/

AssassinationRecords Review Board

Flnal DeterminationNotification
--AGENCY--JCS
- --- -------- -------RECORDNUMBER
REOORD SERIES

202-10002-10104
JCS CENTRALFIL2S 1962

AGENCYPILB 1'"UMBR 3360 (1 FED 62)

October

20,1m

Status of Document:

Poslponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed informatio n: O

Number of Postponements: 5

Postponement It (Page DJSM-2,25

July 1962,pg 2),

"

Reason for BoordAction; The texl is redacted because ii touc.heson a matter currently relating to the
military dclcn.sc,intelligenceope.rationsor conduct of foreign relations o( the United Sb.tes that properly
my be po$1p0ncd under Section6(l)(C) of the JFKAct.

'
Substitute
l.on$UgeoOp=tionI Dei.m
Release Date: 10/2017

...__,;_

---.:_-

.. t ostponement #2 (Page JCS 1969/347,2Moy 1962,ppJ,

-17'~

Rc.'\SOn
for Board Action: The te)(t is redacted becau.scit touchcsona m3ttcrCW'ttntly rclnting to the
military dclCl'ls<l',
intcll.ig:cnce
opera.lionsot condud of foreignrelations of the United States \Mt properly
may be postponed under Section 6(1)(C) of the JFKAct.
rSubstitute Language: Operational Details
Release Date: 10/2017

P06tponement I 3 (Page JCS 1969/347,MaritimeSupport, Operation Mongoose,8 May 1%Zpg I),

Reason for Board AdiO!C The text is n?dact-ed

because it touches on a matter (Uffer\tly reJating to tho

military defense, inteJJJgeneeoperations. or conduct of foreign relations of the United States that properly
,
may be postponed underSection6(t)(C) of the JFK Act.

Substitute~gc

OpetalionalDeW!s

Rcl<aseDAie:10/2017.

P0<~ent

# 4 (Page JC!S19691389,23 July 1962,pP,1415),

~n
for Bo.trd.
Adioii.:i1lletext is reclactedbause ll t0\&Chc$on o.m:ittctcuncntfy-relatingto the
milita.i);
acfet1SC
, in.talliie:nce
~ations orconi:luctof fora~ relationsof theUrutoa
Stntcsthatproperly
may lie Jl(>Slj>oril
lindcr Stion .(l)(C)of die JF]<ef
Act.
Suostiiure l.anS!'s gpc.. tional Di:tails

ReleaseDate: 10/2017,

Pos~ent

f 5 (Page OP605F/6 ,; Set 000374P60

)/U AP,iil1962,pp 2-4Y.

~on forBo.vdAction.:fhe textisredarte<t.

becauseiJtoudieson a m.auerfurrcritly:
-rel3ting
to tKi
milila!f defense,irittlligtnee ~lions
orconcl~ctof foreignrelationsof theUnJteaStatestliatpropcily:
maY,be P,OOIP!!!'edulil!CTStion6(1K'e) of the)Fl< Act.
Substitutel:an~ g'?' ~tlonal

Details

Relwe Date, 10/2017,

ril ReviewComP,leti@:10/1~/97

I
Date
Page

10/09/9 7
1

JFK ASSASSINATIONSYSTEM
IDENTIFICATIONFORM
AGENCYINl'ORMATION
AGENCY
RECORDNUMBER
RECORDSSERIES
AGENCYFILE NUMBER

JCS
202-10002-10104

JCS CENTRALFILES 1962

3360 (7 FEB 62)
DOCUMENT
INl'ORl1ATION

ORIGINATOR
FROM
TO
TITLE
DATE
PAGES
SUBJECTS

JCS
NORTHWOODS
00/00/62
197

U. S. MILITARYINTERVENTIONIN CUBA
PLANNING
, CUBA
CONTINGENCY
OPERATIONMONGOOSE
UPRISINGS IN CUBA
\

COVERTOPERATIONS,CUBA
SOVIET BASE IN CUBA
CARIBBEANSECURITY
PATROLPOSTS
INVASIONOF CUBA

JUSTIFICATION FOR U. S. MILITARYINTERVENTION

DOCUMENT
TYPE PAPER, TEXTUALDOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS lC
CURRENTSTATUS RELEASEDWITH DELETIONS
DATEOF LAST REVIEW 10/07/97
OPENINGCRITERIA
COMMENTS JCS Central Fil es 19 62, Box 29. JCS Record case,
Name Nort hwood~,

containing

JCS Papers

recommendation to invade CUba and

US military intervention.

(R) - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

related

pretexts

Code
to JCS

to justify

--

- -

Date

Page

10/115/97
1

JFK ASSASSINATIONSYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

------------------------------------------------------------------------------AGENCYINFORMATION
AGENCY
RECORDNUMBER
RECORDSSERIES
AGENCYFI LE NUMBER

JCS
202- 10 002- 10 104
JCS CENTRALFILBS 1962
3360 (7 FEB 62)
INFORMATION
DOCUMBNT

ORI GINATOR
FROM
TO
TITLE
DATE
PAGES
SUBJECTS

JCS
NORTHWOODS
00/00/62
197
U. S. MILITARYINTERVENTIONIN

CUBA

CONTINGENCY
PLANNING,CUBA
OPERAT
ION MONGOOSE
UPRISINGS IN CUBA
\

COVERTOPERATIONS, CUBA
SOVIET BASE IN CUBA
CARIBBEANSECURITY
PATROLPOSTS
INVASION OF

CUBA

JUSTIFICATION FOR U. S. MILITARYINTERVENTION

I

'

DOCUMENT
TYPE PAPER, TEXTUALDOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS lC
CURRENTSTATUS RELEASEDWITH DELETIONS
DATEOF LAST REVIEW 10/07/97
OPENINGCRITERIA
COMMENTS JCS Central Fi l eo 1962, Box 29. JCS Record Case , Code
Name Northwoods,
containing
JCS Papers related to JCS
reconunendation to invade Cuba and pretexts
to justify
US military
intervention
.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------[RI - ITEM I S RESTRI CTED

-

.....

:Ir f?

C/ j p

qf)Pr-

, I)

..

:io2-Joco
2..-f@ft(i . f

Declassification Revi ew/Phstnonement Form

Originator:
Date:

"

"

c If No@Mo~

J" J
\

/t1 111/ it I

Pas<:#
9f Pn:;tpnnement

Rea::on
forPo~tponement
IAWSection
6 of JFKAct

1)Sb > NO ~~S

~Cl,:)1110
w.~~tc)tl~

~Of~

6mro r
EXEMPTED
FROMDECLASSIFICATION
BY IOINTSTAR' t M8f
BXEMPTION:

DATE:

<iV}(!)

a~c
-"r-"0.,.1
....
19
....
gz~~

NOOBJtCTION
NA'IIOtlALSECUPJlV
COUNCIL

lb.,.,~ i.,,,.y

" .

-:IDN
I'FEDSW~TES INFORMATION A!GENCY
@FFICE @F THE ~ENERA'LC@UNSEL
DECLA'!
SSIFICAWION UNIT

11HIS ~ GENCY HAS DECLASSIFIEDA'I!JL@F

I!T
Sffl 'SiHOJ1DING IN WIS D@Cl!TME
NWIN
COMPLI:NNQE WI1\H
17HE;JFKA!C:T
~

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(. YEA!l -

MONill
OP.Y
~~
\ AUiHORliY:_

-t-J,.~i&~
~

A'-'
~

e.

..

.-

'

'-11

SltCTION

SOUR C E

SC

JCS PAPERS

JCSM 103 - 62,

28 Feb 62

JCSM 158-62

28 Feb 62 DepSecDef

1 Mar 62

SM-240 - 62

1 Mar 62

SM-241-62

l Mar 62

SM-242-62

l Ma.r 62

:r

SM-243 -62

8 Mar 62 .

JCSM-166-62

13 Mar 6~ . CJCS

10 Apr 62

JCSM 272-62

8 May 62

JCSM 365-62

8 May 62

JCSM-365 -62 .

8 May 62

DODrep CSG

8 May 62
8 May 62
{! May 62

DODRep CSG
DODR ,p CSG

T
T
T

PAEPAFU!l: O OV

xx

.
JCSM 367-62

25 Jul 62

DJSM 909-62

27 Jul 62

JCSM 564- 62

7 11.ug62

DJS Unnumbered

8 Aug 62

CJCS Unnumbere<

31 Aug 62

CJCS Unnumbere,

31 Aug 62 DepSecDef

.r

1,

NO.

,,

13 Jun 62 CJCS

IR A CCESS

REM ARKS AND/OR SUB J ECT

II

1,

NO .

~~tl~~~lfIfD

NORTHWOODS

8 Feb 62

SE:.f! 5B:C ,

NO,

'

SUBJECT

DA.TE

'.

JOINTCHIEFS OF STAFF
WAS HI NGTO N, D. c. 20301

3360 (7 Feb 62)

1,

...

JCS RECO RD CASE NO.

1,

- -

.
II

'

CLASSIFICATION
SPECIAL ACCESS

JCS

'

P'ORM
JAH

NO ,
G9

2:

i!!Q
I f\i\lfl"~----------'
11111,l'1.,11 II
1

:nv,.

\i,VII ~

JCS RECORD CASE CONTENTS

- -

..

~~~~

ff:rif:n__
==---...,....--,!tll.iim:l~"
~

R&
RABR.
TARIAT
~-r
,. --, JOINT
....SECRE
.
P'l&.c~O.
t;rHo's
~

111

C:PIOD8 IHOl!i:X

3360 (7 Feb ~)

JC
S CAS
E FIL
E""""'-R
. SHE
El
_E COV

Code.- NO
RrBWOODS
Nnme- - CRAIG; B/Gen,

3330

5740
"CQU'il:9T

tNlTIATKO

e1111ao,-..

ay

NORrBWOODS
(S)

1/.'lt/>/'/41
-

Report by Gen, Craig""'; Referred to JCS

7 Feb 62

Deci sion on Jcs .1969/303

8 Feb 62

Report ; Referred to

JCS

Decision on JCS 1969/306

A Report
A

- Referred to the Chiefs

13 Feb 62
15 Feb 62
20 Feb 61

Report - Refered to tlie Chiefs

20-Feb-62

Decision on JCS 1~69/310=

20 Feb 62

to -JCS

A Report - Referred

.-

. .

1969/311

27 Feb 62

to JCS

1969/314

i<

...

A Report RefeITed to JCS

.,

,,;

' "--1r

,-~

"

1969/316

Decision on JCS 1969/314 & 1969/316

to JCS

Decision on JCS 1969/321

12 Mar 62

f'

1969/313

A Report - referred

)t'

1969/310

20 Feb 61

Decision on. JCS. 1969/311

A Report - Ref~ed

l-'H1/,'PJI
'
1969/303 'f;:--

ik

.9119/321

+--

1969/324

'>(."'

1969/325

1,3 Har 62

Decision on JCS 1969/313

7 Mar 62

A Report ReferTed to JCS,

De~ision on JCS 1969/324

A Report - RefeITed to JCS

Decision on JCS 1969/325

27~.ar-62

A Report Referred

to JCS

29 Mar 62

A Report refrred

to JCS

29 1:1ar 62 '

Decision on JCS 1969/327

?.27

,Decision on JCS 1969/328

30 Mar 62

J..,_.

l'.ar 62

1969/327
1969/ 328

-'ji.

.l'--

R,~I,-,
11

Controlled
Distribution
THIS Ja TH ~O I NT CHIEP'O Orr 8TA P', MASTER
CASE P'lut COPY.
IT MU8'1" BE Rl:T\IANltO
TO THI:
Al:81:ARCH AND RECOAO& ANAI.V818
DR., DOCUMENT& D1Vl8ION
.JOINT 91:CAKTARIATt
ROOM '1Dt40,
1
WITHIN I DAYIJ OF TH'C DATE DORROWl:D UNLESS OTHCRWI OE 9PS::Clfl'U:D
Jll:NTAGON,

GOSReview 16 SEP1974

--

,
r

1'

. -

'/

'

D
UNCl~~

No 1s

INDEX

page 2

.'

..

f..11:QUCS,T IHITlAflD

ISY

NORTHWOODS
(S)
Paper
A 'l'tjkd:itgRefeITed to JCS

DATS

AoCNCY

' euaa:o,....

'

to JCS

A Report Referred

Decision .on ' JCS 1969/334

II

Decision on JCS 1969/335

Report Referred

NO

.lCD P,AP&R NO.

9...Apr-62

1969/334

9...Apr-62

1969/335 ~

'f_,

10-Apr-62

to JCS

A Report RefeITed to JCS

Decision

Jl'APltR

10-Apr-62

Report RefeITed to JCS

1,

~)'

,csCASEFILE
. COVER
SHEE

.~&RA
.BR
., JOINT
SECRETARIAT

'..33~ ~Feb-62)
CAoe

.').)

on JCS 1969/343

27-Apr-62

1969/343

'i(b-

27 Apr 62

1969/344

,-

1-May-62

1969/347

,tr

8-i,<.ay-62

Decision on JCS 1969/344

'

!Hlay - 62

Decision on JCS 1969/347

9-May-62

1,

A Report referred

to JCS

12....June-62

1969/366

II

A Report [ Referred

to JCS

12....June-62

1969/367

1,

Decision on JCS 1969/366

,,

13 Jun 62

Decision on JCS 1969/367

A Report Referred
.

15 Jun 62

to JCS

2.3Jul

Decision on JCS 1_969/389

A Report Referred

62

1969/389

27....Jul-6'2
, A

to JCS

2 Aug 62

1969/3 92

-.

Decis ion on JCS. 1969/39 2

8 Aug 62

.
,,

1,

A Repo~t - "eferred

to JCS

31 Aug 62

1969/411

A rleport - Referred

to

31 Aug 62

1969/412

.I(:

JCS

Decis i on o~ Jes 1969/411

31 Aug 62

Decision on JCS 1969/412

31 Aug 62-

A Report Refer!ed to JCS

1 Sep 62

}.969/1,l,3

-k--

.
II
I

"
THIS

18 'rHI:

R:8rtARCH
PENTAGON,

JOINT

CHl'!CP'8

OJI' STAPP'

ANO RECORDO
ANALYOIO
WITHIN
:I DAYS 0,. TH

MASTER

CA.Sit

on: 1,. DOCUMENTS

DATtt

BORROWGO

R!!FElRU:NCE: PAR.

P'ILl!t COPYt

I T MU3T

DE RKTURNED

DJV l 810N,
.IOJNT 8 E:CRl!:TARIAT,
UNLEtOO OTHERWISIC
&PEClfl'lttD.
AE3(4) JAi

'TO THE:

ROOM

'"i'i:co.

!1760.1

'

f,0ntrolled
Distribution
'
'

.---.... ... - ..

SPEBIAL
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

25 , O.C ..

8 August 1962

...
.' '

MEMORANDU
M FOR T}ffi SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE

' Subject:

Consequences of US Military
in Cuba (TS)

Intervention
.. .

...

1. On 2 August 1962, the CQief of Operations, Operation

Mongoose, requested the DOD/JCS Representative,
Operation
Mongoose, to~preoare a paper for distribution
to the Special
Group (Augmented~ on 8 August 1962 . Tne specific requirement
is to set forth 'Consequences of (US) Military Intervention
( in Cuba) to include cost (personnel, . uni ts and equipment),
effect on world-wide ability
to react, possibility
of a
requtrement for susta ined occupation,
the level of national
mobilization
required,
and Cuban counteraction."
2 . It is recommended that you approve the attached
to the Special Gr9up (Augmented) .
memorandum for distribution
If more specific and detailed information is required by the
Group, I will be prepared to provide it orally.

EXCLUDED
FROMGOS

EXCLUDEDFROMAUTOl,!A'i'IC

REGRADillG;
DODDIR 5200.10
DOES l!OT APPLY

N8FBRNa
l_______
_...,..~. --:f-."iJ P SEBRET
SPECIAL
HAfJBLlfl8
. ..

-,....
...,,_.
.. ,.. '. . ...

- - ...
,...,

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..

rettl uun1

/ {0 ///~"'/

7 '

~Ntl~S~\f
\lD

7 August 1962

MEMORANDUM
FOR THE DIRECTOR,JOINT STAFF
Subject:

1. Pursuant

Consequences of US Military Intervention

.
in CUba {TS) {JCS 1969/392)
.. : ,

to the discussion

meeting of the Operations

Deputies,

is submitted for addition

subject
11

paper:

'

of the subject

item at today's

the following material

r: .

to Enclosure

A {page 4) of the

,,

3. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, while agreeing

that positive

and successful

is ,.f.ui~y within current

that the attached
appraisal

military

intervention

US capability,

rs of the opinion

memorandumis unduly optimistic

of the force requir .ementa, duration,

sequences of such an action .

reservations

in Cuba

with respect

in its

~nd con-

He has expr essed the following

to the several

elements of the

analysis:
11

a . Cost (personnel , units,

I notice that

this

and equipment)
element is treat ed in

t erms of the magnitu de of force commitment and no specific

estimate

is made of coat in terms of personnel

material

consumed, and equipment -to be replaced

itated,

Even if this

I do not consider

treatment

is considered

caaualtie~,
or rehabilacceptable,

that the ground f orces now.shown are adequate

for the intended purpose within the indic ated time frame .
If the Castro regime is to be confronted
of overpowering force,
capitulation,
infantry

I consider

divisions

and casualties

with the prospect

reduced by early

that a minimum of three

should be introduced

(3)

immediately after

entry point has been seized by amphibious/airborne

11

'b. Level of National

Mobilization

force levels

assault.

Required.

(1) Adequate ground combat forces

in our current

an

are available

even if the scale of i ntervention

EXCLUDED
FROMGOS
\

- -'fBP SEC
ftET SP
ECIAL l!A~
fJ~
IHB N6F8Rt~

,......7

1,i I
1!, ~-u}
a>r 1htM

iur ~ttlltl

.ur.riULI~
; N8F8RN

.A~

UNtl~~S\f
,~~

. ..

is increased

as indicated

above ,

not appear to apply with respect

military

government/civil

of the intervention
.readiness

prior

only to direct
capability

units,

mobilization

, commitment
,

in these areas.
consideration

additional

of our

tensions

in

mobilization
during ~he Berlin

on World-Wide Ability

A critical

to React.

point here is the duration

I,

involvement ?f maJor elements of our strategic

I,

Cuba.

From examination

assessment

and deploy forces

control,

install

level

of

reserve

of time and distance

of the probable

agree that the indicated

factors,

of opposition,

in
and

I cannot

time frame is adequate to introduce

of this magnitude,
an effective

establish
.

effective '

new government, turn over control

to that government, withdraw and rehabilitat:e

our forces,

and place those forces

posture

in a renewed -readiness

in

CONUS
. In my opin i on a mi.tchlonger time would be involved
and during this period our ability
would be seriously
11

I!

,,
,,
,,

....

crisis,

1,

..

to resort

is addressed

to respond quickly to heightened

" c. Effect

I,

and

in CUba, Restoration

approach i ng ~he scale -of that undertaken

I,

~r all elements

. it would appear necessary

other areas might well require

I,

airlift

does

force are to have the same degree or

(2) The foregoing

I:

to tactical

affairs

and preparation,

to partial

The same situation

reduced,

'd, Castro - CUban Counteraction.

that Cuban defensive

initial

res:l.stance,

plans are believed

keypoints,

warfa1e.

This statement

Intelligence

The statement

is made

to contemplate

a strong

followed by a determined defense of'

preselected

military

to respond to other crisis

Estimate

and finally

by protracted

is from the current

which also states

establishment

guerrilla

National

that the present

as a whole is politically

rel i able ,

SPEGIAL
l~NBtltJBNtffiRN

.,ur

I,

..

'

~t41t.I

If Castro's

H
lt~S~\f
ttrIIt"U11n

lrE.&.IAb~ A

Cuba is only partially

of its

:i

defensive

plans,

successful

combat operations

could be of

considerably

longer du.ration thananticipated

and materiel

casualties

11

increasing

e. Possibiiity

Occupation.

with personnel

proportionally.

of a Requirement for a Sustained

The present

real probability

in the execution

wording makes no mention of the very

that a US provisional

military

government
,.

would be required
the size

for an extended period

(44,206 sq, mi.) and population

its long history , f political

sustained

and extensive

constituted

authority,
I consider

occupation

civil

affairs

of Cuba,

tradition

of

resistance

to

phase appears

that a cl~an-up and

divisions

and associated
I
period.
'
government/

for a considerable

to the need r.or a military

capable of directing

of Cuba until

the civil

we can organize and install

regime capable of responsible

This period of transition,

rehabilitation

and its

to the assault

it more probable

.establishment

and ~conomic affairs

a successor

subsequent

would be required

This is in addition

Considering

(6,743,000)

and terrorist

force of three infantry

support units
.

guerrilla

the estimat .e that only a division-,size

force will be required

modest,

unrest,

or time,

re-organization,

self-government.
and economic

might well continue for several

years.'

11

~~
C, H, HAYES

Major General, U.S. Marine Corps

Deputy Chief of staff (Plans)

l '

TQPSECRET
SPfetAL
IIAMBLIN6

. .....,
~

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ll'!m JOill'l'
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l'ago 12. -par~~pli

. ~(3) us N!litlli,:
"

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raco....,nd thilt tho rol l'oii1r~ ~

a l>e mtde in order
to take tull co~~nco
or the 1190:ubi e roqu1ron:cnt ft:tr'
reducing m.1.litocy, ronct1on t11:a to ~eoa than el.Ehto~a
(l!l) <fuya.
.

.......
.-~:r.~
...J
.

doloto

!'

Ja(3l r cha~

~o road O.Dt"o~ova1

R~3Ction

W1tb no prior

.US anri Cuban ceul~ l .tioa.

ency 'Plan No. 2; Qiba (S)

I h!-~ve rov.11:,,ed subJect ~~r (JCS 1969/389) onil

i.

VS Con~

C!!IEFS OP Sl'AW

wam1nc ,

1n l:ll.D1'111111

roeult

iG-'lfleil-t1a-:-~~ai

..

ron:aimar or porag,-:iph throut)I {<i~-weaUeP..~&

i~<i-eete~l}Y
(b) A rcgttiz, m nt to reduce s1en1r1 car,t1 1 tho
1?.ND&uault pt,rlo<.l l-tOuld r..cccosit!Jte !.ncrcmntal

cotmitmnt

,or,,us rore3JS RO they could 1:o asu2Jtl>led a.nd emplo:,,:cd 'l"ha

: ~1ma ...,,p1r6d, ,'to p,i1n o&5ont1Bl us 1>111t3!7 control

l!PPN>Cl.ob
'fy o,: tcn<lad.

"'. .

t>.Cl<
1on tir.i~

' tin n1rliorne

tcllo,rod

'

....

Ro:,evor 1 reduo t ron or us c111tar:,

""':Y:ti<> ct: overriding'

acn.,ult

1t.tportanco.

c<>ulclbo 1n1tiatccl

in l' i va

(5) AA)'&

EXCLUDEJi:-i-1:;v, .t.lli'O
l,UTIC
RECRADI
IIC: 000 018 ~200.10

DOESNOTAPPLY

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.
110..

m:-;

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b}" 01,-1:1,:,.dod unit!) as OO{')non a1ri'1elds

EXCtuom Ffl:OMGOS

u:ay bo

nro

..

~f
!

...~ .. . .. . ..... ~. .

.. ,
/

,,

..

........... ~.1,':i..';

. ..

'

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'

within

eiy.llt

o thcz

nraph!bious

bG com:nitted

(8) da:vs1 1'oll0\< on to,:,oen 1<ould be oor..mitted

Incre~ntal

becoo,:, evnilable.

illcreanod

!'OX'OGDoould

oo=J.toent

th<J risk ot hoav1er eooualtioa

01' .Corcc3

on bot fi u1dcc

..

(ol 'Ihe Cuban c1tuot.l.o:1 could demand more 1"",i:::G1ate

... ;I.

--.

rooct1on

~.,...
,1

~"
,:f,I, :

,tlia Cormuniot

,Pl'OV1do

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,. ': i .

to .._~- r:ipid . comitment

'

PONOI', llt1V8l wntirc

3, 'l'o be ao,.,;1etent

"(3

...,
"~

or air

11

14, psragrapli
sentonco:s as

us m111tacy plt111:1will

!!n-' 1!l1ti&t~ l'll_or :a . blooklldo pr.I.or to tbc eir~o=/e::,ph!l>!.::-.!:

O.SMUlt.

.,,;

C-Jban aovcrnaient.

11!.tb ch8Jl&cs roc<Xm11cndedabove, pago

3b(3) ilhould bo changed 1n tho 1rat 1;-.,0
1
_ l l0M1u
1

i' .

IC

-.
'

D. l!I.L..,--Y
J'\c!::1.trttl, US!J

!C,,1:3=
V!co

TOP SECR -NOFORN

SPEC! HANDLING

- --

D1.r~ctor
2

,,

'.

--
-

....

........ !,,<:

.v ..

,. _, '

.._,......
N~

='.

...: ....'f"':.:..1,.-~l(
,r~'.~.~

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CONTROL
DIVISION:

.\.

.. ~ I. '

, .,:' ,:., ,::.;'~

~~

. . ..

....,..,...,
.
., .... ...'

JllS~il969Y389- NOR'ffll!OODS
(S)

tt

~t their

'

meeting on 25 JulY, 1962 the Joint Clliefs

considered the euliject paper along with

this

,.-.,(~--
":'-~

...~

.....~. .
- .'

'

I.

sub3ect,
,..

~.

'&,...,

dated 25 JulY,, al "J. of which were tabled at tliJ.s

<<,,!')
$,!..~~~~
;~ d
f .'..-

-,_...,

.-

t o refer

."'>, ,.,.

~ eed to !llerer this item. It was also agreec1

the sutiject paper and al ~ purples to General Harris

tor revision

.:.:.1:tm3
<(-"Y,,.T"'I

in the light

of the discussion

Further , it was e,s,,eed to have tliis revision

-;~

Chiefs on an individual
obtained,

basis;

held at the meeting

circulated

should suoh approval not be

tliJ.s item will be rescheduled on the Pr1day,

'!SeDda.

.....'

~J.
ING

Colonel, USAF
Seoret!U'Y

:<:'::!

.~;~.
Copy to,
..., . .
.

General Harrrs

..~

.' .

Hith

~ (

/ ,(t'\

'~Ntl~~
lfllD
- ~"~!ET

E<ClUDEI>
FROMGOS

'irf,

July

. I 715 )OP1-151 a:,

>,ili:illili
26 AL ,,...
s,,.,
1111:
-,,t~
3'
Nt~OIN
iii

--

COPY OF
COPIES
SPECIALDISTRIBUTION

REPORTBY THE DEPARTMENT

OF DEFENSEAND
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFREPRESENTATIVE
ON THE
SURVEY
GROUP
CARIBBEAN
to the

JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF

on

US CONTINGENCY
PLANNO. 2, CUBA(S)

EXCLUDED
FROMGOS

EXCLUDED
FROMAUTOMATIC
REGRADING:
DODDIR 5200.10 DOESNOTAPPLY

,.~NCll~~lf
ltO
TOPOEG
-AfJa&P~GIAt
IMrN
8tING tMJ,URN.e
1

I ..

US CONTINGENCY
PLANNO. 2, CUBA(S)

THE PROBLEM
1. As requested*

by the Chief of Operations,

MONGOOSE,
to develop an interagency
military

intervention

Operation

contingency

plan for US

in Cuba.
ASSUMPTIONS

2. It is possible
in Cuba.

that

A resistance

a spontaneous

could occur

the Communist Cuban

movement against

government could develop a situation

may desire

uprising

that

the United States

to exploit.

3. The United States

will pursue

the overthrow

of the

Communist Cuban government.

FACTSBEARINGON THE PROBLEM
4. The Department of Defense/Joint
repr.esentative

to the Caribbean

for the preparation

which include
wide-spread

to eighteen
plan.

in a situation

of open,

in Cuba.
of forces

will permit

execution

of

Plan No. 314-61** at any time subsequent

(18) days after

6 . For additional
Enclosure B.

plan for US actions

intervention,

5. Normal readiness
CINCLANTOperations

Survey Group is responsible*

of a contingency

military
revolt

Chiefs of Staff

the decision

facts bearing

to implement the

on the problem see

DISCUSSION
7. 'For discussion

see Enclosure

c.

CONCLUSIONS
8. The plan attached
response

at Enclosure

to the requirement

* Memofor representatives

A provides

for a contingency

suitable
plan.

of State, Defense, CIA, USIA, f1~m

B/G Lansdale, subject,
"Spontaneous Revolts . in Cuba,
Contingency Planning," dated 14 Jime 1962; on file in Gen
Harris' office.
,
** CINCLANTContingency Operations Plan No. 314-61 (cuba) (s),
dated 22 July 1961, as amended; on file in JoinG Secretariat.
' I

~NtlASSlf
ltD

RECOMME
NDATIONS

9. It is recommended that:
a.I The contingency
~J,lQ

plan at Enclosure A hereto

forwarded to Chief of Operations,

be approved

Operation MO
NGOOSE,

through the .Secretary of Defense.

and
b. A copy of this paper be forwarded to CINCLANT
CINCSTRil<E.
c. This paper NOTbe forwarded to US officers

assigned

to NATOactivities.
d . This paper NOTbe forwarded to the Chairman, US
Delegation,

United Nations Military

a TOPii~RrEi

.'

Staff

Committee.

DRAFT

~Ntl~~lf
ltU

ENCLOSURE
A

MEMORANDUM
FOR THE SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE
SUbject:
l.

United States

Contingency Plan No. 2, Cuba (S)

As requested ' in memorandumfor representatives

State,

of

Defense, CIA and USIA from Chief of Operations,

Operation Mongoose, subject:

Contingency Planning,"

"Spontaneous Revolts in Cuba,

dated 11+June 1962, the attached

plan is forwarded for your approval,

the Chief of Operations,

prior

intervention

principal

forms.

of confronting

methods of

dealt with in this plan take three

These are,

a. A deliberate,

to

Operation Mongoose.

2. It will be noted that the alternative

military

to delivery

in descending order of magnitude:

orderly,

large-scale

operation

capable

the Castro regime with the prospect

of

over-powering force.
b. An accelerated

initial

reaction

and amphibious forces building

of the primary plan.

c.

An

military

up as feasible

This method enta1is

longer time to establish

probability

of greater

fully

effective

casualties

immediate and continuing

forces and facilities

revolting
tions.

by lesser

airborne

to th,e scale

greater
control,

risk,
and the

on both sides.
air attack

on Castro

to support and assist

the

forces and to pave the way for subsequent opera-

3. The above described

tially to current
in Cuba.

alternative

CINCLANT
plans for contingency

~. This plan was coordinated

during preparation

methods conform essenoperations

with the Department of State

in order to be consistent

with and

EXCLUDED
FROMAUTOMATIC
REGRADING;
DODDIR 5200.10 IX>ESNOTAPPLY
Enclosure A

(Amendedas directed

by the Joint

Chiefs of ~taff

- 27 July 1962)

.. 111r ~ttiKtl

N9sf8
-RN

complementary to the alternate

addresses
limited

5.

the contingency
to US actions

Operations

of State,

less

outlined

Central

plan prepared by State which

of an internal

Cuban revolt

than military

intervention.

within

Intelligence

but is

this plan for the Department

Agency and US Information

Agency were prepared by each agency concerned.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L. L. LEMNITZER

Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure A -,
(Amended as directed

by

the Jo\'1.t Chiefs of Staff

- 27 July 1962)

.~NtllS~lf
llD
I

TOPSEGRET
SPECIAL
HANB~ltt8
.NOFOftN
-

:Aili
IIrx
& w1 1;,
~
. t!:f 11 t RIMI :~. alf411t1
n1
F\J

a
"ue
r-os
nr
ns

APPENDIX TO BNCLOSUREA
UNITED STATES CONTI NGENCY PLAN NO. 2, CUBA (S)

,,

Appendix t o
Enclosure A

1ttt' &tl;Kt I

~~,xrtGIil NANBLIN
-8~ N8F8RN-

UNtl~SSl~lt

DRAFT

5412 SPECIALGROUP(AUGMENTED)
25, D. C.
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM
FOR: The Secretary

Subject:
1., The attached

of State

The Secretary

of Defense

The Director,

Central

The Director,

US Information

United States

Contingency Plan No. 2, Cuba (S)

plan delineates

pursued by the United States

Intelligence
Agency

the course of action

to be

in the event that US military

intervention
is undertaken in support of open, wide-spread
revolt in Cuba.
2. Subject plan is effective
for the conduct of operations

for planning on receipt

and

when directed.

3. This document requires special

releasable to foreign nationals.

handling and is not

FORTHE 5412 SPECIALGROUP(AUGMENTED):

EDWARD
G. LANSDALE
Brigadier General, USAF
Chief of Operations,
Operation MONGOOSE

EXCLUDED
FROMAUTOMATIC
REGRADING;
DODDIR 5200.10 DOESNOTAPPLY

..

TOPSE6RET
SPE61AL
IIANBLIN6
N8F9RN

. I ur ~~tilttI

;:v~t't~IAL
NANDLIN{J)
MOFQRN
TITLE PAGE

1. The title

of t his document is:

UNITEDSTATESCONTINGENCY
PLJ\NNO. 2, CUBA(S)
2. The title

of this

plan may be referred

document is classified

to as the Caribbean

Survey Group (or,

CSG) Plan No. 2, which name is unclassified

Cuba.
3. This document contains
defense

information

793 and 795, title

or revelation

of the contents

4. Reproduction
permission

supporting

t hereof

Its

transmission

in any manner to an

by law.

of OJ)erations,

Operation

Distribution

will be restricted

US government agencies

specifically

the plan on a "Special

Handling - Not Releasable

Nationals"

to

the nation a1

except as necess ary for the preparation

plans.

related

of t his document in whole or in part without

of the Director

is prohibited

affecting

u~s.c.).

18;

person is prohibited

unauthorized

unless

the meaning of the Espionage

of the United Stat es within

Laws (Section

SECRET. The

requiring

MONGOOSE
of
to those

knowledge of
to Foreign

basis.

EXCLUDED
FROMAUTOMATIC
REGRADING:
DODDIR 5200.10 DOESNOTAPPLY
7

~Ntl&S~lf
ltD

TOPSE6RiTSPEC~AL
H-A
N-DLING
NOfflflN

.. 1 ttr

N9F8RN

atGnf I '~JJ
:Sl'ttilAL
. NA
.NULllf,

US CONTINGENCY
PLANNO. 2 1 CUBA(S)

TABLEOF CONTENTS
Letter

of Promulgation

Page

Page

Page

Table of Contents

Page

. Page

Page

Title

Distribution

List

Basic Plan

EXCLUD
ED FROMAUTOMATIC
REGRADI,NG:
DODDIR 5200.10 DOESNOTAPPLY
8

T9PSE8RET
SfEelAL
H"A"N1Jtlfl0

J VF

cltbftt I

iJ'J,
3rttilAL

NANYLIN~w
NHFHRN

UNClAS~ltltU
US CONTINGENCY
PLAt-lNO~., CUBA..:.-J.l
DIS1'RIBUT:O
'Ofi LIST

AGEUCY

COPYNUMBERS

Department of Stace
Departm'3nt of t>e; 13nse
*Department of the Treasury
*Department of Justlce
*Departrnemt or Health,

F.ducation and Welfare

*Department of Agriculture
Central. Intelligenee

Agency

US In.1'orr,:ation Agency
*Federa! Aviation Agency
*Bureau of the Bude.et

*Distri\Jution to asterisked agencies will not be made until

such time as 'their particiy:; .tion 16 required in planning or
implementatj_on of the plan.
Whendistribution
is mad'3 to
th~se agencies, only those por~!o~s of the plan which pertain
wll l be d!ssere:i.!"~.ted.
to their participati"n

EJ!:C!.UDED
1''ROMAUTOMATIC
REGRADitfG;
1)',j;)

DIB 5200 . 10 DOES NOT APPLY:

9
'

TOPSECRET
SPE~IAL
HANDLING
'NOFORN

I , .

UNGlA~~ltltU
UNITEDSTATESCONTINGENCY
PLANNO, 2, CUBA(S)
Reference:

Memorandumfor Representative?

of State,

Defense,

CIA and USIA, from Chief of OperationsP. Operation

MONGOOSE,
subject:
Contingency

"Spontane?US Revolts

in Cuba,

dated i4 June 1962.

Planning",

Department or State

Task Agencies:

Department of Defense
Central

Intelligence

US Information

Agency

Agency

1. Situation,

a. The purpose of this plan is to define

action

to be pursued by affected

of

of the US

a decision

Government in the event that

the United States

agencies

the courses

undertake

military

is made that
'
intervent:!.on in

Cuba.
b. The .:1.ssumedsituation
spread revolt.

in Cuba is open, wide-

This contingency

initiated

situation,

activated

for mid-June 1962.

the situation

similar

include

to that rumored as being

US actions

for implementation
internal

revolt

to exploit

the use of US military

c. It is assumed tha t this

under the following

may be a non-US

plan would be implemented

conditions,

and

under situa tions

has created

force.

a chaotic

~
.

would be considered
less

severe.

situation

An
in

Guba where:

(1) The revolution

is open and threatens

the Communist regime;

EXCLlTJ
)ED FROMAUTOMATIC
REGRADING:
DOD r::R 5200 . 10 DOES NOT APPLY

'... .

l
<

::;i

10

U~ClA~~lf
l(D
.NOFORN
TOPSECRET
SPECIAL
HANDLIKG

(2) Areas are taken and held by the revolutionarie

and;
(3) Leadership

of the revolt,

s,

unable to overthrow

the government or sustain

requests

assistance

the revolution

d. The United States

that a rebellion

diplomatic,

unfriendly

forces

outbreak.

covert

morale,

will

More probably

to initiate

and mi~itary

disposition

necessary
preparations.

and equipage of

will be assumed to be as described

estimates

it will

which will prov:i.de some

and the opportunity

e. The strength,

actual

notice,

revolt

propaganda,

the

be able to determ in e

that the assumed situation

evolve from a localized

current

may, or may not,

at once and without

advance notice

and/or

(OAS),

is imminent before

However, it is unlikely
occur all

indefinitely,

from the United States

Organiz ation of American States

1ft

of the United States

Intelligence

in
Board

(USIB).
2 . Mission.
.
The United States
in Cuba through all
military

force

will suppor t and sustain

its

resources

to assure

including

replacement

the rebe,llion
the use of US

of the Communist regime

with a new Cubi-.n government accep t able to the United States.

3. Execution.
a . Concept of Operations .
(1) When the li ke liho od or emergence of a CUban

revolt
it

becomes apparent

to the US intelligence

will be j.mmed:l.ately brought

5412 Special

to the attention

community
of the

Group (Augmented) through the Office of

the Chief of Operations,

of the situation

Operation

MONGOOSE.Eval\1atj .on

by the Sp0t!~.:l Group will determine

whether

11

"NOFORN
SPECIAL
HANDLING
TOPSECRET

:!)>'UI

II n 11U L I 11'!_.;9

LUlftL

or not the President's

decision

_nurunn

should be sought to

imple n;ent this plan .

(2) The initial
---

stages of a spontaneous rev:olt will

..-- ......~ .....-.-..'Y"'''_:_ ....

..~- -- ...,....._--- - ;

--

be supported by the Unite d States

covert operations

and other actions as necessary, but

"--..
the appearance of non-US involvement should

maintaining
t/

the revolt

through propaganda,

-- .--,,~
...
---

In the event that tte revolt

fail.

as a popular movement against

United States

spreads

the Communist
regime, the
,,

should be capable of rapid military

action

to forestall

a concertedaid

the interest

of humanity and the mission of this plan.

(3) US Military

reprisal

program in

Reaction.

(a) With no prior

days of preparation
assault

drastic

warning and 'with eighteen

a coordinated

(18)

airborne-amphibious

could be executed which, it is anticipated,

would gain control

the principal

of key military

centers

installations

of population

ten (10) days and result

and

of Cuba within

in minimum US and Cuban

casualties.
(b)
assault

requirement

period would necessitat

ment of US forces
ployed.

to reduce significantly

appreciably
tary reaction

circumstance

US military
extended.

the time required

control

However, reduction

In such case, air and naval forces

airborne
( 5)

assault

ill~

of US miliimportance.

could attack

support of the rebel Cubans with little

the ti me ;; c.ecision: . is l!lade.

to

of Cuba could be

time may be of overriding

coul d be i P.itiated

commit-

as they could be assembled and em-

Under .this

gain essential

e incremental

th e pre-

in

delay from

air assault

within eight (8) hours, an

could - be initiated

within five

days and a Na,y/Mari ne amphibious . force

could be comm
itted

three

(3) days later

with

12

(Amended as directed
~t
[

by t he Joi~t Chiefs of Staff

'

- 27 July 1962)

TOPSECRET
SPECIAL
HANDLING
NOFORN

I Uf

OtlJR[

It UI U I\H,

a build up to the full-scale

effort

to follow.

(4) Execution of this plan will . be in two (2) phases:

(a) Phase I.

After Presidential

phase will be undertaken

decision ., this

by the Department of Defense

supported by other agencies of the government,

will be initiated

by overt US mili:tary

Cuba under the direction

control

operation
quicldy
strength
resist

at such time as essential

is gained over the island,

is to be conducted as rapidly
to confront

on

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

and will be terminated

military

assault

The

as possible,

Cuban forces with sufficient

beyond enemy
._,,capability
and to reduce rislt to US units initially

deployed,

It

to be clearly

to

with a view toward early capitulation

Cuban military

of

units and avoidance of needless

loss

of life.
(b) Phase II.
essential

Following the establishment

US military

control

phase will be primarily

of the island,

Cuban government friendly

efforts

will be directed

affairs

and military

tary operations

this

concerned - with the restora-

tion of law and order and the establishment

policy established

of

of a new

to the US.. US military

primarily

to matters of civil

government in accordance with

by the Department of State.

essential

for the.elimination

Miliof

small pockets of resistance

and order throughout

and restoration
of law
the island -will
..' continue. Major

US combat forces will be w~thdrawn as early as

security

may permit.

Operational_r'esponsibility

the Department of Defense will

.
cease at

Department of State assumes responsibility

administration

of

the time the

for civil

of Cuba.

13
,.

~~tl~~~lfIf~
,
.NOFORN
- TOPS~CRET
SPECIAL
HANDLING

___..__ _

HUI Ul\11

b. Department of Defense Operations.

(1)

When directed

by higher authority,

or as the

situation demands, the Department of Defense ;will

.
ini t iate preparatory actions for US military interventi on in Cuba,
positioning
current
(2)

Chiefs

These actions

forces and equipment by execution of

cover and deception

Upon final

decision

plans .
of the President,

of St aff will direct

intervention

may include pre -

execution

the Joint

of military

plans for Cuba.

(3) In concept,
with a blockade,

initial

military

operations

commence

concentrated

air strikes

and coordi-

nat ed Naval gunfi

. r e to effect

destruction

of enemy

air power and to neutralize

possible

and destroy as much as

of the enemy tank, armor, artillery

, and

- -- - - - - ---

'

14
(Amendedas directed

by the Joint

Chiefs of Staff

ll!l
~~\~
~

TOPSECRET

?1 July 1962)

NOFORti
HANDLIKG

I UI

OLOIILI

''

. ,.

. ...........,., .... ..._.......

(5) At such time as essential

is gained in Cuba, matters

of St at e .

of civil

affai rs and mili -

military

est ablished

This includes

US milita ry control

tary government will be given priority

in ac cordance with policy

and under ta ken

by the Depar tment

pr9vis io n for a provisional

government pre pared t o as sume full

executive , and judicial

control until

can be turned over to other autho rity

an expedi t ious and orderly

manner.

le gislative,

such functions

on direction

in

Remainin g re si st ance

element s of the Commun

is t Cuban government
, ar med fo rce s
..
.
or other groups will

be isolated,

contained and destroyed

or ca pt ur ed as ra pi dl y as poss i ble .
units

US military

will be scheduled for early r~turn

States

consistent

with security

combat

to the United

considerat ions.

c. Department of State Operations

Cl) Phase I .

The Depa rtm ent of Sta t e wil l seek t o

place t he United States

in as broad a multilateral

context a s possi bl e .
(a) Immediate l y sound out Latin American
Governments to determine whether the United States
can count upon a 2/3 majori ty decision
th e us e of milit ar y forces under Article

authorizing
6 of

the-Rio Treaty.,.
(Amended as directed
i -

by the Joint Chiefs of sta ff - 27 July 1962)

TOPSECRET
SPECIAL
HAND
LI.NG . NOFORN-

1,u1
'9rt11tfr..:.
SP~ret'At
Hltfltl:1ff
! s Ni-f!O
iltN

~Ntl~~~lf
IfD

(b) If 2/3 majority

is available,

Council of the Organization

request

the

of American States

to

convoke immediately a meeting of foreign ministers

under Article

6 of the Rio Treaty and obtain Organi-

zation of American States

(OAS) decision

authorizing

use of force.
two Latin

(c) Seek agreement from at least

American nations

(preferebly

not Nicaragua or Guate-

mala) to provide token forces

to join United States

forces.
(d) If 2/3 majority
the anti-Castro

cannot be mustered, recognize

forces as the Government of Cuba and,

in response to its appeal for help,

come to its

with United States military

assistance

whatever foreign

forces and

token forces have been made available.

(e) Keep key members of Congress informed of

significant

developments.

(f) Inform all friendly

and the reasons
of their

obtain public expressions

support and of their

Castro forces.
violence

therefor;

governments of our actions

sympathy for the anti-

Warn them to expect communist directed

and offer

them assistance.

(g) Notify the OASand the United Nations (as

appropriate)

of our actions

them in these international

bodies.

(h) Engage in all-out

propaganda stressing
action

and be prepared to defend

psychological

the morality

designed to assist

warfare and

of United States

the Cuhan people throw off

the bonds of communist er!Zlaven,ent .

(a) Provide imrc<?<:'
:.::, .o;
other assistance

1;,:,

,.

16

<::!
n:'?", 3m 1(:;r

._,_
.... ,.,.._,.

t0<"!onomicand

(b) Turn over as rapidly

as possible

Government for administration

of the territory

by United States troops and assist

to the extent feasible

to the Cuban

that government

as it requests.

(c) Make preparations

to provide the Cuban Govern-

ment with long range economic assistance

(d) Take measures to assist
to control

taken

the Cuban Government

entry into and exit from Cuba.

(e) Re- establish

the United States

country team

in Havana.
d . Central

Intelligence

AgencyOperations.

(1) CIA operations

against

Cuba are controlled

component of CIA Headquarters,

elements are located

Washington.

in the vicinity

with sub elements at other Florida

(2) In the event of localized
covert support to the revolt

Operational

of Miami, Florida,
locations.

revolt,

CIA will give

through introduction

communications, arms,equipment and trained

appropriate

by a

of

personnel

as

and feasible.

(3) \\!hen US Military

intervention

is directed

and

contingency plans are implemented, CIA will fUlly support

the military

actions

in accordance with the JCS/CIA

Agreement,whether it is implemented

CommandRelationship
or not.
(~) Liaison
prior

arid communications will be established

to implementation

of CINCLAN~
and subordinate

(5) CIA will support military

tine intelligence,
political

counter intelligence,

and paramilitary

(6) After the initial

quent consolidation
designate

selected

based personnel

assault

propaganda,

and during the subse-

and occupation phase, CIA will

from CIA Headquarters

b~se, . Florida,

conduct clandestine

by clandes-

operations,

personnel

or CIA operations
and objectives ,

operations

plals.

operations

Ultimately,

a permanent CIA station

17

to proceed to Cuba and

in support of US forces
.
the QUlk
of CIA Florida '

will be transferred
I

and/

and bases.

to Cuba to establish

~Ntll~lf
l~D

1
5 aa
9pfe11Al'L
m1tf
A'N
D1~ltf8
N,OtNl7it

. .f u-Psre,~
T
e , United States
(1)

factual

Information

Agency Operations.

The Agency will pro~vide compl:te,

and impartial

informational

taneous revolt , in its

initial

phase ,

but strictly

coverage to a sponThe purpose of

such coverage will be to keep the people of Cuba, and

of the hemisphere,

fully

informed of developments,

to s et the stage for possible

action.

and

subsequent courses of

Extreme caution will be taken to avoid the

appeara1ce of US involvement during this phase so as to

nullify

possible

later

charges of US intervention

Cuba or other Latin American governments)

revolt

fail .

In this

context,

phase must carefully

refrain

(by

should the

the Agency during this

from a type or tone of

coverage that might be construed

(2) In the event of direct

as incitement

US involvement,

to riot.
the Agency

will:
(a) Assign informational
Defense Psywar units

specialists

to work with

during combat operations .

(b) Staff up a regular

USIS unit to move into

Havana with the Department of State contingent

at

the time and place to be decided on by the Department.

(c) Prepare for immediate shipment all physical
equipment and r~sources
operation

necessary

to support a USIS

in Cuba.

(3) Ba.sic considerations

support of direct

US military

in Agency informational
action:

(a) Medium wave radio should receive

attention

for any overt combat operation

Immediately upon securing

priority
in Cuba.

any beachhead or other

'7

enclave on the isl:r~.1d, and perhaps immed:iately prior

to or concurrent

,..._.
_'21 such actinn,

broadcas~:;.ng shoul c begin.

18

--

--

massive medium wave

A beefed - up Guantanamo

~~tl~;if
ltO

IIJJiiO
PR.iz
~SiliG~R
el'Ji;..,gf;f>~f
fflt[M1f:
'1111
tffllfflffl
~Nrtrlffl.1ft,
7 Nftiffr-

a 111
transmitter,

leased

transmitters

and, as soon as possible,

station(s)

U.S. Florida

should be assigned

wave facilities
necessary

will

task,

also be increased

Short

to provide

backup.

simple and direct,

personal
order,

floating

captured Cuban,

to this

(b) The messages of this

safety

rights,

facilities,

reassuring

the people of their

of their

individual

on the maintenance o.f p'J.blic

the distribution

all done hopefully

of food and medical attention,

in a Cuban context

the minimum of reference

credibility

phase should be

and the protection

instructions

power necessary

initial

and with only

to US military

forces

and

to maintain order and to assure

of the inevitability

of Castro's

rapid

and complete defeat.

(c) Care nrust be exercised,
anti-Castro

particularly

Cubans, toa.roid alienating

port by immediate talk of vengeance,

of possible
benefits)

with the

possible

sup-

or of indications

loss of any gains (housing,

land,

social

which might have accrued to the peasant

and

worker groups during the Castro regime.

(d) Given the relatively
in Cuba, wall posters

and leaflets

themes of the broadcasts

and utilized

high rate

of literacy

reiterating

the

should also be available

as soon as practical,

air drop ahead of military

action

the leaflets

by

where deemed

advisable.
(e) Any provisional
have a news bulletin
instruct
( f)

military
for factual

government must also

news summaries and

i ons to t he civilian

population.

:::r. all

planning,

psy~"oloi;ical

tion sho,1-ld be giv \n to avoiding

special

atten-

in so far as possible

19

~~tl~~Slf
If~
D

TOP&EGRET
6PEOl~
H~
:ttl+llftt
, ,N~

LUI' t;t~KtI ,_w~fECIALHANBtlM

& NOFORN
any indications
ante,

all

reassure

of plans to ret\ll'n to the status

information

quo

output should be designed to

the 'populace that the US supported movement

is designed to carry forward the realization

social

and economic aspirations

of the

of the Cuban people.

f. Depart ment of the Treasury

Department of Justice
Deuartment of Health.

Education and Welfare

Department of Agriculture
Federal

Aviation Agency

Bureau of the Budget

Supporting
expedite

functions

will

be undertaken

and promote the efforts

a. As requested

to assist,

of Task Agencies:

by Task Agencies, prior

plan implementation,
b. As requested

to

and
by Chief of Operations,

Operation Mongoose, when plan is implemented.

4. Coordinating

Instructions.

a. Implementation

of this plan will

be as directed

by

the President.
b. Military

operations,

including

military

activities,

directed

by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

of military

will

clandestine

be conducted by CINCLANT
as

government activities

by CINCLA1'1T
as directed
accordance with policy
c. Political,
the Secretary

in Cuba will be conducted

establi ?hed by the Secretary

in
of State.

and economic operations

in accordance with policy

established

will
by

of State.

d. Supporting plans are required

from all

""'"'

D!::ct

coor~!~
-planning purposes.

- - --- ______..

_b:__
~ ~~ag .!:_
nci ~!l2

in current

--

Task Agencies.
-...
__.....,
.l9:.
.~w.'.@.~U
!'

One copy of supporting

provided Chief of Operations,

maintained

The administration

by the Joint Chiefs of Staff

psychological

be accomplished

and para-

plans is to be

Operation Mongoose, and

status.
20

(Amended as directed
Q

by the Joint

Chiefs of Staff

- 27 July 1962)

SPEElt~
IIANDLl~u

1
. IUI' tiECKEf 5PECIA
L H,ANI
~~

e. During implementation
Operations,

NiffRN

~~:~ll~\f
ltO

of the plan the Chief of

Operation Mongoose, will act as the coordinator

for the 5412 Special Group (Augmented) on inter-Agency

activities.

The coordinating

in the Pentagon,

,.

will be established

Office of the Joint Chiefs of ,,Staff,

Room 2 B 913, telephone

(Amended as directed

office

by the Joint

extension

59710.

21
Chiefs of Staff

- 27 July 1962)

TOPtfCtfT SPE~,A.~KAN
DHNG . NOf-.&R,N
.

I YI' :;tt;KtI / 51'Lti1At

IIANDLIK
J N&FftRN

UNtl~SS\f
IEO

ENCLOSUREB

FACTSBEARING
. ON THE PROBLEM
Chiefs of Staff , on 22 May 1962 approved

1. The Joint

CINCLANTOperational
US preparations
2. Planning

Plan 318-62* which provides

ln Cuba.

for mili tary intervention

for US military

a react ion time reduced

j.ntervention

to five

cover for

in Cuba w1th

(5) days i s currently

process but has not bee n appr oved by the Jo i nt Chiefs

Staff.-l!*

3. CIA operations

"w"which

Task Force
Washington,
CIA unit

D.C.

located

at other Florida
operation

against

Cuba are controlled

in
of

by Commander,

is a component of CIA Headquarters

The primary operational"

in the vicinity
location s ,

in

element is the

of Miami., with sub elements

CIA will

in the event US military

support

action

the milit a ry

is taken against

Cuba.
4. Sub-paragraphs
plan,

outlining

of the execution

separate

departmental

paragraph

of the basic

and agency particip~tion,

were prov ided by the agency concerned.

CINCLANTOperations
Secretari .at
** CINCLANTOperations
Secretariat

Plan No 318-62;

on fj .le in Joint

Plan No 316-62 ; on file

in Joint

Enclosure

22

TOPs.ECBET
iSPEC
IAL-11,A,Nll
ING . N&fiR.N

ur atbKtl

...._~
,. ;)rtl,IAL

. ._..1

HANYllt'
_y

NUIUKN

ENCLOSURE
C
DISCUSSION
l, The approved military

plan for US intervention

can be executed in eighteen

no warning;
time, unless,
clearly

to reduce this reaction

such preparatory

to imminent military

at this

measures can be

action,

time for a Cuban operation

Extensive troop
which may not be

executed within the next few years is of questionable

Similarly,

prestockage

and activation

of supplies,

being required

if such preparations
in the foreseeable

2, It is unlikely
without active

fleet

itself

have no likelihood

US military

of

-'

future,

for an appreciable

and positive

of forces

does not

that a . spontaneous uprising

dev~lop and sustain

value.

pre-positioning

of ships from the reserve

appear justified

of

that funds will be

pre-positioned

of course,

related

training

(18) days from a condition

It is not anticipated

expended nor units

in Cuba

in C11bc1.could

length of time

sppport.

It is

expected that the United States would ma.1ntain an appearance

of non-involvement
therefore

prior

important

that US forces

response than eighteen

and, second, to react
reprisals

to any decision

a revolt

acts or

by the Communist Cuban government.

risks

ting US forces

in incremental

to be faced.

The most rapid reaction

as directed

involved in commit-

deployments such risks may have

employ air power, which is currently

possible

in Cuba.

would be to

being planned by CI1~CLANT

by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

be the difference
as rapidly

to sustain

to irrational

3, Although there are increased

uprising

It is

be capable of more rapid

(18) days, first,

adequately

to intervene.

between success or failure

This air plan could

of any popular

'.l.'heuse of air power should be followed

as possible

by the air-dropped/air-landed

assault

as planned in CINCLANT
OPLAN316-62, with follow-on amphibi?US
forces

introduced

as soon as feasible,

and a build up to the

I

full.-scal.e

effort

of CINCLANTOPLAN3111-61.
,.

23

TOPSECRET
SPECIAL
NANQLING
N9f9R~

,,.

-
1

..,
..

UNtlASS~
lD199.SEeRET
13 June 1962

.,,.

......

.~:

Decision on,

1,,~;,

"".

SPr.fCIAh
HAND
UING
REQU!
~E~
;

JCS il.969/366
.,... _

NO
OO
RELEASABLE
liO~OREIGN
NAJl0N.Al1

~ (NORTHWOODS)
(S)

At their

' .,

_,..

......,,...

meeting on 13 June 1962 the Joint Chie fs of

%JCS Representative
Staff approved the recommendations of the DOD
to the Caribbean Survey Group as set forth in paragraph 9'bf
the su~jeot Raper, as amended 1n the Appendix to Enclosure A

--~
.;.J
;>:-,-~
,'.;(,~}.,j

>)S~Mf.11

ffi
...,,......']
' .
,.,,

~4

... ...
.;

"complel<ity ot" and deletion

of the words "an<Sincrease

the risk of Soviet retaliation

redesignated

elsewhere . " from the end

Additional ly, paragraph 2 rs

as par agr aph 3

;,

-~*'~

ii

b.

Deletion of paragraph 3.

c.

Deletion of the word "However" trom the beginning

of the first

sentence of paragraph 4 and of the words

"in the race of 1noreaoed riak of Soviet countermeasures

:~

~~?

:,-.
\

elsewhere."

from tn e end ot the sentence.

al l of the last

. ...~ 1

'.

.. .

Additionally,

sentence of paragJ1aph 4 is deleted

is redesignated

-:'~:..'i."
:'/11

'

1n the second sentence or

!'d8 "urgency for" tor the t>rde

paragl,'aph 2, of the WO

or the sentence.

....,. ~1
-~

.!!. Substitution,

and

as paragraph 2 .

jt(
rM~

Copy to1

DIOOI
tl.II>O

Colonel, USAF
1:)(0.UOEI>
fOOM
GOS
Deputy, Secreta J,'Y;
Of~-

C't'uif" 'J CCIOh

wJ.I. - - -

PoRt!S s e:.;' .

..

.!

.--:;.

us;

UN&tAS~tf
IfO\
S6REI
il.3 JUne 19.92

-,.c-,
-
" ": '

...

.:,. ;,1.,,. ,

~
.;

Dec1s1on on:

...

-: :-

JCS

19.99}366

. .

. . ,(NORTHIIOODS)
. (S)

... .
"

.. ...
.

At tl\e1r meeting on 13 June 19o2 tne Joint Chiefs

or St ate approved the recommendations

oe BOENCraig

as

set fortti in paragraph 9 of tl\e subjec ~ paper, as amended

1n the Appencl1.x
A b;:t:
.. to EilclQsure
.

. .

..

a. Changes to par!!SI'apl\ 2 an~, r ei1e11:tgpat i on

as paraaraph 3 ,
b.

".. :i: I

. .
, ....

.-

Deletion ot paragr apl\ 3.

Changes to para&I?aph 4 and redes1gnat10 .n

as paragr aph 2.
.,

.....~

'
-~
. .. -
,

"I

'. :

'

..

..

..:,<::~

Copy, to,

EXCI.UDED
fROM GOS

General Cra1g

~,.:

.....
,.

. ..
........
.

.....'

..;-i,.&,. ....

.,. ,. ...

..

. ..J..-~

I ur

.)[ " Rt I Ji .)r [ I, 111L

nAnuLIft''jj

nu~., uHn

COPYNO.../__ OF .2 O COPIES
SPECIALDISTRIBUTION

12 ,Tune 1962

REPORT
BY THEDEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE
AND
.QN_.THE
JOINT' CHIEFSOF STAFFREPRESENTATIVE
CARIBBEAN
SURVEY
GROUP
to the

JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF

on

SOVIETBASE IN CUBA (S)

EXCLUDED
FROMGOS

EXCLUDED
FROMAUTOMATIC
REGRADING
DODDIRECTIVE5200. 10
.
DOESNOTAPPLY'

.~NtlA~~ltitu
.
JOP SECRET
SPECIAL
HANDLING
NO
FORN

.
'

.,, II r btliKt I _:ll~rtl:ilAL HANuLIN'j.i

NUt
UKN-.,

SOVIET BASE IN CUBA(S)

PJIOBLEM

1. In response

Operation

to a request*

from Chief of Operations,

Mongoose, to determine

for the United States

a ~ilitary

an appropriate

to take in eve nt that

course of action

the Soviets

establish

base in Cuba.
FACTSBEARINGON THEPROB:W1

2. The problem etated

' posed by Mr. Robert

above was initially

Kennedy at the meeting of the Special

Group (Augmented) on

22 March 1962.
3. The Joint
complexities

attending

have previously
military

Chiefs of Staff ~ ' noting

intervention

before

the release

active

duty.

4. US military
final

the delay of US intervention

recommended** that

should be undertaken

a national

in Cuba,

policy

of early

be adopted by the United States

as soon as possible
or National

intervention

and successful

the fnc reased

and preferably

Guard and Reserve forces

,nll

overthrow

which

be required

to assure

on

the

of the Communist Cuban

government.***
DISCUSSION
5. For discussion

see Enclosure

B.

CONCLUSIONS

6. The Unit ed States

cannot tolerate

the permanent existence

of a communist government in Cuba.

7. Military
to overthrow

intervention

by the United States

will be l'cqu:I.X'ed

the Communist Cuban regime:

* Memorandum for the Special Group (Augmented) from Brig. Gen.

Operation
Lansdalet subJect: "Status or RequE!sted studies,
1962,
on
file
in
Gen.
Craig's
office.
June
Mongoose', dated 8
** JCS 1962/335
*** "Guidelines for Operation Mongoose", dated 14 March 1962,
on file in Gen. Craig's office .

. ~~t\~~~lfltO
TOPSECRET
SPECIAL
HANDLING

..

: UF

.)[bftt

8. The establishment
the complexity
the risk

of a Sovie 't Base in Cuba will

of US military

of Soviet

nuroHn~
.,

nAnlJtlNl>

I ,.)/i.lrtl,IAL

action

countermeasures

increase

in Cuba and increase

elsewhere.

RECOMMENDATIONS

9. It is recommended that:
a. The Memorandum at Enclosure
which reflects
Secretary

the above conclusions,

of Defense for approval

Memorandum for the Special

tabled

A, with its

in order

that

to the

the

for 14 June 1962.

b This paper NOT be forwarded

to commanders of unified

commands.

c. This paper NOT be forwarded

to NATOactivities

to US officers

assigned

d . This paper NOT be forwarded

Delegation,

be forwarded

Group (Augmented) may be

at the meeting scheduled

or specified

Appendix

United Nations

Military

to the Chairman, US
Staff

Committee.

1 ~1r1~,

. TOPSECRET
SPE

HANDLING
NO.f
ORff

I u 1

p.)LhAL 1

.y "'

c1,111L

n11nuL1n
1~

nor
u1cn.,

ENCLOSUREA
DRAFT

MEMORANDUM
FOR SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE
Subject:
1. Reference

Soviet Base in Cuba (S)

is made to Memorandumfor the Special

(Augmented) from Brig.

Gen. Lansdale,

subject:

"Status

Operation Mongoose", dated 8 June.

Requested Studies,
memorandumrequested

the opinion of all participating

having membership in the Special .Group concerning

course of action
the Soviets

establish

2. The Joint
attached

for the United States

a military

Chiefs of Staff

Group
of
This
agencies

the appropriate

to take in the event

base in CUba.
recommend approval of the

memorandum as the position

of the Department of

Defense.
For the Joint

Chiefs of Staff:

L. L. LEMNITZER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

EXCLUDED
FROMGOS

EXCLUDED
FROMAUTO!IATIC
REGRADING
DODDIRECTIVE5200.10
DOESNOTAPPLY

~tttl~~~lt\tU
Enclosure

., TOPSECRET
SPECIAL
HANDLING
NO
fORN)

,..

1ur 3tbnt

I * ~rttilAL H3NULIN'
1

NUFORN

~- UNCllSS\f
\ED
APPENDIXTO ENCLOSURE
A
DRAFT
FOR THESPECIALGROUP(AUGMENTED)
MEMORANDUM
Subject:

Soviet Base in Cuba (S)

1. In response
from Director

to a Memorandumfor the Special

or Operations,

Operation Mongoose, sul:iject:

Department of Defense has considered

Soviets

the problem of an appropriate

for the United States

should establish

a military

to take in event that

the choice of US counteraction

threat
vention.

It is considered

be the only solution

on the island,

is between long term acceptance

in the caribbean with an increasing

to the United States

the

base in Cuba.

2. In the event that a Soviet base is established

a communist state

"Status

Operation Mongoose," dated 8 June 1962, the

of Requested Studies,
course of action

Group (Augmented)

military

from the South, or US military

that the latter

course of action

compatible with the security

of

interests

interwould
of

the United States.

3. It is believed

that military

forces will be required

Cuban regime.
increase

intervention

to successfully

Establishment

by United States

overthrow the Communist .

of a Soviet Base in Cuba would

the urgency for US military

action

in Cuba.

FROMAUTOMATIC
REGRADING
EXCLUDED
DODDIRECTIVE5200,10
DOESNOTAPPLY
Appendix to
Enclosure A
(Page revised

as directed

by ''the JCS, 13 June 1962)

~~tl~~~lfltD

TOPSECRET
SPECIAL
HANDLING
NOFORN
., ,

'

11L'1nL 1 --~~11r.[1,111L

IUI

NUtUHN
.,

nAnULIN
JM

UNtll~~lf
l~O
ENCLOSUREB
DISCUSSION
1. The United States

cannot tolerate

permanent existence

of a communist government in the Western Hemisphere.

The present

regime in Cuba provides

communism with a base of operations

for espionage,

and subversion

sabotage

The stability
threatened

of some governments in Latin

by the overt

government.
increases

against

and covert

Continued existence
the probability

Latin America.

America is al.ready

actions

of the Cuban

of this communist government

that one or more other nations

in

Latin America will become communist or communist dominated .

will greatly
States

increase

the problems currently

and the Organization

unlikely,

it is ,possible

military

~or the Sino-Soviet

Establishment

3 . Time favors
They are provided
subversion

the possibility

resistance

to continue

in Latin America.

measure& by police
of internal

state

uprisings

to meet

with

Increasing
methods decrease

within

defenses

and could lengthen

Cuba.

strengthens

the time required

of the government and the island.

indoctrination

of the Cuban youth creates

for a co1mnunist underground

government.

around

The
the

which must be overcome in the event of US military

intervention

steadily

Bloc to establish

of such bases would increase

with the opportunity

steady improvement in military

control

While considered

the Cuban regime and the communist bloc.

efforts

security

the United

were developed or shifted

US defense coats as forces

the threat.*

internal

of American States.

bases in Cuba similar . to US installations

the bloc periphery.

their

facing

This

This creates

increasing

after

to secure

The continuing
a growing nucleus

the elimination

a problem for the future

of the present
which is

in magnitude . *

JCS 1969/335 .

~Ntl~~Sl't\
t(

EXCLUDED
FROMAUTOMATIC
REGRADING
DODDIRECiIVE 5200.lO
DOESNOT APPLY

TOPSECRET
SPECIAL
HANDLIN&nc10Hftfi

-. .

I U 'I

IJLIIRL I

3, There is nothing
establishing

their

Soviet base,

or bases,

retaliation
also generate

n11nuL1n
. nurunn
.,

tllllll!

!} l)f

'->

.!'

to prevent

the Soviets

ovm base in Cuba.

from eventually

US acceptance

1n Cuba might avoid the risk

to US military
a greater

from the improved Soviet

action

eventual
general

but such acceptance

risk

of a
of Soviet
would

to the United States

war posture.

Enclosure

U~tllSS\f
\ti
TOPSECRET
SPECIAL
HANDLING
NO.fORN

'l ~,.,...
-~..\ IUl1

1,'")~tlilA ll nANULll1li
t:r Ut UHN

~:-

.}

THE :JOINT, CHIEFS OF STAFF

. WASHINOTON

i , .

15, D.e.

.. ..

13 June 1962
r:

.~l'j .. .j

,, , .,.,. I

....

..,,,..

' """1

MEMORANDUM
FOR,THESECRETARY
OF DEPENSE

., .

SubJact:

Soviet Base in Cuba (S)

~ ~,.j
~~

'

l. Reference is made to Memorandumfor the Special Group

(Augmentei1) from Br~dier
General Lansdale, subJect:
"Status
of Re(!l/ested Studies, Operation Mongoose", dated 8 June. This
memorandumrequested the OP.inion of all psrt1c1()!!t1ng agencies
having memliership 1n t ile Special Group ooncer ~
the appropriate
course of action for the United States to take 1n the event the
Soviets establish a military base in Cu~a

' ,;
~~~~:~

.-

.
.

2. The Joint Chiefs or Staff recommend approval or the

attached memorandum as the position or the Department or
Defense .
For the .Joint Chie.fs of Staff:

:I

.....:..-:1

rf7,i.

SYST
~MATI
C!t!.l~J~ '

BYJ(;S ON . _
1.; _
COTI
.
.P-.!!oSS
..lfiCAT/01
-.. ;;~ 1..::-N
- UEO

~)~

.,..,....

--

'

EXCI.UDED
FROMGOS

...

"

EXCLUDED
FROYAUTOlt\TIC

RECRADIHG;
DODDIR 5200,10
DOESNOTAPPLY

.,

NO(ORN,

... ..,

. ...

. . . ...

-... ---- --~-........

;~,

...

11 1 1 1111'

I U G

1 V

t.11

IS i I

UNCl~~S\f
\tu

MEMORANDUM
FOR THE SPECIALGROUP(AUGMENTED)
Subject:
l.

..

Soviet Base 1n CUba (S}

rnresponse

to a memorandumfor the Special

(Augmented) from the Director

of Operations,.

_ of

Mongoose, subject:

"Status
- .....

Group .

<Jperation

Requested Studies,

Operation

Mongoose", dated,,_8 Jun e 1962, the Department of Defense has

considered

th e problem of an appropriate

for the United States

course of action

to take in event that the Soviets

should talce steps to establish

a military

base in Cuba.

2 . In the event of such a contingency,

the choice of

US counteraction

is between long .term acceptance

communist state

1n the Caribbean with an increasing

threat to the Urilted States

intervention.

Our present

interests

military

from the South or US military

view is that the latter

of ,ac t1on would be the onl-y so 1ution

security

of a

course

compatible with th e

of the United States.

'

EXCLUOfOFRO,'A
GDS

.
.......

:. .'i..

NOFORN
.. .,,.

' .

 v.

,1

Of&W;:aaa

..
2 May 1962

COPYNo.L._oF~COPIES
SPEGIALDISTRIBUTION

REPORTBYTHE DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE
AND
JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFFREPRESENTATIVE
ONTHE
CARIBBEAN
SURVEY
GROUP
to the

JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF

on

MARITI
ME SUPPORT.OPERATION
MONGOOSE
(TS)

CSGWG

CONTROL
# _t;_-./c2.
__ .
EXCLUDED
FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING:
DODD1R 5200.10
DOESNO'l'APPLY
1

EXCLUDEDFRO/ii GOS
I

J
MARITIME
SUPPORT,OPERATION
~!ONGOOSE
(TS)
THE PROBLEM
l , To respond to a request
a report on ways of putting
speed boats out of action.

by the Secretary

of Defense for

the Soviet furnished

Cuban high

FACTSBEARINGONTHE PROBLEM
2, On 14 March 1962, the Secretary
a report on ways of putting
speed boats out of action.

of Defense requested*

the Soviet furnished

Cuban high

3, On 16 Narch 1962, the Chief of Naval Operations was

requested

to submit a report

on ways of putting

to the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

Cuban PT boats out of action.

4, On 3 April 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Secretary

informed the

of Defense that the Navy was studying means to put

the Cuban PT boats out of .action.and

that report

would be submitted when the study was completed,***

5, On 26 April 1962, the Chief of Naval Operations
the requested report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff,****
attached (Appendix to Enclosure),

submitted
Copy

CONCLUSION
6, The Memorandum,Enclosure,
together

for the Secretary

with its Appendix, is an appropriate

request

from the Secretary

putting
action,

the Soviet furnished

of Defense,

response to the

of Defense for possible

ways of

Cuban high speed boats out of

RECOMMENDATIONS
7, It is recommended thats
a, The Enclos ure, together
reflects

the above conclusion,

to the Secretary

with its

Appendix, which

be approved and forwarded

of Defense .

*Memorandumon file in General Craig's

**CM 610- 62 dtd 16 Mar 1962
***JCS 1969/325
****On file in General Craig's office.

office.

.... .,.
r
:

.,'

9 ll'A1f11t1
1Ji
H rX.frfrW..: iP6)1ttA4:
N:]J7171N9fflft
,t,,.

UNCl~SSlf
If0
b . This paper NOTbe forwarded to commanders of l.lllified
or specified commands,
c, This paper NOTbe fo~warded to US officers
to NATOactivities.

assigned

d . This paper NOTbe forwarded to the Chairman, US

Delegation,

United Nations Mi-litary Staff Committee.

. .

,.
3

,,

..

7
Itrii liirl 2f'S1"EffAt
9A1t8ff'N
~mr
,.m~

~NCl~!~lf
IfD
ENCLOSURE
DRAFT
MEMORANDUM
FOR THE SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE
Subject:
l,

Maritime Support,

Operation Mongoose (TS)

In response to your question*

of whether there is some

way of putting

the Soviet furnished

Cuban high speed boats

out of action,

the enclosed memorandumfrom the Chief of Naval

Operations has been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and

is forwarded for your information,
2. The enclosed memorandumsets forth
clandestine
of action

ways and means of putting

but states

some possible

the Cuban P'1' boats out

in substance that none can be covertly

executed in Cuba without undue risk of exposure until

information

is obtained on the degree of security

afforded the boats and a pattern

established,

of operations

3, The Navy will continue to watch closely

dispose of them when an opportunity

more

protection

has been
the activities

of the Cuban PTs and will recommend appropriate

*Memorandumon file

covert/

means to

is presented,

in Brig General Craig's

offi ce.

EXCLUDED
FROMGOS

EXCLUDED
FROMAUTOMATIC
REGRADING:
DODDIR 5200.10
DOESNOTAPPLY

zwtUf

Enclosure

E,oR,T SPFClaAl
NMDtlftt NOP
OR'ff
1

IIANfJtlM
s
APPENDIXTO ENCLOSURE
DEPARTMENT
OF THE NAVY
OFFICEOF THE CHlEF OF NAVALOPERATIONS
25, D,C.
WASHINGTON
In reply refer to
OP605F/br
Ser 000374P60
April 1962
MEMORANDUM
FOR THE JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF
Subject:

Maritime Suppor.t, Operation MONGOOSE

(TS)

References:

a. CM610- 62 of 16 Mar 1962

b . CNOmemofor the JCS Ser 000314P60
of 20 Mar 1962

1. Reference a requested
provide

specified

the Chief of Naval Operations

information

on PT type craft,

support needs, and ways of putting

data on PT craft
and possess

a credible

maritime support.
(up to 45 knots),

highly maneuver-

armament consisting

of 4- 25 mm

(twin) guns, 2-21" torpedo tubes (two torpedoes)

12-16 depth charges.
operations

In overt conventional

and from

naval war

these boats would be put out of action

quickly,

although an anti-PT defense would have to be established

protect

our troop/cargo

eliminated.
be aircraft

carrying

rocket/gunfire

3. There have been no reports

PT1 s.

They have been delivered

offloaded

ships until

The primary means of destroying

delivered

and sailed under their

boats are presently

in early April,

located

were still

PT craft

and surface

would

ship gunfire.
of the Cuban

by Soviet ships to Havana,

own power to Mariel.
Four PT's,

in Havana at last

Eight

delivered

report,

expected to move to Mariel in the near future.

to put these boats out of action

to

the PT's were

on the operations

at Mariel.

but are

The only way

while they are in port is by

means of agents or swimmer (UDTtype) sabotage .

Cuban

Reference b provided certain

and specified

2. The Cuban PT' s a r e fast

able,

maritime

the Soviet furnished

high speed boats out of action.

to

Operations

Appendix to Enclosure

TOPOEORET
OP[IMAL
ll~NILINO

ur ~t6HE
'I

NOFORN

within harbors to put these PT' s out cf action ' 'Sre risky
l

in that there is a probability

that agents/stiinuners

captured with subsequent exposure and US complicity.

the PT's commence to operate,
be studied

their

so as to establish

side 01' their

harbors.

After

or operations

A wider spectrum of actions

a:f'ter their

with

pat .tern of

is established.

4 . Possible
CUban PT craft

covert/clandestine

ways and means o:f' putting

out o:f' action include the :f'ollo~ng:

\C/

'

U
Ntl~~~lf
\iD

Append1~ to Enclosure

,
r

will

.methods to dispose of them out-

less risk should become practical

operations

pattern

would be

C'DCOJ11

111 llftl

111ft

'

UftPftftH

..

1 UI

'1Lu.1tt I :!

artGIAL. nJtNOLl[
.\j NOfORN
-

- ..

r,

\c/

..

---

UMtl~~S1f
\tO '

Appenp1x to Enclosure

TOPSEGRE.I
SPECIAL
HANOl'ING
;t:~:
1ofnD11

- -III-IIUI-Ff--ili)t:1[
uu11n,
[:Tl--

~r [

l, IHL

IIAn11L11\.l

RUt UKN

ijtltl~s~lf
\~ij

5, Although the Navy has ways and means available

or neutralize

the . CUban PT boats,

to

none can be covertly

executed :!,n Cuba w:!,thout undue risk of exposure until

. 1irormation
protection,

..

'

is obtained on the aegree of the~r security

Under conditions

of overt warfare,

quickly dispose of the Cuban PT I s.

to watch closely

the activities

recommend appropriate
opportunity

'
more

the Navy can

The Navy will Continue

of the Cuban PT's . and will

means to dispose of them when an

is presented.

/s/ George

,<.Anderson

GEORGE'W, ANDERSON

~Ntl~~lf
l(ijppe~dix

to Enclosure

TOPSECRET
SPECIAL
HANDLING
- "NOFORN

-.'

..

_,. .'

. ....
. ..

.,.

. .
,

,-

At

.- ..;i

19.62 the

p11ge 15,

J
. ..

ll .

In aer t:1m!, 1:n alll)11ar~apb 2 a on p11ge 5 ~ ot the

words "key, strategic

~i

-~ ...
...
,-. .....
.",

areas

s e1ze

11

, , M;. ~~

c.

"
... ~
(

:,,

the t i rat sentence ot

"pr i or t o D-<I~ " at the end ot that sentence.

' ..
.....
~.'""''1.'''

1:n

to:, t lie word "are" aa wel'l! as the aild1t i on ot t he words

...

.:..-

Su1lat1tution,

Addit i onal ly,,

..

".JM~/I!

-.,..
.......
....:~:.
""'.

""
..

'.
" ....
.
:.

.'

~~...
40'

Furt her, in t lie second sentence ot

. .....
V, .j

'

the wor.d "sucli 11 1a autist:1tute i1 for the word "essent l al 1!

,..___
., SY
STEMA
TICA\.!,~-

,'1#

BYJCSGN.1.'i. . - ~!. - --Cl:ASSiF

,ICATiON
Oim~UED
-

___.::
-~- -- -

-..:..

SPfCIAL
H~ND
HING
REQUI
RID;

NO:ii REl.r~
SAB
t E iJiOf ORfilGN NA\lil9flr,;ll.S
- l -

U~OOASSl~l;-?
10:
~~
oooh

..._. ...........
.__._,._.,_ ...,
~

. SREGl!
INn
.... '

REQDiRED
..

No,uRELAs/~~ 101tW E1GNNAf 10NA

ts

.J

(Dec on JCS i99 9:Z392 - Contd)

...

' ;,

'

. > ). 1
....
......::

.!!. Changing SUl>P.aragraph4 6 on page 7 by,,

-~ .J-'

(2) Insertion

,.

or, tlie

or a new second oentence to

"There ~ be a reqUirfelllent for

.
ampll1biow, iif.t fo r rapid redeplo;y1!!entand counterr ead as follows,-

.;,.....#l

~l

. .'
"'""'--

l'

sentence,

word 11only"

~~
.~7,,;

tlie tirst

'
se ntence, of the words "30 to 45" for tile wor~
"ap11rox.imateg, 20" .

i,.
J

.'

In sertion,

at tlie ~ g1nn1ng or th e \r1rst

sentence

of. Blll>P,aragraP.h4 o on P!!Se 7 of the words "It is estimated

that t he".
S. Deletion,

after
.......,,

!f. Deleti on, in the second s entence or slll>par!!,graph5/ o

.,~<,"
,
.

..._..-...

in s~bparagraph 4 don P!!Se 7, of all

the worda "wowd tie f'ull,y committed".

on P!'&e 8, or al 'l! atter

.

'!. Deletion,

wj1i-j

iii the iaat

on page 8, or all alter

capabilities".

. .

tile worits "tars<!~

1n Florida"

sentence gt sllbparBgl'.aph 5, ~

the words "constantly

'

incr easing

.
- 2 -

sff
fBIAnW!lu
1NG
REQUIRED
'

......,,, ..
'

-.

NOTR1:LEASAB
L "J;Of0 REIG
N NA'l'IONA
l::S
"?:','".

. ...
~

.,,,

"

,..

".,

......... ,.~ ,. ... .

........

---~~~

-<--

.... ~

..

-;...

";~

)[ ff ,..-

. . SPrEOIAL
HAtS
ilb
lNQ
REQO{RED
.
NO'JiREtEASAB
liE i!iO FrOREIGN
Ni\T!10NA
U:
S'
8 AtlgUl!t 1992

{Dec on JCS 1969/392 - Contd)

~
~ ,..
, ....

..

..

...

.J!. Clian~ng tb end or tbe r1rat sentence or

oono1at ot awistant1al

Army tollow-on forces w1tb

sucb otber sea and air siwport as

may: be

required ."

..

,~

- ,..,

~~a

' '

}~

.....

Colonel , USAF.
Secretary

.'. 1

. "'

.:.. .. i

.
.:~

.,

,I

Copy to:

. ./

General Harris

ijKCl~~\f
\EO
- 3

~RECiJ\L
HANDLING
REfflimE

NO'fRELEASABLE
liO FOREIGN
NAT
1IOII

fxt''n

it
J: . ~j
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1-1<
v r vnu._:x
~
C.f 1NOtiNQ
' =-

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.
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/:
I

ntE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAPF

~ "4'-,;?ti;
.

WMHINOTON

~:
-~

......
:~1

..

.. '

(j __
,

U, D.l;.

IIM~lA~~1f
f
.::;:/1_~/./Vfa.;J..,

. UR\I-~~ ltO
t

SYST
r1,1n~~l
lYRE'ffil ,
DYiGS't!/

/;~'.l_CA[,.filj{o;;
r;;;~;
QP" -.-~

MEMORANDU!1
FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

....

----

- ~

Subject~ -., JCS 1969/392 The Consequences ot VS Military

Intervention
in CUba (TS-)

! n , -

.l. I ha-ve reViewed .the aubJect paper and reeon:mend the

following changes be made 1n order to amplify selected
)laragraphs therein as requested by Mr." Gilpatric
on : $....
o August 1962,

.I
..

--~:
...
'.
'

:..~~
...~:;,

......
.., ...

.
'1
'
. .. ..

~"1
. . ,;
. l

,~,N

a, Page 7, paragraph
as follows:
.
.

sentenoe
:~..-,...~_.

""To replace

the airborne
troop drop cap ability
by 14Air Reservesquadro
nii'; fl: ' idll- be .
represented
noccsascy . to degrade tbeatcr :1irlift
capal>ilitics
to the following extent for approxiroately
15 days.:
. ..
.
.
.
.
11
.(-1) Loss or .93% o~ PACAP.tot,al airlift
an.:.
15~ or VSAFEairlift;
or
'

.,:

.. 1

.~.--::~
t!1.

'

"-,l1
'I.I .

'

;, (2) Loss or 100% ot VSAFEairlift

PACAFairlift;
or

. ...

,j

"(3) Loss or
of USAFEairli!t.

1t

..''1i"

4 .d add new laot

,,

:..:

..'

.~-:

.i
i

ffl
.......
,.
...

PACAFairlift
.

50%

and

TOPSECRET-NQFORN
EXC!UOf
O fROAI CDS

"'"""
... ...
.....

"

and so%ot

b,. Page 15, para~apl1 4 - change to read as follows:

.. .
.", - "4. Effect on Wo1ld-llide Ability t o React - The
strength
or the .cuban opposition
and the resultant
lehgth of the operation
will determine the total effe~t
to react elsewhere.
When the
..
UP.on th~ VS capability
assault
forces have been committed to the CUban operation,
1;he stratc ic Arm l'orce:; In CONOs
would be sfiort the
oiippor n 1orcea sucn as en 1neer me ca
ary
o ice, s1 na an
e 1co er un1 s 01~ e re.ma n ng
11ve
v1s1ons.. Pres
ng ac evemen ot . .
. o
~cogo1zed, however, that certain corabat ana sUPport .
. , elements Will have to be retained in CUba for counter-
.. guerrilla
and mili ta ry government operat1on 'st, aREl .
tRat-eA3iAeeP7mea!eal7JitllitapY-peliee
,-ai5RilaAEl
. eiv!l-affaiPBYAlta-wlll~e-pe~wiP&Elte-e~ppept-tReee
' 8AEI-B\il1t81y,8BV8Pllale~t-epepati8R8
These support
units ...
.1

,i

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., 1
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-~,,

79%or

.-,~

f~l(ll!->~~ING

---

,-:,r;,~, ,o,~,~
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.. . . EXCLUDED
FROM AUTOMATIC

.. ;
: ... . ' ..

REORI\DIIIG; :JOD DIR 5200, 10

DOESNOT IIPPLY.

URttl~\f\IO
:"-.'"'
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.., :

."

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,.
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.' ' .

J . . _.,.:. "

.-.....t

~~~ll~~lfl~O
a~d net1 sentence

c. 'page 15, paragraph _4, ~ast 11ne

. , j

"''

as to lrr
lows:

. "'1

"cor.11n1.tte<1
to a CUban OP.era'tion. To re15:
lace the
airbo,m~ tro9P. drop capability represented by 14
Air ~ser~e s~uadrons, it will be necessarY, ~o degrade
theater airlift
capab1~ities to the follow i ng extent
tor appr oximately 15 aliys:

.
l~

"a.. Loss ot 93~ or PACAPtotal

of USAFEa1rlit; or

airlil't

'lb. Loso or 100%of USAFEairlif

ai 'rl ift;

ct antl 50% of PACAF

or

"c. Loss or 70% or PACAFil.i.rlift

USAFEairlift."
The readiness

posture

or SAC,

and

and 50% or

,:;;1
..
~!S't
i
.1
--i

'

'
HERBERTD. RILEY

:Vioe Admtral,
Director

USN

.,

-~!

-.

.......

....

;q,

UN~l~~gf
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1::

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..
"

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Oii 7,

t' 1:.'I
.
\>, ' j
., J
', .. :l

A)lglll!t 1962 the Joint Chiet'a ot Stiitt' t entatively

jJ'.
JCS Representative,
approved the reco11111endationaot t he DOD

Operation MongQoaa
, aa aet forth in par!!g,;'.aphi or the aubJect

paper

words

b.

11

the

the neoeaa1ty tor 11

.
.
The a<ldit1on, to the end or the t1rst
.
.
.,

to obviate

sentence

ot aw,~ &rl!Sr.aPh3 o, of the words, , however, CINCLANT

~

Headquarters USAFhave been requested

alternative
Purther,

to pr.epare

plans not 1nvolv1ng any mobilization."

1n the second sentence of aubpar~aph

3 c,

the word "other" 1& eu.bat!tuted for the word "add1t.1onal".

oea have been committed to the Cuban operation

the

strat egic Aral forces 1n the CONUS

woUld be short the
.

J!.. 'l'ne 1nsert1on, 1n aubpar~aph

# d, or the

word "CONUS"lietore the wordli "MATSa1r11rt"

and the

Copy
r- ~l ;,- ot
:Z copies each
ot
.;1; pagos se l":le~,.JCII- -

'
-- .....

..

._.,...

.......

'

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.,

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..............
,-1

,~,...
......

"'""'"""";;
..... ! ..........

.,.

.
'

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,~-'~"'',""t

eentencea.

;r .. :-~
- , ,

- I

V-,...,,,,.U

. ..~

-(

memoranaumcontained 1n the Appenifi.xto Enclosure A (in thia

.....
..... ,..........
_,,,,--~.,
,,,.q.-,'~,

,tiJ.."rltf:1

..
...

... ,
,...,._.._,..
'

the Marl.iie Corpa,) .

s~oUld disP.atoh an apP.rOP.r1atemeasi,.ge implementing the action
(NOTE SubJeot message was

~-..........
..,... ~:..i

.-~.:..: -,(

to

pleas e

'<' I

,:

.
.

Cop,: to1
'

General Harris ~

/UJ
R~f]lRff

....

UNC
!A~~lf
IfD

...,.........................

_...

11'HE JOIN1' CHIEFS OF STAFF

U P"_,:Z?it ...lf)
_(#
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WASMINGTON

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SYS
J<!/,~T!CAU.
Y)ll.'j!~ r,.,. <J\l
31 !CSOH___0-l~fi(.W,~ :.O
CL\SSiflC~
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COilTUJUE.D
.

.....

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--

....

MBMORA.NDlJM,
F._9RTHE SECRETARYOF DEFENSE

;\Sul)Ject:

~J '

united States
Cuba (S~

Contingenc Y, Plan No. 2,

'

l. As requested in memorandumfor re presentatives

of.
State, Defense, CIA and VSIA from Chief or Qperations,
Operation Mongoose, subject: "Spontaneous Revolts 1n
Cuba, Contingency; Planning", dated 14 June a962, the
attached plan 1a forwarded for your approval, prior to
delivery to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose.

'

methods of
2. It will b1! noted that the alternative
mi11ta i<:\r,
intervention dealt with in this plan ta'ke three '-'- --
priheipal forms. 1hese are, in descending order or
magnitude:

""i 1
- .! ~

:~. .

.;

a. A delibe J:'!t;e, orderly, large-scaie operation

capable of confronting the castro regf'me w:fth the
prospect of over-poweril)S force.

'

.....~
. .,,.,

b. An accelerated initia l reaction by lesser .

airborne and amp~ibious forces building up as
feasible to the scale of the primary, plan. Tti1s
method entai l s greater risl<, longer t'1.meto establish
tullY, ef.fective contro ,J, :ind the probab1'11py or :greater
casualties on both sides.

c. An immediate and continuing al.r attack on castro

milita~
forces and rac 1'1.it1es to support and assist
the revol ti!!S rorces and to pave the way for subsequent
operations.

'

ii

~~

. 3. The above described alternative

methods coni'orm
essentially, to current CDICUANTplans for contingency
operations in -Cuba.

,,
,

.' 1.

'

.I

'1>~

EXClUOEI>
FROMGOS.

EXCLUDED
?ao~ AUTO~ATI
C
nEORADl!IG;OOD om 6200. 10
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. 4. 'l'h1S plan was coordinated with the Departrnen_t of

State ijur.il)g preparation 1n order to be consis te nt wi th
and complementary to the alternate plan prel),<lred by State
w~1ch addresbes the contingency of an internal CUban
revolt but 1s limited to us actions less than m1'l1ta:ry
1ntervent1on.

5. Operat1ons outl1rted with i n this pl an for t he

~P.lllii~t~~n,s~;~~yc;~;!;a~r!~~~~;,n;:c:s
concerned.

"""

. ;'I,~

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~
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,

:~;~ c; nd

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

'

..
Jo:l.l'it

.;J!

-'

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'

Encl osure:
Pl'an

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;

ONClASSltl
t
2

fOPSECR
,El SPECl1N
L ffllNDL
ING NO
RORN
.

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JCS 1999/,389

S'ISTEMA
TCAmR
/
~I VE
D
BYJCS011- - ___
:<:.
~~

!1\tlSSlfl
C,U,

-~

H. UED
--.-/ '

At t l!!lir meeting on 27, JUl.Y, 1962 the Joint Chiefs of.

Stat.f approv ~ the recol11!11endationsof the DOD/JCSRepresent -

- '"..
'" .

. .!

''':'.' ,<!v'

ative to t he Caribijean Surv1!3'Group as set forth in para~aph

of t lie
.

...,a-.
Til e deleti
on, !.'rom the 6eg1nn1ng 01' the
<
' ,

'

'

l ast sen t ence 01' suijparagraph 3 b (3) (a:) of t he

'

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. ....,....,.,..,....
,.1

.....
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~11
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'

Appendix t o Enclosure A, or the words ~wlien rel.1.eved

b;y;~
units".
b.

S\l])st1'tu t 1on, in subP.aragrap hs li\ b and !I d

of\ the :A
ppendix to Enclosure A, of tli e word "C,INCLAN'l'"
ror tlie words "the designated

...

.2. CSAPM229-62 itself

.
of paragraph l b.
~-

27,. Jilli

unified

oommander"

amended by the wi t hdrawal

Marine Corps Flimsy, this sullject,

dated

1962 i M el t amended !by re \fision of the propo1red

paragr l!Pli 2 o,conta1ned in paragraph 2,so as to read \ "c. l\:!, inmedi ate and continuing a1r at e'aok on

..

....,..,,~

and rac 111t t es to support and

Castro m~l 1tar:,,; fQ.I;!>
aee i st the
revolting f orces and to pave the way for

subsequent opera tions."

.....' .'
Copy, to,

'

,...

. .. . .

.......,..
,

Decision on:
JCS Q969:/'3$9
, (NORTl!liOODS)(S)
'

At their

~"

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.-....
...,

........
--~
,< ;AV - ,,C.

of Staff

meeting on 27, July 1962 the Joint Chiefs

approved the recol!llllendations of BOENHarris as

set forth in paragraph 9 of the subJect paper as amended

by:

.!!. A change to subparag;,aph' 3 b (3) (a) of

.
tfie Appendix to Enclosure A,

Changes to subparagraphs
.
~
....,...
_.:

4 band 4 d of the

'

Appendix to .Enclosure A.

,...._
.

s-.u ..,

-~),:./,,',.:.,

. "';-:~.'f"J.

.2. CSAFM229-62 itself

or paragraph lb.

amended by the withdrawal

!!_. A Marine Corps Flimsy, this

subJect,

dated

27, JulY, 1962 itself

amended in paraSJ1!1P~2 by changes

to the ppoposed paragraph 2 c.

SYSUIM
TC
II
BYJCSON.,
cv~11:c
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~<}}INGE
~~~~

'.

~~~~,

Colonel, USAF
secretary

Copy to:
General Harris
'' ,..

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EXClUl>ED
FROMGOS

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8 May 1962

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JCS 1969/344
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(NORTIIIIOOD8

On 8 Mg 19Q2 the Jolnt Ch1ers ot Starr aPl.roved

~1

.......:

'

ING

Colonel,
Al!
Deputy Secretary
'

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Copy, to:
... .

General Cralg

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JCS 1969/344
(NOR'l'BIIOODS)
(S)

..

on 8 May 1962 the Jo1nt Ch1ers or Starr approved

BOEN
Craig's recollllllendat1ons as set forth in paragraph 11
... .. , :"':~.1;,r, ..~"':!t.
. ,'
.
.
'
. ' ~ .o:I) t lie subJeot paper. .
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Colonel, !BAI"
Deputy Secretary

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llNClASS/FIEO
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'l

"PEGl~L
NANDl~
~G N9FORN...
-

7/:i Yj/

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF"

I
l

i
t

1962

May

MEMORANDUM
FOR THESECRETARY
OF DEFENSE

.
DODTask No. 38, Operation MONGOOSE

Subject:
l, Pursuant

.-t--l I C/tf
JCS!1-365-62

WASHlNGTON :U, D. C.

to the requirements

I'

.. .

set forth

No. 38 the Department of Defense

was
.
. requested

'

the prese~t

..,.arrangements

for granting

in DODTask

to review

asylum to Cuban

refugees

at Gu!lntanamo Naval Base, with the view of

granting

asylum to all

Cubans so desiring

it,

at the

Naval Base..
2, The Joint

Chiefs of Staff

recommendations outlined

recommend that

in the attached

the

memorandumbe

approved,
FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

G, H, DECKER
Acting Chairlll<!n
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

i
I

EXCLUDED
FROMGOS

EXCLUDED
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REGRAD.mc: DOD !>IR 5200.10

DOC:S!IOT ,\..OPLY

JgpSECRET
SPECIAL
HANDtlNG
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1 SP
'TOPSECRF
.ECIAL

....

.'

.' '

THE JOINT CHIEF"S OF" STAF:F"

WASHINGTON 2.5. D.C.

,
,,.
..

8 May 1962

.
MEMORANDUif'FQR
THE
CHAIRMAN,
JOINT
CHIEFS
OF
STAFF
,,
''!-- ,
Subject:
JCS 1969/347 - Maritime Support,
Operation Mongoose (TS)

J.

1. en14 March 1962, the Secretary of Defense inquii.ed

whether there is some way of putting the Soviet furnished
Cuban PT boats out or action.
2, The attached memorandumfor the SecPetary of Defense
forwards a memorandumfrom the Chief or Naval Operations,
which sets forth some possible ways and means of putting
the Cuban PT boats out of action, but states in substance
that it is not practicable
to carry out the operations at
this time and that appropriate recommendations will ' be
submitted at a later date.

..-3. Some pos,i.i:ble ~/ay-s '0~"'" '

out or action

4
- . ,-

enumerated a ,

,11.
4. The Operations Deputies approved the attached memo
for the Secretary or Defense, together with its enclosure,
to the Secretary or .Defense .
on 7 May 1962 fer transmittal
. It is recommended that you approve and sign th ~ attached
memorandum
' for the Secretary of Defense, which forwards
the CNOreport.

..
.
....
.
,
..
.
,.,
.
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.
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WILLIAMfl, ciAIG
Brig. General, USA
DOD/JCSRepresentative
Caribbean Survey Group

El(ClUOEDFRO/,\ GOS

EXCLUDED
FRO~ AUTOllATIC
RECrvu>IJ:G;DODDin 5200,10
. DOES NOTI.PPLY

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-TOPSECRET
SPECIAL
UANDLl~jG
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--..

- -'---

f.9P
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

25, D.C.

8 May 1962

MEMOilA;
,;l)UHFOR 1'HE CHAIRMAN,
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DODTask No. 38, Operation MO~GOOSE

Su;:;;ject:

!'

1 . In accorda ,;ce 1,:ith Task No. 29 the P.epartment of

Defense was requested to u:1dertake a review of the :9resent
arrangements for the use c f G,:antanamo Naval Base for
asylum. The re .view inc1ude<.l all legal, political
and
security- ,asp ects in addition to development of recommendations on tn~.,feasibility
and desirability
of grarrting
asylum to all Cubans so desiring at Guantanamo Naval Base

',

'

.
,,

2. The Operations Deputies approved such a document

,,/
responsive to this task on .8 May l9.62. It is recommended
that you ~pprove and sign the attached memorandum
forwarding the results of this review to the Secretary
of Defense.

i
1

il,?r

I -~1(;~
'#
~l'.IAM
H. CRAIG

'
Brig General, USA
. DOD/JCSRepresentative
Caribbean Survey Group

.'

..'
'

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0___

SYS1EMA
TICALLY
}Af)J
B'IJCSOill____.J:'.-.--,
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..
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
\

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

... .

JCSM-367-62
8 May 1962

., .

MEMORANDUM
FOR THE SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE

'

Sub~ect:

Maritime Support,

Operat1on .,.M~ngoose (T~)

'
1. In response to your question of whether there 1s some
way of putting the Soviet furnished Cuban high sp~ed boats
out of action, the enclosed memorandum from the Chief of
Naval Operatio ns has been approved by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and is forwarded for your information.
2. The enclosed memorandum sets forth some possible
covert/clancl.est1ne
ways and means of putting the 1CUban PT
boats out of action, but states in substance that none can
be covertly executed in Cuba without undue risk of
exposure until more information is obtained on the degree
of security protection
afforded the boats and a pattern
of operations
has been established.

3, The Navy will continue to watch closely the activities

of the Cuban PT 1 s and will recommend appropriate
means to
dispose of them when an opportunity
1s presented.

!'

:l

For the Joint

Chiefs of Staff:

. I

'

G, H . DECKER
Acting . Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Encl:
Memofrom CNO
EXClUDE'D
FROMGOS

EXCLUDED
FROMAIJTOIIATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200 .10

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DEPARTMEN'l'
0 HE NA'r.l
OFFICE OF '!;i-iE CHJEFOF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON
25, D, C.
. .~ I '

In reply re .fer to
'
OP605F/br
Set' 000374Pfr>
l

24 Ap3:il: 1962
FOR THE JOINT CHmFS OF STAFF
ME!~ORANDUM
......
Subject:

', ,,Maritime Support,

R~ferences:

MONGOOSE
(TS)

a. C!'1610-62 of 16 Mar 19"62

b. CNOmemo for the JCS Ser 000314P6o
of 20 .Mar :1.962

Ref~~cn~c a requested

l.

Operation

the Chief of Naval Operations

provide

specified

support

needs, and ways of putting

in:f'ormation on PT type craft,

the soviet

to

maritime
furnished

Quban
I

high speed boats out of action.

.data on ~T craft

and specified

Reference
maritime

b provided

certain

support.

2 .,.-Th<J
-,C~can PT s , ar;i fas .~:-,{up to 45 knots ,) , :hlghly
able,

and possess

a credible

~twin) guns, 2-21" torpedo

12-16 depth charges .
operations
although
protect

these

armament consisting
tubes

be aircraft

carrying

delivered

rocket/gunfire

They have been delivered

offloaded

ships until

The primary means of destroying

3. There have been no reports

"

naval war

boats would be put out of action

our troop/cargo

quickly,

and sailed

boats a1e presently

under their
located

in early April , were still

PT craft

of the Cuban

ships to Havana,

own power to Ma!'iel.

Eight

Four ~T' s, delivered

in Havana at last

report,

expecte,I 1:o move to Mariel in the near future.

to put these boats out c.f actit,n

would

ship gunfire.

on the operations

at Mariel.

to

the PT's were

and surface

by Soviet

mn1

and from

an anti - PT defense would have to be established

eliminated.

PT's .

of 4-25

(t:wo torpedoes)

In overt conventional

W!11f:uv~1-

but are

The only way

,~hile they are in port is by

'

means of agents or swimmer (UDTtype)

sabotage.

Operat i ons

EXctUDfi> fROM GC~

I

_ ...... 1 ... .
"'.4""1hJ

1n that

thei:e 16 a probabiJ,1 ty ~hat a,i;eni,s/c>timmoro

captured

with subsequent

exposure and US complicity.

the PT's commence to operate,

their

be studied

methods to dispose

so as to establish

side of their
less risk
operations
.

harbors.

pattern

cov;;.t/clandestine
out of action

after

After

their

Will

of them outWith

.pattern

of

ways and means of putting

include

('nrfl 111

! ;

would be

of operation~

A wider spectrum of actions

should become practical

.....
is established.
-.
. ...,

11. Possible

11 I Ii

the follo~11ng:

nI

111n

..

."

ii Ii F

u H IIAMUtltJO
,: ---ii iiiJ
'ff~~t;-ttrbtl1l'ltt-11~
..~.;\JxSi
l~'t:1Jr~llllt1L't-iitAi~;;:;;:;===::;:;;:::::::::
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.....- I tJIl

OtOHt!

--- .-..-

'

the Cuban PT boats,

protection

is obtained
.

none can be covertly

on the degree of their

Under conditions

of overt warfare,

quiclcly dispose of the Cuban PT I s.

to ..watch closely

the a ctivities

to

executed in Cuba without undue ri~k of expo~ure until

information

---

-~-,.--.~ ...

5 . Although the Navy has ways and means available

or neutralize

...

more

security
the Navy can

The Navy will continue

.of tl:;e CU'bc:nPT' ::; :md wi:!.:!.

recommend appropriat e means to dispo se of them when an

' opportunity

i s pr esen ted.

/s/ George W. J-1'1derson

GEORGE W. ANDERSON

'
I
!

.,.

.
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..

THPSFP.RFT

IIA"'A I Ill

f' . 1111 r n n 11

tT

9 April

1962

COPYNO.
OF_.,,...~ COPIES
SPECIALDISTRIBUTION

REPORTBY THE DEPARTMENT

OF DEFENSEAND
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFREPRESENTATIVE
ONTHE
CARIBBEAN
SURVEY
GROUP
to the
JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF
on

CUBA(TS)

EXCLUDED
FROMGOS

EXCLUDED
FROMAUTOMATIC
REGRADING:DODDIR 5200.10
DOESNOTAPPLY
~
l

CUBA(TS)
THE PROBLE~I
1 . To develop the position

with reference

to two questions

to possible

Chiefs

sentences

of Staff

posed by General Taylor at

Group (5412), 5 April

the meeting of the Special

lated

of the Joint

for the invasion

1962, re-

prisoners

as

follows:
a. Do the Joint
States

Chiefs of Staff

believe

that the United

should intervene?

b. Does the United States

have the capability

to

intervene?
FACTSBEARINGON THE PROBLEM
2 . Past considerations

of the Joint

been reviewed for opinions

Taylor's

first

both studies
Project

question.

Chiefs of Staff

or decisions
TWo studies

were directly

related

have

to General

are appropriate;

however,

concerned with the current

CUba

(Mongoose).
a. The first

study , * dated 8 February 1962:

A significant
the Joint

conclusion

Chiefs of Staff

of this

believe

study states

that

the overthrow of the

conununist Cuban Regime can be accomplished

without pre-

cipitating

effect

public

general

opinion if,

created

that

there

war and without serious

among other
is an urgent,

things,

on world

the impression

humanitarian

is

requirement

to re1:1tore order in Cuba.

b . The second study,**dated
This study repeated

16 March 1962:

the above decision,

* JCS 1969/.303
**
JCS 1969/313

but further,

'
2

--- ---,~SPE61At:lfjNBtlfC~nrrs
N
8fl RN
:*<.. .
7

--.. ""0 Af n UATtOtlALARCt1vS

RE.. """""'

1 1

UNtl~~~lf
le
0
appended a list
sufficient

of circumstances

provocation

for US military

One of the situations

seriousness,

which could be considered

listed,

intervention

in Cuba.

which depended upon degree of

is stated:

"Eltecution of prisoners

taken in the abortive

attempt

of April 1961."
3 . For additional

facts

bearing

see Enclosure B.

DISCUSSION

4. For discussion

see Enclosure

C.

CONCLUSIONS
,. The Secretary
meeting of 10 April

of Defense should be advised during the

that execution

ers should be exploited

(with pretexts

ganda campaign if necessary)

intervention.
6. The Secretary
is no question
deliberate
after

by the US as justification

for

of Defense should be advised that

there

of US capability

to intervene,

and that the

is more prudent than the faster

course of piecemea l force

the question
the context

within 18 d~ys
but riskier

commitments.

7. Inasmuch as the Joint

of US military

Chiefs of Staff
intervention

have not addressed

in Cuba except within

of Operation Mongoose it appears desirable

action

or the President
that

and an expanded propa-

course of impl ementing such action

decision

military

of 100 or more Cuban prison-

be recommended to the Secretary

that

of Defense and/

as the only course which provides

assurance

the Communist Cuban regime can be removed in the important

time frame of the near future.

RECOMMENDATIONS
8. It is recommended that:
a. Conclusions
of the Joint
Secretary

5 and 6 above be reflected

Chiefs of Staff

during :the'me~ting' ' with the

of Defense 10 April 1962.

as the positron

=-

u "

, "1' neet,,-1100A1.1,nG1-11\I
ES
RPR00UC 0

--,J;
T
Stflf
8t'A
't=fftffBtt~:e
BeUtJ
Ntf1NtNF!
1
: . ,

~f
ttl~~~lf
If0
b, The memorandumat Enclosure
Secretary
of Staff

of Defense to express
concerning

the context

US military

of Operation

A be forwarded to the
the views of the Joint

intervention

Chiefs

in Cuba outside

Mongoose.

c, This paper NOT be forwarded to commimders of unified

or specified commands,
d. This paper NOTbe forwarded to US officers
to NATOactivities
.

assigned

e. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US

Delegation,

United Nations Military

IUr

I+

Staff

Committee,

N:Of.tRN
.,.... ,."

._.._ -

. :-.:;; :.

ENCLOSURE
A

UNCl~~Slf
If0

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM
FORTHE SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE
Cba (TS)

Subject:
1. The Joint

Chiefs of Staff

believe

must be solved in the near future .

prospect

of early

regime either
political,

Further,

success in overthrowing

as a result

of internal

economic or psychological

they believe

that military

will be required

that the Cuban problem

the present

uprisings

intervention

communist

or external

pressures.

Accordingly

by the United States

to overthrow the present

2. The United States

they see no

communist regime.
1 l,t,

cannot tolerate

permanent existence

r \. \"

of a communist government in the Western Hemisphere.

present

regime in Cuba provides

operations

sabotage and sl.ilversion against

The stability

America is already

threatened

of the Cuban government.

the probability

This Will greatly

facing

tion of American States.

possible

bases in Cuba similar

While considered

as forces

3. Time favors

internal

security

the

and the Organizaunlikely,

it is

, military

around the bloc

of such bases would increase

l

were developed or shifted

US

to meet

the Cuban regime and the communist bloc.

They are provided With the opportunity

th eir subversive

com-

one or

increase

Bloc to establish

to US installations

Establishment

defense costs
the threat .

of this
that

the United States

for the Sino-Soviet

periphery.

by the overt and covert actions

in Latin America Will become communist

or communist dominated.
problems currently

of some governments in Latin

Continued existence

munist government increases

more other nations

communismwi th a base of

for espionage,

Latin America .

The

efforts

to continue with

in Latin America.

measure s by police

state

Increasing
methods decrease

'

fXCtuofo FRO/,\ Gos

EXCLUDED
FROMAUTOMATIC
REGRADING;
DODDIR 5'200.10
DOES NO'r APPLY
(Page revised

as directed

5'
Enclosure A
by the JCS, 10 April 1962)

'',

--

--..-- -

'!

'

- - - ~ 0 AT TU tlATIONM.ARCt0.VS

nEPR............-

'

the possibility

of internal

uprisings

steady improvement in military

resistance

defenses

The

strengthens

the

which must be overcome in the event of US military

intervention
control

within Cuba.

and could lengthen

the time required

of the govern ment and the island.

to secure

The continuing

indoctrination

of the Cuban youth creates

for a communist underground

government.
steadily

This creates

increasing

4. The Joint

af ter the elimination

a problem for the future

Chiefs of Staff

military

general war.

They also believe

rapidly

for solicitation
rapid
action

essential

believe

intervention

of UN action .
milit ary control

that

the United States

in Cuba without risk

that

the intervention

of

can be

Forces available
of Cuba.

would assure

Continued police

would be required.

to the United States

military

and the nations

and subversive

recommend that a national

poli cy of early

Cuba be adopted by the United States.

that such intervention

preferably

before

presently

be undertaken

the release
on active

as directed

military

Chiefs -0f Staff

intervention

They also recommend

as soon as possible

of National

and

Guard and Reserve

duty.

(Page revised

threat

of the Western Hemisphere

posed by the communist regime 1n Cuba, the Joint

forces

which is

enough to minimize communist opportunities

5, In view of the increasing

\1 in

of the present

in magnitude.

can undertake

accomplished

a growing nucles

by the Joint

Enclosure A
C~iefs of Starr,

10 Apr 6,

" --

--

t1

rill

--EOA.TTl-cEtV.llONAt . ARCt-0VES

R(PR\JU"'"'

UNClASSIF
ItV
ENCLOSURE
B
FACTSBEARINGON THEPROBLEM
1. With regard to the question
intervene

concerning US capability

in Cuba, implementation

assure forceful

to

of CINCLANT
OPLAN314-61 will

and rapid overthrow of the Cuban government

within 10 days after

forces

are committed.

As recently

as 3

April 1962 CINCLANT(in response to a Joint Chiefs of Staff

query concerning

the adequacy of forces in his OPLAN)has

advised that contingencies

against

Cuba have been recognized

hazards.
forces

CINCLANT
states,

"

and considered

10 days.

CINCLANT
quali-

judgment to depend on the following:

"a. Intelligence
current

to this commandconcerning the

available

strength,

Cuban military

capabilities,

forces

morale, and locations

is essentially

11

b. The amphibious assault

and PACOM
is,
than present

as an absolute
levels

in time to arrive
10. II

as reserve

forces

providing

as they and their

as feasible.
in

and put in motion

area on or before D plus

completion of the total

task in Cuba is OPLAN314-61, the situation

be considered,

at no less

army forces now listed

means of assuring

by the US in less

in LANTCOM

minimum, maintained

in the objective

2. While the fastest

now available

and improved and increased

the plan are reclassified

of

correct.

lift

"c. Certain of the "on call"

rapidly

acceptable

it is my judgment that the

of Cuba within the estimated

this

reaction

the campaign

in CINCLANT
OPLAN314-61 are adequate to gain essential

control
fies

which could complicate

than 18 days.

may require
A calculated

initial
risk could

piecemeal commitment of US forces as

tra nsportation

become available.

This

is CINCLANT
OPLAN316-61, and although not approveq by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff,
tative

reaction

was returned

to CINCLANT
for rewrite.

Represen-

times, proposed in OPLAN316-61 from a condition

Enclosure B
7

llNClASSJf1l!
J

of no warning were:
2 ABNDivisions

5 days

4 Marine BLTs

7-8 days

Artillery

and Armor -

Follow-on Forces

10-12 days
15-18 days

Enclosure B

t(
~,.:
ENCLOSURE
C
II

,.

DISCUSSION

11

l,

In addition

of Staff,

to related

additional

of the Joint Chiefs

considerations

factors

which support US intervention

Cuba, 1f 100 or more prisoners

a, GUidelines established

are executed,

are:

for Phase II of Operation Mon-

goose, already awroved by the Special Group, indicate

tary int ervention must eventually
of the Communist Cuban regime,

be resorted

b, The passage of time favors Castro rather

c, Justification

in

for US intervention

that ..mili-

to for overthrow
than the US,

will probably be more

convincing to the rest of the world if it can be related

a real and valid provocation
manufactured pretexts

which entail

The US could, however, bolster

vention,
military

if reqUired,
action.

affect

the faith

apparent disinterest,
invasion attempt.

the final

case for US
would

of refugee Cubans

attempts

to resist

the

that the US has ignored,

chapter of last

in Cuba could trigger

year's

Bloc diversionary

of the world (most probably in known

in other parts

trouble

spots such as Laos, South Vietnam, Korea, the Offshore

Berlin

'

in

tactics
Islands,

for inter-

numbers of prisoners

and resolution

Communist regime, if they ,.feel

on

some risk of compromise,

the justification

and the Cuban underground in future

2, US intervention

than based entirely

to provide a stronger

d, Execution of significant
adversely

rather

to

or possibly

the Mid-East) and would likely

engender propaganda campaigns to include use of the UNforum

for pressure
important

against

the US. However, the essential

element of the US plan against

1

CINCLANT
s OPLANstates,
I'

control,

conditions

and most

Cuba is speed,

"Some 5 days subsequent

to gaining

should permit withdrawal of assault

forces,

"
II
9

Enclosure C

Tgg 1':E
9R~fM
S-P
f'fl~AtvIJMffl.~irNf.~;llfl"61li>t1-1

'

...,_
...._ i;s
l,.&.1.Ji.
- ----11
REPRQOUC.EO Af TI IE rV.110UAl AR~ flVES

1
2~iR,N i,
P~&fA
t IIANt~l
~~-

'

UNCi~~Slf
IfD
leaving

small military

guerrilla

units

mop-up operations."

shouJd be expected that

unavailable
although

to conduct civil

for other

Estimating

US forces

contingencies

the Marine Division

be in poor position

affairs

and counter-

from D-5 therefore,

committed to CUba will

it

be

for only about 20 days,

Wing Team from the West Coast will

for immediate redeployment

for some time

longer.

3. The fastest

means of applying

force

against

CUba would

be through the use of US air power (Naval plus .USAF), although

this would be an interim
deployed.

This capability,

a new and separate

plan,

.Cuban air power, reduction

and disruption

measure until

surface

now being prepared

could be utilized
of ground forces

forces
by

CINCLANT
will require
Florida.

(especially

10

of
armor),

systems.

in 6 hours in the strength

prepositioning

CINCLANT
as

for destruction

of Cuban communications and utility

This plan to be operable

could be

desired

by

of 12 Air Force Squadrons in

Enclosure

:- ,

:.. ..

2 HOFORN
IUI! 6[0ft[T
~;JfECIAL
NAHDLilffl

COPY NO./ ' OF;/ tJ COPIES

SPECIAL DISTRIBUTI'oN

REPORTBY THE DEPARTMENT

OF DEFENSEAND
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVEON THE
CARIBBEANSURVEYGROUP

to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on
ESTABLISHMENTOF "PATROL POSTS11 (U)

E)(.ClUDEDFROMGOS

EXCLUDED
FROMAUTOMATIC
REGRADING:DODDIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

, JJ / \
UNClA~Slf
IfD 1 \ csGWG
CONTROL
#_o__j_
____
I

IOPS~Cftfl3Pf61
flt IIANBtlNG
'NDPORH

I yrt~

'

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(;Kt I

--.

1111.LIIQ
I-l!An
Al 11.1.
Ctks.J N6PffRN
*

ESTABLISHMENT
OF "PATROLPOSTS" (U)
THE PROBLEM
l, To respond to a request*

from the Chief of Operations,

Operation MONGOOSE,
to examine the possibility
"patrol posts" in the Caribbean.

of establishing

ASSUMPTIONS
2. The term "patrol
or facility

II

posts

is assumed to include

which could contribute

infiltration

surveillance

any agency

to an anti-invasion

system.

and

Such an agency could be

overt or covert in nature and could be purely US, bi-national,

or multi-national
in nature.
FACTSBEARINGONTHE PROBLEM

3.

By

memorandum to the DOD/JCSRepresentative,

Caribbean

Survey Group, dated 17 April 1962, the Chief of Operations,

Operation MONGOOSE,
requested
of establishing
attention

"patrol

an examination or the possibility

posts"

in the Caribbean.

was to be given to the possibility

establishment,
any invasion

to be purely US, in Haiti,

attempt at that

4. For additional

Particular

or such an
so as to guard against

country from Cuba.

Facts Bearing on the Problem, see

Enclosure B.
DISCUSSION

5. For discussion,

see Enclosure C.
CONCLUSIONS

6. Cuban military
litary
meaningful m.1:
with the possible

forces
invasion

exception

against

is limited

a few aircraft

and/or small boats.

In the case of Haiti,

to a lightly

areas and the ent~e

to launch a

any Caribbean country

of Haiti.

the capability

coastal

armed invasion

Surveillance

using

of Cuban

Caribbean is within the capability

of the US Atlantic

Command. Forces of this

command, assisted

by military

of the country concerned,

are capable of

forces

combatting successfully

*Onfile
7

lack the capability

any .invasion
,.

in General Craig's

attempts

by Cuba

office

NUFbRN
M

'

I.J
- r

tteren

1Ll1"

1
1
..
11,r1t
~...1
11:& n1: IIA
r r,,t P(fj

)trKtl

-.

II

7. From a military
sea "patrol

posts",

of CUban actions

and indications

the value of surface

or intentions.

CUban threat,

supporting

an indigenous
"patrol

posts"

i.e.,

the possibility

ments with Central

'

infiltration

of the Department of State

for bilateral

communist infiltration

for the US to sponsor at this

collectively

for the "patrol

took recognition

a Special

taken to combat this

Consultative

threat

it

time the establishposts"

through

of the OAS,

of the threat

to the Western Hemisphere by communist infiltration.

the actions

agree-

and subversion,

9. At the 8th Meeting or the Foreign Ministers

member States

movement,

is questionable,

of arranging

ment of arrangements necessary

bilateral
agreements.

and

American governments to provide assistance

for defense against

is not feasible

Due to the

revolutionary

8. Based upon the past experience

in exploring

advance information

would be in acquiring

nature or the likely

subversion

point of view, the primary value or air-

posed

One of

was the establishment

Committee on Security

of

to study the threat

and make recommendations on measures wh:l.ch should be taken to

preserve

the peace and security

of the hemisphere.

It is

possible that this committee may develop a multi-lateral.

posal for such action.
10, An early availability
staging

facility

of an amphibious training

and

in Haiti for use of Fleet Marine Force

required

elements or the Atlantic

pro-

Fleet

as previously

expressed*

by the

I'

1:

Joint

Chiefs or Starr,

could assist

in the performance or the

II

functions

envisioned

for a US manned "patrol

post" in Haiti.

RECOMMENDATIONS
11. It is recommended that:
a, The attached

memorandum,Enclosure A, together

with

its

Appendix, which reflects

forwarded to the Secretary

11

the above conclusions,

of Defense,

* Decision on JCS 570/'51+7

3

T8P9E6RET
9PfeIALH'ftNfJt1tf
o
- - -

be

1UP~fCAi:T
-~ a,!tlALHANDLIK
8 N11PO
fKr

UNCl~SSltltu

II

b . This paper NOTbe forwarded to commanders of unified

or specified commands.

I'

c. This paper NOTbe forwarded .to US officers

NATOactivities.

assigned

to

d. This paper NOTbe forwarded to the Chairman, US

Delegation,

United Nations Military

Staff

Committee .

11
11

II
11

II
II

II

II
I

I'

rnp' 3t't fttf' SPECIXL

lfJN'fflffl"RlJFURN
1

1,

',

111rIiWHEl
(~ SPEtlitHXNDLIM

'

UNCt~~lf
ll~

EUCLOSUREA
DRAFT

MEMORANDID1
FOR THE SECRETARYOF DEFENSE
Subject:
It

Establishment

is recommended that

as above,

be approved

Operation

Mongoose,

of "Patrol

the attached

and forwarded

Posts"(U)

memorandum,subject

to the Chief

of Operations,

II

EXCLUDEDFROMAUTOMATIC
REGRADING
: DOD DIR 52od.10
DOES NOT APPLY

~Ntl~~~lf
liD

II

,.

5
7

-- -

Enclosure

l
I

TRPG5CR{JSPEOl~L
lltNffllG "IIJFulrN

Iii"

1.

IU[

APPENDIXTO ENCLOSURE
A
DRAFl'
MEMORANDUM
FOR THECHIEF OF OPERATIONS,OPERATION
MONGOOSE
Subject:

Establishment

of "Patrol

Posts"

(U)

l. By memorandum to the DOD/JCSRepresentative,

Caribbean

Survey Group, dated 17 April 1962, the Chief of Operations,

Operation MONGOOSE,
requested
of establishing
personnel

"patrol

an examination

posts"

from one or several

in the Caribbean manned by

countries.

was to be given to the possibility

to be purely US, in Haiti,

attempt
facility

"patrol

so as to guard against

posts"

surveillance

or multi-national

to an anti-invasion

with the possible

lack the capability

invasion
exception

against

is limited

a few aircraft

and/or small boats.

of the US Atlantic

In the case of Haiti,

to a lightly

areas and the entire

armed invasion

Surveillance

of the country concerned,

respective

countries

of Cuban

attempts

by Cuba.

In this

upon request

of the local

surveillance

to assist

respect,

the

American Countries,

has informed the Presidents

orally

by military

assisted

are capable of combatting

us through the Ambassador in the Central

Colombia and Venezuela,

using

Caribbean is within the capability

Command. These forces,

any invasion

to launch a

any Caribbean country,

of Haiti.

the capability

successfully

Such an agency could be

and could be purely US, bi~national

forces

meaningful military

forces

and

in nature.

2. Cuban military

coastal

any invasion

For the purposes of this

system.

overt or covert in nature

attention

were assumed to be any agency or

which could contribute

infiltration

Particular

of such an establishment,

at that country from Cuba.

examination,

of the possibility

of the

that the US was prepared

to establish,

government, a system of air-sea

in seeking out,

and interdicting

within

. ,.

6
?

Appendix to
Enclosure A

T0P s,r,aq
snSPECIAL
s HAttnLlN
.G., .KOEO&N
1

_,,,,,
national

Jurisdiction

of armed forces,

of the requesting

agents

elements and otherwise

and frustrate

or supplies
to assist

armed assistance

sea "patrol

posts",

of CUban actions
nature

to such subversive

the value of surface

Haiti .

Cuban threat,

1.e.,

an indigenous
"patrol

in exploring

revolutionary

posts"

the possibility

movement

of the Department of
of arranging

assistance

for defense against

subversion

(aversion

agreements

with the US), it is not feasible

for bilateral

American governments to provide

to entering

communist infiltration
into bilateral

time the establishment

and

defense

for the US to

of "patrol

posts"

agreements .

5, At the Eighth Meeting of Foreign Ministers

member States

and

is questionable.

with Central

through bilateral

Due to the

infiltration

agreements

sponsor at this

advance information

of intentions.

4. Based upon the past experience

State

elements.

of view, the primary value of air-

and indications

supporting

landings

governments to identify

would be in acquiring

of the likely

subversion

point

attempted

by Castro-Communist

local

This cornmittment was riot afforded

3. From a nulitary

state,

collectively

took recognition

of the OAS,

of the threat

.posed to the Western Hemisphere by communist infiltration.

One of the actions
establi~hrnent

taken to combat this

of a Special

to study the threat

Consultative

threat

was the

Committee on Security

and make recommendations

on measures which

should be taken to preserve

the peace and security

hemisphere,

It is possible

that

multiloterol

proposal

this

committee may develop a

for such action.

6 . By JCSM-5-62,* dated 4 January 1962, the Joint

Staff

stated

a requirement

staging facility
of the Atlantic

of the

for an amphibious training

Chiefs of
and

in Haiti for use of Fleet Marine Force elements

Fleet,
In reply to the letter from the Deputy
\

*On file

in Joint .Secretariat

..

1UltllS\\i{l~
Appendix to
Enclosure A

f8P 9E8RETlPfCIAt
HtftBtlN8NOFORN

..

Secretary
request

of Defense, dated 6 March 1962, which transmitted

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

of State stated

of military

a number of basic questions

policy toward the present

most careful

of our future
An

to our

regime, and requires

conducting an analysis

policy in regard to the present

early availability

of a US facility

critical

to be made of US forces
MAAGs,Missions,

government of
in Haiti,

in the performance of the functions

for a US manned "patrol

7. During this

post" in Haiti.

period,

maximumuse will continue

1n the Caribbean area (CINCLANT,CINCARIB,

and Attaches)

with Latin American military

in cooperation,
forces

posts.

where possible,

to perform the functions

envisioned

for the "patrol

operations

at Guantanamo Naval Base, normal patrol

and traffic

in Haiti

consideration."

however, could assist

envisioned

facilities
with respect

(Duvalier)

The Depart ment of State is currently

Haiti.

tne Deputy Under Secretary

on 20 March 1962 that:

"The establishment
raises

the

11

For example, training

activity,

between that base and US naval installations

Puerto Rico provide effe "ctive air-sea

Cuba :and the island

of Hispaniola

8. In view of the foregoing,

surveillance

of eastern

including 'Haiti.
it is recommended that no

further

action be taken 1n regar d to the establishment

"patrol

posts)"

pr

in

of

r~:S7"/~(:.

Appendix to
Enclosure A

T9PEGRET
SPEGIAL
IIA
.NBLlrt8s NtFtftft
-

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WWs NU
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;

UNClA~l1tJt
J

ENCLOSURE
B

FACTSBEARINGON THE PROBLEM

l. The Foreign Ministers
American States

(OAS) at their

of the ,threats

cognizance

of the Organization

ei ghth meeting* took

to the peace and security

Western Hemisphere as a result

vigilance,

acts of aggression,

subversion,

the continued

intervention

of such acts,

of Sino-soviet

and to make recommendations

2. As directed
eighth meeting,

With regard

with studying

resulting

thereto."

on security

of the OAS at their

a Special

Consultative

and has charged this

to the hemisphere

report

This Special

committee

and recommending to

the COASmeasures which shculd be taken to maintain

and security .

from

to the governments of

the COAShas established

the threat

any

powers in this

by the Foreign Ministers

Committee of experts

all

or other dangers to peace

or the preparation

the member states

to "maintain

for the purpose of warning against

and security,

hemisphere,

of the

of communist infiltration.

The Council of the OAS (COAS) was requested

necessary

or the

the peace

Committee is to submit the initial

by l May 1962 and subsequent

reports

General Thomas D. White, USAF/Retired,

from the United States .

as available.

is a member selected

3. On 10 May 1961, the Department of State by message** to

US Ambassadors of Central
possibility

American countries

of coli!summatingbilateral

agreements with various

countries

and later

explored

the

multilateral

to defend agaiost

commuoist

1ofiltration
and subversion.
Respooses from addressees
indicated
most
governmeots were oot responsive to such
arraogemeots and opposition could be expected.
This
* Final Act of the Eighth Meeting of Cooaultatioo of Mioisters
of Foreign Affairs, Doc. 68 (English) Rev., dated 21 Jan 62;
on file in Joiot Secretariat
** Departmeot of State message, Circular 1761, dated 10 May 6~;
oo file 1o Joiot Secretariat

Eoclosure
7

- -- - -

NOFORN

., ,. IUr l LtiNL1 . Iil'EOlA1L, II-A

NIN.i~
'},
0

~~tll~~ltltU
proposal

was discarded

Central

and instead,

American countries

the US Ambassadors to the

were requested

2 November 1961, to inform the Presidents

of hos.t countries

orally

that

by message* on
and Foreign Ministers

the US Government recognized

the

Ceri .,,,ean countri es as likeiy t a.rgets of communist subversion or

.
attack and that it was prepared to establish:, upon request of
a local

government,

a system of air-sea

surveillance

to assist

the national

Juris-

in seeking out, and interdicting

within

diction

of the requesting

attempted

forces,

agents

otherwise

or supplies

against

t o such subversive

indirect

present

aggression

aspiration

of President

"Serious

of armed

and frustrate
In respect to
question has

and other kinds of assistance

in addition

to the Haitian

circumstances,

elements.

stated,

as to whether materiel

made available

office

governments to identify

th e Department of State

been raised

landings

by Castro-Communist elements and

to ass i st local

armed assistance
Haiti,

state,

to that already

being

Government should be given in

particula~ly
Duvalier

because of the apparent

to perpetuate

himself

in

indefinitely."

4, On 15 May 1961, the Joint

to the Secretary

of Defense stated,

there may be overriding

the negotiation

Chiefs of Staff,

political

of such bilateral

by memorandum**

1</hile it is recognized

11

considerations

that

which dictate

and multilateral

assistance

agreements, they cannot be recommended from a military

point of view."

* Department of State message,

on file in Joint Secretariat
** Decision on JCS 1976/365

..

Circular

CA-388, dated 2 Nov 61;

10

Enclosure B

, N8f8RI::
1

r pr

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H!'I

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Sf ttlA[ iiA1ffltlN
~

1 1

ENCLOSURE
C
DISCUSSION
l . The communist threat
infiltration
Ministers

to the Western Hemisphere through

and subversion

was recognized

of the OASat their

action was initiated

8th Meeting at Punta del Este and

to find means to combat it .

of the COASSpecial

2. Cuban military
possible

forces

against

exception

The results

Committee should provide measures which

could be taken on a collective

combat the threat.

meaningful attack

by the Foreign

basis to guard against

lack the capability

and

to launch a

any Latin American country with the

of Haiti .

In the case of Haiti,

capability is limited to a lightly

aircraft
and/or small boats.

the

armed invasion using a few

3. Any invasion of a Caribbean country by Cuban forces would

serve only to further

unite the governments of Latin America

and lead to collective

of Non-Intervention.

OASaction under the terms of the Treaty

Further,

a Cuban landing on the territory

of another country could provide a valid

military

intervention

in Cuba.

from Cuba would be most likely

justification

Any attempt

to export communism

by infiltration

and would take the form of an indigenous

for US

and subversion

revolutionary

move-

ment, supported by arms from Cuba and perhaps Cuban volunteers,

and would be made to appear as an uprising
government.
4. Surveillance

of Cuban coastal

Caribbean is within the capability

against

the incumbent

areas and the entire

of US aircraft

and/or ships

assigned , to ,1tlie .-Atl antic Comm1md.Also, US forces and facilities

in the Caribbeanare adequate to prevent any invasion of a
Caribbean country by Cuban forces .
view, the primary value of "patrol
advanced information
intentions.

From a military

posts" would be in acqUiring

of Cuba' s actions

and indications

The value of ground "patrol

posts",

governmental agr~ements could be effected,

View of the nature

TOP

of the threat

point of

from Cuba.

of

even considering

is questionable

in

111
r ,irRET,_;
,UP(tlAtIIANDLl'tlr?,
NO
FOIN

~NCl~~~lf
ll~

5. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider there is little

military

justification

for establishing

use in the Caribbean area,

multilateral

the political

may have some value in gaining further

and in .strengthening

national

ties

Based upon the past indications

in regard to the negotiation

forces for

results

of such an effort

recognition

of the threat

between participating

countries,

from Central American governments

of bilateral

assistance

and the present

relations

appear feasible

for the US to sponsor a "patrol

agreements,

between the US and Cuba, it does not

the Caribbean area at this time.

post" concept in

Additionally

any consideration

of such a proposal must consider the possible

effects

on the

treaty with Cuba for the use of Guantanamo Naval Base, if it is

to be used as a "patrol post. 11
6. In specific

regard to a ground "patrol

Joint Chiefs of Staff

by memorandum*to the Secretary

dated 4 January 1962, stated

amphibious training

there was a requirement

and staging facility

that the Department of State,

the political

post" in Haiti,

considerations

subject

the

of Defense,
for an

in Haiti and requested

to political

involved,

assessment of

make necessary

governmental

a~rangements for the conduct of surveys and for subsequent

arrangements

on specific

requirements

Department of State has indicated

t .he present
regime,

The early availability

meantime, training
activity,

installations

operations

7. The most feasible

however, would

post" in Haiti.

In the

between that base and US naval

Cuba and the island

course of action,

air-sea

of Hispaniola

likely

to be acceptable

concerned, to contend with Cuban infiltration

OAS. Past indicatJons

and rational,

* ~ecision

on JCS 570/

lies

in collective

efforts

and
of the -

from governments of Caribbean countries

'
that collective

defensiqle

cxw
ntlft

is

at Guantanamo Naval Base, normal

of Caribbean countries

been to the effect

with

a thorough analysis

in Puerto Rico provide effective

surveillance
of eastern
including Haiti.

subversion

to negotiate

of this facility,

for a US "patrol

and traffic

to the countries

The

to US policy toward the present Duvalier

meet any requirement

patrol

a reluctance

Government of Haiti until

made with respect

that ar .e developed.

OASefforts

whereas unilateral

and actions

and bilateral

have

are
actions

ofilG
Gl:At:eVPDtrNrnty.
RDEflll~
7
J.::>

,,.__, - -

!_.,

"

,,,

case, appropriate
action,

consideration

of the recommendations for

to be submitted by the Special

of the COAS, should provide a basis

8. During this

interim

to be made of US forces
MAAGs, Missions,
forces

period,

Committee on Security

to accomplish the objective,

maximumuse should continue

in the Caribbean area (CINCLANT,CINCARIB,

and Attaches)

and the Latin American military

to perform the functions

envisioned

for the "patrol

posts."

9, Any actions

to establish

Caribbean area would require

obscure the real
(civilian
Atlantic
surely

purpose.

"patrol

posts"

appropriate

"cover" to hide or

While several

means are available,

commercial interests,

activities

associated

Missile Range, etc.) ., the ostensible

invoke strong reaction

might jeopardize

as such in the

the over-all

with the

purpose would

from the Cuban government and

security

of "Operation Mongoose."

UNCll~~lf
l~D.
.\ ,

13

Enclosure C

1 .

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THE JOINT CHIEFS Of," STAFF,

WASMIMGTON 25, D. C.

'
.3.Apr.1Jl l 962

JCS 1969/327
(NORTHWOODS)( S)

At their
Chiefs of Stil'f
. ... .

meetlllg on

:Z,7 March

1962 the Jolnt

note~ the aaaumptiona which had ijeen agreed

to lij the Special

Group for Operation

MONGOOSE.

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GUIDELINES,OPERATION
MONGOOSE
The Special
preparations

Group (Augmented) agreed that planning

would proceed on the basis

and

of the following

assumptions:
(extracted

from Gen Lansdale s copy of the "Guidelines",

dated

14 March 1962)
"a. In undertaking
government,

to cause the overthrow of the target

the United States

indigenous

resources,

that final

success will

will make maximumuse of

internal

and external,

require

decisive

but recogn i ze

US military

inter-

vention.
11

b . Such i ndigenous resources

used to prepare
thereafter

for and Justify

to facilitate

as are developed will be

this

and support

intervention,

and

it".

UNtllS~lf
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f:XCLUDEO
FROMGl)S

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JCSM-272-#72

.lO Apr11 1962

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MEMORANDUM
FOR 'l'HF. SECRET.ARYOP DEFENSE. .. . .....
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SubJeot1

Cuba

,.,. .
"that the

1. The Joint Chieta of Sta1'1' believe

Cuban
Further,
the:,
problem must be solved in the near ruturo.
nee no prospect or early success 1n overthrowing the present
oormnu!u.S~ree 1w either as a result of internal
up:irls1ngs
or external 'political,
economic or p.syoholog1cal pi~,i:.sures .
intervention
by the
Accordingly they believe that lllilitary
United States 11ill be required
to overthrow the pre:i ent
oolll!l!Uniat regi~.

2, ,The Un5.ted States cannot tolerate permanent exiatenoe

in the Western Hemisphere.
~'he
of' a comim.tn1at gove=nt
present res:ui n 1.n Cuba provides communiam id .th a base or
oper&.tions f'or e s pionage , oabotago and sul>v.,irsion against
Latin Jl.merica. '.!112 stability
of some goverrir.ients in Latin
Am:!r1ca is alr-e a<ly threatelled
by the overt anc. covert actiona
Continued existence
ot' this com- .
of the Cuban government.
that one or
mun1::it eo ven =n-t increases
the probabilicy
more oth er nations in Lntin Amerio~ will become communist
or cont":IUnist dominated . ~111s will sreatly
increase the
probler..s curr en tly !'ao1.l'.g the United States o.n<1 the Organization of Anwr:tc,1n State:;,
While considered unlil:ely,
it 1a
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baseo 1n Cub<l :;:tru. lm- to US :tnstallat1or.s
around t?w bloo .
periphery.
ltctab li sh=nt or such bases would increase US
deten ao coot:; no !'orceo were developed or shifted to meet

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the threat.

\
3. Time favors the Cuban regime and tho cornmuniet bloc.
, 'lhe:y ore provided with the opportunity
to continue with
their sub ver :Jive oi't'orts in Latin Jlnl:!rica, Increasing
internal
security
mea3UX'eoby police state oothods decrea11e

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EXCLtlDE
o FRo .
.REGR.
iDING. D .., "tiTC!.!.~TI
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DOES llO'i' /J'PLl:'

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the pOll!Jib1liey of internal

uprisin,<;s within Cuba~ 'lbe
steady improvemnt
in m1litacy defenses strengthens
the
resiotance
t1hich must be overcome in tho evant or US
Jllilitar:,
intervention
al'ld could lengthen the time required .
~
to secure control ot: the government and the . island.
continuing
1ndootrination
or the Cuban youth creates a
gr0111l'lg nucleus
for a communist underground arter the
elimination
or the prescnt sovermuent.
'.l:n1s creates
a
problem tor the future which is steadily
1noreas11't!J: 1n
magnitude.

..,.~

4. 'nle Joint Chiera of Staf.f believe that tho Uni ted

States can undertake military
intervention
1n Cuba t1ithout
risk or general .w.ar.. 'l'hey also believe that the int ervention
can be aocompl1nhed rapidly enough to m1nim1ze ~ommunis't
opportunities
S:or solicitation
ot: IDl action.
Forceu
available
would ascure r apid essential
m111t/il'Y control of
Cuba. Cont1.nued police action would be required.

.'' .

5. In view or.the increasing m1litnl7 and subversive

threat to the united States and the nations of the Western
Hemisphere posed by the communist re~ime 1n Cuba, the Joint
Chie:f'o or Sta1':f' rocommen:I.that a :national pol:1.cy of early
military
intervention
in Cuba be adopted by the United
States.
They also recommend that such intervention
be
undertaken as soon as possible
and preferably
botore the
~l~a"'~
of Mriticll:/):1_ Guard and P.e!!!trve . i'9roea presently
on aot~ve duty.
.

.
?

For the Joint Chiets or statta

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L. L. LEMNJ:TZER
Chairman

Joint Chiets ot Start

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EXP
~ ATORY
NOTE

One of tlie requiJ'ements wluch evolved r.rom the il'CS Meeting,

6 Apr1'l was to up-date JCS 2304730. 'l'bat document has been
reviewe! and UP.-dati:t,g appears 1.ri!essible for tile fol>lowii;,g
real ons!

a. JCS 2304/30 was written in April 1961 ~ c:i ~ and

forces involved 1il CINCL'ANT
~lan 312-60, from two battle
groups t o a force level considered adequate to cope with
the ,1.!nprovedCUbanm1>1:1
tarl( c;apatiility.
Force levels are
increased from two baf iJ~ groups to two divisions plus
a t llird divi sion in ireserve. This pl an was overtaken
by CINCiiANT
OPLAN
314-61, whlch turther increased the
total forces r eqw.red tc:i tile extent that the al!&!llented
plan 312-60 was supersede<!'. 1'he plan for CUba i:., JCS ,
2304130, therefore, is no longer valid; the plan should
in tact be w1tlidrawn.

...

b. Mucli or the related information included \ 1n JCS 23<>1+

t 30
not strictly
concernell witll the military plan is reflect ed
iii the more current P.aP,ers putilis~ed in support or t he
Cuban Project (Operation Moi;,goose).

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meeting on 10 Apr11 1962 the Jo1nt Cheirs o t, Sta rr

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9 April 1962
Talking Paper for the Chairman, JCS for the
10 April 1962
Subject:
US Intervention
in CUba

SecDef Meeting,

Back~round - At the meeting ~f the Special Group (aUgmented) on 5

Apr 2, General Taylor questioned the US course of action in
the event Castro decided to execute about 100 of last April's
invasion prisoners.
Inconclusive discussion led General Taylor
to ask "Suppose Castro decided to shoot them all, what would
we do then?" Mr. Johnson, for State, expressed the opinion that
even this extreme would not provide sufficient
justification
for US military action.
Mr. Gilpatric,
for Defense and Gen
Parker for the JCS, indicated they felt both the noband the JCS
would stand firm for military intervention.
this

subject
a,

Do

- During the JCS meeting, 6 Apr 62, discussion

developed two basic questions:
the JCS believe

of

the US should intervene?

b, Does the US have the capability?

Discussion - Past considerations
of the JCS have been
for opinions or decisions related to General Taylor's
question.
Two studies are appropriate;
however, both
were directly concerned with the current Cuba Project

reviewed
first
stUdies
(Mongoose),

a. JCS 1969/303, 8 Feb 62:

A significant
conclusion of this study states that the
JCS believe the overthrow of the Communist CUban Regime
can be accomplished without precipitating
general war and
without serious effect on world public opinion, if, among
other things, the impression is created that there is an
urgent, humanitarian requirement to restore order in CUba.
b. JCS 1969/313, 16 Mar 62:
This stud,y repeated the above decision, but further,
appended a list of circumstances which could be considered
sufficient
provocation for US military intervention
in
CUba. One of the situations
listed, which depended upon
degree of seriousness,
is stated:
"Execution of prisoners
attempt of April 1961,"

taken in the abortive

- In addition to these related considerations

of the
JCS,additional factors which support US intervention
in Cuba,
if 100 or more prisoners are executed, are:
a. Guidelines established for Phase II of Operation Mongoose1 already approved by the Special Group, indicate that mil:
tary l.lltervention must eventually be resorted to for overthrow of the Communist Cuban Regime.
b.

The passage of time favors Castro rather

than the US.

c. Justification
for US intervention
will probably be
more convincing to the rest of the world 1f it can be related
to a real and valid provocation rather than based entirely.
on manufactured pretexts which entail some risk of compromise.

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The US c~uld, however 1 bolster the justification
for intervention, if reqUir ed to provide a stronger case for US
military action.

d, Execution of significant
numbers of prisoners would
adversely affect the faith and resoluti on of refugee CUbans
and the Cuban underground in future attempts to resist the
Communist regime, if they feel that the US has ignored in
apparent disinterest,
the final chapter of last year's invasion attemp t.
- With regard to the question concerning US capability
to intervene in CUba, implementation of CINCLANT
OPLAN314-61
will assure forceful and rapid overthrow of the CUban government
within 10 days after forces are committed .; forces can be committed 18 days after the order is given. As ~ecently as 3 Apr
62 CINCLANT(in response to a JCS query concerning the adequacy
of forces in his OPLAN)has advised that contingencies which
could complicate the campaign against CUba have been recognized
CINCLANT
states~ " , it
and considered a99eptable hazards.
is my judgment that .the forces in CINCLANT
OPLAN31~-61 are adequate to gain essential control of Cuba within the estimated
qualifies this judgment to depend on the
10 days, 11 CINCLANT
following:
"a. Intelligence
available to this commandconcerning the
morale, and locations of
current strength, capabilities,
CUban military forces is essentially
correct.
b, The amphibious assault lift now available in LANTCOM
and PACOM
is, as an abso lute minimum, maintained at no less
than present levels and improved and increased as feasible.
11

c, Certain of the I on call I Army for .ces now listed in

the plan are reclassified
as reserve forces and put in
motion in time to arrive in the objective area on or before
D plus 10. 11
11

- While the fastest uieans of assuring completion of .

the total task in CUba is OPLAN314-61, the situation may require initial
reaction by the US in less tha~f1~2QY.A.:.~A calculated risk could be considered
providing '~~s
eelncommitment of US forces as rapidly as they and their transportation
become available.
This was proposed in CINCLANT
OPLAN316-61,
and, although not approved by the JCS, was returned to CINCLANT
for rewrite.
Representative
reaction times, proposed in OPLAN
316-61 from a condition of no warning were:
ABNDivisions
4 Marine BLTs
Artillery
and Armor
Follow-on Forces
2

5 days
7-8 days
10-12 days
15-18 days

- The fastest means of applying force against CUba

would be through-the use of US air power (Naval plus USAF),
although this would be an interim measure until surface forces
now being prepared by
could be deployed,
This capability,
CINCLANT
as a new and separate plan, could be utilized for
destruction of Cuban air power reduction of ground forces
(especially armor)L and disruption of Cuban communications .and
utility
systems. Tnis plan to be operable in 6 hours in the
strength desired by CINCLANT
will require prepositioning
of 12
Air Force Squadrons in Florida.
- US intervention
in Cuba could trigger Bloc ~iversionary tactics . in other parts of the world (most probably in
known trouble spots such ~s Laos, South Vietnam, Korea, the

... .

!Pf SiCRET
- Jl'ECIWL
HtNIJtl!SN&F&RN
Offshore Islands, Berlin or possibly the Mid-East) and would
likely engender propaganda campaig~s to include use of the UN
forum for pressure against the US. However, an essential and
most important element of the US plan against Cuba is speed.
CINCLANT'sOPLANstates, "Some 5 days subsequent to gaining
control, conditions should permit withdrawal of assault forces,
leaving small military units to conduct civil affairs and
counter-guerrilla
mop-up operations,"
Estimating from D-5
therefore, it should be expected that US forces committed to
Cuba will be unavailable for other contingencies for only about
20 days, although the Marine Division Wing Team from the West
Coast will be in poor position for immediate redeployment for
some time longer.
Recommendations a. SECDEFshould be advised during the meeting of 10 Apr
that execution of 100 or more Cuban prisoners should be exploited (with pretexts and an expanded propaganda campaign
if necessary) by the US as justification
for intervention.
b. SECDEFshould be advised that there is no question of
US capability to intervene, and that the deliberate course
of implementing such action within 18 days after decision
is more prudent than the faster but riskier course of piecemeal force commitments,
c. Inasmuch as the JCS have not addressed the question
of US military intervention
in Cuba except within the context
of Operation Mongoose it appears desirable that military
action be recommended to the SECDEFand/or the President as
the only course which provides assurance that the Communist
Cuban regime can be removed in the important time frame of
the near future,
Opinion as to Recommendations:
DOD/JCSRepresentative
Caribbean Survey Group._________
Director,

__,,Concur) (Nonconcur).

Joint Staff

Talking Paper prepared by:

Concur)(Nonconcur)
Colonel C. s. Seamans, USAF
Contingency Plans Branch, J-5
Extension 59057

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

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.;.

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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13 March 1962

t
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MEMORANDUlI
FOR Tim SECRETARYOF DEFENSE

'

\
'

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SUbJect:

'

2. The .Joint Chiefs of .Staff recommend that the

proposed memorandumbe forwarded as a preliminary submission
suitable for planning purposes.
It is assumed that there
will be similar submissions from other agencies and that
these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a
tillle-phased plan.
Individual projects can then be
considered on a case-by-case basis.

..
1:

'

3. Further, it is assumed that a single agency will be

for developing military
given the .primary responsibility
and para-military
aspects of the basic plan.
It is
for both overt and
recommended that this responsibility
- covert military operat~ons be assigned the Joint Chiefs of
Staff .
For the Joint Chiefs of staff:

!
!

. '
.r

for US Military Intervention

, .. .

l . The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the attached

Memorandum.Cor the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, which
responds to a.'-:r._equest of that office for brief' but precise
description
of pretexts which would provide justification
for us military intervention
in Cuba

.I

Justification
in Cuba (TS)

.-

'
S'IS1EM/HI
CALL'lll~'IEV>.J:f}L
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BYJCSON --~.d.
CLASSIFICATIO!l
.C NTINU.;Q.
.----:-
-:::,. ':'""__:::.~..

L. L. LE1'1N1:TZER

Chairman
Joint.Chiefs
pf s

l Enclosure
Memofor Chief of Operations,

E)(CI.UD6>FROMGD$

Cuba Project

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COPYNO. __

JCS 1969/321

SPECIALDISTRIBUTION

12 March 1962
Page 2165

NOTEBY THE SECRETARIES

to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on
NORTHWOODS
(S)
A

report*

on the above ~ubject is submitted for consider-

ation by the Joint

Chiefs of Staff.

F. J. BLOUIN
M. J.

INGELIDO

Joint

Secretariat

' . 'i

* Not

reproduced herewith;

on file

in Joint

Secretariat

EXCLUDEDFROM GOS

EXCLUDED
FROMAUTOMATIC
REGRADING
; DODDIRECTIVE
5200.10 DOESNOTAPPLY
TOP SECRET
JCS 1969/321

..
9 March 1962

COPY OF
COPIES
SPECIALDISTRIBUTION

REPORTBY THE DEPARTMENT

OF DEFENSEAND
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE
ON THE
CARIBBEAN
SURVEYGROUP
to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on
CUBAPROJECT(TS)
The Chief of Operations,
t hat he be furnished
on this

matter

Cuba Project,

the views of the Joint

has requested
Chiefs of Staff

by 13 March 1962.

EXCLUDED
FROMGOS

,.

JUSTIFICATIONFORUS MILITARYINTERVENTION
IN CUBA(TS)
THE PROBLEM
by Chi.ef of Operations,

l. As requested*
Chi.efs of Staff

Joint

are to indicate

Cuba Project,

brief

but precise

of pretexQ3whi.ch they consider

description
Justification

for US military

the

would provide

intervention

in Cuba.

FACTSBEARINGON THE PROBLEM

2. It is recognized
for US military

that

any action

intervention

whi.ch becomes pretext

in Cuba will

lead to a political

whi.ch then would lead to military

decision

action.

3. Cognizance has been taken of a suggested course of

actiwn proposed** by the US Navy relating
instances

to generated

in the Guantanamo area.

4. For additional

facts

see Enclosure B.
DISCUSSION

5. The suggested

coursesof

action

appended to Enclosure

are based on the premise that US niilitary

result

from a period of heightened

place the United States

iable

grievances.

forum
national

US-CUban tensions

in the position

World opinion,

should be favorably

intervention

will
which

of suffering

justif-

and the United Nations

affected

by developing

the inter-

image of the CUban government as rash and irresponsible,

and as an alarming and unpredictable

threat

to the peace of

the western Hemisphere .

6. While the foregoing premise can be utilized

present

time it will continue

there can be reasonable

to hold good only as long as

certainty

in Cuba would not directly

at the

that US military

intervention

involve the Soviet Union.

There is

Memorandumfor General Craig from Chief qf Operations,

Cuba Project, subject:
"Operation MONGOOSE",
dated
5 March 1962, on file in General Craig's office.
** Memorandumfor the Chairman, Joint Chi.efs of Starr, from
Chief of Naval OperatioDs, subJeot:
"Instances to
Provoke Military Actions in Cuba (TS)", dated 8 March 1g62,
on file in General Craig's office.
2

,.

TIJP-S!tRE
T
1

. ~Ntll~~lf
IfD

as yet no bi l ateral

mutual support agreemen

e USSR

to the defense of Cuba, Guba has not yet become a member of th e

War~nwPa ct, nor hnve the Soviets established
in Cuba in the pattern

Soviet bases

of US bases in Western Europe.

since time appears to be an important

the Cuba problem, a l l projects

factor

Therefore,

in resolution

of

are suggested within the time

frame of the next few months.

CONCLUSION
7. The suggested
satisfactorily

courses of action appended to Enclosure A

respond to the statement

these suggestions'should
suitable
integrated,
objective

be forwarded as

for planning purposes,

from other agencies,

of the problem.

a preliminary

and together

However,
submission

with similar

inputs

provide a oasis for develop ment of a single,

time- phased plan to focus all effort s on the

of justification

for US mili t ary intervention

in Cuba.

RECOMMENDATIONS
8. It is recommended that:
a . Enclosure A together
forwarded to the .Secretary
transmittal

with its attachments

of Defense for approva l and

to the Chief of Operations,

b. This paper NOTbe.forwarded

or specified

should be

Cuba ProjectA

to commanders of unified

commands.

c. This paper NOTbe forwarded to US officers

assigned

to NATOactivities.
d. This paper NOTbe forwarded to the Chairman, US
Delegation,

United Nations Military

,.

Staff

Committee.

T18P-mifi
,i&R
E{ss :x
9pee
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ENCLOSURE A

DRAFl'
FORTHE SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE
MEMORANDUM
Justification
in Cuba (TS)
1. The Joint

for US Military

Chiefs of Staff

have considered

Memorandumfor the Chief of Operations,

responds to a request*
description

of pretexts

for US military

of that

2. The Joint

office

for brief

s.1m1lar submissions

tion

projects

submission suitable

It .is assumed that there will be

for developing

these .inputs

a t.1me-phased plan.

oan then be considered

basis . _

on a case-by-case

3. Further,

it .is assumed that

given the primary responsibil.1ty

para-military

justifica

from other agenc.1es and that

will be used as a basis

that this

but precise

Chiefs of Staff recommend that the proposed

for planning purposes.

)-

which

in Cuba.

memorandumbe forwarded as a preliminary

Individual

the attached

Cuba Project,

which would provide

intervention

Intervention

--

- _....

aspects

responsibil.1ty

operatiorsbe

a single

agency w.111 be

for developing mil.1tary and

,---

of the basic plan.

for both
---

assigned the Joint

It is recommended

_______

overt
covert
military
- - -and
...._._
...
..

Chiefs of Staff.

* Memorandumfor Gen Craig from Chief of Operations, Cuba

Project, subject, "Operat.1on MONGOOSE",
dated 5 l4arch
1962, on file in Gen Craig's off.ice

Enclosure A

APPENDIX
TO ENCLOSUREA
DRAFT

MEMORANDUM
FOR CHmF OF OPERATIONS,
CUBAPROJECT
Subject:

Justification
for US Military
in CUba (TS)

Intervention

1. Reference is made to memorandumfrom Chief or Operations,

CUba Project,

for General Craig,

subject:

dated 5 March 1962, which requested

I,

description

or pretexts

brief

for US military

inter -

vention in CUba.
2. The projects

I,

but precise

which the Joint Chiefs of Starr

consider would provide Justification

1,

"Operation MONGOOSE",

~a a preliminary

listed

in the enclosure

submission suitable

hereto are forwarded

for plann:t.pg purposes.

It is assumed that there will be similar

submissions !'rem

other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis

for developing

a time-phased plan.

can then be considered

./

suggestions,

projects

create

intervention.

or incidents

unrelated

irresponsibility
1,
1,
1,
1,
I

properly

should be

on a .specific

ultimate

to be combined with other seemingly

impression

directed

as well as the United States.

be pursued .

objective

or Cuban rashness

on a large scale,

integrate

national

and

,/

The plan would also

and time phase the courses of action to

The desired

of suffering

irresponsible

and

at other

resultant

from the execution

this plan would be to place the United States

position

for

Such a plan would enable a logical

events to camouflage the ultimate

the necessary

countries

from the

which would provide adequate justif~cation

US military
build-up

-K

selected

or from other sources,

developed to focus all efforts

objective

projects

on a case -by - case basis.

3. Thia plan, incorporating

attached

The individual

defensible

grievances

of

in the apparent

from a rash and

government of Cuba and to develop an inter-

image of a CUban threat

to peace in the Western

Hemisphere .

~NCll~~lf
l~D
,.
5

Appendix to
Enclosure A

1~ll&fDr SfC
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itu
4. Ti.me is an important factor in resolution
of the Cuban
1

problem.
projects

Therefore,

the plan should be so time -phased that

5 . Inasmuch as the ultimate

intervention,
for - developing
-~

objective

is overt military

it is recommended that primary responsibilit

and para-military

military

...

for both overt and covert military

Joint

the next few months .

would be operab l e within

aspects

operations

....,..

of the plan

be assigned

the

Chiefs of Staff.

,.

Appendix t d
Enclosure A

~NCl~~~lt
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f Ofm-&fllf,fmfnll~DlrA,
~ ltAIOl~iN

-nrf:w-

..
ANNEX
TO APPENDIXTO ENCLOSUREA
PRETEXTS
TO JUSTIFYUS MILl'l'ARYINTERVENTION
IN CUBA
(Note :

The courses of action which 'follow are a preliminary

submission suitable
arranged neither

only for planning purposes.

chronologically

Together With similar

nor in ascending order.

inputs from other agencies,

intended to provide a point of departure

of a single,

integrated,

permit the evaluation

of cumulative,
intervention

of individual
actions

such a plan would

projects

Within the context

designed to lead inexorably

of adeqo.ate Justification

for US military

in Cuba).

1 . Since it would seem desirable

provocation

to use legitimate

as the basis for US military

a cover and deception plan,

actions

they are

for the development

time-phased plan.

correlated

to the objective

They are

intervention

to include requisite

in CUba

preliminary

such as has been developed in response to Task 33 c,

could be executed as an initial

reactions .

Harassment plus deceptive

CUbans of imminent invasion

posture

effort

throughout

2 . A series

actions

to convince the

would be emphasized.

execution

change from exercise

to provoke CUban

OUr

military

of the plan will allow a rapid

to intervention

if CUban response

of well coordinated

jstifies.

incidents .will be planned

to take place in and around Guantanamo to give genuine

appearance of being done by hostile
a. Incidents
chronological
(1) Start

to establish

Cuban forces.

a credible

attack

(not in

order):
rumors (many).

(2) Land friendly

to stage attack

Use clandestine

radio.

Cubans in uniform "over-the-fence"

on base.

(3) Capture Cuban (friendly)

saboteurs

inside

the

base.
(4) Start

riots

near the base main gate (friendly

Cubans),
7

~~tl~~~lfltU
Ti- 6EG
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f Pf8ftHltftB
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1

Annex to Appendix
to Enclosure A

:.JOPSERRET
--'

llili

(5) Blow up ammunition inside

the base; start

!'ires.

(6) Burn aircrai't on air base ( sabotage )

(7) Lob mortar shells i'rom outside 01' base into base .
Some damage to installations.
(8) Capture assault

or vicinity

teams approaching i'rom the sea

of Guantanamo City,

(9) Capture militia

group which storms the base .

(10) Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires

(ll)

Sink ship near harbor entrance .

!'or mock-victims

(may be lieu

-- napthalene.

Conduct .funerals

01' (10)).

b. United States would respond by executing

operations
artillery

o1'1'ensive

to secure water and power supplies,

destroying

and mortar emplacements which threaten

the base.

c . Commencelarge scale United States military

3,

several

"Remember the Maine" incident

operations.

could be arranged in

forms:
a. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and

blame Cuba.
b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel
in the CUban waters.

anywhere

We could arrange to cause such incident

in the vicinity

01' Havana or Santiago as a spectacular

01' CUban attack

i'rom the air or sea, or both.

01' CUban planes or ships merely investigating

the vessel

could be i'airly

was taken under attack.

would add credibility
have heard the blast
f'ighters
crew.

The presence
the intent

01'

compelling evidence that the ship

The nearness

especially

to Havana or Santiago

to those people that might

or have seen the !'ire .

follow up with an air/sea

result

rescue operation

The US could
covered by US

to "evacuate" remaining members of' the non- existent

in us newspapers would cause a helpf'ul

Casualty lists

wave 01' national

indignation.

4 . we could develop a communist CUban terror

the Miami area,

in other Florida
8

cities

campaign in

and even in Washington.

Annex to Appendix
to Enclosure A

~~tl~~~ifltD
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criNGii'&R
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1

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IOP1f8R[rJ-~ &Pi,e1,k
willA
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SF

The terror

campaign could be~~~l~~lfjf~

haven in the United States .

enroute to Florida
on lives
extent

(real

projecting

s.

of prepared documents

Cuban involvement also would be helpful

against

a neighboring

of the 14th of June invasion

filibuster

Caribbean nation

Haiti,

present

and possible

Dominican Republic,
others.

within their

c-46 type aircraft

We

clandestinely

can be magnified and

For example, advantage

of the Dominican Air Force to

national

air space .

coul d make cane-burning

Soviet Bloc incendiaries

(in the vein

Guatemala, ahd Nicaragua at

These efforts

can be taken of the sensitiVity

intrusions

efforts

for exposure.

ones contrived

could be

of the Dominican Republic).

know that Castro is backing subversive

against

in

government.

A "Cuban-based, Castro-supported"

additional

even to the

chosen spots, the

bombs in carefully

the idea of an irresponsible

simulated

attempts

to be widely - publicized.

of Cuban agents and the release

substantiating

We could foster

1n the United States

of woundir.g in instances

arrest

seeking

we could sink a boatload of Cubans

or simulated) .

of Cuban refugees

Exploding a few plastic

ban refugees

"Cuban" B-26 or
raids at night.

could be found .

This could be coupled

with "Cuban" messages to the Communist IUldergl'OUl1d1n the

Dominican Republic and "Cuban" shipments of arms which would
be found, or intercepted,

on the beach.

6. Use of MIG type aircrai't

additional
surface

provocation.

by US pilots

Harassment of civil

shipping and destruction

attacks

to announce such fact.

as complementary actions.

11' the pilot

risk inherent

However, reasonable

be produced from US resources

that they

of the transport

The primary drawback to this

appears to be the security

on

drone aircraft

painted would conVince air passengers

saw a Cuban MIO, especially

ing an aircraft.

air,

of US military

by MIO type planes would be useful

An F- 86.properly

could provide

were

suggestion

in obtaining

or modify-

copies of the MIO could

in about three months.

Annex to Apperidix
to Enclosure A

~~tl~~~lfIfD

--i1 P:IPIM
w;;im
n; [- IIIIJl;l1J;
:;:;
..:tteftP1
zw-

-',TOP

, NOFtlN

7, Hijacking attempts

against

civil

a1r and surface craft

should appear to continue as harassing

government of Cuba.
civil

and military

Concurrently,

convincingly

genuine defections

air and surface

8. It is possible

to create

craft

civil

airliner

which will demonstrate

has attacked

and shot down

enroute from the United States

to

Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela.

The

be chosen only to cause the flight

route to cross Cuba.

plan

destination

The passengers

could be a group of college

holiday or~

grouping of persons with a commoninterest

support chartering
a.

a non-scheduled

aircraft

An

aircraft
Miami

students

At a designated

substituted

for the actual

loaded with the selected

carefully

for a civil

aircraft

civil

organization

aircraft

passengers,

and

registered

time the dl!Plicate

prepared aliases.

to

flight.

belonging to a CIA proprietary

area.

would

off on a

at Eglin AFBwould be painted

nwnberedas an exact duplicate

in the

would be

and would be

all boarded under

The actual

registered

would be converted to a drone.

b. Take off times of the drone aircraft

and the actual .

aircraft

will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of

Florida.

From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying

aircraft

will descend to minimum altitude

into an auxiliary

field

and go directly

at Eglin AFBwhere arrangements will

have been made to evacuate the passengers

aircraft

to its

original

status.

and return
flight

over CUba the drone will being transmitting

national

distress

is under attack

plan.

by Cuban MIO aircraft.

by destruction

by radio signal.

,.

he

The translliission

of the aircraft

which will

This will allow !CAOradio

10

~~tl~~~lfIf~
f9P &ECRf:T
CtPf&l
t~ llANB+lNQz
1

When

on the inter-

frequency a "MAYDAY"message stating

will be interrupted
be triggered

the

The drone aircraft

meanwhile will continue to fly the filed

of CUban

should be encouraged.

an incident

that a Cuban a1rcratt

a chartered

measures condoned by the

Annex to Appendix
to Enclosure A

-..

NC
rlftiK
~ NOiiHN

: NlP SECRE
I @fj SPffflf

'

has happened to the aircraft

"sell"

the US what

in the western Hemisp~ere to tell

stations

instead of the US try:tng to

the inoident.

9, It is possible

to create

an incident

which will make it

appear that Communist CUban MIGs have destroyed

over international

waters in an unprovoked attaok,

a. Approximately 4 or 5 F-101 airora.ft

in trail

from Homestead AFB, Florida,

Their mission will be to reverse

These aircraft
frequent
least
actions
b,

in southern Florida.
of these flights

however, they would be

to carry live anununition in the event that hostile

were taken by the Cuban MIGs,
one such flight,

On

tail-end

a pre-briefed

Charley at considerable

pilot

interval

While near the Cuban Island this pilot

would fly

between aircraft.

would broadcast

by MIGs and was going do1m.

he had been JU111Ped
calls

at

to rema1.n at

Crews would be briefed

12 miles off the CUban coast;

required

of CUba.

course and s1.mu1ate fakir

would conduct variations

intervals.

will be dispatched

to the vicinity

for an air defense exercise

aircraft

a USAFaircraft

would be made.

The pilot

that

No other

would then fly directly

west at extremely

low altitude

and land at a seoure base, an

Eglin auxiliary.

The aircraft

would be met by the proper

people,
pilot

quickly stored

and given a new tail

number,

The

who had performed the mission under an alias,

resume his proper identity

of business.

The pilot

and return

and aircraft

would

to his normal place

would then have

disappeared.
c. At precisely

the same time that the aircraft

was

presumably shot do1m a submarine or small surface craft

would disburse

F-101 parts,

parachute,

etc.,

at approximately

15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart.

returning

to Homestead would have a true story as far as

they knew. search ships and aircraft

and parts

The pilots

of aircraft

could be dispatched

found.
ll

Annex to Appendix
to Enclosure A

JEBRET
t 6P[-8t.M
.lJtfjN.DiitcD

.'

urec
AS'1
~1tu

ENCLOSURE
B

.
FACTSBEARING
ONTHE PROBLEM
l. The Joint

Chiefs of Staff

that US unilateral
acts against

US forces

or property

in Cuba can be

which would serve as an

upon' which to base overt intervention.

2. The need for positive

covert

intervention

stated*

in the event that the CUban regime conunits hostile

undertaken

incident

military

have previously

efforts

to foster

action

an internal

was indicated**

unsuccessful

in the event that current

Cuban rebellion

by .the Joint

are

Chiefs of Staff

on 1 March 1962, as follows:

11

revolt

determination

is impossible

that a credible

of attainment

9-10 months will require

positive

US military

3,, It is understood
preparing

suggested

for US military

during the next

a decision

to develop a Cuban "provocation"

internal

by the United States

as Justification

for

action."
that

courses

intervention

the Department of State

of action

also is

to develop justification

in Cuba.

* JCS 1969/303

**

JCS 1969/313

12

T8P9t8ttet

Enclosure BI

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

:s. D.C.

WASHINGTON

..

'

Sfol'-240-62

l ?,:arch 1962

,.

'

J ...

..
._..: .
: ..

.,

:-

J>lEMORANDID1
FOR THE CRlEP OP STAPF, VS ARM?

Procedures to be Followed 1n .Handling

Central Intelligence
Agency, State
,
Department and US Information Agency
.
Req1.1ests for DODSupport 1n Connection
,
with the Activities
of the caribbean

',,~ . Survey Group ( cso) ( s)

Subject,

ot Defense

The Department
prepareii

'
..

.
'

...

to as 's'ist the Central rntetI1genoe

Department

of State . and the . US Information

activities

connected

Caribbean

The enclosure

such requests

Agency 1n.

sets

by the Services

to be followed

Agency, the

ot the

with the operations

Survey Group,

procedures

. :lI
... 1
..
!

haa been req1.1ested to be

torth

the

1n handlin$

for support.

.. Por the Joint

11
1,

''O,
''l"'!'F!). .
-~,...-,...''T
,..,.'r.t,~!. ."LV~
UI

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-

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'. .

,-,,- .

'---'-<

I
I

..

F. J. BLOUIN

.. .
- ...

RAdm, USll

Secretar;r

Enclosure:
Subj as above

:.
I

Chiefs ot Sta.tr,

..

EXCLUDED
FROMGOS

'

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FRO!!AUTOllATIC
REGRADIIIG;
DODDill 5200.10
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'

l March -1962

..

'

MBHOIWmUM
FOR 111&emu OP' OP~TIOIIS ,, C1JU Plto.Jl!Cl'

SW>ject, Procedures t,.or llOl)

~

approve4.
tlle attached p~er,
..

~=i'ilionauo_n.

..:t,

..

"',)

port of, tile Op!>_rattou

of. CU, thi State l>ip_ytii~

, ~ tbi USU

alid Mr. Gilpauic

21ie Joint dliara or Stitt

.. ,,,..

!lave

1'll ro:r.var4e4 ror

. vbich
.

"

.-:.
;

'

WILLL\MB. CRAIG
Bri' General, 118A

l
.

l)QI)JCS Representative
CUibbean

Burii t

Group

....,.,..,1

.....--:.".

-.

..

. ......

,l~

..

.,..

.,
'

EXCLUDID
FROMGO$

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HAND
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' .

.
1

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFer1se

WASHINGTON 2.S, D.C.

'I

28 Feb 1962

. ..

.
<

'

..

. ..

.. MEMORANDUM
FOR THEDOD/JCSREPRESENTATIVE
Caribbean Survey Group ,..

..

II

Subject:

Cuba Project

11

,,

'

The, attached
.,

Ii

forwarding

procedures

are approved for

to the Chief of Operations , Cuba Project,

.'.

as the DODpos i tion with respect

'

CIA, the State Department,

.'

connected with the Caribbean Surv ey Group;

11

!
'

to suppor t of the

and USIA activities

'

11

II

:i.

.
.

'

:Enclosure :
DODProcedures

II

'

I
I

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~ClllOEI> f"'-'

GOS

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.......

' ,.I

ENCLOSURE
..
..
' BE FOLLOWED
PROCEDURES
TO
IN HANDLING
CIA STATEDEPARTMENT
AflD

us~!1..REQt1ESTSF0?.
.

DO!) SUPPOP.TIM C,CNNECT!ON':!ITE ~EE ACT!'.'!T!ES

OF THE CARIBBEAN
SURVEY
GROUP(CSG) (S)

1. \~11
en approved by \he

Secretary
of D~fense the DODwill
.....
support full y on a high priority I basis requests
for support

..
received in :~i tihg f~o~ the CIA, the ~:ate Department, and the

Agency in connection with the activities

,.. .

..

of

2. CIA, State
..... Department and the US Information

Agency

US Information

the CSG.
',

should submit requests

Defense (Assistant

for DODsupport to the Secretary

to the Secretary

Operations)~ . ID
hese .requests
m~tion of the overall
and should include
assistance

to permit a determination
the requested

project.

of .such a request

in writing

to the Secretary

will forward the request

Representative..

the following

of Defense (Special
to the DOD/JCS

of tne CSG

b, The DOD/JCSRepresentative

will consult

with the

and then secure the comments and recommendations

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

request

infor-

will apply:

Operations)

Services

suf.ficient

for accomplishment of the mission

is in support of this

a. The Assistant
'

-should -contain

a code word to indicate

3. Upon receipt
procedures

of Defense (Special

plan or project

of the equipment best .suited

of

He will then return

with recommended action

for decision.

The Services

to the Secretary

the
of Defense

and the Joint Chiefs of Staff

will be advised of t~e decision.

~. CIA, State Department and the US Information Agenc:<_z
-.... .
requests for DODsupport involving s.tgnificant numbers of
military

personnel,

supply will require

prior

to the

amounts of equipment, or equipment in short

the approval of the Secretary

.
furnishing

of Defense

of such assistance.

Enclosure
EXCLUDED
.FROM GD&
/

 .J . --. . ....,
p

the Department of State and the US Information

DODwill be retained
and- consistent

under the control

Agency from the

of the DODwhen f easible

.

with the accomplishment of the mission.

6. As determined by the -Secretary

of Defense DODagencies

will be reimbtirsed for support rendered CIA, "the Department

of State and the US Information
existing

procedures.

within the resources

Agency in accordance

'

,., .

Otherwise,
available

with .

such support will be provided

to the DOD. Determination

of

reimbursement wilL not in any way delay the implementation

the support

7, Advance security
projects

that

planning will be made a part of all

provide support to the CIA, the Department of

State and the US Information

Agency.

This advance security

planning will be in conformance with the provisions

Directive

of DOD

5200.1, dated 8 July 1957,

8. In the event the Services

direct

of

requested.

receive

requests

for support

from the CIA, the State Department and the US Information

.. Agency, which involve significant

personnel,

amounts of military

'

short supply,

number s of military
equipment, or equipment in

they will inform -the DOD/JCSRepresentative

of

such requests.

Enclosure

; .('f-.
,..;

..

__,...'---,
~ , ~--'--

~1

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.. A'.Q9~Jril):O!lilliJ!!a
...,,~

7 Bebrua~ 1962

,..

L.
;..
I

At t he1r meeting on 7 February 1962 the Joint Chiefs

<

:~

or Start approved the recOl!llllendatlona or the DODRepreaentat ~

. .

L:

i'.

....;; t ~ ~~!.1
~
1b~e!!!' survey Oro!II)aa a~"' .rorth ~ --p~ ~ a~~--~~.:..__
...,,, o!!" the ~siiliJect pape~;'-as
ameni1ed"b;y chinglffs tlie lJi'"
econi1 para- ,
. t
,.
graph 0 Enclosure A ao ae to reai1: , _

'

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend t hat

.. "2.

.,

'ltlie attacl\ed proposal be adopted aa the otticlal

position

DOD

and forwarded to the Olilef or Operations,

Cuba ProJect . "

It was also agreed that General Craig sholll<I.convey-to
the Deputy-Secretary- or Defense the Joint Chiefs' position

'

f.
I

..

'

the access 11st would be extended Ito inc lude the tour Se~v1ce
Intelligence

Corpe.
'

f\'Olil - IIJE.wL ING S

.'

l .
De
~ut
;-....,
--- ---,. -1..

Cl)leta, the Deputy-Connander 01' TAC,r the

~. ---.
Comnander, olJ.COIW!C
~ and the Col11118nder
ot
...

___

.~

EXCWDEI>
,.__,,,
,
-. FROMGOS

the -18th Ai;; ~me

'

VJ i\ -.;IJ1

<:...-

t~

J ruc.C.v Q,:,t)

i--

. . '~...
. fJ

'

7 February 1962
Decision on:

JCS 1969/303
( NORTHWOODS
) ( S)

At their
or Statr

meeting on 7 February 1962 the Joint Cniefs .

a!)proved BOEHCraig's

in paragraph

recommendations as set forth

13 of the sub Jeot paP,er, as .amended by changes

in the second paragraph of Enclosure

A.

J=
....
_

'

. .....

lJJ/4
-'J
ff

?~

....
~

M.~<71INX.O'}.J<.LX..ID0<-<1.,,,--

Colonel, USAF
Deputy Secretary

Copy to:

'

General Craig

UNCl~~!lf
IW,-o~
mfiryf _f&>)tt1<
,,..G'

Bl

./ -

./

,y
ir]lfrl~

..

~~

: -:

ti , , - .~

COPYNO.

l March 1962

to the
HOLDERSOF JCS 1969/311
A Note by the Secretaries

on
(S)
NORTHWOODS

Holders are requested

Decis i on On and to destroy
with security

to substitute

the attached

the superseded

Decision

revised

On in

regulations.

F.

J.

BLOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO
Joint

Secretariat

.
EXCLUoro
FROM
GDS

EXCLUDED
FROMAUTOMATIC
RF.GRADING;
DODDIRECTIVE
5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

UNCl~~~HR..-$

SPECIALDISTRIBUTION
NOTEBY THE SECRETARIES

accordance

! .._

~RET
.
2nd N/H of JCS 1969/311

.. \,

I ;

51 ~

calkP&c
&:
'.S:~:@.
~P.:
revi
COPYNO.

JCS 1969/311

SPECIALDISTRIBUTION

20 February 1962
Page 2152
NOTEBY THE SECRETARIES
to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on
NORTHWOODS
(S)
A report*

consideration

on the atove subject

by the Joint

is submitted

for

Chiefs of Staff.

F.

J . BLOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO
Joint

Secretariat

'

* Not reproduced;

on file

in Joint

Secretariat

EXCLUDED
FROMAUTOMATIC
REGRADING;
DODDIR 5200.10 DOESNOTAPPLY.

rwr
-m!!!fr""...""."
JCS 1969/311

f.XCWDEDFROMGDs

' 2152

~U.1

'

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:@lWNW.,ifn{fiiMae
1.:

ffi@@n:tr
SiSJ1Biir-'rl
Y

COPNO.

JCS l969.Z3ll

SPECIAl.D,ISTRIBUTION
J0INT CH]EFSOF STAFF
DECISIONON J.CS,1969/311
A Note by th~ Secretar ies
on
NORTHWOODS
(S)
Note by the Secretaries

1. At their
of Staff

meeting on 20 February 1962 the Joint Chiefs

approved the recommendations in paragraph l of

JCS 1969/311 as amended by changes in paragraphs

l, 3b, 4 and

6 of Appendix l to Enclouvre C.
2. At their
of Staff
dations

meeting on 23 February 1962, the Joint

reconsidered
in paragraph

Chiefs

JCS 1969/311 and approved the recommenl, amended as indicated

further amended by changes to paragraph

of Appendix l to Enclosure C.
3 .' The memorandumin Enclosure

above, and as

2 and subpar<1.graph 3b .

was forwarded as JCS(4-l58-62,

dated 28 February 1962, to the Secretary

of Defense.

randum in Enclosure B was forwarded to:

Chief of staff,

by SM-240-62; Chief of Naval Operations

The memo-

US Army

by SM-241-62; Chief of

Staff, US Air Force by SM-2#2-62; and Commandant of the Marine

Corps by SM-243-62. All SM's were dated l March'l962.
'.
4. In tliat the Commandant had expressed direct~ concern of
the Mnrine Corpe in thls

matter,

US Code 141 ( c), applied

and were followed ..

5. ,This decision

tfie provisions

'
of Title

now becomes a part or and shall

as the top sheet or JCS 1969/311.

.
'

10,

be attached

..Mt' tltlilltl
PROCEDUREST-0 BE FOLLOWEDIN HAfJDLING CIA, STATE DEPARTMENT,
N WITH THE AC'rIVITI!!:S
USIA Ri!:QUESTSFOR DODSUPPORT IN CONNECTIO
OF '.!'HE CARIBBB!\N SURVEX GP.CUP (CSG) (S)

1 . WhP.n approv, ~d hy t:.!,e S.;,cretary

su pport

fully

of Defense

the DOD wi ll

on a h:i.gh pr .i o,r 1~y hac:l.s reques t s for

recei ve,1 ii::. vrci ting

US Information

f ro m the CIA, the

Ageney in conn,~ction

State

with

support

Department,

and the

t he a ct.l. vi tiez

of

the CSG.
2. CIA, State
should

ancl the

s1~llmi.t rcqu,~,;t s for

<Assist(.l.nt

De.tense

Ope ratj_ons)),
mation

Depart:nent

US l nf o:rmatj.c: 1 Agency

DOD su pp ort

an d shou J.d. include

pl an or project

a cod~ word to in:licat

project

3. Upon recei 9t of such a rcqt,est

wi ll

will

Repres.,ntative

to the

will

for

military

personnel,

consult

with

the

co1e1ments and recommend a tions

of . Staff.

The Services

be advised

will

(S pecial

to t he tlOD/JC S

will

He will

wi t.!1 r ec orn.m
ended action

requests

prior

secu::-a the

Chiefs

4 . CI A, State

supply

of l)efense

of the CSG.

de cision.

for

s t ha request ed

in .-1ri t i ng the following

forwa::-d the req1 !e st

a nd then

request

of the mission

Sec;:-etary

b. The DOD/JCS Representative

Joinc

ion

ap ply:

a . The Assi,stant
Oi;e rations)

info r-

to permi t. a determinat

accom~>lish ment

assi s tan<;e i s in S'v.pport cf this

of the

:r of

'hese reques i:.s should. conta .in sufficient

of th9 e111ipment bes t s uite d for

Se rv ices

Secrctar

to th..; ,"Jecretal.';r of' Dei\onse (Special

of the: over all

pro cedures

to the

then

return

t o thP. Secretary

and the

Joint

the
of Defense

Chiefs

of Staff

of the dc,cision.
Depart ment and the

DOD support

require

involving

amounts

significant

of equipment,

the ap proval

to the furnishing

US Infor mation

1
(Amended as directed

by the

Joj,nt

numbers of

or eq_ui,ment

of the Secretary

of such assistance

P.gency

in short

of Defense

Enclosure A
Chi.efs

of Staff

on 20 & 23 Feb

1I!r xt JilCJ
!s ~MWitA
L
5.

Military

the Departmerrt
DOD will

p ersonne l and/or
of State

be retained

and consistent

under t he control

be reimbursed

fo~ support

end the US Information

exj .sting

!J?'Ocedures.

reimb tusement

1,.ill

Agency in accordance

~Vo.ilable

that

will

not in an.y way delay

pro v:lde support

of

the implementation

will

be made a p art

of

This advance

security
of DOD

da tea 8 .l\:ly l 95'i .

8. In the eve:1t the Servi(;es

receive

from t he CIA, the State

Department

Agency , which involve

significant

they will

inform

requests

f or sup port

and the US Infor mation

numbers of mili ta1y

amounts of mil::. ta..:-:r equipr.ient,

supply,

of all

tn the CIA, the Departme nt of

be i.n confo.rmance w:i th the previsions

5200 .1,

personnel,

be provided

to the DOD. De ter mination

Sta te :ind the US Inf or.matio!1 Agency .

direct

with

such st:ppo1t wtll

7. Advance sac \:ri ty planning

short

CIA, the Department

request~d.

the support

Directive

of Defe nse DODagencies

rendered

Othsrwise,

withi : , the resources

planning

of the DOD when feasible

by the Secret.,.ry

of State

projects

Agency from the

with the e cccmplishm en t of the mission.

6. As determh1e<l
will

and the US Information

or equipment

the DOD/JCS Representative

in
of

suc h requests.

Enclosur e A
0

(Amendea as d irec ted by the Joint

Chiefs

of Staff

20 & 23 Fe b lii2

E:NCLOSi.i'RE
B
MB;MORANilUM
FOR: Secretary of State
Di.:i'ect0r , Central Intell i gence Agency
Di;:'ectox, United Stat es Infor mation Agency
!'ro ceduro :; to oe Follcwed in Handl ing
I:equsts f.or DODSupport in Connectio:-i with
the Activities
cf the Car:!..::>
tea n Survey Grot:.p
l . Refe;-ence is ir.ade to the ac tiviti

es of the Caribbean

Survey Group (CSG).

;,. Requests for DODsupport
of th P. CSG sho'.l.ld be submitted
Defe nse (Assistant
Opera t i 0ns)).

in connection
in writing

to the Secretary

In order to i':icilita

te and expedite

infor mation of the overall

a determination

of the personnel

for accomplishment

to the Secretary

of

of Defense (Special

furnis h.in g of such support , each request

sufficient

with t he activities

the

should contain

plan or project

to permit

and / or cquir, ment best suited

of the miss i on and an agreed code word to

in di cate tha t t he r equested

ass istanc e is in !;Upor t of thjz

project.

J. In re gard to the fu.,ding of the operations,

desired

t hat,

as determin0d

by the Secretary

it is

of Derens e , DOD

agencies

be re i mbursed for 1;uppo:rt r endered in accordance

existl.ng

procedures .

Determina tion of rei:nbursement

in any way delay tba implementation

with

will not

cf the support requested.

!n t he event agreem'3nt cannot be reached quic kly on t he

funding,
later

! propose t hat the fundi ng problem be resolved

at a

dats .

4. I trust
that yo,l will

that the abov'3 meats with your approva l and

inform me accordingly.

Enclosure

....
19....
NO
FORN .,w

rvrcr

DfiiMbiu:. -OFORN:i

$~
- CbiJR~r~,~iiiiliiiliiii,.
- - .7zi
1:w - ,..,-

SPECIAL HANDLING

GLiJ
-

SPECJA
L fJANDliN
G

II

REPORTBY THEDOD/JCSREPRESENTATIVE
OF
THE CARIBBEAN
SURVEYGROUP
to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on

PROCEDURES
TO BE FOLLOWED
IN HANDLIN(L
C!A, STATE
DEPART!'P.i
~T ANDUS INFORMATION
AGEN
:J:? IiEQUF..rsFOR
DODSUPPORTIN CONNECTION
WITHT".tfilf :}: 'l i'.LTIES
.)!,' THE CA
P.IBBEANSURVEYGROUP( ~l

--

l.

'Fae

DOD/JCSRepresentative

reconunends that the Joint

of the Caribbean Survey Group

Chiefs of Staff:

a. Note the contents

of Enclosure

b . Approve and forward Enclosure

the Secretary

to Enclosure
II
11

'I

A and Enclosure

B.

C, with Appenc!ices, to

of the proposed procedures

C) by the Secretary
Chief of Staff,

of .Defense,

(Appendix l

transmit

US Army, Chief of Naval

US Air Force and the Commandant

'

r--- -- - -- r,: - - l.
.Joris 1:o'J'
1,Y
--- - ... .. ---- - EXCf,IIL'!-;OFHVM
':'ti:.l~.1i C
llEGl!AJ/ll:C: D:JD Flfl! 5200 . 10
lt i'f

EXCLUD
ED FROM GOS

SP ;ICCJJ!
M

cy......
L ..oi....-?..<?,1opi
e~

NOFORN

SPECIAL
HANDLING

Amended as directed

by the Joint Chiefs of Staff 20 February l;-9,6;:? r,'.irT

,

11

,,

9
10

II

-,

of the Marine Corps.

C:11

Enclosure D to the Chief ofStaff,

Operations,

of Defense.

c. After approval

'

'

,,

:iji@KN~t!~r
::ww
'"
-

ENCLOSURE
A

DRAF
T

.,.

~-

- ' .", d1 .,
. t.,. t . .. L... ...
;

MEMORANDUM
FOR THE CHAIRMAN,
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Subject:

Procedure to be Followed
telligence
Agency, State
atio n Agency Requests for
tion with the Activities
Group

1. The attached
mends procedures

in Handling Central .InDepartment and US Infor mDODSupport i n Connecof the Caribbean Survey

memorandumfor the Secretary

of Defense recom-

to be fo ll owed for DODsupport of the operations

of the Central

Intelligence

Agency (CIA), St~te Department and

US Information

Agency (USIA) in connection

of the Caribbean Survey Group.

with the activities

Past experience

indicates

the

need for such procedures.

2 . The recommended ~rocedures
conference.held

are based upon the results

of Defense on 30

with the Deputy Secretary

January 1962 by the DOD/JCSRepresentative

on the CSG.

3. The procedures recommended to the Secretary

will
State

afford

fu ll DODsupport to the operations

Department and USIA in connection

4 . The proc edures provide

requests
requests

to the DOD/JCS
- Representative

ations

will

~f the DOD
.

Department arid

in turn refer

Chiefs of Staff

with recommendations

and then

to the Secretary

WILLIAMH. CRAIG
Brig General, USA
DOD/JCSRepresentative
Caribbean Survey Group

SPECIAL HANDLI
NG

v'atass cr
2

the

on the CSGfor evaluation.

Defense for decision .

7 . 7 . 18!1.~efl!B'J.'-~eiffi:'

of

secure the comments and recommend-

of the Serv i ces and the Joint

forward the request

of

point of view of

for the submission in writing

of Defense, who will

The DOD/JCSRepresentative

of the CIA, the

t he best interests

for DODsupport by the CIA, the State

USIA to the Secretary

of Defense

with the activities

the CSG. At the same time, from the over-all

the US Government, it will protect

of a

Enclosure A

SPECIAL
HANDLIN
G

of

.-

sr1
G
IALHAN
DLJ
NG

.;. 'l.}ti' -,1

II
~ ~

ENCLQSUREB
MEMORANDUM
FOR RECORD
Subject :

Guidance from the Deputy Secretary of Defense

and his Reaction to Original Proposed Policy
for CIA Support by the Department of Defense
of CaribbeanSurvey Group (30 January 1962)

Mr. Gilpatric

did not like this

the paper was too negative

paper at all.

and restricted

towards an enemy like we are dealing

as though a policy

with the Germans or Italians,

not a fellow ,!.;partment of our Government.

operation

with the blessing

him as a most important

important
request

the Joint

Chiefs of Staff

for th0ir

The Secretary

after

the advice of the Joint

considering

the decision

will

of individual

Chiefs of Staff,

of the Secretary

actions

in minutia regarding

regardless
required

of Defense .

on each case.

actions.

what

This

in a case-by-case

basis.

We

We do not want

This is a red line priority

problem and must be handled with dispatch

other details.

evaluat J.on and

Chiefs of Staff.

We do not want to get involved

do not want individual

it and

of Defense will determine,

be, not the Joint

is the prerogative

When a

will evaluate

recommendations.

involved

the most

m:ts sion we have in the government today.

comes in from CIA, you (Craig)

masses

an:l approved by

This is probably

request

decision

T:~.s is a red line

of the President

task.

He indicated

and without getting

expenses and reimbursement

or

Depar1;ment of Defens .e may have to do it themselves

who foots
to reimburse

the bill.

In some cases,

if so determined

CIA will be

by the Secretary

of

Defense.

This is a matter which must be decided by the

Secretary

of Defense - not the Joint

Chiefs of Staff.

Department of Defense budgets for some CIA support.

The
We have

equipment of some types lying around not being used and should
not require

reimbursement

for this

must be decided by the Secretary

an evaluation
$

by the Services

type,

as a general

of Defense after

and the Joint

3

rule.

considering

Chiefs of Staff.
Enclosur e B

This

[PlCIAL
rn!ff:
NoFv,.a
LING
y o&

'H~
NOtF
~G

There are some assets sf!L 1AL

without and should make
these types available to the CIA without necessarily
being
reimbursed

for it.

Mr. Gilpatric

Chiefs of Staff

Joint

does not object

to the

recommending to the Secretary

of

Defense what equipment should be used for accomplishment of

stated

mission and specific

Gilpatric

projects.

that we were not trying

I explained

to obstruct

that we read our message loud and clear.

Bob Kennedy's instructions
cant add anything

He indicated

Saturday

that llr. McNamarahad been

developments

'

security,

as expressed

to me last

Mr. Gilpatric

etc.

the people necessary

regarding

said I could inform

the project

1n order to get

This was up to my judgment.

that I was the DODRepresentative

make recommendations

concerning

requests

and Chiefs should determine

Mr. Gilpatric

for CIA support.

that the Services

the proper personnel

to be used for specific tasks

and

since they were better

and limitation

made

and he wanted me to

I emphasized the urgent requirement

as to capability

Saturday

numbers in the Department of Defense who

knew of the project,

the job done.

"I

that he would inform him in regard to Mr.

McNamara's apprehensions

it clear

which ho stated:

on the Hill and had not kno~m of latest

project,

concerning

I showed him Mr.

my meeting with Mr. McNamara of last

with Mr. Gilpatric.

on this

the operation,

to that."

I discussed
preoccupied

concerning

to Mr.

of their

equipment
qualified

equipment and personnel

than the CIA.

In summary, Mr. Gilpatric
lishment
that

of a policy

the decision

was the prerogative

Chiefs of Staff.

on this

subject.

the need for the estab-

He was most emphatic

as to whether or not a request

of the Secretary

and recommendations

@p?!ti.#Jifi:;
NOFORN
S EC
LING

was approved

of Defense NOTthe Joint

However, the Secretary

to have evaluations

..;ii.,.-

recognized

of Defense would like

of the Joint

Chiefs of

j;,'

T\lllffli
SPEG
l;\LHANDLING

Enclosure B

JjNmJ~lf
~

iBIJ!~r.ffl~~LHAND
LING
.NOFORN
,
Staf f available

f or consideration

on the subject.

He considered

original

in making impor tant

the approach

iecomrnendation s nmch too neg a tive

adopt a more positive

approach

decisions

used in our
and directed

me to

in a new proposa l .

WILLIAM
H. CRAIG

Brig . General, USA

DOD/JCS Re9r.esentative,
Car i bbean s,.,;rvey Group
'

4,d . Ff~

.il C'Jtfl~fl!ff
- NOFORN
L HANDLING
..,e

...,
~.."".

Enclo s ure B

{(

,.

'FOP
SfC~ET

-v

U&.JV.IM.J4

..1,v..1. ,

"''

NU~OKN

SPECIAL
HANDLING

ENCLOSURE
C

. I

DRAFT
.Wf'S~CRET
MEMORANDUM
FOR THE SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE
1

Subject:

Procedures to be Followed in Handling CIA,

State Department, and USIA Requests for
DODSupport 1n Connection with the
Activities
of the Caribbean Survey Group.

1. Reference

is made to the memorandum for Brigadier

General William H. Craig, USA, from the Assistant

Secretary

of Defense,

subject:

"Special

to the

Projects",

dated

17 January 1962.

in***

Intelligence

operations

and materials
and invited
role

Agency and Department of State

as Defense conunitments of men, money,

conc<!l'ning the Defense

and contributions.

State

of the Central

for DODsupport

Intelligence

Department and the US Information

of State,

5. Issuance

Agency in connection

of a recommended memorandum for

the Director,

and the US Information

gover nin g DODsupport

Agency, the

of the Caribbean SUrvey Group ( CSG).

4. Enclosure 2 is a draft
t he Secretary

Central

Agency settin g forth

of the operations

Intelligence,
procedures

of the CSG.

of the recommended memoranda should assure

the procedures

7
8

10
11

1 recommends procedures

with the ac ti vi ties

formal recommendations

of the operations

that

to assist

are required."

3. Enclosure

~lb. Department of Defense must be prepared

Central

2. The refE:,:cmced memorandum states:

fully

governing DODsupport

of the operations

of the CSG are followed.

12

13
14
15

16
17
18

19
20

21
22

Enclosur e C

,, :.
' . '....

OFOR
N

'

ENCLOSURED
DRAFT
MEMORANDUM
FOR:

Subject:

Chief of Staff,
US Army
Chief of Naval Operations
Chief of Staff,
US Air Force
Co:nmandant of the Marine Corps
Procedures
to be ,Followed in Handling Central
Intelligence
Agency~ State Department and US
Information
Agency uequests
for DOD Support in
Connection with the Activities
of the Caribbe an
Survey Group (CSG)

The Departr- ,,:,;-.t of Defense

to assist

the Central

has been reques a,:,.'. to be prepared

Intelligence

of Stat e ,. and the US Information

with

the operations

clost.re

sets

in handling

forth

Agency (CIA),
Agency in activit:

of the Caribbean
the procedures

such requests

for

the Department

.~s connected

Survey Group.

The en-

t.o be fo1. lowe d by ri1e Services

support.

EXCLVDE
D 1,'H
) i
-. \. .J AU-':J!!
.\ w:-,...
'..-tn , : DODi>IP r.... - \.,
DOP
S ~
!o~ ~ v~oo.10

flZGR:'.r:
- "C
-

10

qp SF('.RET
.,,

APPLY

'~ J

Enclosure

.'

l"

D,

: I

SECRFJ.'

. '
. JCSil969X.303

COPY, NO.

---

SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION

8 February il.962

JOINT , CHIEFS OF STAFF

'

DECISION

~N.JCS .1969/303
............,

A Note by the Secretaries

on
NORTHWOODS(S)

Note by the Secretaries

.....

1. At their
Staff

meeting on 7 February 1962 the Joint

approved the recommendations 1n paragraph

Chiefs of

13 of JCS

1969/303 as amended by changes in the second paragraph of

Enclosure A.
2. Thia decision now becomes a part of and shall
as the top sheet of JCS 1969/303.

be attached

F. J. BLOUIN

svsrrr,t~
TIC
ALLY REV!fW
~IM, (7(/
BYJCSON-----'d.-O;:'.'lL4't
<1-(..
'"';.~
ClASS
;FiCATiO!'JCO~Tif;UE
O
.:.....

M. J.

INGELIDO

Joint

Secretariat

Ql,\GDS
EXCLUDED
FR

,.

..

. ;.,

' .

f.~t

'-'

.
1

7 February

COPYNO-- - -SPECIALDISTRIBUTION

UNt!~~~lf
If0

1962

Page 2144

NOTEBY THESECRETARIES
to the

JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF

on

NORTHWOODS
(S)
report* on the above subJect
tio n by the Joint Chiefs of St aff.
A

is submitted for considera-

F. J . BLOUIN

Not reproduced;

on file

in Joint

; rre

INGELIDO

Joint

Secretariat

Secretari at

fXClUDEOFRON.GO,

9BF
JCS 1969/303

M. J.

2144

,.

~NCl~~~lf
IfD

~ JOP SECRET
NO
n,~Rf._,
TOP SEC

!!

!~!~il
\:lliJ~~

SPECIA
i. HAriDUN
G 'Jr!\_r..

11

II
1,
1,

REPORTBY THE DEPARTMENT

OF DEFENSEANDTHE
JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFFREPRESENTATIVE
OF THE
SURVEYGROUPTO THE-C~N,
CARIBBEAN
JOINT CHIEFSOF STAFF

,,

on

CUBANPROJECT

1,

'

II
I

I prt

' c,(Z

EXCLUDED
FROMGOS

-~ri! YEcRET
--BXCLun
~;-i,'Ri~;
~i~
::,"
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I

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r,01,
:s 110-r,._1
1,1s

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"

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;

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ll

SPECIALHANDLING
REQUIRED

NOl"oRN

LIMITEDDISTRIBUTION
POSITIONOF DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE,CUBAPROJECT
THE PROBLEM
1. Au requested

by the Chief of Operations,

oine a firm US position

to o.o ~<:)1~

regarding

Cuba Project*

the stal<e and role

of the Dspartment of Defense in the event US assistance

requ ,,:;ted in support

of Cuban insurgent

efforts

is

to overthro11

the :3 stro government.

ASSUMPTIONS
~,;. i,:-,,.,nal Security

Policy concerning

overthro11 of the

~.'::;:;;~o :r :;f:s.na i s as agreed at the 9 May 1961 meeting

,\:. ~ 1::..1 :s,~r.'lLl~it y Councl.'l . *
1'~11

..'

:,.,_.
. :::-cuation in Cuba will be, a s re~lected

Nat:!," iel .-:ntelligence

of the

in current

Estimates.***

., . Op-,,iit i<:>
YI'; o.,c;'iinst

the Castro government will be covert

~ ":~.\':.;. fa v.:s, :.;,,e Castro government.

FACTSBEARINGON THE PROBLE
M
~, At the 5 May 1961 meeting''"* or the National
Coun:!il it was agreed that US policy
the downfall
determined

of Castro.

close

toward Cuba should aim at

Other signif:icant

elements

of policy

at that meeting were :

a. The United States

vention

Security

in Cuba at that
the possibility

b. The United States

or attempt

should not undertalce milit ary inter time but should do nothing
of military

intervention

to fore-

.in the future.

should not impose a naval blockade

an air war against

Cuba.

Memorandumfrom Brigadier General E. G. Lansdale, USAF, for

Brigadier General W. H. Craig, USA, subject: "Special
Project" dated 17 Jan 1962, not on file in Joint Secretariat
Y... >- Enclosure
to JCS 2304/36
'*'** SNIE 85-61, dated 28 Nov 61, also NIE 85-62 to be pub!l.ished
7 Feb 1962, both documents will be available through Joint
Secretariat
SPECIALHANDLING
REQUIRED
NORORN
.
LIMITEDDISTRIBUTION

U~CllSS\f
\E9

'11"
I.! i

fogenqy.,

Intelligence

,d~

~~~dent

~a J, the Central

e.tiMl.' de V~ ~nts,

~.

elements

t.;.).~

)\

"'sb.oi.,d mal{e

study c;>fpossi'b+e wtakn~ssr,~ , !1l'ldvulnerabili~ies

a :;,;)tailed

i,1

!,',

SPECIAL HANDLmG REQUIRED

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..."'

~11,

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c'o~~oi

i~ !)b, /, 'l<f!ISno'fe d.
....
' . ...
~~~ ~nc:i,osure B.

Which exert

7. For ad~ittonal

raqts,

'

DISCUSSION
.''(

8. For discussion,
:,. Th9 oasic

see Epclosure

C.

CONCLUSIONS
,tr1; ,
imP+!
cation~ of Castro's

mi+itaryl

Communist

gov0 n .if;l?.:. <,re as follows:

~

'

a.

l (, e),.1)9ses t ~E! Western

b:x<:~:::-; ':hreat
~..;. ':.:.cm,,~.

to fts

Hem113phere j;o an increasingly

secr4"ty.

'!'his increases

vulnerabitity

anq d~f!;mse costs

-:i:"e lc ;:.~d Qr shifteq

to ll!eE!1i1(h1s threat.

o.
t,: : ."J

;,

..

i::,c::r
};-"' 1 c, re r

had for " spreading

t ~,,:; W,,fl ce;-n ijemispqe f e .

as forces

j;he most effective

Communism throughout

'fhif! in turn

:;.,, -~ r,,.,.;iibil :\ty th~Ji additional

Latin

greatly

increases

American countries

.') 1 ,~01r.,
, .:nder Conqunist control.

Elilnination

; ,~:.:) would demonstrate

to the other

nations

th<! United

not tolerate

such intrusions.

States

will
'
.

Communist control
result

are

p:".'o,, :~.:~: the Soviet; Union with

'. 1.

our

qf additional

cquntries

of this

of the world

that

would or could

in:
(1) Ipcreaseq

pther

Communist capability

.
. Pf the' Western
.
In 1,;rqa5~q

natipns

(2)

for

attack

on

Hemisphere;
.'
.

Conununist
.
....' . ' capability
:

for

spreading

Commun+~~ ttif9 ~ 1~u,y ~ pi~ Arn~rica;

'
'
(3' ~p~.lQ~~
o;f

areas!
strate~1

f!9!lf

ft,r"
;i

..

fi r,~t ~fr~r~

.'

t .

'

~xf s~ipg and /or poj;entia;

bases, trainin
1
!1f'
apd ris~ts, ~!3 well i;is sour~es of

~,g~~f!ary

. , .

~o or milita;-y
!

qapaqility;

SI']i:CIAL HA-NDLINO
RE UIRED'
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' 'll'

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SPECIAL HANDLINGREQUIRED
NOFORN

Lil{CTE'DDISTRIBUTION

(4) An increased
the Panama Canal
10 . .['he urgency

threat
through

t o US usage
subversion

of the requirement

and control

and sabotage.

to remove the Communist

gove~~nm,.,,,t .from Cuba is made apparent

by Castro's

incr 1asir, i:; capabilities

other

West ,;:n Hemisphere

the :t,.:~nisphere.

for

attacking

and i'or spreading

This

coe;,.'r;es of aci;ion

constantly

nations

of the

Communism throughout

sen:ie of urgency

within

of

is gre ,,tly

t,he capability

increased

if

of t.r.e Communists are

con :~:~'ierad:

,,. '!:.,,~ Soviets

cou). ,,1 establish

:,!\J.!:i ~y~::i.cm:.s,s :tlcs with

:1,;:.m,.'.:r: the

missiles

nuclear

set

that

~r.
:,:,~~
..; ,l'1~re.
1

for.th

the Connnun ist

a:>ove,

regime

The Department

acc,:-:;.~:ab:, :: to the U"i ted

Bloc reactions

Com,;,,mlst
recognized,

it

accoinplished
serious

States

without

ef 'f'ect

that

of Def ens<?. is prepared

other

3 a govern ment
ty of

than Cuba is

general
opinion

to

C..:ba to the extent

the project

precipitating

on wor ld public

of! the

Whil e the possibil1

in areas

ls believed

~he Df.lpartment

requ i raments

and installin
.

bases

in Cuba i s

ov,, .: ,.!.y ()1:.;

,po1't any popu la r movement inside
of ,; " ;tJ .rrr,; the Co!iu,1unist regime

air

joi: ,i; con t r ol of the

i nf'):,,;:a t;,<:,-~e :~th the minimum security

i/cG :-.,~:~n

sea and/or

wc:rhe ads ; or they could

and maintain

factors
of ~;;f en ,,,,. holds

land,

if

objective

can be

war , and without

the following

four

cond :i.tion::, pre vail:

a. If the :impression
ur~ent,
and /or

is created

humanit ar :i.an requirement

the Unitecl States

assistance

that

to restore

is responding

fro m a government

there

. -

is an
order

in Cuba

to an appeal

representat

f or

i ve of the

Cuban people.

SPECIAL HANDLINGREQUIRED
NO!.'
' ORN
.LrMl'l'ED'DI STRIBUTION
j, )' ;'
:tJ'' .'......
,

:t

Jti>h i1':t'
...
")> !l,; " :,> l'\ !.l.''
'
<,;!'Ii

.';-

'f

(\I);p) ~ :[~
<Cill /fi:'/!'

SPECIAL HANDLINGREQUIRED
NOFORN
LI M
"'firED DISTRIBUTION

UNtlAS~lf
IEU
b. If it

is announced

t l~,t the United

States

to the overt

and/or

n,ov tn i :l.nto Cuba for

hold'. V,~ free

prior

other

the purpo s e of restoring

elections,

and that

capability

to maintain

action

members of t he OAS are

they will

w.:.thdiaw as soon as the new go vernment

h!;.ve the

military

order

immediately

advises

order

and

that

they

wit ho.1t furt h er

a:,is 1sta nce fiom OAS na tions .

c. If the military
.'<:, poss i ble

operation

and with

is

sufficient

force

Hl .;,0 ~ ,,.:.::1..!.ilty to ta k0 effective

~f

"J!:,

5.f

the Cuba n regime

1;.-; :'cc<:os or pro;:,erty

as quickly

so that

counter-meas

~;h\; .::;:istro re 3ime :'.!.sreduced

"l,

conducted

the Communist
ures

in support

to a minimum.

co ~l'.i ta b.ost:1.1e acts

agai nst

whi ch woulci .set',,, as an incident

u_.
, ..;n

w~..lch to base overt US intervent~ .c.1s . In this event,

.~)~-.,~.i.~r.bJ.e portions
of a, b, and c abovg apply .
. , ;c::>
~1tmen 'v of Defense is a l so prepar ed to cove :rtl;<i
lt:. 'l'I":..:-

pro v: .d!.

~.i.1.~~v
oil":.

t ,) :;!A and State,

to :;::iy US 3.pproved popular

or thro ug h these

movement inside

sup;~ !.:les, t::-ani:::;>ortation , personnel

agencies,

Cuba, in terms

of

and bases .

RECOMMENDATIONS

J.::.

It 1. :, r-c ,;ommended that:

a.

.r:1e memorandum at Enclosure

t h,~ a.,ov.e c on clu i:i ons,

be forwarded

A he!'eto,

which reflects

to the Secretary

of

!)e.f"
ensa ..

b. This pa p er NO'!' be forwarded

to comma nders

of unifie d

or specif ie d co nunanrl s.
c. Th:ls paper

NO'r be f orwarded

to US officers

NOT be forwarded

to the Chairman,

assi gn ed to

NA1~0activities.
d. This paper
Delegation,

United

Nations

Military

Staff

US

Committee .

SPECIAL HANDLINGREQUIRE
D
NOFORN
LI MI 'l'ED DISTRIBUTION

' 'I'"
. :1.r.

II., t

, ur 1)1:.llQG

Subject:
1.

Pursuant

MEMORANDUM
POR THE SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE
Cuba
to the objectives

of the Caribbean

the Department of Defense was requested*

position

with respect

to the Department's

Survey Group,

to construct

a firm

stake and role

in the

removal of the Communist regime in Cuba,

2. The Joint
proposal

Chiefs of Staff

recommended that

be adopted as the official

to the Chief of Operations,

DODposition

the atta~hed
and forwarded

Cuba Project.

*Memorandumfrom BrigGeneral E. G. Lansdale, USAF, for

BrigGe ,.;eral W.H. C~aig, USA, subject:
"Special Project",
dated 17 Jan 1962; not on file in Joint Secretariat
As amended by JCS at meet~ng on 7 Febraary

ter 9E1fKfT

1962

?t

tro

...
SPECIALHANDLING
REQUIRED
NOFORN
LilgTED DISTRIBUTION
APPENDIXl TO ENCLOSURE
A
DRAF!'

''
FORBRIGADIERuENERAL E. G. LANSDALE,
Chief of Operations, c,1ba ProJect

MEMO
"l,\?,'-)'JM

Cuba Project '.'

Suoject:
P.eference:

Memorandumfrom Your Office for

BrigGen w. H'., craig, USA, subJ :
"Special Project",
dated 17 Jan 62

1. As requested

in re f erenced memorandum, t~1e position

the D,;opartment of Defense,

with respect

to the military

of
stake

anc. ;_...,).e :~n the removal of the Communist regime in Cuba, has
bee,, dc';.mr,,ined baEed upon the following
, . National

Security

Policy,

factors:

determined

b the ~SC during

,_,;,;. ir.c,,:,t:ing of S )lay :.961 .

b. Current intelli

gence estimates

c . );:)er,..t~.Onb against
e t le.;.;<,:;in:i.tially

d. Time favors

a.

the Castro regi me will be covert,

the Castro government .

implications

of Castro's

:cceX9oses

:H)riow,, threat
vulnf:: ability

the Western remisphere

to its

securi

and defense

to meet this

b. It provides

control

our national

are developed

threat.

the Soviet Union with the most effective

that additional

of additional

increases

Latin Jl.Jnerican countries

Elimination

to the other nations

will not tolerate

Communismthroughout

This in turn greatly

come under Communist control.

States

increases

cos r s as forces

the Western Hemisphere.

demonstrate

to an increasingly

tr. This

base they have ever had for spreading

possibility

Coriun
w1ist

as follows:

~t~~,

or shifted

in

2 . The b=?
.sii:; military
gov~?:nme::
: >;

cf the situation

will

of this base would

of the world that the United

such intrusions.

countries

the

Coimnunist

would or could result

in:

...
Appendix l to
Enclosure A
SPIDIAL HANDLING
REQUIRED
Nol{FORN

trMrTEo
pJ;JfS:iJJB'itBgq~
J6l
J~ ir.'"Jr
1.,,

,;

fC8?Erl,PE61~t =l~A"NtLit~
rw=tttffiR
N

I UC

(1) Increased
other

nations

of the Western Hemisphere .

(2) Incr easedCo mmunist

Communismthroughout
(3) The loss

training

of strategic

Latin

capability

facilities

materials

for spreading

Ameri ca.

of existing

areas,

capability

ij~~~~~f

Co~.munist capability-for

and/or

potential

and rights,
necessary

as well as sources

to our ~ilitary

(4) An increased

threat

to US usage and control

of the Panama Canal through

subversion

3. The urgency of the requirement

and sabotage.

to remoye the Communist

government

from Cuba is made apparent

by Castro's

increasing

capabilities

other

for attacking

Western Hemisphere and for spreading

hemisphere.
courses

bases,

nations

within

of the

Communism th'roughout

This sense of urgency is greatly

of action

constantly

the capability

increased

the
if

of the Communists

are considered:
a. The Soviets

could . establish

land,

sea and/or

air

bases in Cuba ,
b. The soviets

could provide

Castro

with a number of

with nuc!l.ea r warheads;

ballistic

missiles

furnish

the missiles

and maintain

or they could

Join t control

of the

nucl ear warheads.

4. In view of the factors
Defense holds

that

above,

The Department

of Defense is prepared

any popular

ousting

the Conununist reglme and installing

to the United States.
:l.n areas

world public

opinion

a government

the possibility

other

than in Cuba is

of

can be accomplished

war, and without

if th e following
2

of

\~tile

recoe;nized , it is believ ed that . this

e;eneral

to overtly

movement :Lnside Cuba to the extent

Communist Bl oc reactions

precipitating

of

of the l1estern

requirements

support

acceptable

the Department

the Communist regime in Cuba is incompatible

with the minimum security

Hemisphere .

set forth

UNtll~Slf
\EU

serious
conditions

effect

wi thout

on

prevail:
Appe:1dix l to
Enclosure A

~NClA~~if
IfD

ezdl'il
f
a TS%

SPECIAL HANDLING
REQUIRED
NOFORN
f;""ri',;
Jf~ DISTRIBUTION

a. I f the impression

is created

h'J.~anit ~.ri an requirement

Ur:~~c:3 s cates

t hat there

to restore

is r espo1:.:li ng to an appeal
representative

;:,. :r it
a ct.ion

is announced

that

mc-1ing into

order

the United

inc ident

for assistance

States

to the overt

and/or

the
from

ad vises

military

members of the OAS are

of res~or.:l.;;g order

and th :;.t they will

as the new government

in Cuba and/or

of the Cuban people.

Cuba for t!le purpose

t ree electio!'ls,

is an urgent,

and holding

im.>nediacel y withdraw as soon

that

they have the capability

t c i11alntain order \11thout further

assistance

from the OAS

natiom; .
c.

:er th e, milj, :;ary

operation

is conducttid

a:,. .<'Jc.;r,:::~
le and w:,th s~ficient
B).o-:i's ability

to take

force

effective

w!'dch

pc!'t:1.onv

c t'

support

movement inside
personnel

US intervention.

acts

again st

as an incident

In this

event,

upon
applicable
,,..-

'

a, b, and c above apply.

5 . The i)':l1.w
rtment
provide

in support

to a m:,,1imum.

or prope rty whi ch would serve

to base overt

cl<ly

t hs.t the Conununist

:)r , 11 the Guban regime commits hostile

U~ forci!s

c;..\ j

counter-measures

o,' the C>.istro re g1:'ae is reouced

c.

,10

as

of Defense

to CIA or State,
Cuba, in tenns

is also

prepared

or any US approved
of supplies,

to covertly
popular

transportation,

and bases .

~NtllS~lf
llO

Appendix 1 to
Enclosure A
SPECIAL HANDLING
REQUIRED
NOFORN
LIMITED
DISTRIBUTION

i1'
:i,, ,;.
~
JI,"\!
'(..~ ,~{
;,;.
, 1,u .j ~.
N >
I , ir
~

11

,,
FACTSBEARINGON THE PROB.LEN
1. The over-all
II

plan* f:c,r the overthrow of ;;he Castro

gove1.:i:r.ent is respon:'live
"'l'h N

to the following

IJS objec t ive is to help the Cubans overth.'ow

th:-: Coi:imun1st reg i me from within

'

objective:

Cuba and institute

r.eu go:arnment \'11th which the United States

peace.

evident

aideC mat,1, j.al ::.:1, moi'lly and financ :tally

Bloc, h,!l.f' jecome, firmly

in

e:1trenched.

th i.t the Castro regime,

py the Sino-Soviet

Ove,:, the :9ast two and one -

half yea ,:,:., th1: cas c:::-oregime has gradually

on the s :,.r,o- Soviet model.

The first

inunec:l!<tc, ;repla:..emer:-c of the existing

force

can live

11

2. It :ts becoming i ncreasingly

state

by 1evolut1ona1y units

the J?evol\,;t;ion :i.n th~ hills

built

up a police

ste:,; was !;h e

Cubar, Ar':Oyand police

which had fo~>.

ght with Castro durin g
and in the underground.

Changes 1n

the Navy ::i!ld. A:!.i Fol'ce were accompl ished through purges of top
personnel.
tion

TOW<lrd~he end of 1959 as d i sillusionment

over the drift

toward closer

Soviet Bloc began to crystal1ze

the regime again

shifted

II

newl y -formed civilian

Ii

looked upon this

'

.force.

its

basis

federation
the militia
Speci.fically

tilitia.

maintained

its

Castro

military
status

as

under labor union and student

lines

and the chief

o.f the corresponding

took over command of the militia

trained

Dr.

On 29 Septe mber 1960, Castro reorganized

along military

district

time to tlte

as a presumably more reliable

organization

leadership.

armed forces,

of power, this

worl<er-peasant - student

militia

with the Sino -

wi t hin the regular

For almost a year the militia

a par a-military

military

association

and opposi-

officers

commanders and military

units .

rep l aced the original

training

was accelerated

militia

"'Program Review by Brisadier General E. G. Lansdale, USP.F,

subject : "The Cuba Project",
dated 18 Jan 1962; not on ',
.file in the Joint Secretariat.

Enclosure B
SPECIAL HANDLING
REQUIRED
.NOFORN
LIMI TED DISTRIBUTIO
N
'f' H. m
",!!'
p __ 'iii
.. (..
"' iill
' :a
..,.,.,JeAi!i
~, tK
......
....
r:-

"IL

. '

..

SP.R\JIAL ::.\NDLING
REQUIRED
-

"'7, W,< ""1""n\; ;>, ...tm

Lf!l:fTED))I STRIBUTION
3 . Sir: ,;J.taneousl y, the Castro regime was al s.:i bu i ldin g its
I n Jur ,e 1961, the process

sec1:.:.:::.ty :,etwork '*.

the ,3ata~. U.shment o:? a M:i.n:Lstl"Jof Interi.)r

for :'l?.
.:tni".~tning

"put, !.i c order" .

uni ts under

a' _i;o gave the Ministr~ : authority

of ''11ommj:~tee; ; for i:,

',.a D(:;'ense

the

tl 1e nen nun~.stry.

to su:_9erv11Je the activities

of the Revolu ,;i (1n11

These

conm;~.tte. 1.-..
ar<; raapo\ ,.sib:..c !'or inf'orming

autl \c :i..'.;.."::ieao~

rev o~Lutiv,;~,ry '' r-cti Vi tie;;

.\ car,:;iaign is under way

or attitudes.

to ei,!;ab ~.;;,h J.Cl:J

,OOC or such committees

with

membe~a ~.,, of x'.~,,es,

churches,

factories,

and comb~.;::~.1g it

schools,

l'li'~i1 a vast

reg iJ'1e hi>.s estf.'.olisl:.ed

model.
4 . !n .:;.,ppo:..t of this

system

military

f'orGes have be e,, equipped

Czechoslovakia

mode;:on wea.!JOns and th at there

equip!.!ent for the force

indicate

that

includes

EW radar,

that

and possibly
the Castro

operations

rar

and internal

materiel

in bein g .
is rather

control

are being

beyond that
security.

the Western Hemisphere,

systems,

Ji -

equipped

surplus

of

, and

It becomes obvious
and equipped

for

law and order

a continuous

and is a Cor;u
nunist

with

Some accounts

to maintain

This represents

In-

advanced fighters,

trained

required

Castro

rrom the Sino-

sophisticated

Department of State White Pap.er, subject:

in Cuba" , recently
published but undated;
Joint Secretariat

TOP59BB'll
.-

build-up,

and Russia, ,

is well

medium range rockets.

forces

the Castro

is in Cuba an actual

nulitary

short

co>.~eratives,

the Communist Bloc

with arms and materiel

i.e.,

!:ire

0l1

and securj.ty

forJM ti on :t~i,,ic,'\\tes the Cuban force

certain

"v11lunteer"

50,000

networ k or :i~,t'or:ners,

a security

Sovj,et Bloc covntries,

counter-

11

By centra :i.:J.~;i,,g ',l~.a pol 'i ce tr.notion

resid,; ).1;.
::.,:.:. are ?.s, e t c.

w1th

w::5;h reu ponsib i lity

The dec:::-ee ce ntralizes

var5 .:,,la pc,).ice and invest,igation

It

\lUlminated

threat

~tronghold

to

for the

"The Castro
not on file

Regime
in

Enclosure

SPECIAL HANDLING
REQUIRED

NOFORN

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

~Ntl~S~lf
llD ?\ifnu; l'i'

1~~~

""r1

"2tf3?le:
%Uk&!f~
.~r'*....
a T?P

SPECIAL HANDLINGREQUIRED
NOFORN
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

continued

spread

inter-American

of Communism to other

countries

of t he

System.

5. In response

to a request*

the !),z!'e';';Se Department

thrc ,u of the Castro
the e vent formal,
beco :,,2 necessary

has already

government
overt

in April

p l anned for

by use of military

force .

w,c, ,:,;:>l,:,1.,m
ent of sizeable

US forces

In

in Cuba should

are now two US military

be .implemented .

196 1

the over-

conum.tment of US forces

there

c.lt ,,. ; o:' which could

by the President

plans**

Both plans

in being

provide

and are des.1.gned,

for

among

o:,:":~ '::,::,,:;;;, toward the over -throw of the Castro- government as

a. ::::"1CLANTOPLAN314-61, * * approved**"

,:;:,., ,:1:, pr ovides

for ~1a simultimeous

amphibious

...,, ,.%'.J . within

18 days aft e r the execution

: .~.. pr ; ,_,,.. a) .ert

OY.'

prepos it ioning

,:,::,sa: . ':. :lt. :is e:,;:timated

that

overthrow

forc e s, provides

forces

initi

order.
al l)',

for

an airborne

However,

Joint

of' Cuba .
Cr1iefs

the intial

of Cuba would

no est.imate

This latter

of Staff,

for
assault

a \\faster
within

commit ment

5 qays

si nce t h is plan de ploys

i .s made concernin g th e

le ngt h of ti me req uir ed for overthrow

control

After

i n 10 days .. I./

of the exec u tion

fewer

assUJm.ng

of th e Castro

control

b . CINCLANTOPLAN316-61 , ** designed

er US

a,id airborne

order,

of forces.

0p ver r, .,, ;, ,; <<Lti , he gain of essential

r.~ assured

by the ,Toint Chi efs

p lan,

of the gover nment or

not yet approved

is .in process

of J!:nino:ttl revision

by t he
:lfy

CL'lCLAN'l'
.

~- JCS 23011/29
.,.... CI NCLANT Cont inge ncy Operations
Plan
Plan
CINCLANTCont1n~ency i)p erations
plans on .file ln Joint Secretariat
., ..,..,.. J CS 20 18/306

Enclosure

SPECIAL HANDLINGREQUIRED

NOFORN

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

~NtlA~~lf
IED

SPECIALHANDLD~G
REQUIRED

NOFORN

LilUTEDDISTRIBUTION

ENCLOSUREC
DISCUSSION
1. Although it

is possible

that a Cuban counter--revolutionary

l eader ~ould emerge with sufficient

Casf :.. ~lements to unite
eve ntuality

in an attemp t to '3eize power, such

does not seem likely

,by the United States_

To date,

Pl c,.:uce .such a leader.*

o; by rn,.tural

casues,

a:i:i.<'l
st certainly

appeal to enable the anti-

unless
exiled

Cubens have f'ailed

while unsettling

not prove f'atal

on the government,

to the regime.**
or insurgent

undertal<e a signif'icant

the government with any reasonable

2. Even a cursory
defend Cuba indicates

and supported
to

Even the loss of' Ca!::t!'o by assassination

f' ::;:,e ~x:.ecte d that no Cuban leader

i n:lepe: :dently

fostered

plan in signif'icant

vention

by the United States.

force,

ef'f':-2t against

cJ1ance ot success.
military
overt

preparations

attempt

the Castro government can only be accomplished

military

It is theregroup can

subversion

loo k at Castro's
that a purely

woul:d

requiring

to

to overthrow

by a well conceived
military

inter-

3. As lon ; as Cuba does not become a member and an accepted

military

partner

a result
exist_

of' US military

of' the Warsaw Pact the threat

int ervention

of' general war as

in Cuba does not appear to

4_ It is expected that the Castro gover nment will avoid givin g

the United States
For this
an attack

suff'icient

provocation

f'or armed intervention_

reason Cuban f'orces are not expected to be committed to

on the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay.

Neither

is it

* J-2 DN-400-61, "Af'ter the Assassination

of' Castro ' What?"
dated 27 Octooer 1961; on file in J-2
** SNIE 85~61, "The Situation and Prospects 1n Cuba", dated
28 Nov 61; on f'ile in Joint Secretariat

Enclosure

SPECIALHANDLING
REQUIRED

NOF
ORN

.LllUTED DISTRIBUTION
p

.~,
~1

It'
~N~!i:s.lf~~lli
,.. tw.
~ M ,~~
~,h, J1--

,, TOP

zW El

expected

that

SPECIALHANDLING
REQUIRED
NOFORN
LIMITEDDISTRIBUTION

Castro will

knoim or apparent
at inf ilitr

and subversion

5 , :i:t is postulated

Ca~Cl' O,

policy

be necessary

a ~electe d Cuban insurgent

pr 9pared to sustain

that

to progress

in fo llo l'ling

of aiming at the downfal l of

for the United States

attemp t from the outset

program t .;

such insurgent
overt military

including

and decisive

to become

of other Latin American states.

therefore,

national

::.t l'lill

co.1clusion,

relationship

between his government and communist attempts

ation

tt. , (:;ablished

allow a definite

to support
and to be

successt'ul

interve r,tion as the final

step.

6 . Ii ; is clear

that

or th~ unrortunate

the United

on of the political

miscalculati

of l?idel Castro in the desire

It would appear that

Stat es cannot arrord

repetition

D.Sl)irations

to sss ar1 e::1

d to ,the Ba :;ista regime.

a sign:l.ficant

lesson

of th:l.s costly

mistake

is the requ:l.rement for emphasis and improvement in US intelligence

efforts

to evaluate

personalities

the true colors

of potentially

and groups which eventually

recognized

and supported

revolutionary

capable

may have to be

by the United States

in ruture

counter-

undertal<ings.

7, The basic military

implicatio

ns or Castro's

Conunun
ist

government are as rollows:

a . It exposes the Western Hemisphere to an increasingly
serious

threat

vulnerability
shifted

to its

security.

and defense

to meet this

b, It provides

costs

This increases
as forces

US will
additional

Latin American

Elimination

to the other

not t olerate
countries

Conununism throu ghout

This in turn greatly

addit ional

under Conununis t control.

would demonstrate

or

the Soviet Union l'lith the most effective

the Western Hemispher e.

ty that

are developed

threat .

base they have ever had for spreading

possibili

our national

incr eases the

countries

of this

will

come

base i n Cuba

nat i ons of the world that the

suc11 intrusions

Co11ununistcontrol

would or cou l d result

of

in :

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(1) Increased

nations

Coromunist capabil~ty
Communist capability

r.:;munun
i sm throughout
(3) The loss

ing areas,
strategic

of existing

facilities

and/or

potential

and ri ghts,

materiels

threat

subversion

as well as sources

capability.

to re move the Co~un ist

by Castro's

for attacki: ,6 ether

constantly

nations

oi' the Western

'

Communism t hroughout the hemisphere .

of urgenc:r is greatly

the capability

of

and sabotage.

governme:1t from Cuba is made apparent

Hemisphere and for spreading

train-

to US usage ~"le! control of the

8. The urgency of the requirement

capabilities

bases,

to our m:.lttary

necessary

P~~ru.,a Canal thro~h

within

for spreading

Latin America .

( 4 ) An increased

This sense

on other

of the Western Hemisphere.

(2) Increased

increasing

for attack

increased

if courses

of action

of the Communists are considered:

a. The Soviets

cvuld establish

land,

sea and/or

air

bases in Cuba.
b. The Soviets
ballistic

Castro with a number of

could provide

111issiles with nuclear

furnish

the missiles

nuclear

warheads .

and maintain

9 , In view of the factors

Defense holds that

warheads,
joint

set forth

requirements

movement inside

of the Western Hemisphere.

believed
general

this

of ousting

can be accomplished
se rious

if the followin g conditions

any

the
to the

of Communist. Bloc

other than in Cuba is recognized,

war, and without

gaa:mem:t &-n *'

support

a government acceptable

Whil e the possibility

in areas
that

to overtly

Cuba to the extent

Communist regime and installing

reactions

of the

above, the Depart ment of

The Department of Defense is prepared

United States.

control

the Conununist regi me in Cuba is incompatible

with the minimum security

popular

or they could

without

effect

it is

precipitating

on world public

opinion

prevail:
3

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a. If the impression
humanitarian

requirement

the United States

!' Pc:-<
, a

is created

of the Cuban people.

the United States

are moving into

is an urgent,

to an appeal for assistance

is responding

government representative

that

there

order in Cuba and/or

to restore

b. If it is announced incident
action

that

to the overt nulitary

and/or

other members of the OAS

Cuba for the purpose of ,::al'ltorin r.; order

and holdin g free

and that

elections,

the; ' Vi.'<.

11 immediately

withc'.ra~L as soon as the new govern ment advises

have the c,ipability

to maintain

that

order without

they

further

assis-

tance from OAS nations.

c. If the military
as possible
Bloc's

ability

support

operatim : 5.,:; conducted

and with sufficient

force

to take efi'ective

as q\.ickly
.

so that

the Communist

counter-measures

of the Castro regime is reduced to a minimum.

d. Or, ii' the Cuban regime col!U'nits hostile

against

US forces

incident
event,

or property

acts

which would serve as an

upon which to base overt US intervention.

a~plicable

10. The Department

provide

in

support

approved popular
transportation,

portions

of a, b, and c above apply.

of Defense is also prepared

to CIA, or through
movement inside
personnel

In th:l.s

to covertly

these agencies,

to any US

Cuba, in terms of supplies,

qnd bases .

Enclosure

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