Saado vs Court of Appeals(356 SCRA 546)

Nature of Particular Acts

FACTS: Saado was issued by the now defunct Philippine Fisheries Commission an Ordinary
Fishpond Permit covering an area of 50 hectares. On July 16, 1973, Saado executed a
contract with Nepomuceno wherein the latter agreed to develop 30 hectares of the 50
hectares covered by Saado's fishpond permit. Two days later, the parties modified this
earlier agreement by excluding the area of 10 hectares already cultivated and fully
developed and providing that the contract is renewable on terms acceptable to both of
them.
On September 28, 1979, the Director of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources recommended to
the then Ministry of Natural Resources the conversion of Sanados fishpond permit into a 25year fishpond loan agreement which covered a reduced area of 26.745 hectares.
Accordingly, a Fishpond Lease Agreement was issued.
On July 17, 1981, Saado filed a complaint against Nepomuceno with the RTC for recovery
of possession and damages, alleging that Nepomuceno failed to deliver Saados share of
the net harvest among other things. While this case was pending, the then Minister of
Agriculture and Food canceled the Fishpond Lease Agreement, forfeiting the improvements
thereon in favor of government. Later, said order was reconsidered to the extent that
Nepomuceno was given priority to apply for the area and that his improvements thereon
were not considered forfeited in favor of the government.
Saado elevated the matter to the Office of the President but appeal was dimissed.
Meanwhile, the trial court rendered a decision over Saado's complaint for recovery of
possession in his favor.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Office of the President in cancelling petitioner's
lease agreement should be given weight
RULING: Yes. The action of an administrative agency in granting or denying, or in
suspending or revoking, a license, permit, franchise, or certificate of public convenience and
necessity is administrative or quasi-judicial. The act is not purely administrative but quasijudicial or adjudicatory since it is dependent upon the ascertainment of facts by the
administrative agency, upon which a decision is to be made and rights and liabilities
determined. As such, the July 31, 1989 decision of the Office of the President is explicitly an
official act of and an exercise of quasi-judicial power by the Executive Department headed
by the highest officer of the land. It thus squarely falls under matters relative to the
executive department which courts are mandatorily tasked to take judicial notice of under
Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. Judicial notice must be taken of the organization of
the Executive Department, its principal officers, elected or appointed, such as the President,
his powers and duties.
The rendition of the subject July 31, 1989 Malacaang decision is premised on the essential
function of the executive department which is to enforce the law. In this instance, what is
being enforced is Presidential Decree No. 704 which consolidated and revised all laws and

decrees affecting fishing and fisheries. Such enforcement must be true to the policy behind
such laws which is "to accelerate and promote the integrated development of the fishery
industry and to keep the fishery resources of the country in optimum productive condition
through proper conservation and protection" (Section 2, P.D. No. 704).
Further, the issue of whether or not petitioner is still entitled to possession of the subject
fishpond area is underpinned by an ascertainment of facts. And such task belongs to the
administrative body which has jurisdiction over the matter the Ministry of Agriculture and
Food. The policy of the courts as regards such factual findings is not to interfere with actions
of the executive branch on administrative matters addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies. This policy is specially applicable in the grant of licenses, permits,
and leases, or the approval, rejection, or revocation of applications therefor. Such respect is
based on the time-honored doctrine of separation of powers and on the fact that these
bodies are considered co-equal and coordinate rank as courts. The only exception is when
there is a clear showing of capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment or grave abuse of
discretion, which we find absent in the case at bar.
The reasons given by the Office of the President in dismissing petitioner's appeal are quite
clear. Transferring or subletting the fishpond granted to a licensee without the consent or
approval of the administrative body concerned, as well as the failure to develop the area
required by the fisheries rules, are definitely solid and logical grounds for the cancellation of
one's license. Withal, if petitioner disagrees with the decision of the Office of the President,
he should have elevated the matter by petition for review before the Court of Appeals for
the latter's exercise of judicial review. Nowhere in the record do we find such action on
petitioner's part.
Understandably, to restore petitioner to the possession of the fishpond area is to totally
disregard the July 31, 1989 decision of the Office of the President which can hardly be
described as an unrelated matter, considering its patent implications in the result of both
Civil Case No. 2085 and CA-G.R. CV No. 23165. For how could the appellate court award
possession to the very same party whose license has been cancelled by the executive or
administrative officer tasked to exercise licensing power as regards the development of
fishpond areas, and which cancellation has been sustained by the Office of the President?
Petitioner must remember the essence of the grant of a license. It is not a vested right given
by the government but a privilege with corresponding obligations and is subject to
governmental regulation. Hence, to allow petitioner to possess the subject area is to run
counter to the execution and enforcement of the July 31, 1989 decision which would easily
lose its "teeth" or force if petitioner were restored in possession.
RATIO: The action of an administrative agency in granting or denying, or in suspending or
revoking, a license, permit, franchise, or certificate of public convenience and necessity is
administrative or quasi-judicial. The act is not purely administrative but quasi-judicial or
adjudicatory since it is dependent upon the ascertainment of facts by the administrative
agency, upon which a decision is to be made and rights and liabilities determined.

CANDIDO ALFARO v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.G.R. No. 140812, 28 August, 2001,

THIRD DIVISION, ( J. Panganiban)

Voluntary resignation is an act of an employee, who finds himself in a situation in which he

believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service;
thus, he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment. If the
agreement was voluntarily entered into and represented a reasonable settlement, it is
binding on the parties and may not later be disowned, simply because of a change of mind.
Petitioner Candido Alfaro (Alfaro) was employed as a helper/operator of private respondentStar Paper
Corp. (Star Paper). When Alfaro reported back to work after availing a sick leave, he
wassurprised to find out that another worker was recruited to take his place. Consequently,
he wastransferred to the wrapping section of Star Paper. Subsequently, he was assigned to a new work
whichwas even more difficult.One day, Alfaro alleged that he was pressured to sign a
resignation letter, and a Release andQuit Claim in exchange for P3,000 as his 13
th
month pay and 15 days sick leave pay. After a few months, he filed a complaint to the Labor
Arbiter (LA) for non-payment of separation pay andcomplaint for illegal dismissal. Contrastingly,
Star Paper contends that, because of his illness, it wasAlfaro who asked the company to
allow him to resign. The LA, National Labor Relations Commission(NLRC) and the Court of
Appeals (CA) all ruled that Alfaro did resign voluntarily.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Alfaro was illegally dismissed (he did not resign voluntarily)
HELD:Petition DENIED
The factual findings of the LA, NLRC, as affirmed by CA, reveal that Alfaro resigned from hiswork due to
his illness, with the understanding that Star Paper would give him a separation
paywhichunfortunately, Star Paper did not comply with. The claim of Alfaro that he was illeg
ally dismissedcannot be sustained, considering that his voluntary resignation has been
indubitably established as a factby the three tribunals..Voluntary resignation is defined as an
act of an employee, who finds himself in a situation inwhich he believes that personal reasons
cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service; thus,he has no other choice but to
disassociate himself from his employment. Based on the facts, it wasAlfaro who negotiated
for a resignation with separation pay as the manner in which his employmentrelations with
Star Paper would end. Alfaro was already suffering from a lingering illness at the time hetendered his
resignation. Alfaros continued employment would have been detrimental not only to hishealth, but also to
his performance as an employee of Star Paper. Alfaros resignation with separationpay was the best
option for him under the said circumstances.The Court adds further that not all waivers and
quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into
and represented a reasonable settlement, it is binding on theparties and may not later be
disowned, simply because of a change of mind. Moreover, an employee whoresigns and
executes a quitclaim in favor of the employer is generally estopped from filing any
furthermoney claims against the employer arising from the employment. Considering, however, that
Star Paperdid not comply with its agreement with Alfaro, the Court ordered Star Paper to pay
Alfaro his separationpay amounting to P8,452.50.
CASE # 78
Fidel Salamera v. Sandiganbayan
G.R no 121099 February 17, 1999
Pardo, J.:
Facts;
The Sandiganbayan convicted Mayor Fidel Salamera of Casiguran Aurora for the crime of Malversation of
Public Property. This was about the Smith & Wesson revolver gun that was mortgaged to him by
barangay chairman Antonio Benavidez. The said gun was owned and licensed to Ponciano Benavidez.
When the owner demanded the return of his gun the latter cannot produce the item because it was
conficted by the police during the checkpoint when Mayor Salamera and his security went to manila.
Ponciano Benavidez filed a complaint for theft against the mayor before the sandiganbayan. Issue;
Whether the gun which is owned by a private person converted into a public property when it was

entrusted to a public officer. Held;

The supreme court reversed the decision of sandiganbayan By turning over the gun to Mayor Salamera,
the gun did not become public property because it was not intended for public use or purpose nor was it
lawfully sized. The gun continued to be private property, that is why the gun owner rightfully asked for its
return to him, not to be turned over to the public coffer or treasury. Petitioner's failure to return the gun
after demand by the private owner did not constitute a prima facie evidence of malversation. The property
was private and the one who demanded its return was a private person, not a person in authority. The
presumption of conversion will not apply.
People vs Francisco Abarca
G.R. No. 74433
September 14, 1987
Facts:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte, sentencing the accused-appellant
Francisco Abarca to death for the complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder.
The case was elevated to this Court in view of the death sentence imposed. With the approval of the new
Constitution, abolishing the penalty of death and commuting all existing death sentences to life imprisonment, we
required the accused-appellant to inform us whether or not he wished to pursue the case as an appealed case. In
compliance therewith, he filed a statement informing us that he wished to continue with the case by way of an
appeal.
On 15 July 1984 in Tacloban City, the accused, Francisco Abarca with deliberate intent to kill and with evident
premeditation, and with treachery, armed with an unlicensed firearm (armalite), M-16 rifle, shot several times
Khingsley Paul Koh on the different parts of his body inflicting upon gunshot wounds which caused his
instantaneous death and as a consequence of which also caused gunshot wounds to Lina Amparado and Arnold
Amparado on the different parts of their bodies which have caused the death of said spouses.
Issue:
W/O accused-appellant is liable for the crime of complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder?
Held:
The case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-appellant was not committing murder when he discharged
his rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is not murder. We cannot therefore hold
the appellant liable for frustrated murder for the injuries suffered by the Amparados.
For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses, we therefore impose upon the accused-appellant arresto
mayor (in its medium and maximum periods) in its maximum period, arresto to being the graver penalty (than
destierro).
The decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. The accused-appellant is sentenced to four months and 21 days
to six months of arresto mayor. The period within which he has been in confinement shall be credited in the service
of these penalties. He is furthermore ordered to indemnify Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of P16,000.00 as
and for hospitalization expense and the sum of P1,500.00 as and for Arnold Amparado's loss of earning capacity. No
special pronouncement as to costs.