Afghan reconstruction

Back to Crises

US Army suicide rate last year highest since 1999

Fri 21 Apr 2006 8:21 PM ET

The number of soldiers who took their own lives while serving in Iraq and Afghanistan
rose in 2005 over the previous year, as the U.S. Army experienced its highest suicide
rate since 1999, officials said on Friday. Full Article

Six police, U.S. soldier, killed in Afghan violence

Fri 21 Apr 2006 6:02 AM ET

Taliban insurgents attacked a police post on Friday killing six policemen as gunmen
opened fire on a patrol in a separate incident, killing a U.S. soldier, officials said. Full
Article

U.S. soldier killed in Afghan attack

Fri 21 Apr 2006 4:48 AM ET

Gunmen opened fire on a patrol investigating a weapons cache in Afghanistan on

Friday killing a U.S. soldier and wounding an Afghan trooper, the U.S. military said.
Full Article

JS Online
Afghanistan still needs U.S. attention
By RICHARD FOSTER
rfoster@journalsentinel.com

Last Updated: March 29, 2003

The ruins of the World Trade Center were still smoldering when the United States attacked Afghanistan
with the objective, quickly achieved, of overthrowing the Taliban regime. It was a regime that had sheltered
Osama bin Laden's terrorist network, al-Qaida, which was responsible for the terror attacks of Sept. 11,
2001.

Today, Afghanistan has been crowded off the television screens and newspaper pages by the U.S. attack on
another rogue regime, this one in Iraq. But however invisible and silent they may have become,
Afghanistan's problems did not end with the downfall of the Taliban and the dispersal of al-Qaida.

Just a few days ago, in fact, Afghan fighters believed to be remnants of the Taliban regime attacked a
government checkpoint in northern Afghanistan and started fighting that left at least 13 people dead. And
state television reported that four former Taliban officials had been arrested southwest of Kabul, the Afghan
capital.

Bin Laden himself pops up from time to time on Arab television to taunt Americans and urge a continued
struggle against this country, its values and its government.

In the 1980s, the United States supported the defeat of another army that had invaded Afghanistan - the
army of the Soviet Union. But once the Russian occupiers had been expelled, the world quickly lost interest
in Afghanistan, just as it has now.

It was in this environment of neglect and postwar poverty and political anarchy that the Taliban took root in
the early 1990s. The memory of that terrible takeover recently prompted Afghanistan's foreign minister,
Abdullah Abdullah, to warn that "the Afghan people hope not to become victims of neglect and policy
shortsightedness again. They are weighing and matching words with deeds."

Mindful of its continuing responsibilities in Afghanistan, the Bush administration played a key role in
organizing an international gathering in Tokyo in January 2002. At that conference, donors pledged more
than $4.5 billion in aid to Afghanistan over five years to repave shattered roads, rebuild schools and
hospitals, and generally help the country heal and rebuild. The problem is, not much of this aid has been
delivered.

Most of it has been channeled through the United Nations and private relief organizations to feed and house
refugees and others.

The Bush administration has made attempts to energize the reconstruction process, but these attempts have
become increasingly rare and weak; since the Kyoto meeting, the administration has been pre-

occupied with the planning for the war in Iraq.

As a result, the authority of the Karzai government is pretty much limited to Kabul. Outside the capital,
Afghanistan's various warlords - with exquisite delicacy, the Pentagon calls them "regional leaders" - hold
sway. They collect tolls, customs duties and other forms of revenue and even, in some cases, field local
armies.

In late 2001, the U.N. authorized the creation of an international security assistance force that would operate
until a new national army for Afghanistan could be trained, equipped and fielded. But the new force
operates only in Kabul, and the creation of a new army has been slow going, largely because Afghanistan's
regional divisions have not been bridged. Afghanistan is less a unified nation than a region of fiefdoms,
presided over by these warlords.

It hardly needs saying that abandoning Afghanistan yet again would be a colossal blunder. The failure of the
United States and other countries to remain engaged there made it possible for the Taliban and the al-Qaida
gang to move in.

There are already reports that the Taliban and al-Qaida are filtering back into Afghanistan from Pakistan and
elsewhere, and these reports have been given credibility by last week's news of renewed Taliban violence.

There are reasonable doubts about the Bush administration's allegations linking Saddam Hussein's Iraq to al-

Qaida. No such doubts can exist about al-Qaida's link to the

Taliban. This country cannot allow itself to become so obsessed with Iraq that it allows Afghanistan to once
again become a hotbed of terrorism and religious extremism.

If we neglect and abandon Afghanistan once again, we will be setting the stage for the restoration of al-
Qaida, with all the misery that that portends.

Richard Foster is a Journal Sentinel editorial writer and columnist. His e-mail address is
rfoster@journalsentinel.com

A version of this story appeared in the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel on March 30, 2003.

Unfinished Business in Afghanistan: Warlordism, Reconstruction, and Ethnic

Harmony Summary
 In comparison to the quick and successful U.S. military campaign to oust the Taliban, the political task of
creating a stable and secure democratic state in Afghanistan is proving much more difficult. There are
some hopeful signs since January 2003 with sections of President Hamid Karzai's government apparatus
becoming more functional. But the central government continues to be severely hampered in the absence
of adequate funds, security structures, and infrastructure.
 The most compelling challenges facing Afghanistan today are: legitimizing the central government and
managing center-periphery relations, especially in dealing with warlords; providing credible security and
rule of law extending beyond Kabul; economic reconstruction; and maintaining ethnic harmony and
achieving national integration.
 The roots of "warlordism" are both internal and external. Historically, the Afghan central government has
been weak, with regionalist politics the norm. Regionalism and warlordism are not the same, but warlords
use regionalism for their own purposes when circumstances allow. The manner in which the United States
fought the Soviet Union by furnishing weapons and money to a variety of Afghan commanders rather than
to a centralized political authority facilitated warlordism. Similarly U.S. military strategy between 9/11 and
the establishment of the Karzai government emphasized support for those Afghan commanders capable of
working with the United States in pursuing its military objective, thus contributing to the persistence of
warlords.
 The lack of international security forces or an effective national army beyond Kabul leaves the provinces
outside of international and central control, with warlords filling the vacuum. Regional actors question the
government's capacity to provide basic public goods and undermine its authority by controlling alternative
 resources through a variety of mechanisms, including illegal transit fees, smuggling, and drug dealing.
 The ethnic dynamics, while potentially volatile, continue to be reasonably well balanced. U.S. military
action affected the political balance and tilted power away from the Pashtuns, who find this difficult to
accept. But the Pashtun community also suffers internal divisions based on region, ideology, and
leadership personality. The victory of religious (as opposed to nationalist) Pashtun parties in the October
2002 elections across the border in Pakistan raises concern about its implications for Afghanistan. U.S.
intervention in Iraq may also mobilize Pashtun sentiment against American involvement in Afghanistan
and increase attacks against U.S. troops.
 Afghanistan's future is going to be significantly determined by how much priority the country will receive
in the short and medium run on the international community's agenda. So far, international assistance has
tended to be long on promises, short on delivery. This undercuts U.S. credibility in particular since the
United States is seen as President Karzai's strongest ally. Unless international attention can be maintained
on peace and reconstruction in Afghanistan even as other issues threaten to overwhelm the international
agenda, there is a danger that while the battle has been won, the war will be lost. The flare-ups between
U.S. troops and remnants of the Taliban or al Qaeda fighters since late January 2003 serve as a sharp
reminder that Afghanistan remains at risk.

Introduction
Afghans paint the interior of the Sayeed Jamaludin Teacher's Training College in Kabul. The college was rebuilt with funding from USAID
and implemented through the International Organization for Migration (IOM), in collaboration with the Transitional Government of
Afghanistan.
Courtesy USAID

Should the situation in Afghanistan be viewed as a glass half empty or a glass half full? The participants
who attended the three Afghanistan Working Group meetings held at the Institute between November 2002
and January 2003 gave different answers to this question, but there was consensus that much work remains
to be done in Afghanistan to keep it from sliding downwards. Afghanistan is not out of the woods yet
because it is plagued by multiple challenges at the domestic, regional, and international levels. The sense
was that the scale of the problem of reconstruction is much larger than most analysts had anticipated. For
example, more than a year after Hamid Karzai was installed as president, the central government's control
remains highly tenuous beyond the outskirts of Kabul—some close observers claim that up to 75 percent of
the country is controlled by warlords and regional leaders. At the same time, the remarkable resilience of the
war-weary population and their commitment for change from the past serves as a strong base for charting a
new course. There is popular expectation that the United States—having removed the Taliban from power—
will lead a major reconstruction effort by the international community.

Many participants pointed out that Afghanistan is one of the world's poorest countries (fifth in the world),
ravaged by more than two decades of war and strife, and that it would be foolhardy to expect change
overnight. In 2003, Afghanistan remains the world's largest exporter of heroin, ensuring a debilitating
connection between criminal elements and warlords. Apart from the huge economic devastation, Karzai's
government also inherited dysfunctional political and bureaucratic institutions from the Taliban era and
previous regimes, which have to be revamped. As important, Kabul does not control tax revenues
(especially customs duties), which remain in the hands of regional power brokers. A lingering question is
whether the international community, especially the United States, can marshal the necessary resources and
political staying power to assist President Karzai even as the crisis in Iraq unfolds.

The immediate challenges are manifold: legitimization of the central government and managing center-
periphery relations, especially warlords; provision of credible security and rule of law beyond Kabul;
maintaining ethnic harmony and achieving national integration; and ensuring that the international
community delivers on its promises. These are the key issues that were taken up by the speakers and
discussed by the participants in the Afghanistan Working Group. Barnett Rubin, New York University,
Thomas Barfield, Boston University, and Larry Sampler, Institute consultant, made brief presentations on
"Warlordism and Regionalism in Afghanistan"; Samina Ahmed, International Crisis Group in Pakistan, gave
a talk on "Post-Taliban Ethnic Dynamics"; and Robert Finn, U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, led
discussions on "Afghanistan Today."

"Warlordism" and Regionalism in Afghanistan

The term "warlord" is now a contested term, but for our purposes it denotes an individual who exercises a
combination of military, political, and economic power outside a constitutional or legal framework.
Warlords are particularly threatening when they exercise power over distinct geographical regions. In
normal, bureaucratically organized and functioning states, the government defines the legitimate sub-
national territorial units over which power is to be exercised. In Afghanistan, these units consist of 32
provinces (up from 29 in 1978), but there are also hauzas, military zones the communist regime created in
the 1980s. By and large, the regionally based warlords operate within the hauzas. This form of regionalism
is not unique to Afghanistan, and is in fact a form of politics in parts of post-Soviet Central Asia. However,
how did a combination of warlordism and regionalism emerge in today's Afghanistan? There is some social
basis for it, but one determining factor is whether sufficient resources are available for building a central
state that can incorporate or subordinate those wielding regional military power. The Taliban successfully
subordinated them with Pakistani and later al Qaeda assistance, one of the most popular things the Taliban
did.

The re-emergence of warlords after the ouster of the Taliban is partly related to the U.S. decision to support
regional commanders (who could help American military objectives) with money and weapons during the
campaign after September 11 rather than supporting a central authority. This approach resembled the war
waged by the United States against the Soviets in the 1980s, but one participant emphasized that it was
Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) that was America's key conduit to the warlords during that
period, thereby allowing the ISI to select recipients that served its own interests without any thought of
strengthening Afghanistan's central government. This time around, some officials argued that the United
States should delay the initiation of hostilities after September 11 until an international conference to
legitimate an alternative Kabul government was held so that the United States did not need to rely on
decentralized commanders, but their view did not prevail. Working group participants noted, however, that
it is incorrect to believe that because these commanders re-emerged with U.S. assistance, Americans and
their allies now can dictate terms to them.
The Persistence of Warlords

The warlords persist because the conditions that allow them to remain have not fundamentally changed.
Besides, they have a strong incentive to retain power as long as possible. It is no accident that the major
customs posts of Herat, Kandahar, Jalalabad, and Balhk (near Mazar-i-Sharif), which produce considerable
revenue, fall under their control. The goods that pass through these customs posts are primarily smuggled
goods, such as consumer durables from the Persian Gulf headed for the smugglers' markets in Pakistan, and
now increasingly for the Afghan market (largely for foreigners with hard currency).

The factor that contributes most to the survival of warlords is the continuing weakness of the center vis-a-vis
the periphery. Historically, Afghanistan's central government had the lowest rate of taxation per capita of
any nation in the world, and it tended to obtain resources externally, including transit fees, "supervised
smuggling," or international aid. The central government's trump card has been that it has a monopoly on
outside resources. After the Taliban was expelled, all the regional commanders realized that a key source of
power for the central government would be international aid, something which the average warlord had no
access to. The lack of adequate outside funds to the government, however, has made the warlords question
the government's capacity to provide basic public goods and given them the signal to develop their own
alternative resources through illegal transit fees, smuggling, and drug dealing. There are also some who
would like nothing better than to see the central government fail in its responsibilities, and actively seek to
undermine the government's capacity. The lack of security structures beyond Kabul allows the warlords to
consolidate their power without fear of being checked. There is neither a sufficient international security
force outside the capital or a credible national army, leaving the provinces outside international and central
control. Warlords fill the vacuum. There was a consensus among participants that the decision to restrict the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to Kabul has been a mistake. There is no international
security presence outside Kabul that is not fighting a war or perceived as a combatant (largely U.S. forces).

The purpose of the Bonn Agreement (resulting from the Bonn conference convened by the United States and
other key international actors in December 2001, which brought together many of Afghanistan's warring or
competing groups) is to establish a national government, modeled on the 1964 Constitution, which in
administrative terms means a centralized administration. The 1964 Constitution was selected because it was
the best legal framework available and the one with the greatest legitimacy among Afghans. It is fair to say
that most people who are not leaders of armed groups welcome a strong central government, which in
people's minds is equated with provision of security and rule of law. In that respect, the Taliban government
received considerable public support. When decentralization or federalism is brought up, many people in
Afghanistan interpret it to mean that regional commanders and warlords can keep their militias. The basic
dilemma in setting up the Afghan political entity is that "you have to organize some state power before you
can decentralize it." In Bosnia, to cite a recent experiment, the negative consequences of decentralizing
before consolidating the central authority continue to slow peacebuilding.

Tackling Warlords: Combat or Co-opt?

Opinion among the participants was split about the best way to deal with the warlords—whether to combat
them or try to co-opt them. One of the more provocative views put forth was that the warlords should not be
dislodged unless there was something to replace them with. Warlords are a problem, this participant said,
Feb. 4, 2002 Printer-Friendly Version

In an environment where lawlessness and subornation have filled the vacuum left
by the Taliban’s ouster, interim president Hamid Karzai has called for the creation
of an Afghan army — national mobilization that, in the words of Ali Shamkhani,
is supposed to “establish peace and security” in the country. It is one of the
provisional government’s top priorities — held as the country’s only way to avoid
civil war and guard against a weak, illegitimate government — the same situation
that enabled al Qaeda’s presence. However, the country is still struggling to
solidify a legitimate government that can control or influence provincial
strongmen and establish basic law and order.

Afghanistan is teeming with potential threats to security and stability, and they are
both internal and transnational in scope. To what extent these threats fall under
the purview of national defense, and to what extent they are classified as civil
police functions, is one of the most complex issues facing Afghanistan. A
national armed force must be loyal to the state and able to defend the country
against threats to security. In Afghanistan, though, internal power struggles and
armed, subversive Taliban loyalists may pose the greatest threats to national
survival — highlighting the difficulties of organizing “law and order” in a society
dominated by desperate poverty and warlords. Creation of an Afghan army,
rather than concentrating on internal police functions and border controls, may not
be the most effective way to deal with marked corruption, drug and arms
trafficking, and hijacking of foreign aid.

An Afghan Army vis-à-vis History and National Character

Afghanistan’s tumultuous political history has resulted in a recurring lack of

consistent, legitimate central authorities able to create or sustain a reasonably
disciplined, loyal armed force. At the same time, patronage-style relationships
have dominated both regular and paramilitary forces. Allegiance to commanders
hinges on a leader’s charisma and successful battle record and is contingent on his
ability to pay, provide food, and supply ammunition and vehicles. Fighters are
apt to switch sides when defeat looms or supplies run short; enticing enemy
commanders and soldiers to switch sides is merely a question of remuneration.
The fluid nature of alliances, the loose bands of fighters prone to hate crimes
when a battle is not going their way, and the tendency to desert and then re-join
when the bounty or weather is favorable are difficult obstacles to creating an
effective regular fighting force.

The creation of an Afghan army will further be complicated by its raison d’etre.
What will be the military’s mission if the commanders of the army itself, or its
reintegrated Taliban fighters, may in and of themselves be the threats to the
government? In Afghanistan, tribal and linguistic connections often supercede
other modes of identity, and leaders who need support from their groups have
reinforced the confinement of identity to these ties rather than extending it to a
larger notion. In a best case scenario, the army may serve as a connecting body
— uniting Afghans in a cause larger than tribal concerns or linguistic associations
— but it will also be difficult to overcome the tendency for political leadership to
seize on preexisting divisions and exploit them to maintain power. The extent to
which the army can do this will largely hinge on the threats that it is created to
counter.

Nature of the Threat

At present, the Afghan army’s area of responsibility is unclear, as is the reason for
its prioritization. Very generally speaking, military power exists for defense of
the nation. In Afghanistan, though, defending the nation is not a clear-cut
mission.

Most threats to Afghan national security are not traditional border-defense issues.
In fact, most of them are political-military or civil-military hybrids which
complicate the definition of “roles and missions” for an Afghan army.

As the British (the primary funders and trainers) admit, one of the major tasks of
an Afghan army will be to function as a counterbalance to warlords who, with
their armed militias, control large areas of the country and represent one of the
most pervasive threats to Afghan security and stability. To erode the power bases
from which these provincial and factional leaders operate, Afghans not associated
with the new military have been ordered to turn in their weapons. Yet unless the
commitment to this is widespread, leaders doubtless fear a strategic disadvantage
if they comply before their rivals.

Polarization of societal elements and the resultant clashes — whether the dividing
lines have had a religious, ethnic, or political orientation — is an internal threat,
not an external one. Afghanistan’s most recent threats have been home-grown.
Few threats will likely emerge from beyond its borders, and those of foreign
origin will likely be limited to the inflammation of existing conflicts by foreign
governments pursuing their own agendas.

There is no doubt that a stable security environment is a prerequisite for

Afghanistan’s reconstruction. Since Afghanistan’s security from an external
standpoint, i.e., the reassurance of its neighboring states and its contributions to
regional stability, will be determined by its ability to govern and police itself (in
essence, its internal security), domestic issues are paramount. If Afghanistan is
unable to mitigate problems like refugee flows and drug smuggling, the
possibility of unwanted foreign intervention — most likely from Iran —
increases. Border control will be essential; internal policing to stop blatant
thievery, bribery, and crime is also necessary before Afghanistan can even take
advantage of international assistance to create an economy, feed and relocate its
people, begin its turnaround. Moreover, a continued flow of reconstruction aid
will eventually depend on its effective distribution; down the road, there must be
enough order and rule of law to create a climate conducive to foreign investment.

Although these are immediate concerns, a more pressing problem remains the
eradication of remaining al Qaeda and Taliban fighters. In this regard, the United
States experienced firsthand that the traditional method to fight what would most
certainly be guerrilla warfare requires special, nontraditional training. The
Afghans are exceptionally well-versed in this kind of fighting — in fact, it has
been proven time and time again to them as the most effective way to fight. This
being said, fighters experienced in guerrilla tactics might be hard-pressed to
maintain a professional “law of war” mentality after being inculcated with tactics
that, while effective, are not sanctioned by the regular militaries of most nation
states.

Organization

Britain intends to be instrumental in the creation of a new army. Afghan military

leaders will tour British bases in February to develop a feel for administration and
oversight. Although appointed Afghan Defense Ministry officials believe
warlords will only submit forces to the command of newly-appointed (and former
Northern Alliance) defense minister, Gen. Mohammed Qaseem Fahim, if the
army is large, Major Gen. John McColl, commander of the International Security
Assistance Force, is likely to press for reorientation to a small professional force
rather than a large militia coalition. A smaller, truly national, ethnically balanced
army or police force seems to many Western donors to be a more sustainable,
practical alternative. Realizing their regional security is inherently linked to
Afghanistan’s, Russia and Iran have also indicated more than a passing interest in
training the new army in an attempt to gain leverage in Kabul. As part of its aid
package, the United States is providing uniforms for the new force, a ragtag group
where some march in flip-flops.

The Ministry of Defense created a council of eight commanders and generals to

implement the two-part plan to bring existing troops under a single command
while creating an elite initial corps of 1,500-2000 soldiers to serve as a model for
the entire military. Gen. Atta Muhammad, an ethnic Tajik, will oversee transition
to a force divided into six regions, drawn from all major ethnic groups, and
recruited from each province. The final goal is disarmament and reconfiguration
of the 700,000 current fighters into a (comparatively) streamlined standing army
of 250,000. Ethnic groups will be represented proportionate to their part of their
population; any recruits must be free of ethnic and territorial agendas. Men aged
22-42 will serve for periods of two years and the officer corps will be overhauled.
Preference will be given to officers who served under the former king. Although
the Air Force currently consists of only six planes and six helicopters, women can
be recruited as air traffic controllers.

The inclusion of former jihadi is opposed by many members of the Afghan

provisional government, and radical fighters are supposed to be eliminated from
the recruiting. Yet Commander Abdul Karim, a former mujahidin commander
himself, estimates that one in five of the men under his command is a former
Taliban fighter and that no recruits have been turned away. Some recruits contest
that they were professional soldiers of the government’s army — not fanatic
fighters — but there has been little indication that time or motivation exist for
such deep social change. Poor oversight and control of the army’s weapon could
enable clandestine regroupings of Taliban or al Qaeda zealots to return to a
mainstream military long enough to siphon off new arms. The real number of
former Taliban in the army may already be higher than one in five.

If regional leaders are not be allowed to keep their own small militias and those
fighters are not included in the new Afghan army, their exclusion may prevent
regional commanders from supporting the government.

Conclusions

In Mazar-e Sharif, soldiers recruited from three factions reside in three separate
military bases on the east, west, and south sides of town, reinforcing the divisions
that already challenge the army. In Kandahar, the Seventh Brigade has tanks,
trucks and artillery but lacks food, medicine, shoes, and uniforms. Countrywide,
commanders are having difficulty providing meals as payment for service.

Rifaat Hussain, a professor of defense and strategic studies at Pakistan's Quaid-i-

Islam University, fears that the result will be a group of unpaid armed men who
turn to force to obtain what they need to feed and support their families. Both
former and returning soldiers must either be given employment alternatives or be
paid well so they won’t loot. They must be fed so they won’t steal from
humanitarian organizations or regular citizens. The contradiction is, however,
that without the societal order the army is supposed to help provide, the financial
and humanitarian aid supposed to alleviate these problems can’t be used
effectively at all.

Thus, creation of an army may not be as pragmatic an initial goal as it might

seem. Rather, the focus should be on creating an environment where former
fighters do not have to return to the army or become part of an emerging mafia-
type society, and will not remain firmly entrenched in a primarily tribal identity.
Concomitantly, a police force may be the best operational goal — internationally
trained and supported, tasked with border security and internal police functions.
A police force would help control Afghanistan’s rampant corruption and might
ease the development of a financial and social situation more amenable to paying
and supporting a regular army.

It seems, however, that the creation of an army is a done deal — and that the
international community is largely supportive. There must, then, be a concerted
effort on the part of Britain and the United States, and whoever else assists in
training, to seize an opportunity to urge evolution of the military into not only a
tool for internal security, but also a revolutionized social institution that sets
examples of national and professional loyalty, sound business practices, useful
and constructive career paths, and even a vehicle for education.

The army should be trained in demining and tasked with reclamation of arable
land; there should be units trained to rebuild the country as an Afghan brand of
the Army Corps of Engineers. If soldiers are appropriately trained and selected
for border police duties, control of the notorious Afghan arms smuggling pipeline
(the route between India and Pakistan) could be tightened. Soldiers who have not
been formerly aligned with factional movements should be trained in weapons
collection; others could be trained in basic medical care and sent into rural areas.
If an Afghan army is to be created and supported by the international community,
armaments assistance should support mobility and reconnaissance capabilities to
enable border supervision; training emphasis should be on programs that would
cement Afghans’ allegiance to the post-Taliban system of government and stress
that national defense is not just war.

By Emily Clark
Afgha .com
Afgha's Interim Home
Submitted by administrator on Fri, 14/04/2006 - 14:57.

Dear Users, we are currently working on a new and better version of Afgha. We keep
you updated with the latest news from Afghanistan. The other services (older news,
forums, job opportunities etc) will be available again soon.

At the moment it is not possible to log in with your username.

An overview of links to news about Afghanistan can be found here

» add new comment | 332 reads

Afghan history's warning to UK troops
Submitted by fatima on Fri, 21/04/2006 - 21:44. International

BBC
By Paul Danahar
The British have made some disastrous decisions in Afghanistan - one led to one of the
worst massacres in the UK's military history.

Next month the British army will make its biggest deployment in southern Afghanistan
in more than a century.

» add new comment | read more | 31 reads

Gunmen kill police in Afghanistan
Submitted by fatima on Fri, 21/04/2006 - 21:39. National

BBC

Six policemen have been killed by suspected Taleban insurgents in the southern
Afghan province of Kandahar.
The gunmen attacked the police post in the Maiwand district in the early hours of
Friday, a police official said.

» add new comment | read more | 24 reads

Pakistan Taleban vow more attacks
Submitted by fatima on Fri, 21/04/2006 - 21:38. International | Taliban

BBC
By Aamer Ahmed Khan

The head of the Taleban in Pakistan's tribal areas has warned that there can be no
peace in Afghanistan for as long as US forces remain in that country.

"We will not stop our jihad [holy war] against the Americans," Haji Omar told the BBC
News website.

» add new comment | read more | 23 reads

Taming of a Guest Military in Afghanistan
Submitted by administrator on Wed, 19/04/2006 - 10:35.

Afgha.com
By Dr. G. Rauf Roashan

The peoples of Afghanistan and the United States need to be friends. The US needs to
win over the hearts and minds of the Afghans. To do this it needs to restructure and
rethink its policy in Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s friendship will benefit the United States
military, strategic, economic and diplomatic needs in this important region of the
world. To ensure the success of the venture establishment of general and specific joint
military, diplomatic and administrative commissions to oversee operations, exchange
information and explain policies between the two governments seems to be one of the
effective means that would boost trust and ensure cooperation.

» add new comment | read more | 112 reads

Ex-Taliban envoy, al-Qaeda suspects arrested in
Peshawar
Submitted by administrator on Tue, 18/04/2006 - 11:39.
Pajhwok Afghan News.
Daud Khan.

Pakistani secret agencies have arrested former Taliban ambassador to Pakistan Maulvi
Saeedur Rehman Haqqani and four suspected al-Qaeda elements in two separate raids
in the border town of Peshawar.

» 1 comment | read more | 201 reads

Afghanistan Between Opium and Taliban
Submitted by administrator on Mon, 17/04/2006 - 12:05.

Blog: Informed Comment

Juan Cole

Yes, there still is a war in Afghanistan. Seven were killed in it on Sunday, and over 40
on Saturday. Accusations against the US are swirling of having killed innocent
civilians. Meanwhile, a suicide bomber wounded 3 British troops.

» add new comment | read more | 302 reads

Family bonds stop merchant of death from suicide
attack
Submitted by administrator on Mon, 17/04/2006 - 11:38.

Pajhwok Afghan News

Safia Millad

Mullah Noorul Baqi, the man who was recruiting suicide bombers for Taliban in
Afghanistan, said he did not carry out such an attack because of his love for his wife
and daughter.

» add new comment | read more | 119 reads

Ajmal Khattak in Kabul after 17 years
Submitted by administrator on Mon, 17/04/2006 - 11:37.

Pajhwok Afghan News

Habib Rahman Ibrahim/Janullah Hashemzada

Renowned Pashto poet, writer and nationalist politician Ajmal Khattak Monday arrived
here with a 15-member delegation from NWFP and Balochistan to attend a seminar
organised by the Ministry of Higher Education on life and literary services of the great
leader.

» add new comment | read more | 117 reads

Four American governors arrive in Kabul
Submitted by administrator on Mon, 17/04/2006 - 11:35.

Pajhwok Afghan News

Reported by Zubair Babakarkhel & translated by Rahman

Visiting Governor of Florida and brother of US President G W Bush has appreciated

National Reconstruction Strategy for the country and pace of rebuilding work.
» add new comment | read more | 121 reads
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

...
next

China to Play 'Significant' Role in Afghanistan's Reconstruction

China has made marked economic achievements and can play a "significant"
role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, Foreign Minister Dr. Abdullah Abdullah
of the Afghan Interim Government said Wednesday evening in Beijing.

At a press conference held at the Afghan embassy, Abdullah said that during the
meeting between Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji and Afghan Interim Government
Chairman Hamid Karzai, both sides extended willingness to cooperate in
Afghanistan's reconstruction work.

Earlier, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan and Abdullah signed two
documents on the Chinese government's provision to the Afghan Interim
Government of one million U.S. dollars as initiating fund and 30 million yuan-
worth (over 3.6 million U.S. dollars) of emergency assistance in the form of
goods.

Abdullah said many Chinese products and technological items are urgently
needed in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, including in the fields of medical
equipment, road construction, high technology, communication equipment and
landmine clearance.

"The trade relations between the two can start at any time," he added.

On the anti-terrorism issue, he said that his government will " take every measure
to make sure that no terrorist can act inside Afghanistan, live in Afghanistan or
use the soil of Afghanistan against other countries."

"Our position is firm and clear," he stressed, adding that his government will
"extend full cooperation" with China on the issue.

(People's Daily January 24, 2002)

Afghanistan's Reconstruction:
Progress So Far and Challenges
Ahead
Manabu Fujimura, Associate Professor
Economics Department, Aoyama Gakuin University

Abstract

Afghanistan's nation re-building and reconstruction process has

come a long way since the Bonn Agreement in December 2001.
So far the envisaged transitional political agenda, including the
passage of the new constitution, have been on track. The Afghan
economy has shown a strong rebound from a devastated initial
condition. The transitional government demonstrated its
commitment to fiscal discipline and monetary control so far,
which is being well received by the donor community and
ensures commitment to further assistance. Continued strong
growth is expected in the short term, however, the country has a
long way to go before the reconstruction and further
development process can become self-sustaining. Challenges
ahead include: successful implementation of the national
elections to be held by June 2004, strengthening revenue
mobilization, rebuilding public administration capacity, rebuilding
the financial sector, creating market-enabling environment, and
tackling the poppy cultivation problem. The presentation will be
based on a report prepared for Asian Development Bank
Institute (Tokyo), which relies on data and information collected
through field visits and exchanges with the Afghan transitional
government and development partners.

Manabu Fujimura (Ph.D., University of Hawaii, 1994) started his

career in 1985 as a researcher on Asia's trade and investment at
Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO). He came to Hawaii
as a EWC Degree Fellow from 1990 to 1994, and returned as a
Visiting Fellow in 1996. His main area of research interest has
been benefit-cost analysis in theory and application. He served
as a project analysis economist at the Asian Development Bank
(ADB) from 1998 to 2001 and contributed to ADB publications in
this area, including: Handbook for Integrating Poverty Impact in
the Economic Analysis of Projects (editor-author) and Economic
Analysis of Policy-Based Operations: Key Dimensions (co-
author). Currently he teaches economics at Aoyama Gakuin
University and Sophia University, both in Tokyo. His latest
position at ADB was as country economist for ADB's Afghanistan
operation, which led to his continued involvement and interest in
the country's reconstruction.