Scribd Logo
Upload

Welcome to Scribd!

  • 53 views

    Mixed Strategies and Nash Equilibrium: Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

    Uploaded by

    Tanoy Dewanjee
    1. A classical example of a zero-sum game is the game of Matching Pennies, where each of two players independently chooses heads or tails and their payoffs depend on whether their choices match. 2. In mixed strategies, players choose strategies that are probability distributions over actions rather than single actions. Expected utility is used to calculate payoffs. 3. A Nash equilibrium exists when no player can increase their expected payoff by unilaterally changing their strategy, given the strategies of other players. Every finite game has at least one Nash equilibrium.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd

    Mixed Strategies and Nash Equilibrium: Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

    Uploaded by

    Tanoy Dewanjee
    53 views10 pages
    1. A classical example of a zero-sum game is the game of Matching Pennies, where each of two players independently chooses heads or tails and their payoffs depend on whether their choices match. 2. In mixed strategies, players choose strategies that are probability distributions over actions rather than single actions. Expected utility is used to calculate payoffs. 3. A Nash equilibrium exists when no player can increase their expected payoff by unilaterally changing their strategy, given the strategies of other players. Every finite game has at least one Nash equilibrium.

    Original Description:

    Mixed Nash

    Original Title

    2-2-MixedNash

    Copyright

    © © All Rights Reserved

    Available Formats

    PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd

    Did you find this document useful?

    Is this content inappropriate?

    1. A classical example of a zero-sum game is the game of Matching Pennies, where each of two players independently chooses heads or tails and their payoffs depend on whether their choices match. 2. In mixed strategies, players choose strategies that are probability distributions over actions rather than single actions. Expected utility is used to calculate payoffs. 3. A Nash equilibrium exists when no player can increase their expected payoff by unilaterally changing their strategy, given the strategies of other players. Every finite game has at least one Nash equilibrium.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf or txt
    53 views10 pages

    Mixed Strategies and Nash Equilibrium: Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

    Uploaded by

    Tanoy Dewanjee
    1. A classical example of a zero-sum game is the game of Matching Pennies, where each of two players independently chooses heads or tails and their payoffs depend on whether their choices match. 2. In mixed strategies, players choose strategies that are probability distributions over actions rather than single actions. Expected utility is used to calculate payoffs. 3. A Nash equilibrium exists when no player can increase their expected payoff by unilaterally changing their strategy, given the strategies of other players. Every finite game has at least one Nash equilibrium.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf or txt
    of 10

    .

    Mixed Strategies and Nash Equilibrium


    Game Theory Course:
    Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

    Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

    Mixed Strategies and Nash Equilibrium

    you allow more agents, any game can be turned into a zero-sum game by adding
    a dummy player whose actions do not impact the payoffs to the other agents, and
    whose own payoffs are chosen to make the payoffs in each outcome sum to zero.
    A classical example of a zero-sum game is the game of Matching Pennies. In this
    game,
    of the
    playersbad
    hasidea
    a penny
    and any
    independently
    chooses
    to display
    Iteach
    would
    betwo
    a pretty
    to play
    deterministic
    strategy
    either in
    heads
    or tails.pennies
    The two players then compare their pennies. If they are the
    matching
    same then player 1 pockets both, and otherwise player 2 pockets them. The payoff
    matrix is shown in Figure 3.6.

    Mixed Strategies

    Heads

    Tails

    Heads

    1, 1

    1, 1

    Tails

    1, 1

    1, 1

    Figure 3.6: Matching Pennies game.


    The popular childrens game of Rock, Paper, Scissors, also known as Rochambeau, provides a three-strategy generalization of the matching-pennies game. The
    Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

    Mixed Strategies and Nash Equilibrium

    Mixed Strategies
    It would be a pretty bad idea to play any deterministic strategy

    in matching pennies
    Idea: confuse the opponent by playing randomly
    Define a strategy si for agent i as any probability distribution
    over the actions Ai .
    pure strategy: only one action is played with positive probability
    mixed strategy: more than one action is played with positive

    probability

    these actions are called the support of the mixed strategy

    Let the set of all strategies for i be Si


    Let the set of all strategy profiles be S = S1 . . . Sn .

    Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

    Mixed Strategies and Nash Equilibrium

    Utility under Mixed Strategies


    What is your payoff if all the players follow mixed strategy

    profile s S?

    We cant just read this number from the game matrix anymore:

    we wont always end up in the same cell

    Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

    Mixed Strategies and Nash Equilibrium

    Utility under Mixed Strategies


    What is your payoff if all the players follow mixed strategy

    profile s S?

    We cant just read this number from the game matrix anymore:

    we wont always end up in the same cell


    Instead, use the idea of expected utility from decision theory:

    ui (s) =

    ui (a)P r(a|s)

    aA

    P r(a|s) =

    sj (aj )

    jN

    Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

    Mixed Strategies and Nash Equilibrium

    Best Response and Nash Equilibrium


    Our definitions of best response and Nash equilibrium generalize
    from actions to strategies.
    .

    Definition (Best response)

    .si BR(si ) iff si Si , ui (si , si ) ui (si , si )


    .

    Definition (Nash equilibrium)

    .
    .s = s1 , . . . , sn is a Nash equilibrium iff i, si BR(si )

    Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

    Mixed Strategies and Nash Equilibrium

    Best Response and Nash Equilibrium


    Our definitions of best response and Nash equilibrium generalize
    from actions to strategies.
    .

    Definition (Best response)

    .si BR(si ) iff si Si , ui (si , si ) ui (si , si )


    .

    Definition (Nash equilibrium)

    .
    .s = s1 , . . . , sn is a Nash equilibrium iff i, si BR(si )
    .

    Theorem (Nash, 1950)

    .
    Every
    finite game has a Nash equilibrium.
    .
    Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

    Mixed Strategies and Nash Equilibrium

    A classical example of a zero-sum game is the game of Matching Pennies. In this


    game, each of the two players has a penny and independently chooses to display
    either heads or tails. The two players then compare their pennies. If they are the
    same then player 1 pockets both, and otherwise player 2 pockets them. The payoff
    matrix is shown in Figure 3.6.

    Example: Matching Pennies

    Heads

    Tails

    Heads

    1, 1

    1, 1

    Tails

    1, 1

    1, 1

    Figure 3.6: Matching Pennies game.


    The popular childrens game of Rock, Paper, Scissors, also known as Rochambeau, provides a three-strategy generalization of the matching-pennies game. The
    payoff matrix of this zero-sum game is shown in Figure 3.7. In this game, each of
    the two players can choose either rock, paper, or scissors. If both players choose
    Game
    Course:
    Jackson,
    Leyton-Brown
    & Shoham
    Strategies
    and Nash Equilibrium
    theTheory
    same
    action,
    there
    is no winner
    and the utilities areMixed
    zero.
    Otherwise,
    each of the

    As an example, imagine two drivers driving towards each other in a country


    having no traffic rules, and who must independently decide whether to drive on the
    left or on the right. If the drivers choose the same side (left or right) they have
    some high utility, and otherwise they have a low utility. The game matrix is shown
    in Figure 3.5.

    Example: Coordination

    Left

    Right

    Left

    1, 1

    0, 0

    Right

    0, 0

    1, 1

    Figure 3.5: Coordination game.

    Zero-sum games
    At the other end of the spectrum from pure coordination games lie zero-sum games,
    Mixed
    Strategies
    and Nash affine
    Equilibrium
    which (bearing in mind the comment we made earlier
    about
    positive
    trans-

    Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

    you adopts D and the other adopts C then the D adopter will experience no delay at all,
    but the C adopter will experience a delay of 4ms.
    These consequences are shown in Figure 3.1. Your options are the two rows, and
    your colleagues options are the columns. In each cell, the first number represents
    your payoff (or, minus your delay), and the second number represents your colleagues
    payoff.1

    Example: Prisoners Dilemma

    1, 1

    4, 0

    0, 4

    3, 3

    Figure 3.1 The TCP users (aka the Prisoners) Dilemma.

    Given these options what should you adopt, C or D? Does it depend on what you
    think your colleague will do? Furthermore, from the perspective of the network operator, what kind of behavior can he expect from the two users? Will any two users behave
    the same when presented with this scenario? Will the behavior change if the network
    operator
    allows
    the Leyton-Brown
    users to communicate
    with each other
    a decision?
    Game
    Theory Course:
    Jackson,
    & Shoham
    Mixedbefore
    Strategiesmaking
    and Nash Equilibrium

    You might also like

    pFad - Phonifier reborn

    Pfad - The Proxy pFad of © 2024 Garber Painting. All rights reserved.

    Note: This service is not intended for secure transactions such as banking, social media, email, or purchasing. Use at your own risk. We assume no liability whatsoever for broken pages.


    Alternative Proxies:

    Alternative Proxy

    pFad Proxy

    pFad v3 Proxy

    pFad v4 Proxy