SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 111904. October 5, 2000.]

SPS.

AGRIPINO

GESTOPA

GESTOPA, petitioners, vs.

and

COURT

ISABEL
OF

SILARIO

APPEALS and

MERCEDES DANLAG y PILAPIL, respondents.

Batiquin & Batiquin Law Office for petitioners.
Danilo L. Pilapil for private respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Sometime in 1965 and 1966, three (3) deeds of donation mortis causa over
several parcels of unregistered land were executed in favor of Mercedes Danlag y
Pilapil by spouses Diego and Catalina Danlag. In January 1973, Diego, with the
consent of Catalina, executed a deed of donation inter vivos over said parcels of
land again in favor of respondent Mercedes. This contained the condition that the
spouses Danlag shall continue to enjoy the fruits of the land during their lifetime.
Likewise, it imposed a limitation on Mercedes' right to sell the land during the
lifetime of the spouses without their consent and approval. However, years later,
spouses Danlag sold several parcels of the land so donated to spouses Gestopa.
Thus, Mercedes filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition for quieting of title,
the main issue being the nature of the donation executed in favor of Mercedes.
The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants. The Court of Appeals reversed
this judgment. Hence, this petition for review.
The granting clause in the Deed of Donation showed that Diego donated the
properties out of love and affection for the spouse. This is a mark of a
donation inter vivos. The reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates that the donor
intended to transfer the naked ownership over the properties. The donor reserved

sufficient properties for his maintenance indicating that the donor intended to part
with the parcels of land donated. Lastly, the donee accepted the donation.
Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter vivos.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP; DONATIONS; TO
DETERMINE WHETHER DONATION IS INTER VIVOS ORMORTIS CAUSA,
INTENT OF DONOR MUST BE ASCERTAINED. Crucial in resolving whether
the donation was inter vivos ormortis causa is the determination of whether the
donor intended to transfer the ownership over the properties upon the execution
of the deed. In ascertaining the intention of the donor, all of the deed's provisions
must be read together.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. The granting clause shows that Diego
donated the properties out of love and affection for the donee. This is a mark of a
donation inter vivos. Second, the reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates that the
donor intended to transfer the naked ownership over the properties. As correctly
posed by the Court of Appeals, what was the need for such reservation if the
donor and his spouse remained the owners of the properties? Third, the donor
reserved sufficient properties for his maintenance in accordance with his standing
in society, indicating that the donor intended to part with the six parcels of land.
Lastly, the donee accepted the donation.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; A DEED OF REVOCATION, THE VALIDITY OF WHICH IS
BEING ASSAILED, CANNOT BE USED TO SHOW DONOR'S INTENT. As
correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the Danlag spouses were aware of
the difference between the two donations. If they did not intend to donate inter
vivos, they would not again donate the four lots already donated mortis causa.
Petitioner's counter argument that this proposition was erroneous because six
years after, the spouses changed their intention with the deed of revocation, is
not only disingenuous but also fallacious. Petitioners cannot use the deed of

revocation to show the spouses' intent because its validity is one of the issues in
this case.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACCEPTANCE CLAUSE IS A MARK OF A DONATION INTER
VIVOS. In the case of Alejandro vs. Geraldez, 78 SCRA 245 (1977), we said
that an acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos. Acceptance
is a requirement for donations inter vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in the
form of a will, are not required to be accepted by the donees during the donors'
lifetime.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; LIMITATION ON THE RIGHT TO SELL, AN IMPLICATION THAT
OWNERSHIP HAD PASSED TO THE DONEE. A limitation on the right to sell
during the donors' lifetime implied that ownership had passed to the donees and
donation was already effective during the donors' lifetime.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; REVOCATION; GENERALLY, A VALID DONATION, ONCE
ACCEPTED IS IRREVOCABLE; EXCEPTIONS. A valid donation, once
accepted, becomes irrevocable, except on account of officiousness, failure by the
donee to comply with the charges imposed in the donation, or ingratitude. The
donor-spouses did not invoke any of these reasons in the deed of revocation.
7. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE, PRESUMPTIONS; REGULARITY IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTIES, PRESUMED UNLESS PROVEN
OTHERWISE. Petitioners aver that Mercedes' tax declarations in her name
can not be a basis in determining the donor's intent. They claim that it is easy to
get tax declarations from the government offices such that tax declarations are
not considered proofs of ownership. However, unless proven otherwise, there is a
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.

ACaEcH

8. ID.; ID.; FINDINGS OF FACT BY APPELLATE COURT GENERALLY UPHELD

IN A PETITION FOR REVIEW. As a rule, a finding of fact by the appellate
court, especially when it is supported by evidence on record, is binding on us.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J :
p

This petition for review, 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assails the
decision 2 of the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 1993, in CA-G.R. CV No.
38266, which reversed the judgment 3 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 5.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Spouses Diego and Catalina Danlag were the owners of six parcels of
unregistered lands. They executed three deeds of donation mortis causa, two of
which are dated March 4, 1965 and another dated October 13, 1966, in favor of
private respondent Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil. 4 The first deed pertained to parcels
1 & 2 with Tax Declaration Nos. 11345 and 11347, respectively. The second deed
pertained to parcel 3, with TD No. 018613. The last deed pertained to parcel 4
with TD No. 016821. All deeds contained the reservation of the rights of the
donors (1) to amend, cancel or revoke the donation during their lifetime, and (2)
to sell, mortgage, or encumber the properties donated during the donors' lifetime,
if deemed necessary.
On January 16, 1973, Diego Danlag, with the consent of his wife, Catalina
Danlag, executed a deed of donation inter vivos 5covering the aforementioned
parcels of land plus two other parcels with TD Nos. 11351 and 11343,
respectively, again in favor of private respondent Mercedes. This contained two
conditions, that (1) the Danlag spouses shall continue to enjoy the fruits of the
land during their lifetime, and that (2) the donee can not sell or dispose of the
land during the lifetime of the said spouses, without their prior consent and
approval. Mercedes caused the transfer of the parcels' tax declaration to her
name and paid the taxes on them.
On June 28, 1979 and August 21, 1979, Diego and Catalina Danlag sold parcels
3 and 4 to herein petitioners, Mr. and Mrs. Agripino Gestopa. On September 29,
1979, the Danlags executed a deed of revocation 6 recovering the six parcels of
land subject of the aforecited deed of donation inter vivos.

On March 1, 1983, Mercedes Pilapil (herein private respondent) filed with the
RTC a petition against the Gestopas and the Danlags, for quieting of title 7 over
the above parcels of land. She alleged that she was an illegitimate daughter of
Diego Danlag; that she lived and rendered incalculable beneficial services to
Diego and his mother, Maura Danlag, when the latter was still alive. In recognition
of the services she rendered, Diego executed a Deed of Donation on March 20,
1973, conveying to her the six (6) parcels of land. She accepted the donation in
the same instrument, openly and publicly exercised rights of ownership over the
donated properties, and caused the transfer of the tax declarations to her name.
Through machination, intimidation and undue influence, Diego persuaded the
husband of Mercedes, Eulalio Pilapil, to buy two of the six parcels covered by the
deed of donation. Said donation inter vivos was coupled with conditions and,
according to Mercedes, since its perfection, she had complied with all of them;
that she had not been guilty of any act of ingratitude; and that respondent Diego
had no legal basis in revoking the subject donation and then in selling the two
parcels of land to the Gestopas.

aTIEcA

In their opposition, the Gestopas and the Danlags averred that the deed of
donation dated January 16, 1973 was null and void because it was obtained by
Mercedes through machinations and undue influence. Even assuming it was
validly executed, the intention was for the donation to take effect upon the death
of the donor. Further, the donation was void for it left the donor, Diego Danlag,
without any property at all.
On December 27, 1991, the trial court rendered its decision, thus:
"WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the Court hereby renders
judgment in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff:
1. Declaring the Donations Mortis Causa and Inter Vivos as revoked,
and, therefore, has (sic) no legal effect and force of law.
2. Declaring Diego Danlag the absolute and exclusive owner of the six
(6) parcels of land mentioned in the Deed of revocation (Exh. Pplaintiff, Exh. 6-defendant Diego Danlag).

3. Declaring the Deeds of Sale executed by Diego Danlag in favor of

spouses Agripino Gestopa and Isabel Gestopa dated June 28,
1979 (Exh. S-plaintiff; Exh. 18-defendant); Deed of Sale dated
December 18, 1979 (Exh. T-plaintiff; Exh. 9-defendant); Deed of
Sale dated September 14, 1979 (Exh. 8); Deed of Sale dated
June 30, 1975 (Exh. U); Deed of Sale dated March 13, 1978 (Exh
X) as valid and enforceable duly executed in accordance with the
formalities required by law.

4. Ordering all tax declaration issued in the name of Mercedes

Danlag y Pilapil covering the parcel of land donated cancelled and
further restoring all the tax declarations previously cancelled,
except parcels nos. 1 and 5 described, in the Deed of
Donation Inter Vivos (Exh. "1") and Deed of Sale (Exh. "2")
executed by defendant in favor of plaintiff and her husband.
5. With respect to the contract of sale of abovestated parcels of land,
vendor Diego Danlag and spouse or their estate have the
alternative remedies of demanding the balance of the agreed
price with legal interest, or rescission of the contract of sale.
SO ORDERED." 8

In rendering the above decision, the trial court found that the reservation clause
in all the deeds of donation indicated that Diego Danlag did not make any
donation; that the purchase by Mercedes of the two parcels of land covered by
the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos bolstered this conclusion; that Mercedes failed
to rebut the allegations of ingratitude she committed against Diego Danlag; and
that Mercedes committed fraud and machination in preparing all the deeds of
donation without explaining to Diego Danlag their contents.
Mercedes appealed to the Court of Appeals and argued that the trial court erred
in (1) declaring the donation dated January 16, 1973 as mortis causa and that
the same was already revoked on the ground of ingratitude; (2) finding that

Mercedes purchased from Diego Danlag the two parcels of land already covered
by the above donation and that she was only able to pay three thousand pesos,
out of the total amount of twenty thousand pesos; (3) failing to declare that
Mercedes was an acknowledged natural child of Diego Danlag.
On August 31, 1993, the appellate court reversed the trial court. It ruled:
"PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is REVERSED
and a new judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring the deed of donation inter vivos dated January 16, 1973 as
not having been revoked and consequently the same remains in full
force and effect;
2. Declaring the Revocation of Donation dated June 4, 1979 to be null
and void and therefore of no force and effect;
3. Declaring Mercedes Danlag Pilapil as the absolute and exclusive
owner of the six (6) parcels of land specified in the above-cited deed of
donation inter vivos;
4. Declaring the Deed of Sale executed by Diego Danlag in favor of
spouses Agripino and Isabel Gestopa dated June 28, 1979 (Exhibits S
and 18), Deed of Sale dated December 18, 1979 (Exhibits T and 19),
Deed of Sale dated September 14, 1979 (Exhibit 8), Deed of Sale dated
June 30, 1975 (Exhibit U), Deed of Sale dated March 13, 1978 (Exhibit
X) as well as the Deed of Sale in favor of Eulalio Danlag dated
December 27, 1978 (Exhibit 2) not to have been validly executed;
5. Declaring the above-mentioned deeds of sale to be null and void and
therefore of no force and effect;
6. Ordering spouses Agripino Gestopa and Isabel Silario Gestopa to
reconvey within thirty (30) days from the finality of the instant judgment to
Mercedes Danlag Pilapil the parcels of land above-specified, regarding
which titles have been subsequently fraudulently secured, namely those
covered by O.C.T. T-17836 and O.C.T. No. 17523.

7. Failing to do so, ordering the Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional

Trial Court (Branch V) at Cebu City to effect such reconveyance of the
parcels of land covered by O.C.T. T-17836 and 17523.
SO ORDERED." 9

The Court of Appeals held that the reservation by the donor of lifetime usufruct
indicated that he transferred to Mercedes the ownership over the donated
properties; that the right to sell belonged to the donee, and the donor's right
referred to that of merely giving consent; that the donor changed his intention by
donating inter vivos properties already donated mortis causa; that the transfer to
Mercedes' name of the tax declarations pertaining to the donated properties
implied that the donation was inter vivos; and that Mercedes did not purchase two
of the six parcels of land donated to her.
Hence, this instant petition for review filed by the Gestopa spouses, asserting
that:
"THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, TWELFTH DIVISION, HAS
GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE COURT A
QUO." 10

Before us, petitioners allege that the appellate court overlooked the fact that the
donor did not only reserve the right to enjoy the fruits of the properties, but also
prohibited the donee from selling or disposing the land without the consent and
approval of the Danlag spouses. This implied that the donor still had control and
ownership over the donated properties. Hence, the donation was post mortem.
Crucial in resolving whether the donation was inter vivos or mortis causa is the
determination of whether the donor intended to transfer the ownership over the
properties upon the execution of the deed. 11
In ascertaining the intention of the donor, all of the deed's provisions must be
read together. 12 The deed of donation dated January 16, 1973, in favor of
Mercedes contained the following:

"That for and in consideration of the love and affection which the Donor
inspires in the Donee and as an act of liberality and generosity, the
Donor hereby gives, donates, transfers and conveys by way of donation
unto the herein Donee, her heirs, assigns and successors, the abovedescribed parcels of land;
That it is the condition of this donation that the Donor shall continue to
enjoy all the fruits of the land during his lifetime and that of his spouse
and that the donee cannot sell or otherwise, dispose of the lands without
the prior consent and approval by the Donor and her spouse during their
lifetime.
xxx xxx xxx
That for the same purpose as hereinbefore stated, the Donor further
states that he has reserved for himself sufficient properties in full
ownership or in usufruct enough for his maintenance of a decent
livelihood in consonance with his standing in society.
That the Donee hereby accepts the donation and expresses her thanks
and gratitude for the kindness and generosity of the Donor."

13

Note first that the granting clause shows that Diego donated the properties out
of love and affection for the donee. This is a mark of a donation inter
vivos. 14 Second, the reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates that the donor
intended to transfer the naked ownership over the properties. As correctly
posed by the Court of Appeals, what was the need for such reservation if the
donor and his spouse remained the owners of the properties? Third, the donor
reserved sufficient properties for his maintenance in accordance with his
standing in society, indicating that the donor intended to part with the six
parcels of land. 15 Lastly, the donee accepted the donation. In the case
of Alejandro vs. Geraldez, 78 SCRA 245 (1977), we said that an acceptance
clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos. Acceptance is a requirement
for donations inter vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will,
are not required to be accepted by the donees during the donors' lifetime.

acHCSD

Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the right to
dispose of the properties belonged to the donee. The donor's right to give
consent was merely intended to protect his usufructuary interests. In Alejandro,
we ruled that a limitation on the right to sell during the donors' lifetime implied that
ownership had passed to the donees and donation was already effective during
the donors' lifetime.
The attending circumstances in the execution of the subject donation also
demonstrated the real intent of the donor to transfer the ownership over the
subject properties upon its execution.

16

Prior to the execution of donation inter

vivos, the Danlag spouses already executed three donations mortis causa. As
correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the Danlag spouses were aware of
the difference between the two donations. If they did not intend to donate inter
vivos, they would not again donate the four lots already donated mortis causa.
Petitioners' counter argument that this proposition was erroneous because six
years after, the spouses changed their intention with the deed of revocation, is
not only disingenious but also fallacious. Petitioners cannot use the deed of
revocation to show the spouses' intent because its validity is one of the issues in
this case.
Petitioners aver that Mercedes' tax declarations in her name can not be a basis in
determining the donor's intent. They claim that it is easy to get tax declarations
from the government offices such that tax declarations are not considered proofs
of ownership. However, unless proven otherwise, there is a presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties.

17We

find that petitioners did not

overcome this presumption of regularity in the issuance of the tax declarations.

We also note that the Court of Appeals did not refer to the tax declarations as
proofs of ownership but only as evidence of the intent by the donor to transfer
ownership.
Petitioners assert that since private respondent purchased two of the six parcels
of land from the donor, she herself did not believe the donation was inter
vivos. As aptly noted by the Court of Appeals, however, it was private
respondent's husband who purchased the two parcels of land.

As a rule, a finding of fact by the appellate court, especially when it is supported

by evidence on record, is binding on us. 18 On the alleged purchase by her
husband of two parcels, it is reasonable to infer that the purchase was without
private respondent's consent. Purchase by her husband would make the
properties conjugal to her own disadvantage. That the purchase is against her
self-interest, weighs strongly in her favor and gives credence to her claim that her
husband was manipulated and unduly influenced to make the purchase, in the
first place.

Was the revocation valid? A valid donation, once accepted, becomes irrevocable,
except on account of officiousness, failure by the donee to comply with the
charges imposed in the donation, or ingratitude.

19

The donor-spouses did not

invoke any of these reasons in the deed of revocation. The deed merely stated:
WHEREAS, while the said donation was a donation Inter Vivos, our
intention thereof is that of Mortis Causa so as we could be sure that-in
case of our death, the above-described properties will be inherited
and/or succeeded by Mercedes Danlag de Pilapil; and that said intention
is clearly shown in paragraph 3 of said donation to the effect that
the Donee cannot dispose and/or sell the properties donated during our
life-time, and that we are the one enjoying all the fruits thereof."

20

Petitioners cited Mercedes' vehemence in prohibiting the donor to gather coconut

trees and her filing of instant petition for quieting of title. There is nothing on
record, however, showing that private respondent prohibited the donors from
gathering coconuts. Even assuming that Mercedes prevented the donor from
gathering coconuts, this could hardly be considered an act covered by Article 765
of the Civil Code.

21

Nor does this Article cover respondent's filing of the petition

for quieting of title, where she merely asserted what she believed was her right
under the law.

AcHaTE

Finally, the records do not show that the donor-spouses instituted any action to
revoke

the

donation

in

accordance

with

Article

769

of

the

Civil

Code. 22 Consequently, the supposed revocation on September 29, 1979, had no

legal effect.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision
of the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 1993, is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

ASTIED

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

|||

(Spouses Gestopa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111904, October 05, 2000)