Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 190293
March 20, 2012
PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN and ALBERT LEE G.
ANGELES, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, as Commanderin-Chief and President of the Republic of the
Philippines, EDUARDO ERMITA, Executive
Secretary,
ARMED
FORCES
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES (AFP), or any of their units,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), or any of
their units, JOHN DOES and JANE DOES acting
under
their
direction
and
control,
Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 190294
DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN, Petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, NORBERTO GONZALES in
his capacity as Secretary of National Defense,
RONALDO PUNO in his capacity as Secretary
of
Interior
and
Local
Government,
Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 190301
NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLES' LAWYERS
(NUPL) SECRETARY GENERAL NERI JAVIER
COLMENARES, BAYAN MUNA REPRESENTATIVE
SATUR C. OCAMPO, GABRIELA WOMEN'S
PARTY REPRESENTATIVE LIZA L. MAZA, ATTY.
JULIUS GARCIA MATIBAG, ATTY. EPHRAIM B.
CORTEZ, ATTY. JOBERT ILARDE PAHILGA, ATTY.
VOLTAIRE B. AFRICA, BAGONG ALYANSANG
MAKABAYAN (BAYAN) SECRETARY GENERAL
RENATO M. REYES, JR. and ANTHONY IAN
CRUZ, Petitioners,
vs.
PRESIDENT
GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA,
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF
STAFF
GENERAL
VICTOR
S.
IBRADO,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR
GENERAL JESUS A. VERZOSA, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE
SECRETARY
AGNES
VST
DEVANADERA, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES EASTERN MINDANAO COMMAND

CHIEF LIEUTENANT GENERAL RAYMUNDO B.

FERRER, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 190302
JOSEPH NELSON Q. LOYOLA, Petitioner,
vs.
HER
EXCELLENCY
PRESIDENT
GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ARMED FORCES CHIEF
OF
STAFF
GENERAL
VICTOR
IBRADO,
PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL
POLICE
(PNP),
DIRECTOR
GENERAL
JESUS
VERZOSA,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA,
Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 190307
JOVITO R. SALONGA, RAUL C. PANGALANGAN,
H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL R. BUTUYAN,
EMILIO CAPULONG, FLORIN T. HILBAY, ROMEL
R. BAGARES, DEXTER DONNE B. DIZON,
ALLAN JONES F. LARDIZABAL and GILBERT T.
ANDRES, suing as taxpayers and as
CONCERNED Filipino citizens, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in his (sic)
capacity as President of the Republic of the
Philippines, HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, JR., in his
capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON.
ROLANDO ANDAYA in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management, GENERAL VICTOR IBRADO, in
his capacity as Armed Forces of the
Philippines Chief of Staff, DIRECTOR JESUS
VERZOSA, in his capacity as Chief of the
Philippine National Police, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 190356
BAILENG S. MANTAWIL, DENGCO SABAN, Engr.
OCTOBER CHIO, AKBAYAN PARTY LIST
REPRESENTATIVES WALDEN F. BELLO and ANA
THERESIA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, LORETTA
ANN P. ROSALES, MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN,
THEODORE O. TE and IBARRA M. GUTIERREZ
III, Petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY
OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, and THE CHIEF
OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE

PHILIPPINES, THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.
x - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 190380
CHRISTIAN MONSOD and CARLOS P. MEDINA,
JR., Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
These cases concern the constitutionality of a
presidential proclamation of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus
in 2009 in a province in Mindanao which were
withdrawn after just eight days.
The Facts and the Case
The essential background facts are not in
dispute. On November 23, 2009 heavily
armed men, believed led by the ruling
Ampatuan family, gunned down and buried
under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians on a
highway in Maguindanao. In response to this
carnage, on November 24 President Arroyo
issued
Presidential
Proclamation
1946,
declaring
a
state
of
emergency
in
Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato
City to prevent and suppress similar lawless
violence in Central Mindanao.

to submit to that body a report in person or in

writing of her action.
In her report, President Arroyo said that she
acted based on her finding that lawless men
have taken up arms in Maguindanao and risen
against the government. The President
described the scope of the uprising, the
nature, quantity, and quality of the rebels
weaponry, the movement of their heavily
armed units in strategic positions, the closure
of the Maguindanao Provincial Capitol,
Ampatuan Municipal Hall, Datu Unsay
Municipal Hall, and 14 other municipal halls,
and the use of armored vehicles, tanks, and
patrol cars with unauthorized "PNP/Police"
markings.
On December 9, 2009 Congress, in joint
session, convened pursuant to Section 18,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to review
the validity of the Presidents action. But, two
days later or on December 12 before Congress
could act, the President issued Presidential
Proclamation 1963, lifting martial law and
restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in Maguindanao.
Petitioners Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun and the
other petitioners in G.R. 190293, 190294,
190301,190302,
190307,
190356,
and
190380 brought the present actions to
challenge the constitutionality of President
Arroyos
Proclamation
1959
affecting
Maguindanao. But, given the prompt lifting of
that proclamation before Congress could
review it and before any serious question
affecting
the
rights
and
liberties
of
Maguindanaos inhabitants could arise, the
Court deems any review of its constitutionality
the equivalent of beating a dead horse.

Believing that she needed greater authority to

put order in Maguindanao and secure it from
large groups of persons that have taken up
arms against the constituted authorities in the
province, on December 4, 2009 President
Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1959
declaring martial law and suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in that
province except for identified areas of the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front.
Prudence and respect for the co-equal
departments of the government dictate that
Two days later or on December 6, 2009 the Court should be cautious in entertaining
President Arroyo submitted her report to actions that assail the constitutionality of the
Congress in accordance with Section 18, acts of the Executive or the Legislative
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which department. The issue of constitutionality,
required her, within 48 hours from the said the Court in Biraogo v. Philippine Truth
proclamation of martial law or the suspension Commission of 2010,1 must be the very issue
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,

of the case, that the resolution of such issue is privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, he
unavoidable.
shares such power with the Congress. Thus:
1. The Presidents proclamation or suspension
The issue of the constitutionality of is temporary, good for only 60 days;
Proclamation 1959 is not unavoidable for two 2. He must, within 48 hours of the
reasons:
proclamation or suspension, report his action
in person or in writing to Congress;
One.
President
Arroyo
withdrew
her 3. Both houses of Congress, if not in session
proclamation of martial law and suspension of must jointly convene within 24 hours of the
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus proclamation or suspension for the purpose of
before the joint houses of Congress could reviewing its validity; and
fulfill their automatic duty to review and 4. The Congress, voting jointly, may revoke or
validate or invalidate the same. The pertinent affirm the Presidents proclamation or
provisions of Section 18, Article VII of the suspension, allow their limited effectivity to
1987 Constitution state:
lapse, or extend the same if Congress deems
warranted.
Sec. 18. The President shall be the
Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution
the Philippines and whenever it becomes the President and the Congress act in tandem
necessary, he may call out such armed forces in exercising the power to proclaim martial
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, law or suspend the privilege of the writ of
invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since,
he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, after the President has initiated the
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas proclamation or the suspension, only the
corpus or place the Philippines or any part Congress can maintain the same based on its
thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight own evaluation of the situation on the ground,
hours from the proclamation of martial law or a power that the President does not have.
the suspension of the privilege of writ of
Consequently,
although
the
habeas corpus, the President shall submit a Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court
report in person or in writing to the Congress. the power to review the sufficiency of the
The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at factual basis of the proclamation or
least a majority of all its Members in regular suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that
or special session, may revoke such the Court must allow Congress to exercise its
proclamation or suspension, which revocation own review powers, which is automatic rather
shall not be set aside by the President. Upon than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in
the initiative of the President, the Congress its express duty to defend the Constitution
may, in the same manner, extend such through such review should the Supreme
proclamation or suspension for a period to be Court step in as its final rampart. The
determined by the Congress, if the invasion or constitutional validity of the Presidents
rebellion shall persist and public safety proclamation of martial law or suspension of
requires it.
the writ of habeas corpus is first a political
question in the hands of Congress before it
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the
twenty-four hours following such proclamation Court.
or suspension, convene in accordance with its
Here, President Arroyo withdrew
rules without any need of a call.
Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of
xxxx
Congress, which had in fact convened, could
Although the above vests in the President the act on the same. Consequently, the petitions
power to proclaim martial law or suspend the in these cases have become moot and the
Court has nothing to review. The lifting of

martial law and restoration of the privilege of

the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao was
a supervening event that obliterated any
justiciable controversy.2
Two. Since President Arroyo withdrew
her proclamation of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in just eight days, they have
not been meaningfully implemented. The
military did not take over the operation and
control of local government units in
Maguindanao. The President did not issue any
law or decree affecting Maguindanao that
should ordinarily be enacted by Congress. No
indiscriminate mass arrest had been reported.
Those who were arrested during the period
were either released or promptly charged in
court. Indeed, no petition for habeas corpus
had been filed with the Court respecting
arrests made in those eight days. The point is
that the President intended by her action to
address an uprising in a relatively small and
sparsely populated province. In her judgment,
the rebellion was localized and swiftly
disintegrated in the face of a determined and
amply armed government presence.
In Lansang v. Garcia,3 the Court received
evidence in executive session to determine if
President Marcos suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus in 1971 had
sufficient factual basis. In Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile,4
while the Court took judicial notice of the
factual
bases
for
President
Marcos
proclamation of martial law in 1972, it still
held hearings on the petitions for habeas
corpus to determine the constitutionality of
the arrest and detention of the petitioners.
Here, however, the Court has not bothered to
examine the evidence upon which President
Arroyo acted in issuing Proclamation 1959,
precisely because it felt no need to, the
proclamation having been withdrawn within a
few days of its issuance.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio points out in
his dissenting opinion the finding of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City that
no probable cause exist that the accused
before it committed rebellion in Maguindanao
since the prosecution failed to establish the
elements of the crime. But the Court cannot

use such finding as basis for striking down the

Presidents proclamation and suspension. For,
firstly, the Court did not delegate and could
not delegate to the RTC of Quezon City its
power to determine the factual basis for the
presidential proclamation and suspension.
Secondly, there is no showing that the RTC of
Quezon City passed upon the same evidence
that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces, had in her possession when
she issued the proclamation and suspension.
The Court does not resolve purely
academic questions to satisfy scholarly
interest, however intellectually challenging
these are.5 This is especially true, said the
Court in Philippine Association of Colleges and
Universities v. Secretary of Education,6 where
the issues "reach constitutional dimensions,
for then there comes into play regard for the
courts duty to avoid decision of constitutional
issues unless avoidance becomes evasion."
The Courts duty is to steer clear of declaring
unconstitutional the acts of the Executive or
the Legislative department, given the
assumption that it carefully studied those acts
and found them consistent with the
fundamental law before taking them. "To
doubt is to sustain."7
Notably, under Section 18, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution, the Court has only
30 days from the filing of an appropriate
proceeding to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. Thus
The Supreme Court may review, in an
appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen,
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or
the extension thereof, and must promulgate
its decision thereon within thirty days from its
filing. (Emphasis supplied)
More than two years have passed
since petitioners filed the present actions to
annul Proclamation 1959.1wphi1 When the
Court did not decide it then, it actually opted
for a default as was its duty, the question
having become moot and academic.
Justice Carpio of course points out
that should the Court regard the powers of the

President and Congress respecting the

proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as
sequential or joint, it would be impossible for
the Court to exercise its power of review
within the 30 days given it.
But those 30 days, fixed by the Constitution,
should be enough for the Court to fulfill its
duty without pre-empting congressional
action. Section 18, Article VII, requires the
President to report his actions to Congress, in
person or in writing, within 48 hours of such
proclamation or suspension. In turn, the
Congress is required to convene without need
of a call within 24 hours following the
Presidents proclamation or suspension.
Clearly, the Constitution calls for quick action

on the part of the Congress. Whatever form

that action takes, therefore, should give the
Court sufficient time to fulfill its own mandate
to review the factual basis of the proclamation
or suspension within 30 days of its issuance.
If the Congress procrastinates or
altogether fails to fulfill its duty respecting the
proclamation or suspension within the short
time expected of it, then the Court can step
in, hear the petitions challenging the
Presidents action, and ascertain if it has a
factual basis. If the Court finds none, then it
can annul the proclamation or the suspension.
But what if the 30 days given it by the
Constitution proves inadequate? Justice Carpio
himself offers the answer in his dissent: that
30-day period does not operate to divest this
Court of its jurisdiction over the case. The

settled rule is that jurisdiction once acquired

is not lost until the case has been terminated.
The problem in this case is that the
President aborted the proclamation of martial
law and the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao in just
eight days. In a real sense, the proclamation
and the suspension never took off. The
Congress itself adjourned without touching
the matter, it having become moot and
academic.
Of
course,
the
Court
has
in
exceptional cases passed upon issues that
ordinarily would have been regarded as moot.
But the present cases do not present
sufficient basis for the exercise of the power
of judicial review. The proclamation of martial
law and the suspension of the privilege of the

writ of habeas corpus in this case, unlike

similar Presidential acts in the late 60s and
early 70s, appear more like saber-rattling than
an actual deployment and arbitrary use of
political power.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the
consolidated petitions on the ground
that the same have become moot and
academic.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice