Esso Standard v CA Digest

G.R. No. L-29971

Facts of the Case:
The petitioner Esso Standard is a foreign corporation duly licensed to
do business in the Philippines. it is engaged in the sale of petroleum
products which are identified by the trademark 'Esso'. Esso is a
successor of Standard Vacuum Oil Co, it registered as a business
name with the Bureau of Commerce in 1962. United Cigarette is a
domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of
cigarettes. it acquired the business from La Oriental Tobacco Corp
including patent rights, once of which is the use of 'Esso' on its
cigarettes.
The petitioner filed a trademark infringement case alleging that it
acquired goodwill to such an extent that the buying public would be
deceived as to the quality and origin of the said products to the
detriment and disadvantage of its own products. The lower court
found United Cigarette guilty of infringement. Upon appeal, the Court
of Appeals ruled that there was no infringement in this case.
Issue: Is there infringement committed?
Ruling: NONE. Infringement is defined by law as the use without the
consent of the trademark owner of any reproduction, counterfeit,
copy or colorable imitation of any registered mark or tradename
which would likely cause confusion or mistake or deceive purchasers
or others as to the source or origin of such goods.
The products of both parties (Petroleum and cigarettes) are noncompeting. But as to whether trademark infringement exists depend
on whether or not the goods are so related that the public may be or
is actually deceived and misled that they come from the same maker.
Under the Related Goods Theory, goods are related when they belong
to the same class or have the same descriptive properties or when
they have same physical attributes. In these case, the goods are
absolutely different and are so foreign from each other it would be

unlikely for purchasers to think that they came from the same
source. Moreover, the goods flow from different channels of trade and
are evidently different in kind and nature.

Is the use of trademark, CANON, by the private respondent

affects the business of Canon Kabushiki Kaisha who has an existing
CANON KABUSHIKI KAISHA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

ownership of a trademark also known as CANON?

G.R. No. 120900, July 20, 2000

HELD:
FACTS:
The Supreme Court says that ordinarily, the ownership of a
On January 15, 1985, private respondent NSR Rubber

trademark or tradename is a property right that the owner is entitled

Corporation filed an application for registration of the mark CANON

to protect as mandated by the Trademark Law. However, when a

for sandals in the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks, and Technology

trademark is used by a party for a product in which the other party

Transfer (BPTTT). Canon Kabushiki Kaisha filed a Verified Notice of

does not deal, the use of the same trademark on the latter's product

Opposition alleging that it will be damaged by the registration of the

cannot be validly objected to.

trademark CANON in the name of private respondent since they were

using the same trademark for their footwear line of products. The

The BPTTT correctly ruled that since the certificate of

private respondent will also use the name Canon for its footwear

registration of petitioner for the trademark CANON covers class 2

products.

(paints, chemical products, toner, dyestuff), private respondent can

use the trademark CANON for its goods classified as class 25

Based on the records, the evidence presented by petitioner

(sandals). Clearly, there is a world of difference between the paints,

consisted of its certificates of registration for the mark CANON in

chemical products, toner, and dyestuff of petitioner and the sandals of

various countries covering goods belonging to class 2, paints,

private respondent

chemical products, toner, and dye stuff. Petitioner also submitted in

evidence its Philippine Trademark Registration No. 39398, showing its
ownership over the trademark CANON.
The BPTTT, on November 10, 1992, issued its decision
dismissing the opposition of petitioner and giving due course to NSR's
application for the registration of the trademark CANON. Canon
Kabushiki Kaisha filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals that
eventually affirmed the decision of the BPTTT.
ISSUE:

Faberge v IAC Digest

G.R. No. 71189, November 4, 1992

Facts of the Case:
Co Beng Kay applied for the registration of the trademark 'BRUTE' to
be used it its underwear (briefs) products. The petitioner opposed on
the ground that there is similarity with their own symbol (BRUT,
Brut33 & Device) used on its aftershave, deodorant, cream shave,
hairspray and hair shampoo/soaps and that it would cause injury to
their business reputation. It must be noted that the petitioner never
applied for registration of said trademark for its brief products. The
Patent Office allowed Co Beng Kay the registration and this was
further affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Is there confusing similarity between the challenged
marks and that its use would likely cause confusion on the
part of the purchasers?
HELD: NONE. Co Beng Kay may rightly appropriate the mark. In this
case Sec. 20 (Philippine Intellectual Property Law) is controlling. The
certificate of registration issued confers the exclusive right to use
its own symbol only to those goods specified by the first user in the
certificate, subject to any conditions or limitations stated therein.
Moreover, the two products are so dissimilar that a purchaser of
one (a brief) would not be misled or mistaken into buying the other
(such as an aftershave).

Thus,

this

case,

petition

for

certiorari.

Issue:
Are the goods or articles or which the two trademarks are used
similar or belong to the same class of merchandise?
CASE DIGEST: Ana Ang vs. Toribio Teodoro
G.R. No. L-48226

December 14, 1942

Facts:
Respondent Toribio Teodoro has continuously used "Ang Tibay," both
as a trade-mark and as a trade-name, in the manufacture and sale of
slippers, shoes, and indoor baseballs since 1910. On September 29,
1915, he formally registered it as trade-mark and as trade-name on
January
3,
1933.
Petitioner Ana Ang registered the same trade-mark "Ang Tibay" for
pants and shirts on April 11, 1932, and established a factory for the
manufacture
of
said
articles
in
the
year
1937.
The Court of First Instance of Manila absolved the defendant (Ms.
Ang) on the grounds that the two trademarks are dissimilar and are
used on different and non-competing goods; that there had been no
exclusive use of the trade-mark by the plaintiff; and that there had
been no fraud in the use of the said trade-mark by the defendant
because the goods on which it is used are essentially different from
those
of
the
plaintiff.
The Court of Appeals reversed said judgment, directing the Director
of Commerce to cancel the registration of the trade-mark "Ang Tibay"
in favor of petitioner, and perpetually enjoining the latter from using
said trade-mark on goods manufactured and sold by her.

Ruling:
Yes, pants and shirts are goods closely similar to shoes and slippers.
They belong to the same class of merchandise as shoes and slippers.
They are closely related goods.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals
and added that although two non-competing articles may be
classified under to different classes by the Patent Office because they
are deemed not to possess the same descriptive properties, they
would, nevertheless, be held by the courts to belong to the same
class if the simultaneous use on them of identical or closely similar
trademarks would be likely to cause confusion as to the origin, or
personal source, of the second users goods. They would be
considered as not falling under the same class only if they are so
dissimilar or so foreign to each other as to make it unlikely that the
purchaser would think that the first user made the second users
goods.

Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court said it does not constitute an infringement as
the words PALE PILSEN, which are part of ABIs trademark, are
generic words descriptive of the color (pale), of a type of beer
(pilsen), which is a light bohemian beer with a strong hops flavor
that originated in the City of Pilsen, Czechislovakia and became
famous

in

the

Middle

Ages.

ASIA BREWERY, INC. vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION

The Supreme Court further said that the words "pale pilsen" may not

G.R. 103543 July 5, 1993

be appropriated by SMC for its exclusive use even if they are part of
its registered trademark. No one may appropriate generic or

Facts:

descriptive

words.

They

belong

to

the

public

domain.

San Miguel Corporation (SMC) filed a complaint against Asia Brewery

Petitioner ABI has neither infringed SMC's trademark nor committed

Inc. (ABI) for infringement of trademark and unfair competition on

unfair competition with the latter's SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN

account of the latter's BEER PALE PILSEN or BEER NA BEER product

product.

which has been competing with SMC's SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN for
a

share

of

the

local

beer

market.

The trial court dismissed SMC's complaint because ABI "has not
committed trademark infringement or unfair competition against"
SMC

TEST OF DOMINANCY
If the competing trademark contains the main or essential or
dominant features of another, and confusion and deception is likely to
result, infringement takes place.
DOMINANT FEATURES:

On appeal by SMC, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision

SMC- SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN

rendered by the trial court, finding the defendant Asia Brewery

ABI- BEER

Incorporated GUILTY
competition.

ABI

of infringement of trademark and unfair

then

filed

petition

for

certiorari.

Issue:
Are the words PALE PILSEN as part of ABIs trademark constitute
infringement

of

SMCs

trademark?

Word BEER does not even appear in the dominant feature of SMC

ISSUE: Whether or not there is unfair competition and infringement

in the case at bar.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court recognizes that there really are
distinctions between the designs of the logos or trademarks of Del
Monte and Sunshine Sauce. However, it has been held that side by
side comparison is not the final test of similarity. Sunshine
Sauces logo is a colorable imitation of Del Montes trademark. The
word catsup in both bottles is printed in white and the style of the
DEL MONTE V CA

print/letter is the same. Although the logo of Sunshine is not a

Del Monte Corporation is an American corporation which is not

engaged in business in the Philippines. Though not engaging business
here, it has given authority to Philippine Packing Corporation
(Philpack) the right to manufacture, distribute and sell in the
Philippines various agricultural products, including catsup, under the
Del Monte trademark and logo. In 1965, Del Monte also authorized
Philpack to register with the Patent Office the Del Monte catsup bottle
configuration.

Philpack

was

issued

certificate

of

trademark

registration under the Supplemental Register.

Later, Del

Monte

and

Philpack

learned

person who infringes a trade mark does not normally copy out but
only makes colorable changes, employing enough points of similarity
to confuse the public with enough points of differences to confuse the
courts. What is undeniable is the fact that when a manufacturer
prepares to package his product, he has before him a boundless
choice of words, phrases, colors and symbols sufficient to distinguish
his product from the others. When as in this case, Sunshine chose,
without a reasonable explanation, to use the same colors and letters
as those used by Del Monte though the field of its selection was so

that

Sunshine

Sauce

Manufacturing was using Del Monte bottles in selling its products and
that Sunshine Sauces logo is similar to that of Del Monte. The RTC of
Makati as well as the Court of Appeals ruled that there was no
infringement because the trademarks used between the two are
different in designs and that the use of Del Monte bottles by Sunshine
Sauce does not constitute unfair competition because as ruled
in Shell Company vs Insular Petroleum: selling oil in containers of
another with markings erased, without intent to deceive, was not
unfair competition.

tomato, the figure nevertheless approximates that of a tomato. The

broad, the inevitable conclusion is that it was done deliberately to

deceive.
The Supreme Court also ruled that Del Monte does not have
the exclusive right to use Del Monte bottles in the Philippines
because Philpacks patent was only registered under the
Supplemental Register and not with the Principal Register.
Under the law, registration under the Supplemental Register is not a
basis for a case of infringement because unlike registration under the
Principal Register, it does not grant exclusive use of the patent.
However, the bottles of Del Monte do say in embossed letters: Del
Monte Corporation, Not to be Refilled. And yet Sunshine Sauce

refilled these bottles with its catsup products. This clearly shows the

On 19 July 1988, the Director of Patents rendered a decision granting

Sunshine Sauces bad faith and its intention to capitalize on the Del

private respondent's petition for cancellation and opposition to

Montes reputation and goodwill and pass off its own product as that

registration. The Director of Patents, using the test of dominancy,

of Del Monte.

declared that petitioner's trademark was confusingly similar to private

respondent's mark because "it is the word 'Lee' which draws the
attention of the buyer and leads him to conclude that the goods
originated from the same manufacturer. It is undeniably the dominant
feature of the mark.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a trademark causes confusion and is likely to
deceive the public is a question of fact which is to be resolved by
applying the "test of dominancy", meaning, if the competing
trademark contains the main or essential or dominant features of

EMERALD

GARMENT

MANUFACTURING

CORPORATION vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BUREAU OF

another by reason of which confusion and deception are likely to

result.

PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER and

H.D. LEE COMPANY, INC.
G.R. No. 100098, December 29, 1995
FACTS:
On 18 September 1981, private respondent H.D. Lee Co.,
Inc. filed with the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks & Technology
Transfer (BPTTT) a Petition for Cancellation of Registration No. SR
5054 for the trademark "STYLISTIC MR. LEE" used on skirts, jeans,
blouses, socks, briefs, jackets, jogging suits, dresses, shorts, shirts
and lingerie under Class 25, issued on 27 October 1980 in the name
of petitioner Emerald Garment Manufacturing Corporation.
Private respondent averred that petitioner's trademark "so
closely resembled its own trademark, 'LEE' as previously registered
and used in thePhilippines cause confusion, mistake and deception on
the part of the purchasing public as to the origin of the goods.

HELD:NO

HELD: No. From a cursory appreciation of the Converse Rubbers

corporate name CONVERSE RUBBER CORPORATION it is evident
that the word CONVERSE is the dominant word which
identifies Converse Rubber from other corporations engaged
in similar business. Universal Rubber, in the stipulation of facts,
admitted Converse Rubbers existence since 1946 as a duly
organized foreign corporation engaged in the manufacture of
rubber shoes. This admission necessarily betrays its knowledge of
the reputation and business of petitioner even before it applied for
registration of the trademark in question. Knowing, therefore, that
the word CONVERSE belongs to and is being used by Converse
Rubber, and is in fact the dominant word in its corporate name,
Universal Rubber has no right to appropriate the same for use on its
products which are similar to those being produced by Converse
Rubber.
CONVERSE RUBBER VS UNIVERSAL RUBBER PRODUCTS
Converse Rubber Corporation is an American corporation while
Universal Rubber Products, Inc. is a corporation licensed to do
business in the country. Converse has been operating since 1946.
Universal Rubber has been operating since 1963. Later, Universal
Rubber filed an application for the trademark Universal Converse and
Device before the Philippine Patent Office. Converse Rubber opposed
as it averred that the word Converse which is part of its corporate
name cannot be granted as part of Universal Rubbers trademark or
trade name because it will likely deceive purchasers of Universal
Rubbers products as it may be mistaken by unwary customers to be
manufactured by Converse Rubber. The Director of Patents did not
grant the opposition by Converse Rubber.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Director of Patents is
correct.

Respondent, In-n-out Burger, Inc., alleged that it is the owner of the

tradename IN-N-OUT and trademarks IN-N-OUT, IN-N-OUT
Burger & Arrow Design and IN-N-OUT Burger Logo which are used
in its business since 1948 up to the present. These tradename and
trademarks were registered in the United States as well as in other
parts of the world. Petitioner Sehwani allegedly had obtained a
trademark registration for the mark IN N OUT (with the inside letter
O formed like a star) without its authority.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the Respondent has the legal capacity to sue
for the protection of its trademarks albeit it is not doing business in
the Philippines
Whether or not a ground exists for the cancellation of the
Petitioners registration

Ruling:
Yes. Section 160 RA No. 8293 provides for the right of foreign
corporations to sue in trademark or service mark enforcement action,
provided that it meets the requirements under Section 3 thereof,
which are:

Case Digest: Sehwani, Incorporated and/or Benitas Fries, Inc. vs. Ina.
Any convention, treaty or agreement relation to intellectual
n-out Burger, Inc.
property
right or the repression of unfair competition wherein
Petitioners Claims:
Philippines is also a party; and
b.
An extension therein of reciprocal rights.
Petitioners alleged that the Respondent lack the legal capacity to sue
because it was not doing business in the Philippines and that it has no Moreoever, Article 6bis of The Paris Convention, which governs the
cause of action because its mark is not registered or used in the protection of well-known trademarks, is a self-executing provision
Philippines. Sehwani, Inc. also claimed that as the registered owner and does not require legislative enactment to give it effect in the
of the IN N OUT mark, it enjoys the presumption that the same was member country. The essential requirement therein is that the
trademark must be well-known in the country where protection is
validly acquired and that it has the exclusive right to use the mark.
Moreover, petitioners argued that other than the bare allegation of sought. In this case, Director Beltran-Abelardo found that In-n-out
fraud in the registration of the mark, respondent failed to show the Burger and Arrow Design is an internationally well0known mark as
existence of any grounds of cancellation thereof under Section 151 of evidenced by its trademark registrations around the world and its
the IP Code of the Philippines. It also alleged that the action is comprehensive advertisements therein.
Yes. Section 151(b) of RA 8293 provides that a petition to
barred by laches.
cancel a registration of a mark may be filed with the Bureau of Legal
Affairs by any person who believes that he is or will be damaged by
Respondents Claims:
the registration of a mark at any time, if the registered mark
becomes the generic name for the goods or services, or a portion

thereof, for which it is registered, or has been abandoned, or its

registration was fraudulently or contrary to the provisions of this Act,
or if the registered mark is being used by or with the permission of,
the registrant so as to misrepresent the source of goods or services
on or in connection with which the mark is used. The evidence
showed that not only did the petitioners use the IN-N-OUT Burger
trademark for the name of their restaurant, but they also used
identical or confusingly similar mark for their hamburger wrappers
and French-fries receptacles, thereby effectively misrepresenting the
source of the goods and services.

KTV,
Disco
&
Party
Club.

246 answered special affirmative defences: no confusion would

arise from the use by petitioner of the mark Rolex considering that
its entertainment business is totally unrelated to the items catered by
respondents such as watches, clocks, bracelets and parts thereof

RTC: quashed the subpoena ad testificandum and denied

petitioners motion for preliminary hearing on affirmative defenses
with
motion
to
dismiss

CA:
affirmed
ISSUE:

246
G.R.

Corporation
No.

157216

v.
November

Daway
20,

2003

Lessons Applicable: Jurisdiction of Trial court, special affirmative

defences
on
infringement
Laws

Applicable:

FACTS:

Montres Rolex S.A. and Rolex Centre Phil., Limited,

owners/proprietors of Rolex and Crown Device, filed against 246
Corporation the instant suit for trademark infringement and damages
with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order or writ of
preliminary
injunctionbefore
the
RTC
of
QC
o July 1996: 246 adopted and , since then, has been using without
authority the mark Rolex in its business name Rolex Music Lounge
as well as in its newspaper advertisements as Rolex Music Lounge,

W/N

RTC

performed

grave

abuse

of

discretion

HELD:
NO.
petition
denied.
RTC
affirmed
The issue of whether or not a trademark infringement exists, is a
question of fact that could best be determined by the trial court.

Section 123.1(f) of the Intellectual Property Code (Republic Act

No.
8293)
o (f)
Is identical with, or confusingly similar to, or constitutes a
translation of a mark considered well-known in accordance with the
preceding paragraph, which is registered in the Philippines with
respect to goods or services which are not similar to those with
respect to which registration is applied for: Provided, That use of the
mark in relation to those goods or services would indicate a
connection between those goods or services, and the owner of the
registered mark: Provided, further, That the interest of the owner of
the registered mark are likely to be damaged by such use

Section 123.1(f) is clearly in point because the Music Lounge of

petitioner is entirely unrelated to respondents business involving
watches, clocks, bracelets, etc. However, the Court cannot yet
resolve the merits of the present controversy considering that the
requisites for the application of Section 123.1(f), which constitute the
kernel issue at bar, clearly require determination facts of which need
to be resolved at the trial court. The existence or absence of these
requisites should be addressed in a full blown hearing and not on a
mere preliminary hearing. The respondent must be given ample
opportunity to prove its claim, and the petitioner to debunk the same.

granted. The search warrants were recalled, and the goods ordered to
be returned. La Chemise Lacoste filed a petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether the proceedings before the patent office is a
prejudicial question that need to be resolved before the criminal
action for unfair competition may be pursued.

La Chemise Lacoste vs. Fernandez GR 63796-97, 21 May 1984;

First Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J)
Facts: La chemise Lacoste is a French corporation and the actual
owner of the trademarks Lacoste, Chemise Lacoste, Crocodile
Device and a composite mark consisting of the word Lacoste and a
representation of a crocodile/alligator, used on clothings and other
goods sold in many parts of the world and which has been marketed
in the Philippines (notably by Rustans) since 1964. In 1975 and 1977,
Hemandas Q. Co. was issued certificate of registration for the
trademark Chemise Lacoste and Q Crocodile Device both in the
supplemental and Principal Registry. In 1980, La Chemise Lacoste SA
filed for the registration of the Crocodile device and Lacoste.
Games and Garments (Gobindram Hemandas, assignee of Hemandas
Q.Co.) opposed the registration of Lacoste. In 1983, La Chemise
Lacoste filed with the NBI a letter-complaint alleging acts of unfair
competition committed by Hemandas and requesting the agencys
assistance. A search warrant was issued by the trial court. Various
goods and articles were seized upon the execution of the warrants.
Hemandas filed motion to quash the warrants, which the court

Held: No. The proceedings pending before the Patent Office do not
partake of the nature of a prejudicial question which must first be
definitely resolved. The case which suspends the criminal action must
be a civil case, not a mere administrative case, which is
determinative of the innocence or guilt of the accused. The issue
whether a trademark used is different from anothers trademark is a
matter of defense and will be better resolved in the criminal
proceedings before a court of justice instead of raising it as a
preliminary matter in an administrative proceeding. Inasmuch as the
goodwill and reputation of La Chemise Lacoste products date back
even before 1964, Hemandas cannot be allowed to continue the
trademark Lacoste for the reason that he was the first registrant in
the Supplemental Register of a trademark used in international
commerce. Registration in the Supplemental Register cannot be given
a posture as if the registration is in the Principal Register. It must be
noted that one may be declared an unfair competitor even if his
competing trademark is registered. La Chemise Lacoste is world
renowned mark, and by virtue of the 20 November 1980
Memorandum of the Minister of Trade to the director of patents in
compliance with the Paris Convention for the protection of industrial
property, effectively cancels the registration of contrary claimants to
the enumerated marks, which include Lacoste.

4. In an appeal, the decision was reversed by the SEC En Banc. They

held that the word Lyceum to have become identified with petitioner
as to render use thereof of other institutions as productive of
consfusion about the identity of the schools concerned in the mind of
the general public.
5. Petitioner went to appeal with the CA but the latter just affirmed
the decision of the SEC En Banc.
HELD:

LYCEUM OF THE PHILS. V. CA

219 SCRA 610
FACTS:
1. Petitioner had sometime commenced before in the SEC a complaint
against Lyceum of Baguio, to require it to change its corporate name
and to adopt another name not similar or identical with that of
petitioner. SEC decided in favor of petitioner. Lyceum of Baguio filed
petition
for
certiorari
but
was
denied
for
lack of merit.
2. Armed with the resolution of the Court, petitioner instituted before
the SEC to compel private respondents, which are also educational
institutions, to delete word Lyceum from their corporate names and
permanently to enjoin them from using such as part of their
respective names.
3. Hearing officer sustained the claim of petitioner and held that the
word Lyceum was capable of appropriation and that petitioner had
acquired an enforceable right to the use of that word.

Under the corporation code, no corporate name may be allowed by

the SEC if the proposed name is identical or deceptively or
confusingly similar to that of any existing corporation or to any other
name already protected by law or is patently deceptive, confusing or
contrary to existing laws. The policy behind this provision is to avoid
fraud upon the public, which would have the occasion to deal with the
entity concerned, the evasion of legal obligations and duties, and the
reduction of difficulties of administration and supervision over
corporations.
The corporate names of private respondents are not identical or
deceptively or confusingly similar to that of petitioners. Confusion
and deception has been precluded by the appending of geographic
names to the word Lyceum. Furthermore, the word Lyceum has
become associated in time with schools and other institutions
providing public lectures, concerts, and public discussions. Thus, it
generally refers to a school or an institution of learning.
Petitioner claims that the word has acquired a secondary meaning in
relation to petitioner with the result that the word, although originally
generic, has become appropriable by petitioner to the exclusion of
other institutions.
The doctrine of secondary meaning is a principle used in trademark
law but has been extended to corporate names since the right to use

a corporate name to the exclusion of others is based upon the same

principle, which underlies the right to use a particular trademark or
tradename. Under this doctrine, a word or phrase originally incapable
of exclusive appropriation with reference to an article in the market,
because geographical or otherwise descriptive might nevertheless
have been used for so long and so exclusively by one producer with
reference to this article that, in that trade and to that group of
purchasing public, the word or phrase has come to mean that the
article was his produce. The doctrine cannot be made to apply where
the evidence didn't prove that the business has continued for so long
a time that it has become of consequence and acquired good will of
considerable value such that its articles and produce have acquired a

well known reputation, and confusion will result by the use of the
disputed name.
Petitioner didn't present evidence, which provided that the word
Lyceum acquired secondary meaning. The petitioner failed to
adduce evidence that it had exclusive use of the word. Even if
petitioner used the word for a long period of time, it hadnt acquired
any secondary meaning in its favor because the appellant failed to
prove that it had been using the same word all by itself to the
exclusion of others.