Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
SUSAN NICDAO CARIO, petitioner,
vs.
SUSAN YEE CARIO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two
marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, whose
death benefits is now the subject of the controversy between the two
Susans whom he married. 1wphi1.nt
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside
the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which
affirmed in toto the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted
two marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan
Nicdao Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Nicdao), with whom he had
two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cario; and the second was on
November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cario (hereafter
referred to as Susan Yee), with whom he had no children in their almost
ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and bedridden due to
diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on
November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his
medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims
for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased
from various government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to
collect a total of P146,000.00 from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation,
NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig, 3 while respondent Susan Yee received a
total of P21,000.00 from GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS). 4

On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for
collection of sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter
alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one
hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated
as death benefits which she (petitioner) received from MBAI, PCCUI,
Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig. Despite service of
summons, petitioner failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court to
declare her in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took
place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial
declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the
deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the
previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of
the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife
of the deceased. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money,
respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is
voidab initio because the same was solemnized without the required
marriage license. In support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the
marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no
marriage license number; 5and 2) a certification dated March 9, 1994,
from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the
spouses SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are
married in this municipality on June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue as
requested a true copy or transcription of Marriage License number from
the records of this archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cario for
whatever legal purpose it may serve. 6
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan
Yee, holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the
sum of P73,000.00, half of the amount which was paid to her in the form
of death benefits arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, plus
attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 7
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto
the decision of the trial court. Hence, the instant petition, contending that:

I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT
THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO
THE CASE AT BAR.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN APPLYING EQUITY IN THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF
THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE
FAMILY CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN NOT FINDING THE CASE OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS
GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN
ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY
CODE. 8
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely
of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning,
where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked
for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in
law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 9 However, for purposes
other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited
to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for
that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after
the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. 10 In such instances, evidence must be adduced,
testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering
such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited
solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous
marriage void. 11
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to
pass upon the validity of the two marriages in this case, as the same is

essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the subject

death benefits of the deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a
valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, 12 and the absence
thereof, subject to certain exceptions, 13 renders the marriage void ab
initio. 14
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and
the deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license
requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the
validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that
the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage
license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 15 the Court held that such a certification
is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any
circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued
by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer
charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance
of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner
and the deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the
burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they
secured the required marriage license. Although she was declared in
default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue
and explained the absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before
the Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided
the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her
case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot
stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary
marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the
marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the
marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the
death benefits under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent
Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes
of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity

of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a

second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous
marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate
the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact
remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a
judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the
deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the
separation of the property of the spouses according to the applicable
property regime. 16 Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio,
the applicable property regime would not be absolute community or
conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the
provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on Property
Regime of Unions Without Marriage.
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property
regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a
state of concubine, relationships where both man and woman are married
to other persons, multiple alliances of the same married man, 17 ... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned
by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions ...
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through
their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages
and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then
too, contributions in the form of care of the home, children and
household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime. 18
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased
is a bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence
of a previous marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and
the deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association,
Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly
renumerations, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies
earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee
presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed

money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits.

Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent and the deceased,
but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever
to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said death benefits of
the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the
legal wife of the deceased is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased,
Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of
parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other
reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. Article 147 of the Family
Code reads Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each
other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries
shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by
both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they
lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares.
For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
xxx
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the
share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in
favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or
all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall
belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases,
the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries
earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the
parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if
only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute
thereto. 19 Conformably, even if the disputed death benefits were earned

by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a

co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half
thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both
parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, onehalf of the subject death benefits under scrutiny shall go to the
petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half
pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal
heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on
the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance
System, 20 where the Court awarded one-half of the retirement benefits of
the deceased to the first wife and the other half, to the second wife,
holding that:
... [S]ince the defendants first marriage has not been dissolved or
declared void the conjugal partnership established by that marriage has
not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as
putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share
in his estate upon his death should she survive him. Consequently,
whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such
putative heir she has an interest in the husbands share in the property
here in dispute.... And with respect to the right of the second wife, this
Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be
void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still
subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And
inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage
was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, [t]he only just
and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the
second wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her and
her husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal
partnership of the first marriage. 21
It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on
the rule which requires a prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity
of marriage. This is the reason why in the said case, the Court determined
the rights of the parties in accordance with their existing property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 22 however, the Court, construing Article
40 of the Family Code, clarified that a prior and separate declaration of
nullity of a marriage is an all important condition precedent only for
purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married
wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a

judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could
contract said second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be
void. The same rule applies even if the first marriage is patently void
because the parties are not free to determine for themselves the validity or
invalidity or their marriage. However, for purposes other than to remarry,
like for filing a case for collection of sum of money anchored on a
marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and separate judicial declaration of
nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do is to present evidence,
testimonial or documentary, that would prove that the marriage from
which his or her rights flow is in fact valid. Thereupon, the court, if
material to the determination of the issues before it, will rule on the status
of the marriage involved and proceed to determine the rights of the
parties in accordance with the applicable laws and jurisprudence. Thus,
in Nial v. Bayadog, 23 the Court explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may
arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration
of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code connoted that such final
judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 which affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay
respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorneys fees in the amount of
P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case
No. Q-93-18632, is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to
costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Puno J., on official leave.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 43-47
2. Rollo, pp. 49-55
3. Exhibit F, Records, p. 38

4. Ibid
5. Exhibit D-1, Records, p. 36
6. Exhibit E, Records, p. 37
7. Rollo, p. 55
8. Rollo, p. 18
9. Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, 579 [1993]
10. Nial, et al., v. Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000
11. Domingo v. Court of Appeals, supra
12. ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are
complied with:
(1)Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2)Their consent, freely given;
(3)Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4)A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
13. ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter
2 of this Title, but not those under article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized
without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the
municipality where either contracting party habitually resides
14. ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of

exceptional character;
xxx

xxx

xxx

15. 236 SCRA 257, 261-262; citing the Rules of Court, Rule 132, Section 29
16. Art. 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of
Article 43 and in Article 44 shall also apply in proper cases to marriages which
are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and
45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation,
partition, and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody
and support of the common children, and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in
previous judicial proceedings.

14. ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the

preceding Article shall produce the following effects:
14. ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(2)The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as

the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse
contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits
of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be
forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the
children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of
children, the innocent spouse;
14. ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith,
said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of
marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the
other are revoked by operation of law
17. Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, p. 233-234
(1995)
18 Id., p. 234.18
19. Id., p. 230
20. 37 SCRA 316 [1971]
21. Id., p. 326
22. Supra
23. Supra

Article 40

In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Cario married Susan Nicdao Cario. He had 2

children with her. In 1992, SPO4 contracted a second marriage, this time
with Susan Yee Cario. In 1988, prior to his second marriage, SPO4 is
already bedridden and he was under the care of Yee. In 1992, he died 13
days after his marriage with Yee. Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim
the benefits of SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim a total of P140,000.00
while Yee was able to collect a total of P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an
action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao. She wanted to have
half of the P140k. Yee admitted that her marriage with SPO4 was
solemnized during the subsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao
but the said marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to
the absence of a valid marriage license as certified by the local civil
registrar. Yee also claimed that she only found out about the previous
marriage on SPO4s funeral.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked
to claim presumptive legitimes.
HELD: The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the
absence of a valid marriage license. The marriage between Yee and SPO4
is likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized without the
judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and
SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely
of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning,
where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked
for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in
law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes
other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited
to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for
that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after
the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. In such instances, evidence must be adduced,
testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering
such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited
solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous
marriage void.
The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a
policeman for their marriage is void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to
properties, money etc owned by them in common in proportion to their

respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by each party shall

belong to him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to
the full benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage is
likewise void. This is because the two were capacitated to marry each
other for there were no impediments but their marriage was void due to
the lack of a marriage license; in their situation, their property relations is
governed by Art 147 of the FC which provides that everything they
earned during their cohabitation is presumed to have been equally
contributed by each party this includes salaries and wages earned by
each party notwithstanding the fact that the other may not have
contributed at all.
G.R. No. 132529 February 2 2001
[Article 147 Family Code-Property Regime of Union Without Marriage;
Article 148 - Rules on Co-ownership regarding polygamous/bigamous
marriages, adulterous or concubinage relationships; Article 40 - Judicial
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage]
FACTS:
SPO4 Santiago Cario married Susan Nicdao in 1969 without marriage
license. They had two children. He then married Susan Yee on November
10 1992, with whom he had no children in their almost 10 year
cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
He passed away on November 23 1992. The two Susans filed with the
RTC of Quezon City the claims for monetary benefits and financial
assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies.
Nicdao collected a total of P146,000 while Yee received a total of
P21,000.
Yee filed an instant case for collection of half the money acquired by
Nicdao, collectively denominated as "death benefits." Yee admitted that
her marriage with the SPO4 took place during the subsistence of, and
without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity, the marriage
between Nicdao and the SPO4. She however claimed that she became
aware of the previous marriage at the funeral of the deceased.
In 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of Yee. Nicdao appealed to the CA,
which the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Yee can claim half the amount acquired by Nicdao.

RULING:
No. SC held that the marriage between Yee and Cario falls under the
Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of
bigamous or polygamous marriages, adulterous or concubinage
relationships.

Yee cannot claim the benefits earned by the SPO4 as a police officer as
her marriage to the deceased is void due to bigamy. She is only entitled to
the properties acquired with the deceased through their actual joint
contribution. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or
her exclusively. Hence, they are not owned in common by Yee and the
deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and Yee has no right
whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said death
benefits of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, Yee, not being
the legal wife, is not one of them.
As regards to the first marriage, the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4
is null and void due to absence of a valid marriage license. Nicdao can
claim the death benefits by the deceased even if she did not contribute
thereto. Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling
Nicdao to share one-half of the benefits. As there is no allegation of bad
faith in the first marriage, she can claim one-half of the disputed death
benefits and the other half to the deceased' to his legal heirs, by intestate
succession.
The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the
same has been solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity
of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40, if a party
who is previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she
has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void,
before he or she could contract said second marriage, otherwise the
second marriage would be void. However, for purposes other than to
remarry, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary.
Categories: Persons and Family Relations, Philippine Civil Code,
Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage