FGU Insurance Corp. v.

CA
Facts:
On April 21, 1987, a car owned by private respondent FILCAR Transport Inc.,
rented to and driven by Dahl-Jensen, a Danish tourist, swerved into the right
and hit the car owned by Lydia Soriano and driven by Benjamin Jacildone.
Dahl-Jensen did not possess a Philippine drivers license. Petitioner, as the
insurer of Sorianos car, paid the latter P25,382.20 and, by way of
subrogation, sued FILCAR, Dahl-Jensen, and Fortune Insurance Corporation,
FILCARs insurer, for quasi-delict. The trial court dismissed the petition for
failure to substantiate the claim for subrogation. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision, but on the ground that only Dahl-Jensens negligence
was proven, not that of FILCAR. Hence, this instant petition.
Issues:
(1) Whether an action based on quasi-delict will prosper against a rent-a-car
company and, consequently, its insurer for fault or negligence of the car lessee
in driving the rented vehicle
(2) Whether the ruling in MYC-Agro-Industrial Corporation v. Vda. de Caldo
is applicable in the case at bar
Held:
(1) We find no reversible error committed by respondent court in upholding
the dismissal of petitioner's complaint. The pertinent provision is Art. 2176 of
the Civil Code which states: "Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict . . . . ". To sustain a claim based
thereon, the following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by the
plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and, (c) connection of cause
and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage
incurred by the plaintiff. We agree with respondent court that petitioner failed
to prove the existence of the second requisite, i.e., fault or negligence of
defendant FILCAR, because only the fault or negligence of Dahl-Jensen was
sufficiently established, not that of FILCAR. It should be noted that the
damage caused on the vehicle of Soriano was brought about by the
circumstance that Dahl-Jensen swerved to the right while the vehicle that he
was driving was at the center lane. It is plain that the negligence was solely

attributable to Dahl-Jensen thus making the damage suffered by the other

vehicle his personal liability. Respondent FILCAR did not have any
participation therein. Respondent FILCAR being engaged in a rent-a-car
business was only the owner of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen. As such, there
was no vinculum juris between them as employer and employee. Respondent
FILCAR cannot in any way be responsible for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen,
the former not being an employer of the latter.
(2) Petitioner's insistence on MYC-Agro-Industrial Corporation is rooted in a
misapprehension of our ruling therein. In that case, the negligent and reckless
operation of the truck owned by petitioner corporation caused injuries to
several persons and damage to property. Intending to exculpate itself from
liability, the corporation raised the defense that at the time of the collision it
had no more control over the vehicle as it was leased to another; and, that the
driver was not its employee but of the lessee. The trial court was not
persuaded as it found that the true nature of the alleged lease contract was
nothing more than a disguise effected by the corporation to relieve itself of the
burdens and responsibilities of an employer. We upheld this finding and
affirmed the declaration of joint and several liability of the corporation with its
driver.

Cruz v. CA
Dr. Ninevetch Cruz v. CA and Lydia Umali
1997 / Francisco / Petition for review on certiorari of a CA decision
Standard of conduct > Experts > Medical professionals

FACTS
Medical malpractice suit type of claim which a victim has available to him/her to redress a wrong
committed by a medical professional which has caused bodily harm; most often brought as a civil
action for damages under NCC 2176 or a criminal case under RPC 365, with which a civil action
for damages is impliedly instituted.
Lydia Umali was examined by Dr. Cruz who found a myoma [benign tumor] in her uterus, and
scheduled her for a hysterectomy operation [removal of uterus] on 23 Mar 1991. Rowena Umali de
Ocampo accompanied her mother to the hospital a day before the operation, and they spent the night
there. Rowena noticed that the clinic was untidy, so she tried to persuade her mother not to proceed
with the operation. The following day, Rowena asked Dr. Cruz if the operation could be postponed, but
Lydia told her daughter that Dr. Cruz said that the operation must go on as scheduled.

While Lydias relatives were waiting, Dr. Ercillo (anesthesiologist) told them to buy tagamet
ampules, and Rowenas sister went out to buy some. An hour later, Dr. Ercillo asked them to
buy blood for Lydia, so they did. A few hours later, the operation was finished, but later, Dr. Cruz
asked the family to buy additional blood, but there was no more type A blood available in the blood
bank. A person arrived to donate blood which was later transfused to Lydia. Rowena noticed that
her mother was gasping for breathapparently, the oxygen supply had run out, so the family
went out to buy oxygen. Later in the evening, she went into shock and her blood pressure dropped.
She was then transferred to another hospital so she could be connected to a respirator and further
examined. However, this transfer was without the consent of the relatives, who only found
out about it when an ambulance came to take Lydia to the other hospital.
In the new hospital, she was re-operated upon by Dr. Cruz and Dr. Ercillo because blood was
oozing out from her incision. They summoned Dr. Angeles, Ob-Gyne head of the new hospital, but
when he arrived, Lydia was already in shock and possibly dead (BP: 0/0). Dr. Angeles told Drs. Cruz
and Ercillo that there was nothing he could do. Lydia died while Dr. Cruz was closing her abdominal
wall. Immediate cause of death is shock; disseminated intravascular coagulation (DIC) as
antecedent cause.
Dr. Cruz and Dr. Ercillo were charged with reckless imprudence and negligence resulting
in homicide of Lydia Umali. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) found Dr. Ercillo not guilty
for insufficiency of evidence against her, but held Dr. Cruz responsible for Umalis death. RTC and
CA affirmed MTCC.
Manifestation of negligence

untidiness of clinic
lack of provision of supplies
the fact that the transfer was needed meant that there was something wrong in the way Dr.
Cruz conducted operation

no showing that pre-surgery procedure (clearance, blood typing/tests) was conducted

ISSUE AND HOLDING
WON the circumstances are sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction against Dr. Cruz for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide. NO. DR. CRUZ IS ACQUITTED, BUT SHE IS STILL CIVILLY
LIABLE (50K civil liability; 100k moral damages, 50k exemplary damages).
RATIO
Elements of reckless imprudence
1.

Offender does / fails to do an act

2.

Doing / failure to do act is voluntary

3.

Without malice

4.

Material damage results from reckless imprudence

5.

There is inexcusable lack of precaution, taking into consideration offenders employment, degree of
intelligence, physical condition, other circumstances re: persons, time, place
Standard of care
Standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing under similar
circumstances, bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the
present state of medical science

When the physicians qualifications are admitted, there is an inevitable presumption that in
proper cases, he takes the necessary precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in
attending to his clients, unless the contrary is sufficiently established by expert testimony.
Expert testimony
Expert testimony is essential to establish standard of care of the profession, as well as that
the physicians conduct in the treatment and care falls below such standard. It is also usually
necessary to support the conclusion as to causation. There is an absence of any expert testimony
re: standard of care in the case records. NBI doctors presented by the prosecution only testified as
to the possible cause of death.
While it may be true that the circumstances pointed out by the lower courts constitute
reckless imprudence, this conclusion is still best arrived not through the educated
surmises nor conjectures of laymen, including judges, but by the unquestionable
knowledge of expert witnesses. The deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified
physicians stems from the realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen
are incapable of intelligently evaluating.
Burden of establishing medical negligence on plaintif
Plaintiff has the burden to establish this, and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be
proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon, as well as a causal connection of such breach and
the resulting death of patient. Negligence cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate
cause of the injury complained of (Chan Lugay v. St. Lukes Hospital, Inc.). In this case, no cogent proof
exists that the circumstances caused Lydias death, so the 4th element of reckless imprudence is
missing.
The testimonies of the doctors presented by the prosecution establish hemorrhage /
hemorrhagic shock as the cause of death, which may be caused by several different
factors. Autopsy did not reveal any untied cut blood vessel, nor was there a tie of a cut blood vessel
that became loose. The findings of the doctors do not preclude the probability that a clotting
defect (DIC) caused the hemorrhage and consequently, Lydias death.
The Court has no recourse but to rely on the expert testimonies that substantiate Dr. Cruz allegation
that the cause of Lydias death was DIC, which cannot be attributed to Dr. Cruz fault or negligence.
This probability was unrebutted during trial.

Saludaga vs FEU (Civil Law)

G.R. No. 179337

April 30, 2008

JOSEPH SALUDAGA vs. FEU and EDILBERTO C. DE

JESUS (President of FEU)
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore
law student of (FEU) when he was shot by
Alejandro Rosete, one of the security
guards on duty at the school premises on
August 18, 1996. Petitioner was rushed to
FEU Hospital due to the wound he
sustained. Meanwhile, Rosete was brought to
the police station where he explained that
the shooting was accidental. He was
eventually released considering that no
formal complaint was filed against him.
Saludaga thereafter filed with RTC Manila
a complaint for damages against
respondents on the ground that they
breached their obligation to provide
students with a safe and secure environment
and an atmosphere conducive to learning.
Respondents, in turn, filed a Third-Party
Complaint against Galaxy Dvpt and Mgt Corp.
(Galaxy), the agency contracted by FEU to
provide security services within its
premises and Mariano D. Imperial
(Imperial), Galaxy's President, to

indemnify them for whatever would be

adjudged in favor of petitioner, if any;
and to pay attorney's fees and cost of the
suit. On the other hand, Galaxy and
Imperial filed a Fourth-Party Complaint
against AFP General Insurance.
On Nov.10, 2004, the trial court ruled in
favor of Saludaga, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, from the foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered ordering:
1. FEU and Edilberto de Jesus, in his
capacity as president of FEU to pay jointly
and severally Joseph Saludaga the amount of
P35,298.25 for actual damages with 12%
interest per annum from the filing of the
complaint until fully paid; moral damages
xxx, exemplary damages xx, attorney's fees
xx and cost of the suit;
2. Galaxy Corp. and its president, Col.
Mariano Imperial to indemnify jointly and
severally 3rd party plaintiffs (FEU and
Edilberto de Jesus in his capacity as
President of FEU) for the above-mentioned
amounts;

3. And the 4th party complaint is dismissed

for lack of cause of action. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Respondents appealed to the CA which ruled
in its favor, reversing the RTC decision,
dismissing the complaint, and also denying
Saludagas subsequent MR. Hence, the
instant petition based on the following
grounds:
THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED....IN RULING THAT:
5.1. THE SHOOTING INCIDENT IS A FORTUITOUS
EVENT;
5.2. RESPONDENTS ARE NOT LIABLE FOR DAMAGES
FOR THE INJURY RESULTING FROM A GUNSHOT
WOUND SUFFERED BY THE PETITIONER.....IN
VIOLATION OF THEIR....CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION TO PETITIONER.......TO PROVIDE
HIM WITH A SAFE AND SECURE EDUCATIONAL
ENVIRONMENT;
5.3. ALEJANDRO ROSETE....IS NOT FEUS
EMPLOYEE.....; and
5.4. RESPONDENT EXERCISED DUE DILIGENCE IN
SELECTING GALAXY AS THE AGENCY WHICH WOULD

PROVIDE SECURITY SERVICES WITHIN THE

PREMISES OF RESPONDENT FEU.
ISSUES:
WON Saludaga may claim damages from FEU for
breach of student-school contract for a
safe learning environment
Whether FEUs liability is based on quasidelict or on contract
From what source of obligation did the other
claims arose?
HELD:
1) Yes.
2) FEUs liability is based on contract, not
quasi-delict.
3) Quasi-delict vicarious liability between
Galaxy Agency and security guard Rosete
Quasi-delict but SC held that there is no
vicarious liability between FEU and Rosete
Quasi-delict damage to FEU due to the
negligence of Galaxy Agency in supplying
FEU with an unqualified guard (Imperial,

the president of Galaxy is solidarily

liable with the agency)
It is undisputed that Saludaga was enrolled
as a sophomore law student in FEU. As such,
there was created a contractual obligation
between the two parties. On Saludaga's
part, he was obliged to comply with the
rules and regulations of the school. On the
other hand, FEU, as a learning institution
is mandated to impart knowledge and equip
its students with the necessary skills to
pursue higher education or a profession. At
the same time, it is obliged to ensure and
take adequate steps to maintain peace and
order within the campus.
It is settled that in culpa contractual,
the mere proof of the existence of the
contract and the failure of its compliance
justify, prima facie, a corresponding right
of relief. In the instant case when
Saludaga was shot inside the campus by no
less the security guard who was hired to
maintain peace and secure the premises,
there is a prima facie showing that FEU
failed to comply with its obligation to
provide a safe and secure environment to
its students.

In order to avoid liability, however, FEU

alleged that the shooting incident was a
fortuitous event because they could not
have reasonably foreseen nor avoided the
accident caused by Rosete as he was not
their employee; and that they complied with
their obligation to ensure a safe learning
environment for their students by having
exercised due diligence in selecting the
security services of Galaxy.
After a thorough review of the records, the
SC found that FEU failed to discharge the
burden of proving that they exercised due
diligence in providing a safe learning
environment for their students. They failed
to prove that they ensured that the guards
assigned in the campus met the requirements
stipulated in the Security Service
Agreement. Certain documents about Galaxy
were presented during trial; however, no
evidence as to the qualifications of Rosete
as a security guard for the university was
offered. FEU also failed to show that they
undertook steps to ascertain and confirm
that the security guards assigned to them
actually possess the qualifications
required in the Security Service
Agreement.

Consequently, FEU's defense of force

majeure must fail. In order for force
majeure to be considered, FEU must show
that no negligence or misconduct was
committed that may have occasioned the
loss. An act of God cannot be invoked to
protect a person who has failed to take
steps to forestall the possible adverse
consequences of such a loss. When the
effect is found to be partly the result of
a person's participation - whether by
active intervention, neglect or failure to
act - the whole occurrence is humanized and
removed from the rules applicable to acts
of God.
Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides
that those who are negligent in the
performance of their obligations are liable
for damages. Accordingly, for breach of
contract due to negligence in providing a
safe learning environment, respondent FEU
is liable to petitioner for damages.
We note that the trial court held
respondent De Jesus solidarily liable with
respondent FEU. In Powton Conglomerate,
Inc. v. Agcolicol, we held that:

... Personal liability of a corporate

director, trustee or officer along
(although not necessarily) with the
corporation may so validly attach, as a
rule, only when - (1) he assents to a
patently unlawful act of the corporation,
or when he is guilty of bad faith or gross
negligence in directing its affairs, or
when there is a conflict of interest
resulting in damages to the corporation,
its stockholders or other persons; (2) he
consents to the issuance of watered down
stocks or who, having knowledge thereof,
does not forthwith file with the corporate
secretary his written objection thereto;
(3) he agrees to hold himself personally
and solidarily liable with the corporation;
or (4) he is made by a specific provision
of law personally answerable for his
corporate action.
None of the foregoing exceptions was
established in the instant case; hence,
respondent De Jesus should not be held
solidarily liable with respondent FEU.

Incidentally, although the main cause of

action in the instant case is the breach of
the school-student contract, petitioner, in
the alternative, also holds respondents
vicariously liable under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code. However, respondents cannot
be held liable for damages under Art. 2180
of the Civil Code because respondents are
not the employers of Rosete. The latter was
employed by Galaxy. The instructions issued
by respondents' Security Consultant to
Galaxy and its security guards are
ordinarily no more than requests commonly
envisaged in the contract for services
entered into by a principal and a security
agency.
As to the Third Party Claim against Galaxy,
evidence duly supports that Galaxy is
negligent not only in the selection of its
employees but also in their supervision.
Indeed, no administrative sanction was
imposed against Rosete despite the shooting
incident; moreover, he was even allowed to
go on leave of absence which led eventually
to his disappearance. Galaxy also failed to
monitor petitioner's condition or extend

the necessary assistance. For these acts of

negligence and for having supplied
respondent FEU with an unqualified security
guard, which resulted to the latter's
breach of obligation to petitioner, it is
proper to hold Galaxy liable to respondent
FEU for such damages equivalent to the
above-mentioned amounts awarded to
petitioner.

Unlike respondent De Jesus, we deem

Imperial to be solidarily liable with
Galaxy for being grossly negligent in
directing the affairs of the security
agency. It was Imperial who assured
petitioner that his medical expenses will
be shouldered by Galaxy but said
representations were not fulfilled.

Viloria vs Continental airlines

n 1997, while the spouses Viloria were in the United States, they approached Holiday

Travel, a travel agency working for Continental Airlines, to purchase tickets from Newark to
San Diego. The travel agent, Margaret Mager, advised the couple that they cannot travel by
train because it was already fully booked; that they must purchase plane tickets for
Continental Airlines; that if they wont purchase plane tickets; theyll never reach their

destination in time. The couple believed Magers representations and so they purchased
two plane tickets worth $800.00.
Later however, the spouses found out that the train trip wasnt really fully booked and so
they purchased train tickets and went to their destination by train instead. Then they called
up Mager to request for a refund for the plane tickets. Mager referred the couple to
Continental Airlines. As the couple were now in the Philippines, they filed their request with
Continental Airlines office in Ayala. The spouses Viloria alleged that Mager misled them into
believing that the only way to travel was by plane and so they were fooled into buying
expensive plane tickets.
Continental Airlines refused to refund the amount of the tickets and so the spouses sued the
airline company. In its defense, Continental Airlines claimed that the tickets sold to them by
Mager were non-refundable; that, if any, they were not bound by the misrepresentations of
Mager because theres no contract of agency existing between Continental Airlines and
Mager.
The trial court ruled in favor of spouses Viloria but the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling
of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not a contract of agency exists between Continental Airlines and Mager.
HELD: Yes. All the elements of agency are present, to wit:
1.

there is consent, express or implied of the parties to establish the

relationship;

2.

the object is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person;

3.

the agent acts as a representative and not for himself, and

4.

the agent acts within the scope of his authority.

The first and second elements are present as Continental Airlines does not deny that it
concluded an agreement with Holiday Travel to which Mager is part of, whereby Holiday
Travel would enter into contracts of carriage with third persons on the airlines behalf. The
third element is also present as it is undisputed that Holiday Travel merely acted in a
representative capacity and it is Continental Airlines and not Holiday Travel who is bound by
the contracts of carriage entered into by Holiday Travel on its behalf. The fourth element is
also present considering that Continental Airlines has not made any allegation that Holiday
Travel exceeded the authority that was granted to it.
Continental Airlines also never questioned the validity of the transaction between Mager and
the spouses. Continental Airlines is therefore in estoppel. Continental Airlines cannot be
allowed to take an altogether different position and deny that Holiday Travel is its agent
without condoning or giving imprimatur to whatever damage or prejudice that may result
from such denial or retraction to Spouses Viloria, who relied on good faith on Continental
Airlines acts in recognition of Holiday Travels authority. Estoppel is primarily based on the
doctrine of good faith and the avoidance of harm that will befall an innocent party due to its
injurious reliance, the failure to apply it in this case would result in gross travesty of justice.