that in 1937 had been convicted of
perjury because in certain document's he represented himself to be an American citizen. Upon his application for release
on habeas corpus, the Court released him upon his own recognizance. Judge Leibell, of the United States District, Court
for the Southern District of New York, said in part:
When the return to the writ of habeas corpus came before this court, I suggest that all interested parties . . . make an effort
to arrange to have the petitioner ship out some country that would receive him a a resident. He is a native-born Pole but
the Polish Consul has advises him in writing that he is no longer a Polish subject. This Government does not claim that he

is a Polish citizen. His attorney says he is stateless. The Government is willing that he go back to the ship, but if he were
sent back aboard ship and sailed to the port (Cherbourg, France) from which he last sailed to the United States he would
probably be denied permission to land. There is no other country that would take him, without proper documents.
It seems to me that this to me this is a genuine hardship case and that the petitioner should be released from custody on
proper terms . . .
What is to be done with the petitioner? the government has had him in custody almost seven months and practically
admits it has no place to send him out of this country. The steamship company, which employed him as one of group sent
to the ship by Union, with proper seaman's papers issued by the United States Coast Guard, is paying $3.00 a day for
petitioner's board at Ellis Island. It is no fault of the steamship company that petitioner is an inadmissible alien as the
immigration officials describe him. . . .
I intend to sustain the writ of habeas corpus and order the release of the petitioner on his own recognizance. he will be
required to inform the immigration officials at Ellis Island by mail on the mail. If the government does succeed in
arranging for petitioner's deportation to a country that will be ready to receive him as a resident, it may then advise the
petitioner to that effect and arrange for his deportation in the manner provided by law.
Although not binding upon this court as a precedent, the case aforecited offered a happy solution to the quandary in which
the parties here find themselves, solution which we think is sensible, sound and compatible with law and the Constitution.
For this reason, and since the Philippine law on immigration was patterned after or copied from the American law and
practice, we choose to follow and adopt the reasoning and conclusion in the Staniszewski decision with some
modifications which, it is believed, are in consonance with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the Philippines.
It was said or insinuated at the hearing of the petition at bar, but not alleged in the return, that the petitioner was engaged
in subversive activities, and fear was expressed that he might join or aid the disloyal elements if, allowed to be at large.
Bearing in mind the Government's allegation in its answer that "the herein petitioner was brought to the Philippines by the
Japanese forces," and the fact that Japan is no longer at war with the United States or the Philippines nor identified with
the countries allied against those nations, the possibility of the petitioner's entertaining or committing hostile acts
prejudicial to the interest and security of this country seems remote.
If we grant, for the sake of argument, that such a possibility exists, still the petitioner's unduly prolonged detention would
be unwarranted by law and the Constitution, if the only purpose of the detention be to eliminate a danger that is by no
means, actual, present, or uncontrollable. After all, the Government is not impotent to deal with or prevent any threat by
such measure as that just outlined. The thought eloquently expressed by Mr. Justice Jackson of the United States Supreme
Court in connection with the application for bail of ten Communists convicted by a lower of advocacy of violent
overthrow of the United States Government is, in principle pertinent and may be availed of at this juncture. Said the
learned Jurist:
The Government's alternative contention is that defendants, by misbehavior after conviction, have forfeited their claim to
bail. Grave public danger is said to result from what they may be expected to do, in addition to what they have done since
their conviction. If I assume that defendants are disposed to commit every opportune disloyal act helpful to Communist
countries, it is still difficult to reconcile with traditional American law the jailing of persons by the courts because of
anticipated but as yet uncommitted crimes. Imprisonment to protect society from predicted but unconsummated offenses
is so unprecedented in this country and so fraught with danger of excesses and injustice that I am loath to resort to it, even
as a discretionary judicial technique to supplement conviction of such offenses as those of which defendants stand
convicted.
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But the right of every American to equal treatment before the law is wrapped up in the same constitutional bundle with
those of these Communists. If an anger or disgust with these defendants we throw out the bundle, we also cast aside
protection for the liberties of more worthy critics who may be in opposition to the government of some future day.
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If, however, I were to be wrong on an of these abstract or theoretical matters of principle, there is a very practical aspect
of this application which must not be overlooked or underestimated-that is the disastrous effect on the reputation of
American justice if I should now send these men to jail and the full Court later decide that their conviction is invalid. All
experiences with litigation teaches that existence of a substantial question about a conviction implies a more than
negligible risk of reversal. Indeed this experience lies back of our rule permitting and practice of allowing bail where such
questions exist, to avoid the hazard of unjustifiably imprisoning persons with consequent reproach to our system of justice.
If that is prudent judicial practice in the ordinary case, how much more important to avoid every chance of handing to the
Communist world such an ideological weapon as it would have if this country should imprison this handful of Communist
leaders on a conviction that our own highest Court would confess to be illegal. Risks, of course, are involved in either
granting or refusing bail. I am not naive enough to underestimate the trouble making propensities of the defendants. But,
with the Department of Justice alert to the dangers, the worst they can accomplish in the short time it will take to end the
litigation is preferable to the possibility of national embarassment from a celebrated case of unjustified imprisonment of
Communist leaders. Under no circumstances must we permit their symbolization of an evil force in the world to be
hallowed and glorified by any semblance of martyrdom. The way to avoid that risk is not to jail those men until it is
finally decided that they should stay jailed.
If that case is not comparable with ours on the issues presented, its underlying principle is of universal application. In fact,
its ratio decidendi applies with greater force to the present petition, since the right of accused to bail pending appeal of his
case, as in the case of the ten Communists, depends upon the discretion of the court, whereas the right to be enlarged
before formal charges are instituted is absolute. As already noted, not only are there no charges pending against the
petitioner, but the prospects of bringing any against him are slim and remote.
Premises considered, the writ will issue commanding the respondents to release the petitioner from custody upon these
terms: The petitioner shall be placed under the surveillance of the immigration authorities of their agents in such form and
manner as my be deemed adequate to insure that he keep peace and be available when the Government is ready to deport
him. The surveillance shall be reasonable and the question of reasonableness shall be submitted to this Court or to the
Court of First Instance of Manila for decision in case of abuse. He shall also put up a bond for the above purpose in the
amount of P5,000.00 with sufficient surety or sureties, which bond the Commissioner of Immigration is authorized to
exact by Section 40 of Commonwealth Act No. 613. No costs will be charged.
Paras, C.J., Feria, Bengzon, Padilla, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Jugo, J., concurs in the result.