QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER

CARIDAD CRUZ DE SYQUIA v. BOARD OF POWER AND

WATER WORKS
Facts: In December, 1974, private respondents filed three separate
complaints with respondent Board of Power and Waterworks
charging petitioner as administrator of the South Syquia
Apartments at Malate, Manila with the offense of selling electricity
without permit or franchise issued by respondent board, in that
petitioner billed respondents-complainants various specified
amounts for their electricity consumption at their respective
apartments for the months of May to September, 1974 in excess
of the Meralco rates authorized by respondent board.
Petitioner contends, among others, that the tenants including
respondents had no complaint under the contractual set-up of
billings for water and electric service consumption, whereby while
individual electric meters are installed in each apartment, Meralco
billings include all consumption in the entire compound, including
the common areas, servants' quarters and elevators, the payment
for which was advanced by petitioner and later collected by way
of reimbursement from the tenants pro rata; but that respondents
alone complained later when on account of the energy crisis,
additional fuel adjustment costs were added by Meralco to their
billings which were likewise passed on by petitioner to all the
tenants pro rata.
Issue: WON the Board has jurisdiction over the subject-matter.
Held: None. Respondent board as a regulatory board manifestly
exceeded its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and adjudicating
the complaints filed by respondents against petitioner.
Respondent board acquired no jurisdiction over petitioner's
contractual relations with respondents-complainants as her
tenants, since petitioner is not engaged in a public service nor in
the sale of electricity without permit or franchise.
Respondents' complaints against being charged he additional cost of
electricity for common facilities used by the tenants (in addition to
those registered in their respective apartment meters) give rise to
a question that is purely civil in character that is to be adjudged
under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code (not the Public
Service Act) and not by the respondent regulatory board which
has no jurisdiction but by the regular courts of general jurisdiction.

PLA v. CELEDONIO AGRAVA

Facts: On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular
announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an
examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to
practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office,
the said examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and
the rules of practice before said office. According to the circular,
members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with
sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the
said examination.
It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association
that one who has passed the bar examinations and is licensed by
the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in
good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines
Patent Office, and that consequently, the cat of the respondent
Director requiring members of the Philippine Bar in good standing
to take and pass an examination given by the Patent Office as a
condition precedent to their being allowed to practice before said
office, such as representing applicants in the preparation and
prosecution of applications for patent, is in excess of his
jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.
Issue: WON the Philippine Patent Office (through the Director)
has the authority to require members of the Philippine Bar to
submit to an examination or tests and pass the same before
being admitted to appear and practice before the Patent
Office.
Held: No. Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes
every chief of bureau to prescribe forms and make regulations or
general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the
harmonious and efficient administration of his branch of the
service and to carry into full effect the laws relating to matters
within the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act
1937, known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines,
provides that the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the
approval of the Department Head, makes all rules and regulations
necessary to enforce the provisions of said code. Section 338 of
the National Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466
as amended, states that the Secretary of Finance, upon
recommendation of the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall
promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective
enforcement of the provisions of the code. We understand that
rules and regulations have been promulgated not only for the

Bureau of Customs and Internal Revenue, but also for other

bureaus of the Government, to govern the transaction of business
in and to enforce the law for said bureaus.
Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and
clear provision of law giving the necessary sanction, to require
lawyers to submit to and pass on examination prescribed by it
before they are allowed to practice before said Patent Office, then
there would be no reason why other bureaus specially the Bureau
of Internal Revenue and Customs, where the business in the
same area are more or less complicated, such as the
presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc.,
assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the classification of goods,
imposition of customs duties, seizures, confiscation, etc., as
regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also require that any
lawyer practicing before them or otherwise transacting business
with them on behalf of clients, shall first pass an examination to
qualify.
In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the
Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in
good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent
Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office
involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and
application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well
as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that
part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasijudicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions
are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.
GLOBE WIRELESS LTD v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
Facts: A message addressed to Maria Diaz in Madrid, Spain, filed by
private respondent Arnaiz with the telegraph office of the Bureau
of Telecommunications in Dumaguete City, was transmitted to the
Bureau of Telecommunications in Manila. It was forwarded to
petitioner Globe Wireless Ltd. for transmission to Madrid.
Petitioner sent the message to the American Cable and Radio
Corporation in New York, which, in turn, transmitted the same to
the EmpresaNacional de Telecommunicaciones in Madrid. The
latter, however, mislaid said message, resulting in its non-delivery
to the addressee.
After being informed of said fact, private respondent Arnaiz, sent to
then Public Service Commissioner Enrique Medina an unverified
letter-complaint relating the incident.
Petitioner, in its answer, questioned PSC's jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the letter-complaint, even as it denied liability for the
non-delivery of the message to the addressee.
Hearing ensued, after which the PSC issued an order finding
petitioner "responsible for the inadequate and unsatisfactory
service complained of, in violation of the Public Service Act" and
ordering it "to pay a fine of TWO HUNDRED [P200.00] PESOS
under Sec. 21 of Com. Act 146, as amended." petitioner was
likewise required to refund the sum of P19.14 to the remitter of
the undelivered message.
Issue: WON the PSC has jurisdiction over the subject-matter.
Held: No. Verily, Section 13 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as
amended otherwise known as the Public Service Act, vested in
the Public Service Commission jurisdiction, supervision and
control over all Public services and their franchises, equipment
and other properties. However, Section 5 of Republic Act No.
4630, the legislative franchise under which petitioner was
operating, limited respondent Commission's jurisdiction over
petitioner only to the rate which petitioner may charge the Public.
Moreover, under Section 21 of C.A. No. 146, as amended, the
Commission was empowered to impose an administrative fine in
cases of violation of or failure by a Public service to comply with
the terms and conditions of any certificate or any orders,
decisions or regulations of the Commission. petitioner operated
under a legislative franchise, so there were no terms nor
conditions of any certificate issued by the Commission to violate.
Neither was there any order, decision or regulation from the
Commission applicable to petitioner that the latter had allegedly
violated, disobeyed, defied or disregarded.
Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the
rule that the jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies,
like respondent Commission, are limited to those expressly
granted or necessarily implied from those granted in the
legislation creating such body; and any order without or beyond
such jurisdiction is void and ineffective. The order under
consideration belonged to this category.

JUDICIAL REVIEW

ABEJO VS. DELA CRUZ

FACTS:In 1982, Teletronics purchased from the Spouses Abejo,
principal stockholders of the corporation Pocket Bell, 133,000
minority shareholdings and 63,000 shares registered in the name
of Virginia Braga, erstwhile majority stockholder, covered by 5
stock certificates endorsed in blank by her.With the said
purchases, Telectronics would become the majority stockholder,
holding 56% of the outstanding stock and voting power of the
corporation Pocket Bell. With the said purchases in 1982,
Telectronics requested the corporate secretary of the corporation,
Norberto Braga,the corporate secretary and son of the Bragas, to
register and transfer to its name, and those of its nominees the
total 196,000 Pocket Bell shares in the corporation's transfer
book, cancel the surrendered certificates of stock and issue the
corresponding new certificates of stock in its name and those of
its nominees.Norberto refused to register the aforesaid transfer of
shares in the corporate books, asserting that the Bragas claim
preemptive rights over the 133,000 Abejo shares and that Virginia
Braga never transferred her 63,000 shares to Telectronics but had
lost the five stock certificates representing those shares. The
Abejos and Telectronics and the latter's nominees, as new
majority shareholders, filed SEC Cases against the Bragas. The
Bragassought to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. SEC
dismissed the Bragas' petition for lack of merit and andordered
the SEC Hearing Committee to continue with the hearings ruling
that the "issue is not the ownership of shares but rather the
nonperformance by the Corporate Secretary of the ministerial
duty of recording transfers of shares of stock of the corporation of
which he is secretary." Bragas filed a complaint against the
Abejos and Telectronics in the Court of First Instance of Pasig for:
(a) rescission and annulment of the sale of the shares of stock in
Pocket Bell made by the Abejos in favor of Telectronics (b)
declaration ofnullity of any transfer, assignment or endorsement
of Virginia Bragas' stock certificates for 63,000 shares in Pocket
Ben to Telectronics. CFI ruled in favor of the Bragas.
ISSUE: WON SEC has jurisdiction over the case
HELD: YES. The SEC ruling upholding its primary and exclusive
jurisdiction over the dispute is correctly premised on, and fully
supported by, the applicable provisions of P.D. No. 902-A which
reorganized the SEC with additional powers. The dispute at bar,
as held by the SEC, is an intracorporate dispute that has arisen
between and among the principal stockholders of the corporation
Pocket Bell due to the refusal of the corporate secretary, backed
up by his parents as erstwhile majority shareholders, to perform
his "ministerial duty" to record the transfers of the corporation's
controlling (56%) shares of stock. Such a dispute and case clearly
fag within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC to
decide, under Section 5 of P.D. 902-A. As stressed by the
Solicitor General on behalf of the SEC, the Court has held that
"Nowhere does the law [PD 902-A] empower any Court of First
Instance to interfere with the orders of the Commission," 5 and
consequently "any ruling by the trial court on the issue of
ownership of the shares of stock is not binding on the
Commission 6 for want of jurisdiction.
The Corporation Code (B.P. No. 178) enacted on May 1, 1980
specifically vests the SEC with the Rule-making power in the
discharge of its task of implementing the provisions of the Code
and particularly charges it with the duty of preventing fraud and
abuses on the part of controlling stockholders, directors and
officers.
"Otherwise stated, in order that the SEC can take cognizance of a
case, the controversy must pertain to any of the following
relationships: [al between the corporation, partnership or
association and the public; [b] between the corporation,
partnership or association and its stockholders, partners,
members, or officers; [c] between the corporation, partnership or
association and the state in so far as its franchise, permit or
license to operate is concerned; and Id] among the stockholders,
partners or associates themselves."
BERNARDO vs. ABALOS
G.R. No. 137266.
December 5, 2001.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
FACTS: Respondent Benjamin Abalos, Sr. was the mayor of
Mandaluyong City & his son, Benjamin Abalos Jr. was a
candidate for city mayor of the same city for the May 1998
elections.
Petitioners herein interposed that respondents conducted an allexpense-free affair at a resort inQuezon Province for the
Mandaluyong City public school teachers, registered voters of the
said city and who are members of the Board of Election
Inspectors therein. The said affair was alleged to be staged as a
political campaign for Abalos Jr., where his political jingle was

played all throughout and his shirts being worn by some

participants. Moreover, Abalos Sr. also made an offer and a
promise then to increase the allowances of the teachers. In this
regard,petitioners filed a criminal complaint with the COMELEC
against Abalos Sr. and Abalos Jr. forvote-buying, further alleging
that they conspired with their co-respondents in violating
theOmnibus Election Code. Pursuant to the recommendation of
the Director of the Law Departmentof the COMELEC, the
COMELEC en banc dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of
evidence.Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the petition before the Supreme Court must be
given due course without the petitioners first submitting a
motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC.
HELD: NO. The Court ruled that a petition for certiorari can only be
resorted to if there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In the instant
case, it was said that filing of the motion for reconsideration
before the COMELEC is the most expeditious and inexpensive
recourse that petitioners can avail of as it was intended to give
the COMELEC an opportunity to correct the error imputed to it. As
the petitioners then did not exhaust all the remedies available to
them at the COMELEC level, it was held that their instant petition
is certainly premature. Significantly, they have not also raised any
plausible reason for their direct recourse to the Supreme Court.
As such, the instant petition was ruled to fail.
Industrial Enterprises, Inc. vs. CA184 SCRA 426, April 18, 1990
FACTS: Industrial Enterprises, Inc. was granted a coal operating
contract by the Government through the Bureau of Energy
Development (BED) for exploration of two blocks in Eastern
Samar and IEI also applied with the Ministry of Energy for a coal
operating contract in Giporos Area. That later it was advised that
in line with the objective of rationalizing the countrys over all-coal
supply-demand balance, the Giporos Area and Bagacay Area
should be awarded to Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC).
Then on, IEC and MMIC executed a Memorandum of Agreement,
IEC assigned and transferred to MMIC all its rights and interests
in the two coal blocks which are subject of IECs coal operating
contract. However, IEC thereafter filed an action of rescission of
the Memorandum of Agreement with damages against MMIC and
the Minister of Energy Geronimo Velasco before the RTC Makati,
branch 150.alleging that MMIC took over the subject coal blocks
even before the Memorandum had finalized and approved by
BED. It found out that the President of both IEC and MMIC is
Jesus S. Cabarrus. In a summary judgment, coal operation
contract was in favor of IEC and ordered to BED to issue its
written affirmation but the Court of Appeals reverse RTCs
decision that it is BED has the power to decide the controversies
relative to the exploration, exploitation and development of coal
blocks.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE BUREAU OF ENERGY
DEVELOPMENT HAS JURISDICTION OVER SAID ACTION
AND NOT THE CIVIL COURT.
HELD:
YES. It has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction in many cases involving matters that demand
the special competence of administrative agencies. It may occur
that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular
case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in
character. However, if the case is such that its determination
requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the
proper administrative bodies because technical matters or
intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be
obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be
supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper
jurisdiction of a court. Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
finds application in this case since the question of what coal areas
should be exploited and developed and which entity should be
granted coal operating contracts over said areas involves a
technical determination by the BED as the administrative agency
in possession of the specialized expertise to act on the matter.
The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however,
does not call for the dismissal of the case below. It need only be
suspended until after the matters within the competence of the
BED are threshed out and determined.
GSIS vs CA
GR No. 87146
FACTS: According to Asuncion Salazars service record filed with the
CSC, she was employed by the GSIS as a casual laborer. She
became permanent with a designation of stenographer.
Thereafter, she was promoted to Confidential Technical Assistant
Aide.
Salazars GSIS Service Record however, revealed that she was

appointed to the position of Confidential Executive Assistant in the

office of then GSIS President and General Manager Roman A.
Cruz, Jr. on a permanent status. She was then promoted to
Technical Assistant III, the position she held when her services
were terminated by the newly appointed President and General
Manager of the GSIS for the reason that her position was coterminous with the term of the appointing authority.
Salazar filed a petition for reconsideration with the GSIS Board of
Trustees, but reconsideration was denied. Thereafter, she filed a
petition for reconsideration of the denial with the Review
Committee, which referred the same to the Merit System
Promotion and the CSC.
In a resolution, the CSC directed the immediate reinstatement of
Salazar with back salaries. The Board however affirmed her
termination. Salazar filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Boards order and manifested that the Commissions prior
resolution of the case. The GSIS filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied by the Board and stated that the
CSC is higher administrative appellate body on matters
concerning the removal of officers and employees from the
service. Hence the Board cannot in any manner modify of alter
the determinations and actions of the CSC. The GSIS appealed
but the CSC denied the motion for consideration. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: WON the CSC has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: No. P.D. No. 1409, creating the Merit Systems Board provides
that the Merit Systems Board (Board) has the function to Hear
and decide cases brought before it by officers and employees
who feel aggrieved by the determination of appointing authorities
involving appointment, promotion, transfer, detail, reassignment
and other personnel actions, as well as complaints against any
officers in the government arising from abuses arising from
personnel actions of the these officers or from violations of the
merit system.
When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to
hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be
presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved
that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in
which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the
matter. Presidential Decree No. 1409 clearly provides that the
Merit Systems Board shall take cognizance of appeals from
parties aggrieved by decisions of appointing officers involving
personnel action. The Commission therefore cannot take original
cognizance of the cases specified under Section 5 of P.D. 1409,
except in the case specified under Section 9 (j) of the Civil
Service Decree which directly gives it such power, to wit:
SECTION 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission. The
Commission shall administer the Civil Service Commission and
shall have the following powers and functions:
j) Hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly
with it in accordance with Section 37 or brought to it on appeal;
In the case at bar, the appeal of Salazar was endorsed by the Review
Committee to both the Merit Systems Board and the Civil Service
Commission. In the absence of a decision from the Merit System
Board, the Commission cannot legally assume jurisdiction over
the appeal. Hence, its decision in favor of Salazar and all
subsequent resolutions of the Commission in the case are void.
Likewise, the Order of the Board setting aside its previous order
upholding the termination of Salazar in deference to the
Commissions final appellate jurisdiction over the matter, is null
and void. Jurisdiction s vested by law and is not lost nor legally
transferred by voluntary surrender in favor of a body not vested
by law with such jurisdiction.
PAAT VS CA
GR NO. 111107 January 10, 1997
FACTS: The truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was
seized by the DENR personnel while on its way to Bulacan
because the driver could not produce the required documents for
the forest products found concealed in the truck. Petitioner
Laguyan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Officer (CENRO) issued an Order of confiscation of the truck and
gave the owner the opportunity to explain why the truck should
not be forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to submit
the required explanation. Regional Executive Director Baggayan
of DENR sustained the said Order. Private respondents then filed
a letter of recommendation but was denied. The case was
brought to the Secretary of DENR for appeal.
Pending resolution of the appeal, a suit for replevin was filed by
private respondents against Laguyan and Baggayan for the return
of the truck confiscated. Petitioners contend that private
respondents had no cause of action for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. The trial court and CA ruled in favor of
private respondents. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: WON the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies

should apply?
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court has consistently held that before a
party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a precondition that he should have availed of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within
the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a
matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should
be exhausted first before court's judicial power can be sought,
The premature invocation of court's intervention is fatal to one's
cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or
estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of
action.
However, this doctrine is not without exceptions, to wit: (1) when there
is violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a
legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently
illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there
is estoppels on the part of the administrative agency concerned,
(5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a
department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President
bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to
require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to nullification of a claim,
(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case
proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
Theres no question that the controversy was pending before the
Secretary of DENR when it was forwarded to Public Respondent.
Private respondents, thru their letter for consideration, looked up
to the Secretary of DENR for review therefore it is perceived that
former acknowledged the existence of an adequate and plain
remedy still available and open to them in the ordinary course of
the law. Thus, they cannot now, without violating the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, seek court's intervention
by filing an action for replevin for the grant of their relief during the
pendency of an administrative proceedings
VALMONTE VS BELMONTE
G.R. No. 74930 February
13, 1989
FACTS: In a letter addressed to Feliciano Belmonte, Jr., then GSIS
General Manager, petitioner Belmonte requested the list of names
of the defunct interim and regular BatasangPambansa including
the 10 opposition members who were able to secure a clean loan
of P2 million each on guaranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos and also
documents evidencing their loans. Such concern of Valmonte was
reffered by Belmonte to the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS
Tiro. In Tiros letter to Valmonte, he is in his opinion that a
confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those
who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a
duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it
would not be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to
preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for
the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the
courts.
Apparently not having received the Letter of Tiro, Valmonte wrote
another letter to Belmonte saying that for failure to receive to
reply, they are now considering themelves free to do whatever
action necessary w/in the premises to pursue their desired
objective in pursuance of public interest.
Petitioners filed a special civil action for mandamus with preliminary
injuction invoking their right to information over the documents
mentioned. GSIS however contends that the actions of GSIS
General Manager is reviewable only by the Board of Trustees of
the GSIS. Petitioners however did not seek relief from the GSIS
Board of Trustees thus have failed to exhaust administrative
remedies and have no cause of action.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners should avail administrative remedies
before seeking relief from the court?
HELD: No. Among the settled principles in administrative law is that
before a party can be allowed to resort to the courts, he is
expected to have exhausted all means of administrative redress
available under the law. However the issue raised by the
petitioners, which requires the interpretation of the scope of the
constitutional right to information, is one which can be passed
upon by the regular courts more competently than the GSIS or its
Board of Trustees, involving as it does a purely legal question.
Thus, the exception of this case from the application of the
general rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is
warranted.

INDUSTRIAL POWER SALES, INC. V SINSUAT

G.R. No. L29171 April 15, 1988
FACTS: Two invitations to bid were advertised by the Bureau of
Supply Coordination of the Department of General Services. The
first called for eight units of truck for the use of the Bureau of
Telecommunications. The invitation to Bid as well as the
requisition itself contained a proviso limiting the offers to foreign
made products on a CIF basis, Port of Manila. The second
invitation to Bid announced that both CIF Port of Manila and FOB
Manila quotations would be accepted and made part of bid
requirements.
Among the bidders were Industrial Power Sales, Inc (IPSI) and Delta
Motor Corporation (Delta). The bids were deliberated by the
Committee on Awards and was awarded to IPSI. Delta protested
the award to IPSI to the Bureau of Telecommunications claiming
that the trucks offered by IPSI were not factory built, as stipulated
in the requisition and invitation to bid. The Director ruled that the
bidding has been made in strict compliance with technical
specifications and requirements stated by the Bureau of
Telecommunications.
Deltas next move was to file with the Office of the Secretary of
General Services (Sinsuat). The latter informed the Acting
Director of Supply that the Department had already approved
Deltas price, and categorically direct him to award to Delta the
purchase order of the eight trucks with the least possible delay.
This notice was given notwithstanding all the Government
agencies concerned already agreed on the correctness of the
award to IPSI Bureau of Telecommunications, the Department
of Public Works & Communications to which said Bureau of
Telecommunications pertains, the Bureau of Supply, which had
direct supervision and control of the bidding, and of course, the
Committee on Awards.
IPSI appealed from the Secretarys decision to award the purchase
contract Delta to the Office of the President as well as the Office
of the Auditor General. The appeal notwithstanding, the LetterOrder in favor of Delta was released. IPSI then filed with the CFI
a petition certiorari and mandamus, with application for
preliminary and mandatory injunction. The verdict wen against
IPSI. From the judgment of the CFI, IPSI appealed to the Court.
The plea made in behalf of Secretary Sinsuat claims that IPSI had
gone to Court without first exhausting all administrative remedies.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was an exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies.
HELD: Certain universally accepted axioms govern judicial review
through the extraordinary actions of certiorari or prohibition of
determinations of administrative officers or agencies: first, that
before said actions may be entertained in the courts of justice, it
must be shown that all the administrative remedies prescribed by
law or ordinance have been exhausted; and second, that the
administrative decision may properly be annulled or set aside only
upon a clear showing that the administrative official or tribunal
has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion.
There are however exceptions to the principle known as exhaustion of
administrative remedies, these being:
(1) where the issue is purely a legal one,
(2) where the controverted act is patently illegal or was done
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction;
(3) where the respondent is a department secretary whose acts
as an alter ego of the President bear the latter's implied or assumed
approval, unless actually disapproved; OR
(4) where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of
judicial intervention.
In view of these doctrines, there is no need for the exhaustion of
administrative remedies in the case at bar because Secretary
Sinsuat indeed acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
National Development Company v Collector of Customs
GR No. L-19180, 31 October 1963
9 SCRA 429
FACTS: The customs authorities found that the vessel carried on
board an unmanifested cargo consisting of one television set, and
respondent Collector of Customs sent a written notice to the
operator of the vessel and the latter answered stating that the
television set was not cargo and so was not required by law to be
manifested. The operator requested an investigation and hearing
but respondent finding the operators explanation not satisfactory
imposed on the vessel a fine of P5,000.00, ordering said fine to
be paid within 48 hours from receipt, with a threat that the vessel
would be denied clearance and a warrant of seizure would be
issued if the fine will not be paid.
NDC, as owner, and operator AV Rocha filed for special civil action for
certiorari before the CFI of Manila against the respondent.

Respondent contended that petitioners have not exhausted all

available administrative remedies, one of which is to appeal to the
Commissioner of Customs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of respondent is correct.
HELD: The Court held in the negative. Respondent Collector
committed grave abuse of discretion because petitioner NDC was
not given an opportunity to prove that the television set involved is
not a cargo that needs to be manifested. Exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not required where the appeal to the
administrative superior is not a plain, speedy or adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, as where it is undisputed that the
respondent officer has acted in utter disregard of the principle of
due process.
Further, the action was proper for it really appears that the petitioner
Rocha was not given an opportunity to prove that the television
set complained of is not a cargo that needs to be manifested as
required by Section 2521 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Under
said section, in order that an imported article or merchandize may
be considered a cargo that should be manifested, it is first
necessary that it be so established for the reason that there are
other effects that a vessel may carry that are excluded from the
requirement of law, among which are the personal effects of the
members of the crew.
The fact that the set in question was claimed by the customs
authorities not to be within the exception does not automatically
make the vessel liable. It is still necessary that the vessel, its
owner or operator, be given a chance to show otherwise. This is
precisely what petitioner Rocha has requested in his letter. Not
only he was denied this chance, but respondent collector
immediately imposed upon the vessel the huge fine of P5,000.00.
This is a denial of the elementary rule of due process.
True it is that the proceedings before the Collector of Customs insofar
as the determination of any customs law or regulation is
concerned, or of any act arising under the Tariff and Customs
Code, are not judicial in character, but merely administrative,
where the rules of procedure are generally disregarded, but even
in the administrative proceedings, due process must be observed
because that is the right enshrined in our Constitution. The right
to due process is not merely statutory. It is a constitutional right.
Indeed, the Constitution provides that No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law,
which clause epitomizes the principle of justice which hears
before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial. That this principle applies with equal
force to administrative proceedings was well elaborated upon by
this Court in the AngTibay case.
Another point raised is that the petitioners have brought this action
prematurely for they have not exhausted all the administrative
remedies available to them, one of which is to appeal the ruling to
the Commissioner of Customs. This may be true, but such step
we do not consider a plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law as would prevent the petitioners from
taking the present action, for it is undisputed that respondent
collector has acted in utter disregard of the principle of due
process.
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD vs. COMELEC
G.R. No.
205728 January 21, 2015
FACTS: On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins
within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral
of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6) by ten
feet (10) in size. They were posted on the front walls of the
cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the
message IBASURA RH Law referring to the Reproductive
Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second
tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin
contains the heading Conscience Vote and lists candidates as
either (Anti-RH) Team Buhay with a check mark, or (Pro-RH)
Team Patay with an X mark. The electoral candidates were
classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act
No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for
the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising
Team Patay, while those who voted against it form Team
Buhay.
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor
paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the
tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but
not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but
were not candidates for that election.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies as the case was not
brought first before the COMELEC En Banc or any if its
divisions.

HELD: NO. The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of

administrative remedies is not proper in this case.Despite the
alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that
the controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the
prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or
performed by either branch or in this case, organ of government
before a court may come into the picture.
Petitioners exercise of their right to speech, given the message and
their medium, had understandable relevance especially during the
elections. COMELECs letter threatening the filing of the election
offense against petitioners is already an actionable infringement
of this right. The impending threat of criminal litigation is enough
to curtail petitioners speech. In the context of this case,
exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC
suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their
freedom of speech.
Atlas Consolidated Mining vs Factoran
Doctrine: Findings of fact by an administrative official should not be
disturbed if supported by substantial evidence but review is
justified when there has been denial of due process, a mistake of
law or fraud, collision or arbitrary action in the administrative
proceeding, where the procedure which led to factual findings is
irregular, when palpable errors are committed or when grave
abuse of discretion, arbitrariness or capriciousness is manifest.
Facts: Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation
registered the location of its Master VII Fr. mining claim with the
Mining Recorder. On 1973, private respondent Asterio Buqueron
registered the declarations of location of his St. Mary Fr and St.
Joseph Fr mining claims with the same Mining Recorder. On
1973, Atlas registered the declarations on location of its Carmen
I Fr. and Carmen V Fr with the same Mining Recorder.
Buquerons survey plans for St. Mary Fr and St. Joseph Fr
were approved by the Director of Mines and Geo Sciences to
which notice of Buquerons lease application was published.
During such publication, petitioner filed an adverse claim against
private respondents mining claims on the ground that they
allegedly overlapped its own mining claims.
The director of Mines rendered a decision in favour of Buqueron, thus
giving his a preferential right to possess, lease, explore, exploit
and operate the areas covered by his St. Mary Fr and St.
Joseph Fr mining claims except the area covered thereby in
conflict with the Atlas Master VII Fr. Atlas on the other hand is
given preferential right to the area covered by its Master VII Fr.
Atlas appealed to the Minister of Natural Resources reversing the
said decision declaring Buquerons mining claims null and void.
Issue: Whether or not there was a valid location and discovery of
the disputed mining claims
Held: The court ruled that such question of fact is best left to the
determination of the administrative bodies charged with the
implementation of the law they are entrusted to enforce. It is
sufficient that the administrative findings of fact are supported by
evidence; substantial evidence is all that is necessary to support
an administrative finding of fact. In the case at bar, the Director of
Mines decision was supported by substantial evidence. The
director of mines established that there is in fact an overlapping of
mining claims of petitioner and private respondent and that as a
matter of record petitioners mining claims were registered
subsequent to those of private respondent.
Carpio vs Executive Secretary
Doctrine: Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency - all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the executive
department , the heads of various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the chief executive and exept in cases
where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to
act in person on the exigencies of the situation demand that he
act personally ; the presidents power of control is directly
exercised by him over the members of the cabinet who in turn
and by his authority control the bureaus and other offices under
their respective jurisdictions in the executive department
Facts: In 1990, congress passed RA 6975 entitled an act establishing
the Philippine national police under a reorganized department of
the interior and local government and for other purpose. Petitioner
as citizen, taxpayer, and member of the Philippine Bar filed the
petition seeking the declaration of unconstitutionality of RA 6975
with prayer for temporary restraining order. Petitioner advanced
the view that RA 6975 emasculated the National Police
Commission by limiting its power t administrative control over the

PNP thus control remained with the department secretary under

whom both the National Police Commission and the PNP were
placed.
Issue: Whether or not RA 6975 is unconstitutional
Held: No. The president has control of all executive departments,
bureaus, and offices which extends over all executive officers
from the Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. (insert doctrine of
qualified political agency)
The circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed
under the reorganized Department of Interior and local
government is merely an administrative realignment that would
bolster a system coordination and cooperation among the
citizenry, local executives and the integrated law enforcement
agencies.
National Development Company and DOLE Philippines Inc. vs.
Wilfredo Hervilla
GR No. L-65718, June 30, 1987
FACTS: The antecedent of this is an action for the recovery of
possession and damages filed on December 20, 1973 by Wilfredo
Hervilla against DOLE Philippines involving four lots with a total
area of four hectares. On June 1, 1962, Wilfredo Hervilla,
claiming to be the successor-in-interest of his brother, Hernane
Hervilla who vacated these properties, [in favor of the former],
filed with the District Land Office of the Bureau of Lands in
General Santos City Free Patent Application for the said lots. On
April 1, 1963, Candido de Pedro, as claimant and occupant, filed
with the Bureau of Lands, Manila, his free patent application,
having planted agricultural plants. On April 27, 1968, Hervilla filed
an ejectment suit against DOLE, successor-in-interest of Candido
de Pedro. Counsel of Hervilla wrote the District Land Officer
requesting for the investigation of the said lots, to which a report
was rendered and an order was issued as to the adjustment of
the said title numbers. The trial court dismissed the action for
recovery, to which was appealed to the Court of Appeals which
reversed the trial court decision and declared that the issuance of
the patent title by the Bureau of Lands to Candico de Pedro is null
and void.. A motion for reconsideration was filed and
subsequently, a motion for new trial was filed for the purpose of
submitting original certificate of titles which was issued to the
DOLE predecessor-in-interest by the Bureau of Lands while the
case was pending. The two motions were denied. Thus this
petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES: Whether or not the court in a deciding a case involving
recovery of possession declare null and void title issued by
an administrative body or office during the pendency of such
case?
HELD: In the administration and disposition of public lands are
committed by law to the Director of Lands primarily, and,
ultimately, to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
The jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands is confined to the
determination of the respective rights of rival claimants to public
lands or to cases which involve disposition and alienation of
public lands. The jurisdiction of courts in possessory actions
involving public lands is limited to the determination of who has
the actual, physical possession or occupation of the land in
question (in forcible entry cases, before municipal courts) or, the
better right of possession (in accion publiciana, in cases before
Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts. In the case at
bar, the petitioners possession of the lands in question has been
confirmed by the issuance of Free Patents in favor of their
predecessor-in-interest. By this act, nothing more is left for the
courts to pursue. Thus, the private respondent's cause of action
has been rendered moot and academic by the decision of the
Director of Lands. Defendants' possession of the lands disputed,
for purposes of the free patents, has been confirmed in the
administrative case. The administrative branch of the government
has thus already spoken. Its action has lapsed into finality.
Accordingly, plaintiffs' claim of possession is lost. Moreover,
records do not show that private respondent Wilfredo Hervilla
ever filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
Director of Lands issuing free patent over the lands in dispute in
favor of petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. Neither did he appeal
said decision to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, nor did he appeal to the office of the President of the
Philippines. In short, Hervilla failed to exhaust administrative
remedies, a flaw which, to our mind, is fatal to a court review. The
decision of the Director of Lands has now become final. The
Courts may no longer interfere with such decision. The decision
of the Appellate court is reversed and set aside.