Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

Coalition Warfare
PB 80 93 3

July 1993

Vol. 6, No. 3

From the Commandant

Special Warfare
One of the great success stories of Operation
Desert Storm was the performance of our Special Forces in coalition warfare. According to
Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, they were the glue
that held the coalition together. Working with
the military forces of the Arab countries and
with those as varied as France, Bangladesh,
Czechoslovakia and Senegal, Special Forces
made a vital contribution to the overall effort.
Later, during Hurricane Andrew relief
efforts, the nation-assistance skills of U.S. SOF
allowed them to contribute to disaster-relief
efforts in Florida. In both instances, SOF were
able to adapt their skills to assume and succeed
in a mission for which they were not specifically
trained.
Their success in supporting the coalition
came not from the fact that Special Forces are
trained for coalition warfare, but because the
strengths needed language proficiency, cultural awareness and the ability to work as
trainers and advisers were similar to those of
one of their primary missions, foreign internal
defense.
Nor are language and cultural skills the
exclusive property of Special Forces. Civil
Affairs used the same strengths during Desert
Storm to assist them in coordinating hostnation support and to aid dislocated civilians.
PSYOP forces used the same skills to produce
effective leaflets and radio broadcasts which
influenced enemy soldiers to surrender.
Desert Storm and Hurricane Andrew point to
two widely separate mission areas in which our
special-operations forces can be successful.
Seemingly at opposite ends of the spectrum,
these combat and humanitarian-assistance missions illustrate the diversity of the roles SOF
can fill.
As we identify military functions and as new
missions emerge in the future, this diversity
promises to make SOF more likely to assume

non-traditional roles which require a variety of

skills. With strengths in numerous fields, SOF
provide a versatile and flexible capability to
respond to a number of challenges and to fill or
contribute to a number of military roles and
functions.

Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow

Contents

PB 80 93 3
July 1993

Special Warfare

Commander & Commandant

Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow
Editor
Jerry D. Steelman
Graphic Art Director
Bruce S. Barfield

VE R

IT

AS

ET

E
LI B

Features
2

Five Imperatives of Coalition Warfare

by Capt. John Fenzel III

Cross-Cultural Communication in Coalition Warfare

by Capt. David E.A. Johnson

12

SOF Support to Hurricane Andrew Recovery

by SSgt. Keith Butler

18

PSYOP Task Force to JTF Andrew: A Case Study in Support

to Disaster-Recovery Operations
by Lt. Col. Paul B. Kappelman and Maj. Robert E. Armstrong

22

Roles and Functions of U.S. Special Operations Forces

by John M. Collins

28

Cameroon: CA Unit Conducts Joint Medical Exercise

by Lt. Col. Mark W. Dushnyck

30

Future Trends in Terrorist Targeting and Tactics

by Bruce Hoffman

36

The Self-Development Test: Whats In It for Me?

by MSgt. Kirk Thomas

39

Military Qualification Standards System: Army Framework

for Leader Development
by Carol M. Bushong

40

Interview: Lt. Col. Daniel Brownlee, commander,

1st Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group

45

Fire-Support Planning at the ODA Level

by Lt. Col. Geoffrey Lambert

AS
RT

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of the

United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare
Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission
is to promote the professional development of special
operations forces by providing a forum for the examination
of both established doctrine and new ideas.
Views expressed herein are those of the author, and do
not necessarily reflect official Army position. This
publication does not supersede any information presented in
other official Army publications.
Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited, and
should be addressed to: Editor, Special Warfare,
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Warfare reserves the right to edit all material.
Published works may be reprinted, except where
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Official distribution is limited to active and reserve
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subscription should forward their requests to:
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

Gordon R. Sullivan
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
Milton H. Hamilton
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army

Departments
46

Enlisted Career Notes

47

Officer Career Notes

48

Foreign SOF

50

Update

52

Book Reviews

04499

Headquarters, Department of the Army

Vol. 6, No. 3

Cover: Computer graphic by Bruce S. Barfield

Five
Imperatives of
Coalition
Warfare
by Capt. John Fenzel III

In this new era of peacetime

engagement, and in the wake of
Operations Desert Shield and
Desert Storm, coalition warfare has
rapidly become popularized as the
future for military endeavors worldwide. Indeed, in recent years we
have seen the renewal of the United
Nations as a primary vehicle in
forming and guiding global coalitions through the full continuum of
military operations.
Despite its apparent novelty,
coalition warfare is deeply rooted in
ancient and contemporary history.
In 1775, the Continental Congress
selected General George Washington to lead a tenuous coalition of
colonies and nations during the
Revolutionary War. His leadership
was vital in employing American
and French troops to collectively
defeat the British at Yorktown.
Abroad, Carl Von Clausewitz
wrote of coalition formation in
18th- and 19th-century Europe.
During that era, Wellington defeat2

ed Napoleon at Waterloo with his

European allies. Yet not all coalitions of the time were successful.
During the Seven Years War (175663), for instance, Frederick the
Great found himself on a battlefield
vastly outnumbered by the coalition
armies of Austria, France, Russia,
Sweden and Saxony whom he
soundly defeated.
In the 20th century, coalition
warfare has been practiced extensively in both world wars, Korea
and Vietnam. In each of these campaigns, allied coalitions were
formed, composed of the joint forces
at each member nations disposal.
Whether they are classified as a
peacekeeping force or as actual
allied combatants, unified multinational military forces define coalition warfare. By design, coalitions
and alliances are formed by strategic planners with a dual purpose: to
enhance combat power, and to
demonstrate global or forming coalitions, as seen during World War II

with the allied Grand Alliance

between the U.S., Great Britain and
the Soviet Union then referred to
euphemistically as the Strange
Alliance. This classic case points
directly to a significant characteristic of coalitions: their unique power
to unite political antagonists for a
common cause.
Coalition warfare also has a tactical realm, which remains just as
intricate and challenging for its participants. Here, coalition warfare
encompasses the widest variety of
conventional and special-operations
missions. It is important therefore,
at the outset, not to characterize
coalition warfare as a type of mission, but as an environment in
which to operate.
What separates coalition warfare
from other forms of warfare? Its
many different characteristics seem
to defy any single answer. And yet,
further analysis reveals one overwhelming consideration that stands
out above the rest, a principle of
Special Warfare

war both universal and essential in

its application to coalition warfare.

Sixth principle of war

Depending on the national identity of the forces involved, the degree
of difficulty in employing a nationally integrated force varies. In virtually all cases and at all operational levels of coalition warfare,
the nine principles of war are particularly cogent. At the strategic
and operational levels, the most
vital of these is the sixth: unity of
command. In 1942, Gen. George C.
Marshall, then Army chief of staff,
described unity of command as a
dominating factor facing the Allies
in those days of crisis:
Of all the military lessons which
could have been learned from
[World War I], the question of unity
of command is probably the most
outstanding. Personally, I learned
my lesson in observing the problems
of General Pershing in France and
the reluctance of our allies to meet
the issue until almost overwhelmed
by the great German offensive of
March 1918.1
In a coalition of political antagonists, unity of command may be
achievable in name alone. Even
Clausewitz recognized the inherent
complex, fragile nature of coalitions,
pointing to the independent interest in and independent force with
which (each state) prosecutes the
war.2
This characteristic was further
demonstrated by another 18th-century warrior, Napoleon Bonaparte,
whose distrust of coalitions was a
matter of public record: Give me
allies as an enemy, he would say
defiantly, so I can defeat them one
by one.3 Today such Napoleonic
zeal is quite likely an anachronism.
Yet, however intemperate, it is
nonetheless characteristic of the
widely divergent, independent
interests which commonly exist
between coalition allies.
Depending on the circumstances
and politics involved, one commander may very well not have absolute
control over all coalition partners.
July 1993

In this environment, the principle of

unity of command must therefore be
reduced to its most important defining component: unity of effort.
In a politically charged arena,
unity of effort is a virtual prerequisite to the other principles of war.
Implicit within this tenet is the
notion that when unity of command
is not achievable in its purest form,
unity of effort is created on a strong
foundation of close liaison and cooperation between counterparts; with
unified planning and execution as
its cornerstones.
For leaders at all levels, the
lessons of history are clear: waging
coalition warfare successfully centers not around the martial skills
espoused by Clausewitz, but on the
ideological and non-tangible fundamentals which address each coalition partners social, cultural and
doctrinal differences. When these
differences are effectively reconciled
through intensive dialogue and
training, doctrinal and instinctive

martial skills then become decisive

forces on the battlefield. Without a
reconciliation of this type, however,
combat power is all but irrelevant.
One of the continuing challenges
faced by commanders operating
within a coalition force is to effectively manage the countless threats
to effective, unified effort. They are
often regarded as distractions and
challenges by those who are accustomed to them obstacles to be
overcome.
The immediate challenges are
normally those which present themselves upon stepping foot in country: language and culture. Because
they are the first challenges confronted, their importance cannot be
overstated. Adept handling of linguistic and cultural disparities form
a vital first impression with multinational counterparts and set the
tone for future interaction.
As time progresses, other diversions inevitably emerge: hidden or
conflicting agendas, limited

As the commander of
USCENTCOM, Gen.
H. Norman Schwarzkopf led the coalition
force in Operation
Desert Shield/Storm.
Success in coalition
operations demands
skill not only military
operations, but also in
addressing social, cultural and doctrinal
differences within the
coalition.

Photo by Dean Wagner

resources, low confidence and trust,

doctrinal differences, lack of organization, political dissension, power
struggles, lack of clear objective and
personality clashes. If left alone,
any one of these could well become
a show-stopper.

Five imperatives
U.S. military doctrine embraces
five combat imperatives, or methods
to defeat an enemy. While they are
proven, invaluable battlefield
tenets, none seem to adequately
address the issues unique to coalition warfare. At the outset of this
type of campaign, questions of how
to deal with the enemy are peripheral to the manner in which allies
interact. Addressing that issue
requires an entirely different set of
working guidelines, or imperatives, to be applied well before any
battle plans are executed.
Cultivate intense political and
cultural awareness.
Develop rapport between
participants.
Synchronize the force.
Maximize doctrine and innovation to overcome obstacles.
Simplify the plan.
Cultivate intense political and

cultural awareness. The phenomenon of coalition formation has

its origins with the Achaean and
Aetolean city leagues of ancient
Greece and the Hanseatic and
Swabian Leagues in Europe. It was
also attempted in the 1920s by
Woodrow Wilson in his failed
League of Nations. These, and other
supranational alliances since, were
developed primarily to counter common threats and to further shared
goals. However ancient the trend,
most coalitions in history have been
relatively short-lived; the causes
are normally found at that point
when established associations evaporated into shared socio-political
differences.
From the city leagues of ancient
Greece to todays United Nations,
cultural and political ideologies have
been indelibly interwoven into the
fabric of coalitions and alliances.
The evolution of a coalition is literally as complex as the cultures and
political systems which comprise it.
Understanding the role which these
two factors play in forming coalitions is vital to their function and
largely determines their ultimate
success or failure.
On a somewhat less grand scale,

Photo by John Fenzel

U.S. soldiers from the 5th SF Group and Kuwaiti units prepare to cross into
Kuwait from Saudi Arabia during Operation Desert Storm.
4

yet equally as important, is the

foundation of any alliance people.
Because multinational coalitions
consist of populations with different
cultural backgrounds, the challenges and distractions to unified
effort are often predestined.
Culture is the single most dominating influence on people, and
therefore, on coalitions. In nearly all
cases where alliances have failed,
the cause can ultimately be traced to
basic ignorance of the others cultural values. Conversely, successful
coalitions are bred through empathic
communication and through a profound understanding of socio-political environments.
In his book Green Berets at War,
Shelby Stanton describes SF relationships with the Montagnards
during the Vietnam War, clearly
illustrating the importance of cultural awareness:
The Special Forces found the
Montagnard aborigines incredibly
simplistic and superstitious. To gain
their allegiance, the Special Forces
soldiers carefully learned tribal customs and studied the local dialects,
ate the tribal food, endured the cold,
mixed indigenous garb with their
uniforms, and participated in the
rituals and ceremonies. ... Montagnards accepted only those who
shared their lifestyles and dangers.4
Coalition warfare demands nothing less than a thorough, in-depth
understanding of the operational
area and its people. Limited awareness of an areas culture can be
gained through area analysis and
language studies. Detailed understanding, however, can be achieved
only through actual, intensive personal interaction with coalition
counterparts. It is here that knowledge of cultural subtleties is gained,
and true partnerships are formed.
No grand strategy or technological
advantage can be substituted for
intensive personal awareness of a
counterparts politics and culture.
Develop rapport between participants. While developing rapport
among coalition members may not
be entirely possible at the strategic
Special Warfare

level of war, it is vital in performing

tactical operations. Rapport is
defined by Websters as a relation
marked by harmony, conformity,
accord, or affinity.5 On the battlefield, rapport extends beyond the
textbook definitions and translates
to mutual understanding, trust and
confidence between participants.
In the most ideal circumstances,
synchronized effort is an elusive
equation at best. Within an alliance
or coalition, however, it is accomplished through the cultivation of
partnership. A common goal or purpose, alone, is not sufficient. Interpersonal skills and linguistic ability
communicate perceptions and go
far in promoting a shared sense of
partnership.
Rapport is often hard-won among
coalition counterparts when cultural and political differences far outweigh any similarities. An enduring
observation from our Desert Shield
and Desert Storm experience supports this claim: Rapport-building is
often exhausting, tedious work. It
requires the active employment of
interpersonal skills which may or
may not be normally forthcoming. It
also requires overcoming endemic
personal prejudices that would otherwise serve as barriers to effective
interaction.
The issue of rapport is a familiar
one found throughout American
military history. A virtual case
study of successful interaction can
be found during World War II, in
Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhowers
encounters with British Field Marshal Montgomery and French General DeGaulle. His dealings with
these and other allies were frequently distressing to the allied
commander, but he remained cordial nonetheless. His disagreements
with Churchill in planning the invasion of Europe are well-documented.
Through his own experiences, he
developed an acute awareness of
the need for interpersonal skills in
dealing with his allied counterparts:
Allied commands depend on
mutual confidence. How is mutual
confidence developed? You dont
July 1993

Photo by Thomas Witham

A U.S. Navy SEAL trains Saudi Special Forces troops in the use of C-4
explosives. Building rapport is important to a sense of coalition partnership.
command it. ... By development of
common understanding of the problems, by approaching these things
on the widest possible basis with
respect to each others opinions, and
above all, through the development
of friendships, this confidence is
gained in families and in Allied
Staffs.6
The mutual respect and understanding gained during such interaction is invaluable in reconciling
agendas, calming fears, reducing
ethnocentrism and planning for
events to come. It is important to
re-emphasize that rapport-building
is often painstaking. It frequently
involves a seemingly endless search
for compromise, long hours spent
coordinating training events in a
social setting, and perseverance in
the face of rejection. While enjoying
the process is desirable, it is certainly not always possible, nor is it
easy.
Perhaps most important to rapport development, and indeed, to
the effectiveness of any coalition
effort, is commitment. At the tactical level, American co-combatants
or advisers must be able to assure
their coalition counterparts that
they are committed to their cause.

Presence alone, however, cannot

assure commitment. At the strategic and operational levels, commitment is largely measured by historic example. For 30 years, the
tragic examples of the Bay of Pigs
and Vietnam cast doubt on our ability as a nation to fully commit ourselves to a just cause. Those examples did not go unnoticed in the
global arena. Desert Shield and
Desert Storm have since healed
these wounds and reinforced the
United Nations role as a viable
global peacekeeping organization.
In 1990, Saudi Arabias King
Fahd welcomed the U.S. deployment on his nations soil based on
that sentiment of trust and commitment: I trust the United States of
America. I know that when you say
you will be committed, you are in
fact committed.7
In the tactical arena, American
forces, whether they are conventional or SOF, must be assured of
their ability to permanently commit themselves to their assigned
coalition counterparts. Once committed in their roles as advisers or
co-combatants, those units must
remain together until the mission
is accomplished. They should not
5

be detached for other missions, nor

should they be subject to administrative restrictions which apply to
other non-affiliated forces. Once
the mission is completed, our units
should depart on schedule, as
promised. Credibility and trust
the two basic ingredients to rapport hinge on unwaiverable,
honest commitment.
Synchronize the force. Synchronization is a common operational
concept which pervades U.S. military doctrine. It is also a published
tenet of our AirLand Battle Doctrine. Similarly, the goal of joint
warfare is expressed by our JCS
doctrine as the sequenced and synchronized employment of resources.8
In coalition warfare, however, synchronization advances from its status as a tenet and a goal to that of
an imperative. The requirement for
coordinated planning and execution
is critical in a diverse multinational
alliance. When compared to recent
unitary national efforts such as

Grenada, Panama and the Falkland Islands, the challenges of synchronization assume a different
shape and a far greater degree of
difficulty.
Developing a synergistic effort
among multinationals, at any level,
necessitates common, steadfast
focus. During Operations Desert
Shield and Desert Storm, 5th Special Forces Group advisers,
assigned foreign-internal-defense
missions with each of the Arab
coalition armies, discovered that to
be an exhausting, and frequently
frustrating endeavor. Hidden agendas, conflicting doctrine and decidedly different sets of priorities were
commonplace and posed formidable
barriers to synchronized effort. The
methods SF advisers used to better
align their counterpart units were
often tailored to fit situations as
they arose. The methods which they
found to be most effective were
numerous and form a compendium
of doctrinal lessons taught in basic

Advisers from the 5th

SF Group train
Kuwaiti soldiers in the
use of the MG-3
machine gun. Good
language and communications skills, combined with realistic
training and
rehearsals, allowed SF
soldiers to develop unit
cohesion and soldier
confidence within the
coalition units.

Photo by John Fenzel

service schools. Many, in fact, would

seem manifest in their simplicity:
Observe and evaluate.
Begin with the basics. Set
achievable standards and objectives.
Task-organize to fit the mission
and the capabilities of the force.
Ensure the existence of a good
communications plan.
Coordinate the plan and maintain focus through close liaison.
Conduct extensive, realistic
training and rehearsals with coalition counterparts.
Train during the day and at
night.
5th Groups success in applying
these tools with coalition partners
translated into dramatically
increased unit cohesion and soldier
confidence with their Arab counterparts. Ultimately, as they discovered, the psychological benefits of
this approach proved to be the most
powerful synchronizing force of all.
Maximize doctrine and innovation
to overcome obstacles. Throughout
the course of Operations Desert
Shield and Desert Storm, coalition
partners faced numerous obstacles,
ranging from the tactical employment of nationally diverse units to
POW management. Many of those
obstacles were directly related to a
general lack of needed materials to
accomplish resource-intensive
tasks. Yet in every instance, those
problems were resolved, either
through sheer force of will or
through resourcefulness and creative thought.
Perhaps the strongest and most
recognized quality of American soldiers is their ability to adapt and
innovate to solve problems. Innovation is, in fact, part and parcel of
U.S. military tradition. American
ingenuity has been ingrained into
our national mindset and is part of
what Russell Weigley has called the
American way of war. Indeed, in
the absence of adequate knowledge
or resources, Americans habitually
adapt, innovate and overcome.
Innovation, however, should not
be perceived as a substitute for doctrine, but rather as a supplement to
Special Warfare

it. One common, historic tendency

among the U.S. military is our failure or unwillingness to apply a doctrinal approach to the problems we
face. In an almost traditional way,
the first piece of baggage most frequently thrown overboard in the
heat of battle is doctrine. Invariably
then, it is common to see unfocused
innovation take over, confusing not
only the enemy, but ourselves, in
the process.
Nor should doctrine be held as a
strict set of rules or preconceived
ideas on the conduct of war. This
view is not only seriously flawed,
but potentially fatal for those who
practice it. The belief that doctrine
is nothing more than a rule book
lends itself to predictability and certain gridlock on the battlefield. A
handbook entitled Infantry in
Battle, prepared in 1929 by thenCol. George Marshall, goes to great
lengths in warning against that
misperception:
Every situation encountered in
war is likely to be exceptional. The
schematic solution will seldom fit. ...
Those who seek to fight by rote, who
memorize an assortment of standard solutions with the idea of
applying the most appropriate when
confronted by actual, walk with disaster. Rather, it is essential that all
leaders from subaltern to commanding general familiarize
themselves with the art of clear, logical thinking.9
Doctrine must be realized as a
fundamental base of knowledge to
draw upon in the search for new
and innovative solutions. Once
established, that foundation is useful in allowing leaders to cope with
unexpected situations as they arise.
It is often tempting to adopt different or hybrid doctrinal solutions when working with a foreign
army. The assumption that a
British or German technique would
work better is often fallacious when
U.S. doctrine is not only just as efficient, but far more detailed and
available in our own publications
and experience. Moreover, U.S. military doctrine is a proven quantity,
July 1993

Photo by Joel Torres

A U.S. soldier processes EPWs captured during Desert Storm. Management of

enemy prisoners was one of the obstacles to be overcome by the coalition.
and a common denominator
among sister services and allies
alike, which ensures the critical elements of continuity, interoperability
and accuracy. Used properly and
consistently, our own doctrine is a
key contributor to unity of effort.
A certain degree of flexibility,
however, should always be maintained. The infamous buy American approach is one destined for
failure. Without question, there are
times when allied partners disagree
and will choose to maintain their
own doctrinal approach. The immediate challenge, then, for U.S.
advisers or co-combatants should
not be to change their allies minds
(as instinct would dictate), but to
determine whether that approach is
tactically sound, and whether or not
it conflicts with the coalitions concept of the operation. It is here
where a discussion of task, conditions and standards is often most
productive for both parties.
There are occasions, in fact, when
methods espoused by coalition partners fill our own doctrinal voids.
Sadly, the concept of learning from
counterparts is frequently overlooked or ignored. Additionally,
there may be occasions when U.S.

doctrine is found to be in conflict

with a host nations cultural mores.
Some Arab, Eastern and African
armies, for instance, do not train or
fight at night for fear of nocturnal
predators, superstition or religious
reasons. Attempts to change that
logic often prove futile.
Simplify the plan. Another principle of war which is especially relevant to coalition warfare is simplicity. This principle states that simplicity plays an important role in
providing direction, focus and accuracy to the battle: Other things
being equal, the simplest plan is
held to be the best plan.10
This dictum has been extensively
tested with the strange alliances
which are now becoming more commonplace. Language barriers, conflicting doctrinal methods and interoperability problems make a simple,
easily understood plan essential to
success on an already complex,
chaotic battlefield. The more complex a plan is, the more time must
be allocated in training forces to
standard, and in maintaining the
plans focus and intent.
American doctrine offers a variety
of powerful tools designed specifically to ensure accuracy, coherence
7

and simplicity:
The Army Problem Solving
Process.
Troop-leading procedures.
Backward planning
Mission analysis
Operations orders
Mission-essential-task lists
Time phasing
Each of these was developed with
the principle of simplicity in mind.
Their utility, however, is magnified
tenfold when they are used in devising joint plans with coalition partners. Albert Einsteins advice perhaps best defines this imperative:
Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler.11

Conclusions
These five imperatives of coalition warfare were chosen for their
critical function and relevance to
coalition operations. They have in
common an enduring logic used
throughout history by diplomats
and warriors alike. When used as a
systemic approach to the management of coalition warfare, they
assist in finding solutions to seemingly impossible problems and in

forming lasting partnerships. The

results achieved in applying these
imperatives are surprising only in
retrospect.

Capt. John Fenzel

III is currently the
commander of Company A, 3rd Battalion,
5th SF Group. During
Operations Desert
Shield/Desert Storm,
he commanded ODA 582, Company
B, 3rd/5th SF Group. His detachment advised a newly formed
Kuwaiti motorized infantry battalion throughout the campaign. His
other assignments include serving
as the executive officer, HHS Battery, 4/27th Field Artillery; assistant operations and training officer,
72nd Field Artillery Brigade; and
commander, Company D, 3rd/5th
SF Group. Captain Fenzel holds
bachelors degrees in international
relations and history from Tulane
University.

Speeches and Statements of General of the

Army George C. Marshall, ed. Maj. H.A.
DeWeerd (Washington, D.C.: The Infantry
Journal, 1945), p. 215.
2 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Anatol
Rapoport (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books,
1968), p. 390.
3 Napoleon Bonaparte, quoted in J.
Christopher Herold, The Mind of Napoleon,
n.p., 1955.
4 Shelby L. Stanton, Green Berets at War:
U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia
1956-1975 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press,
1985), p. 39.
5 Websters Third New International Dictionary (1986), s.v. rapport.
6 Dwight D. Eisenhower, quoted in Joint
Pub 1 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense
University Press, 1991), p. 42.
7 King Fahd, letter to President George
Bush, 1990, quoted in Congressional Quarterly, October, 1990.
8 Joint Pub 1, p. 47.
9 George C. Marshall, quoted in Russell
Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Strategy and Policy
(Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University
Press, 1977), p. 215.
10 Weigley, p. 214.
11 Albert Einstein, quoted in The New
Websters Library of Practical Information
(1987), s.v. simplicity.

Notes:
1 George C. Marshall, Address before the
American Academy of Political Science, New
York City, November 10, 1942, in Selected

Special Warfare

Cross-Cultural Communication
in Coalition Warfare
by Capt. David E. A. Johnson
Recently a senior American officer visited a Middle Eastern country where a Special Forces team
was conducting training in order to
coordinate future operations. He
was invited to lunch with the hostnation-unit officers and the SF
team leader. Offered food, he
responded, No, thank you, I am not
hungry, and pulled out a notebook
to conduct an American-style luncheon meeting. His hosts responded
positively to his coordination
efforts, but after he left, they
quizzed the embarrassed team leader about his compatriots manners
and gave the impression that the
coordination would have to be
repeated in an appropriate forum.
What went wrong? The visitor
sent a message his hosts were not
ready to hear. He was polite, based
on American hospitality and business customs, but not based on
those of the host nation. His breach
of manners, refusing food and
interpersonal interaction before
working, diminished his authority,
July 1993

and his hosts were not ready to listen to such a low-caste source. To
be polite, they responded favorably,
but they considered the coordination to be non-binding.
Soldiers in coalition-warfare missions are likely to find themselves
in similar situations to that of the
visiting officer, and their success
will depend on their skill in crosscultural communication. Cross-cultural communication is the process
of transmitting facts, ideas or feelings to someone of different customs, religion, language or social
organization, and it is essential to
coalition warfare.
Communication seems simple: A
sender transmits a message
through some medium to a receiver, who then responds in a manner
that indicates understanding. With
cross-cultural communication, however, there are difficulties with all
three components of communication the sender, the medium and
the receiver. During coalition warfare, only effective and efficient

communication will enable a coalition force to succeed on a rapidly

changing battlefield.
In cross-cultural communication,
biases and perceptions affect the
message being transmitted. Problems occur in three basic areas:
direction and source of the message,
expectations of response and need,
and social credibility.

Direction and source

In directing a message it is easy
for special-operations soldiers to
assume that their coalition counterparts have the same responsibilities
and decision-making authority they
themselves have. During Desert
Shield, this was often not the case.
It was common for a Special Forces
NCO to request that radios or other
assets be available for training and
receive a positive response from his
counterpart, only to find that no
equipment arrived. Often the counterpart did not have the authority
to commit the resources, and he did
not want to upset the American or
9

admit his own lack of importance.

When communicating to the decision maker through aides, staff officers or interpreters, soldiers should
also remember that often the leastessential officer is assigned to escort
or deal with foreigners, and he may
have difficulty getting anyone to
take his message seriously. The
solution is to build a closer relationship with the decision maker and to
communicate directly, in order to
save time and energy spent transmitting in the wrong direction.
Like the messages direction, its
source can also affect its reception.
Coordination, advice and assistance
may be rendered ineffective because
the coalition decision maker is
unreceptive to the source. In some
highly centralized armies, where
NCOs have less knowledge or
authority, a message sent by a nonofficer may be seen as bearing little
weight. This may make it difficult
for highly qualified special-operations NCOs to do their jobs.
During Operation Desert Shield,
a senior Special Forces NCO turned
in a coalition ground-to-air radio
for repair. Every week for a month,
he asked if the radio was fixed.
Every week the division communications officer said the radio had
been repaired. It had not. Finally
the team leader, a captain, went to
the brigade commander to ensure
the maintenance was completed.
The division communications officer, when confronted with the radio
itself, insisted he had not been
properly asked to perform the
maintenance. His attitude was that
if the need was important, someone
important would have sent the
message.
In cultures where women have
less authority, an allied officer is
less likely to accept a womans
advice or assistance. A female officer assigned to the 1st Cavalry
Division, purchasing supplies in
Saudi Arabia, found shopkeepers
and allied officers alike confirming
everything through her driver, a
junior-enlisted male.
10

Photo by John Fenzel

Soldiers from the 5th SF Group dine with their coalition counterparts. Social
interaction is often important to the accomplishment of military objectives.

Expectation
Another problem area is expectation. The U.S. Army has a high
operations tempo even in peacetime. Our soldiers are secondaryschool graduates and volunteers,
and we have adopted a tactical system which requires initiative at the
lowest levels. The coalition force
may not have these advantages. It
may have adopted another tactical
system based on centralized control
and rigid formations.
When the special-operations soldier training with a coalition unit is
confronted with tactics not performed to American standards, he
should realize this does not indicate
incompetence. Their tactical and
operational systems are based on
their needs and experiences and
may be more correct than our own.
If asked to evaluate a coalition unit,
hold them to their own standards.
We can give advice, training and
demonstrations of our system to
improve joint operations, but coalition warfare involves adapting to
each others systems, not changing
them.
The receivers expectations are
also important. If our training,
advice and assistance have not

actually been requested by the host

nation, the counterpart may have a
low expectation of his need and be
confident that his culture and military doctrine are correct. As one
coalition officer explained early in
Operation Desert Shield, Our tactics already take the best of American and Soviet systems. This attitude makes it unlikely that the
coalition soldier will admit failure
or ignorance and may cause him not
to ask important questions that
could improve interoperability. In
these cases, it is best to frame messages in terms of our training needs
rather than theirs. This will also
help to bolster their stature within
their peer group.

Credibility
The third problem area is credibility. For the sender, it is important to recognize that the credibility
of his messages may be linked to his
social credibility. In class-oriented
or rigid societies, awareness of
social rules of etiquette can define
that credibility.
We can establish credibility by
building rapport. This may mean
eating goat and playing cards in one
culture or drinking so-ju in another,
Special Warfare

regardless of personal taste. If we

desire to receive the respect afforded our counterpart officers, we have
to play the part. As always, honesty
and tact in even the smallest things
are critical. Behaving appropriately
when invited to dine can enhance or
diminish authority and credibility.
The object of all this social interaction is to accomplish something of
military value. During Operation
Desert Storm, effective rapport
building resulted in one 12-man
team receiving the use of armored
vehicles, ground-to-air radios, land
line, a water trailer and direct
access to unit scouts.
For our coalition partners, the
need to maintain social credibility
can hamper their response. In some
environments, no coalition soldier
wants to be the one to say no or
admit they do not have the authority to answer a message. Being
assigned to assist the Americans
may be seen as a political plum, and
the problem for the coalition decision maker may be to keep the
Americans happy without seeming
to give away resources or make
many changes. This is why maybe
and soon are such common
responses.
The desire to keep the Americans
happy can sometimes result in
wasted effort and resources. During
Operation Desert Shield, a Special
Forces company commander developed a comprehensive training
plan, complete with start dates,
based on potential coalition needs
and his companys capabilities. He
presented the list of tasks to the
coalition division commander as a
suggestion, and amazingly enough,
those were exactly the subjects and
start dates the coalition unit felt it
needed. When the companys
detachments later conducted
assessments of each brigade, they
found the majority of the tasks were
neither needed nor battle-focused.

Medium
In addition to problems of transmission and reception, the medium
we use to communicate may also
July 1993

distort the message. Even when the

coalition relationship is cordial, differences in verbal and body language between cultures can cause
misunderstandings.
Although the special-operations
soldier may be proficient in the
host-nation language, it is difficult
to anticipate the impact a words
shades of meaning may have. When
trying to fix a land-line connection
between the Special Forces company commanders tent and the coalition division commanders tent, soldiers used the Arabic word for broken instead of out of order,
resulting in the coalition unit bringing a new telephone instead of trying to find the problem in the line.
One way to overcome this problem is through graphics. Luckily,
the Infantry Officer Advanced
Course teaches Soviet-threat tactics, doctrine and map symbols,
with which Arab forces were also
familiar. Once differences in gridreference systems were resolved
during Operation Desert Shield,
missions could be briefed and discussed in commonly understood
symbols.
Another way the language problem may be addressed is through an
interpreter, but we should understand enough to spot-check our
interpreters. A translator who does
not want to lose face with his subordinates or points with his superiors
is unlikely to admit to being unable
to translate. One interpreter during
Operation Desert Shield, when baffled by the term brown-out (obscurity caused by blowing dust and
sand), told students that U.S. helicopters used laser beams to land
and thus damaged the eyes of the
landing-zone control party.
Body language is a large part of
our communication, but body codes
are not universal. In some cultures,
holding hands among men is an
acceptable demonstration of friendship and trust. In the American culture it can mean something different. An Arab may stand very close
to see our pupils dilating in order to
tell if we are being honest; if we are

wearing sunglasses or avert our

eyes, he may feel that we are trying
to hide something.
There are many problems inherent in cross-cultural communication. The senders choice of where to
direct the communication, high
expectations of response and lack of
social credibility affect the message.
The coalition receivers bias toward
the source of the message, low
expectation of his own needs and
the need to maintain social credibility can impede his response. The
medium, verbal or body language,
distorts the message. All these factors can combine to create a communication failure that will take
time and energy to correct.
Luckily, communication is a twoway street, and our coalition partners face the same difficulties trying to get through to us. Study and
awareness of the problem can go a
long way toward solution, and with
hard work and patience we can
accomplish the mission together.

Capt David E.A.

Johnson is a 1984
graduate of the U.S.
Military Academy at
West Point. Commissioned in Infantry, he
has served as an antiarmor platoon leader, brigade assistant adjutant and company executive officer with the 9th Infantry
Division. He served as commander
of SFODA 552 during Operation
Desert Shield/Storm, as J-3 for the
Joint Special Operations ForcesSomalia during Operation Restore
Hope, and is currently assigned as
commander of SFODA 565 in the
2nd Battalion, 5th SF Group. Airborne-, Ranger- and Special Forcesqualified, he has previously published articles in Infantry magazine
and is a Russian, French and Arabic linguist.

11

SOF Support
to Hurricane Andrew
Recovery
by SSgt. Keith Butler

When Hurricane Andrew struck

southern Florida in August 1992,
Army special-operations forces were
among the first on the scene to
assist residents in recovering from
the damage.
In fact, some were among those
struck by the storm. Members of the
478th Civil Affairs Battalion, 361st
Civil Affairs Brigade, were stationed near the heart of the hurricanes path.
Reserve Maj. Lee L. Stockdale, a
Civil Affairs specialist, turned on
the television weather report at
midnight on Aug. 23, and watched
as the radar showed a green swirl
heading toward his area on the
map. He woke his family, and
together they huddled on the floor
in their 4-by-5-foot downstairs bathroom for almost six hours.
We heard trees smashing off the
side of the house and the fences
being ripped apart. Then the roof
came off, said Stockdale. The wind
sounded like a freight train going
through, only it wouldnt stop.
12

By morning, the hurricane had

ripped apart Stockdales neighborhood and other housing areas
throughout Dade County. Pulling
together, he and his neighbors
began to clean up and rebuild.
Stockdale was one of 38 of the units
soldiers who bore the storms wrath.
In spite of their own personal losses, they immediately pitched in
with the relief operation for southern Dade County.

Civil Affairs
Reservists from the Civil Affairs
community pulled together as well.
The 361st Civil Affairs Brigade
called in volunteers from units
around the country to ease the
strain on the local Reserve soldiers.
The CA soldiers, who work in an
array of professions in civilian life,
from corrections officers and
lawyers to governmental employees
and engineers, are trained to bring
normalcy back to communities.
Civil Affairs units act as a mediator between civilian government

and its military counterpart, said

Maj. George M. Waldroup, 478th
CA Battalion executive officer.
Civil Affairs expertise is immediately available to provide relief
operations. We have a high level of
skills in a myriad of jobs.
We speak governmentese and
understand the jargon that opens
doors in communities, said Capt.
John Orillo of the 414th CA Battalion. Orillo works as an attorney in
Utica, N.Y. Interaction with local
authorities is key. We started marrying up the services of the police,
water authorities, sewage, engineers, Florida Power and Light and
building-code officials to people who
needed help the most.
As relief operations continued,
mail carriers were used to find out
more about damage in the communities and what businesses were
coming back on line. Capt. Ronald
Post of the 414th CA Battalion
learned about the pulse of the Perrine, Fla., community from about
150 mail carriers, who regularly
Special Warfare

reported to him.
Everybody gets mail. Who better
can tell you who is staying to
rebuild and who is leaving? said
Post, a Vietnam veteran. I learned
a long time ago in Civil Affairs to be
innovative.
At first, the Civil Affairs teams
assessed damage throughout the
city and directed residents to local
relief centers and medical facilities.
When the relief operation turned
into one of recovery, the Civil
Affairs practitioners focused on
linking customers to reopened local
businesses. Building contractors,
utilities companies and insurance
offices began answering the call
through Civil Affairs coordination.
One of the biggest challenges
teams faced was getting rid of
debris. With help from the local
police, Army Corps of Engineers,
the XVIIIth Airborne Corps and
local contractors, the Civil Affairs
teams helped organize a unique
garbage-disposal plan. Designed by
Army engineers to efficiently burn
tons of debris, about 20 trash and
refuse collection points as high as
60 feet were set up throughout
Dade County. Police were located at
busy intersections to direct the
nearly 2,500 trucks rolling into each
dump site per day.
Civil affairs also assisted with
animal rescue. Col. Thelton M.C.
McCorcle, a 478th CA Battalion
member from Auburn, Ala., treated
farm animals and pets. Working
from four tents, McCorcle and volunteers from animal-welfare agencies also coordinated a lost-andfound program. The crew took pictures of animals that were brought
in and tried to return them to their
owners. We were concerned for the
animals for humanitys sake, but
they also posed a danger for the
people around here. Dogs, particularly, can get nasty when they form
packs and are very hungry, said
McCorcle, who works as a veterinarian for the U.S. Department of
Agriculture.
Throughout Dade County, the
Civil Affairs work continued for
July 1993

other members of the 361st CA

Brigade. Food-distribution relief
points were centralized at the heart
of the hardest-hit enclaves.
Stockdale, who began tracking
down insurance compensation and
putting his family life in order right
after the hurricane, provided advice
to the Reservists who lost homes.
The international-relations lawyer
for the 478th CA Battalion, Stockdale helped coordinate the countys
mobilization of more than 100
lawyers to provide free legal advice
to residents for their recovery.

Special Forces
While they were not on-scene at
the time of the hurricane, Special
Forces soldiers were among the first
to arrive. Soldiers from the Army
Reserve 11th SF Group deployed
immediately after the hurricane hit
to provide medical assistance, initial damage assessment and communications link-ups. National
Guardsmen from the 20th SF Group
also moved in quickly when they got
word from the Florida governor to
provide 24-hour security against
looting of businesses, homes and
public buildings left vulnerable
after the hurricane.

Within 24 hours our soldiers

became operational with the Homestead police officers, said Capt.
Thomas Bradey, operations officer
for the 3rd Battalion, 20th SF
Group during the relief operation.
A lot of sales were going on to the
migrant farmers who were afraid or
didnt know about relief centers
because they didnt speak English.
Soldiers from the 7th SF Group
also deployed from Fort Bragg to
aid in recovery efforts. Soldiers
from all three SF groups targeted
southern Florida communities to
assess the damage and focus aid to
victims of the hurricane. Communities with the most dire needs were
pinpointed by roving Special Forces
teams. Many accompanied federalagency personnel to provide food,
water, lanterns, heating fuel and
medical treatment to beleaguered
citizens.
Through the end of August and
into September, teams from all
three SF groups went door-to-door
searching for people trapped in
their homes on the outskirts of
Dade County, while conducting
damage assessment for the Joint
Task Force and aid agencies. Their
patrols took them as far as the

Photo by Keith Butler

Soldiers from the 20th SF Group help to direct residents into designated lines
at the Homestead, Fla., post office following Hurricane Andrew.
13

Capt. Alvin Sanders of

the 7th SF Group gives
out supplies during
Hurricane Andrew
relief operations in
south Florida.

Photo by Keith Butler

Everglades.
Soldiers of the 20th SF Group
found one family trapped in their
home. A van rolled over and
blocked the front door, while a tree
covered the back way. The team
opened up the house and found an
elderly couple, said SFC Daniel
Paul, NCOIC of the 3rd/20ths personnel administration center. They
were trapped for days without electricity or water. They were very
glad to see the 20th SF Group of
Florida.
The determination to help citizens rebuild their lives after the
disaster showed no more than with
Sgt. Maj. Richard Wolf and another
group of 20th Group soldiers. Helping those in the rural sections of the
county, they brought out food,
water, building materials and childrens books. They pitched tents for
those whose homes had been
destroyed.
Close your eyes and picture
sheer hell. That is what this whole
ordeal has been like, said LaVanne
14

Donaldson, an avocado farmer who

received assistance from Wolf and
his soldiers. These guys have made
it bearable. They are always checking on us even though we live out
here in the boonies. Ill never forget what they have done for all of
us.
The 7th SFG also teamed up with
Civil Affairs soldiers to assess damage on the Miccosukee Indian
Reservation and provide assistance
coordination for the 10th Mountain
Division.
The 75,000-acre Miccosukee Indian Reservation, set along Highway
84 north of the Everglades National
Park, showed how brutal nature
could be. Trees lay uprooted on
their sides; homes were demolished.
The 10th Mountain Division G-5
told us there were rapport problems
between the Miccosukee Indians
and various federal agencies. They
told us to get our foot in the door to
address the problems, said CWO 1
Bruce D. Phelps, commander of
ODA 716, A Company, 1st Battal-

ion, 7th Special Forces Group at

Fort Bragg, N.C. We build rapport
all of the time when we go to Latin
America. We learn as much as we
can about people we are trying to
help customs and their way of
life.
To assist in the relief effort,
Phelps linked up with Detachment
3, Team 3, of Civil Affairs Task
Force 489. Army Reservists Capt.
Daniel E. McCabe and Sgt. Anthony
deForest, a Cherokee Indian himself, stepped in to help gather
research on the Miccosukee Indian
customs.
The Miccosukee tribe operates
much like a country within a country. They practice customs more
than 300 years old and live by laws
set forth in their own constitution.
They speak their own language,
called Mikasuki.
When youre dealing with the
Miccosukee, youre dealing with a
sovereign nation, said Phelps, who
picked up a little of the language to
add to his repertoire of Spanish.
They are people like you and me
after the hurricane, they needed
help.
After the first meeting with Miccosukee chairman Billy Cypress, a
sort of Indian-soldier pact was
formed. The Miccosukee picked
deForest to serve as the liaison
between the Indians and soldiers. It
was also agreed that promised
building supplies be delivered right
away.
We established immediate rapport with the Miccosukee as a team,
SF and CA, and backed it with
action, said McCabe, a landscaper
who volunteered to come help in the
hurricane-relief effort from his
home, Knoxville, Tenn. The 710th
folks (710th Main Support Battalion, 10th Mountain Division) gave
us that capability.
Two days after their initial meeting, the Civil Affairs and Special
Forces troops were escorting two
tractor-trailers to the Miccosukee
reservation about 60 miles northwest of Homestead where the Army
elements were headquartered.
Special Warfare

In a traditional, Miccosukee manner, the leader of the tribe gave his

blessing to the soldiers for the relief
work they had orchestrated. We
are very satisfied with what you
and the Army have done for our
people, said Jasper S. Nelson,
assistant chairman of the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida. Outside the conference room, the third
set of trucks carrying roofing material, plywood and ladders was being
unloaded. The Miccosukee Indian
nation was ready to rebuild.
The Miccosukee Indian relief
effort will be one of the most
notable things to come out of this,
said Lt. Col. James T. LaRue, commander of the Civil Affairs Task
Force 489. We put this task force
together in 24 hours from all over
and it jelled into an excellent team.
The relationship between all special-operations forces Civil
Affairs, Special Forces and Psychological Operations has been
unparalleled. The devastation here
was on a magnitude that weve
never dealt with before. This has
been a textbook operation in SOF
integration and execution.

Communications
The ears for soldiers of the 7th
SF Group deployed for Hurricane
Andrew relief operations came from
the112th Signal Battalions specialoperations team.
The three-soldier team worked
around the clock to keep six teams
from the 1st Battalion, 7th SF
Group linked to the special operations command-and-control element
in Florida and to the 7th Group
headquarters at Fort Bragg.
The 112th team did a superb job
keeping us linked to headquarters
and our ODAs, said Sgt. Maj.
Michael W. Jefferson, SOCCE
sergeant major. This allowed us to
perform a difficult mission while
keeping our commanders informed
here and at Fort Bragg. You have to
be informed to support the guys on
the ground.
Ready to pack up and move out at
all times with any of the Special
July 1993

Forces units, the 112th Signal Battalion loaded up a flat-bed trailer

after receiving word to move out for
southern Florida.
We not only support Special
Forces, but all special-operations
units, said SSgt. Andre L. Topp,
net-radio-interface team chief, A
Company, 112th Signal Battalion.
We had a four-hour notification to
deploy to Florida.
Working hand microphones and
an array of knobs and lights, the
112th radio-team members called
the confines of a 2-by-4-foot cubicle
home for 12-hour shifts throughout
the hurricane-relief operation. They
monitored UHF satellite nets and
HF nets with the ODAs providing
damage assessment throughout
southern Florida. They were the
sole connection between SF troops
reporting on Hurricane Andrews
damages and the headquarters
directing aid.
Its always a rush when you get
called up for a real-world mission,
said Spec. Martin J. Mancuso,
senior radio operator from A Company, 112th Signal Battalion. Most
units do a lot of training missions.
Most of what we go on is for real.
Theres a lot of pride in doing the

job. You have to be ready to go in a

moments notice and be proficient,
because people are depending on
you at all times.

PSYOP
Also active in recovery operations
were Army Psychological Operations specialists, who steered victims of Hurricane Andrew to relief
centers throughout southern Dade
County with a three-week blitz of
public-service information via
print products, radio and loudspeaker teams.
The Psychological Operations
Task Force, comprised of activeduty soldiers from the 1st Battalion,
4th PSYOP Group, and Army
Reservists from 5th PSYOP Group,
plugged the hole in public-information services left by the hurricane.
Telephones, radio stations, newspapers and television had been
wiped away, leaving local citizens
with no means of receiving the
word about relief centers and aid
available.
There was a tremendous requirement when we arrived, said Lt.
Col. Paul B. Kappelman, commander of the 1st Battalion, 4th POG,
at Fort Bragg, and POTF comman-

Photo by Keith Butler

CWO 1 Bruce Phelps, 7th SF Group (left) and Sgt. Anthony deForest, a Civil
Affairs NCO, discuss rebuilding with members of the Miccosukee Indian tribe.
15

der in Florida. Our services were

useful for peoples survival initially
and for recovery later. We helped
them get back on their feet. The
operation was a success. Our soldiers performed an essential service
in a professional manner.
Because of PSYOPs ability to get
the word out quickly and efficiently,
they were called on to spread the
word, initially from a 400-watt,
mobile radio station. A second
1,000-watt transmitter was then set
up to broadcast public-service
announcements from 6 a.m. to 10
p.m., seven days a week, on Recovery Radio.
The radio went on the air strictly
to broadcast public-service
announcements such as the
opening of disaster-relief centers
and to inform the public about
health facilities and disaster-reliefapplication centers, said Capt.
John L. Wesson, the assistant operations officer for the 1st Battalion,
4th POG, who served as the liaison

officer to the XVIII Airborne Corps

throughout relief effort.
From what we got by talking to
the people, they were getting necessary information about humanitarian aid being performed by military
and civilian organizations, said
SSgt. Thomas R. Ayers, the NCOIC
of Recovery Radio.
Content for the public-service
announcements, which were broadcast live and on tape, was compiled
by the Product Development Center, perhaps the heart of POTF.
Scripts were written for airing on
the radio along with an assortment
of printed products. Fliers, posters,
instructional wallet-sized cards,
maps to relief centers and a
newsletter were crafted by teams
working around the clock.
Newspaper boys werent throwing newspapers on peoples front
porches, because they didnt have
front porches anymore, said Maj.
Robert E. Armstrong, officer in
charge of the PDC. Armstrong, an

PFC Shelen B. Ayling,

112th Signal Battalion,
provides communication between 7th SF
Group teams and headquarters elements during the relief operation.

Photo by Keith Butler

16

Army Reservist from the 5th POG,

put aside his work as a selfemployed crop scientist to help.
PDC developed all the products
that were disseminated. We placed
a priority on information that had
to go out immediately then decided on how to get it out quickly
through radio, print and loudspeakers, added Armstrong. Posters and
fliers placed throughout Dade
County gave phone numbers and
locations for aid agencies, including
food-distribution points, inoculation
centers and insurance offices.
In all, 400 different products were
designed at the PDC, which also
informed citizens about safety precautions, preventive medicine,
debris clearing, schools and church
functions. More than 500,000 copies
of materials were printed by
PSYOP members. The printed public-service information was posted
at camps, on telephone poles and
throughout neighborhoods across
Dade County.
While PDC soldiers worked at
their headquarters, eight loudspeaker teams hit the streets as a
sort of an electric town crier, broadcasting public-service news similar
to the radio and print teams, but
reaching people whose radios and
televisions were destroyed.
Because of the diverse blend of
cultures there, the PSYOP team
used its Spanish-speaking ability to
get the word out to Hispanic areas.
It also broadcast in Creole for
Haitian communities and Kanjobal,
a dialect spoken by Guatemalans.
We tried to draw people out of
their homes to travel to relief centers. I felt real strong about going to
help these people; it looked like a
huge mess, said Sgt. Jon E. Walsh,
NCOIC of 4th POGs roving
Humanitarian Information Support
Teams. My parents were in the
San Francisco earthquake. I was
proud that we had a chance to use
our knowledge and skills to help
out.
Using the LSS-40, a 3-by-2-foot
box-like contraption which can be
mounted on a soldiers back with a
Special Warfare

battery pack or mounted on a

Humvee roof, the HISTs covered
more than 50 square miles of urban
and rural areas throughout the
county, broadcasting public-service
information. They also operated
static loudspeaker systems at relief
centers to explain how residents
could get further assistance.
As relief turned into recovery, the
pace slowed. Newspapers and radio
and television stations continued to
come on-line. We are working ourselves out of a job, said 1st Lt. Elizabeth C. McClure, the HIST officerin-charge and a Reservist from the
5th POG out of Washington, D.C.
When we got here, people had no
way to get information. Our soldiers
hit the ground and took off.
Photo by Keith Butler

SSgt. Keith Butler

is a journalist
assigned to the Public
Affairs Office, U.S.
Army Special Operations Command.

July 1993

PSYOP soldiers prepare folders in the Product Development Center. The

Center designed 400 products to inform residents about a variety of topics.

17

PSYOP Task Force to JTF Andrew:

A Case Study in
Support to Disaster-Recovery
Operations

by Lt. Col. Paul B. Kappelman & Maj. Robert E. Armstrong

The PSYOP task force formed to

support relief efforts following Hurricane Andrew was unique in several aspects, and a review of its organization and function provides a
number of valuable lessons learned
for the PSYOP community.
Initially, the only PSYOP troops
deployed were loudspeaker teams
accompanying the 82nd Airborne
Division. Within days of their deployment, as the extent of the damage
became more evident, the need for
additional PSYOP assets became
obvious. Within less than a week, the
POTF had been established.
Any POTF uses assets from the
entire 4th PSYOP Group. The
Andrew POTF was unique because
it included Reserve forces. Reservists held positions at every level
within the POTF, from the staff
down to the loudspeaker teams.

Organization
As in any military operation, the
role of the POTF required a clear
mission statement, as well as an
articulation of the commanders
18

intent and a concept of the operation. The following were developed

to state the POTFs role as precisely
as possible:
Mission: Provide coordinated information programs in support of the
joint-task-force relief operations.
Commanders intent:
Supply immediate relief information through radio, loudspeaker,
print and face-to-face contact.
Identify key communicators and
appropriate language balance to
provide greatest impact.
Assess the adequacy of recovery
communications infrastructure and
effectiveness of relief information.
Synchronize emerging information programs oriented at recovery
operations using mass media
(radio).
Keep the information program
ahead of events to inform and prepare the population for restoration
of its former communication and
information network.
Concept of operation:
Immediately establish radio
operations in the vicinity of Home-

stead City and provide for the

greatest footprint in the affected
area.
Provide immediate survival
information from command, public
affairs office and press releases.
Provide loudspeaker teams to
supplement the communication mix
and provide personal, face-to-face
contact.
Stress themes of survival and
basic needs.
As a daily routine is formed,
apply PSYOP assets so that information remains ahead of events to
elevate behavior beyond survival to
recovery and sustainment.
The most useful tool developed by
the staff was an operational continuum that showed the concept of the
operation in a longitudinal manner.
Any POTF involved in a military
operation supports a commander
directing his troops in the execution
of a specified mission. The POTF
can envision its mission as a succession of stages, tied to the overall
task-force mission and mirroring
the task-force commanders concept.
Special Warfare

In a disaster-recovery operation,
troops assist in the recovery, but
they cannot cause it to happen in
the same sense that they can complete a tactical mission. The POTFs
role is to provide information to
assist the population in recovery.
Regardless of how the task-force
commander may phase the overall
operation, transition from one
phase to the next depends on the
populations response, and that is
largely dependent upon its ability to
obtain accurate information on
where to go and what to do.
It was critical to know at all
times where the POTF was in the
continuum, to be able to shift the
emphasis of work in the Product
Development Cell and to allow adequate time for development and
preparation of timely materials.
Accurate information on how the
recovery was progressing was as
crucial as if the POTF had been
supporting a combat operation.
Operating within the United
States raised two major issues for
the Andrew POTF: the product-

July 1993

approval process and use of the

word PSYOP.
The JTF commander reported to
a civilian agency the Federal
Emergency Management Agency
which in turn reported to the Secretary of Transportation, the overall
director of the effort. While the
POTFs role was solely to provide
information, its products still
required approval from those within
the chain. In general, the final
approval authority for the POTFs
products was at the JTF level. In a
classic PSYOP campaign in an overseas theater, the theater commander-in-chief or the JTF commander
is, by doctrine, the approval authority. There is no doctrine covering
approval for products in a U.S.based organization.
To some segments of society, a
misunderstanding persists with
respect to PSYOP and its various
capabilities. The very use of the
word conjures up images of brainwashing. To avoid a misinterpretation of its role, the POTF was
referred to as the Humanitarian

Assistance Information Element,

and the troops making daily contact
with the civilians were referred to
as humanitarian information support teams.

Lessons learned
To say that the soldiers assigned
to the POTF performed well is an
understatement. In the best traditions of military operations, things
did not always go as planned, and,
in the best traditions of the U.S. soldier, the troops always found a way
to fix whatever was broken.
We learned numerous lessons at
the unit level, and the lessons
offered here are for planners, commanders and staff of the next POTF
organized to assist in a U.S.-based
disaster. Even before we redeployed
from Florida, a warning order was
issued to form another POTF to go
to Hawaii and assist in the recovery
from Hurricane Iniki. Although that
POTF was not deployed, it illustrates the point that the Andrew
mission is unlikely to stand as a
singular event.

19

Spec. Michael Parrish

(left) and PFC Michael
Stork ensure POTF
broadcasts are going
out over the airwaves
during the Hurricane
Andrew relief
operation.

Photo by Keith Butler

Formation of the POTF: A

PSYOP representative should be
deployed at the beginning of a crisis
to make an assessment of communication-and-information requirements. If needed, a POTF can be
built within 18-72 hours and inserted into the task organization. This
is much more effective than providing piecemeal support.
If a POTF is to be deployed, it
should be sent within the first 24-36
hours. Not only does this quickly fill
the information vacuum, but it also
permits the POTF to harness any
sources of information still present
in the area. The POTF must be
deployed as a unit, which will likely
require at least one dedicated aircraft. The POTF should also have
compatible communications with
the supported command.
Augmentation by reserve-component forces is a viable option, particularly in a U.S.-based operation,
but the mobilization process may
present some delays. Part of the
20

problem lies in the fact that some

PSYOP units have mobilization stations other than Fort Bragg a
vestige of the days before the formation of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs
and Psychological Operations Command. To whatever extent possible,
PSYOP units should have Fort
Bragg as their mobilization site and
a standardized procedure developed
by USACAPOC to bring the RC soldiers onto active duty.
Role of the POTF and the operational continuum: Stating the
POTFs role in the manner used for
combat operations helps keep the
unit focused. The same language
will be used by the JTF. Be prepared for some confusion by civilian
agencies: Much of their thinking
centers on providing information to
the press. Our emphasis must be on
information the population needs to
keep it moving toward recovery.
To accurately judge your position
on the operational continuum
requires timely and accurate intelli-

gence. In Andrew, we frequently

relied on the local newspapers.
A consolidated information-andintelligence collection plan should
be developed that satisfies the intelligence-collection requirements for
the entire JTF, with the emphasis
on human intelligence. The task to
conduct face-to-face communication
and to survey attitudes is an ideal
task for Special Forces disasterassistance relief teams, or DART,
and Civil Affairs personnel. DART
and CA personnel were deployed in
Andrew and will likely be present in
any future recovery operation. The
intelligence cycle has to feed back
into the POTF, to ensure timely
products.
The CONUS perspective: The
POTF was assigned to the Army
forces, presenting several challenges to its successful operation.
When product requests came from
the JTF or FEMA, they were not
necessarily viewed as a priority by
the Corps. In addition, having the
POTF below the JTF level created a
layered approval chain, slowing
down the process and in some cases
watering down the final product.
FM 33-1, Psychological Operations,
clearly indicates that the POTF
should work directly for the JTF.
Just as PSYOP has had to argue its
case to be recognized as properly
belonging in the G-3/S-3, so, too,
must POTF commanders argue
their way into the JTF. The POTF
commander should work as a special staff officer in the JTF.
The crisis environment requires
that many things happen at once,
and there is a temptation to decentralize. For information activities,
that seems an incorrect approach.
Many critiques of the Andrew effort
noted the lack of a central approval
authority for information release.
Civilian planning does provide for
such a central authority. Under the
provisions of the Robert T. Stafford
Disaster Relief and Emergency Act
(Public Law 93-288, as amended),
the Federal Response Plan calls for
the establishment of a joint information center. According to the
Special Warfare

Plan, as it is commonly called, the

JIC coordinates all information
released to the public and the news
media.
The JIC, formed at FEMA-level,
should serve as the information
CINC. It should hold a daily meeting with all parties involved and
direct the themes to be followed. The
JTF contingent should consist of
representatives from the J-2 (armed
with the latest intelligence gathered
by the DART and CA teams), PAO,
Civil Affairs and PSYOP. On an asneeded basis, consideration should
be given to including other staff officers, e.g., staff judge advocate, surgeon and chaplain. Taking the
themes determined in the meeting,
the POTF should prepare the products and the JTF should act as the
approval authority.
While the JIC was formed and
served as the focal point for information, as in the Plan, its initial
emphasis was on providing information to the press. Although the JIC
eventually began focusing on information to the population, as
opposed to information about the
population, it continued to have a
strong orientation toward its PAO
role. The POTF commander must
stay alert to the PAO orientation of
many of the other players in the
information arena and educate

July 1993

them on the capabilities and role of

PSYOP assets.
At the outset, the POTF commander should ensure that the dissemination of information by military
forces is centralized. A JTF directive should state the JTF commanders policies and guidelines. With
the advent of personal computers,
laser printers and graphics programs, it is all too easy for a miniPOTF to spring up and start printing its own leaflets. There were a
couple of instances of this in Florida, and while the efforts were wellintentioned, they did not support
the overall JTF mission, nor were
they designed by PSYOP-trained
soldiers.
Finally, use of the word PSYOP
warrants some discussion. There
have been a number of valid arguments put forth over the years, calling for a change in our designation.
That change, however, would play
into the hands of those who already
misunderstand our role, providing
them even further proof if they felt
we were deliberately trying to conceal our true identity. Particularly
in the wake of Desert Storm, the
U.S. public is reasonably wellinformed about the U.S. military
including PSYOP and holds it in
high regard. When the opportunity
presents itself, we should try to edu-

cate that portion of the public still

ill-informed about the versatility of
the PSYOP soldier.

Lt. Col. Paul B.

Kappelman is commander of the 1st
PSYOP Battalion, 4th
PSYOP Group, Fort
Bragg, N.C. During
the Hurricane Andrew
relief effort, he served as the POTF
commander. He has also served with
the 82nd Airborne Division during
Operation Urgent Fury and with the
7th Special Forces Group during
Operation Just Cause.
Maj. Robert E. Armstrong is the civil-military operations officer
for the 5th PSYOP
Group, Washington,
D.C. He served in the
Andrew POTF as officer-in-charge of the Product Development Cell. An Army Reserve officer,
he has held various command and
staff positions in the Army Reserve
and National Guard and served in
Vietnam with the 173rd Airborne
Brigade and 5th Special Forces
Group.

21

Roles
and Functions
of U.S. Special
Operations Forces
by John M. Collins

Congress specifies broad roles for

each U.S. military service and the
U.S. Special Operations Command.
The Secretary of Defense, with
presidential approval, assigns functions that amplify those responsibilities. The President and Secretary
of Defense prescribe operational
missions for each unified and specified command. Some assignments
are clean cut, others unavoidably
interlock and overlap.
Title 10, United States Code, as
amended by Congress in 1986,
directs the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to review roles and
functions not less than once every
three years. Re-evaluation is required to determine whether redundancies foster flexibility or raise
costs without increasing capabilities; to ensure that responsibilities
are properly distributed among U.S.
military services and USSOCOM;
This article is taken from the 1993
Roles and Functions of U.S. Combat
Forces, prepared by John M. Collins
for the Library of Congress Congressional Research Service.
22

and to fill gaps that encourage

interservice competition for scarce
resources.
Several special-operations roles
and functions might benefit from
reviews that could help Congress
and the Secretary of Defense determine what additions to, subtractions from and other adjustments
would be appropriate.

Inconsistent instructions
Title 10, Section 167, lists 10
activities equivalent to statutory
roles and missions for special operations: direct action; strategic reconnaissance; unconventional warfare;
foreign internal defense; counterterrorism; theater search and rescue;
psychological operations; civil
affairs; humanitarian assistance;
and such other activities as may be
specified by the President or the
Secretary of Defense.
DoD instructions differ from Title
10 in important respects. Directive
5100.1 tells the Army, Navy and Air
Force to organize, train, equip and
provide forces for the support and
conduct of special operations, but

specifies no functions for USSOCOM.

Special-operations doctrine downgrades humanitarian assistance from
a statutory obligation to a collateral
mission, with the attendant admonition that SOF commanders should
exercise care in allocating forces
against non-primary missions to preclude overcommitment. These inconsistent instructions require revision.
The following observations might
make useful starting points.

Direct action
DoD officially defines direct
action as a specified act involving
operations of an overt, covert, clandestine or low visibility nature conducted primarily by a sponsoring
powers special operations forces in
hostile or denied areas.
That description invites disparate
interpretations. SO doctrine, for
example, asserts that units may
employ raid, ambush, or direct
assault tactics; emplace munitions
and other devices; conduct standoff
attacks by fire from air, ground, or
maritime platforms; provide terminal guidance for precision-guided
munitions; and conduct independent sabotage. Direct action also
includes efforts to locate and capture or recover personnel and
materiel; neutralize, seize, or
destroy critical facilities; and even
help stem the spread of massdestruction weapons.
Some SOF are explicitly organized, equipped and trained to
undertake DA operations. The Joint
Special Operations Command, a
secret, triservice organization that
concentrates on counterterrorism,
emphasizes surgical strikes that
conventional forces seldom could
engage successfully. The Navys
SEAL teams undertake DA operations in maritime and riverine environments. Specially armed Army
helicopters and Air Force fixed-wing
gunships able to operate at night
and in adverse weather also qualify.
Rangers, in contrast, are primarily superb parachute infantry that
unified commanders normally
employ in battalion or greater
Special Warfare

strength to accomplish conventional missions, as they did during

Operations Urgent Fury and Just
Cause. Their combat-diving and
scout-swimming teams possess
capabilities comparable to those of
the SEALs.
Marine Expeditionary Units designated special operations capable, like Rangers, are essentially
conventional forces. They are organized, trained and equipped to conduct operations that include maritime special-purpose missions, but
they are not SOF and have never
come under USSOCOM control.
Congress and the Secretary of
Defense might use that precedent to
revamp current roles and functions
so that USSOCOM would retain
primary responsibility only for
direct actions that truly require
special talent. They should resolve
the future purpose and assignment
of the Ranger Regiment, however,
before they opt for change. At least
three options are open:
The Ranger Regiment could
greatly expand its direct-action capabilities at little cost by adapting the
best features of spetsnaz brigades
that once served the Soviet Union
and now belong to various independent republics. Ranger companies, if
required, could then quickly form
many small, uniquely-tailored teams
organized, equipped and trained to
neutralize scattered, high-value,
heavily guarded targets. Rangers in
such event would become SOF in
every sense of the word and function
much more effectively as members of
USSOCOM, provided they could supplement infantry skills with area-oriented direct-action specialties.
The Ranger Regiment might
move from USSOCOM to Army
jurisdiction. Careful consideration
should precede any decision to do
so, because few Army generals
fully appreciate Ranger capabilities and limitations. Their predecessors briefly lionized Rangers for
daring deeds early in World War
II, later misused and destroyed two
battalions at Cisterna, Italy,
reduced the remainder to separate
July 1993

companies during the Korean conflict, then erased all Rangers from
active rolls from September 1951
until 1974. Returning Rangers to
Army control consequently would
be wise only if senior Army leaders
welcomed the move.
The Ranger Regiment might
remain under continued USSOCOM
control, even though the missions it
performs are mainly conventional.
Current arrangements clearly are
welcome.

Strategic reconnaissance
Title 10 identifies strategic reconnaissance as a special-operations
activity. SO doctrine instead
addresses special reconnaissance,
intended to collect specific, welldefined and time-sensitive information of national or theater-level
significance.
SR often depends primarily on
human-intelligence agents in hostile or politically touchy territory
when technological systems are less

satisfactory or infeasible. Typical

tasks include contact with insurgent or resistance factions to ascertain whether they deserve U.S. support; topographic, meteorological,
hydrographic and demographic
explorations; forays to find worrisome enemy weapons; investigations to confirm the strength, location and movement of major enemy
forces; and battle-damage-assessment probes.
SEALS concentrate their strategic-reconnaissance capabilities along
continental shelves and coasts. Special-operations aircraft perform
unique missions aloft. Army Special
Forces conduct strategic recon
inland. Whether SF should continue
to do so is debatable:
Special Forces teams, composed
mainly of seasoned, professional
NCOs, are fully qualified to perform
strategic-reconnaissance missions.
Their employment, however, risks
hard-to-replace personnel who
spend years acquiring language pro-

Army Rangers are

superb parachute
infantry that have performed well in Operations Urgent Fury and
Just Cause. Although
they are often used in
conventional missions,
few conventional commanders fully understand their limitations
or capabilities.

U.S. Army photo

23

ficiency and cross-cultural understanding applicable to a particular

geographic area. One option would
be to consider SR a collateral rather
than primary function for Army
Special Forces.
Rangers, in response to any
such decision, might fold strategic
reconnaissance and surveillance
into their repertoire. That would
capitalize on professed abilities of
Ranger companies and battalions
to infiltrate and exfiltrate hostile
territory, survive in all types of
weather and terrain under adverse
conditions, and perform shortduration tactical reconnaissance.
Individual Rangers and small
intelligence-collection teams thus
could excel at SR if given proper
training and retention policies that
stabilize assignments.
USSOCOM, at additional cost
in terms of personnel, time and
money, could activate the necessary
number of specialized SR units.
Rangers and Special Forces then
could concentrate on other important responsibilities.

Unconventional warfare
Unconventional warfare, which
may replace, complement or supple-

ment conventional military operations, involves strategically offensive covert, clandestine or low-profile assistance for insurgents, secessionists or resistance movements in
foreign countries.
U.S. SOF, primarily Army Special
Forces, help organize, train and
advise indigenous undergrounds
and guerrillas. They furnish intelligence, communications, psychological operations and medical support,
and establish evasion-and-escape
networks that allow safe movement
by individuals and small groups to
and from enemy-held areas.
Raids, sabotage, deception and
survival techniques are UW stocks
in trade. Success depends in large
part on professional SOF steeped in
local cultures and proficient in local
languages. UW professionals further require the acumen, maturity
and temperament needed to influence local leaders, whom they normally must persuade instead of
command.
The U.S. conducted three notable
UW operations during World War
II, in the Philippines, Burma and
France. The succeeding half-century
has seen none on a comparable
scale.

U.S. Army photo

The primary purpose of U.S. SOF in foreign internal defense is to train and
advise host nations to develop forces able to maintain internal security.
24

Anticommunism and containment

policies, which inspired most if not
all U.S. unconventional warfare during the Cold War, no longer seem in
prospect. A counterrevolution in
Russia that adversely affected U.S.
security conceivably could revive
interest, but not necessarily decision makers in Washington were
reluctant to launch large UW operations against the Soviet Union or
Red China when both were bona
fide threats.
Congress therefore might weigh
the advisability of discarding
unconventional warfare as a statutory role. DoD Directive 5100.1, in
response, could designate UW a collateral function. USSOCOM then
could devote full attention to foreign
internal defense, which requires
Army Special Forces to emphasize
quite different skills.
Alternatively, it might be wise
to retain unconventional warfare as
a statutory role. UW was the original function of Army Special Forces.
It still contributes to their mystique, and pride in related capabilities remains an immeasurable
morale builder. Financial costs
would be minuscule.

Foreign internal defense

Foreign internal defense, a unique
form of collective security, is the
strategically defensive counterpart
of unconventional warfare. It
involves protracted interagency and
multidisciplinary efforts by U.S.
civilian specialists and armed forces
to forestall or defeat selected insurgencies, resistance movements and
lawlessness.
The primary purpose of U.S. SOF
is to train, advise and otherwise
help host nations develop military
and paramilitary forces fully able to
maintain internal security. Some
UW and FID skills, such as appreciation for local culture and language
proficiency, are interchangeable,
but different organizations and
equipment are required.
As a result, Army Special Forces
and Navy SEALs are not equally
adept at foreign internal defense and
Special Warfare

unconventional warfare, although

U.S. policy makers currently expect
equal competence at both.
The need to fix the relative importance of UW and FID seems pressing, because FID is becoming ever
more complex in the post-Cold War
world. Multinational operations may
become the norm. Successful FID,
moreover, might promote U.S. interests in global stability at less cost
and risk than most known means.
Alternatives listed below therefore
might prove advantageous:
Title 10 designates foreign internal defense and humanitarian assistance as special-operations activities.
Humanitarian assistance, however,
is a subset of civil-military operations which, in turn, contribute to
FID. No harm therefore would be
done if Title 10 discarded humanitarian assistance as a discrete role
for SOF. USSOCOM then could
legally consider foreign internal
defense as an entity and freely determine which aspects to emphasize.
DoD Directive 5100.1 does not
tell USSOCOM whether unconventional warfare or foreign internal
defense should take precedence.
That document might helpfully
assign the primary function.

Paramilitary operations
Guerrillas and other armed irregular forces that employ quasimilitary tactics and techniques are
offensive paramilitary forces.
Defensive paramilitary forces help
regular armed forces and lawenforcement agencies retain or
regain internal security.
The Office of Strategic Services
conducted U.S. paramilitary operations during World War II. The
CIA, its successor, thereafter
assumed paramilitary responsibilities. Diversified endeavors during
the 1950s occurred in China, Korea,
the Philippines, Guatemala,
Indonesia and Tibet.
CIA retains primary responsibility for paramilitary operations, but
the Drug Enforcement Agency now
conducts or controls small-scale
actions in Andean states. The State
July 1993

Departments Bureau of International Narcotics Matters has

received legal permission to arm its
own air wing of 60 fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters for such purposes. Consolidation rather than
proliferation of paramilitary responsibilities, however, seems worth
consideration. Accordingly:
Congress might amend Title 10
to identify USSOCOM as the lead
agency for all U.S. paramilitary
operations. It might simultaneously
amend Title 50, Section 403(d)(5) to
exclude participation by the CIA,
which the present text implicitly
permits with these words: perform
such other [unspecified] functions ...
as the National Security Council
may from time to time direct. DoD
Directive 5100.1 and joint specialoperations doctrine thereafter could
contain specific instructions related
to paramilitary functions, missions
and interdepartmental and interagency relationships.
CIA might retain primary
responsibilities if, after careful
review, policy makers decided that
it is best qualified to plan and conduct paramilitary operations.

Anti/counterterrorism
Terrorism is public, repetitive violence or threats of violence intended
to achieve socio-political objectives
by intimidating innocent people and
severely disrupting community routines. Domestic terrorism, which
originates within and is directed
against one country or factions
therein, is a favorite tool of some
insurgents. Transnational terrorism,
instigated by groups that renegade
governments may sponsor and support, emanates from foreign bases.
U.S. programs to combat terrorism comprise two basic roles.
Antiterrorism emphasizes passive
protection for personnel and installations. Counterterrorism may
attack terrorists before they can
strike or be reactive. Timely, accurate intelligence is essential to both.
Title 10 designates counterterrorism, but not antiterrorism, as a special-operations activity. DoD Direc-

tive 5100.1 assigns neither function

to USSOCOM or any military service. Joint special-operations doctrine, in the absence of contrary
instructions, considers counterterrorism a primary activity and calls
antiterrorism collateral.
Distinctions between antiterrorism and counterterrorism are
sharp; they demand different skills.
Steps to discourage terrorists before
they strike and to mitigate damage
embrace individual-protection programs to reduce risks, public education to increase awareness and
installation-protection programs.
Active countermeasures, in contrast, require unique reconnaissance
and surveillance techniques. With
rare exceptions, such as the 1986 air
attack against Libya, they require
intricately choreographed SOF
actions as well. Flexibility and a flair
for improvisation often are imperative. Hostage-rescue units that
expect the unexpected, for example,
must maintain a mind-boggling
array of special skills on standby,
because they cannot predict the
nature of any future emergency.
Antiterrorism and counterterrorism nevertheless are closely linked,
because they are flip sides of the
same coin. Roles and functions that
disregard antiterrorism therefore
are apt to be flawed. Amendments
to Title 10 and DoD Directive 5100.1
accordingly may prove appropriate:
Members of JSOC, all intimately familiar with terrorist tactics, are
eminently qualified to help the
State Department and FBI educate
and train antiterrorists. Title 10
could encourage them to do so by
adding antiterrorism to other special-operations activities.
DoD Directive 5100.1, in
response, could assign antiterrorism to USSOCOM as a primary
responsibility without degrading
JSOCs counterterrorism capabilities in the slightest.

Theater search and rescue

Search-and-rescue forces must be
properly organized, equipped, trained
and controlled to recover personnel
25

in distress on land or at sea under

trying conditions. They remain on
constant call, ready to pick up
downed aircrews and passengers in
peacetime. Combat-search-and-rescue operations under fire during
minor contingencies and major wars
are even more demanding.
Title 10, Section 167, designates
theater SAR as a special-operations
responsibility. DoD Directive 5100.1
tells the Coast Guard to provide
maritime search-and-rescue forces
in wartime, but otherwise snubs
SAR. Joint doctrines differentiate
SAR from CSAR: Every sovereign
country conducts SAR within its
own boundaries. U.S. military services and SOF assist in accord with
existing agreements. Each U.S. unified commander, however, regularly
conducts CSAR operations in support of U.S. forces within his area of
responsibility.
CSAR forces received due attention throughout the Vietnam war,
but units dedicated to that purpose
inexplicably disappeared thereafter. Only the Air Force currently
maintains full-time CSAR assets.
Other service contributions are ad
hoc. Only USSOCOM has fixedand rotary-wing aircraft able to

penetrate deeply into enemy

airspace, pick up evaders and
recover high-priority cargo and
return surreptitiously.
As a result, USSOCOM has
become the de facto force of choice
for providing theaterwide CSAR.
Continued reliance at current intensities reportedly would degrade
abilities to satisfy a host of other
SO requirements unless USSOCOM
received extra aircraft, personnel
and funds.
Some redistribution of searchand-rescue roles and functions thus
might be appropriate. Various proponents propose several options:
Congress might begin by revising Title 10 requirements for theater search and rescue to read combat search and rescue, since theater-wide SAR operations in peacetime are basically a host-country
responsibility.
DoD Directive 5100.1 might
subdivide CSAR functions among
the Army, Navy, Marine Corps,
USSOCOM and the Air Force. Such
action would require all but USAF
to designate full-time CSAR assets,
since no other service currently
does so. A Joint Rescue Center
could coordinate all combat-search-

U.S. Air Force photo

Search-and-rescue forces recover personnel in distress on land or at sea. They

must remain constantly ready to pick up downed aircrews and passengers.
26

and-rescue forces in wartime. Decision makers might consider theaterwide peacetime SAR a collateral
function if they take this tack.
Option three, the consolidation
of all CSAR units under USSOCOM,
would be consistent with the current
emphasis on streamlined functions.
Centralized control could foster efficiency and effectiveness in peacetime
as well as war. USSOCOM, however,
would need substantial augmentation, as noted above.
A compromise that assigned
primary covert or clandestine CSAR
functions to USSOCOM and all
other combat search and rescue to
military services under joint control
might register useful improvements
with minimum disruption. USSOCOM then could concentrate on SOrelated CSAR, even if it received
conventional CSAR as a collateral
function.

Psychological operations
Psychological operations, as practiced by the U.S. military establishment, constitute the purposeful use
of information and actions to influence the emotions, attitudes and
behavior of target audiences in
ways that expedite the achievement
of security objectives in peacetime
and war.
PSYOP targets are idiosyncratic.
Subtle themes that work well
against timid souls seldom faze
tough adversaries such as Saddam
Hussein or Serbias President Slobodan Milosevic. Leaflets are useless if
printed in improper dialects or in
colors that recipients consider
unlucky. PSYOP specialists who
hope to manipulate key individuals
or groups consistently must therefore be conversant with local idioms,
customs and predispositions.
PSYOP often involves interagency coordination. Most U.S. military
capabilities reside in the Army,
which maintains an active-duty
four-battalion PSYOP group. Three
more groups are reserve components. Air Force aircraft deliver
leaflets and provide platforms for
loudspeakers.
Special Warfare

A shotgun marriage between

PSYOP and special operations took
place at Fort Bragg, N.C., in 1952
when the first Special Forces group
joined a newly-formed Psychological
Warfare Center to soften resistance
by Army, Air Force and CIA officials who then opposed all efforts to
create military SOF formations.
Those largely artificial relationships have long since ceased to
exist. The former Psychological
Warfare Center currently is called
the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center.
Perhaps 90 percent of all PSYOP
output supports conventional operations. Critics accordingly question
whether psychological roles and
functions are properly assigned:
Title 10 specifies that only so
much of PSYOP as relates to special
operations is legitimately a SO
activity. Retired Gen. Richard G.
Stillwell, bearing that fact in mind,
stated to the Secretary of the Army
that the only thing special about
psychological operations is their
extraordinary importance.
Congress consequently could consider shifting PSYOP to Army control,
especially since it normally supports conventional operations. DoD
Directive 5100.1 would pass primary PSYOP functions to the Army vs.
USSOCOM in such event.
Others prefer present arrangements, partly because PSYOP
forces, like Rangers, might atrophy
if returned to Army jurisdiction.
They nevertheless recommend that
DoD Directive 5100.1 formally designate PSYOP assets as SOF. As it
stands, fuzzy relationships reportedly frustrate USSOCOM efforts to
command, control, administer and
budgetarily support PSYOP forces
as congressional legislation intends.

Civil Affairs
Civil Affairs specialists facilitate
civil-military cooperation between
U.S. armed forces and allied governments. They operate at national
and local levels before, during and
after hostilities or other emergencies, in accord with international
July 1993

law and bilateral or multilateral

agreements. They may also exercise
executive, legislative and judicial
authority in occupied territory.
Fundamental functions are to identify and coordinate the acquisition
of indigenous resources and facilities; minimize civilian interference
with U.S. military activities; assist
military commanders in meeting
legal and moral responsibilities to
the populace; advise U.S. and hostcountry authorities on civic action;
and train allied counterparts.
Title 10 identifies CA as a specialoperations activity insofar as it
relates to SO. Perhaps 90 percent of
assigned CA missions, however,
assist conventional commanders.
Most U.S. Civil Affairs forces reside
in the Army, which maintains one
active battalion under USSOCOM
control. Ninety-seven percent are
reserve components subject to call
as required. Two Marine Corps
Reserve CA groups support Marine
air-ground task forces. Neither is
assigned to USSOCOM.
Civil Affairs operations, like
PSYOP, frequently require interagency and multiservice coordination. Like PSYOP, they support
assorted U.S. military programs in
peacetime and at every conflict
level. Even more than PSYOP, the
merger of Civil Affairs with special
operations was a marriage of
administrative convenience. Critics
seldom question the value of Civil
Affairs, but they do debate whether
CA roles and functions are properly
assigned. Arguments for and
against change are virtually identical with those previously described
for psychological operations:
Congress might amend Title 10
to relieve USSOCOM of Civil
Affairs roles, since only a small
fraction of all CA efforts support
special operations. DoD Directive
5100.1 then could order the Army to
organize, equip and train CA forces
as a primary function.
Civil Affairs might suffer as a
stepchild under Army control if
Title 10 remains unchanged. DoD
Directive 6100.1, however, reported-

ly would have to formally designate

Civil Affairs forces as SOF before
USSOCOM could command, control,
administer and budgetarily support
CA as congressional legislation
intends.
Title 10 and DoD Directive 5100.1
tell the services and USSOCOM
what roles and functions each must
perform to ensure well-balanced
armed forces with capabilities the
U.S. combatant commands need to
accomplish their assigned missions.
Every change creates a ripple effect.
Decision makers consequently
should strive to determine beforehand whether any given amendment would increase cost effectiveness or deprive U.S. combat forces
of desirable flexibility.

John M. Collins is a senior specialist in national defense at the

Library of Congress. He is the
author of a number of books, including Americas Small Wars: Lessons
for the Future, Military Space
Forces: The Next 50 Years, and
Green Berets, SEALS and
Spetsnaz. A frequent defense consultant for members of Congress and
the U.S. defense establishment, he
has 30 years of military service, having enlisted as a private in 1942 and
retired as a colonel in 1972.

27

Cameroon:
CA Unit Conducts Joint Medical Exercise
by Lt. Col. Mark W. Dushnyck

Crowds came from miles around,

primarily on foot, forming long lines
and standing for hours under a
relentless sun which generated temperatures up to 120 degrees. They
were waiting to see a doctor.
The second joint Civil Affairs and
military medical exercise between
soldiers from the armies of the
United States and Cameroon was
under way, with uniformed doctors
and nurses conducting a 10-day
medical program that left many citizens of Cameroon happier and
healthier.
More than 5,000 residents of the
central-African countrys extreme
north province poured into 12 towns
and villages to see two teams of
American and Cameroonian doctors
and nurses, who diagnosed and
treated a variety of ailments, many
unheard of in the United States.
Most of the exercise took place in
the Mayo-Tsanaga district, an area
near the site of the first bilateral
exercise in 1991. That campaign
focused on immunization against
28

meningitis, which had struck the

region severely. Early in 1992,
another severe outbreak of the disease struck the province, but with
relatively modest impact on those
vaccinated in 1991.The success of
the 1991 mission, coupled with a
desire to expand training for Americans and Cameroonians, led to an
emphasis on general medical treatment in 1992.
The mission involved a team of 12
reservists from six Civil Affairs
units throughout the U.S. Since
only three of the 12 had prior tours
in Cameroon, there were inevitable
adjustments in terms of environment, language, culture and local
medical problems and practices.
Most of the deploying Americans
did research about Cameroon before
travelling, and they received additional briefings upon their arrival
from embassy personnel and military physicians of the Cameroon Army on the health-care system, area
diseases and common treatments.
Within a few days the citizen-sol-

diers were working long hours in

tiny towns and villages whose
names they had never heard of.
Usually split into two teams, they
plied their Civil Affairs and medical
craft side-by-side with their Cameroonian counterparts more often
than not with the aid of military or
civilian volunteer interpreters.
Capt. Mary Ellen Robbins primarily performed triage, the sorting
and screening of patients, during
the exercise. A member of the 443rd
Civil Affairs Company, West Warwick, R.I., she recalls how language
barriers constituted one of the
biggest challenges. At practically
every site we visited, there had to
be translation from a local or tribal
dialect into French and then into
English for us to work, she said.
Despite this trilingual method of
health-care delivery, there was success. To a degree, I was unsure of
what we would encounter in terms
of patient load, severity of illness,
etc. So imagine our collective thrill
and pride in possibly saving three
Special Warfare

lives and delivering a baby girl as

well, said Col. Charles Kilhenny,
senior medical member of the team.
Assigned to the 411th Civil Affairs
Company, West Hartford, Conn.,
the 64-year-old radiologist also relished the opportunity to see how
my military-medical counterparts
function without much of the equipment that is available to the American medical profession.
At each location, the team set up
four stations: registration, triage,
treatment and pharmacy. The
American soldiers worked closely
with Cameroonians, military and
civilian, to deliver hope and health
care to a region that has been very
vulnerable to illness in the past.
The team treated more than
5,000 Cameroonians. An analysis of
patient data disclosed 13 fairly common conditions that prevailed, with
one of every six patients afflicted
with malaria. One of every eight
patients suffered from respiratory
infections or schistosomiasis, a variety of tropical diseases caused by
parasites in the bloodstream.
Considering some of the geographical and sociological challenges that are part of an African
mission, the operations success was
simply overwhelming, said Col.
Albert P. Grupper, 353rd Civil
Affairs Command, mission commander for the American contingent.
Lt. Col. Patricia Heringa, a member of the 308th Civil Affairs Group,
Homewood, Ill., and a registered
nurse in civilian life, recalls the
severity of the work environment.
This was my first trip outside of
the U.S., let alone Africa, and I was
almost overwhelmed by the heat.
With one exception, the 14 hospitals
or clinics in which we worked had
no running water or electricity.
Water for washing or drinking
would come from a nearby well. ... It
was simply an extraordinary experience, but one in which I am glad I
had a chance to play a role.
As a physician, Lt. Col. Eugene
White of the 413th Civil Affairs
Company, Lubbock, Texas, said he
learned about new cultures, disJuly 1993

eases and how to deal with them.

The gynecologist also cited the
unique opportunity to teach and
learn from our Cameroonian fellow
physicians in the spirit of comradesin-arms. I went home with a
strong sense of satisfaction about
our accomplishments in so short a
period.
The U.S. ambassador to
Cameroon, the Honorable Frances
D. Cook, visited the exercise and
encouraged the team to persevere in
spite of the austere conditions. She
thanked them for helping to better
cement the ties of cooperation for
the United States in the Hinge of
Africa and expressed hope that she
would see the soldiers in future
exercises.
Col. Carol A. Miller served as the
exercises public health team chief.
Deputy commander of the 308th CA
Group and a registered nurse in
civilian life, Miller said that the
mission to Cameroon was the ultimate in Civil Affairs training. Were

all a lot smarter in terms of cultural

impact and in our language and
communications skills. We worked
with elements of a foreign military
in concert with representatives of a
U.S. country team. Our understanding of how the populations health is
affected by customs, traditions, politics and egomaniacs is greatly
improved, and I learned about medical treatment in Africa.
Brig. Gen. Donald F. Campbell,
former commander of the 353rd and
currently commander of the Army
Civil Affairs and PSYOP Command,
is eager to see the units role in the
development of Cameroon grow.
The training the Army Reserve
gets is beyond compare, as are the
benefits to the indigenous population. I hope to see this relationship
continue and flourish.

Lt. Col. Mark W. Dushnyck is currently commander of the 353rd CA

Command, Bronx, N.Y.

Lt. Col. Pat Heringa

discusses medication
with a Cameroonian
Army officer as U.S.
ambassador Frances
Cook looks on.

Photo by Raymond Barrager

29

Future Trends in
Terrorist Targeting and
Tactics
by Bruce Hoffman

Although terrorists killed more

people during the 1980s than in the
previous two decades combined,
they did so without having to resort
to the exotic or esoteric weapons
popularized by both fictional
thrillers and pseudo-scholarly,
headline-grabbing analyses.
Bombings continue to account for
roughly half of all terrorist attacks
annually as they have since
1968. Few skills are required to
manufacture a crude bomb, surreptitiously plant it and then be miles
away when it explodes. Bombings,
therefore, do not require the same
organizational expertise, logistics
and knowledge required of more
complicated or sophisticated operations, such as kidnapping, assassination and assaults against defended targets.
Indeed, the frequency of various
types of terrorist attacks decreases
in direct proportion to the complexity or sophistication required. Attacks
Copyright 1992 by Bruce Hoffman.
Reprinted with permission.
30

on installations are the second most

common tactic, accounting for fewer
than 20 percent of all operations, followed by assassinations and shooting, kidnapping, hijacking, barricade
and hostage situations. Significant
threats account for the small number of remaining incidents.
The fact that these percentages
have remained largely unchanged
for the past 25 years provides compelling evidence that the vast
majority of terrorist organizations
are not tactically innovative. Radical in their politics, these groups
appear to be conservative in their
operations, adhering largely to the
same limited operational repertoire
year after year. What innovation
does occur is mostly in the methods
used to conceal and detonate explosive devices, not in their tactics or
their use of non-conventional
weapons.
In this respect, despite its popularity as a fictional theme, terrorists have in fact rarely attempted
the infliction of mass, indiscriminate casualties. Of more than 8,000

incidents recorded in the RAND

Chronology of International Terrorism since 1968, for example, only 52
evidence any indication of terrorists
plotting such attacks or attempting
to use chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.
Most terrorist activity throughout
the world is primarily symbolic,
designed to call attention to the terrorists and their causes. Attacks
tend to be directed not against people, but against things
embassies, consulates, government
offices, businesses, airlines and military installations that have symbolic connotations. Thus, diplomatic
targets have historically been the
focus of most terrorist attacks, followed by business, airline, military,
and civilian targets with attacks
on energy, maritime, transportation
and communications targets comparatively rare.
Only 20 percent of the terrorist
incidents during the 1980s, in fact,
killed anyone, but those operations
that did kill tended to kill more people than before. The reasons for this
Special Warfare

trend the terrorists apparent

belief that lethality attracts attention; improved effectiveness of terrorist organizations over generations; the resurgence of religious
terrorism; the fact that terrorists
themselves are more adept at
killing; and increased state-sponsorship of terrorism also shed light
on terrorist capabilities, targeting,
tactics and decision making.

Increasing lethality
The most obvious explanation for
international terrorisms increasing
lethality is that public attention is
not as readily aroused as it was in
the past. The general proliferation
of terrorist movements and the
increase in terrorist incidents have
created problems for both old and
new groups who now must compete
for a wider audience share. Terrorists have therefore been forced to
undertake spectacular and bloody
deeds in order to achieve the same
effect a small action would have had
10 years ago.
Other terrorist acts are not only
driven by the desire for publicity
but are explicitly coercive as well,
threatening dire consequences
unless specific demands are met.
The wave of bombings that shook
Paris during 1986 beginning in
February with an explosion in a
shopping center that killed eight
persons and culminating the following September with a nine-day terrorist rampage that killed another
eight persons and wounded more
than 150 others is an example of
this symbiosis of objectives. Following the first incident, a group calling itself the Committee of Solidarity with the Arab and Middle East
Political Prisoners claimed credit
for the bombing and demanded the
release of three terrorists imprisoned in France. After the French
government refused, three more
bombings occurred in February, two
more the following month, and five
in September.
Still other terrorist operations are
carried out in reprisal for a particular governments actions. In this
July 1993

category is the September 1986

attack on an Istanbul synagogue
that claimed the lives of 22 people
and wounded three others. A
spokesman in Beirut later claimed
that the operation had been staged
in retaliation for a recent Israeli
raid on a guerrilla base in southern
Lebanon.
An almost Darwinian principle of
natural selection also seems to
affect terrorist groups, so that each
new generation learns from its predecessors, becoming smarter,
tougher and more difficult to capture. For terrorists, intelligence is
essential not only as a prerequisite
for success, but for survival. Succes-

The proliferation of
terrorist movements
and the increase in
incidents have created
problems for both old
and new groups who
now must compete for
a wider audience
share. Terrorists have
been forced to undertake spectacular and
bloody deeds in order
to achieve the same
effect a small action
would have had 10
years ago.
sor generations, therefore, routinely
study the lessons from mistakes
made by former comrades who have
been killed or apprehended. Surviving group members cull and absorb
information on security-force tactics
from press accounts, courtroom testimony and trial transcripts.
Successor generations also tend to
be more ruthless and less idealistic
than their predecessors. For some,
violence becomes almost an end in
itself rather than the means to a
political end embraced by previous
generations. A dedicated, hard core

of some 20 to 30 terrorists today, for

example, composes a third generation of Germanys Red Army Faction.
In contrast to the groups first generation, who more than 20 years ago
embarked on an anti-establishment
campaign of non-lethal bombings
and arson attacks, the present generation at least until recently
has pursued a strategy of cold-blooded assassination.
During the past five years, the
Red Army Faction has murdered six
prominent Germans. The last victim was Detlev Rohwedder, a
wealthy industrialist and chairman
of the government agency charged
with overseeing the economic transition of eastern Germany. A shot
fired from a high-powered rifle
killed Rohwedder in April 1991
while he sat in his study. In December 1989, financier and Deutsche
Bank president Alfred Herrhausen
was assassinated when a remotecontrol bomb, concealed in a parked
bicycle and triggered by a lightbeam, was detonated just as his car
passed. A similar device was used
the following July in an attempt to
assassinate Germanys top government counterterrorist official, Hans
Neusel.
Almost as disturbing as the assassinations themselves is the fact that
the perpetrators and their fellow
conspirators have eluded what is
perhaps the most sophisticated antiterrorist machinery in the world.
The Third Generation learnt a lot
from the mistakes of its predecessors and about how the police
works, a spokesperson for the Bundeskriminalamt recently lamented,
they now know how to operate very
carefully. Indeed, according to a
former member of the organization,
Peter-Juergen Brock, currently serving the seventh year of a life sentence for murder, the group has
reached maximum efficiency.
Another key reason for terrorisms
increased lethality is the growing
incidence of violence motivated by a
religious, as well as a nationalist or
separatist imperative. Certainly, the
relationship between terrorism and
31

religion is not new. In fact, as David

C. Rapoport points out in his seminal study of what he terms holy terror, until the 19th century, Religion provided the only acceptable
justifications for terror. This form
of terrorism has occurred throughout history, although in recent
decades it has largely been overshadowed by nationalist/separatist
or ideologically motivated terrorism.
The record of terrorist acts by
Shia Islamic groups reinforces, for
example, the causal link between
religion-motivated terrorism and
terrorisms growing lethality.
Although these groups have committed only eight percent of all
international terrorist incidents
since 1982, they are responsible for
30 percent of the total number of
deaths.
Contrary to its depiction and discussion in Western news accounts,
terrorism motivated by religion is
by no means a phenomenon restricted to Islamic terrorist groups. Many
of the characteristics the legitimization of violence based on religious precepts, the sense of alienation, the existence of a terrorist
movement in which the activists are
the constituents, and preoccupation
with the elimination of a broadly
defined category of enemies are
also apparent among militant
Christian white supremacists in the
United States and in at least some
radical Jewish messianic terrorist
movements in Israel. Both groups
view violence as morally justified
and an expedient toward the attainment of the religious and racial
purification of their respective
countries.
That terrorists motivated by a
religious imperative can contemplate massive acts of death is a
reflection of their belief that violence is a sacramental act or a
divine duty. Terrorism thus
assumes a transcendental dimension, and its perpetrators are
unconstrained by the political,
moral or practical constraints that
affect other terrorists.
Religious and secular terrorists
32

also differ in their constituencies.

Religious terrorists are at once
activists and constituents engaged
in what they regard as a total
war. They perform their terrorist
acts for no audience but themselves.
Thus the restraints on violence that
are imposed on secular terrorists by
the desire to appeal to an uncommitted constituency are not relevant to the religious terrorist.
Finally, religious and secular terrorists have different perceptions of
themselves and their violent acts.
Secular terrorists regard violence as
a way of correcting a system that is
basically good or to foment the creation of a new system. Religious terrorists regard themselves as outsiders, seeking vast changes in the
existing order. This sense of alienation enables them to contemplate
far more destructive and deadly
types of operations than secular terrorists and to embrace a far more
open-ended category of enemies
for attack.
Terrorisms trend toward increasing lethality is also a reflection of
the fact that terrorists themselves
are more adept at killing. Not only
are their weapons becoming smaller,
more sophisticated, and deadlier,
but terrorists have greater access to
these weapons through their
alliances with foreign governments.
In addition to their standard
arsenal of small arms and ordinary
explosives, state-sponsored terrorists used a truck carrying some
12,000 pounds of high explosives,
whose destructive power was
enhanced by canisters of flammable
gases, to kill 241 U.S. Marines in
what has been described as the
largest non-nuclear blast ever detonated on the face of the earth.
Other groups deployed nearly 200
sophisticated, multifused, Sovietmanufactured acoustic mines to disrupt shipping entering the Suez
Canal from the Red Sea and fabricated the device that exploded
aboard Pan Am Flight 103, killing
all 259 on board and 11 others on
the ground. It is not surprising,
therefore, to find that state-spon-

sored terrorist incidents are, on

average, eight times more lethal
than those carried out by groups
acting on their own.
Admittedly, diminishing communist-bloc support and training of
various international terrorist organizations will make it more difficult
for those groups to operate. However, recent reports that during the
past decade Czechoslovakia shipped
more than 1,000 tons of Semtex
plastic explosive (the same type
used against Pan Am 103) to Libya
ensure that at least those terrorist
organizations still favored by
Colonel Khadafy will have ample
supplies of that explosive for years
to come.
Czechoslovakia is also thought to
have exported some 40,000 tons of
Semtex to Syria, North Korea, Iran
and Iraq countries long cited by
the U.S. Department of State as
sponsors of international terrorist
activity. Irrespective of communistbloc action, terrorists now are
assured an almost inexhaustible
international stockpile of plastic
explosives on which to draw for
future operations.

Technology
The availability of these weapons,
coupled with the terrorists own
ingenuity, has enabled at least
some groups to stay constantly
ahead of the counterterrorist technology curve and repeatedly frustrate or defeat the security measures placed in their path.
Relying on unconventional adaptations or modifications to conventional explosive devices, these organizations have developed innovative
and effective means to conceal,
deliver and detonate all kinds of
bombs. The devices used in the
assassination of Alfred Herrhausen
and the downing of Pan Am Flight
103 are two examples of terrorists
using specially or cleverly modified
off-the-shelf technology to strike
at well-defended targets.
A 1/8-inch thick, four-inch wide,
and 10-inch long bomb, constructed
of 300 grams of Semtex and trigSpecial Warfare

gered by a combination electronic

timer and barometric sensor, was
placed under the seat cushion of a
TWA flight en route from Cairo to
Athens via Rome and exploded,
killing four persons and injuring
nine others in April 1986.
Liquid explosive concealed in a
generic half-gallon whiskey bottle
was placed in an overhead bin during a Korean Air flight in November
1987. It was detonated nine hours
later by 12 ounces of C-4 plastic
explosive wired to a timing device
hidden in a transistor radio placed
in the seat pocket below, killing all
115 persons on board. These are
chilling examples of terrorist creativity and adaptation.
The PIRAs relentless quest to
pierce the armor protecting both the
security forces in Northern Ireland
and the most senior government
officials in England illustrates the
dynamics of the struggle for technological superiority. The first generation of early 1970s PIRA devices
were often little more than crude
anti-personnel bombs, consisting of
a handful of roofing nails wrapped
around a lump of plastic explosive,
that were detonated simply by
lighting a fuse.
Time bombs from the same era
were hardly more sophisticated.
They typically were constructed
from a few sticks of dynamite and
commercial detonators stolen from
construction sites or rock quarries
attached to ordinary battery-powered alarm clocks. Neither device
was terribly reliable and often put
the bomber at considerable risk.
In hopes of reducing that risk, the
PIRAs bomb makers invented a
means of detonating bombs from a
safe distance using the radio controls for model aircraft purchased at
hobby shops. Scientists and engineers working in the British Ministry of Defences scientific research
and development division in turn
developed a system of electronic
countermeasures and jamming
techniques for the Army that effectively thwarted this means of
attack.
July 1993

Rather than abandon this tactic

completely, the PIRA began to search
for a solution. In contrast to the
state-of-the art laboratories, huge
budgets and academic credentials of
their government counterparts,
PIRAs own R&D department toiled
in cellars beneath cross-border safehouses and back rooms of urban tenements for five years before devising
a network of sophisticated electronic
switches for their bombs that would
ignore or bypass the Army s electronic countermeasures.
Once again, the Ministry of
Defence scientists developed a new
system of electronic scanners to

Although the technological mastery

employed by the PIRA
is arguably unique
among terrorist organizations, experience
has demonstrated
repeatedly that, when
confronted by new
security measures, terrorists will seek to
identify and exploit
new vulnerabilities,
adjusting their means
of attack accordingly.
detect radio emissions just tenths of
seconds before the bomber can actually transmit the detonation signal.
The almost infinitesimal window of
time provided by this early warning of impending attack is just sufficient to allow Army technicians to
activate additional electronic measures to neutralize the transmission
signal.
For a time, this countermeasure
proved effective. But within the
past year, the PIRA has discovered
a means to outwit even this countermeasure. The groups bomb makers fabricated a detonating system
triggered by the same type of hand-

held radar gun used by police to

catch speeding motorists. Since the
radar gun can be aimed before
being switched on, and its signal is
nearly instantaneous, no practical
means currently exists to detect or
intercept the transmission signal in
time.
Even attacks that are not successful in conventionally understood
military terms can still be a success
for the terrorists, provided that they
are technologically daring enough to
garner media and public attention.
Indeed, the terrorist groups fundamental organizational imperative to
act also drives this persistent
search for new ways to overcome,
circumvent or defeat governmental
security and countermeasures.
Thus, while the PIRA failed to
kill then-Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher at the Conservative
Partys 1984 conference in
Brighton, the technological ingenuity involving the bombs placement
at the conference site weeks before
the event and its detonation timing
device powered by a computer
microchip succeeded in capturing
headlines and provided the PIRA
with a propaganda platform.
Similarly, although the remotecontrol mortar attack staged by the
PIRA on No. 10 Downing Street
as Prime Minister John Major and
his cabinet met at the height of the
1991 Gulf War failed to hit its
intended target, it elbowed the war
out of the limelight and shone
renewed media attention on the terrorists, their cause and their
impressive ability to strike at the
nerve center of the British government even at a time of heightened
security.
Although the technological mastery employed by the PIRA is
arguably unique among terrorist
organizations, experience has
demonstrated repeatedly that,
when confronted by new security
measures, terrorists will seek to
identify and exploit new vulnerabilities, adjusting their means of
attack accordingly.
This point is especially pertinent
33

to the threat posed by terrorists to

commercial aviation. During the
late 1960s, for example, hijacking of
passenger aircraft was among terrorists favored tactics, accounting
for 33 percent of all incidents. However, as security at airports
improved, as metal detectors and xray machines were installed at
boarding areas, and as passenger
profiling and other countermeasures were adopted, the incidence of
airline hijackings declined appreciably to just 7 percent of all incidents
in the 1970s and only 4 percent in
the 1980s.
While these measures were successful in reducing airline hijackings, they did not stop terrorist
attacks on commercial airlines altogether. Prevented from smuggling
weapons on board to hijack aircraft,
terrorists merely continued to
attack them by means of bombs hidden in carry-on or checked baggage.
A new generation of sophisticated
bomb-detection devices able to
detect even plastic explosives is
currently being installed at airports
throughout the world, while a successor generation involving other
techniques is already being tested.
These machines will doubtlessly
make it more difficult for terrorists
to place bombs on board aircraft
much the same as the metal detectors and x-ray machines made
hijacking more difficult. But if past
experience is any guide, as airport
security and bomb-detection technology closes off this avenue of
attack, terrorists will merely find
another.
They are likely to turn to readily
available shoulder-fired, precisionguided surface-to-air missiles as the
only practical means to attack commercial aircraft. A single terrorist,
trained in the use of this weapon,
could position himself at the edge of
any airports runway and fire at
incoming or departing passenger
planes with devastating results.
Black-nationalist guerrillas
downed two Rhodesian passenger
jets with SAM-7s in 1978 and 1979,
killing 107 persons. Sudanese
34

rebels used a SAM-7 in 1986 to

shoot down a Sudan Airways commercial jet, killing all 60 persons on
board. Polisario Front guerrillas in
Morocco downed an American DC-7
weather plane in 1988 with a Soviet
missile, killing its five-man crew.
The effectiveness of such weapons
has reportedly led the British Army
to respond to alleged PIRA possession of Libyan-supplied SAM-7s by
equipping its helicopters in Northern Ireland with infrared defensive
systems to thwart missile attacks.

Bombing continues
to account for the
majority of terrorist
operations, and most
of the bombs are not
particularly innovative. Most are made of
commercially purchased or stolen
dynamite or from
plastic explosives
from military stockpiles. Even in those
instances involving
comparatively more
sophisticated, statesponsored terrorists,
the weapons used
have been exclusively
conventional.
Given the fact that the arsenals
of some 80 countries throughout the
world now contain SAM-7s or their
equivalents, that countries as
diverse as Egypt, China, Brazil,
South Africa and Sweden are at
various stages of producing their
own man-portable surface-to-air
missiles, and that such weapons can
reportedly be purchased on the
international arms black market
for as little as $80,000, terrorist and
guerrilla use of these weapons is
likely to increase in the future.

Future tactics
Most analyses of the possibility of
chemical, biological or nuclear terrorism have tended to discount it
because few terrorists know anything about the technical intricacies
of developing or dispersing such
weapons. Political, moral and practical considerations also affect terrorist decision making.
There are few realistic demands
that terrorists could make by
threatening the use of such indiscriminate weapons. More important, as Brian Jenkins notes, Terrorists operate on the principle of
the minimum force necessary. They
find it unnecessary to kill many, as
long as killing a few suffices for
their purposes. Terrorists have
demonstrated repeatedly that their
goals and objectives can be accomplished by using the same tactics
and off-the-shelf weapons that
they have traditionally relied upon.
These arguments are supported
by the general pattern of worldwide
terrorism. Bombing continues to
account for the majority of terrorist
operations, and most of the bombs
are not particularly innovative.
Most are made of commercially purchased or stolen dynamite or from
plastic explosives from military
stockpiles. Even in those instances
involving comparatively more
sophisticated, state-sponsored terrorists, the weapons used have been
exclusively conventional.
If, however, terrorist lethality
continues to increase and the constraints, self-imposed and otherwise
imposed, on terrorists in the commission of mass murder erode further, actions involving chemical,
biological or nuclear weapons could
become more attractive to some
groups. In this respect it should be
emphasized that terrorists have yet
to reach their killing potential using
even off-the-shelf weapons. They
have generally kept their threats
realistic, in the sense that they
can and will carry them out if
denied their objectives, and approximately commensurate with the
Special Warfare

demands made. Any use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons

could result in unprecedented numbers of casualties and damage, with
attendant undesired (by the terrorists) implications for public opinion
and government reaction.
Today, however, when old
empires and countries are crumbling and new ones are being built,
the possession of a nuclear bomb or
the development of a chemical or
biological-warfare capability may
become increasingly attractive
either to new nations seeking to
preserve their sovereignty or to
would-be nations seeking to attain
their independence. In both
instances, terrorists may find new
roles for their skills and expertise.
Ethnic and religious fanaticism
could more easily allow terrorists to
overcome the psychological barriers
to mass murder than could a radical
political agenda. A terrorist group
of religious zealots, with state support, in a context of ongoing violence, could see the acquisition and
use of a chemical, biological or
nuclear capability as a viable
option. State sponsorship, in particular, could provide terrorists with
the incentives and resources they
previously lacked for undertaking
an ambitious operation in any of

July 1993

these domains. Combined with

intense ethnic enmity or a strong
religious imperative, this could
prove deadly.
One final observation seems in
order: while the volume of worldwide terrorism fluctuates from year
to year, one enduring feature is that
Americans remain favored targets
of terrorists abroad. Since 1968, the
United States has annually headed
the list of countries whose nationals
and property are most frequently
attacked by terrorists. This is a phenomenon attributable as much to
the geographical scope and diversity
of Americas overseas commercial
interests and the large number of
its military bases on foreign soil as
to the United States stature as a
superpower and leader of the free
world.
Terrorists, therefore, are attracted to American interests and citizens abroad precisely because of
the plethora of readily available
targets; the terrorists perceived
difficulty of operating and striking
targets in the United States itself;
the symbolic value inherent in any
blow struck against U.S. expansionism, imperialism, or economic exploitation, and, not least,
because of the unparalleled opportunities for exposure and publicity

from perhaps the worlds most

extensive news media that any
attack on an American target
assures.
These reasons suggest that,
despite the end of both the Cold
War and the ideological polarization
that divided the world, the United
States will nonetheless remain an
attractive target for terrorists seeking to attract attention to themselves and their causes. As the only
superpower, the United States may
likely be blamed for more of the
worlds ills and therefore could be
the focus of more terrorist attacks
than before.

Dr. Bruce Hoffman

is a member of the
senior research staff of
the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica,
Calif., and is currently director of the
Arroyo Centers Strategy and Doctrine Program in RANDs Army
Research Division. A graduate of
Oxford University, where he undertook his doctoral research, he holds
degrees in government, history and
international relations.

35

The Self-Development Test:

Whats In It for Me?
by MSgt. Kirk Thomas

The old Skill Qualification Test is

gone. Now we have something
called a Self-Development Test. Is it
the same thing with a different
name? What impact will it have on
soldiers careers?
One of the jobs of the Individual
Training Division of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School is to
develop the MOS portion of the SDT
for CMF 18. In that capacity, we
can answer these questions and
explain some of the whys and
wherefores of the SDT.
Is the SDT the same thing as the
SQT with a different name? No.
There are similarities, and even
some of the same questions could be
used, but there are major differences. Each SDT will have 20 leadership questions, 20 training questions and 60 MOS-knowledge questions. The old SQT always had several questions for each task; the
SDT might have only one, but it will
be one important for the task. The
old SQT notice had more tasks listed than were actually tested; with
36

the SDT, there is no more guesswork if its in the notice, it will be

tested. Another difference is that
preparation for the SDT is now on
your own time; duty time will not be
scheduled for SDT train-up.
What impact will it have on soldiers careers? Starting in FY 94, it
will have a major impact. While the
SDT was under development, test
results were sent only to the soldier.
With the FY 94 SDT, however, test
results will be used for personnelmanagement decisions about promotions, selection for schools and
re-enlistment. Your rater can also
comment about your SDT score on
your NCOER. The FY 94 SDT is the
first one that will count for real.
Who makes these tests up, anyway? The Center for Army Leadership, U.S. Army Command and
General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kan., develops the leadership questions. The U.S. Army
Sergeants Major Academy, Fort
Bliss, Texas, develops the training
questions. The Army Training and

Doctrine Command school which is

the MOS proponent writes the MOS
questions for that SDT. For the
MOS portion of the Special Forces
SDT, the SF Development Branch
of the Individual Training Division
of the Directorate of Training and
Doctrine at the SWCS is responsible
for assembling the questions,
administering and evaluating the
validation test, and for putting the
final version of the test together.
The last time I took one of those
tests, I found some mistakes; what
can I do about that? The validation
part of the development process is
designed to identify testing errors,
bad questions, etc. Despite our best
efforts and intentions, however,
mistakes still get into the final version of the test. But if you find what
you believe to be an error in a test
question or the answer choices, submit an inquiry. After finishing the
test and turning in the answer
sheet, ask to see the testing standards officer and tell him you want
to fill out an inquiry sheet for that
Special Warfare

test. This inquiry will be sent to the

SDT developers in our office, who
will evaluate the comment and send
an answer back to the TSO. On several occasions, we have even called
the soldier on the phone to discuss
his comment. If there was an error
in the way the question was written
or in the answer choices, the
inquiry may result in the SDT being
rescored without that question
being counted. Every inquiry will be
read, evaluated for validity, and if it
would result in a change in the way
the test was scored, the test is
rescored accordingly.

Overview
The SDT replaces the old SQT on
the recommendation of senior command sergeants major during a conference in October 1989. They felt
the NCO Corps had outgrown the
SQT and believed the Army needed
an evaluation tool to measure and
guide the growth of NCOs as they
continue to develop as leaders. The
Army leadership agreed, and the
Chief of Staff of the Army
announced the SDT on July 3, 1990.
Units will not schedule SDT
train-up time. It is the individual
soldiers responsibility to study during off-duty time. To prepare for the
leadership questions, study FMs 22100, -101, and -102. To prepare for
the training questions, study FM
25-101. To prepare for the MOSknowledge portion, study your
MOS-specific soldiers manual and
supporting technical references
identified in your SDT notice. By
now you should have received a set
of the SDT publications from your
unit. If not, ask your unit publications clerk to order FMs you need
using normal publication-ordering
procedures.
SF units having trouble obtaining
publications may need to establish
or modify publications accounts.
Since Jan. 1, 1990, the Army Publications Distribution Center in Baltimore no longer sends publications
to units on an automatic basis.
Instead, units must establish publications accounts to tell the Army
July 1993

what they need.

To establish an account, the unit
publications officer should prepare
a DA Form 12, Requirements for
Publications. To request initial distribution of new or revised publications, units must also complete DA
12-series forms to identify the titles
and quantities of publications they
will need. These should be forwarded to Commander, USAAGPC; Attn:
New Account Processing; 2800
Eastern Boulevard; Baltimore, MD
21220. See DA Pam 310-10, The
Standard Publication System Users
Guide, for further information.
After taking the SDT, you will
receive two reports showing your
results. The first, an initial Individual Soldiers Report, will be sent
within 30 days after your test. The
ISR will show the number of correct
answers for each part of the SDT.
The second report, or final ISR, will
be sent about 2 1/2 months after the
close of the test period. This report
will show the SDT score and a comparison with other NCOs in your
MOS and skill level. It will also
reflect changes in the scoring
resulting from testing errors identified during the testing period.

SDT development
SDT development begins with
task selection. All tasks in the soldier training publication for each
MOS are subject to be tested,
though not all are tested every year.
Usually the most important of the
subject areas are tested every year,
while the less-important areas are
rotated through so they all will be
tested in a 3-5-year period. A similar rationale is applied to the selection of tasks within a subject area.
Once the tasks are selected, the
next step is to collect questions for
each task. We like to have several
questions for each task, but it is
permissible to have only one, as
long as it is a question vital for that
task. We do not question trivia; all
questions must concern something
truly significant for the task. It is
also important to remember that we
do not write the questions our-

selves. Questions for a task come

from the school that has proponency
for that task; the Engineer School
at Fort Leonard Wood, the Signal
School at Fort Gordon, etc. Those
tasks for which SWCS is proponent
are written by the company in the
1st Special Warfare Training Group
having proponency for that task.
The validation test is composed of
more than enough questions to
make up the final version for the
official SDT. This is done to leave
room to eliminate questions that
are not suitable (poorly written, not
relevant to the task, etc.). We task
the Army Special Forces Command
to provide contacts in each SF group
to coordinate and schedule troops,
times and locations for validation
testing. Testing is done in August
and September of each year. Validation testing gives the soldier in the
unit an opportunity to affect what is
tested in his MOS, how the questions are written, and what kind of
answer choices are given. The validation test given in FY 93 will be
for the FY 94 SDT, the first one to
be used for personnel-management
decisions.
Soldiers taking this and later validation tests will have an advance
look at what might be on the following years SDT. Several things come
out of the validation phase:
We find out how long it takes to
answer the questions so we can be
sure the final version stays within
time limits.
We find out which questions
need revising. Soldiers taking the
test have the opportunity to comment on each question, and they are
encouraged to be specific about why
they think a question is wrong or
poorly written and how they would
fix it. What we want to know is:
Are the questions relevant to the
MOS and the job as performed in
the field? Are there any bad or poorly written questions? Are there any
ambiguous questions? Is there more
than one right answer? Is there no
right answer? Is the answer given
away in the question? Is there anything else that would make this a
37

better test, a better measure of a

soldiers ability to do the job? We do
pay attention to comments and use
them in correcting the test.
Soldiers taking the validation test
can be assured that the results of
validation testing do not leave our
office; the team sergeant or
sergeant major will never know
whether they passed the SDT validation test or not. As a matter of
fact, scoring is done on a task-bytask basis, rather than scoring the
entire test as a whole. Our tabulated data shows, for example, how
many soldiers got a particular question right, not what Staff Sergeant
Smiths score was.
Once all the validations have
been done and the results tabulated, selection for the final version of
the test can proceed. The final ver-

38

sion will come in its entirety from

the validation test administered to
the field, but not all the questions
will be used. Some questions will be
eliminated as too hard, too easy, not
relevant, etc., others will be rewritten according to comments from the
field and our own review.
We want to do a good job and
make this the best test we can, but
we need your help. If you are selected to take the validation test, make
your time count for something.
Take the test with an open mind
and think hard about all those
questions placed before you. This is
your chance to have an impact on
the way the test is written; your
comment, however trivial you might
think it is, can make a difference.

MSgt. Kirk Thomas

is NCOIC of the Individual Training Division of the Directorate
of Training and Doctrine, JFK Special
Warfare Center and
School. With more than 20 years
experience in Special Forces, his
military schooling includes the Special Forces Qualification Course,
Korean and Spanish language
courses, Intelligence Analyst Course,
Static Line Jumpmaster Course and
the SF Operations and Intelligence
Course. He holds a bachelor of arts
degree from Francis Marion University in Florence, S.C., and is a candidate for a masters degree from
Webster University.

Special Warfare

Military
Qualification
Standards System:
Army Framework
for Leader
Development

by Carol M. Bushong

Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth,

Kan.
Leader development under MQS is
a product of three factors: institutional training, operational assignments and self-development.
Institutional School commandants identify officer-performance
requirements and train students to
perform those duties.
Operational Unit commanders establish leader-development
programs to complement unit training programs. MQS does not require
them to train tasks not on their mission-essential task list. Commanders
must tailor their MQS training and
professional reading program to
METL-based unit training plans.
Self-development Self-development involves individual officers
in their development as leaders.

MQS II
To develop its officers as leaders,
the Army has established a system to
give officers, school commandants
and unit commanders a common
framework for leader development.
The Military Qualification Standards System identifies common and
branch-specific training requirements
for officers. It has two components:
The military-task-and-knowledge
component identifies critical battlefocused tasks, skills and knowledge,
and the professional-military-education component establishes responsibilities and standards for professional
development and education.
MQS covers officer training from
precommissioning to promotion to
colonel and is organized into three
stages. MQS I establishes minimum
skills for branch qualification and is
taught at the commissioning
sources: the U.S. Military Academy,
Reserve Officers Training Corps and
Officer Candidate School. MQS II
covers company-grade officer training and includes officer basic and
advanced courses, the Combined
Arms and Services Staff School and
operational assignments. MQS III
applies to field-grade officers and is
being formulated by the Combined
July 1993

MQS II applies to company-grade

officers in the active and reserve
components. It prepares them to
accomplish wartime tasks, provides
the basis for promotion and attendance at command-and-staff-collegelevel schools, and prepares them for
greater responsibilities.
The military-task-and-knowledge
component consists of companygrade common and branch-specific
tasks. The professional-military-education component consists of a reading program and, in some cases,
advanced civil schooling.
Common and branch manuals
support MQS II training. Common
manuals concentrate on companygrade-officer critical tasks; branch
manuals on branch qualification.
Two branch manuals, Special Forces
and Civil Affairs, are relevant to
Army SOF.
The Special Forces branch manual
describes tasks critical for captains
planning and executing the five SF
missions: unconventional warfare,
foreign internal defense, direct
action, special reconnaissance and
counterterrorism. It complements
instruction in the officer advanced
course and SF Qualification Course.
It contains SF branch tasks, orga-

nized by battlefield operating system, and Infantry branch tasks

essential to SF.
The CA branch manual describes
tasks critical for CA captains and
complements the CA Officer
Advanced Course. Because CA units
support general-purpose forces
throughout the operational continuum, CA captains must know their
SOF tasks and retain the conventional skills of their accession
branch. The CA branch manual is
scheduled for completion in September 1994.

MQS III
MQS III charts the development of
field-grade officers through lieutenant colonel, preparing them for
greater responsibility, for command
and service on Army and joint staffs,
and for senior service colleges.
Unlike MQS I and MQS II, it is not a
task-based program it describes
broad areas of knowledge. Two publications support MQS III: DA Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer
Development and Career Management, and the MQS III leader-development manual.
The SWCS Directorate of Training
and Doctrine made initial distribution of the MQS II SF branch manual
to ensure that each officer received a
copy. That will continue with the
MQS II Civil Affairs branch manual
and the MQS III leader-development
manual. After initial distribution,
unit publications officers will have to
establish unit requirements and
order the manuals from the Baltimore AG Publications Center using
DA Form 4569. For more information
on MQS, contact Carol Bushong,
DSN 239-9802, commercial (919)
432-9802.

Carol M. Bushong is
an education specialist
in the Directorate of
Training and Doctrine
at the JFK Special
Warfare Center and
School.

39

Interview:
Lt. Col. Daniel Brownlee,
commander, 1st Battalion,
5th Special Forces Group

Lt. Col. Daniel Brownlee is currently commander of the 1st Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group at Fort
Campbell, Ky. During Operations
Desert Shield/Desert Storm, he
served as the operations and training
officer for the 5th SF Group. Other
assignments during his career
include serving as the operations and
training officer and executive officer
in the 1/5th SF Group, as a Middle
Eastern foreign-area officer serving
in the embassies in Amman and
Cairo, as a company commander in
the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division, as a detachment commander in
the 1st Battalion, 10th SF Group,
and as a platoon leader in the 82nd
Airborne Division.
SW: How important was coalition
warfare to the success of Desert
Storm?
Brownlee: It was critical to the
success of Desert Shield and Desert
Storm. Obviously, the United States
40

and the major NATO allies like

France or Britain could have put
enough combat power on the ground
to have accomplished the mission to
liberate Kuwait, but in order to
legitimize our effort over there, it
was critical that all of the Islamic
coalition allies be integrated into
the defensive and offensive phases
of the operation. If there had not
been an effort to organize and integrate all the various countries into
the coalition, I dont think we could
have been successful.
SW: Did it contribute to our success
from a military standpoint?
Brownlee: It did contribute to the
military success, and I will tell you
from my perspective, having worked
with all the allied countries, down
to the smallest contributor, that it
wasnt so much what they contributed to combat power as it was
that they were integrated, so that
we could maximize their contribu-

tions and minimize the limitations

they might have. The extent to
which we could integrate the forces
increased our chances of success on
the battlefield, even though their
combat power did not sway the balance. Its not like General
Schwarzkopf said OK, we finally
got the 2nd Egyptian Division and
now we are ready to go on the offensive. The 2nd Egyptian Division
was there, and they had a corps
headquarters, they were more a
contributing partner, and it brought
the ratio of forces into a more legitimate balance, but did it increase
the overall combat power or the
ability to conduct a offensive? Only
to a limited extent.
SW: How many countries were in
the coalition?
Brownlee: The primary contributors were Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, obviously Kuwait, and then to a
lesser extent, the peninsula shield
Special Warfare

forces Oman, the UAE, Qatar

and Bahrain and then we had
small forces from Morocco, Senegal,
Nigeria, Niger and Afghanistan, so
there were many countries who contributed. You can also say that
within the coalition, even though
we were traditional allies used to
operating together, you had the
French and the British.
SW: Did Special Forces soldiers
work with all those countries?
Brownlee: Yes, they worked with
every country I mentioned, some to
a greater extent than others. With
the French and the British, for
instance, our role was usually more
in a liaison mode, but with the
Kuwaitis we basically fell in as the
shadow chain of command in the
brigades as they built them.
SW: What roles did Special Forces
perform in coalition warfare?
Brownlee: We started out with two
primary functions. The first was to
assess the capability of the various
non-European coalition allies to
survive and conduct battlefield
operations in an NBC environment.
That was the key issue because
NBC posed a serious threat from
Iraq. Our job was to assess the
capability and then, to the extent
we could, raise that level. In some
cases we found entire brigades
which had no NBC equipment, no
training and no capability. Thats a
good piece of information, because
you know what ground zero is.
Some units had all the equipment
sitting in a building and didnt
know what to do with it. You get
them to issue that equipment and
train them to use it and then they
can survive as individuals and operate as a unit. Some of the more
sophisticated units had the equipment and the rudimentary training,
and you bring them up a little bit to
where you can start talking about
decontamination.
Our second role was in the closeair-support arena. During Desert
Shield, there were tremendous theater aviation assets available to supJuly 1993

port the battlefield, especially in the

initial days in the defense, but
except for the French, the British
and the U.S., the coalition allies had
no way, either by communications or
training or language, to become customers of that system. At the same
time, they were the ones most forward arrayed, so they had the
biggest need for close air support.
We tried to get as far forward as
we could, to provide ground-air communication, coordinating instructions and the means to link into the
system, so we could bring air support to bear against a threat if it
came across the border. In the early
days the coalition was not organized
to conduct a defense. All they would
be able to do if the Iraqis came
across in numbers would be to report
and then attempt to disengage. We
could say to the Syrians or the Egyptians, Im here and Ive got a radio,
and I can talk to AWACS and I can
call air strikes on the threats out
there, and they would say, Youre
the kind of guy we want, stick very
close to me. Our two main entres
were close air support and NBC,
because the allies knew they needed
those two things and thats what we
were ready to do when we got on the
ground. That was truly what were
now calling support to the coalition.
We later took on the role to assess
unit capabilities: could they maneuver, did they have fire support, what
was their mobility and countermobility capability, what were their intelligence capabilities, what was their
command and control, what were
their air-defense capabilities the
conventional battlefield operating
systems. We could provide assessment reports on a given Saudi
brigade so that a brigade commander in the 24th Mechanized Infantry
Division could look at that assessment and understand it.
We would assess them to be either
green, amber, red or black we had
to come up with a new category
because in many cases, the coalition
allies had no capability that was
appropriate. For instance, the Egyptian divisions came in with no mobil-

ity/countermobility capability; they

hadnt brought any equipment with
them, so when that battlefield operating system was lost, we rated them
as black. Later on, when we were
able to get them mine detection and
breaching equipment, we were able
to raise them up to red. When we
talked to a 24th Division guy and
said the unit was raised into red, to
him that would mean no capability, but when you consider they had
nothing, and then they had a rudimentary capability, that was an
improvement. We would provide
these assessments and update them
every two weeks for every unit in
theater, so when General
Schwarzkopf and his senior counterparts developed an operational plan,
they knew what they had to work
with.
Another area in which we made
particular contributions was in
their operational planning. Their
idea of conducting operations was to
move to a line and sit. We would
say, What are your alternate, supplementary positions? What are
your passage lines? What are your
coordinating points? Do you have an
order? Do people know what to do?
Have you rehearsed it? Do you
know who the unit is behind you?
Do you know what their actions
would be if you moved back
through?
These are basic questions when
youre in the defense, but their
planning was not at a sophisticated
level; their attitude was, If they
want us to leave the field, we will
turn around and drive south.
Thats not good when youve got the
101st and the 24th Mech behind the
line its a prescription for disaster. We helped them develop and
coordinate plans so that if there
was an Iraqi offensive operation,
they would have a series of things
they would do next, and some units
actually rehearsed it.
We also tried to raise individual
soldier skills, especially rifle marksmanship, rudimentary patrolling
skills and general collective operational skills, as far as we could. With
41

individual skills, it doesnt take long

to determine what their level is. For
instance, if you go into a unit and
talk to soldiers and find out they
have never fired their M-16s, you
know theyve never fired on a qualification range, so you can approach
the commander with a training
schedule and say, Here are the
things we can help with to raise the
level of your soldiers individual
skills. In some cases they would be
happy to do it, and in other cases
they would resent it. Thats where
the interpersonal skills and negotiation come in. With something like
tank gunnery, obviously, our capability to assess is limited. What we
could do, if we were with an M-60A3
company in the Saudi Brigade that
really needed some help in their
gunnery, would be to look across the
entire 5th Group and find the guys
with that expertise and bring them
over to work with them.
Another important contribution
that we made was in integration.
Youve got a Saudi brigade sitting
here, youve got an Egyptian brigade
sitting here and youve got a Syrian
brigade sitting here. Youve got
brigade and battalion boundaries,
and on a map it looks real nice. In
truth, the Saudis, Egyptians and
Syrians had no communication or
contact between each other. The first
thing we would do is go to the right
and the left, see whos there, establish contact, develop control measures and coordination. That was the
last thing that they would do. They
would talk only to the people in
Riyadh, to their liaison elements,
and in most cases they didnt know
who was on their right and left and
didnt care, but if youre going to conduct a defense and later move to an
offensive operation, that has to be
coordinated.
On the 13th of January, there was
great consternation the airborne
platforms and the other moving-target indicators determined that there
was a tremendous amount of Iraqi
mechanized traffic moving down
toward the tri-border area. They
were concerned about it, because
42

they were getting ready to start the

air campaign, and they were afraid
the Iraqis were going to cross and
disrupt all the preparations. They
ordered the 1st Cav Division to move
to establish a defense, to block whatever it was. This was at 1800, and
we got a call from ARCENT through
the headquarters saying Get with
the Syrians and ensure that the Cav
can move through there unhindered
and without incident.
It is no small matter to coordinate
a night movement. Even among

Coalition warfare
was a logical extension of our FID capability, so we were prepared to conduct these
operations when we
hit the ground.
American units, it would take
tremendous coordination, but were
going to move through an edgy coalition Arab ally who has similar equipment to the Iraqis, and we have a
possible movement to contact, and
everybody has ammunition. We were
able to accomplish it, but we had to
put a lot of resources and assets on
the ground in that Syrian division,

which they didnt like, to ensure that

the U.S. forces could move through
there safely, and it was done by
sunup the next day. It was transparent from the outside, but when you
consider what the negative ramifications would have been, if a Syrian
had fired a main-gun round at some
tank from the 1st Cav ... Undoubtedly the 1st Cav would have engaged
every T-62 they saw, because they
would have been sure it was the
Iraqis, and you can imagine how perilous that would have been for the
whole coalition. So that was one of
the most significant contributions we
made to prevent those things
from happening.
SW: How well prepared were the SF
soldiers for the CW mission?
Brownlee: We were well-prepared
to provide support to the coalition
because the 5th SF Groups primary
mission is foreign internal defense
for the CINC, USCENTCOM. If you
look in the doctrinal manual, it will
tell you one of the key components is
to be prepared to provide training,
advice and assistance, and organization, and to be prepared to conduct
combat operations with the people
youre providing this to. The conduct
of coalition warfare was just a logical
extension of our FID capability, so we
were prepared to conduct these operations when we hit the ground. You
have to make adjustments depending
on the coalition ally. When we had a
team that fell in with the French,
they didnt have to advise and assist
them, but they did provide the link in
the close-air-support system and did
provide them certain NBC capabilities. When we fell in with one of the
Saudi or Kuwaiti units, we had to
advise, assist, train, equip and integrate, so it was just a logical extension of what we were already prepared to do.
SW: Did we identify any shortcomings or were there any lessons
learned?
Brownlee: Its not so much that we
learned lessons as that we validated
what we believed was true in the
Special Warfare

CENTCOM area of operations. We

validated that in order to be able to
conduct FID or support a coalition,
our personnel have to be at least as
mobile as our allies. Weve known
this all along, but we werent ready
to go to the extreme, which was to
mount every detachment. We have
determined that it is valid and weve
gone in to mount all of our detachments with at least a Humvee-type
vehicle. You cant support the coalition if you dont have that capability.
After we had been with them long
enough, our guys were riding in the
Saudi tanks, the Kuwaiti BMPs and
the Egyptian 577s thats the goal
you want to get to, but until you do,
youve got to be able to drive to
where they are and move with them.
We found that we had some
shortcomings in the communications area: We are well-equipped
with communications equipment to
support FID, to do DA and SR and
the other primary SF collateral missions, but in order to provide support to a coalition like we had in
Desert Shield/Desert Storm, youve
got to be able to replicate all the
communications you find in a conventional operating force. We dont
have that, so we had to draw those
communications assets and integrate them into our system.
Now, it doesnt make sense for us
to be equipped with all the communications you need in a division,
and to have all this equipment sitting in a warehouse at Fort Campbell in case were required to go to
that level. What makes sense is for
us to identify that equipment and to
understand that in certain supportto-coalition situations, the Army
may have to supply us with that
capability.
We also validated that in our theater, our soldiers have to be competent in armor and mechanized tactics, at least through the battalion
level, because when you go to the
CENTCOM area of responsibility,
thats how our counterpart coalition
allies are equipped. In SOUTHCOM,
the typical unit might be light
infantry, but our typical counterpart
July 1993

unit is a tank or mechanizedinfantry battalion. Its not sufficient

for our guys to go to the light leaders course at Fort Benning; they
have to attend armor and mechanized courses so theyre competent in
those tactics and in the equipment.
We have to be competent to fall in on
a counterpart brigade, and we have
to understand their requirements
and capabilities for indirect fire, air
defense and engineer countermobility/mobility. We have to be able to get
that competency down to the lowest
possible level. Theres a tremendous
time and money requirement to
make every operational attachment
competent in all those skills, but
that is the goal. Our soldiers are
more mature and very smart, and
they bring a lot of skills when they
come to SF. If a guy has been a platoon leader in the 24th Mech, he
automatically becomes one of the
subject-matter experts in 5th SF
Group on anti-armor operations, and
the entire group takes advantage of
his skills.
SW: How well-suited are conventional forces to conduct coalition
warfare?
Brownlee: I would say that their
role is more logically combined warfare, thats where theyve been
working with the NATO allies. You
can get a brigade from the 82nd to a
British division and they could
operate on the battlefield, but
theyre conducting combined operations. What could a brigade or a
battalion from the 82nd contribute
to a battalion in the Kuwaiti army?
The Kuwaiti army doesnt have the
capability to operate with them in a
combined fashion. Could a battalion
in the 82nd fall in on a brigade in
the Kuwaiti army and make them a
competent fighting brigade able to
conduct a combined operation? In
theory, I would say yes, but is that
their primary mission and their
role? I would argue that thats not a
good utilization for the 82nd
their job is to be prepared to fight,
not to train. They have to be personally trained to do their job. Its

not their job to transpose that capability to another element. I would

say the same thing for the Marine
Corps; it needs to be able to operate
in a combined fashion, not train
other people to operate as it does.
Weve got the senior, mature,
experienced NCOs and officers who
have the interpersonal skills and the
negotiation capabilities. We cultivate
those skills, we train our guys to be
able to make that coalition unit
capable of conducting an operation. I
dont believe the conventional forces
would want to spend the resources,
because everything they would have
to do to support a coalition would
detract from their capability to operate. I dont believe they would have
the staying power, I dont believe
they have the maturity and the
experience and the interpersonal
skills to be successful in providing
support for a coalition. They have
the job to participate in a coalition,
but not to provide support to the
coalition, and I think thats the difference between the conventional
Army and the Marine Corps and
Army special-operations forces.
SW: Coalition warfare is now seen
as a collateral activity for SF.
Should we place more emphasis on
it as a full-fledged mission?
Brownlee: I would say that it is
perfectly appropriate for the 5th SF
Group to place more emphasis on it
as a collateral activity, because the
way we operate in the CENTCOM
AOR and the way CENTCOM operates, it is the most likely activity we
will be asked to conduct in support of
the CINC, USCENTCOM. We need
to emphasize the areas that will
enable us to provide better support
in a coalition, because that is the
most likely collateral activity under
the FID umbrella that we will be
asked to do. Thats become very evident, and thats why we put tremendous emphasis on it in the 5th
Group. We look at the full FID spectrum, from the perspective of how
our training in mission-essential
tasks enhances our capability to conduct support to a coalition. Thats
43

where we put our emphasis. So its

something we need to identify, not
as a full-fledged mission, but as the
most likely collateral activity we will
be asked to do in the CENTCOM
AOR.
SW: How do you identify these areas
and plan for your requirements?
Brownlee: We analyze the potential coalition counterparts for their
equipment and missions, then we
orient individual companies and
teams on specific brigades and specific armies, down to the point that
we identify what kind of tanks they
have, what kind of tracks they
have, what their combat-service
support is, what their air-defense
capabilities are, what their engineering assets are. Each team,
then, in its mission-area analysis
and its area study, emphasizes its
ability to provide coalition support
to a unit thats configured like that.
If they have M-60A3s, T-62s or
AMX-10 French tanks, our guys oriented toward that brigade will learn
about that tank, will study the preventive maintenance checks and
services, the gunnery and how its
used.
SW: How does coalition warfare differ from FID?
Brownlee: Weve had a lot of theoretical discussions in the 5th Group
about coalition warfare, and personally, I am much more comfortable
calling it support to a coalition.
When you say coalition warfare,
thats limiting, but when you say
support to a coalition, that allows
you to do many things. That allows
you to do what we did with Desert
Shield/Desert Storm, it allows you
to do what we did in Somalia, it
allows you to conduct joint exercises
with other coalition allies in support of U.S. operational war plans.
Its transparent to the people youre
working with, but everything youre
doing while youre exercising with
them is enhancing their ability.
Youre supporting the coalition by
enhancing their capabilities, and
getting to know their capabilities
44

and limitations by conducting

assessments. That all supports
coalition activities in the future. If
we had to go to war in country X
tomorrow as part of a coalition
force, and the U.S. had conducted a
joint readiness exercise with these
countries, we would already be able
to say, Heres what you can expect
to find on the ground, here are the
capabilities and limitations, heres
how they can best be integrated,
and thats what we do on a continuous basis. Foreign internal defense

If we are going to do
anything in the
CENTCOM AOR, it is
going to be conducted
under the aegis of a
coalition. Its a proven
commodity.
is when we help them help themselves. When we go to Jordan and
do a joint readiness exercise under
the FID umbrella, were helping the
Jordanians become a better army.
When we do coalition warfare, we
are helping them help us. By helping them, by increasing their capabilities, by making them a better

player in the U.S. coalition, we help

us. The U.S. has a national objective, and to the extent we can make
those guys better, they help us
achieve it. Thats the only distinction that I will make between FID
and support-to-coalition activities.
SW: Do you expect to see more
emphasis on support to coalitions in
the future?
Brownlee: In the CENTCOM AOR,
its absolutely essential. There are
no forward-deployed forces in
CENTCOM. If the national command authorities decide to participate in an operation, i.e., Somalia,
Desert Shield/Desert Storm, if we
are going to do anything in the
CENTCOM AOR, it is going to be
conducted under the aegis of a coalition. Only in the most extreme circumstances, none of which I can
even envision, would there be unilateral U.S. operations in the
CENTCOM AOR. Anything that we
do over there is going to be part of a
coalition. Its a proven commodity,
its been successful, and our allies
there are comfortable operating
with the United States in a coalition. It allows them the breathing
space and the legitimacy to be an
equal participating partner, rather
than a subordinate element to a
U.S. operation. Saudi Arabia and
the other coalition allies were willing to liberate Kuwait as part of a
coalition; they would not have been
willing to as subordinate military
elements of a U.S. operation. It will
be the primary collateral activity for
us in the future. We consider that to
be completely complementary to
FID, the primary mission which
weve been given by the ASOC. Its
not a new mission, its not something that requires us to reinvent
the wheel. We are already doing it,
have been doing it, and will continue to do it.

Special Warfare

Fire-Support
Planning at the
ODA Level
by Lt. Col. Geoffrey Lambert

Having completed a rotation at the

Joint Readiness Training Center and
a recent battalion-level OCONUS
exercise, and having had the opportunity to isolate active- and reservecomponent Special Forces detachments from four SF groups and
SEAL elements for direct-action and
special-reconnaissance missions, I
am not convinced that we are doing
our job teaching subordinate leaders
that fire support is an essential element of combat power.
If recent contingency operations
are any guide to the potential modern battlefield, it is likely that SF
will be operating in the proximity of
friendly light or heavy forces. Our
soldiers can be brought on-board to
plan for this significant battlefield
operating system if we, as leaders,
do a few simple things:
Define fire support.
Teach fire-support planning and
coordination.
Demand overlays.
Use the special operations command-and-control element, the
SOCCE.
Ensure that the joint task force is
informed.
July 1993

Define fire support. Fire support

includes mortars, field artillery,
naval gunfire, Army or SOF aviation, and air-delivered weapons, as
well as non-lethal electronic warfare, illumination or smoke. Failure
to recognize all the fire-support systems that can affect ODA operations may leave our units less than
adequately concerned about planning communications, targets or
control measures.
Teach fire-support planning and
coordination. Officer-professionaldevelopment and NCO-professionaldevelopment classes addressing the
battlefield coordination element, or
BCE, at echelons above corps and
the fire-support element, the FSE,
at corps, division, brigade and battalion will make it apparent to our
soldiers that air support, field
artillery, naval gunfire, aviation
and even air defense artillery (if
used as fire support) are effectively
synchronized and managed and
that ODA requirements will be considered in the system.
Demand overlays. ODAs in isolation should be required to provide
fire-support overlays complete with
proposed restrictive measures.
These restrictive fire-control measures could protect ODA missionsupport sites, selected portions of
operational areas, and routes and
corridors. Overlays should also provide proposed targets in case fire
support becomes available. The
ODA should also brief its annotated
overlay to the area specialist team,
including the proposed communication plan and overall concept for fire
support. This will establish a starting point, and the forward operational base or SOCCE can provide
coordinating information if the ODA
falls within range of fire-support
systems.
Use the SOCCE. Since SF units
have no fire-support officers, the
SOCCE is the best way to enter the
fire-support system. On Solid Shield
88, ODA no-fire areas received
acknowledgment at the CINCLANT
level when data was provided to the
XVIII Airborne Corps FSE by the

7th SF Groups SOCCE. If no

SOCCE is available, the air component of the joint special-operations
task force may have to fill the bill.
Early coordination between the
Army special-operations task force
and joint fire planners should align
the effort.
Ensure the JTF Is informed. It is
imperative that our planners
ensure proper fire-support visibility. Unless a unique command-andcontrol arrangement exists, the only
complete coordination level in our
most likely scenario is the joint task
force BCE or FSE. Most delicate
could be the coordination of fires for
compartmented operations. They
must be planned and carefully coordinated at the JTF level within the
guidance issued by the JSOTF. To
coordinate fires only within the
SOF community could be a fatal
mistake.
The existing fire-support system
works, it is responsive, and it is
manned by fire-support coordinators trained to provide flexibility
and to anticipate future contingencies. Our charter should be to train
our detachments to tap into the system and fully put this essential element of combat power into the Special Forces arsenal.

Lt. Col. Geoffrey C.

Lambert is currently
attending the Army
War College at
Carlisle Barracks, Pa.
His previous assignments include duty as
the deputy commander, 7th Special
Forces Group and commander, 1st
Battalion, 7th SF Group.

45

Enlisted Career Notes

Special Warfare

SMA required for promotion

to sergeant major

The Special Operations Proponency Office reminds soldiers that effective

Oct. 1, 1993, promotion to sergeant major will be restricted to graduates of
the Army Sergeants Major Academy, Fort Bliss, Texas. The SMA currently
conducts two classes per year, beginning in January and July, whose average size is 450 students. In March, the Chief of Staff of the Army approved
a recommendation to conduct one nine-month class per year beginning in
August 1995. Average size of the nine-month class is projected to be 700
students. Soldiers are chosen to attend the SMA by an annual Army selection board. Others may qualify for a nonresident SMA course to be taken
by correspondence. Qualifications for nonresident training are outlined in
an annual MILPO message normally released in August or September. For
more information contact SFC R.B. Gardner, Special Operations Proponency Office, at DSN 239-9002, commercial (919) 432-9002.

SF NCOs may apply

for 18D cross-training

Since the establishment of the Special Forces Enlisted Branch in 1983, the
Branch has been trying to fill the force, recruiting more than 2,500 soldiers
each year until 1993, according to Sgt. Maj. William L. Frisbie of the Special Operations Proponency Office. With the exception of 18D, medical
NCO, which is currently at 80 percent, the fill has been accomplished, with
MOSs 18B, weapons NCO; 18C, engineer NCO; and 18E, communications
NCO; currently at more than 100 percent. Soldiers in these MOSs in
grades of sergeant and staff sergeant may currently apply for cross-training into 18D by submitting a DA Form 4187 through normal channels. The
current waiting period for 18D training is approximately seven months,
and the next available class will begin Nov. 24, 1993. For more information, contact Sgt. Maj. William L. Frisbie at DSN 239-2415/9002, commercial (919) 432-2415/9002, or Donna Wheeler in the Special Forces Recruiting Office, DSN 239-1818, commercial (919) 432-1818.

Credit for 38A

MOS switch ends soon

Time is running out for soldiers wishing to change their military occupational specialty to 38A (Civil Affairs) by completing the two-week Civil
Affairs Operations Course. After September, the CAOC cannot be applied
toward an MOS change to 38A, said MSgt. Michael J. Rupert of the Special
Operations Proponency Office. Currently, soldiers working in a 38A position who have completed the CAOC and meet the specifications listed in
AR 611-201 are eligible to change their MOS to 38A. Soldiers who want
credit for the CAOC in order to change MOSs need to submit their packets
to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, deputy chief of staff for
personnel office, this year, Rupert added. For more information contact
MSgt. Michael J. Rupert, DSN 239-6406, commercial (919) 432-6406.

46

Special Warfare

Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

Warrants accessed
up to 12 years

Current Army policy calls for the accession of warrant officers from enlisted soldiers with 5-8 years of active federal service. Proponents of the various branches have the authority to vary this service requirement, up to 12
years. According to CWO 3 Shaun Driscoll of the Special Operations Proponency Office, Special Forces is currently accessing soldiers with more than
12 years in order to fill its warrant-officer vacancies, but this may become
more difficult as SF nears its goals. For more information, contact CWO 3
Shaun Driscoll at DSN 239-2415/9002, commercial (919) 432-2415/9002.

Board selects RC officers

to return to active duty

A PERSCOM selection board convened Mar. 31, 1993 to select reservecomponent captains and first lieutenants to be returned to active duty in
Branch 18, Special Forces, and Functional Area 39C, Civil Affairs. According to Maj. Ron Fiegle of the Special Operations Proponency Office, the
board selected officers who were fully qualified and able to compete for promotion and retention with their active-component counterparts, to fill critical shortages within the personnel inventory. Selection was based on the
quality of the individuals file, advanced-course completion, language capability, experience and demonstrated potential. Officers selected will incur a
four-year obligation. During their third year on active duty, they will be
eligible to compete for voluntary indefinite or conditional voluntary indefinite status. Selected FA 39C officers will be accessed in their basic branch
but will single track as FA 39. The first of these officers should be returning to active status before the end of fiscal-year 1993.

Experience earns credit

for FA 39 courses

Increasing numbers of officers are getting credit for Functional Area 39

courses because of their experiences. Records of the Special Operations
Proponency Office reveal that about half of the officers requesting constructive credit for the Regional Studies Course, the Psychological Operations Course and the Civil Affairs Course qualify, according to Jeanne
Schiller, FA 39 manager. Multiple deployments of significant duration to
various areas in the same geographic region will earn constructive credit
for the Regional Studies Course if officers had the opportunity to learn of
the culture, religion, government, economics and military aspects during
those deployments. Constructive credit for PSYOP or CA courses requires
extensive PSYOP or CA experience. That experience must have been for a
significant amount of time and at a level where the training parallels the
curriculum of the courses. A review of all FA 39 officer records indicated
that many officers would probably receive constructive credit for the
PSYOP Officer Course or the Civil Affairs Course; fewer officers would
qualify for the Regional Studies Course. Officers interested in applying for
constructive credit should contact Jeanne Schiller, Special Operations Proponency Office, at DSN 239-6406/9002, commercial (919) 432-6406/9002.

July 1993

47

Foreign SOF
Special Warfare

Colombian cocaine
in Russia

Russian border troops

on Tajik-Afghan frontier

48

In what was characterized as Humanitarian Assistance: Colombian Style,

Russian security officials reported the Feb. 16, 1993, seizure of 1,092 kilograms (1.4 short tons) of cocaine in the city of Vyborg. Concealed in cans
labeled Meat with Potatoes, it had been shipped from Colombia via Finland to Vyborg, a port city about 70 miles northwest of St. Petersburg, the
shipments destination. It would have subsequently been sent on to European markets. The largest-ever cocaine seizure in Russia, it marks the
growing involvement of international drug traffickers in the former Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe. According to the Russian Ministry of Security,
or MB, Russia is on the eve of a massive offensive by the drug business. In
a statement reminiscent of Soviet days, the deputy chief of the MBs Directorate for Countering Smuggling and Corruption added that he could not
rule out the possibility that foreign intelligence services were aiding the
drug deliveries, though he noted that he had no reliable information to that
effect. Russia has also become a frequent transhipment or target area for
illegal narcotics from the former Soviet Central Asian republics, the Caucasus, Southwest Asia and other regions. Indigenously-produced synthetic
narcotics have also become a substantial problem, with some 70 illegal drug
laboratories seized in Russia during 1992. This growing drug-trafficking
problem, sometimes linked with arms trafficking and ethno-national conflict, will clearly shape the organization and activities of law-enforcement
and security forces in Russia and neighboring states and has the potential
of involving military resources as well.

Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, KGB Border Troops played a central role in border-security operations along the Soviet-Afghan border. During the war, according to Soviet statistics, 515 Border
Troops were killed and another 3,000 injured. Prominent among the border
units were special-operations forces termed Assault-Landing MotorizedManeuver Groups, which conducted heliborne strikes, raids and interdiction actions in defense of the frontier and against mujahedin targets 100
kilometers deep into Afghanistan. Today, in accord with a two-year agreement between Russia and the now-independent state of Tajikistan concluded
in 1992, Russian Border Troops under the Russian Ministry of Security are
stationed along the 2,000-kilometer border between Tajikistan and
Afghanistan. By all accounts, the border is at least as active as it was during
the war years, with Border Troops engaging in numerous firefights against
narcotics and arms traffickers and with armed Islamic groups affiliated with
factions in the Tajik civil war. Tajik fighters opposing the government are
thought by the Russians to undergo guerrilla training in Afghan camps run
by the Islamic Party of Afghanistan. Following their training, they cross
back into Tajikistan, one of a number of factors that fuels Russias concerns
about Islamic extremism along the southern borders. Some 30 armed clashes
with illegal crossers had occurred during the first two months of 1993. As of
March 1993, Russian border guards were deployed on territory controlled
both by the Tajik government and opposition forces, as well as facing hostile
armed groups of various types in Afghanistan. Given recent historical preceSpecial Warfare

dent from the war in Afghanistan, and Russias forcefully stated security
interests in the region, the special-operations dimensions of Russian efforts
to deal with a dangerous border and the threat of extremist-inspired instability may be particularly instructive in the months ahead.

Terrorism, ethnic conflict

threaten stability
of eastern Europe

The proliferation of terrorist groups associated with ethno-national conflict

in Eastern Europe is directly threatening the stability and development of
fragile new states and institutions in the area. Virtually every ethno-national flashpoint in the region of which the former Yugoslavia is the most
notable at present has spawned terrorism and terrorist groups, with
growing emigr and refugee populations creating potential support bases for
alienated groups using violence as a means to their goals. As with terrorist
groups generally, the agenda, size, location and activity level of groups in
Eastern Europe are far from precise. A few examples of groups appearing
over the last two years illustrate the nature of the problem. Amidst growing
conflict in Yugoslavia in 1991, a Pan-Serbian Chetnik faction threatened
the destruction the Krsko nuclear power plant owned jointly by Croatia and
Slovenia, the kind of threatened action that has continued to generate concerns in the region. In the fall of 1992, a Belgrade newspaper reported a
smuggling network trying to bring uranium into Yugoslav conflict zones,
and speculated about linkages to Soviet nuclear warheads rumored to have
disappeared. While such rumors seem highly unlikely and often even
absurd, the fact that the theft and diversion of nuclear fuels and materials of
various types is under way is beyond dispute. In the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic, which at the start of 1993 became separate Czech and Slovak states, a 1990 text attributed to the Slovak Republican Army an
extremist right-wing organization that identifies its enemies as Hungarians,
Czechs, Jews and renegade Slovaks noted its contacts with the Irish
Republican Army, Vatra Romanescu in Romania, Polands 13 December
Independence Group, (and) the PLO. The organization declared its intention to create an apocalypse in central and southeastern Europe through the
destruction of nuclear power plants, petroleum and gas pipelines and other
facilities, if the Slovak nation is threatened with extinction. While the division of Czechoslovakia took place peacefully, the potential for this kind of
activity remains a concern to security establishments in the region. In Bulgaria, the proliferation of small terrorist groups include the Resistance
National Revolutionary Committee, Political Rights, Eagle, Future
Innovation, the Secret Revolutionary Committee, Reality, Warriors of
Islam, Red Pirates, and the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, which has the apparent goal of creating a Macedonian state out of
Macedonian-populated areas of Bulgaria and the Yugoslav republic of Macedonia. The 16 September Commando in Hungary illustrates the ethnic
dimension of terrorism. Claiming a membership of several hundred, the
group has promised to murder Slovak law-enforcement officials involved in a
so-called anti-Hungarian pogrom in Bratislava in 1992 stemming from a soccer match. Overall, these and other appearing, disappearing and changing
terrorist groups in Eastern Europe seem likely to threaten stability in the
region. This post-Cold War development has implications for foreign nations
and forces providing peacemaking, peacekeeping and security-assistance
support to East European states, since these groups have the clear potential
for generating terrorist actions locally and abroad.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr., of the Foreign Military Studies Office,
Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.
July 1993

49

Update
Special Warfare

Scott takes command

of USASOC
Maj. Gen. James T. Scott took
command of the Army Special Operations Command during ceremonies
at Fort Bragg May 20.
Scott, commander of the 2nd
Infantry Division since July 1991,
replaced Lt. Gen. Wayne A. Downing, now commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command at
MacDill AFB, Fla.
Scott has formerly served as commander of Special Operations Command - Europe; commander of the
3rd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division;
and as commander of the 1st Ranger
Battalion, 75th Infantry.

Reserve linguist unit

seeks members
The 1st U.S. Army Reserve Linguist Unit is recruiting soldiers who
wish to practice their language skills
and improve their proficiency.
The unit is a non-pay, reinforcement training unit whose soldiers
drill for retirement points. Its recent realignment with the Army
special-operations community opens
new opportunities to perform duties
with Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations and Special Forces units
both during training and on actual
operations.
The unit headquarters in Washington, D.C., monitors the activities
of all its soldiers in CONUS and
OCONUS. Subordinate detachments
are currently located in San Diego,
Calif.; Houston, Texas; Tampa, Fla.;
Chicago, Ill.; Pittsburgh, Pa.; New
York City and Charlottesville, Va.
Membership is open to all language-qualified soldiers of the Army
Reserve and National Guard regardless of rank or MOS. For more infor50

mation, soldiers should write: 1st

USAR Linguist Unit; Attn: A/S-1
(Recruiting); 6601 Baltimore Ave.;
Riverdale, MD 20737-1025.

New handbook covers

terminal-guidance operations
The Special Warfare Center and
School will soon release a new handbook for use by special-operations
forces in planning terminal-guidance
operations.
Intended primarily for Army SOF,
the Terminal Guidance Handbook
addresses joint operations, covering
the operational concept of TGO and
giving guidance and checklists for
staff planning and coordination. Terminal guidance is a joint directaction mission SOF ground forces
provide assistance in locating targets
to be destroyed by aircraft, missiles,
ships or artillery elements.
The handbook is not designed to
provide new doctrine, said Maj. R.L.
Snyder, chief of the SWCS Doctrine
Development Division. We have
reviewed existing doctrine and procedures and consolidated the information into what we feel is an easily
read quick reference.
The handbook describes TGO procedures and provides definitions and
checklists for planning. Reference
guides allow users to ensure communications compatibility.
For more information on the handbook, contact Maj. R.L. Snyder, DSN
239-5393/8689, commercial (919)
432-5393/8689.

USACAPOC gets
new commander
Brig. Gen. Donald F. Campbell
took command of the U.S. Army
Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command during ceremonies

on Fort Braggs Sicily Drop Zone

May 2.
Campbell, a superior court judge
for the state of New Jersey and former commander of the 353rd Civil
Affairs Command, Bronx, N.Y., took
command from Brig. Gen. Joseph C.
Hurteau, who retired from the active
reserve component.
USACAPOC is the headquarters
for all Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units and consists of 11 separate commands.
Approximately 83 percent of its
10,000 soldiers are Army reservists.
Two of its units, the 4th PSYOP
Group and the 96th Civil Affairs
Battalion, are active-component and
based at Fort Bragg. Its reserve elements are located in 29 states.

New free-fall manual

available for issue
FM 31-19, Military Free-Fall
Parachuting Tactics, Techniques and
Procedures, is complete and is being
issued to field units.
The new manual supersedes TC
31-19, dated Sept. 9, 1988. Units
which have established publications
accounts should receive the new
free-fall manual automatically.
Those who do not should check to see
if they have established a need for
the manual as detailed in DA Pamphlet 310-10, The Standard Publication System Users Guide.

National Guard SF unit

looking for members
The 3rd Battalion, 20th Special
Forces Group is currently recruiting
soldiers to serve in the unit.
The battalion, assigned to the
Florida National Guard, has a number of openings for personnel, including HALO and scuba slots. Soldiers
Special Warfare

with an 18-series military occupational specialty or who are willing to

volunteer for SF training should contact Capt. John Wright at (904) 5333550 or Capt. Rick Jones at (904)
533-3419.

Analysis identifies
critical PSYOP tasks
An ongoing analysis of critical
tasks for PSYOP units will have farreaching effects on PSYOP doctrine,
training and personnel in the future.
The Analysis Branch of the Individual Training Division of the
SWCS Directorate of Training and
Doctrine began conducting the
PSYOP front-end analysis in the second quarter of FY 93 to identify critical collective tasks for PSYOP units,
from the group to the team level.
The analysis will conclude with the
PSYOP Critical Task Selection
Board, scheduled for August 1993.
Results of the analysis will affect
PSYOP doctrine, instruction and
training materials, and will serve as
a basis for further analysis of individual positions within the PSYOP
career-management field.

Twenty former members of the 1st

SSF and soldiers from the 3rd and
7th Special Forces Groups unveiled
the stone, dedicated to the unit from
which modern Special Forces units
trace their lineage.
There are great similarities
between us and those young soldiers
out there today, said retired Col.
Robert S. Moore, a 1st SSF veteran.
You can see it in their spirit, attitude and confidence. Their dedication is equal to that exhibited by the
1st Special Service Force.

July 1993

Roach new commander

of 7th SF Group
Col. James S. Roach assumed command of the 7th Special Forces
Group in a Fort Bragg ceremony
June 8.
Roach, 46, replaced Col. James G.
Pulley, now chief of staff for the
Army Special Forces Command.
Roachs previous assignments
include SF detachment, company
and battalion command. He served
two tours in Vietnam, was an adviser in El Salvador, and most recently
was Director of Training and Doctrine at the JFK Special Warfare
Center and School.

SOF veterans dedicate

memorial stones
Two groups of SOF veterans have
recently dedicated memorials to
their fallen comrades in the JFK
Memorial Plaza at Fort Bragg.
On May 31, members of the Special Forces Association joined soldiers of the 3rd and 7th SF Groups
to dedicate a stone to the memory of
606 SF soldiers killed in action and
126 missing in action since 1952. Lt.
Gen. James T. Scott, commander of
the U.S. Army Special Operations
Command, challenged his listeners
to preserve the memory of those soldiers honored by the stone. To us,
theyre more than just a name on a
white cross or a memorial stone in a
cemetery somewhere, he said.
Veterans of World War IIs 1st
Special Service Force joined with
modern Special Forces soldiers to
dedicate a stone in memory of their
unit at the Plaza April 2.

climbed the mountains 1,000-foot

cliffs to approach German defenses
from the rear. Under heavy fire, the
Americans attacked and fought
hand-to-hand to overrun enemy positions. Within hours the 1st SSF
secured a victory that Allied generals
had estimated would take six days.
The 1st SSF went on to fight near
Rome and in southern France. It was
inactivated Dec. 5, 1944 near Menton, France. Linda Thompson,
USASOC PAO

MILES brackets available

for foreign weapons
Photo by Keith Butler

1st SSF veterans dedicate memorial stone.

Activated July 9, 1942 at Fort

William Henry Harrison, near Helena, Mont., the combined U.S.-Canadian force of 173 officers and 2,194
enlisted men was formed to conduct
hit-and-run raids against German
garrisons in Norway and Romania.
Before its training was finished,
the units original mission was canceled, but its leader, Brig. Gen.
Robert T. Frederick, found new missions. During the Anzio operation,
the unit earned the name, The
Devils Brigade, but its reputation
was forged in the taking of Monte La
Difensa, a strategic 3,210-foot mountaintop in southern Italy.
On the night of Dec. 3, 1943, 600
men of the 1st SSFs 2nd Regiment

In the May 1993 issue of Special

Warfare, the article, Using MILES
on Foreign Weapons, described a
procedure for adapting the M-16
mounting bracket of the MILES
transmitter to an FN FAL rifle.
According to Gene McCarthy of
the Collective Training Instrumentation and Engagement Systems
Directorate, Combined Arms Command Training at Fort Eustis, Va.,
MILES mounting brackets for a
variety of foreign weapons have
already been developed and are
available through his directorate or
local training and audiovisual support centers. For further information, contact Gene McCarthy, DSN
927-3313/4589, commercial (804)
878-3313/4589.

51

Book Reviews
Special Warfare
Terrorism, Politics and Law. By
Antonio Cassese. Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1989.
ISBN 0-691-07838-6. 162 pages.
This compact book by a noted
Italian jurist, diplomat and author
explores, with clarity and brevity,
the impact of terrorism on international law.
The hijacking of the Italian cruise
liner Achille Lauro provides the
authors focal point. He skillfully
explains the facts of the hijacking,
the precepts of international law
applicable to the incident, and the
impact of domestic political considerations on the election by those
nations involved to respond either
with diplomatic initiatives or with
armed force.
Cassese begins his book with an
overall discussion of terrorism and
its effect on international relations.
In subsequent chapters, he reviews
the details of the Achille Lauro incident. Finally, he presents his view
of the lessons to be learned from the
Achille Lauro affair. The actions of
all the participants, governmental
(the U.S., Italy and Egypt) and
quasi-governmental (the PLO and
its offshoot, the PLF) are closely
scrutinized for compliance with
existing standards of international
law. There is an abundance of criticism for everyone involved.
Cassese has little use for terrorists and no sympathy for their
methods. He does look beyond their
criminal acts, however, to the root
causes of their aberrant behavior.
Although not an advocate of peace
at any price, Cassese favors the
diplomatic response. He levels
scathing criticism against the U.S.
government for its refusal to cooperate with the Italian governments
52

diplomatic initiatives. He condemns

the American governments insistence from the very outset of the crisis that it would use a special-operations force deployed immediately
to the area even as the Italians
were achieving success through
their diplomatic initiatives.
He is almost as harsh on the

Egyptians for their duplicity in covering up the death of Leon

Klinghoffer during negotiations
with the hijackers and offers an
explanation for their behavior. He
also expresses disappointment at
the Egyptian governments failure
to comply with a treaty obligation to
the United States to extradite the
hijackers here for trial. He views
this violation as provoking the subsequent diversion by U.S. Navy
warplanes of the Egyptian airliner
as it carried the hijackers over the
Mediterranean the scene, only
days earlier, of their murderous
activities.
Although Cassese is generally

sympathetic to the approach taken

by the Italian government, he similarly condemns its decision not to
honor the U.S. governments request
to extradite the terrorist Abul Abbas.
He explains the lenient treaty-standard for extradition (adopted earlier,
ironically, at the urging of the Italian government, which desired to
facilitate the extradition from the
United States of criminals wanted
for offenses in Italy) and how the
Italian municipal courts misapplication of stricter standards, resulting
in the escape from justice of the principal architect of the hijacking, was
probably the result of domestic political considerations.
The author thoroughly researched the material available to
him. His review of the court transcripts from the trials and appeals
of the hijackers and his use of other
sources provides the reader with
many interesting facts. He provides
some insightful speculation on Abul
Abbas purpose in ordering the
hijacking, as well.
The authors stated purpose in
writing this book is to demystify
international law for the layman.
He cites the influential legal scholar
Emmerich de Vattel, who wrote in
1758 that, International law is the
law of sovereigns. It is written
mainly for them, and for their ministers. In truth, it should interest
all men and, in a free Nation, its
precepts should be the study of all
its citizens.
Cassese feels that international
law should not be, and no longer is,
solely the province of sovereigns.
He believes that informed and
thoughtful citizen action is the best
hope for eliminating the problem of
terrorism. His interesting and
thought-provoking book should be
Special Warfare

of particular interest to policy makers and, equally, to those who

implement these policies, especially
in the area of special operations.
Maj. Neil R. Porter Jr.
Deputy Staff Judge Advocate
USACAPOC
Fort Bragg, N.C.
Clandestine Warfare: Weapons
and Equipment of the SOE and
OSS. By James D. Ladd, Keith
Melton and Peter Mason. New York:
Sterling Publishing Co., 1988.
ISBN: 0-7137-1822-6. 159 pages.
$24.95.
In 1942, William Wild Bill
Donovan, the director of the Office
of Strategic Services, appointed
Stanley P. Lovell, a chemist then
serving with the Office of Scientific
Research and Developments Division 19, as chief of the OSS
Research and Development Branch.
I need every subtle device and
every underhanded trick to use
against the Germans and the
Japanese by our own people
but especially by the underground
resistance groups in all occupied
countries, he said. You will have
to invent all of them, Lovell,
because youre going to be my man.
Stanley Lovell rarely disappointed (Donovan later referred to Lovell
as his Professor Moriarty). But he
did not invent all the special
weapons and devices associated
with OSS. Lovell brought some over
to OSS R&D from Division 19. The
British developed others for their
Special Operations Executive, then
passed them on to their American
allies. The Yanks abundant funding of military research and development occasionally improved upon
these weapons, and the American
capacity for mass production made
it possible to turn them out in vast
numbers.
Among the many special weapons
and devices developed, adapted or
considered for use by the OSS were
Black Joe, an explosive coal that
could blow away an enemy blast
July 1993

furnace or steam engine; the Big

Joe 6, an OSS crossbow that fired
an arrow at the rate of 200 feet per
second; the OSS Stinger, a singleshot pistol small enough to conceal
in a mans hand; the Lockpicking
Knife, an OSS device that would
pry open both bolt locks and cylinder locks; and Aunt Jemima, an
explosive powder with the appearance and consistency of flour that
could be kneaded into dough, baked
into bread and then used to destroy
an enemy bridge. The OSS had Ktablets to knock out a man, and
General Donovan himself sometimes carried the deadly L-tablet, a
gelatin capsule coated with rubber

and filled with potassium cyanide,

to ensure that he would not be captured alive. Clandestine Warfare
discusses these and other fearful
instruments of subversive warfare
in some detail.
To date, it seems that research in
the records of the Office of Strategic Services has discovered little or
no evidence to show that most of
the OSS weapons and devices discussed in Clandestine Warfare were
ever actually employed in combat
or special operations. A few, like
the OSS Matchbox Camera and the
OSS Silenced Pistol, were widely
used. Triggering, demolition and

incendiary devices developed by

SOE and adopted and modified by
OSS also proved highly effective in
OSS operations.
Some OSS special weapons did
more to inspire confidence and
strengthen morale than to affect
operations. The OSS Stiletto, an
adaptation of the Fairbairn Knife,
was issued to most OSS personnel
serving overseas, and possession of
this weapon is still a point of pride
among OSS veterans. In practice, it
left much to be desired. Its sheath
was awkward, and its razor-sharp
edge and needle point made the
Stiletto much too brittle and fragile.
James Ladd, who has written
well concerning subversive warfare;
Keith Melton, the owner of an outstanding collection of OSS and SOE
weapons and equipment; and Capt.
Peter Mason, who served with the
British Special Air Service and the
British commandos during World
War II, have combined their considerable talents and resources to compose an exciting and interesting
book. It is well-illustrated and carefully indexed. It is undocumented,
however, and understandably, the
authors have not avoided some mistakes in writing about a subject so
complex. Certainly Clandestine
Warfare is not the last word on special weapons and devices. Still, it
makes a good read in an endlessly
fascinating field of research. Those
interested in unorthodox warfare
and the weapons and equipment
developed for special operations will
want to add this book to their
library.
Lawrence H. McDonald
National Archives
Washington, D.C.

53

Special Warfare

This publication is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited Headquarters, Department of the Army

Department of the Army

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