AN ANALYSIS OF THE MODERN

OFFENCE OF SEDITION
Nivedita Saksena & Siddhartha Srivastava*
Of all the laws that were inherited from the colonial regime in India, few have
been as controversial as those related to seditious offences. Since independence, the law has been modified and interpreted to incorporate safeguards so it may withstand constitutional scrutiny. However, it still acts as an
effective means to restrict free speech, and has been used by contem-porary
governments for reasons that are arguably similar to those of our former
oppressive rulers. In this paper, we make a case in favour of repeal-ing the law
of sedition. Through an examination of how the law has been interpreted and
applied by the courts even after it was read down in Kedar Nath v. Union of
India, it is argued that it is indeterminate and vague by its very nature and
cannot be applied uniformly. Further, the law was enacted by a colonial
autocratic regime for a specific purpose, which cannot extend to a postindependence democratically elected government. An analysis of the cases of
sedition before the High Courts and Supreme Court show that the offence of
sedition is increasingly becoming obsolete. Problems of pub-lic order, which the
law purportedly addresses, may instead be addressed through other laws that
have been enacted for that specific purpose.

I. INTRODUCTION
The law relating to the offence of sedition was first introduced
in colonial India through Clause 113 of the Draft Indian Penal Code (Draft Penal
Code), proposed by Thomas Babington Macaulay in 1837.1 However, when the
Indian Penal Code (IPC) was finally enacted after a period of 20 years in 1860,
the said section pertaining to sedition had inexplicably been omitted.
Although Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, architect of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872, and the Law Secretary to the Government of India at the time, attributed
the omission to an unaccountable mistake, 2 various other explanations for the
omission have been given. Some believe that the British government wanted

1*

5th and 4th year students respectively of the West Bengal National University of Juridical
Sciences, Kolkata. We would like to acknowledge the research assistance of Ms. Sadhvi Sood.

We would also like to thank Ms. Ujwala Uppaluri, Ms. Ashna Ashesh and Ms. Sindhu
Rao for their invaluable comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Any errors, however, are
attribut-able solely to us.

1
2

Arvind Ganachari, Evolution of the Law of Sedition

Social Reform In A Colonial Situation 54 (2005).

in the

Context of the Indian Freedom Struggle in Nationalism And

Walter Russel Donogh, A treatise on the law of sedition and cognate offences in British India,
available at http://archive.org/stream/onlawofsedition00dono#page/n23/mode/2up (Last visited on March 10, 2014).

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NUJS LAW REVIEW 7 NUJS L.Rev. 121 (2014)

to endorse more comprehensive and powerful strategies against the press such
as the institution of a deposit forfeiture system along with more preventive and
regulatory measures.3 Others proffered that the omission was to be primarily
attributed to the existence of 121 and 121A of the IPC, 1860. 4 It was
assumed that seditious proceedings of all kinds were to be subject to
official scrutiny within the ambit of these sections.
The immediate necessity of amending the law, in order to al-low the
government to deal more efficiently with seditious activities was first
recognised by the British in light of increased Wahabi activities in the period
leading up to 1870.5 With increasing incidents of mutinous activities against the
British, the need to make sedition a substantive offence was widely acknowledged, and the insertion of a section pertaining specifically to
seditious rebellion was considered exigent. It was the recognition of this rising
wave of nationalism at the turn of the 20 th century which led to the bill containing
the law of sedition finally being passed. The offence of sedition was
incorporated under 124A of the IPC on November 25, 1870, and
continued without modifi-cation till February 18, 1898.6
The amended legislation of 1870 was roughly structured around
the law prevailing in England insofar as it drew heavily from the Treason

Felony Act, the common law with regard to seditious libels and the law relating to
seditious words. The Treason Felony Act,7 extensively regarded as one of the
3

R. Dhavan, Only The Good News: On the Law Of the Press in India 285-87 (1987).

14

These sections dealt with waging war against the government and abetting to wage a war
respectively. See Edmund C. Cox, Police and Crime in India 86-7 available at http://archive.
org/stream/policecrimeinind00coxerich#page/86/mode/2up (Last visited on March 10, 2014).

15
25

Ganachari, supra note 1; See generally, R. Sammadar, Emergence Of The Political Subject

45 (2010) (The Wahabis have been described as an extensive network of rebels who
principally participated in the First War of Indian Independence in 1857. They followed a wellorganised model of mass preaching, mostly concentrating on political and religious issues to win the

support of the people); See also Narahari Kaviraj, Wahabi and Farazi Rebels of Bengal 72
(
read or by signs or by visible
1
representations or otherwise excite or
attempts to excite feelings of
T
disaffection to the Government
h
established by Law in British India,
be
punishable
with
Wh shall
osoe transportation of life to three
years to which fine may be
ver,
added.);
by
See also Donogh, supra note 2, 9.
word
s, The Treason-Felony Act, 1848, 3 (It
states:
eithe
If any person whatsoever shall, within
r
spok the United Kingdom or without, compass, imagine, invent, devise, or
en
intend to deprive or depose our Most
or
inten Gracious Lady the Queen, from the
ded
style, honour, or royal name of the
to
imperial crown of the United Kingdom,
be
or of any other of her Majestys

dominions and countries, or to levy war against in

her Majesty, within any part of the United order
Kingdom, in order by force or constraint to to
compel her to change her measures or coun-sels, intim
or in order to put any force or constraint upon or idate

or overawe both Houses or either

House of Parliament, or to move or
stir any foreigner or stranger with force
to invade the United Kingdom or any
other of

April - June, 2014

The Modern Offence of Sedition

defining Acts of the English law pertaining to treason, imposed liability on
all those who harboured feelings of disloyalty towards the Queen. Any
thought connoting unfaithfulness or treachery towards the Crown, coupled with
the presence of an overt act, i.e., an act from which an apparent criminal intention
could be inferred, was subject to punishment within the ambit of this legislation.
After the initiation of the law of sedition in 1870, it was allowed to
remain in force, unaltered, for a period of 27 years. Throughout this period, one
of the primary objectives of the British Government was to strengthen this law.
Therefore, it ultimately approved the enactment of two cognate laws: the

Dramatic Performances Act XIX of 1876 (DPA) and the Vernacular

Press Act (IX) of 1878. These Acts came to be popularly referred to as
preventive meas-ures.8 While the former law was primarily introduced
to keep a check on sedi-tious activities in plays,9 the latter was formulated
to actively suppress criticism against British policies and decisions in the
wake of the Deccan Agricultural riots of 1875-76.10
Since it came into operation in 1870, the law of sedition
has con - tinued to be used to stifle voices of protest, dissent or
criticism of the govern-ment. While the indeterminate invoking of the
provision has put it in the media spotlight, there has been very little
academic discussion with respect to the nature of the law and its possible
repeal.
The punishment for seditious offences is known to be
especially harsh compared to other offences in the IPC. It is a cognisable, nonbailable and non-compoundable offence that can be tried by a court of sessions. 11 It
may attract a prison term of up to seven years if one is found guilty of comher Majestys dominions or countries under the obeisance of her Majesty, and such
compassing, imaginations, inventions, devices, or intentions, or any of them, shall
express, utter, or declare, by publishing any printing or writing, or by open and
advised speaking ,or by any overt act or deed, every person so offending shall
be guilty of felony, and being convicted thereof shall be liable

8
9

... to be transported beyond the seas for the term of his or her natural life.);
See also Donogh, supra note 2, 4.
Ganachari, supra note 1, 57.
See Ganachari, supra note 1, 58 (The institution of the Dramatic Performances Act of 1876
was prompted by the allegedly seditious nature of the two plays Cha Ka Darpan in Marathi
and Malharraoche Natak in Bengali. It was in acknowledgement of the provocative nature
of these plays that Mr Hobhouse, while introducing the Act, observed that drama has been
found to be one of the strongest stimulants that can be applied to the passions of men. And
in times of excitement no surer mode has been found of directing public feeling against an
individual, a class or a government than to bring them on stage in an odious light).

10

See Arvind Ganachari, Combating Terror of Law in Colonial India: The Law of
Sedition and

11the Nationalist Response in Engaging Terror: A Critical And Interdisciplinary Approach 98

(2008) (This Act aimed to establish control over the editors and publishers of vernaculars and
periodical magazines published in native languages. This it sought to do through the development of a system of personal security).

12

The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Schedule I.

April - June,
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NUJS LAW REVIEW 7 NUJS L.Rev. 121 (2014)

mitting seditious acts.12 It is very difficult for a person accused of sedition

to get bail.13 The highly subjective nature of the offence makes it
necessary that courts determine on a case-to-case basis if any threat is caused
to the stability of the State or its democratic order. Leaving such a
determination to legislative or executive feat only enables a repressive
government to undermine the free speech guarantee.14
In this paper, we attempt to make a case for scrapping the provi-sion
for sedition in the IPC and any other laws making seditious acts an offence.

In Part II, we examine the judicial application of the law of sedition in India since
the colonial era to highlight their vagueness and the non-uniform way in which it
has been applied. In Part III, we discuss the findings of the court in
Kedar Nath v. State of Bihar15 (Kedar Nath), which upheld the constitutional
validity of 124A, and demonstrate that the law has evolved considerably since
then. In Part IV, we analyse two specific aspects of the offence of sedition: the
nature of the government established by law and the effect of the shift to a
democratic form of government post independence. In Part V, we undertake an
analysis of all sedition cases that have come before the high courts and the

Supreme Court of India between 2000 and 2015. We will draw from the
English experience with the crime of sedition, explaining why it should
find no place in a modern democracy. Finally, in Part VI, we provide
some concluding remarks to our discussion.

II. THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF

DISAFFECTION IS PLAGUED BY VAGUENESS
AND NON-UNIFORMITY
A. THE ORIGINS OF S EDITION LAW
In the 13th century, the rulers in England viewed the printing
press as a threat to their sovereignty.16 The widespread use of the printing press
thus prompted a series of measures to control the press and the dissemination of
information in the latter half of the century.17 These measures may broadly be
categorised as the collection of acts concerning Scandalum Magnatum and the
offence of Treason. While the former addressed the act of speaking ill of the

King, the latter was a more direct offence against the person or government of
the King.18

12
13
14
15
16

The Indian Penal Code, 1898, 124-A.

17
18
19

Colum. L. Rev. 92 (1984).

84

See PSA Pillai, Criminal Law 1131 (K.I. Vibhute eds., 2009).
Barendt, infra note 160.
Kedar Nath v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955.
William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and a Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of Expression,

Id., 94.
Id.

April - June,
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The Modern Offence of Sedition

The first category of offences, classified as acts concerning

Scandalum Magnatum, were a series of statutes enacted in 1275 and later.19

These created a statutory offence of defamation, which made it illegal to concoct or disseminate false news (either written or spoken) about the king
or the magnates of the realm.20 However, its application was limited to the
extent that the information had to necessarily be a representation of facts as
the truth.21 Thus, truth was a valid defence to the act.22
The second category of offences was that of treason, subsequently
interpreted as constructive treason. Essentially, treason was an offence
against the State.23 It was understood that all the subjects of the rulers owed a
duty of loyalty to the king.24 Thus, if any person committed an act detrimental to
the interests of the rulers, they would be guilty of the offence of treason. Initially,
the offence required that an overt act be committed to qualify as treason. 25
However, by the 14th century, the scope of the offence was expanded through
legislation and judicial pronouncements to include even speech in its ambit. 26

This modified offence was known as constructive creason.

Despite the existence of the aforementioned categories of of-fences,
the rulers faced many hurdles in curbing the expression of undesirable opinions
about them. While the expression of fact and truth acted as defences to the offence
of Scandalum Magnatum, the offence of treason also had vari-ous safeguards.
Only common law courts had jurisdiction over the offence. 27 Further, it necessitated
a procedure wherein one would have to secure an indict-ment for the accused before
they faced a trial by the jury.28 Initially, the overt act requirement also acted as a
complication while trying to secure convictions.

However, with the expansion in the scope of the crime to include

speech, this defence became unavailable. To overcome these procedural and
substantive difficulties, the offence of seditious libel was literally invented
in the court of the Star Chamber.29

19

Philip Hamburger, The Development of the Law of Seditious Libel and the
Control of the Press, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 668 (1985).

20
21
22
23
24
25

Id., 669.
Id.
Id.
Mayton, supra note 16.

Mathew Hale & George Wilson Thomas, The History of the Pleas of the Crown, Vol. 1 59
(1st edn., 1800) ([A]s the subject hath his protection from the King and his laws,
so on the other side the subject is bound by his allegiance to be true and faithful to the King).

26
Mayton, supra note 16, 105.
27
Id.
28
Id., 122.
29
125.
30Crown.Id.,
Id.Its(These
courts
to the
administrative
tribunals
in the
service
the
mem-bers
werewere
often akin
part of
Kings council
and would
serve
at the of
Kings
pleasure.
This court
wasinquisitorial
not subject to
the same procedural rigours as the common law courts.
Its
proceedings
prosecutions
forwere
various
offences). in nature and were intended to secure efficacious

April - June,
2014

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NUJS LAW REVIEW 7 NUJS L.Rev. 121 (2014)

The offence of seditious libel was first devised in the Star

Chamber decision in de Libellis Famosis.30 In this case, the defendants had
confessed to ridiculing some clergymen of high status. While drawing from the
common law private offence of libel, the court eschewed the requirements thereof.
Instead, it condemned the criticism of public officials and the govern-ment
and stressed that any criticism directed at them would inculcate disre-spect for
public authority.31 Since the goal of this new offence was to cultivate respect
for the government in power, truth was not considered a defence. 32 It also evaded
the various safeguards of the offences of Treason and Scandalum Magnatumthat
it was modelled on. This judgment cited no precedent, as there was none.
Previously, libels were purely private actions for damages.

Henceforth, the offence of seditious libel was used as a

ruthless tool for the curbing of any speech detrimental to the government. 33
Over the course of many cases, it came to mean slander or libel upon the
reputations and/or actions, public or private, of public officials,
magistrates and prelates, which sought to divide and alienate the presente
governors from the sounde and well affected parte of the subjects .34 If
the speech published was true, the offence was only aggravated as it was
considered more likely to cause a breach of the peace.35
By the 18th century, the crime of seditious libel was viewed as a
harsh and unjust law that was used by the ruling classes to trample any criticism of
the Crown.36 However, given its utility, it was seen as a convenient tool in the
hands of the rulers. Thus, when a penal code was being drafted for colonial

India, where the rulers had the task of suppressing opposition, it was
only obvi-ous that seditious libel would be imported into the territory of India.

30
Id., 125.
31
Id.
33
32
Id.
One
such
infamous
case
is
Fourdes
case
(1604).
Anticipating
that
an
injunction
that
would
be
passed
against
him
in
the
Court
of
Chancery
bring
ruin
upon
his
family,
Fourde
petitioned
the
King
tothe
stay
the
injunction.
King
James
sent
acharged
message
to
the
Lord
Chancellor
asking
him
to
stay
injunction.
Fourde
then
presented
a
second
petition
before
the
King
suggesting
that
the
question
now
was
whether
the
commandment
of
the
king
the
order
of
the
Chancellor
should
take
effect.
HeIwould
was
with
sedition
before
the
Court
of
Star
Chamber
for
sowing
sedition
between
the
King
and
his
Peers.
He
was
sentenced
to
undergo
every
sentence
that
the
Court
of
Star
Chamber
was
empowered
to
placards
proclaiming
hisears,
slander
of
magistrates
and
justice,
riding
with
his
face
toor
the
horses
tail,
the
pillory,
loss
of
his
a
fine
of
1100
and
perpetual
imprisonment.
One
of give:
the
judges,
Thomas
Cecil,
second
Lord
Burghley
pronounced:
Let
all
men
hereby
take
heede
how
they
complayne
in
words
againste
any
magistrate,
for
they
are
gods...
34

Roger B. Manning, The Origins of the Doctrine of Sedition, 12(2) Albion 99 (Summer

35
36

Id.
Id., 675.

1980).

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The Modern Offence of Sedition

2. DEFINING DISAFFECTION UNDER THE

COLONIAL REGIME
The law of sedition that was introduced in India, despite being
partly deduced from the provisions of the Treason Felony Act, was less severe
and yet more precise. Sir James Stephen, while introducing the
amendment, jus-tified its inclusion in the Act by asserting that it was free
from a great amount of vagueness and obscurity with which the Law of
England was hampered.37 However, when this provision came to be
interpreted by the Indian courts, there was great uncertainty as to the
precise definition of the term disaffection. This was sought to be resolved
in various cases, which will be discussed in this part of the paper.
The first recorded state trial for sedition is that of Queen
Empress v. Jogendra Chunder Bose38 (Jogendra Bose). The Court, in
its much debated judgment, laid down the distinction between disaffection
and disapproba-tion. Disaffection was defined as the use of spoken or
written words to create a disposition in the minds of those to whom the words
were addressed, not to obey the lawful authority of the government, or to resist
that authority.39 It was also observed that:
It is sufficient for the purposes of the section that the words
used are calculated to excite feelings of ill-will against the

Government, and to hold it up to the hatred and

contempt of the people, and that they were used with an
intention to create such feeling.40
Another significant case which had a direct bearing on the 1898
amendment was that of Queen Empress v. Bal Gangadhar Tilak41 (Tilak).
Allegations of sedition against Bal Gangadhar Tilak were first forwarded when
the magazine Kesari published detailed reports of the proceedings that had taken place
at the Shivaji Coronation Festival, during the celebration of which several patriotic
lectures and speeches were delivered. It was alleged that these speeches made
references to Shivajis call for Swarajya (independence) and al-luded to the trials of
the people under the British rule.42 Although the Coronation

37
38
39
40

Donogh, supra note 2, 5.

Queen Empress v. Jogendra Chunder Bose, ILR (1892) 19 Cal 35.

Id., 40-42.
Id., 45 (This expression is an example of how the law was a direct import from
the English case law of the time and is noteworthy insofar as it became the basis for
the 1898 amendment to the legislation. Eventually, the accused himself tendered an
apology and all proceedings against him were dropped).

41
Queen Empress v. Bal Gangadhar Tilak, ILR (1898) 22 Bom 112.
42The Chilling
Ganachari, supra note 10, 60; See also Siddharth Narrain, Disaffection and the Law:
Effect of Sedition Laws in India, XLVI (8) EPW 34 (2011) (The allegedly seditious
report comprised of two sets of publications. The first was a metaphorical poem entitled

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NUJS LAW REVIEW 7 NUJS L.Rev. 121 (2014)

Ceremony in itself was peaceful, the weeks following the publication of the
re-port on June 15, 1897, saw the murder of two eminent British officials. 43
In perhaps one of the most comprehensive expositions of the law in
colonial India, the Court, transcending the arguments from both sides, in-terpreted
124A mainly as exciting feelings of disaffection towards the gov-ernment,
which covered within its ambit sentiments such as hatred, enmity, dislike, hostility,
contempt, and all forms of ill-will. It expanded the scope of the offence by
holding that it was not the gravity of the action or the intensity of disaffection, but
the presence of feelings that was paramount44 and mere at-tempt to excite such
feelings was sufficient to constitute an offence.45
The meaning of disaffection and disapprobation was further
clarified by the court in Queen Empress v. Ramchandra Narayan46 in which
accusations against the editor and proprietor of the Pratod newspaper for publishing an article entitled Preparation for Becoming Independent. The
Court did not agree with the notion that disaffection was necessarily the opposite
of affection, but it advocated that an attempt to excite disaffection amongst the
masses was to be construed as an attempt to excite political discontent and
alienation from their allegiance to a foreign sovereign. 47 In Queen Empress v.
Amba Prasad,48 the Court, however, held that even in cases of disapproba-tion
of the measures of the government, if it can be deduced from a fair and impartial
consideration of what was spoken or written, that the intention of the
accused was to excite feelings of disaffection towards the government and
therefore it could be considered a seditious act. 49 Thus disaffection would include the absence or negation of affection as well as a positive feeling of
aversion towards the government.50
Shivajis utterances. It was asserted that strong symbolic parallels could be drawn
from the poem insofar as it linked Shivajis attempt to attain swarajya with the Indian
struggle for independence. The second was a compilation of speeches delivered at the
Shivaji coronation ceremony. It was believed that these speeches, by referring to the
killing of Afzal Khan by Shivaji, sought to justify acts of political assassination and
were directly responsible for the murder of Commissioner Rand and Lieutenant
Ayherst,
both
whom
were
killed
within
athe
of the
publication).
pressure
of
the era,
which
such
the
as
Imperialist
thethe
Times
Anglo-Indian
oftoIndia
and
press
put
Bombay
on
Gazette,
Government.
laid accusations
Leading newspa
of sedition
- pers
against
Tilak
andof
urged
Crown
bring
him
toweek
trial
under
124-A).

44

Janaki Bakhle, Savarkar (1983-1966), Sedition and Surveillance: the rule of law in a
colo-nial
situation,
February
12,
2010,
available
at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/94493285/Bakhle-Sedition-and-Savarkar (Last visited on March
10, 2014).

45
46
47
48
49
50

Id.
Queen Empress v. Ramchandra Narayan, ILR (1898) 22 Bom 152.
Id., Ganachari, supra note 10, 62.
Queen Empress v. Amba Prasad, ILR (1898) 20 All 55.
Id.

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The Modern Offence of Sedition

A conflict arose when the Federal Court of India, the high-est
judicial body of the country till the establishment of the Supreme Court,
overturned the conviction of Majumdar in Niharendu Dutt Majumdar v. King

Emperor51 (Niharendu Majumdar). Charges of sedition had first been

pressed against Majumdar on account of him allegedly delivering violent and
provoca-tive speeches in the Bengal legislative assembly highlighting
the inefficiency of the State Government to maintain law and order in
the aftermath of the Dacca riots.52 Sir Maurice Gwyer, Chief Justice of
the Federal Court at the time, held that the mere presence of violent
words does not make a speech or publication seditious. Instead, he was of
the belief that in order to be brought under the ambit of sedition, the acts or
words complained of must either incite to disor-der or must be such as to
satisfy reasonable men that that is their intention or tendency.53
Subsequently, the soundness of the decision given by the Federal

Court in Niharendu Majumdar came to be discussed in great detail in King

Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao54 (Sadashiv Bhalerao). This case,
pertaining to the publication and distribution of leaflets containing prejudicial
reports, was heard before the Privy Council. The Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council opined that Niharendu Majumdar was decided on the basis of a wrongful
construction of 124A. In acknowledgement of the model of literal
interpretation followed by Strachey, J., in Tilak case, 55 it asserted that the view
proposing the imposition of the offence of sedition only on the basis of suggest-ing
rebellion or forcible resistance to the government was inadmissible. 56

C. OPPOSITION IN THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

At the time of the Indian movement for independence from British
rule, the law of sedition was applied against great nationalists, such as Annie
Besant, Bal Gangadhar Tilak and Mahatma Gandhi, as a tool to curb dissent.
Keeping such excesses in mind, the Freedom of Speech and Expression was
originally encompassed in Article 13 of the Draft Constitution. In its original form, this
provision guaranteed this right subject to restrictions imposed by

Federal Law to protect aboriginal tribes and backward classes and to

preserve public safety and peace.57

51
52
53
54
55

Niharendu Dutt Majumdar v. King Emperor, AIR 1942 FC 22.

56
57
58

King Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao, [1947] L.R. 74 I.A. 89.

Constitutional Assembly Debates, December 7, 1948, speech by Damodar Swarup Seth 17

Id.
Id., See also Narrain, supra note 42.

King Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao, (1947) LR 74 IA 89.

Where he had stated that such an interpretation would be absolutely opposed to the
express words of the section itself, which as plainly as possible, made the exciting or
attempting to excite certain feelings, and not the inducing or attempting to induce to any course
of action such as rebellion or forcible resistance, the test of guilt.

10,

available at http://164.100.47.132/LssNew/constituent/vol7p21.pdf (Last visited on March

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A proposal for an amendment to this provision was moved in the

Constituent Assembly to permit the imposition of limitations on this right on
the grounds of libel, slander, defamation, offences against decency or morality or sedition or other matters which undermine the security of the
State.58 However, in light of the biased nature of judicial
pronouncements pertaining to cases of sedition in India, along with a
precipitous rise in the abuse of sedi-tion law to incarcerate nationalists, the
final drafters of the Constitution felt the need to exclude sedition from the
exceptions to the right to freedom of speech and expression.59
A prominent objection to the inclusion of sedition as an exception to
the freedom of speech and expression was raised by Sardar Hukum Singh,
who noted that in the United States of America, any law that limited a fundamental right is mandatorily subjected to judicial scrutiny and must be deemed
constitutional. However, by granting a blanket protection to any sedition law
that the Parliament may legislate upon, the courts in India would be incapaci-tated
from striking down an errant law for violating the right to the freedom of
speech and expression.60 He also criticised the validation of laws on the
ground that they were in the interest of public order or undermined the
authority or foundation of the state as classifications that were too vague. 61

There was a clear consensus among the members of the

Constituent Assembly on the oppressive nature of sedition laws. They
expressed their reluc-tance to include it as a ground for the restriction of the
freedom of speech and expression. The term sedition was thus dropped from
the suggested amend-ment to Article 13 of the Draft Constitution.

2014).

58
59

Id.

60
61

Constitutional Assembly Debates, December 7, 1948, speech by S.H. Singh 16 available at

62

Id.

Soli J. Sorabjee, Confusion about Sedition, August 12, 2012, available at

http://www.indi-anexpress.com/news/confusion-about-sedition/987140 (Last visited on
March 10, 2014); See also Soli J Sorabjee, Aseem Trivedis cartoons dont constitute
sedition,
September
15,
2012,
available
at
http://newindianexpress.com/opinion/article607411.ece (Last visited on March 10, 2014)
(The most vocal opposition to such an inclusion came from the renowned activist and lawyer
Dr. K.M. Munshi. To support his position, Dr. Munshi cited the wide divergence in the judicial
interpretation of the term sedition. Further, he believed that public opinion with respect to
sedition had evolved over the years, and taking cognizance of the changing nature of public
opinion, a line needed to be drawn between constructive criticism of the Government which
was crucial to address the grievances of the people, and an incitement to violence which would
undermine security and disrupt public law and order).

2014).

http://164.100.47.132/LssNew/constituent/vol7p21.pdf (Last visited on March 10,

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The Modern Offence of Sedition

4. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
POST-INDEPENDENCE

LAW

After India attained independence in 1947, the offence of

sedition continued to remain in operation under 124A of the IPC. 62 Even
though sedi-tion was expressly excluded by the Constituent Assembly as a ground
for the limitation of the right to freedom of speech and expression, this right was
still being curbed under the guise of this provision of the IPC. On three
significant occasions, the constitutionality of this provision was challenged in the
courts. These cases shaped the subsequent discourse in the law of sedition.
Following the decision in Niharendu Majumdar, 124A was
struck down as unconstitutional in Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras,63
Ram Nandan v. State,64 and Tara Singh v. State65 (Tara Singh). In Tara
Singh, the East Punjab High Court relied on the principle that a restriction
on a fundamen-tal right shall fail in toto if the language restricting such a right is
wide enough to cover instances falling both within and outside the limits of
constitutionally permissible legislative action affecting such a right.66

During the debates surrounding the first amendment to the

Constitution, the then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was subjected to severe criticism by members of the opposition for the rampant curbs that were
being placed on the freedom of speech and expression under his regime. 67 This
criticism, accompanied by the rulings of the courts in the aforementioned judgments holding 124A to be unconstitutional, compelled Nehru to
suggest an amendment to the Constitution.68

62

The Indian Penal Code, 1860, 124A. (Sedition.

Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or
otherwise, brings or attempts to bring into hatred or contempt, or excites or attempts to excite
disaffection towards, the Government established by law in India, shall be punished with
imprisonment for life, to which fine may be added, or with imprisonment which may extend to
three years, to which fine may be added, or with fine.

Explanation 1 The expression disaffection includes disloyalty and all feelings of

enmity.
Explanation 2 Comments expressing disapprobation of the measures of the
Government with a view to obtain their alteration by lawful means, without exciting or attempting to
excite hatred, contempt or disaffection, do not constitute an offence under this section.

Explanation 3 Comments expressing disapprobation of the administrative or

other action of the Government without exciting or attempting to excite hatred,
contempt or disaffection, do not constitute an offence under this section).

63
64
65
66
67
68

Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124.

Ram Nandan v. State, AIR 1959 All 101.
Tara Singh v. State, AIR 1951 SC 441.
Id.
Narrain, supra note 42.
Id.

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NUJS LAW REVIEW 7 NUJS L.Rev. 121 (2014)

132

Thus, through the first amendment to the Constitution, the additional grounds of public order and relations with friendly states were added to the
Article 19(2) list of permissible restrictions on the freedom of speech and
expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a).69 Further, the word reasonable was
added before restrictions to limit the possibility of misuse by the govern-ment. 70 In the
parliamentary debates, Nehru stated that the intent behind the amendment was not
the validation of laws like sedition. He described 124A as

objectionable and obnoxious71 and opined that it did not deserve a place in
the scheme of the IPC.

III. KEDAR NATH AND THE MODERN

DEFINITION OF SEDITION
As stated earlier, the decision of the Supreme Court in Kedar Nath
laid down the interpretation of the law of sedition as it is understood today. In this
decision, five appeals to the Apex Court were clubbed together to decide the
issue of the constitutionality of 124A of the IPC in light of Article 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution. In the Courts interpretation the incitement to violence was considered an
essential ingredient of the offence of sedition. 72 Here, the court followed the
interpretation given by the Federal Court in Niharendu Majumdar. Thus, the crime of
sedition was established as a crime against public tranquil-lity 73 as opposed to a
political crime affecting the very basis of the State.

The Court looked at the pre-legislative history and the opposition in the Constituent Assembly debates around Article 19 of the
Constitution. Here, it noted that sedition had specifically been excluded as
a valid ground to limit the freedom of speech and expression even though it was
included in the draft Constitution.74 This was indicative of a legislative intent that
sedition not be considered a valid exception to this freedom. 75

69
70
71
72
73
74

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Pillai, supra note 13, 482.

See Rex v. Aldred, (1909) 22 Cox CC 1.

Kedar Nath v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955, 30; See also Romesh Thappar
v. Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124 (per Sastri, J.:

75

Deletion of the word sedition from draft Art. 13(2), therefore, shows that
criticism of Government exciting disaffection or bad feelings towards it is
not to be regarded as a justifying ground for restricting the freedom of
expression and of the press, unless it is such as to undermine the security or tend
to over-throw the State.
Further, the court also observed that the Irish formula of undermining the public order or the
authority of the State as a standard to impose limits on the freedom of speech and
expression had not found favour with the drafters of the Constitution).

76

Kedar Nath v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 955, 29.

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The Modern Offence of Sedition

As a consequence, sedition could only fall within the purview of

constitutional validity if it could be read into any of the six grounds listed in Article
19(2) of the Constitution. 76 Out of the six grounds in Article 19(2), the Court
considered the security of the state as a possible ground to support the
constitutionality of 124A of the IPC. 77 The Court made use of the princi-ple
that when more than one interpretation may be given to a legal provision, it must
uphold that interpretation which makes the provision constitutional. 78 Any
interpretation that makes a provision ultra vires the Constitution must be
rejected. Thus, even though a plain reading of the section does not suggest such a
requirement, it was held to be mandatory that any seditious act must be accompanied by an attempt to incite violence and disorder.79
However, the fact that the aforementioned Irish formula of undermining the public order or the authority of the State that been rejected by
the members of the Constituent Assembly was ignored by the Court. This was despite
making a reference to this fact earlier in the judgment. The reasoning of the
Court was that since sedition laws would be used to maintain public order, and the
maintenance of public order would in turn be in the interests of the security of the
state, these laws could be justified in the interests of the latter.80

1. MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC ORDER AS A LIMIT ON

FREE SPEECH
The reason the drafters of the Constitution omitted the term sedition from the enacted Constitution was the divergence in interpretation of the
term.81 To avoid any complications that may arise out of this ambiguity in interpretation, they used the term security of the state that was to include grave
crimes like sedition.82 Concurring with this reasoning, the Court in Kedar Nath
stated that the section related to sedition was a reasonable restriction both on
grounds of public order and security of the state. Further, the addition of the
phrase in the interest of public order in Article 19(2) through the first constitutional amendment with retrospective application was seen as an attempt to
validate the interpretation given by Fazl Ali, J. in Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi83
(Brij Bhushan) whereby public order was allied to security of the

76
77
78
79
80
81
82

Id., 38.

83

Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 129 : (1950) 51 Cri LJ 1525.

Id.
Id., 39 (citing R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 628).
Id.
Id., 31.
Narrain, supra note 42.

While it was widely accepted by various scholars and authorities that sedition was
essentially an offence against public tranquillity and was represented by any form of public
disorder, the Judicial Committee had stated that the intention or tendency to incite disorder was
not an es-sential element of the crime of sedition as defined in the IPC.

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state.84 The insertion of the words in the interest of before public order in
Article 19(2) was seen as providing a wide amplitude of powers to the
State for the curtailment of free speech. 85 Consequently, the amendment was
seen as a validation of the law of sedition.
Since then, however, a clear distinction has been drawn by courts
between the terms public order and security of the state. 86 The difference,
essentially, is one of degree. While the terms have not been precisely defined,
public order is synonymous with public safety and tranquillity and has only local
significance. Security of the state, on the other hand, would involve a national
upheaval such as revolution, civil strife or war.87 Thus, an argument that a law
justified in the interest of public order would also consequently be justified in
the interests of the security of the state would not stand.

Further, it would also be difficult to argue that the law could

be saved on the grounds of being in the interests of public order. For the purpose of permissible restriction, the breach of public peace may be categorised
as: offences against law and order, public order and security of the state.
According to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ram Manohar v.
State of Bihar88 (Ram Manohar Lohia) these may be viewed as three
concentric cir-cles, with law and order forming the outermost circle, public
order the next circle and security of the state the innermost circle. These
form a hierarchy of disturbances of peace, with security of the state possessing
the highest standard of proof. Thus, if a restriction is to be justified on the
grounds of security of the state, it would have to be subjected to a higher
standard than that applied in cases of public order.
As has already been stated, sedition is an offence against
the State and punishes an act intended to subvert the government established
by law. It is difficult to imagine how the mere disturbance of public order
could attract a charge for an offence against the state, given that the term in
the interests of public order is used in an extremely localised context. 89 These
could include punishing loud and raucous noise caused by noise-amplifying
instruments in public places or preventing utterances likely to cause a
riot. Thus, in light of the clear distinction that has been drawn between public
order and security of the state in Ram Manohar Lohia, the courts have in
subsequent decisions on sedition imposed a disturbance of public order
requirement for the offence to be proved.90

84
85

Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955, 29.

86
87
88
89
90

V.N. Shukla, Constitution Of India 135 (M.P. Singh, 2008).

Id.

Id., 33 (The Court cited the decision in Debi Soren v. State, AIR 1954 Pat 254
to support this contention).

Ram Manohar v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 740 : (1966) 1 SCR 709.
Id.
Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 214 : AIR 1995 SC 1785.

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The Modern Offence of Sedition

IV. AN OFFENCE AGAINST THE STATE?

1. STATE V. PEOPLE FOR TIME BEING ENGAGED IN
GOVERNMENT
1. Distinction between Government and People engaged
in
Administration.
While defining the contours of the crime of sedition, the court in
Kedar Nath also sought to distinguish between the Government established by
law as used in 124A of the IPC from people engaged in the administration for
the time being. The former was said to be represented by the visible symbol of the
State.91 Any attempt to subvert the government established by law would jeopardise
the very existence of the State. However, any bona fide criticism of government
officials with a view to improve the functioning of the government will not be
illegal under this section. 92 This exception was introduced to protect journalists
criticising any government measures.93

It is submitted, however, that on closer scrutiny, this distinction is

murky and is difficult to practically implement. Any persons involved in the
daily administration of the government or acting as a representative of the peo-ple
in the government would also necessarily constitute a visible symbol of the state. 94
As a result of this tenuous distinction, a conflicting situation is created.
While calling all the bureaucrats of a government thugs and profiteers
does not qualify as a seditious act,95 attributing the same qualities to the
government as a whole would bring the speech within the ambit of sedition.

2. POST-INDEPENDENCE CHANGE IN NATURE OF

GOVERNMENT
It must be noted that the Court was still driven by the notion of sedition
as a crime that affected the very basis of the State. It had thus been included
under the section related to Offences against the State in the IPC.

The rationale for the criminalisation of such acts is generally that it fosters an
environment and psychological climate conducive to criminal activity even
though it may not incite a specific offence.96

91
92
93
94
95
96
97

Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955, 36.

Id.
Durga Das Basu, Commentary on Constitution of India 2547 (Justice Y.V Chandrachud et al,
8th ed., 2008).

R.A. Nelson, Indian Penal Code 665 (S.K. Sarvaria, 2008).

Om Prakash v. Emperor, 42 PLR 382.
Modechai Kremnitzer & Khalid Ghanayim, Incitement, Not Sedition in Freedom of
Speech and Incitement against Democracy 147, 197 (David Kretzmer & Francine Hazen eds., 2000).

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Given that sedition is a crime against the state, one must take into
consideration the changing nature of the State with time. At the time when
sedition was introduced in the IPC, India was still a part of the British Empire
and was ruled by the British monarchs. Since all authority emanated from the

Crown and the subject owed personal allegiance to the Crown, it was consid-ered
impermissible to attempt to overthrow the monarchs through any means. 97

Subsequent to the attainment of independence, however, all authority is

de-rived from the Constitution of India, rather than an abstract ruling state.98
The State now consists of the representatives of the people that are
elected by them through democratic elections. Thus, a crime that is premised
on prevent-ing any attempt to alter the government loses its
significance.99 It is possible for governments to come and go without the
very foundations of the State being affected.100
In fact, in Tara Singh, while striking down 124A as being
ultra vires Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, the Court drew a
distinction between a democratically elected government and a government
that was established under foreign rule. In the former, a government may come
in power and be made to abdicate that power, without adversely affecting the
foundations of the state. This change in the form of government has made a
law of the nature of sedition obsolete and unnecessary.
Lastly, it has also been emphasised that the courts must take into
consideration the growing awareness and maturity of its citizenry while deter-mining
which speech would be sufficient to incite them to attempt to overthrow the
government through the use of violence.101 Words and acts that would en-danger society
differ from time to time depending on how stable that society is. Thus, meetings and
processions that would have been considered seditious

150 years ago would not qualify as sedition today.102 This is because
times have changed and society is stronger than before.103
This consideration becomes crucial in determining the threshold of
incitement required to justify a restriction on speech. Thus, the audience must be kept
in mind in making such a determination. In S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram104
(Rangarajan), the Court held that the effect of the words must be judged from the
standards of reasonable, strong-minded, firm and cou-rageous men, and not
those of weak and vacillating minds, nor of those who

97
98
99

Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, U. Chi. L. Rev. 260 (1992).

100
101
102
103
104

See Tara Singh Gopi Chand v. State, 1951 Cri LJ 449 (per Eric Weston, C.J.).
Seervai, Constitutional Law of India 718 (2010).

Id.

It must be remembered, however, that a call to alter the form of Government is

not punishable under this section.

Id.

Bowman v. Secular Society Ltd, 1917 AC 406 (per Lord Sumner).

S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 SCC 574.

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The Modern Offence of Sedition

scent danger in every hostile point of view. 105 It gives an indication of what sort
of acts might be considered seditious, when it observes that the film in
question did not threaten to overthrow the government by unlawful or
unconstitutional means, secession or attempts to impair the integrity of the country.

V. RECENT EXPERIENCE WITH SEDITION

A. ANALYSING JUDGMENTS BETWEEN 2000-2015
Since the eponymous decision of the Supreme Court in Kedar
Nath, the courts have applied the law of sedition on various occasions. To ex-amine
how the courts have dealt with cases of sedition in the recent past, we have
examined all cases that came before the high courts and Supreme Court
between the years 2000 and 2015. Of these cases, the cases where the
question of sedition was not directly in issue or where the court did not address the
issue of sedition were eliminated. It was found that there have been only fourteen
cases of sedition in the last fifteen years, of which only two were heard
before the Supreme Court. Further, there have been only three convictions,
of which one conviction was made by the Supreme Court. In this part of the
paper, we will briefly analyse these cases. For the purpose of clarity, we
have categorised them as Clear Acquittal Cases, Grey Area Cases and
Convictions. While the Clear Acquittal Cases are those where it could easily be
determined that the requirements for sedition were not satisfied, the Grey
Area Cases are where the courts acquitted the accused, but where these
acquittals give us crucial guid-ance on what activities do not qualify as sedition.

1. Clear Acquittal Cases

Of the fourteen cases of sedition before the courts, six can be
categorised as Clear Acquittal Cases. As per Kedar Nath, it is necessary that the act
causes disaffection towards the government established by law and that it incites
people to violence and to disrupt public order. It can be seen from the facts of these
cases that the acts involved clearly did not satisfy these require-ments. The
courts recorded findings to this effect, and acquitted the accused in these
cases. In one such case, P.J. Manuel v. State of Kerala,106 the accused affixed
posters on a board at the Kozhikode public library and research centre,
exhorting people to boycott the general election to the Legislative Assembly of the
state.107 The poster proclaimed, No vote for the masters who have become
swollen exploiting the people, irrespective of difference in parties.

Consequently, criminal proceedings were initiated against him under

124A of the IPC for the offence of sedition.

105
106
107

Id., 20.
P.J. Manuel v. State of Kerala, ILR (2013) 1 Ker 793.
Id.

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The Kerala High Court observed that it needs to be examined

whether the publication or preaching of protest, or even questioning the foundation or form of government should be imputed as causing disaffection towards the
government in a modern democracy. The content of the offence of sedition must
be determined with reference to the letter and spirit of the Constitution and not to
the standards applied during colonial rule. In support of its view, it cited authority
to demonstrate that even the shouting of slogans for the estab-lishment of a
classless society in line with the tenets of socialism would not be punishable as
sedition.108 Further, it noted that 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973, (CrPC) mandates that the government must expressly au-thorise
any complaint filed for an offence against the State (under Part VI of the
IPC) before the Court can take cognisance of such an offence. It thus held
that the impugned act did not constitute the act of sedition and quashed the
criminal proceedings against the petitioner.

The courts reached a similar conclusion in a case where the editor of a newspaper published articles claiming that the Police Commissioner of
Ahmedabad city was corrupt and was responsible for a high profile
murder,109 where the publisher and editor of an Urdu weekly was charged
for publish-ing articles that claimed denounced the injustice being done to
Muslims and claimed that former Prime Ministers Indira Gandhi and Atal
Bihari Vajpayee had conspired against Muslims,110 and where the Chief Minister
of Jammu and Kashmir had tweeted that if their Assembly had passed a resolution
par-doning the death sentence of a terrorist (as had been done by the Tamil Nadu
Assembly), the reactions would not have been so muted. 111 Acquittals were also
obtained by a filmmaker who made a documentary that highlighted the vio lence that affects the life of people in Kashmir,112 and by a cartoonist who drew
cartoons highlighting and lampooning the corruption in the government. 113

2. Grey Area Cases

In five cases of sedition before the courts, the accused also
man-aged to obtain acquittals on this charge. However, these cases
have been cat-egorised as Grey Area Cases as they involved acts that
could be categorised as anti-national, secessionist or terrorist activities.
However, the courts found that in the absence of an immediate threat of
violence, these ideologies could not be criminalised.

108
109
110
111
112
113

Alavi v. State of Kerala, 1982 KLT 205; Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC

114

Sanskar Marathe v. State of Maharashtra, Cri PIL No. 3 of 2015 (Bom)

214 : AIR 1995 SC 1785.

Bharat Desai v. State of Gujarat, Cri Misc App 7536 of 2008 (Guj) (Unreported).
Javed Habib v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2007) 96 DRJ 693.
K. Neelamegam v. State, Cri OP (MD) No. 14086 of 2011 (Mad) (Unreported).

Pankaj Butalia v. Central Board of Film Certification, WP (C) 675 of 2015 (Del)
(Unreported).

(Unreported).

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In Gurjatinder Pal Singh v. State of Punjab,114 for example, the
accused petitioned the Punjab & Haryana High Court for an order to quash the
First Information Report (FIR) that had been filed against him under 124A
and 153B of the IPC. At a religious ceremony organised in memory of the martyrs during Operation Blue Star, the petitioner gave a speech to the people
present advocating the establishment of a buffer state between Pakistan and
India known as Khalistan. He stated that the Constitution was a worthless/
useless books for the Sikhs. The supporters of the petitioner then raised aggressive slogans and naked swords were raised in the air. The High Court cited
the decision of the Supreme Court in Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab,115 where
it was held that the mere casual raising of slogans a couple of times without the
intention to incite people to create disorder would not constitute a threat to the

Government of India. Crucially, it held that even explicit demands for

secession and the establishment of a separate State would also not
constitute a seditious act.116 Thus, the FIR against the accused was quashed.
Courts have also consistently found that criminal conspiracies and acts of
terrorism did not constitute seditious acts. In Mohd. Yaqub v. State of W.B.,117 the
accused had admitted to being a spy for the Pakistani intelligence agency ISI.
He would receive instructions from the agency to carry out anti-national
activities. He was thus charged for sedition under 124A of the IPC.

Citing the elements of sedition that were laid down in Kedar Nath, the Calcutta
High Court found that the prosecution had failed to establish that the
acts were seditious and that they had the effect of inciting people to violence.
Thus, the accused were found not guilty as the strict evidentiary requirements
were not met.
Similarly, in Indra Das v. State of Assam118 (Indra Das), the
ac-cused had been shown to be a member of the banned organisation ULFA. It
was also alleged that he had murdered another man, even though there was no
evidence for the same. Applying the decision of the Court in Kedar Nath and
Niharendu Majumdar, the Supreme Court found that no seditious acts
could be imputed to the accused, and the appeal was allowed. This strict
evidentiary requirement was also echoed in the decision of the courts in State of
Assam v.

Fasiullah Hussain119 and State of Rajasthan v. Ravindra Singhi,120 where

the courts acquitted the accused of the charge of sedition on the grounds that
the prosecution had failed to produce sufficient evidence to prove that
they had committed a seditious act.

114
115
116
117
118
119
120

Gurjatinder Pal Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 3 RCR (Cri) 224.

Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 214 : AIR 1995 SC 1785.
Partap Singh v. UT, Chandigarh, Cri Misc No. 11926-M of 1991.
Mohd. Yaqub v. State of W.B., (2004) 4 CHN 406.
Indra Das v. State of Assam, (2011) 3 SCC 380.
State of Assam v. Fasiullah Hussain, (2013) 4 GLT 284.
State of Rajasthan v. Ravindra Singhi, (2001) 3 WLN 242.

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3. Convictions
Finally, there were only three cases where the accused was convicted of the charge of sedition. While two of these cases were before the
Chhattisgarh High Court, one was before the Supreme Court. However,
as will be argued in this part, these cases were per incuriam and were based on
an incorrect application of the law and failure to take into cognisance the
legally binding precedent on the matter.
In Binayak Sen v. State of Chhattisgarh,121 one of the accused
Piyush Guha made an extra-judicial confession that Binayak Sen, a public
health advocate, had delivered certain letters to him to be delivered to Kolkata.

These letter allegedly contained naxal literature some contained information

on police atrocities and human rights. Convicting the accused of sedition, the
High Court cited the widespread violence by banned Naxalite groups against
members of the armed forces. However, it did not explain how the mere
posses-sion and distribution of literature could constitute a seditious act. Further, the

High Court did not address the question of incitement to violence, which
was evidently absent in this case. Consequently, the judgment of the Chhattisgarh
High Court in this case has also been the subject of immense criticism. 122
In Nazir Khan v. State of Delhi123 (Nazir Khan), the accused underwent training with militant organisations such as Jamet-e-Islamic and Al-eHadees, and was given the task of carrying out terrorist activities in India. He
then kidnapped British and American nationals visiting India, and demanded
that ten terrorists that were confined in jail be released in exchange for the
release of the foreign nationals. However, he was caught by the police after one
of the hostages managed to escape. He was subsequently tried for several
offences, including sedition. The Trial Court had convicted the accused on this charge,
stating that they were trying to overawe the Government of India by criminal
force and arousing hatred, contempt and dissatisfaction in a section of people in India
against the government. Further, they had collected materials and arms to carry out
these acts. The Supreme Court noted that the line divid-ing preaching
disaffection towards the Government and legitimate political ac-tivity in a
democratic set up cannot be neatly drawn. However, it then disposes of its
analysis of whether the act qualified as sedition in a paragraph without citing any
precedent. It does not give any reasons why the particular acts in this case were
seditious, but instead merely posits that [t]he objects of sedition generally are to
induce discontent and insurrection, and stir up opposition to the Government, and
bring the administration of justice into contempt; and the

121
122

Binayak Sen v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2011) 266 ELT 193.

123

Nazir Khan v. State of Delhi, (2003) 8 SCC 461 : AIR 2003 SC 4427.

See, e.g., Tehelka, Not a 21st Century Law, April 30, 2011, available at
http://archive.tehelka. com/story_main49.asp?filename=Op300411Not21st.asp (Last visited on
June 17, 2015).

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The Modern Offence of Sedition

very tendency of sedition is to incite the people to insurrection and rebellion. It

then states that the offence under 124A has been clearly established.
In this case, the Court appears to blur the distinction between the
act and the incitement to the detriment of public order by suggesting that the act
of sedition itself has the tendency to incite people to insurrection and rebellion. It
thus disposes of the need to examine whether the acts of the ac-cused had the
tendency to incite people to disrupt public order, as the act itself constitutes the
incitement. We argue that this interpretation of the Court is per incuriam, as it has
been made without reference to several cases that operate as binding legal
precedent on the matter. Most significantly, it ignores the decision in Kedar
Nath, which was passed by a five-judge bench and was thus binding on the
two-judge bench in this case. In Kedar Nath, as has been explained in Part III of
this paper, the Court drew a clear distinction between the act of sedition and the
incitement to public disorder. Inciting disaffection against the govern-ment would
not constitute sedition unless it was accompanied by the direct incitement to
violence. In fact, it was this distinction that rendered the provi-sion constitutional.
Thus, the decision of the Court in Nazir Khan is incorrect in holding that seditious
acts themselves constituted incitements to violence.
In Asit Kumar Sen Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh124 (Asit Gupta),
the appellant challenged his conviction inter alia under 124A of the IPC be - fore
the Chhattisgarh High Court (Bilaspur Bench), for which he had been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and a fine of Rs. 500.
He was found to be in possession of Maoist literature and was a member of the
banned organisation Communist Party of India (Maoist). He was accused of
inciting and provoking people to join the organisation, with the intention of
overthrowing the current capitalist government through armed rebellion.

In coming to its conclusion, the Court cited the decision of the Supreme
Court in Raghubir Singh v. State of Bihar,125 where it was held that the accused
does not necessarily have to be the author of seditious material for a charge of sedition to be established. It was enough to prove that the accused had circulated or
distributed the seditious material. Thus, it concluded that in this case it was enough
that the accused was in possession of this Naxalite literature and was propagating
the information contained therein. However, while the Court es-tablished
that merely circulating or distributing seditious material could make a
person liable under 124A, we argue that its reasoning with respect to the
content of the offence was lacking in several respects.
To determine the content of the offence of sedition, the Court applied the decision of the Supreme Court in Nazir Khan, to conclude that the
very tendency of sedition is to incite the people to insurrection and rebellion. 126

124

Asit Kumar Sen Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh, Cri App No. 86 of 2011 (Chh)
(Unreported).

125
126

Raghubir
Singh
v. State
of Bihar,
(1986)
4 SCC
Nazir Khan
v. State
of Delhi,
(2003)
8 SCC
461 :481.
AIR 2003 SC 4427.

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2014

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NUJS LAW REVIEW 7 NUJS L.Rev. 121 (2014)

However, as we have explained above, the decision of the Court in

Nazir Khan was per incuriam, and thus the Court in Asit Gupta incorrectly
applied it as precedent. The binding authority in this matter still remains
Kedar Nath, and the courts must apply the ratio in that case faithfully.
Next, the Court observed that the Naxalite material that had been seized
from the appellant showed that he was exciting and encouraging the people to wage
war against the Government established by law through armed rebellion by
inciting them to join the Naxal forces. While the literature did prescribe overthrowing
the State through armed rebellion, the question that arises is what standard and
threshold must be applied to determine incitement to violence. Before discussing the
application of the law by the Court in Asit Gupta, it would be helpful to
summarise the position of law on permissible restrictions on speech in the interest
of public order. Three distinct threads of jurisprudence have emerged in this
respect at the Supreme Court.127 In the first thread, exemplified by cases such
as Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U.P.,128 Virendra v. State of Punjab129 and Kedar
Nath, the Supreme Court applied an older and weaker American standard,
which required merely the tendency or likelihood of violence as a
consequence of speech. It was opined that the use of the words in the interest
of before public order in Article 19(2) implied a

wide ambit of protection and would even include acts with the mere tendency
to cause violence.130
The second thread is exemplified by cases such as Ram Manohar
Lohia and Rangarajan where the Court has applied a higher threshold, namely the
proportionality or proximity test. In Ram Manohar Lohia, the Court held that the
restriction in question must have a proximate relation with the object sought to be
achieved, must be proportionate and must not be remote, arbitrary or fanciful. 131
Being a five-judge bench decision, this case is the locus clas-sicus and binding
authority on the issue. In Rangarajan as well, the Court held that the anticipated danger
should have a proximate and direct nexus with the expression, and likened it to the
infamous spark in a powder keg.132 Finally, the third thread is exemplified by
some recent cases such as Indra Das, Arup
Bhuyan v. State of Assam133 (Arup Bhuyan), and Shreya Singhal v. Union of
India134 (Shreya Singhal) where the Supreme Court has applied the modern

American test of a clear and present danger. Laid down most prominently in the
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Brandenburg v.

127

See Sunil Abraham, Shreya Singhal and 66-A: A Cup Half Full and Half Empty,
50 (15) EPW 12 (2015).

128
129
130
131
132
133
134

Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U.P., AIR 1957 SC 620.

Virendra v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 896.
Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U.P., AIR 1957 SC 620, 8.
Id., 13.
Id., 45.
Arup Bhuyan v. State of Assam, (2011) 3 SCC 377.
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2013) 12 SCC 73.

April - June,
2014

The Modern Offence of Sedition

Ohio,135 the test requires that restrictions cannot be placed on speech unless it
is directed to inciting, and is likely to incite imminent lawless action. At
the same time, however, the Indian Supreme Court has also rejected
the application of the Brandenburg test in Kameshwar Prasad v. State
of Bihar136 and Ramlila Maidan Incident, In re.137
In Asit Gupta, the High Court stated that it was applying Kedar
Nath to arrive at its conclusion that the appellants were guilty of sedition, as both
Arup Bhuyan and Indra Das could be distinguished on facts from the present case. As explained above, the proportionality and proximity test of Ram

Manohar Lohia would be the binding test applicable in this case.

However, even if the test of Kedar Nath were to be applied, the High
Court did not explain how the acts in the current case even had the tendency
to incite the public to violence.
Further, it failed to explain how the possession and distribution of
Naxalite literature, even if it advocated overthrowing the government and replacing
it with a new form of government, would constitute a seditious act in the absence
of an explicit and direct incitement to violence. In fact, these actions were not
considered seditious even during the period of British rule. By way of
illustration, consider the decision of Kamal Krishna Sircar v. Emperor,138 where
the accused was charged under 124A of the IPC for making a speech
advocating that a Bolshevik form of government replace the government of
the time. It must be noted that this ideology also espoused the overthrow of the
capitalist form of government.139 Acquitting the accused, Lord Williams, J.
observed that supporting communism did not constitute a seditious act. 140
inflam
mem-bers
matory
of
certain
racial
made
communities.
by
anot
leader
The
the
Kuimminence
Klux
held
Klan,
that
swearing
constitutional
revengeance
guarantees
against
of
free
use
speech
of- force
and
orspeech
free
of
law
press
violation
do
except
permit
where
acourt
State
to
forbid
advocacy
or
proscribe
is directed
advocacy
to
inciting
of
or
producing
any
government
imminent
action
lawless
curtailing
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and
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isfreedom
likely
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of
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orthe
produce
may
only
such
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justified
Thus,
ifthe
it
satisfies
the
threefold
requirements
ofof
intent,
and
likelihood).

136 Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 1166.

137 Ramlila Maidan Incident, In re, (2012) 5 SCC 1.
138
Kamal Krishna com/topic/communism
Sircar v. Emperor, AIR 1935
636.on June 14, 2015).
http://www.britannica.
(Last Cal
visited
140

Kamal Krishna Sircar v. Emperor, AIR 1935 Cal 636 (It was observed:
All that the speaker did was to encourage the young men, whom he was addressing, to join the Bengal Youth League and to carry on a [sic] propaganda for the
purpose of inducing as large a number of people in India as possible to become supporters
of the idea of communism as represented by the pre-sent Bolshevik system in Russia. It
is really absurd to say that speeches of this kind amount to sedition. If such were
the case, then every argument against the present form of Government and in
favour of some other form of Government might be allowed to lead to hatred of the
Government, and it might be suggested that such ideas brought the Government
into contempt. To suggest some other

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2014

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NUJS LAW REVIEW 7 NUJS L.Rev. 121 (2014)

It is evidenced from the foregoing analysis that the offence of sedition has now begun to wane in relevance. There have been only twelve cases at
the High Court and three at the Supreme Court. Of these, the accused has
been acquitted in a majority of the cases. Even where convictions have
been obtained, it can be demonstrated that they were based on an incorrect
applica-tion or disregard of the law, and were thus per incuriam.

2. LESSONS FROM THE REPEAL OF THE LAW

OF SEDITION IN ENGLAND
The crime of sedition, as it came to be interpreted in modern
England, was much wider in its scope than how it was applied in India. 141
The punishment prescribed for committing the crime was also disproportionately
high. Commission of the act attracted imprisonment for life or a high fine. 142
However, with the development in Englands criminal and constitutional law,
the crime of sedition became almost obsolete. People have been charged with the
crime only a few times over the last century.143 It was considered unac-ceptable
that the act was still in the statute books, despite the Law Reform

Commission having recommended the abolition of the crime almost thirty

years prior.144 In its report, the Commission principally based its opinion on
the fact that most of the potentially harmful acts against public peace that were
involved in committing sedition would be punishable separately under various
other statutory provisions.145
The provision was also inconsistent with the human rights obligations of the UK at the international level.146 The UK is signatory to the
European Convention on Human Rights, which was implemented in England
through the enactment of the Human Rights Act, 1998.147 The section was seen as
having a chilling effect on the freedom of expression. Thus, the crime
form of Government is not necessarily to bring the present Government
into hatred or contempt).

141
142
143
144

Basu, supra note 93, 2540.

Id.

Id.
Clare Feikert-Ahalt, Sedition in England: The Abolition of a Law from a Bygone
Era, October 2, 2012, available at http://blogs.loc.gov/law/2012/10/sedition-in-england-theabolition-of-a-law-from-a-bygone-era/ (Last visited on March 15, 2014).

Human Id.
Rights,
1950and
guarantees
the freedom
expressionby(which
opinions
and
to receive
impart information
withoutofinterference
a publicincludes
authority).the right
145

to hold

The European Court on Human Rights had previously held that the Freedom of
expression [...] is applicable not only to information or ideas that are favourably
received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those
that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population).

147

Ministry of Justice, Government of the UK, Making Sense of Human Rights: A

Short
Introduction,
October,
2006,
available
at
https://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/human-rights/human-rights-making-sensehuman-rights.pdf (Last visited on March 6, 2014).

April - June,
2014

The Modern Offence of Sedition

of seditious libel was abolished through the enactment of the aforementioned

Coroners and Justice Act, 2009.148

C. SIMILAR JUSTIFICATIONS FOR R EPEAL IN INDIA?

Our analysis in this part shows that the crime of sedition is now
waning in relevance. An examination of just the IPC demonstrates that these very
acts would be covered by its other provisions, rendering 124A obsolete.

Chapter VIII of the IPC contains offences against public tranquillity. These include being the member of, joining, hiring people to join, or
continuing an unlawful assembly.149 It also includes rioting, 150 assaulting or
obstructing a public servant trying to suppress a riot, 151 provocation with the
intent to spark a riot,152 and promoting enmity between different groups on
the basis of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language etc. 153 Further, it
also contains a provision for punishing acts that were prejudicial to national
integration.154 Minor squirmishes are covered by the crime of affray which
punishes the act of two or more persons disturbing the public peace by
fighting in a public place.155 Thus, any such act that was prejudicial to the
maintenance of harmony would be punishable. This would also include the
organisation of any form of training activities (exercise, movement or drill) to
train for the use of criminal force or violence.156
Thus, the crux of the crimes of sedition, violence, and public
disorder, can be contained by applying the aforementioned provisions of the
IPC. The various states also have specific legislation addressing the issue
of the maintenance of public order.157 Consequently, there would be no need for a
specific provision for the punishment of acts committed against the state or
the government. Other provisions that are clearly defined and less stringent
may instead be applied. An obvious advantage arising out of charging offenders
under ordinary criminal laws as opposed to under the laws of sedition is that
offenders are not counter-productively marked out and legitimised as
political offenders rather than ordinary criminals. 158

148

Press Gazzette, Criminal libel and sedition offences abolished, January 13, 2010,
available at http://www.pressgazette.co.uk/node/44884 (Last visited on March 15, 2014).

149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157

The Indian Penal Code, 1860, 141.

Id., 146.
Id., 152.
Id., 153.
Id., 153-A.
Id., 153-B.
Id., 159.
Id.

See, e.g., the West Bengal Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1972; the Assam
Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947; the Goa Maintenance of Public Order and Safety
Act, 1972.

158

Ben Saul, Speaking of Terror: Criminalising Incitement to Violence, 28 UNSW LJ 874

(2005).

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2014

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NUJS LAW REVIEW 7 NUJS L.Rev. 121 (2014)

Additionally, the Supreme Court has also recognised the right

of the citizens to gain access to information. 159 Given that most offences
covered under sedition can potentially be addressed by other provisions in
criminal law, it might be difficult to justify the retention of seditious offences
in the statute books in light of its obsolescence. It only serves the purpose
of undermining the public interest in having access to opposing political views. 160
Such access cannot be denied merely on the grounds that it might lead to the
people adopt-ing particular beliefs or acting on those beliefs.161

VI. CONCLUSION
Since its origin in the court of Star Chamber in England, the
law of sedition has been defined by uncertainty and non-uniformity in its
applica-tion. By keeping its scope deliberately vague, generations of
members of the ruling political class have ensured that they have a tool to
censor any speech that goes against their interests.
The courts have also been unable to give a clear direction to the law.
While the final position on the law in India was laid down as early as 1960, the
law of sedition is characterised by its incorrect application and use as a tool for
harassment. Thus, some of the reasons for which people have been booked
under the provision (and often incarcerated) include liking a Facebook page, 162
criticising a popular yoga expert,163 cheering for the Pakistani team during a cricket
match versus India,164 asking a question about whether the stone-pelters in
Jammu and Kashmir were the real heroes in a university exam, 165 making

159

Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Govt. of India v. Cricket Assn. of

Bengal, (1995) 2 SCC 161 ; AIR 1995 SC 1236.

160

Eric Barendt, Interests in Freedom of Speech: Theory and Practice in Legal

Explorations:
161 Essays in Honour of Professor Michael Chesterman 175 (Kam Fan Sin, 2003).

162
163

HC,

Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech 170 (2006).

Times News Network, Facebook like case: No evidence of sedition, govt tells

164

January 30, 2013, available at http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-01-30/

kochi/36635179_1_national-flag-facebook-post-sedition (Last visited on March 15, 2014).

165

The Indian Express, Sedition charge against Digvijay over remark against
Ramdev, June 6, 2011, available at http://www.indianexpress.com/news/sedition-chargeagainst-digvijay-over-remark-against-ramdev/799912 (Last visited on March 15, 2014).

166

NDTV, Outrage over Sedition Charges against Students who cheered Pakistan,
March 6,

167

2014, available at http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/outrage-over-seditioncharges-against-students-who-cheered-pakistan-492250 (Last visited on March 6,

2014).

168

India Today, Kashmir University lecturer released, January 2, 2011, available at

http://in-diatoday.intoday.in/story/kashmir-university-lecturer-released/1/125303.html
(Last visited on March 15, 2014).

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2014

The Modern Offence of Sedition

cartoons that allegedly incite violence 166 and making a speech at a conference
highlighting the various atrocities committed by the armed forces. 167
An analysis of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kedar Nath
itself demonstrates certain deficiencies in how the law is currently understood.

There has been a shift in how we understand security of the state as a ground
for limiting the freedom of speech and expression. Further, a change in the
nature of the government and the susceptibility of the common people to be
incited to violence by an inflammatory speech has also reduced
considerably. Even the maintenance of public order cannot be used as
a ground to justify these laws as it is intended to address local law and order
issues rather than ac-tions affecting the very basis of the State itself.
Drawing inspiration from the repeal of the law of sedition in
England, it may also be argued that the law of sedition is now obsolete.
Various other statutes govern the maintenance of public order and may be
invoked to ensure public peace and tranquillity. In light of the above observations,
it is time that the Indian legislature and judiciary reconsider the existence of
provisions related to sedition in the statute books. These provisions remain
as vestiges of colonial oppression and may prove to undermine the rights of the
citizens to dissent, protest against or criticise the government in a democracy.

166

India Today, Anti-corruption cartoonist Aseem Trivedi arrested on sedition

charges,
September 9, 2012, available at http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/anti-corruption- cartoonistaseem-trivedi-arrested-on-sedition-charges/1/216643.html (Last visited on March 15, 2014).

167

Press Trust of India, Sedition case registered against Arundhati Roy, Geelani,
November 29,

168

2010, available at http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/sedition-case-registered-againstarund-hati-roy-geelani-69431 (Last visited on March 15, 2014).

April - June,
2014