SECOND DIVISION

Norma
Mangaliag
and
Narciso Solano,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 143951

- versus -

PUNO, Chairman,
AUSTRIAMARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,

Present:

Hon.
Edelwina
Catubig-Pastoral,
Judge
of
the
Regional Trial Court,
1st Judicial
Region,
San Carlos
City, (Pangasinan),
Branch 56
and
Apolinario
Serquina, Jr.,
Respondents.

TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

Promulgated:

October 25, 2005

x------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, to
set aside the Order dated April 17, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 56, San Carlos City
in Civil Case No. SCC-2240, which denied petitioners motion to dismiss; and the Order dated June 13,
2000, which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The factual background of the case is as follows:

On May 10, 1999, private respondent Apolinario Serquina, Jr. filed before the RTC a complaint for
damages against petitioners Norma Mangaliag and Narciso Solano. The complaint alleges that: on
January 21, 1999, from 9:00 to 10:00 a.m., private respondent, together with Marco de Leon, Abner
Mandapat and Manuel de Guzman, was on board a tricycle driven by Jayson Laforte; while in Pagal,
San Carlos City, a dump truck owned by petitioner Mangaliag and driven by her employee, petitioner
Solano, coming from the opposite direction, tried to overtake and bypass a tricycle in front of it and
thereby encroached the left lane and sideswiped the tricycle ridden by private respondent; due to the
gross negligence, carelessness and imprudence of petitioner Solano in driving the truck, private
respondent and his co-passengers sustained serious injuries and permanent deformities; petitioner
Mangaliag failed to exercise due diligence required by law in the selection and supervision of her

employee; private respondent was hospitalized and spent P71,392.00 as medical expenses; private
respondent sustained a permanent facial deformity due to a fractured nose and suffers from severe
depression as a result thereof, for which he should be compensated in the amount of P500,000.00 by
way of moral damages; as a further result of his hospitalization, private respondent lost income
of P25,000.00; private respondent engaged the services of counsel on a contingent basis equal to
25% of the total award.[1]

On July 21, 1999, petitioners filed their answer with counterclaim denying that private respondent has
a cause of action against them. They attributed fault or negligence in the vehicular accident on the
tricycle driver, Jayson Laforte, who was allegedly driving without license. [2]

Following pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued. When private respondent rested his case,
petitioner Solano testified in his defense.
Subsequently, on March 8, 2000, petitioners, assisted by a new counsel, filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim, alleging that the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) has jurisdiction over the case since the principal amount prayed for, in the
amount of P71,392.00, falls within its jurisdiction. [3] Private respondent opposed petitioners motion to
dismiss.[4] On March 24, 2000, petitioners filed a supplement in support of their motion to dismiss. [5]

On April 17, 2000, the respondent RTC Judge, Edelwina Catubig-Pastoral, issued the first assailed
Order denying petitioners motion to dismiss, [6] relying upon the mandate of Administrative Circular
No. 09-94, paragraph 2 of which reads:
2. The exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in determining the jurisdictional amount under
Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applied to cases
where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However,
in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the
amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.

The respondent RTC Judge also cited the 1999 case of Ong vs. Court of Appeals,[7] where an action for
damages due to a vehicular accident, with prayer for actual damages of P10,000.00 and moral
damages of P1,000,000.00, was tried in a RTC.

On May 19, 2000, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration [8] but it was denied by the
respondent RTC Judge in her second assailed Order, dated June 13, 2000. [9]
Hence, the present petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order.[10]

On August 9, 2000, the Court resolved to issue the temporary restraining order prayed for by
petitioners. Consequently, the respondent RTC Judge desisted from hearing further Civil Case No. SCC2240.[11]

Petitioners propound this issue for consideration: In an action for recovery of damages, does
the amount of actual damages prayed for in the complaint provide the sole test for determining the
courts jurisdiction, or is the total amount of all the damages claimed, regardless of kind and nature,
such as moral, exemplary, nominal damages, and attorneys fees, etc., to be computed collectively
with the actual damages to determine what court whether the MTC or the RTC has jurisdiction over
the action?

Petitioners maintain that the courts jurisdiction should be based exclusively on the amount of
actual damages, excluding therefrom the amounts claimed as moral, exemplary, nominal damages
and attorneys fee, etc. They submit that the specification in Administrative Circular No. 09-94 that in
cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action. . . the amount of such claim shall be
considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court signifies that the courts jurisdiction must be
tested solely by the amount of that damage which is principally and primarily demanded, and not the
totality of all the damages sought to be recovered.

Petitioners insist that private respondents claim for actual damages in the amount
of P71,392.00 is the principal and primary demand, the same being the direct result of the alleged
negligence of petitioners, while the moral damages for P500,000.00 and attorneys fee, being the
consequent effects thereof, may prosper only upon a prior finding by the court of the existence of
petitioners negligence that caused the actual damages. Considering that the amount of actual
damages claimed by private respondent in Civil Case No. SCC-2240 does not exceed P200,000.00,
which was then the jurisdictional amount of the MTC, the jurisdiction over the case clearly pertains to
the MTC, and not to the RTC. Therefore, the RTC should have dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction. Petitioners cite as relevant the case ofMovers-Baseco Integrated Port Services, Inc. vs.
Cyborg Leasing Corporation[12] wherein the Court, in disposing of the jurisdictional issue, limited its
consideration only to the actual or compensatory damages.

Furthermore, while admitting that the defense of lack of jurisdiction was only raised during
the trial, petitioners nevertheless contend that jurisdiction may be raised anytime, even after
judgment, but before it is barred by laches or estoppel. They submit that they seasonably presented
the objection to the RTCs lack of jurisdiction, i.e., during the trial stage where no decision had as yet
been rendered, must less one unfavorable to them.

At any rate, they argue that when the jurisdictional flaw is evident from the record of the
case, the court may, even without the urgings of the parties, take judicial notice of such fact, and
thereupon dismiss the case motu proprio. Thus, even if lack of jurisdiction was not initially raised in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer, no waiver may be imputed to them.

Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that in an action for recovery of damages
arising from a tortious act, the claim of moral damages is not merely an incidental or consequential
claim but must be considered in the amount of demand which will determine the courts jurisdiction.
He argues that the position taken by petitioners is a misreading of paragraph 2 of Administrative
Circular No. 09-94. The clear and explicit language of said circular leaves no room for doubt; hence,
needs no interpretation.

He further submits that petitioners reliance on Movers-Baseco Integrated Port Services, Inc. is
misplaced since that case is for recovery of the value of vehicle and unpaid rentals on the lease of the
same. He contends that Section 18, paragraph 8 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7691, upon which petitioners anchor their stand, refers to all the demands involving
collection of sums of money based on obligations arising from contract, express or implied, where the
claim for damages is just incidental thereto and it does not apply to actions for damages based on
obligations arising from quasi-delict where the claim for damages of whatever kind is the main action.

Private respondent also contends that, being incapable of pecuniary computation, the amount
of moral damages that he may be awarded depends on the sound discretion of the trial court, not
restrained by the limitation of the jurisdictional amount. Should the Court follow petitioners line of
reasoning, private respondent argues that it will result in an absurd situation where he can only be
awarded moral damages of not more than P200,000.00 although he deserves more than this amount,
taking into consideration his physical suffering, as well as social and financial standing, simply
because his claim for actual damages does not exceed P200,000.00 which amount falls under the
jurisdiction of the MTC.

Lastly, he asserts that it is too late in the day for petitioners to question the jurisdiction of the
RTC since they are estopped from invoking this ground. He contends that after actively taking part in
the trial proceedings and presenting a witness to seek exoneration, it would be unfair and legally
improper for petitioners to seek the dismissal of the case.

At the outset, it is necessary to stress that generally a direct recourse to this Court is highly
improper, for it violates the established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of
courts. Although this Court, the RTCs and the Court of Appeals (CA) have concurrent jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such

concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. This Court is a
court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by
the Constitution and immemorial tradition.[13]

Thus, this Court, as a rule, will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired
cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such
as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary
remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. [14] Such exceptional and
compelling circumstances were present in the following cases: (a) Chavez vs. Romulo[15] on the
citizens right to bear arms; (b) Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan [16] on bail in
extradition proceedings; (c) Commission on Elections vs. Quijano-Padilla [17] on a government contract
on the modernization and computerization of the voters registration list; (d) Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB
vs. Zamora[18] on the status and existence of a public office; and (e) Fortich vs. Corona[19] on the socalled Win-Win Resolution of the Office of the President which modified the approval of the conversion
to agro-industrial area of a 144-hectare land.
Be that as it may, the judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. It generally applies
to cases involving warring factual allegations. For this reason, litigants are required to repair to the
trial courts at the first instance to determine the truth or falsity of these contending allegations on the
basis of the evidence of the parties. Cases which depend on disputed facts for decision cannot be
brought immediately before appellate courts as they are not triers of facts. [20] Therefore, a strict
application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not necessary when the cases brought before the
appellate courts do not involve factual but legal questions.

In the present case, petitioners submit a pure question of law involving the interpretation and
application of paragraph 2 of Administrative Circular No. 09-94. This legal question and in order to
avoid further delay are compelling enough reasons to allow petitioners invocation of this Courts
jurisdiction in the first instance.

Before resolving this issue, the Court shall deal first on the question of estoppel posed by
private respondent. Private respondent argues that the defense of lack of jurisdiction may be waived
by estoppel through active participation in the trial. Such, however, is not the general rule but an
exception,
[21]

best

characterized

by

the

peculiar

circumstances

in Tijam

vs.

Sibonghanoy.

In Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after fifteen years and at a stage

when the proceedings had already been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case
because of the presence of laches, which was defined therein as failure or neglect for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier; it is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable

time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to
assert it.[22]

As enunciated in Calimlim vs. Ramirez,[23] this Court held:

A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so
numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the action is a matter of
law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a
court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified
by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case
of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to
situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstances involved
inSibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection
to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that
rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule,
virtually overthrowing altogether the time honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by
waiver or by estoppel.
...
It is neither fair nor legal to bind a party by the result of a suit or proceeding which was taken
cognizance of in a court which lacks jurisdiction over the same irrespective of the attendant
circumstances. The equitable defense of estoppel requires knowledge or consciousness of the facts
upon which it is based. The same thing is true with estoppel by conduct which may be asserted only
when it is shown, among others, that the representation must have been made with knowledge of the
facts and that the party to whom it was made is ignorant of the truth of the matter ( De Castro vs.
Gineta, 27 SCRA 623). The filing of an action or suit in a court that does not possess jurisdiction to
entertain the same may not be presumed to be deliberate and intended to secure a ruling which
could later be annulled if not favorable to the party who filed such suit or proceeding. Instituting such
an action is not a one-sided affair. It can just as well be prejudicial to the one who file the action or
suit in the event that he obtains a favorable judgment therein which could also be attacked for having
been rendered without jurisdiction. The determination of the correct jurisdiction of a court is not a
simple matter. It can raise highly debatable issues of such importance that the highest tribunal of the
land is given the exclusive appellate jurisdiction to entertain the same. The point simply is that when
a party commits error in filing his suit or proceeding in a court that lacks jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the same, such act may not at once be deemed sufficient basis of estoppel. It could
have been the result of an honest mistake or of divergent interpretations of doubtful legal provisions.
If any fault is to be imputed to a party taking such course of action, part of the blame should be
placed on the court which shall entertain the suit, thereby lulling the parties into believing that they
pursued their remedies in the correct forum. Under the rules, it is the duty of the court to dismiss an
action whenever it appears that court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter. (Section 2, Rule 9,
Rules of Court) Should the Court render a judgment without jurisdiction, such judgment may be
impeached or annulled for lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 30, Rule 132, Ibid), within ten (10) years from the
finality of the same (Art. 1144, par. 3, Civil Code). [24]

In the present case, no judgment has yet been rendered by the RTC. [25] As a matter of fact, as
soon as the petitioners discovered the alleged jurisdictional defect, they did not fail or neglect to file
the appropriate motion to dismiss. Hence, finding the pivotal element of laches to be absent,
the Sibonghanoy doctrine does not control the present controversy. Instead, the general rule that the
question of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings must apply.
Therefore, petitioners are not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC.

In any event, the petition for certiorari is bereft of merit.

Section 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, which took effect on April 15, 1994, provides inter
alia that where the amount of the demand in civil cases exceeds P100,000.00,[26] exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the exclusive jurisdiction
thereof is lodged with in the RTC. Under Section 3 of the same law, where the amount of the demand
in the complaint does not exceed P100,000.00, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the exclusive jurisdiction over the same is vested in the
Metropolitan Trial Court, MTC and Municipal Circuit Trial Court. The jurisdictional amount was
increased to P200,000.00,[27] effective March 20, 1999, pursuant to Section 5 [28] of R.A. No. 7691 and
Administrative Circular No. 21-99.

In Administrative Circular No. 09-94 dated March 14, 1994, the Court specified the guidelines
in the implementation of R.A. No. 7691. Paragraph 2 of the Circular provides:
2. The exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in determining the jurisdictional amount under
Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applied to cases
where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action.
However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the
causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the
jurisdiction of the court. (Emphasis supplied)

The well-entrenched principle is that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of
the action is determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law, irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein.
[29]

In the present case, the allegations in the complaint plainly show that private respondent seeks to

recover not only his medical expenses, lost income but also damages for physical suffering and
mental anguish due to permanent facial deformity from injuries sustained in the vehicular accident.
Viewed as an action for quasi-delict, the present case falls squarely within the purview of Article 2219
(2),[30] which provides for the payment of moral damages in cases of quasi-delict causing physical
injuries.

Private respondents claim for moral damages of P500,000.00 cannot be considered as merely
incidental to or a consequence of the claim for actual damages. It is a separate and distinct cause of
action or an independent actionable tort. It springs from the right of a person to the physical integrity
of his or her body, and if that integrity is violated, damages are due and assessable. [31] Hence, the
demand for moral damages must be considered as a separate cause of action, independent of the
claim for actual damages and must be included in determining the jurisdictional amount, in clear
consonance with paragraph 2 of Administrative Circular No. 09-94.

If the rule were otherwise, i.e., the courts jurisdiction in a case of quasi-delict causing physical
injuries would only be based on the claim for actual damages and the complaint is filed in the MTC, it

can only award moral damages in an amount within its jurisdictional limitations, a situation not
intended by the framers of the law.

It must be remembered that moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are
designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury unjustly caused a person. [32] Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain
means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has
undergone, by reason of the defendants culpable action. Its award is aimed at restoration, as much as
possible, of the spiritualstatus quo ante; thus, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. Since
each case must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances, there is no hard and fast rule in
determining the proper amount.[33]

The petitioners reliance in the case of Movers-Baseco Integrated Port Services, Inc. vs. Cyborg
Leasing Corporation[34] is misplaced. The claim for damages therein was based on a breach of a
contract of lease, not a quasi-delict causing physical injuries, as in this case. Besides, there was no
claim therein for moral damages. Furthermore, moral damages are generally not recoverable in
damage actions predicated on a breach of contract in view of the provisions of Article 2220 [35] of the
Civil Code.

In view of the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the respondent RTC Judge committed no
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Orders dated April 17, 2000 and June 13, 2000.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The temporary
restraining order issued by this Court on August 9, 2000 is LIFTED.

The Regional Trial Court, Branch 56, San Carlos City is DIRECTED to continue with the trial
proceedings in Civil Case No. SCC-2240 and resolve the case with dispatch.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-34362 November 19, 1982
MODESTA CALIMLIM AND LAMBERTO MAGALI IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
ESTATE OF DOMINGO MAGALI, petitioners,
vs.

HON. PEDRO A. RAMIREZ IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF PANGASINAN, BRANCH I, and FRANCISCO RAMOS, respondents.
Eugenio Ramos for petitioners.
Rogelio P. Closa for respondents.

VASQUEZ, J.:
The dismissal of Civil Case No. SCC-180 filed by the herein petitioners in the respondent Court against
the private respondent is sought to be annulled and set aside by this Petition For Review On
Certiorari.
The antecedent material facts are not disputed. Sometime in 1961, a judgment for a sum of money
was rendered in favor of Independent Mercantile Corporation against a certain Manuel Magali by the
Municipal Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 85136. After said judgment became final, a writ of
execution was issued on July 31, 1961. The Notice of Levy made on September 21, 1961 on a parcel
of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9138 registered in the name of "Domingo Magali,
married to Modesta Calimlim", specified that the said levy was only against "all rights, title, action,
interest and participation of the defendant Manuel Magali over the parcel of land described in this
title. " The Certificate of Sale executed by the Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan on October 17, 1961 in
favor of Independent Mercantile Corporation also stated that the sale referred only to the rights and
interest of Manuel Magali over the land described in TCT No. 9138. Manuel Magali is one of the several
children of Domingo Magali who had died in 1940 and herein petitioner Modesta Calimlim.
However, when the Sheriff issued the final Deed of Sale on January 25, 1963, it was erroneously
stated therein that the sale was with respect to "the parcel of land described in this title" (referring to
TCT No. 9138) and not only over the rights and interest of Manuel Magali in the same. The execution
of the said final Deed of Sale was annotated at the back of said title.
On February 23, 1967, Independent Mercantile Corporation filed a petition in the respondent Court to
compel Manuel Magali to surrender the owner's duplicate of TCT No. 9138 in order that the same may
be cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the said corporation. Not being the registered
owner and the title not being in his possession, Manuel Magali failed to comply with the order of the
Court directing him to surrender the said title. On June 20, 1967, Independent Mercantile Corporation
filed an ex-parte petition to declare TCT No. 9138 as cancelled and to issue a new title in its name.
The said petition was granted by the respondent Court and in its Order dated July 13, 1967, it directed
the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of the Independent Mercantile Corporation and
the cancellation of TCT No. 9138. By virtue of said Order, the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan issued
a new title in the name of the corporation, Identified as TCT No. 68568.
On November 21, 1967, petitioner Modesta Calimlim, surviving spouse of Domingo Magali, upon
learning that her husband's title over the parcel of land had been cancelled, filed a petition with the
respondent Court, sitting as a cadastral court, praying for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568. An
opposition to the said petition was filed by Independent Mercantile Corporation. After the parties
submitted their respective Memoranda, the respondent Court issued an Order dated June 3, 1968
dismissing the petition. (Rollo, pp. 31-38.)
The herein petitioners did not appeal the dismissal of the petition they filed in LRC Record No. 39492
for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568. Instead, on January 11, 1971, they filed the complaint in Civil
Case No. SCC-180 praying for the cancellation of the conveyances and sales that had been made with
respect to the property, covered by TCT No. 9138 previously registered in the name of Domingo
Magali, married to Modesta Calimlim. Named as defendant in said civil case was herein private
respondent Francisco Ramos who claimed to have bought the property from Independent Mercantile
Corporation on July 25, 1967. Private respondent Francisco Ramos, however, failed to obtain a title

over the property in his name in view of the existence of an adverse claim annotated on the title
thereof at the instance of the herein petitioners.
Private respondent Francisco Ramos filed a Motion To Dismiss Civil Case No. SCC-180 on the ground
that the same is barred by prior judgement or by statute of limitations (Rollo. pp. 42-45). Resolving
the said Motion, the respondent Court, in its Order dated April 21, 1971, dismissed Civil Case No. SCC180 on the ground of estoppel by prior judgment. (Ibid., pp, 10-13.) A Motion For Reconsideration filed
by the petitioners was denied by the respondent Judge in his Order of September 2, 1971. (Ibid., pp.
13-15.) A second Motion For Reconsideration was similarly denied in the Order dated September 29,
197 1. (Rollo, pp. 16-17.) Hence, this Petition.
We find merit in this appeal.
It is error to consider the dismissal of the petition filed by the herein petitioner in LRC Record No.
39492 for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568 as a bar by prior judgment against the filing of Civil Case
No. SCC-180. In order to avail of the defense of res judicata, it must be shown, among others, that the
judgment in the prior action must have been rendered by a court with the proper jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the proceeding in which the prior judgment or order was rendered. If there is lack of
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit or of the parties, the judgment or order cannot operate
as an adjudication of the controversy. (2 Moran Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, p.
364.) This essential element of the defense of bar by prior judgment or res judicata does not exist in
the case presently considered.
The petition filed by the herein petitioners in LRC Record No. 39492 was an apparent invocation of the
authority of the respondent Court sitting as a land registration court, Although the said petition did
not so state, that reliance was apparently placed on Section 112 of the Land Registration Act. It has
been settled by consistent rulings of this Court that a court of first instance, acting as a land
registration court, is a court of limited and special jurisdiction. As such, its proceedings are not
adequate for the litigation of issues pertaining to an ordinary civil action, such as, questions involving
ownership or title to real property. (Bareng vs. Shintoist Shrine and Japanese Charity Bureau, 83 SCRA
418; Manalo vs. Mariano, 69 SCRA 80; In re: Nicanor T Santos, 102 SCRA 747; Santos vs. Aquino, 101
SCRA 377.) In Hu chon Sunpongco vs. Heirs of Nicolas Ronquillo, L- 27040, December 19, 1970, 36
SCRA 395, we have held that:
Section 112 of Act 496 confers authority upon the land registration court to order the cancellation,
alteration or amendment of a certificate of title but withdraws from the Court the power to pass upon
any question concerning ownership of the registered property, or any incident where the issues
involved have become controversial.
It may hardly be questioned that the issues raised by the petitioners in their petition to cancel TCT No.
68568 refer to the ownership or title over the property covered thereby. The said petition presented
before the respondent Court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction as a cadastral court, the question
of who should be considered the true and lawful owner of the parcel of land embraced in said title.
The petitioners alleged therein that they are the true owners of the property, and that TCT No. 68568
which they sought to cancel was issued as a result of the errors which were not of their own making.
In short, the petition raised a highly controversial matter which is beyond the judicial competence of a
cadastral court to pass upon or to adjudicate.
It may neither be claimed that the parties have mutually agreed to submit the aforesaid issues for the
determination by the court, it being a fact that herein private respondent was not a party in the
petition in LRC Record No. 39492. Incidentally, although the said petition was filed by the herein
petitioners on November 21, 1967, the Opposition filed by Independent Mercantile Corporation to the
said petition made no mention of the alleged sale of the property in question in favor of private
respondent Francisco Ramos on July 5, 1967. This circumstance places in grave doubt the sincerity of
said sale and the claim that the private respondent was an innocent purchaser for value of the
property in question.

In the order of the respondent Judge dated September 29, 1971 denying the second motion for
reconsideration, he cited the case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, to uphold the view that the
petitioners are deemed estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the respondent Court in having
taken cognizance of the petition for cancellation of TCT No. 68568, they being the ones who invoked
the jurisdiction of the said Court to grant the affirmative relief prayed for therein. We are of the
opinion that the ruling laid down in Sibonghanoy may not be applied herein. Neither its factual
backdrop nor the philosophy of the doctrine therein expounded fits the case at bar.
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite
is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not
be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised
at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent
pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to
be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were
obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which
justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has
been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed
ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing
altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the questioned ruling
was held to be barred by estoppel by laches. It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction having been
raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned
ruling had been rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised for being barred by laches. As defined
in said case, laches is "failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled
to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it."
The petitioners in the instant case may not be faulted with laches. When they learned that the title to
the property owned by them had erroneously and illegally been cancelled and registered in the name
of another entity or person who had no right to the same, they filed a petition to cancel the latter's
title. It is unfortunate that in pursuing said remedy, their counsel had to invoke the authority of the
respondent Court as a cadastral court, instead of its capacity as a court of general jurisdiction. Their
petition to cancel the title in the name of Independent Mercantile Corporation was dismissed upon a
finding by the respondent Court that the same was "without merit." No explanation was given for such
dismissal nor why the petition lacked merit. There was no hearing, and the petition was resolved
solely on the basis of memoranda filed by the parties which do not appear of record. It is even a
possibility that such dismissal was in view of the realization of the respondent Court that, sitting as a
cadastral court, it lacked the authority to entertain the petition involving as it does a highly
controversial issue. Upon such petition being dismissed, the petitioners instituted Civil Case No. SCC180 on January 1, 1971, or only two and one-half years after the dismissal of their petition in LRC
Record No. 39492. Hence, we see no unreasonable delay in the assertion by the petitioners of their
right to claim the property which rightfully belongs to them. They can hardly be presumed to have
abandoned or waived such right by inaction within an unreasonable length of time or inexcusable
negligence. In short, their filing of Civil Case No. SCC-180 which in itself is an implied non-acceptance
of the validity of the proceedings had in LRC Record No. 39492 may not be deemed barred by
estoppel by laches.
It is neither fair nor legal to bind a party by the result of a suit or proceeding which was taken
cognizance of in a court which lacks jurisdiction over the same irrespective of the attendant
circumstances. The equitable defense of estoppel requires knowledge or consciousness of the facts
upon which it is based. The same thing is true with estoppel by conduct which may be asserted only
when it is shown, among others, that the representation must have been made with knowledge of the
facts and that the party to whom it was made is ignorant of the truth of the matter. (De Castro vs.
Gineta, 27 SCRA 623.) The filing of an action or suit in a court that does not possess jurisdiction to
entertain the same may not be presumed to be deliberate and intended to secure a ruling which
could later be annulled if not favorable to the party who filed such suit or proceeding. Instituting such
an action is not a one-sided affair. It can just as well be prejudicial to the one who filed the action or

suit in the event that he obtains a favorable judgment therein which could also be attacked for having
been rendered without jurisdiction. The determination of the correct jurisdiction of a court is not a
simple matter. It can raise highly debatable issues of such importance that the highest tribunal of the
land is given the exclusive appellate jurisdiction to entertain the same. The point simply is that when
a party commits error in filing his suit or proceeding in a court that lacks jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the same, such act may not at once be deemed sufficient basis of estoppel. It could
have been the result of an honest mistake, or of divergent interpretations of doubtful legal provisions.
If any fault is to be imputed to a party taking such course of action, part of the blame should be
placed on the court which shall entertain the suit, thereby lulling the parties into believing that they
pursued their remedies in the correct forum. Under the rules, it is the duty of the court to dismiss an
action "whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter." (Sec. 2, Rule
9, Rules of Court.) Should the court render a judgment without jurisdiction, such judgment may be
impeached or annulled for lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 30, Rule 132, Ibid), within ten (10) years from the
finality of the same. (Art. 1144, par. 3, Civil Code.)
The inequity of barring the petitioners from vindicating their right over their property in Civil Case No.
SCC-180 is rendered more acute in the face of the undisputed fact that the property in question
admittedly belonged to the petitioners, and that the title in the name of the private respondent was
the result of an error committed by the Provincial Sheriff in issuing the deed of sale in the execution
proceeding. The justness of the relief sought by herein petitioners may not be ignored or rendered
futile by reason of a doctrine which is of highly doubtful applicability herein.
WHEREFORE, the Orders appealed from are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Motion To Dismiss
filed by the private respondent in Civil Case No. SCC-180 shall be deemed denied and the respondent
Court is ordered to conduct further proceedings in the case. With costs against the private
respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION

VENANCIO FIGUEROA y
CERVANTES,[1]

G.R. No. 147406

Petitioner,
Present:

QUISUMBING, J.,*
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Chairperson,
- versus -

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES,

July 14, 2008

Respondent.

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

When is a litigant estopped by laches from assailing the jurisdiction of a tribunal? This is the
paramount issue raised in this petition for review of the February 28, 2001 Decision[2] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 22697.
Pertinent are the following antecedent facts and proceedings:
On July 8, 1994, an information [3] for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide was filed against the
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, Branch 18. [4] The case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94. [5] Trial on the merits ensued and on August 19, 1998, the trial court
convicted the petitioner as charged. [6] In his appeal before the CA, the petitioner questioned, among
others, for the first time, the trial courts jurisdiction. [7]
The appellate court, however, in the challenged decision, considered the petitioner to have
actively participated in the trial and to have belatedly attacked the jurisdiction of the RTC; thus, he
was already estopped by laches from asserting the trial courts lack of jurisdiction. Finding no other
ground to reverse the trial courts decision, the CA affirmed the petitioners conviction but modified the
penalty imposed and the damages awarded.[8]
Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari raising the
following issues for our resolution:

a. Does the fact that the petitioner failed to raise the issue of jurisdiction during the trial of
this case, which was initiated and filed by the public prosecutor before the wrong court, constitute
laches in relation to the doctrine laid down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, notwithstanding the fact that said
issue was immediately raised in petitioners appeal to the Honorable Court of Appeals? Conversely,
does the active participation of the petitioner in the trial of his case, which is initiated and filed not by
him but by the public prosecutor, amount to estoppel?

b. Does the admission of the petitioner that it is difficult to immediately stop a bus while it is
running at 40 kilometers per hour for the purpose of avoiding a person who unexpectedly
crossed the road, constitute enough incriminating evidence to warrant his conviction for the crime
charged?
c. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in considering the place of accident as falling
within Item 4 of Section 35 (b) of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, and subsequently ruling
that the speed limit thereto is only 20 kilometers per hour, when no evidence whatsoever to that
effect was ever presented by the prosecution during the trial of this case?
d. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in convicting the petitioner for homicide through
reckless imprudence (the legally correct designation is reckless imprudence resulting to
homicide) with violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code when the prosecution did
not prove this during the trial and, more importantly, the information filed against the petitioner does
not contain an allegation to that effect?
e. Does the uncontroverted testimony of the defense witness Leonardo Hernal that the victim
unexpectedly crossed the road resulting in him getting hit by the bus driven by the petitioner not
enough evidence to acquit him of the crime charged? [9]
Applied uniformly is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a
case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless such statute
provides for a retroactive application thereof. [10] In this case, at the time the criminal information for
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide with violation of the Automobile Law (now Land
Transportation and Traffic Code) was filed, Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129[11] had
already been amended by Republic Act No. 7691.[12] The said provision thus reads:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in Criminal Cases.Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

xxxx

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable
accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated
thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof.
As the imposable penalty for the crime charged herein is prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods or imprisonment for 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years, [13] jurisdiction to
hear and try the same is conferred on the Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs). Clearly, therefore, the RTC of
Bulacan does not have jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94.
While both the appellate court and the Solicitor General acknowledge this fact, they
nevertheless are of the position that the principle of estoppel by laches has already precluded the
petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTCthe trial went on for 4 years with the petitioner

actively participating therein and without him ever raising the jurisdictional infirmity. The petitioner,
for his part, counters that the lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be raised at
any time even for the first time on appeal. As undue delay is further absent herein, the principle of
laches will not be applicable.
To settle once and for all this problem of jurisdiction vis--vis estoppel by laches, which continuously
confounds the bench and the bar, we shall analyze the various Court decisions on the matter.
As early as 1901, this Court has declared that unless jurisdiction has been conferred by some
legislative act, no court or tribunal can act on a matter submitted to it.[14] We went on to state in U.S.
v. De La Santa[15] that:

It has been frequently held that a lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter is fatal, and subject to
objection at any stage of the proceedings, either in the court below or on appeal (Ency. of Pl. & Pr.,
vol. 12, p. 189, and large array of cases there cited), and indeed, where the subject-matter is not
within the jurisdiction, the court may dismiss the proceeding ex mero motu. (4 Ill., 133;
190 Ind., 79; Chipman vs. Waterbury, 59 Conn., 496.)

Jurisdiction over the subject-matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign

authority which organizes the court; it is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law and
an objection based on the lack of such jurisdiction can not be waived by the parties. x x x[16]
Later, in People v. Casiano,[17] the Court explained:

4. The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction

seemingly depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it
had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that
it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction,
for the same must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the
parties or by estoppel (5 C.J.S., 861-863). However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case
was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction,
the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an
inconsistent positionthat the lower court had jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The
rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will of the parties,
has no bearing thereon. Thus, Corpus Juris Secundum says:
Where accused has secured a decision that the indictment is void, or has been granted an
instruction based on its defective character directing the jury to acquit, he is estopped, when
subsequently indicted, to assert that the former indictment was valid. In such case, there may be a
new prosecution whether the indictment in the former prosecution was good or bad. Similarly, where,
after the jury was impaneled and sworn, the court on accused's motion quashed the information on
the erroneous assumption that the court had no jurisdiction, accused cannot successfully plead
former jeopardy to a new information. x x x (22 C.J.S., sec. 252, pp. 388-389; italics ours.)
Where accused procured a prior conviction to be set aside on the ground that the court
was without jurisdiction, he is estopped subsequently to assert, in support of a defense of previous
jeopardy, that such court had jurisdiction. (22 C.J.S. p. 378.) [18]

But in Pindagan Agricultural Co., Inc. v. Dans,[19] the Court, in not sustaining the plea of lack of
jurisdiction by the plaintiff-appellee therein, made the following observations:

It is surprising why it is only now, after the decision has been rendered, that the plaintiffappellee presents the question of this Courts jurisdiction over the case. Republic Act No. 2613 was
enacted on August 1, 1959. This case was argued on January 29, 1960. Notwithstanding this fact, the
jurisdiction of this Court was never impugned until the adverse decision of this Court was handed
down. The conduct of counsel leads us to believe that they must have always been of the belief that
notwithstanding said enactment of Republic Act 2613 this Court has jurisdiction of the case, such
conduct being born out of a conviction that the actual real value of the properties in question actually
exceeds the jurisdictional amount of this Court (over P200,000). Our minute resolution in G.R. No. L10096, Hyson Tan, et al. vs. Filipinas Compaa de Seguros, et al., of March 23, 1956, a parallel case, is
applicable to the conduct of plaintiff-appellee in this case, thus:
x x x that an appellant who files his brief and submits his case to the Court of Appeals for decision,
without questioning the latters jurisdiction until decision is rendered therein, should be considered as
having voluntarily waived so much of his claim as would exceed the jurisdiction of said Appellate
Court; for the reason that a contrary rule would encourage the undesirable practice of appellants
submitting their cases for decision to the Court of Appeals in expectation of favorable judgment, but
with intent of attacking its jurisdiction should the decision be unfavorable: x x x [20]
Then came our ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy[21] that a party may be barred by laches from invoking
lack of jurisdiction at a late hour for the purpose of annulling everything done in the case with the
active participation of said party invoking the plea. We expounded, thus:
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different
reasons. Thus, we speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel
by laches.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of stale demands is based upon grounds of public policy which
requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of
limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of
permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief
against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that
same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of
explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of
the subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is
barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as
an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice cannot be toleratedobviously for reasons of
public policy.

Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an
adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the
court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S.Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs.
McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it
is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter
to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.

Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the Court
of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra)to the effect that we frown upon the undesirable practice of a party
submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it
for lack of jurisdiction, when adverseas well as in Pindagan etc. vs. Dans et al., G.R. L-14591,
September 26, 1962; Montelibano et al. vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men
Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs.
Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it
could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take
cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law
then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead,
at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo, as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked
the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication
on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it
finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We
would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was
commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more.
The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting. [22]
For quite a time since we made this pronouncement in Sibonghanoy, courts and tribunals, in resolving
issues that involve the belated invocation of lack of jurisdiction, have applied the principle of estoppel
by laches. Thus, in Calimlim v. Ramirez,[23] we pointed out that Sibonghanoy was developing into a
general rule rather than the exception:
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so
numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of
law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a
court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified
by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case
of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to
situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance involved
inSibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection
to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that
rendered the supposed ruling inSibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule,
virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by
waiver or by estoppel.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the questioned
ruling was held to be barred by estoppel by laches. It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction having
been raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned
ruling had been rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised for being barred by laches. As defined
in said case, laches is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled
to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it. [24]
In Calimlim, despite the fact that the one who benefited from the plea of lack of jurisdiction was the
one who invoked the courts jurisdiction, and who later obtained an adverse judgment therein, we
refused to apply the ruling in Sibonghanoy. The Court accorded supremacy to the time-honored
principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.

Yet, in subsequent cases decided after Calimlim, which by sheer volume are too plentiful to mention,
the Sibonghanoy doctrine, as foretold in Calimlim, became the rule rather than the exception. As
such, inSoliven v. Fastforms Philippines, Inc.,[25] the Court ruled:
While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time, this rule presupposes that estoppel has not
supervened. In the instant case, respondent actively participated in all stages of the proceedings
before the trial court and invoked its authority by asking for an affirmative relief. Clearly, respondent
is estopped from challenging the trial courts jurisdiction, especially when an adverse judgment has
been rendered. In PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, we held:
Moreover, we note that petitioner did not question at all the jurisdiction of the lower court x x x in its
answers to both the amended complaint and the second amended complaint. It did so only in its
motion for reconsideration of the decision of the lower court after it had received an adverse
decision. As this Court held in Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 105180,
July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 477, 491), participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, that
included invoking its authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively barred petitioner by estoppel
from challenging the courts jurisdiction. Notably, from the time it filed its answer to the second
amended complaint on April 16, 1985, petitioner did not question the lower courts jurisdiction. It was
only on December 29, 1989 when it filed its motion for reconsideration of the lower courts decision
that petitioner raised the question of the lower courts lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner thus foreclosed its
right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by its own inaction. (italics ours)
Similarly, in the subsequent case of Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. vs. Cabrigas, we ruled:
In the case at bar, it was found by the trial court in its 30 September 1996 decision in LCR
Case No. Q-60161(93) that private respondents (who filed the petition for reconstitution of titles)
failed to comply with both sections 12 and 13 of RA 26 and therefore, it had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case. However, private respondents never questioned the trial courts
jurisdiction over its petition for reconstitution throughout the duration of LCR Case No. Q60161(93). On the contrary, private respondents actively participated in the reconstitution
proceedings by filing pleadings and presenting its evidence.They invoked the trial courts jurisdiction
in order to obtain affirmative relief the reconstitution of their titles. Private respondents have thus
foreclosed their right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by their own actions.
The Court has constantly upheld the doctrine that while jurisdiction may be assailed at any
stage, a litigants participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, including the invocation
of its authority in asking for affirmative relief, bars such party from challenging the courts
jurisdiction (PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 402 [1998]). A
party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and
after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Asset
Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 579 [1998]; Province of Bulacan vs. Court of
Appeals, 299 SCRA 442 [1998]). The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party
participating in the proceedings and submitting his case for decision and then accepting judgment,
only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse (Producers Bank of the
Philippines vs. NLRC, 298 SCRA 517 [1998], citing Ilocos Sur Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. NLRC, 241
SCRA 36 [1995]). (italics ours)[26]
Noteworthy, however, is that, in the 2005 case of Metromedia Times Corporation v. Pastorin,[27] where
the issue of lack of jurisdiction was raised only in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on
appeal, we stated, after examining the doctrines of jurisdiction vis--vis estoppel, that the ruling
in Sibonghanoy stands as an exception, rather than the general rule. Metromedia, thus, was
not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter before the NLRC on appeal. [28]

Later, in Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip,[29] the Court clarified that:

Petitioner argues that the CAs affirmation of the trial courts dismissal of its case was erroneous,
considering that a full-blown trial had already been conducted. In effect, it contends that lack of
jurisdiction could no longer be used as a ground for dismissal after trial had ensued and ended.
The above argument is anchored on estoppel by laches, which has been used quite
successfully in a number of cases to thwart dismissals based on lack of jurisdiction. Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy, in which this doctrine was espoused, held that a party may be barred from questioning
a courts jurisdiction after being invoked to secure affirmative relief against its opponent. In fine,
laches prevents the issue of lack of jurisdiction from being raised for the first time on appeal by a
litigant whose purpose is to annul everything done in a trial in which it has actively participated.
Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled
to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The ruling in Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction is, however, the exception rather than the rule.
Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the
factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should be clearly
present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption
that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it. That Sibonghanoy applies
only to exceptional circumstances is clarified in Calimlim v. Ramirez, which we quote:

A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite
is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not
be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised
at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent
pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to
be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were
obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which
justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has
been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed
ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing
altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
Indeed, the general rule remains: a courts lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects
the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action. Moreover,
jurisdiction is determined by the averments of the complaint, not by the defenses contained in the
answer.[30]
Also, in Mangaliag v. Catubig-Pastoral,[31] even if the pleader of lack of jurisdiction actively took part in
the trial proceedings by presenting a witness to seek exoneration, the Court, reiterating the doctrine
inCalimlim, said:
Private respondent argues that the defense of lack of jurisdiction may be waived by estoppel through
active participation in the trial. Such, however, is not the general rule but an exception, best
characterized by the peculiar circumstances in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy. In Sibonghanoy, the party
invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after fifteen years and at a stage when the proceedings had
already been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the presence of
laches, which was defined therein as failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is the
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it. [32]

And in the more recent Regalado v. Go,[33] the Court again emphasized that laches should be
clearly present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to be applicable, thus:
Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The ruling in People v. Regalario that was based on the landmark doctrine enunciated in Tijam
v. Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction by estoppel is the exception rather than the
rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which
the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should have
been clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the
presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.

In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in a motion to
dismiss filed by the Surety almost 15 years after the questioned ruling had been rendered. At several
stages of the proceedings, in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, the Surety invoked
the jurisdiction of the said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for final
adjudication on the merits. It was only when the adverse decision was rendered by the Court of
Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction.

Clearly, the factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present in the case at
bar. Petitioner Atty. Regalado, after the receipt of the Court of Appeals resolution finding her guilty of
contempt, promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the said courts jurisdiction based on
procedural infirmity in initiating the action. Her compliance with the appellate courts directive to show
cause why she should not be cited for contempt and filing a single piece of pleading to that effect
could not be considered as an active participation in the judicial proceedings so as to take the case
within the milieu of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the natural fear to disobey the mandate of the court
that could lead to dire consequences that impelled her to comply. [34]

The Court, thus, wavered on when to apply the exceptional circumstance in Sibonghanoy and
on when to apply the general rule enunciated as early as in De La Santa and expounded at length
inCalimlim. The general rule should, however, be, as it has always been, that the issue of jurisdiction
may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by
estoppel.Estoppel by laches, to bar a litigant from asserting the courts absence or lack of jurisdiction,
only supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the
fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from
thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law
and not by mere consent of the parties. This is especially true where the person seeking to invoke
unauthorized jurisdiction of the court does not thereby secure any advantage or the adverse party
does not suffer any harm.[35]
Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in
assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before

the appellate court. At that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach. True,
delay alone, though unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of estoppel by laches unless it further
appears that the party, knowing his rights, has not sought to enforce them until the condition of the
party pleading laches has in good faith become so changed that he cannot be restored to his former
state, if the rights be then enforced, due to loss of evidence, change of title, intervention of equities,
and other causes.[36] In applying the principle of estoppel by laches in the exceptional case
of Sibonghanoy, the Court therein considered the patent and revolting inequity and unfairness of
having the judgment creditors go up their Calvary once more after more or less 15 years. [37] The
same, however, does not obtain in the instant case.
We note at this point that estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is to be
applied rarelyonly from necessity, and only in extraordinary circumstances. The doctrine must be
applied with great care and the equity must be strong in its favor.[38] When misapplied, the doctrine of
estoppel may be a most effective weapon for the accomplishment of injustice. [39] Moreover, a
judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void. [40] Hence, the Revised Rules of
Court provides for remedies in attacking judgments rendered by courts or tribunals that have no
jurisdiction over the concerned cases. No laches will even attach when the judgment is null and void
for want of jurisdiction.[41] As we have stated in Heirs of Julian Dela Cruz and Leonora Talaro v. Heirs of
Alberto Cruz,[42]
It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or
government agency, over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by
the material allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the
petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs. Jurisdiction over the nature and subject
matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law, and not by the consent or waiver of
the parties where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the nature or subject matter of
the action. Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties.
Moreover, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over the cause of
action. x x x
Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal is not affected by the defenses or theories set
up by the defendant or respondent in his answer or motion to dismiss. Jurisdiction should be
determined by considering not only the status or the relationship of the parties but also the nature of
the
issues
or
questions
that
is
the
subject
of
the
controversy.
x
x
x
x The proceedings before a court or tribunal without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and
void, hence, susceptible to direct and collateral attacks.[43]
With the above considerations, we find it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised in the
petition.
WHEREFORE, premises

considered,

the

petition

for

review

on certiorari is GRANTED. Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94 is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

APOLONIA BANAYAD
FRIANELA,

G.R. No. 169700

Petitioner,

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus -

CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

SERVILLANO BANAYAD, JR.,

Respondent.

Promulgated:

July 30, 2009

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

NACHURA, J.:
Before the court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the June 17, 2005 Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 53929, and the
August 17, 2005 Resolution[2] denying the motion for partial reconsideration thereof.
Narrated in brief are the antecedent facts and proceedings, to wit:
Following the death of her uncle, the testator Moises F.
Banayad

, petitioner, who was named as devisee in the will, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasay City, on June 3, 1991, Sp. Proc. No. 3664-P[3] for the allowance of the November 18, 1985
holographic will of the decedent. Petitioner alleged that Moises died without issue and left to her the
following properties, namely: (1) a parcel of land situated in Pasay City and described in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 9741; (2) images of Oracion del Huerto and Pieta including the crown; and (3)
all personal belongings.[4]
Respondent, a cousin of the petitioner, filed his opposition and counter-petitioned for the allowance of
two other holographic wills of the decedent, one dated September 27, 1989 and another dated
September 28, 1989.[5]
After trial on the merits, the RTC, on September 29, 1995, rendered its Decision [6] declaring
the September 27, 1989 holographic will as having revoked the November 18, 1985 will, allowing the
former, and appointing respondent as administrator of Moisess estate. [7]
On appeal, the CA, in the assailed June 17, 2005 Decision, [8] modified the decision of the trial
court and ruled that the September 27, 1989 holographic will had only revoked the November 18,
1985 will insofar as the testamentary disposition of Moisess real property was concerned. [9]
With the denial of her motion for reconsideration in the further assailed August 17, 2005
Resolution,[10] petitioner elevated the case before us via the instant petition. [11]
The Court notes that the trial court focused all of its attention on the merits of the case
without first determining whether it could have validly exercised jurisdiction to hear and decide Sp.
Proc. No. 3664-P. On appeal, the appellate court also overlooked the issue on the jurisdictional
competence of the trial court over the said case. This Court, after a meticulous review of the records,
finds that the RTC of Pasay City had no jurisdiction over the subject matter in Sp. Proc. No. 3664-P.
The jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the
time of the institution of the action unless such statute provides for a retroactive application thereof.
[12]

Jurisdiction is moreover determined by the allegations or averments in the complaint or petition. [13]
In this case, at the time the petition for the allowance of Moisess holographic will was

instituted, the then Sections 19 and 33[14] of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129[15] were in force, thus

SECTION 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:

xxxx

(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate
exceeds twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00);
xxxx

SECTION 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
civil cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and
intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the demand does not
exceed twenty thousand pesos exclusive of interest and costs but inclusive of damages of whatever
kind, the amount of which must be specifically alleged: Provided, That where there are several claims
or causes of action between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the
amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action irrespective of
whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions; and
xxxx
The applicable law, therefore, confers jurisdiction on the RTC or the MTCs over probate
proceedings depending on the gross value of the estate, [16] which value must be alleged in the
complaint or petition to be filed. Significantly, in this case, the original petition docketed before the
trial court contains only the following averments:
xxxx
1. That Petitioner is of legal age, married, Filipino and residing at 2237 P. Burgos St., Pasay
City who is named devisee in the Last Will and Testament of MOISES BANAYAD, deceased who died in
Pasay City General Hospital on March 27, 1991 xerox copy of his death certificate is herewith attached
as Annex A to form integral part hereof;
2. That the said Last Will and Testament is herewith (sic) attached as Annex B and made an
integral part of this Petition, the original thereof will be presented to this Honorable Court at the time
of probate;
3.
That
the
decedent
is
an
inhabitant
at 2237 P. Burgos St., Pasay City at the time of his death;

of

the Philippines and

residing

4. That the properties left by the decedent consist of real and personal properties particularly
described herein below, which decedent all bequeathed to petitioner;
A. A parcel of land described under TCT No. 9741 xerox copy of which is herewith (sic)
attached as Annex C.
B. Imahen ng Oracion del Huerto at Pieta, kasama and korona.
C. All personal belongings.
5. That the testator at the time of the execution of the said Will was of sound and disposing
mind.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court that:
a. Upon proper notice and hearing, the above mentioned Will be admitted to probate;
b. That letters testamentary or administration be issued to herein petitioner without bond;
Petitioner prays for such other reliefs just and equitable in (sic) the premises.

x x x x[17]
Nowhere in the petition is there a statement of the gross value of Moisess estate. Thus, from a
reading of the original petition filed, it cannot be determined which court has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the proceedings. [18] The RTC therefore committed gross error when it had
perfunctorily assumed jurisdiction despite the fact that the initiatory pleading filed before it did not
call for the exercise of its jurisdiction. The RTC should have, at the outset, dismissed the case for lack
of jurisdiction. Be it noted that the dismissal on the said ground may be ordered motu proprio by the
courts.[19] Further, the CA, on appeal, should have dismissed the case on the same ground. Settled is
the doctrine that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised by any of the parties or may be reckoned by
the court, at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. [20]

Despite the pendency of this case for around 18 years, the exception laid down in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy[21] and clarified recently in Figueroa v. People[22] cannot be applied. First, because, as a
general rule, the principle of estoppel by laches cannot lie against the government. [23] No injustice to
the parties or to any third person will be wrought by the ruling that the trial court has no jurisdiction
over the instituted probate proceedings.
Second and most important, because in Tijam, the delayed invocation of lack of jurisdiction
has been made during the execution stage of a final and executory ruling of a court. In Figueroa,
the Court has emphasized that estoppel by laches only supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the
factual milieu in Tijam. It is well to note the following factual setting of Tijam:
On July 19, 1948 barely one month after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 296 known as the
Judiciary Act of 1948 the spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced Civil Case No. R-660
in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio
to recover from them the sum of P1,908.00, with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of
the complaint until the whole obligation is paid, plus costs. As prayed for in the complaint, a writ of
attachment was issued by the court against defendants' properties, but the same was soon dissolved
upon the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.
hereinafter referred to as the Surety, on the 31st of the same month.
After being duly served with summons the defendants filed their answer in which, after
making some admissions and denials of the material averments of the complaint, they interposed a
counterclaim. This counterclaim was answered by the plaintiffs.
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs
and, after the same had become final and executory, upon motion of the latter, the Court issued a
writ of execution against the defendants. The writ having been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs
moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against the Surety's bond (Rec. on Appeal pp. 46-49),
against which the Surety filed a written opposition (Id. pp. 49) upon two grounds, namely, (1) Failure
to prosecute and (2) Absence of a demand upon the Surety for the payment of the amount due under
the judgment. Upon these grounds the Surety prayed the Court not only to deny the motion for
execution against its counter-bond but also the following affirmative relief: "to relieve the herein
bonding company of its liability, if any, under the bond in question" (Id. p. 54) The Court denied this
motion on the ground solely that no previous demand had been made on the Surety for the
satisfaction of the judgment. Thereafter the necessary demand was made, and upon failure of the
Surety to satisfy the judgment, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for execution against the counter-

bond. On the date set for the hearing thereon, the Court, upon motion of the Surety's counsel,
granted the latter a period of five days within which to answer the motion. Upon its failure to file such
answer, the Court granted the motion for execution and the corresponding writ was issued.
Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the same was issued
without the required summary hearing provided for in Section 17 of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. As
the Court denied the motion, the Surety appealed to the Court of Appeals from such order of denial
and from the one denying its motion for reconsideration (Id. p. 97). Its record on appeal was then
printed as required by the Rules, and in due time it filed its brief raising therein no other question but
the ones covered by the following assignment of errors:
I. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in issuing its order dated November 2, 1957, by
holding the incident as submitted for resolution, without a summary hearing and compliance with the
other mandatory requirements provided for in Section 17, Rule 59 of the Rules of Court.
II. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in ordering the issuance of execution against the
herein bonding company-appellant.
III. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in denying the motion to quash the writ of execution
filed by the herein bonding company- appellant as well as its subsequent motion for reconsideration,
and/or in not quashing or setting aside the writ of execution.
Not one of the assignment of errors it is obvious raises the question of lack of jurisdiction,
neither directly nor indirectly.
Although the appellees failed to file their brief, the Court of Appeals, on December 11, 1962,
decided the case affirming the orders appealed from.
On January 8, 1963 five days after the Surety received notice of the decision, it filed a motion
asking for extension of time within which to file a motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals
granted the motion in its resolution of January 10 of the same year. Two days later the Surety filed a
pleading entitled MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging substantially that appellees' action was filed in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948 for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only; that a
month before that date Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, had
already become effective, Section 88 of which placed within the original exclusive jurisdiction of
inferior courts all civil actions where the value of the subject-matter or the amount of the demand
does not exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs; that the Court of First Instance therefore
had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. Upon these premises the Surety's motion prayed the
Court of Appeals to set aside its decision and to dismiss the case. By resolution of January 16, 1963
the Court of Appeals required the appellees to answer the motion to dismiss, but they failed to do so.
Whereupon, on May 20 of the same year, the Court resolved to set aside its decision and to certify the
case to Us.
x x x x[24]

Clearly, then, in Tijam, the issue of lack of jurisdiction has only been raised during the
execution stage, specifically when the matter of the trial courts denial of the suretys motion to quash
the writ of execution has been brought to the appellate court for review. Here, the trial courts
assumption of unauthorized jurisdiction over the probate proceedings has been discovered by the
Court during the appeal stage of the main case, not during the execution stage of a final and
executory decision. Thus, the exceptional rule laid down in Tijam cannot apply.

Since the RTC has no jurisdiction over the action, all the proceedings therein, including the
decision rendered, are null and void.[25] With the above disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to
discuss and resolve the other issues raised in the petition.
IN

THE

LIGHT

OF

THE

FOREGOING,

Sp.

Proc.

No.

3664-P

before

the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 117363. December 17, 1999]

MILA G. PANGILINAN, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Is the conviction of the accused-appellant by the Regional Trial Court under an information falling
with the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial court valid?
On 20 September 1990, appellant Mila G. Pangilinan was charged with the crime of Estafa in an
information[1] which reads:
The undersigned Asst. Provl. Prosecutor accuses Mrs. Mila Pangilinan of the Crime of Estafa,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of June, 1984 in the municipality of Tanay, Rizal Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, by means of false pretenses and
misrepresentations introduced and misrepresented herself that she was instructed by Mr. Rodolfo
Elnar, father of Miss Luzviminda SJ Elnar, a girl 15 years of age, to get one (1) stereo component,
marked Fisher PH 430K valued at more or less P17,000.000, one (1) headphone, one (1) electrical jack
and two (2) record tapes worth P450.00, or with total amount of P17, 450.00 form their house and
falsely alleging that said father of the minor further instructed her that the stereo component be
tested in a turntable somewhere in EDSA, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and taking advantage of the inexperience and feelings of the said minor,
induce the said minor Luzviminda SJ Elnar to give her said stereo component and electrical parts
belonging to spouses Rolando Elnar and Soledad SJ Elnar when in truth and in fact said accused was
not authorized by Mr. Rolando Elnar to have said stereo components be tested and once said accused
had in her possession the said articles, she took them away to the damage and prejudice of such Mr.
and Mrs. Rolando Elnar in the aforesaid amount of P17,450.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On 12 March 1991, appellant was arraigned before the Regional Trial Court of Morong, Rizal,
where she entered a plea of not guilty. After due trial, said court in a Decision dated 7 October
1992[2]convicted the appellant of the crime of ESTAFA under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
This unfavorable verdict was appealed to the Court of Appeals which on 13 August 1993,
affirmed the conviction but modified the sentence, to wit:

xxx and that there being no proof of mitigating and or aggravating circumstances which attended the
commission of the offense, the appellant should suffer the penalty of four (4) months of arresto
mayor and a fine of P17,450.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. [3]
A Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the respondent court on 11 November 1993. [4] On 3
December 1993, appellant filed a petition for New Trial in the Court of Appeals [5] which was denied by
said Court on 10 January 1994.[6] Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court premised on the following grounds:
I
THAT THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT CONVICTING HEREIN ACCUSED IS NULL AND VOID FOR
LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE CRIME CHARGED. BEING NULL AND VOID, THE DECISION OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS ON APPEAL HEREIN CANNOT VALIDATE IT;
II
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION
OVER THE CASE, THE GUILT OF THE PETITIONER HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.[7]
The Court has carefully reviewed the records of this case and finds the appeal to be impressed with
merit.
The information uses the generic term Estafa as the classification of the crime appellant is
charged with without citing the specific article of the Revised Penal Code violated.
The trial court, however, presumed that the petitioner was charged with the crime of estafa
falling under Article 315 of the RPC. This is evidenced by the trial courts assumption of jurisdiction
over the case and its subsequent conviction of the appellant for this form of estafa, [8] to wit:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused MILA PANGILINAN, GUILTY of the Crime of Estafa, in violation
of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended and hereby sentences her to suffer
imprisonment of One (1) year, Eight (8) months and Twenty (20) days of Prision Correccional, as
minimum to Five (5) years, Five (5) months and Eleven (11) days of Prision Correccional as maximum,
plus costs.
Further to pay the complainant Soledad Elnar the amount of P17,000.00 the value of the unrecovered
one stereo component.
SO ORDERED.
In order to find estafa with abuse of confidence under subdivision No. 1, par. (b) of Art. 315, the
following elements must be present:
1. That money, goods, or other personal property be received by the offender in trust, or on commission,
or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return
the same;
2. That there be misrepresentation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on
his part of such receipt;
3. That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
4. That there is a demand made by the offended party to the offender. [9]
A circumspect examination of the allegations in the information will disclose that the information
under which the appellant is charged with does not contain all the elements of estafa falling under
Article 315 (b). There was a failure to allege that demand was made upon the appellant by the
offended party.
Thus, as correctly observed by the Court of Appeals in the questioned decision, to which the
Solicitor General agrees, appellant was charged under an information alleging an offense falling under
the blanket provision of paragraph 1(a) of Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code, which treat other
Deceits.[10]
As prescribed by law, a violation of Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code is punishable by
imprisonment for a period ranging from one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months. At the time

of the filing of the information in this case, the law in force was Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Under the
express provision of Section 32 of B.P. 129, the offense of which the petitioner was charged with falls
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court:
Section 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in criminal cases.
xxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four
years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability
arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount
thereof:Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence
they shall have exclusive jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand
pesos.
Settled is the rule that it is the averments in the information which characterize the crime to be
prosecuted and the court before which it must be tried. [11] Without a doubt, it was the Municipal Trial
Court who had jurisdiction over the case and not the Regional Trial Court.
However, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that the appellant is barred from raising the
issue of jurisdiction, estoppel having already set in.
This contention is without merit. In our legal system, the question of jurisdiction may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings. The Office of the Solicitor General relies on this Courts ruling in the
landmark case of Tijam vs. Sibanghanoy[12] where the Court stated that:
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief
against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that
same jurisdiction. In this case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the
question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties
was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the
judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such
a practice can not be tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy.
The Office of the Solicitor Generals reliance on the said ruling is misplaced. The doctrine laid
down in the Tijam case is an exception to and not the general rule. Estoppel attached to the party
assailing the jurisdiction of the court as it was the same party who sought recourse in the said
forum. In the case at bar, appellant cannot in anyway be said to have invoked the jurisdiction of the
trial court.
Thus, we apply the general rule that jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or
waived by the parties. Even on appeal and even if the reviewing parties did not raise the issue of
jurisdiction, the reviewing court is not precluded from ruling that the lower court had no jurisdiction
over the case:
The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon
whether the lower court had jurisdiction or not. If it had nor jurisdiction, but the case was tried and
decided upon the theory it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such
jurisdiction, for the same must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the
parties or by estoppel.[13]
Estoppel in questioning the jurisdiction of the court is only brought to bear when not to do so will
subvert the ends of justice. Jurisdiction of courts is the blueprint of our judicial system without which
the road to justice would be a confusing maze. Whenever the question of jurisdiction is put to front,
courts should not lightly brush aside errors in jurisdiction especially when it is the liberty of an
individual which is at stake:
Where life or liberty is affected by its proceedings, the court must keep strictly within the limits of the
law authorizing it to take jurisdiction and to try the case and to render judgment. It cannot pass
beyond those limits in any essential requirement in either stage of these proceedings; and its
authority in those particulars is not be enlarged by any mere inferences from the law or doubtful
construction of its terms.There has been a great deal said and written, in may cases with
embarrassing looseness of expression, as to the jurisdiction of the courts in criminal cases. From a
somewhat extended examination of the authorities we will venture to state some rule applicable to all

of them, by which the jurisdiction as to any particular judgment of the courts in such cases may be
determined. It is plain that such court has jurisdiction to render a particular judgment only when the
offense charged is within the class of offenses placed by the law under its jurisdiction; and when in
taking custody of the accused, and its modes of procedure to the determination of the question of his
guilt or innocence, and in rendering judgment, the court keeps within the limitations prescribed by the
law, customary or statutory. When the court goes out of these limitations its action, to the extent of
such excess, is void.[14]
The Office of the Solicitor General makes a final attempt to bolster its position by citing Section 4,
Rule 120 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is a variance between
the offense charged in complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and
the offense as charge is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted or of the offense charge included in that which is proved.
According to the OSG, since the offense proved (Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code) is necessarily
included in the offense charged, then the decision of the respondent court modifying the court of
origins judgment is perfectly valid and the petitioners claim that the trial court had no jurisdiction
must necessarily fail.[15]
This argument is specious. Aforementioned section applies exclusively to cases where the
offenses as charged is included in or necessarily the offense proved. It presupposes that the court
rendering judgment has jurisdiction over the case based on the allegations in the
information. However, in the case at bar, from the onset of the criminal proceedings, the lower court
had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.
Having arrived at the conclusion that the Regional Trial Court did not have jurisdiction to try the
case against the appellant, it is no longer necessary to consider the other issues raised as the
decision of the Regional Trial Court is null and void.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-GR CR No. 12320 is set aside as the Regional Trial Court, whose decision was affirmed
therein, had no jurisdiction over the Criminal Case No. 0867-M.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Chairman, Puno, Pardo, and Santiago, JJ. concur.