FAO JOURNAL

VOLUME XII, NUMBER 1

WarriorDiplomats: The Role of the

Marine Attach
Insurgency and the Role of the 21st
Century FAO
The Other End of the Red Sea, or Has
Anyone Considered a Base in Puntland?

March 2008

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FAO JOURNAL
A Professional Journal for
Regional Specialists
March 2008

VOLUME XII, NO. 1

ISSN 1551-8094

INSIDE THIS ISSUE

ARTICLES
WarriorDiplomats: The Role of the Marine
Attach
LtCol R.E. Lucius, USMC

pg 4

Insurgency and the Role of the 21st Century FAO:

An Introductory Study Guide
Rod Propst
pg 9
The Other End of the Red Sea, or Has Anyone
Considered a Base in Puntland?
LTC Robert K. Holzhauer, USA
pg 27

WEB SITE: The Association Web Site is at

www.faoa.org.
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to secretary@faoa.org.

FAO Journal Editor

LTC Steve Gotowicki
US Army (Retired)
editor@faoa.org
and
LCDR Michael Beidler,
USN

FEATURES
Letter from the President
Service Proponent Notes
Army
USMC

pg 3
pg 29
pg 30

Page 3

FAO Journal

Letter from the President . . .

us to share our professional experiences and
knowledge of different
Let me address two issues with you:
regions of the world. It is
FAOA Policy Lunches and FAOA membership. On the first issue, over the past also a perfect way for
two years we have had a series of Policy FAOs to get published.
Since the FAO Journal is
Lunches in the McNair Room at the Ft.
McNair Officers Club where the turn-out a registered professional periodical, you
has been terrific. In fact, your outstanding are considered a published author if your
support for these Policy Lunches often ex- article is approved for the journal.
ceeded the capacity of the room, which
made the venue crowded or, even worse, Lastly, my thanks to BGen Dick Lake, Dileft some of you unable to get a seat at all. rector of Intelligence, Headquarters, U.S.
Marine Corps, for his compelling and
enlightening remarks concerning the imStarting with our most recent Policy
portance of FAOs in todays security enviLuncheon on 3 April 2008, we have
moved our events upstairs to the Ballroom ronment, which he presented at our April
where there is adequate seating for every- 2008 Policy Luncheon.
one attending. I would ask, however, that
when you RSVP you consider that as an Best regards,
obligation to pay for the lunch, whether
you attend or not. Your FAOA is charged Steve Norton
by the number of meals we order and if
there are no shows we are still obligated
to pay for them.
Dear FAO Colleagues,

Secondly, it is important to the future of

your FAOA to increase the membership of
active duty, reserve, and retired FAOs.
Recently, your Board of Governors approved a life membership category for a
one-time fee of $250.00. This brings you
four membership options: 1 year - $25; 2
years - $38; 3 years - $46; and life - $250.
Membership includes a subscription to the
FAO Journal. The journal is the place for

Page 4

FAO Journal

Warrior Diplomats: The Role of the Marine Attach

LtCol R.E. Lucius, USMC
MARA/ALUSNA USDAO Hanoi
By Intelligence we mean every sort of information about the enemy and his country
the basis, in short, of our plans and operations.
Carl von Clausewitz,
Vom Kriege (On War)
So it is said that if you know your enemies
and know yourself, you will win a hundred
times in a hundred battles. If you only know
yourself, but not your opponent, you win one
and lose the next. If you do not know yourself
or your enemy, you will always lose.
Sun Tzu,
(The Art of War)
Serving as a military attach, I am often
asked in the sincerest of ways if Ive ever felt
conflicted by the fact that many of my Foreign
Area Officer (FAO) peers are currently on the
ground in Iraq and Afghanistan fighting a determined enemy while I make the rounds on the
alcohol, cholesterol, and protocol circuit fighting
little more than an expanding waistline. It is a
fair question based on a widely embraced
(though not entirely accurate) stereotype of attach duty, and it deserves more than a dismissive
reply. Consequently, this article is intended to
contribute to a better understanding about precisely what it is that a Marine Attach (MARA)
does and how that mission contributes to the
Marine Corps overall warfighting effectiveness.
Functionally speaking, military attachs
have been around for at least two thousand
years, though the appellation itself is of a more
recent vintage. The embedding of military specialists within diplomatic missions for the expressed purpose of ascertaining the military
strength and intent of foreign armies is perhaps
as old as the art of war itself. Scipio Africanus,
the victor over Hannibal in the Second Punic

War, reportedly embedded military officers

among his ambassadors to the court of Numidia,
charging them with determining the strength and
disposition of King Syphaxs army. Military liaison agents were also occasionally employed for
similar ends up through the Age of Enlightenment, but it was not until the early 19th century
that officers were assigned to diplomatic missions with some regularity.
While the posting of military officers
alongside their civilian counterparts was initially
resisted by many in diplomatic circles, the increasing complexity of warfare in the 18th century
ultimately necessitated this innovation. No
longer could nations depend solely on their civilian diplomats to report on such specialized matters as military organization, doctrine, and armaments; experts were now needed for investigating such matters. Napoleon Bonaparte is credited widely with making routine the use of military observers abroad, begun tentatively in 1806
with the appointment of a French Army Captain
as Second Secretary of the French Embassy in
Vienna. This officer was charged with keeping
strict account of the strength of the Austrian regiments and their location . . . so that no battalion
is moved without it being known to him. Prussia, Austria, and Russia soon followed suit; by
the 1830s, such exchanges had become a fairly
common occurrence throughout Europe. The
term military attach, however, did not come
into common use until around the mid-1800s,
when Great Britain began sending its own officers abroad.
The American Congress did not begin authorizing the appointment of military and naval
attachs to American Legations overseas until
September 1888, although a number of US Naval Officers had already been serving in that ca-

Page 5
pacity since the early 1880s. The first US Naval
Attach, Lieutenant Commander French
Chadwick, was posted to London in 1882; the
second, a young Ensign by the name of George
Foulk, was shipped off to Seoul in 1883. By the
mid-1890s, the United States had ten military attachs abroad in Berlin, St. Petersburg, Paris,
London, Vienna, Rome, Brussels, Madrid, Tokyo,
and Mexico City. Following the SpanishAmerican War, the United States sent additional
military attachs to various capitals throughout
Latin America and the Caribbean, including the
first American military attach of African descent,
Captain Charles Young, who took up residence in
Haiti, and later served as military attach to the
Republic of Liberia.
The first Marine Corps officers called to
such duty usually filled naval attach billets, or
what is more appropriately referred to as an
American Legation US Naval Attach (ALUSNA).
Major Henry Leonard, who saved the life of First
Lieutenant Smedley Butler and lost an arm for his
troubles at the Battle of Tientsin, served as the
first Marine Corps ALUSNA from 1905-1907.
Three years later, he was followed by Captain
Thomas Holcomb, Jr., who later went on to become the 17th Commandant of the Marine Corps
(1936-1943). Within a decade, Marine Corps Officers were also serving as ALUSNAs in London,
Paris, and Tokyo.
By the outbreak of World War I, there were
about 350 military and naval attachs worldwide,
31 of which were from the United States (23 military and eight naval); by the start of World War II,
however, that number had nearly doubled.
These included Major Florence C. Jepson of the
Womens Army Corps (WAC), who, in 1944, became the first female military attach ever sent
abroad. At one point, the United States had over
258 Army and Air Force Officers assigned to duty
in 59 countries and another 160 Naval Officers
posted as attachs in 43 countries; yet, by the
early 1950s, that number had been cut by a third,

FAO Journal
and for about the next fifteen years it remained
relatively stable.
Up until December 1964, each service had
been responsible generally for managing its own
attach system, but with the promulgation of Department of Defense (DoD) Directive C5105.32,
the Secretary of Defense assumed authority for
the appointment of senior Defense Attachs
(DATT), who, in turn, were given oversight for
other US naval, military and air attachs assigned
to their respective Defense Attach Offices
(DAO) and Defense Liaison Offices (DLO). This
directive also led to the establishment of a centralized Defense Attach System (DAS) under the
management of the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA). Since then, attachs have been nominated by their respective services, but ultimately
approved, trained, and managed by DIA.
Today, there are 32 Marine Corps Attach
billets worldwide, five of which are also DATT positions, and eleven are concurrent ALUSNA billets. Tour length can range anywhere from 12-36
months depending on the assignment and
whether it is an accompanied billet. Current billets are roughly divided between O-5s and O-4s,
although most of the DATT jobs call for lieutenant
colonels. Identification of additional MARA billets
are in the works, with India, Afghanistan, and Iraq
as likely new posts.
The primary job of a modern military attach, and thus of MARAs as well, remains the observation and reporting of foreign military developments in the nation(s) to which he or she is accredited. This reporting typically includes gathering information about such obvious factors as a
host nations military institutions, manpower, doctrine and equipment, as well as its warfighting
proficiency and combat readiness. It also includes seeking out countless other qualitative
and quantitative data points concerning things
like military morale, the relationships among key

Page 6
leaders, attitudes towards other nations, domestic
and international policy constraints, economic
pressures affecting readiness, or anything else
that can lead us to a fuller understanding of the
host nations military capabilities. Almost anything can contribute towards completing this complex mosaic.
Like other members of the diplomatic community, military attachs are also accorded immunity protections provided by the 1961 Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Attachs
are not spies, however, and most of their efforts
are carried out overtly. Those who forget this
cardinal rule find themselves frequently and
quickly declared persona non grata (PNG) by the
host nation and returned to service. While the
truth is decidedly less glamorous and mysterious,
much of what a capable military attach learns is
gleaned from informal discussions in social gatherings or in face-to-face exchanges across a conference table. In most countries you will also find
a Military Attach Corps (MAC) that provides both
informal and formal opportunities for attachs to
get together to compare notes and to complain
invariably about their shared lack of access.
Fortunately, being selected for attach
duty nowadays is no longer dependent on the
size of ones personal bank account or any tenuous family claims to royalty as it was in the days
of Prussias Kaiser Wilhelm I. Instead, officers
interested in pursuing an attach assignment ideally should have had some experience as a Foreign Area Officer (FAO), a Regional Affairs Officer (RAO), or as an Olmsted Scholar. Additional
experience as a regional or country desk officer is
also helpful. While a candidate should have a
record that indicates both initiative and adaptability, he or she should also have demonstrated a
capacity to perform independent duty in unfamiliar and difficult environments. Moreover, because of the Johnny-on-the-spot nature of attach duty, a candidate should not only be able to
speak intelligently and in detail about the doctrine, organization, and policies of American naval services, he or she should also possess more

FAO Journal
than a passing understanding of the political, military, economic, and cultural characteristics of
both the United States and the host country.
Moreover, an advanced degree and a capacity
for language training is an enormous advantage
in a job where you can be put on the spot at any
time or place to discuss (sometimes in the local
language) the most varied of topics.
Once a candidate is selected for a particular post by the Marine Corps Director for Intelligence (DIRINT), he or she must be approved by
DIA. Only then will the officer be scheduled for
preparatory training, which can take up to two
years, and which is anchored around the 12week Joint Military Attach School (JMAS) at
Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, DC. This
course provides the basic administrative and
technical skills that attachs require to effectively
carry out their diverse duties, as well as a number
of more esoteric subjects, such as diplomatic etiquette, dressing for success, memory skills. and
the cultivation of the social skills necessary for
the assignment. For better or worse, attach life
is also full of temptations, some of which are
manufactured by the host government to compromise the attach and to embarrass the US Government. Consequently, both the Marine Corps
and DIA greatly prefer to select attachs that are
not only married, but who are in marriages that
can sustain the myriad stresses of attach life.
Attach duty is certainly one of those few billets
where your spouse plays a truly integral role in
your success, so much so that a separate, but
concurrent, attach spouse course is offered at
JMAS. It is strictly voluntary but absolutely worthy of a spouses time and effort.
After an officer graduates from JMAS, he
or she will then be directed to attend a number of
personal safety training courses. Successful
completion of these will be followed by a series of
briefings by country and regional specialists from
various US Government agencies. Language
training is also provided, if required, and take
from several months to more than eighteen

Page 7

FAO Journal

develop an accurate and objective understanding of the role that Vietnams military plays domestically and throughout the region. I also get
the occasional chance to lecture at local universities or to speak to delegations from important
social, political, and economic constituencies.
These invaluable opportunities to participate in
public diplomacy allow me to talk about the
United States and explain US policies. Many of
When I first arrived as a new MARA in
my evenings are set aside to attend any of dozHanoi, Vietnam, I was a bit surprised to learn
ens of receptions marking important host nation
that the traditional attach duties of observing
events or those of other countries represented in
and reporting for which I had been trained acthe diplomatic corps. Military attachs attend
counted for only a part of my portfolio. It turns
out that a great deal of my time has been spent these events in order to represent the US DoD
coordinating and implementing various aspects officially, and even though they soon become
tedious, they provide an informal (albeit imporof the US Theater Security Cooperation Plan
(TSCP) and carrying out the painstaking work of tant) occasion to trade professional gossip.
These events offer truly unique opportunities for
establishing and sustaining a complex spider
web of bilateral initiatives aimed at building trust, me to interact on a recurrent basis with some of
encouraging transparency, and fostering coop- the host countrys most senior military and civileration. These initiatives include not only host- ian leadership. Other than attach duty, there
nation participation in US DoD sponsored semi- are few other assignments where majors and
lieutenant colonels can routinely rub elbows with
nars and conferences, but also the hosting of
a nations leadership and work to influence the
subject matter expert exchanges (SMEE), the
scheduling of US Navy port calls, visits by dele- course of US foreign policy personally.
gations from military schools, and visits by senAs an attach you will find yourself ineviior US military leaders. Duty in a DAO also includes managing various elements of the secu- tably laboring under a relatively complex hierarrity assistance portfolio, such as overseeing For- chy of bosses, often with sometimes very different goals and priorities. As members of the Emeign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Fibassy Country Team, the DATT and other sernancing (FMF), Excess Defense Article (EDA)
vice attachs work directly for the Ambassador,
transfer programs, as well as any International
but since 1964 all military attachs have also
Military Education and Training (IMET) programs. It can also include overseeing Humani- fallen under the operational management of the
Director of DIA. As a MARA and ALUSNA, you
tarian Assistance (HA) and Humanitarian Civic
are also the personal representative of the ComAssistance (HCA) projects, and, in the case of
mandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) and the
DAO Hanoi, executing the US Department of
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), respectively.
State Humanitarian Demining Program, which
Further complicating the chain of command is
includes about $3 million annually in various
the fact that military attachs also answer to the
mine action programs. There is also the occasional natural disaster or other humanitarian cri- appropriate regional unified combatant commander. Additionally, the Office of the Secretary
sis to which the US military must respond.
of Defense (OSD) and the various major comAdditionally, I am called upon frequently mands (MACOM) both have a lot to say about
to provide briefings to visiting US congressmen, how you spend your time. With all of these
bosses clamoring for your attention, it isnt diffisenators, cabinet-level officials, as well as our
own military leadership so that they are able to
months. DIAs Patriots Memorial Wall provides
a sobering reminder that military attachs have
long been favored by terrorist groups looking for
a highly symbolic target, so the final step before
departing CONUS is to get fitted for your very
own bulletproof vest.

Page 8
cult to see how a small DAO can have a hard
time keeping up with all of the demands.

FAO Journal
well into the future, but its health also allows US
forces to focus their attention right now on more
pressing problems elsewhere. I am hopeful that,
by working to achieve US strategic objectives in
my little corner of the world, my peers fighting
elsewhere are more likely to get the resources
they need to carry the fight ever forward. Furthermore, when a former attach returns to the
operating forces, he or she does so with a
wealth of experiences and contacts, as well as a
range of skills that are truly unique among his or
her peers. In a world where culture is increasingly seen as warfighting enabler, the attach
can be a tremendous force multiplier for the
commander wise enough to exploit his or her
skills.

Sadly, it is true that military attachs are

better known generally for their widely publicized
failures, rather than for their often unreported
successes. Indeed, few likely recall that Count
Alfred Graf von Waldersee, von Moltkes successor as Chief of the Prussian General Staff, was
the military attach in Paris who quickly discerned the intent behind Frances mobilization
on 19 July 1870 and wired a timely warning to
the Kaiser in Berlin. Nor do many perhaps remember that it was while serving as the US military attach in Chile that famed Captain Andrew
S. Rowan, whose exploits were immortalized in
For an officer that is interested in blazing
Elbert Hubbards A Message to Garcia, had dehis or her own trail in an assignment that proveloped the contacts and language skills that
vides a lot of room for personal initiative and
would later serve him so well in his mission to
find General Calixto Garcia in the hills of Cuba. also unlimited opportunities to contribute in a
meaningful way towards achieving US strategic
Finally, no discussion of attach success objectives, the DAS may be what you are looking for. That being said, participation in the DAS
stories would be complete without mentioning
Captain C. R. Clark, USN, who, while serving as has rarely been considered the fast track to promotion and command. You will likely never be
the ALUSNA in Havana in early 1962, noted
suspicious port activity that indicated a rapid So- adequately recognized for the contributions you
make on behalf of US national interests, and
viet military buildup. His subsequent reports
most will never really appreciate the sophisticaspurred increased monitoring of Soviet-Cuban
tion of the type of work you performed in some
communications and led to the U-2 overflights
dark corner of the world. In some cases, those
which helped prove eventually the presence of
contributions may never even come to light. Yet,
Soviet Medium Range Ballistic Missiles
it is hard to overstate the sense of self(MRBMs) on Cuban soil. Examples such as
these serve merely to illustrate the strategic role satisfaction that you will inevitably feel when
your quiet and patient diplomacy helps persuade
that one attach on the ground can play in an
unfolding crisis. One need only look to the next a potential enemy to pursue a different course of
emerging crisis and you will likely find that a mili- action or when it helps strengthen the resolve of
a faltering friend, especially when precious
tary attach has already been working quietly
American blood and treasure are ultimately at
behind the scenes to establish and sustain US
military influence and facilitate follow-on US mili- stake.
tary involvement.
During my time as an attach in
Hanoi, I have been privileged to serve on the forward edge of US efforts to forge a strengthened
bilateral defense relationship with a strategically
important partner. This relationship has implications not only for maintaining regional stability

Page 9

FAO Journal

Insurgency & the Role of the 21st Century Foreign

Area Officer: An Introductory Study Guide
Rod Propst
As the 21st Century unfolds, the fog of
containment, a strategy which defined both our
political and military worlds for the second half of
the 20th century, has dissipated. In its place is a
world of greater uncertaintymilitarily, politically,
diplomatically, economicallywith no single
strategy other than [perhaps] Preemption having established a strategic foothold. For the foreign area officerour cutting edge politicomilitary warriorwhat has emerged in these
early years of the 21st Century is a focus on insurgency. Much has been made of lost lessons
-learned; in fact, the wheel was partially reinvented, but in fairness updated with a new century focus, with the publication of the Armys FM
3-24, Counterinsurgency, in December 2006.
This article seeks to place what we know, from
this centurys experience; what we knew before,
using some superior examples of insurgency literature every FAO should know; and how the
foreign area officer can apply that knowledge in
the many roles every FAO professional faces in
ones career.
Preparation of the foreign area officer is a
lifetimes undertaking. T.E. Lawrence, one of
historys great insurgent warriors, once asked
Basil Liddell Hart, If your new book could persuade some of our new soldiers to read and
mark and learn things outside drill manuals and
tactical diagrams, it would be a good work. Lawrence described himself as an example of the
necessaryI was not an instinctive soldier
When I took a decision, or adopted an alternative, it was after studying every relevantand
many irrelevantfactors. Geography, tribal
structure, religion, social customs, language, appetites, standardsall were at my fingertips.
The enemy I knew almost like my own side. I
risked myself among them [authors emphasis)
a hundred times to learn. This is the foreign

area officer corps at its heart; and the present

article seeks to assist the reader in taking one
small step forward in this endless endeavoran
understanding of insurgency for the 21st Century
FAO.
THE 21ST CENTURY FACE OF INSURGENCY
COUNTERINSURGENCY AND FM 3-24
Navigating the maze of insurgency analyses is as fraught with philosophical danger as
that faced by our warriors facing the physical

threat of improvised explosive devices and explosively formed projectiles used by rebels in our
current conflict with Iraqi insurgents. Instead of
an exploration of the myriad books available currently on insurgencies, the author believes it is
most worthwhile to discuss insurgency in terms
of current doctrineas stated in Field Manual 324, Counterinsurgency. The reason for this tack
is simpleit is our doctrine, it represents our
militarys current best thought on what insurgency and countering that threat should look
like, and it ensures that the reader gets at least a
summary view of our doctrinal framework.

Page 10
The initial chapter offers the requisite overview for the reader unfamiliar with this nontraditional form of warfare for regular army officer
study. In the second chapter, the linkage between politics, diplomacy, host nation actors, and
the martial aspect are all creatively linkeda linkage which the descriptions of the books which
follow establishes as essential to counterinsurgency operations.

FAO Journal
essential to counterinsurgency success. If the insurgent lives like the fish in the sea of the people
(Mao), then our task is to make that sea one
where we swim equally with the insurgent. The
enabler to do so is based on ethical, fair treatment of the population, who otherwise are driven
to the enemyas case study after case study not

Chapter 3 deals in some detail on intelligence in counterinsurgency operations. The element of information is absolutely critical to the
conduct and success of counterinsurgency operations. In particular, both Mao Zedong and
Frank Kitson repeatedly hammer the reader on
the importance of good information to counter the
efforts of the insurgent adversary.
Chapters 4 and 5 are planning chapters.
The former offers an overhead view of campaign
and large operations planning. The latter delves
more specifically into the execution of such a
plan. Key in the fifth chapter is the short section
on learning and adapting; the mere brevity of that
short entry should not be a signal to the reader to
offer that subject short shrift. The loss of Lessons
Learned is precisely what prompted the reengineering of the present manualas we
seemed to have momentarily misplaced the many
Lessons Learned that both our prior experience
and the body of work discussed herein provides.

only suggests but precisely describes.

Chapter 8 deals with the logistical considerations for counterinsurgency. As most staff college graduates attest, the study of logistics was
not their favorite element in the college; however,
all realize its importance. The value-added of understanding how to sustain a counterinsurgency
is equally important to the foreign area officer
reader on insurgencies.
The doctrinal volume ends with several appendices of significanceall worth review then careful
study and application as warfighter and as foreign
area officer pol-mil advisor. An understanding of
the legal considerations of counterinsurgency is
Chapter 6 is particularly relevant to the
st
modern, 21 Century reader. One of our greatest essential for the conduct of the ethical fight we
challenges is an exit strategy for separation from demand of ourselves as professionals (Appendix
an insurgency, thus allowing a host nation force D). The requirement for linguistic support of
to assume our role. In order to reach that goal,
course rings true to every foreign area officer; unthe development of solid host nation security
derstanding the importance of that capability and
forces is essential. This chapter describes that
how to make it so is the subject of Appendix C.
Appendix B offers an analytic approach for the
challenge and how to meet it.
application of METT-TC. Although it seems at
Although not specifically designed as a compan- first too difficult and burdensome, it is remarkably
ion chapter, Chapter 7 offers a logical extension straight-forward and easy to apply. A careful
of the previous chapter. Discussing leadership
study of this simple analytic tool is a must for the
and ethics is more than criticalit is absolutely

Page 11
foreign area officer student of insurgency.
The last Appendix discussed is intentionally out of order. Perhaps the most practical of
the several Appendices is Appendix A. It is similar to the famous 150 Questions for a Guerrilla,
the classic book by General Alberto Bayo, Castros long-time mentor. The Guide for Action
offers a hands-on, practical guide for the individual about to enter a counterinsurgency. Its sixty,
step-by-step guidelines walk even the greenest
participant through a process leading to greatest
individual effectiveness in a counterinsurgency
role. Its straight forward Plan, Prepare, Execute
format is accessible and easy to use.
The last section of FM 3-24 of immediate
use by the FAO reader is the list of references.
One will note that highlights of several of these
references are summarized in this paper. This is
a solid initial study list for the counterinsurgent
warrior of the 21st Century.
A one page overview of our militarys newest counterinsurgency doctrine barely suffices; a
more thorough review for understanding
coupled with extensive research and reading on
the subjectwill be requisite for the serious foreign area officer student of this subject.
Authors NOTE: The thorough reader, in conjunction with a careful study of the current doctrine,
may wish to consider reading the several versions of FM 31-20 (1951, 55, 65, 71, 90, & present) and FM 31-21 (1951, 58, 61, 69, and present) to measure the development of doctrinal
understanding and development of insurgency,
guerrilla, and revolutionary warfare that these two
central doctrinal volumes capture. Also note the
Armys definition of guerrilla parallels the current
definition for insurgent.

FAO Journal
INSURGENCYLEARNING FROM THE PAST:
NINE ESSENTIAL FAO READS
For the modern foreign area officer, study
is continuous. The FAO must always proceed
with caution. Regional expertise is essentialit
is at the heart of the foreign area officers valueadded to the military. However, regional expertise
must be combined with a broader perspective on
the warfighting art. The challenge is formidable;
the rewards great. The challenge for the FAO is
not to become a Pacific Ocean wading pool
very broad, but too shallow to be worth much;
given the reality of time constraints, vaulting that
obstacle represents a continuing test. From the
wealth of insurgency and counterinsurgency literature, the author has chosen to pick some essential highlights from nine indispensable, classic
studies. This article can barely do justice to
these complex works; but perhaps by at least
identifying these to the reader, guided study
providing the greater depth of knowledge we
seekwill result. From theoretical works
Robert Tabers WAR OF THE FLEA: THE CLASSIC
STUDY OF GUERRILLA WARFARE; Bard E. ONeills
INSURGENCY AND TERRORISM: FROM REVOLUTION
TO APOCALYPSE; Mao Zedongs ON GUERRILLA
WARFAREto case studies such as Alistair
Hornes A SAVAGE WAR OF PEACE (Algeria); T.E.
Lawrences SEVEN PILLARS OF WISDOM (Arabia);
Robert Aspreys WAR IN THE SHADOWS: THE
GUERRILLA IN HISTORY; the Special Operations
Research Offices CASEBOOK ON INSURGENCY AND
REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE: 23 SUMMARY ACCOUNTSto how-to books such as Frank
Kitsons LOW INTENSITY OPERATIONS: SUBVERSION, INSURGENCY, AND PEACEKEEPING; and the
United States Marine Corps SMALL WARS MANUALwe shall identify essential, common
threads.

This snapshot sought to provide a simplistic [space-constrained] overview of this important

WAR OF THE FLEA
new manual. Equally of value is a study of some
of the classics from the wealth of insurgency and
Robert Tabers WAR OF THE FLEA: THE
counterinsurgency literature. That is the subject CLASSIC STUDY OF GUERRILLA WARFARE reof the next portion of this brief overview study.
mainsdespite its publication date in 1965

Page 12
relevant and largely current. While its concluding
chapters concerning a roadmap for the conflict in
Vietnam are of less interest today than when written, its introductory description of the nuts and
bolts of insurgency offers the student new to the
subject plenty of initial meat on which to chew.
Prior to the introduction of that foundational material, it is useful to understand the meaning of the
title the author selected.

FAO Journal
veloped through judicious use of spacethe insurgent creates a growing political will in the people for support. The insurgent militates the population. He creates the will to revolt. In this
sense the insurgent flea is a political partisan

they are woers as well as doers. At all times

the insurgent gains a foothold, often fighting a
military and political enemy whose goals are so
disparate as to cause failure before the war even
develops.

The analogy insurgent as a flea is particularly apt and sets the stage for much that follows.
The flea survives because he trades time for
space, and uses that to multiply and create a larger communitya community which ultimately
simply wears the host down. Insurgencies seek
to recreate this ambience. A small core group (as
few as eighteen men, such as Castros initial insurgents) enters a country. At first they are a minor itch; over time, they grow. The host government tries to scratch at them, but the insurgent
uses the space available to engage at selected
times and places; the flea is analogous to Maos
fish in the sea. Next, again over timetime de-

Taber uses several case studiesalbeit

not in the depth that some of our other key
sources describeto further his description of
insurgent warfare. Of course, Taber quotes Mao,
as the fish in the sea metaphor earlier indicated.
He also provides short lists from Sun Tzu, upon
whom Mao based many of his martial, insurgent
ideas. He then shows how select insurgencies
the Irish in the six Northern Counties, the EOKA
in Cyprus are among these excellent overviews
applied these fundamentals. And he uses these
to reveal a common themedespite the impressive technological innovation of the 20th Century,
the principles of warfare are not modern, but ancient. He reveals General Giaps methods in
Vietnam, dynamism, initiative, mobility, and
rapidity of decision in the face of new situations.
He uses General Grivasthe Cypriot insurgencys leaderas a link showing how the judicious use of focused terrorism serves the insurgent well. He describes a plague of dragons
teeth, sown in confusion, nourished in the soil of

Page 13
social dissention, economic disruption, and political chaos, causing armed fanatics to spring up
wherever peaceful peasants toiled.

Taber then moves on to why it remains so

difficult for a larger power and its military to defeat an insurgency, He states, the Army fights to
control territory, roads, strategic heights, vital areas; the guerrilla fights to control people, without
whose cooperation the land is useless to its possessor. The government and its military must
control their land, its resources. In contrast, for
the guerrilla, territory is nothing, attrition is everything. The insurgent succeeds because his goal
is achievable; the opposing government often
fails because it is fighting a different war, whose
ends are often immaterial to the enemy it faces.
Thus, the government is vulnerable, and must
maintain that appearance of normalcy to succeed. Where it is unable to do so, an insurgency
has a marked advantage. And where the protracted war which is a central strength of insurgencies continues, the government is at everincreasing risk. Tabers own words are of best
use here, and tell a cautionary tale to those who
must execute counterinsurgencies in the 21st
Century:
Modern governments are highly conscious of what journalism calls world opinionlarger community of interests
appearance of stabilityprotracted internal
war threatens all of this
Insurgency was successful simply because terror, sabotage, and constant disorder
[make the situation] too unprofitable and politically embarrassingto remain.
Rebellious colony through terrorism and
guerrilla warfare, becomes (1) too great a political embarrassment to be sustained domestically or on the world stage, and (2) unprofitable, too expensive, or no longer prestigious.
Local military success will serve no purpose if the guerrilla campaign does not also
weaken the morale of the government and its
soldiers, strain the financial resources of the

FAO Journal
regime, and increase political pressure on it
by creating widespread apprehension and dissatisfaction with a war in which there is no
progressand no end in sight.
Thus, in summary, It has given freely of
its brains, its blood, and its lives. All has been
to no avail. The worlds mightiest nation has
been unable to find the key to success.
Of course, the reader clearly sees the applicability of these cautions and challenges in our present world.
The insurgent flea survives by hopping
and hiding; he prevails because he multiplies
faster than he can be caught and exterminated.
He does this by trading time for space in order to
buy the ability to create a climate of change in the
people. Thisalong with the two simultaneous
yet disparate wars of the insurgent and the controlling government and militaryform the heart
of Tabers initial study of insurgency, ONeills
book builds upon this introductory description
with another theoretical work.
INSURGENCY & TERRORISM: FROM REVOLUTION TO
APOCALYPSE
A second theoretical work also proves of
value to the foreign area officer studying insurgency literature. INSURGENCY & TERRORISM:
FROM REVOLUTION TO APOCALYPSE by Bard E.
ONeill actually offers a theoretical framework for
the analysis of insurgenciesby students, warfighters, and other analysts, all of which identify
the modern FAO. Written in 1990, it is even more
compelling as a tool for today than it was on publication. Before ONeill begins his description of
his analytic tool, he describes some of the challenges of the study of insurgencies. Among
these are ones the modern reader will recognize
as relevant todaychallenges of national integration and economic underdevelopment, the internationalization of insurgencies, the asymmetrical
nature of the conflict and renewed North American involvement (we may have missed the need
to colonize, but we have been less successful

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FAO Journal

He concludes his introduction with a brief

preview of the coming discussion of politics and
ONeills definition of insurgency is spot on. the forms of warfarewith an emphasis on terrorism. Before detailing the various forms of insurFor him it is a Struggle between a non-ruling
group and the ruling authorities in which the non- gent strategies, he describes six variables that
ruling group consciously uses political resources lead insurgents to pick a winning stratagem.
These are: environment, popular support, organiand violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain
zation, unity, external support, and the governthe basis of legitimacy of one or more areas of
politics. He then defines politics using three ele- ment response. These six factors form the basis
for ONeills analytic tool.
ments: the political system, the authorities, and
their policies.
Having defined the variables defining strategic approaches, ONeil then introduces the several strategies available to insurgents. These include: the conspiratorial strategy (the quick
strikelike the Bolsheviks of 1917), the protracted popular war (the Mao approach), the military-focus strategy (adopted by the South in our
own Civil War), and the urban warfare strategy
(the IRA approachparalleling todays conflict in
Iraq). The next six chapters provide details on
each of the six elements of ONeills model.
dodging the imperialist bullet).

Most interesting is the chapter on government response, since that is the area where the
FAO will likely be a government value-added.
Nearly every page has a sentence or phrase that
jumps out at the modern reader as applicable to
the 21st Century foreign area officer:

ONeill further describes the types of insurgencies: anarchist, egalitarian, traditionalist, pluralist, secessionist, reformist, and preservationist.
He then outlines the four problem areas associated with the proper identification of insurgent
type (an important consideration for anyone who
would use his analytic tool to study a particular
insurgency). These four problem areas are: goal
transformation, goal conflicts, misleading rhetoric,
and goal ambiguity.

The success of the operation depends

not primarily on the development of the insurgent strength, but more importantly on the degree of vigor, determination, and skill with
which the incumbent regime acts to defend
itself, both politically and militarily;
Historical and contemporary data reveal
instances in which governments have misdirected policies because they misunderstood
or falsely portrayed the goals, techniques,
strategies, and accomplishments of their opponents. Whatever the reasons (inflexibility,
sloppy thinking, ignorance, biases, bureaucratic imperatives, or psychological aversion
to acknowledgement ones own weaknesses),
the outcome is flawed, costly, and sometimes
fatal policies and behavior;

Page 15
Experience and the experts suggest that
the most effective way to deal with internal
terrorismis to emphasize police work, good
intelligence, and judicial sanctions;
Adaptability is crucial;
The importance features of popular supportcharismatic attraction of the insurgent
leader, nationalism, religious appeals;
Placing a premium on patience;
Even where terrorism is limited to internal attacks, international cooperation is important becauseaid for terrorists often come[s]
from the outside;
The absence of Flexibility and Integrity
can create untold difficulties [and the]
absence of these attributes has a corrosive
effect; and finally,
What is requisite is patiencethe Will
to stay the course.
These are hardly revelations to the reader,
but surely paint a clear cautionary picture to the
political-military analyst. ONeills analytic framework offers a clear road usable to FAO analysts
in the pursuit of their efforts.

FAO Journal
ested in politics but only in the profession of
arms. It is vital that these simple minded militarists be made to realize the relationship that exists between politics and military affairs. This
linkage finds common expression across many of
the selected works summarized in this paper.
Mao then simply states the strategy for this type
of martial endeavorselect the tactics of

seeming to come from the east and attacking

from the wets; avoid the solid, attack the hollow;
ON GUERRILLA WARFARE
attack; withdraw; seek a lightning decision
withdraw when [the enemy] advances; harass
As a long-recognized classic suitable for
him when he stops; strike him when he is weary.
study by all officers, Mao Zedongs ON GUERCentral to Maos approach was the conservation
RILLA WARFARE merits special inclusion for the
of [limited] human resources. Most important in
foreign area officer studying insurgency. Of the
many available editions, any one that uses Briga- this aspect may be the concept of protracted
war; that is as vital today as it was in Maos
dier General Samuel B. Griffiths translation is
recommended, as his introductory insights are as timeand important for the foreign area officer to
understand, as it clearly indicates that insurgents
valuable to the reader as Maos words.
are in it for the long haul, and their concern for
Maos guidance is simple, and need not be American electoral cycles approaches zero,
unless those cycles can be used to gain them an
overly complicated by the reader. Mao begins
with the most important linkage between the po- advantage over the U.S. enemy.
litical and warfare; the reader will see this comThe crucial link between the warrior and
mon thread throughout the selected studies. He
cautionsas does Sam Griffith laterthe military the people forms Maos next set of advice. The
on too tight a focus solely on the military. There guerrilla/insurgent is of the people, for the people,
and utterly dependent upon the people for his
are some militarists who say, We are not inter-

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FAO Journal

survival and success. He cautions that the people must be inspired to cooperate voluntarily.
We must not force them. Mao captured the essence of this formula in three rules and eight remarks, and used these to ensure that this vital
link was never weakened by his forces. They are
as follows:
Rules:
1. All actions are subject to command.
2. Do not steal from the people.
3. Be neither selfish nor unjust.
Remarks:
1. Replace the door when you leave the house.
2. Roll up the bedding on which you have slept.
3. Be courteous.
4. Be honest in your transactions.
5. Return what you borrow,
6. Replace what you break.
7. Do not bathe in the presence of women.
8. Do not without authority search the pocketbooks of those you arrest.
Maos simple lessonthe strong link between force and politics and the same permanent
link between the warfighter and the people surrounding the insurgent make this short book a
must read.
SAVAGE WAR OF PEACE
Alistair Hornes A SAVAGE WAR OF PEACE
(a book length case study of the Algerian insurgency) possesses dual value. First, as an exhaustive case study of all facets of an insurgency
from the balanced point of view of all participants,
it represents a thorough model of the several elements of insurgency and counterinsurgency
Common Threads, which appear in this papers
conclusion. Second, the Algerian savage war
resonates in the current experience of the early
21st Century, with many lessons learned, to be
learned, or in some cases lessons sadly forgotten. Hornes significant lessons from his case
study include: 1) Commonality & Cohesiveness;
2) Small Beginnings; 3) Military Primacy; and, 4) the

Use of Torture.

Commonality & Cohesiveness. insurgencies share participant characteristics in common.

These often include ethnicity. Although even the
Muslim Algerians were of significantly mixed heritageBerber, Arab, Kabyle, Chaouia, Mauritanian, and Turkthey were perceived by the
French government and the Algerian pied noir
colonists as simply Arabs, beneath and different.
Separate and different, the native Algerians began to see themselves as the true Algerians,
meriting their own government for their own people. Another commonality is of locale. While
marginally mixed, the truth is that French colonists and native Algerians were ghettoized. The
most notorious of these was the Casbah of Algiers, where more than 100 thousand Muslims
existed in under a square kilometer. This eased
difficulties of attack and reprisal on both sides
throughout the insurgency. Yet another commonality was of language. While many pied noir
spoke Arabic, and many Algerians spoke French,
for most French, Arabic was a foreign tongue; admittedly, this linguistic isolation was often used to
the insurgents advantage. Although others may
be mentioned as adjuncts, the final significant
commonality was that of religion. The Islamic
faith bound the insurgents backgrounds; although Islamic fundamentalism was not central to
the Algerian experience, some present day ech-

Page 17
oes back to Wahhabism and Fundamentalism
harken back to that conflict.

FAO Journal

French response was the shift from a politicalmilitary solution to a purely martial approach, one
which ultimately spun out of the control of the
These several commonalities yield a cohe- French government.
siveness that is difficult for the outsider to penetrate. In Hornes lexicon the term is collectivity Military Primacy. With Yasefs bombings, the
of leadership, of suffering, and of anonymity (he French sent in the paras. For the reader unfamilwas an Arab, dressed as a person, as one non- iar with Frances recent history at the time, they
had suffered the humiliation of German defeat
FAO officer observed). Commonality, cohesiveness, collectivityregardless of the noun, it repre- and occupation, they faced challenges in Morocco, and they had most recently been embarsents the insurgent identifier and the outsider or
rassingly evicted from Vietnam after the defeat at
governmental separator.
Dien Bien Phu, where many of their officers and
Legionnaires had served and fallen. Over time,
Small Beginnings. Although activity predates any single event of initiation, the massacres both their presence, their methods, and their disof May 8, 1945 at Setif both politicized and marti- dain and ignoring of their civilian masters became
greater. That led, in many cases, to excesses.
alized many future insurgent leaders. Like the
events of Derrys Bloody Sunday pitting peaceful Some French officers defend these excesses as
both necessary and fruitful In truth, both led to
marchers with a smattering of IRA agitators
against the military, it is unclear who fired the first greater international involvement and pressure on
shot. During the V-E Day parade a French com- the French government to end the crisis, regardmissioner was knocked down and a young Mus- less of military success. SO Algeria won its freedom. The caution of military primacy is a hardlim was shot. At that point Muslims roamed the
area and slaughtered 103 Europeans and injured won lesson learned for all persons in uniform, as
we face many of the same pressures and frustraan equal number. The French reprisal was brutions today.
talalmost a ten-to-one ratio of Muslims killed.
Although the eight-year savage war was a decade
Torture. Terrorism is a potential tool of inaway, the conflict bloomed from this point. Many
future leadersAbdulhamid Ben Badis, Messali
surgents; it was a tool used by them, and by their
Hadj, Ferhat Abbaswere profoundly influenced French adversaries, during the savage war. Genby these events. As one said, Setif has taken us eral Godard in Algeria said that intelligence is
back to the days of the Crusadersa common
capital. Many of the other texts summarized here
theme in the early 21st Century. Later, on June
state the same; however, the means used to ob19, 1957, the most significant spark and response tain such information and the degree to which
occurred. On that day Zabane and Ferradj were they are applied is the challenge. Jean-Paul Sarguillotined by the French for attacks on civilians. tre said during this conflict, Torture is neither civilian nor military; it is a plague on both of us.
In response Saddi Yasefs hit squads
reminiscent of the Michael Collins shooters of the Over the long view, this is, of course, always the
IRAroamed the city of Algiers and shot to death case. Albert Camus, a native Algerian, finally
noted, Such deeds inevitably led to the demorali49 civilians. Yasefwhose campaign is immortalized in the film Battle of Algiers, where he plays zation of France and the loss of Algeria.
himself thinly disguised, then initiated the attack
As a study embodying many of the
which spooled up the war irretrievably. He sent
Insurgency Common Threads in our conclusion,
three female bombers to mass gathering places
Alistair Hornes A SAVAGE WAR OF PEACE is a
(the parallel to Muslim, female, suicide bombers
worthy addition. As a summary of a conflict with
in Israel in the past few years is unavoidable) in
Algiers where they killed scores of pied noir. The too many parallels to our current efforts fighting

Page 18
Islamic Fundamentalism, its lessons learned
and many cautions merits detailed study by all
foreign area officers, regardless of their region
of interest.

FAO Journal
area officers and other special operations leaders seek to becomean officer instructoradvisor to potential allies.

Lawrences strategy, as he defined it,

merits discussion. He saw the Revolts strategy
as composed of three elementsalgebraic, bioOne of the great warriors in the unconlogical, and psychological. The first was easy;
ventional role is T.E. Lawrence. His SEVEN PIL- the land the Turks must control was massive,
LARS OF WISDOM, and the shorter REVOLT IN
and that offered a strategic advantage to the
THE DESERT, are revolutionary primers on the
insurgent bands of Lawrence and Feisal, who
conduct of a successful insurgency, making the dealt in surprise and distance to maximize efstudy of these books well worth the investment fect and minimize casualties. Lawrence saw
in understanding insurgency for the 21st Cenhis forces as an influence, a thing invulnertury.
able, intangible, without front or back, drifting
about like a gas. This translated algebraically
Lawrence was an unlikely soldier. An
into massive amounts of Turks tied down to
honors graduate at Oxford, he was a scholar, static locations, while the insurgents roamed
linguist, historian, and writer. He spent many of and struck at willIn Lawrences own words,
the pre-World War I years conducting archaeo- We used the smallest force in the quickest time
logical digs in Syria. Lawrence saw the poten- at the farthest place.
tial of an Arab Revolt, using the unifying theme
of Arab nationalismrequiring only a charisThe second element, biological, was
matic Arab leader to move this strategic apequally confounding for the Turks traditionallybased army. Lawrence called this bionomics.
This defined a relationship between the organism and the environment. Lawrences insurgents were part of the environment and thrived
in it; the Turks, by comparison, were outsiders,
marginalized by the environment in which they
operated. Lawrence preached elasticity and
freedom of movement. He also highly valued
perfect intelligencealmost always the advantage of the insurgent, and equally important
(and often lacking) with the larger force.
SEVEN PILLARS OF WISDOM

proach. In that, Lawrence found Prince Feisal,

and immediately became what many foreign

Lawrences final strategic element was

the psychological. It dealt with the will of the
Arab to fight for his ethical rights in the environment. Since the environment was both biologically and psychologically Arab, the Turkish
army was an accident, not a target for Lawrence. The insurgents followed that most ancient of axiomshit em where they aintto
phenomenal success. His insurrection, draped
in nationalism, never sought to confront the en-

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FAO Journal

emy but rather to isolate him by destroying lines

of communications (note also Maos emphasis on
lines of communications), so vital to a large,
standing, occupying army such as the Turks.
Lawrences greatest achievement may be
his gift of assimilation. As Asprey describes him,
Thanks to linguistic ability, imagination, perception, intellectual and moral honesty, and immense energy, he went to the tribes, found a
leader, determined a viable goal, weighed capabilities, and hit on a type of war compatible to
leadership, capabilities, and political goals. This
is the heart of insurgent, charismatic leadership; it
is also an important facet for the foreign area officer. It is further defined by Lawrence himself in
his Twenty-seven Articlesa short guide to new
officers arriving in-theater for dealing with Arabs;
it is also reflective of the foreign area officer
mindset, which complements ones soldierly abilities. By any of these several measures, a careful
study of Lawrence as insurgent leader and strategist is of great use to the modern foreign area officer.

problems with the Scythians, who made it impossible for the enemy who invades them to escape destruction, while they themselves are entirely out of his reach. The Greek Demosthenes

WAR IN THE SHADOWS

WAR IN THE SHADOWS by Robert Asprey is
a fine historical overview of guerrilla war, many
instances of which actually describe insurgencies, or the fight by a population against its governments forces. While thorough and inclusive
through 1975, it is the first half of the first volume
this author believes is the most useful for study,
as much of what follows in the remainder of the
two-volume-set is familiar to most readers.
Aspreys work covers all of the big, better known
insurgenciesthe Philippines, Mexico, Lawrence
in World War I, Collins and the Irish Revolution,
the Bolsheviks, Mao, British colonial uprisings,
global movements in World War II, Southeast
Asia; it is his coverage of the lesser known cases
which add to the depth of foreign area officer
knowledge base concerning insurgencies.
The initial challenges to modern armies
[for their time] that Asprey explores begin 2,500
years ago. He describes The Persian Darius

in 426 B.C. faced the same challenge of insurgent tactics which Mao would later espouse,
when the Aetolians being swift of foot and
lightly equipped constantly harassed and destroyed the Greeks. Alexander the Great faced
the same tactics in Turkestan and Bokhara. No
great battles awaited Alexander; he was to be
faced by a peoples war, a war of mounted guerrillas whom, when he advanced would suddenly
appear in his rear,and when pursued vanished
into the Turkoman steppes. The Roman challenges in Spain against the Gauls met with the
same insurgent tactics that work today.
Asprey voices a caution relevant to the
modern reader. It concerns the loss of memory,
the loss of lessons learned from one experience
to the next, one war to the next, one generation
of military professionals to the next (not to men-

Page 20
tion our civilian oversight). Speaking of the Romansthe reader can decide if the words remain
accurate todayAsprey says, The lesson of the
earlier insurgency crises must have struck even
the most obtuse governor and dim-witted military
commander; yet, with the passing of each crisis,
the lessons seemingly vanished into the prevailing morass compounded by imperial arrogance,
personal greed, and professional ineptness. If
the lesson applies, even in part, to today, then it
is hoped the reader heeds that caution.

FAO Journal

The power to embarrass the regular forces

or to cause the local population to lose faith in our
ability to help them is also an important aspect
Asprey highlights. Describing the 19th Century
fight of the British in Burma, he says that insurgents attack loyal locals who, having cause to
recognize that we were too far off to protect them,
lose confidence in our power and throw in their lot
with the insurgentsIn a country itself one vast
military obstacle, the seizure of the leaders of the
rebellion, though of paramount importance, thus
Asprey applauds the modern foreign area becomes a source of great difficulty. Here, not
officer by default. He says that these officers are much has changed.
adaptable. That they think in terms of the
One final case study, to highlight the imunexpected or the indirect approach based on
portance of politics in insurgencies, is this case
cunning. He says they must think at the
General Hubert Lyautey in Indochina in the
strategic, political, and tactical levels.
late 19th Century. The general was known as one
Asprey even mentions previous [ancient] who took an interest in the social welfare of those
literature on the subject of insurgency. One of the with whom he came in contactthe population of
most compelling is Nikephoros Phokas 965 vol- Indochina. He understood, In every country
ume titled ON SHADOWING WARFARE. In it the au- there are existing frameworks. The great mistake
thor describes this type of warfare succinctly and for Europeans coming there as a conqueror is to
aptly. His translator observes, the methods
destroy these frameworks. He battled the comrely heavily upon the natural advantages offered plicity of the population with insurgents by applyby terrain, on the willing cooperation of the civil- ing social, economic, and political measures
ian population, on good intelligence, on interrupt- designed to elicit equal if not greater support
ing the enemys lines of communications, and fi- for the troops of Lyautey as for the insurgents.
nally on the demoralizing effect of an endless se- The careful reader notes that, like the modern forquence of small, surprise, carefully planned tacti- eign area officer, no mention of a marital solution
cal attacks in a war of strategic defensive. Mao appeared in the solution the general offered. Like
and Kitsondescribing insurgency operations Mao, Lyautey also relied heavily on information,
said it no better than this centuries before.
on the correct behavior of his men, on his personal charisma and example, and in the care he
Of interest is understanding both the politi- took cementing relationships with tribal authorical and martial aspects of insurgent warfare is the ties. Lyautey summarizes his approach elocase on Napoleons Grand Army in Russia in
quentlyThe rational methodthe only one, the
proper one, and also the one for which I was cho1811-12. The political elementNapoleon versus Alexandersoon resulted in abuses by both sen rather than anyone elseis the constant insides against the native population. That then
terplay of force with politics. This remains good
caused numerous insurgent bands to spring up guidance to the foreign area officer as both advisor and warrior.
Ermolai Chetvertakov, Estepan Eremenko, and
Ermolai Vasilyev all offer case studies of interest
in the art of guerrilla/insurgent warfare. By some
accounts, over half a million French soldiers died
in this catastrophe, much of the losses due to the
harassment of the insurgent bands.

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FAO Journal

CASEBOOK OF INSURGENCY AND REVOLUTIONARY three case studies it includes.

As previously stated, the comparison across varWARFARE
ied insurgencies is a complex, difficult task. The
THE CASEBOOK OF INSURGENCY AND REVO- authors sought to ease this burden by application
LUTIONARY WARFARE remains a comparative
studies classic. Although published in 1962
limiting the case studies to those occurring prior
to that year and also limiting the case studies to
those occurring in the 20th Centurymany of the
most vital insurgencies of the 20th Century are
included: Vietnam, Malaya, Guatemala, Cuba,
Algeria, Iraq and Iran, China, Spain, and Czechoslovakia, among the more familiar of these.
The authors recognized the need to extend the understanding of the processes of violent social changeincluding the alreadyestablished linkage between martial and politicaldiplomatic elements of insurgenciesand use
that as a central focus of the volume. In this
manner, they extend our knowledge of how
revolutions are born, grow, succeed, or fail. Designed as an unclassified, open source only
reader on insurgencies, it remains one of the
best initial references for the study of the twenty-

Mail with your check to: FAOA, P.O. Box 295, Mt. Vernon, VA 22121

Page 22

FAO Journal
interest to the foreign area officer reader.

of a standard format across all the case studies.

This systematic ordering allows for ease of comparison and contrast among and between the
studies. First, the case studies are grouped into
seven geographic Sectionsallowing for ease of
regional comparison and contrast. Seeking to
describe the complex political, military, cultural,
social, and economic features of each case study
makes perfect sense and is of immediate valueadded to the foreign area officer reader of the
studies.
Each case then develops in four standard
parts: Major Historical Events, leading up to the
insurgency; Environment of the Revolution, which
includes geography; Form and Characteristics,
delving into actors, forces, and goals; and Effects
of the insurgency, both near- and long-term.
Within each of these four major sections are fourfive common sub-headings. These are designed
to both ensure as complete an understanding of
the case as possible and also to answer common
operational questions which the professional
reader needsboth for near-term study and perhaps for long-term application as an advisor or
warfighter.
Even in the 1971 edition, Kitson saw the
THE CASEBOOK OF INSURGENCY AND REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE ends with a list of recomworld as a place where insurgent warfare repremended reading, its final contribution to the seri- sented the wars of the future. Insurgency is
ous foreign area officer student of insurgency.
the kind of war that fits the conditions of the modern age, while being at the same time well-suited
LOW-INTENSITY OPERATIONS: SUBVERSION, INSUR- to take advantage of social discontent, racial ferment, and nationalist fervours. This continues to
GENCY, & PEACEKEEPING
ring true in 2008.
Frank Kitson was a Oxford-trained warrior
with extensive experience in insurgent warfare,
Like most of the authors represented
particularly in Africa against the Mau Mau. His
herein, Kitson saw force as only a part of the
thoughtful studies of the art of counter insurgency equation of subversion and insurgency. He said,
remain of value today. One of the most highly
Force, if it is used at all, is used to reinforce
recommended of Kitsons texts is LOW-INTENSITY other forms of persuasion, whereas in more orthodox forms of war, persuasion in various forms
OPERATIONS: SUBVERSION, INSURGENCY, &
PEACEKEEPING. While its general lessons are ap- is used to back up force. He sees force as secplicable to any officer studying insurgency,
ondaryunstated is its role in the support of the
Kitsons view on the development of a specially
politics of the insurgency, as Mao and Lawrence
trained cadre of country specialists is of further

Page 23
both highlight. He then clearly defines the two
primary roles of the insurgentroles the reader
must understand in order to counter. The really
important point is that the leaders of a subversive
movement have two separate but closely related
jobs to do; they must gain the support of a portion
of the population, and they must impose their will
on the government either by military defeat or by
unendurable harassment.

FAO Journal
tial description of every good foreign area officer.
Interestingly, Kitson describes the development
of a foreign area officer corps in some detail.

Kitson saw quite clearly the need for area

specialists. He says that the army owes it to the
nation to provide properly trained and experienced officers capable of advising the government and its various agencies at every level on
how best to conduct the campaign. To do this
Kitson is among the authors who address the individual must submerge themselves in
terrorism as a part of insurgency. The insurgent the atmosphere of the country. Then, he even
tasks are clear. Tasks may also include acts of more explicitly states, Each officer or group of
sabotage and terrorism designed to ensure that officers could specialize in a particular area of the
the government deploys disproportionately large worldspecialization should involve visits and
bodies of its own forces on protection duties and someof the languages of the area as well as a
searches, and carefully calculated acts of revolt- thorough study of the areas problems. Kitson,
ing brutality designed to bring excessive govern- among the selected authors, is the one who most
ment retaliation on the population thereby turning specifically calls for foreign area officer preparationas counter insurgency advisors, in this limthem against the government. Kitson saw this
work in Africa, and he was as equally familiar with ited caseand by that measure alone this selecthe terror imposed by the Irish Republican Army tion merits a careful reading.
and its carefully calculated use of terror which often caused the provocation to over-react [by the
SMALL WARS MANUAL
British Army] they sought.
Over a half century old, this landmark work
One of the key aspects of Kitsons view is continues to inform what we know about and how
the over-arching importance of information when we practice or observe insurgencies. In the early
fighting an insurgency. He saw it as paramount. part of the 20th Century, the Marines were our
He continues, The main problem of fighting inforce projection platform of choice. Their sevsurgents lies in finding them, and it could be said eral small wars lessons learned were captured
that the process of developing information
over time. The Marine Corps Schools Major S.M.
constitutes the basic tactical function of counter
Harrington first did a systematic study in 1921.
insurgency operations. (A parallel view dealing
Major C.J. Miller added to this with a study of the
with the Indian Wars of 1886 in the U.S. cautions Dominican republic campaign in 1923. Later,
the commander, be careful when operating
several different campaigns of the time were seriindependently with limited force and with inade- alized in the Marine Corps Gazette. Finally, a
quate knowledge of enemy and terrain.a cau- consolidated, overarching version appeared in
tion, along with dividing force, that Custer proba- 1940, the United States Marine Corps SMALL
bly should have read.) He then describes what
WARS MANUAL.
the author sees as a common foreign area officer
traita curiosity, and an ability to think outside of
Much of the Manual is a tactics guide.
the doctrinal box. The [Intel} process is a sort of However, its introductory chapter and its chapters
game based on intense mental activity allied to a on handling the government and the population
determination to find things out and an ability to
are central to the theme of the present articlea
regard everything on its own merits without reprimer on insurgency.
gard to customs, doctrine, or drill. That is a par-

Page 24
The Introduction begins with one of the
most cogent definitions applicable to insurgenciesSmall wars are operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is
combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal
or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory
for the preservation of life and of such interests
as are determined by the foreign policy of our nation. Uncovering this simple definition is [alone]
worth the investment in opening the Manual.

FAO Journal
establishes the link between force and political
strategy. In this strategy, both a military and a
political strategy are executed simultaneously.
Then the strategy must take into account the adversaryand whether that adversary follows the
rule of lawand the civilian population. It also
falls to small wars to take into account the terrain
in which these operations occur, as their impact
is different than those of a regular force.
What the Marine Corps identifies as
Psychology in Section III is rather closely
aligned with those elements of interest to the Foreign Area Officer. This includes; political considerations, social considerations, religious considerations, and the historical environment and its
historyand respect for them all. Finally, the
Section deals with how to interact with local
populations for greatest success when facing an
insurgency.
Later chapters and sections deal with the
armed insurgent, and either disarming him or rendering him ineffective. Key in the set of actions
one must take is the re-establishment of local authority and the formation of a constabulary (the
same approach we are taking at present in Iraq).
That set of efforts then bridge normally into the
development of a strong local government; it is
the development of a strong local government
versus a strong national government that currently plagues our counterinsurgency efforts in
the GWOT. The USMC SMALL WARS MANUAL
merits study, although more selective reading is
required, unless one reads it in preparation to be
an on-ground commander.

The legal aspects of small wars are highlighted. While much of the Manuals focus, given
its heritage and timing was more applicable to the
Monroe Doctrine, its lessons apply generally.
First, use of force is illegal against other states
except where the right of self-preservation applies. That rule was invoked in the present
Global War on Terror, particularly in the case of
Iraq.
The basis of a strategy for small wars is
explored in depth. Right off the bat, the Manual

The USMC Small Wars Manual should not

be confused with a similarly named predecessor,
the equally influential SMALL WARSTHEIR PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES, written in 1896 by
Charles Callwell. As an aside, Callwells work is
worth a brief mention. Callwell said that Small
wars are a heritage of extended empire; while
the U.S. may not be imperialistic in our view, one
might recognize why those insurgents engaging
our forces might not have the same point of view.
Callwell called upon the complicated organism

Page 25

FAO Journal

which is the modern, regular army to adapt to the foreign area officer warrior diplomat.
realities that small wars represent, that these
conflicts must be approached on a method totally different from the stereotyped system.
INSURGENCY AND THE 21ST CENTURY FOREIGN
He says that good intelligence exploited
AREA OFFICERCONCLUSIONS
by mobility are essential elements in countering
The several facets of insurgencypolitical,
an insurgency, and this axiom remains true today. While urging the development of self-reliant economic, diplomatic, and martialdemand that
officers (a requisite FAO trait), he states that the
guerrilla war is the one the regular army
always has to dread [because]an effective
campaign becomes well-nigh impossible. His

the foreign area officer be fluent in this form of

warfare in order to complete all FAO roles.
Not only is Sam Griffiths translation of Maos
work of value in itself as a revelation of Maos
most vital lesson is deeply buried in the textthe thought, but also his Introduction to the 1941
importance of national commitment to fighting a work is of value as it illuminates both the value of
small war over the long-haulcertainly a lesson understanding guerrilla warfare (as a sub-set of
that is applicable today in our present campaign insurgency) and of the careful preparation of
those officers charged with both the understandin Iraq. The lessons the Marines and Callwell
ing and conduct or mitigation of such campaigns.
teach are vital to todays warrior, none more so
In a brief caution, Griffith states, We go to conthan the trusted political-military advisor who is
siderable trouble to keep soldiers out of politics,
the foreign area specialist.
and even more to keep politics out of soldiers.
Having established both an historical con- Guerrillas do exactly the opposite. He undertext in the second section of this paper and cur- stands, as Mao understood, that politics and
guerrilla warfare are inseparable. Like Mao and
rent doctrine in the initial section, this overview
closes with some thoughts on applicability to the

Page 26
his fish in the sea, Griffith says, the principal
concern of all guerrilla leaders [in our case, read
insurgent leaders] [is] to get the water to the
right temperature and to keep it there a clear
message to running or defeating an insurgency.
A soldiers understanding of the political element
is crucial, and especially so in the foreign area
officer.
Griffith also places the value of understanding insurgencies in perspective for the military man. A revolutionary war is never confined
within the bounds of military action. Because its
purpose is to destroy the existing society and its
institutions and to replace them with a completely
new state structure, any revolutionary war is a
unity of which the constituent parts, in varying importance, are military, political, economic, social,
and psychological. He has precisely described
the modern foreign area officer and at the same
time highlighted the importance of the study of
insurgencies.
The careful military student of insurgency,
particularly in our era, should strive to understand
the mindset of the adversary. The following caution from Asprey has never been more relevant, if
perhaps a bit inflammatory, To define (and condemn) terror from a peculiar social, economic,
political, and emotional plane is to display a selfrighteous attitude that, totally unrealistic, is
doomed to be disappointed by the harsh facts.
The modern foreign area officer is particularly
well-prepared and mentally suited to adhere to
this caution, and to pass that caution professionally to a wide range of governmental agencies
and ones commanders.
Larry Kahaners short commentary on both
Callwell and the Marines Small War manuals
captures the essence of the present paperwhat
we need are more soldiers with language
skills, armed with durable rifles, who understand
history, foreign culture, religion local customs and
guerilla warfare. That forms the heart of this papers summary of the importance of the foreign

FAO Journal
are officer and his understanding of insurgency.
The common threads of these several
works apply to the in-depth preparation of the foreign area officer, with several FAO threads of
our own:
Regional Immersion;
Linguistic Capability;
Importance of Intelligence;
Understanding of social, cultural, historical, political, diplomatic, and military underpinnings of a country or region;
Necessity of being First a Warfighter,
Second a FAO; and,
Thorough understanding of the nature of
21st Century warfareas represented by insurgency and counterinsurgency.
The FAO need only remember these essential elements at all stages of development
and execution to be the best pol-mil advisor
our assignment demands.
Rod Propst is the Vice President for Government
Operations for the Praemittias Group, Inc, Englewood, Colorado. He has previously authored articles on Islam, diplomacy, escape and evasion,
FAO predecessors, and analysis of FAO-related
literature in the Journal. A retired U.S. Army officer, among Propsts FAO assignments was as a
Defense Attach in Mexico City, and as an operator and staff officer in national asset units.

Page 27

FAO Journal

The Other End of the Red Sea,

Or Has Anyone Considered a Base
in Puntland?
By

LTC Robert K. Holzhauer, USA, 48G

It is well known that the Suez Canal,

located at the northern end of the Red
Sea, is a strategic chokepoint to the Red
Sea, a waterway vital to the worlds economic prosperity. Our failure to consider
the southern end of the Red Sea, particularly the Strait of Bab al Mandab, located
between the Horn of Africa and Yemen,
could prove disastrous for worldwide shipping. Not only is the strait constantly under threat by smugglers, pirates, and unstable governments (primarily Somalia),
the Arabian Peninsula itself is also a target for members of extremist groups that
wish to infiltrate by sea. As such, both
CENTCOM and AFRICOM have a stake
in securing this strategic waterway.

now track the vessels to shore, intercept

the refugees as they disembark, and take
them to UNHCR camps. The vessel is
then seized while still in Yemeni waters.

Piracy has increased insurance

rates substantially for international shipping in the region and, as a consequence,
forced much of the traffic north, away from
the Somali coast, into Yemeni waters.
Unfortunately, Yemens navy is all but inoperable and will require years to achieve
a sustained operating capability. As a
stop-gap measure, the Yemeni Coast
Guard (YCG), run by the Ministry of Interior and trained by numerous security cooperation partners, patrols Yemens coastline and has made substantial progress in
the fight against smuggling. Ironically, its
Human Trafficking & Piracy
small fleet and budget are being used to
much greater effect than those of Yemens
Somalia accounts for the bulk of
refugees crossing this strategic waterway. navy.
Most refuges are bound for Yemen, a
country ill prepared to deal with the influx, Proposals for Increasing Regional Sewhich amounts to as many as 300 refucurity
gees a day. Without the assistance of the
Besides additional security assisUN High Commission for Refugees
tance, or a wished-for donation of blue
(UNHCR), many of the refugees would
water-capable hulls, there are other ways
suffer needlessly upon their arrival to
Yemen. Upon learning that the smugglers to help the Yemeni government, particularly the YCG, secure its maritime borders.
were throwing their human cargo overboard during maritime intercepts, Yemens Yemen needs to link its existing services,
along with their sensors and shooters, efgovernment changed its policy for intercepting human smugglers. Yemeni police

Page 28
fectively through an organized and decisive maritime operations center. Yemen
must link its planned coastal surveillance
assets to provide a comprehensive picture
of maritime activity. Moreover, Yemen
desperately needs to create a comprehensive command control and communications network to secure all of its borders,
not just the maritime border. At present,
many outposts, both coastal and inland,
are limited to hard-wire communications or
experience spotty cellular coverage.

FAO Journal
Summary
The benefits of securing the Bab al
Mandab are numerous: International shipping insurance rates would decline, extremists would be denied freedom of
movement, and Yemens shipping industry
could rebound, giving the country a muchneeded diversification from an oil economy that is rapidly approaching its twilight.

A secondary benefit of Yemen securing the waterway and its coastline is

Somalias trafficking of peoples and the reduction in regional smuggling, from
acts of piracy must also be isolated. So- which Saudi Arabia would also benefit. A
malias failed transitional federal govern- reduction in the smuggling of contraband
ment and endless civil strife call for inno- into Saudi Arabia from Yemen could only
serve to improve relations between the
vation to break the status quo. A diplomatic approach might entail the immediate two countries and invigorate border securecognition of Puntland and Somaliland as rity cooperation between them.
separate, sovereign nations. Puntland is
Finally, a maritime operation with
certainly the more viable candidate. Recforce projection capability based in Puntognizing both has the potential of deciland would allow the coalition the ability to
sively limiting the coastline available to
certain tribes and factions in Somali soci- ensure safe shipping through the length of
ety that engage in maritime criminal activ- the Red Sea in the event of a regional criity and threaten the security of the Bab al sis, such as the resumption of hostilities
between Ethiopia and Eritrea or an unMandab. By recognizing Puntland, and
friendly Sudanese government choosing
then either through aid or presence, we
to interdict shipping for its own reasons.
can create an opportunity to establish a
continuing maritime capability that would A combined joint task force established
between the two regional commands
further pressure maritime criminals.
Yemen already negotiates with Puntland would certainly be capable of this function.
for fishing rights and could easily form a
maritime policing partnership with Puntland. (I am not the first U.S. official to
suggest recognizing Puntland, nor will I be
the last.)

Page 29

FAO Journal

ARMY NOTES
COL John Blumenson, Chief,
Strategic Leadership Division
The Armys Foreign Area Proponent Office has
seen a number of personnel changes beginning
with the retirement of COL Steve Beal. As many
of you know Steve has lead the Division since
September 2005 and has spearheaded numerous initiatives that have propelled the Army's
FAO Program to new heights. During Steves
tenure demand for FAOs reached new heights
with an increase of over 100 positions. His experience and knowledge will be missed by the
Army and the FAO community. Best wishes to
Steve and his family in all of their future endeavors.

access our AKO site through

our internet portal at
www.fao.army.mil. LTC Jon Edwards (48C/E)
remains our point of contact for the site.

Finally, let me take a few lines to introduce myself. Some of you may know me as the Assistant
Division Chief where I have served as a drilling
Army Reservist since June of 2005. With Steve
Beal's departure and a gap of some months until
the arrival of his successor, COL Michael Curci,
I'm able to step in on an active duty tour and
serve as the Division Chief. As I look back on my
entry into the FAO Program during the dark days
As summer approaches we'll be seeing other di- of the early 1990s, words cannot describe my
vision members departing: COL Al Brooks (48B) feelings of elation to serve in the center of the
will be heading off to SOUTHCOM as the Deputy FAO universe in a time that is one hundred and
eighty degrees out from those dark days when
J-5; LTC Jeff Maxcy (48D/F/H/I) will be retiring
and relocating to the Ft. Leavenworth, KS area to the program was slashed and burned.
continue contributing to the fight, and LTC Ro
Jackson (48G/J) is off to assume duties as the
I look forward to getting to know as many of you
ARMA in Angola.
as possible during the next six months and beyond.
During this time of transition between the old
guard and the new team the train isn't slowing
down. Many initiatives such as the international
military affairs (IMA) divisions at the Army Service
Component Commands, the FAO path to General
Officer and the development of FAO programs in
our sister services continue. The one continuous
beat I hear in all our initiatives and Department of
Defense actions is the Army FAO Program remains the bell weather program for DoD. FAO
Proponent is not resting on its status as the premier program, we still face challenges in meeting
all of our requirements with limited personnel resources.
We continue to enhance our capability to get information to the field. Our website is the premier
location for you to get current information on not
just the FAO community but our Army. You can

Page 30

FAO Journal

USMC FAO Notes

LrCol Chris Sill, International Affairs Officer
Program Coordinator
The Marine Corps FAO program is currently undergoing an expansion to meet
an increased demand for cultural and linguistic expertise across the board in general and at the operational and higher
headquarters level in particular. In 2007,
FAO accessions jumped from a traditional
norm of ten officers per year to twentyeight, a figure that is projected to be
matched in 2008 before leveling off at a
steady state of 20 officers per year in the
long term. The first of those selected
have begun to enter the training pipeline
in Monterey and will complete their training in FY-11.
In December, the Commandant signed off
a new operational employment concept,
called The Long War, which provides a
strategic direction for the Marine Corps
that includes an increased emphasis on
Security Cooperation and partner building
capacity. As natural enablers for Security
Cooperation activities, the Marine Corps
FAO proponent foresees an increased
role for FAOs at the Marine Component
Commands, advising MARFOR commanders and guiding the employment of
Security Cooperation Marine Air/Ground
Task Forces as they deploy forward on
SC missions. This, along with the traditional FAO role as attaches and Security
Assistance Officers will ensure Marine
FAOs are out in front engaging allies and
partners while enabling the operating
forces in their SC role.

Finally, as the Marine

Corps continues to leverage the operational relevance of FAO
skills, the FAO proponent is working with
the Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) to
establish skill sustainment programs that
will help ensure Marine FAOs serving in
their Primary MOS keep their FAO skills
sharp and ready to employ on a moments
notice. If successful, a proof-of-concept
currently under development with III MEF
in Okinawa, will be expanded to support
FAOs serving in their PMOS in the remaining MEFs.

F.Y.I. Service FAO POCs

U.S. Army FAO Proponent Office
COL John Blumenson - Div Chief, (703) 602-8183
DSN 332-8183 Email: john.blumenson@hqda.army.mil

PLU-1: LtCol Chris Goff - PACOM-SE Asia (E. Asia FAO)

EMAIL: jonathan.goff@usmc.mil Phone: (703) 692-4346 or DSN 2224346

Mr. Charles Reimer, Deputy Division Chief, (703) 602-8179

DSN 332-8179, Email: Charles.reimer@hqda.army.mil

PLU-2: Maj Michael Cho - PACOM-NE Asia (Korean FAO)

EMAIL: michael.cho@usmc.mil Phone: (703) 692-4364 or DSN 222-4364

LTC Alfred Brooks - 48B Regional Manager, COM 703-602-8191

DSN 333-8191, Email: Alfred.brooks@hqda.army.mil

PLU-3: LtCol Patrick Carroll- CENTCOM (Middle East/North Africa FAO)

EMAIL: patrick.caroll1@usmc.mil Phone: (703) 692-4345 or DSN 222-4345

LTC Roderic Jackson - 48G/J Regional Manager, COM 703-6028188 / DSN 332-8188 , Email: roderic.jackson@hqda.army.mil

PLU-4: LtCol Brian Chin - SOUTHCOM/NORTHCOM (Latin America

FAO) EMAIL: brian.chin@usmc.mil Phone: (703) 692-4344 or DSN 2224344

LTC William Maxcy-48D/F/H/I Regional Manager, (703) 6027373 / DSN 332-7373, Email: William.maxcy@hqda.army.mil
LTC Jonathan Edwards - 48C/E Regional Manager COM 703-602-8195
DSN 332-8195, Email: jonathan.edwards@hqda.army.mil
LTC Gary Garay- FAO Coordinator, Defense Language Institute,
(831) 242-6467/DSN 768-6467, Email: gary.garay@us.army.mil
U.S. Army FAO Assignments Team, HRC
LTC TJ Moffat- Assgmts Off (COLONELS - 48).
(703) 325-2861/DSN 221-2861
EMAIL: Thomas.moffat@us.army.mil
LTC Matt Greco - Branch Chief
(703) 325-3153/DSN 221-3153
EMAIL: matthew.greco@us.army.mil
MAJ Jerzy Zubr - Assgmts Off (48C, E),
(703) 325-3134/DSN 221-3134
EMAIL: jerzy.zubr@us.army.mil
MAJ Jeffrey Wyatt - Assgmts Off (48D, G, H, I), (703) 325-3132
DSN 221- 3132, EMAIL: Jeffrey.wyatt1@us.army.mil
MAJ Jeff Miller - Assgmts Off (48B,F,J).
(703) 325-2755/DSN 221-2755
EMAIL: jeffrey.s.miller@us.army.mil
MAJ Brunilda Garcia - HRC-St. Louis Reserve FA 48 Manager
314-592-0608 - DSN: 892-0608
FAX: 314-592-0649 - DSN: 892-0650
E-mail brunilda.garcia@us.army.mil
MS. Aundra Brown - TRG PLANS (48D, E, G, J).
(703) 325-3121/DSN 221-3121
EMAIL: aundra.brown@us.army.mil
Ms. Mary Gathers - Human Resource Specialist
(703)325-0159/DSN: 221-0159
FAX: 703-325-6374/DSN: 221-6374
Email: Mary.Gathers@us.army.mil
US Army Reserve FAO Program
COL John D. Blumenson - Asst. Div Chief (DIMA)
(408)209-7563
E-mail john.blumenson@us.army.mil

USMC FAO Proponent

PLU: Col Dan Hahne- Branch Head, International Issues Branch
EMAIL: daniel.hahne@usmc.mil Phone: (703) 692-4254 or DSN 222-4254
PLU EA: Mr. Tom Braden- Deputy Branch Head, International Issues
Branch, (FSU FAO) EMAIL: thomas.c.braden@usmc.mil Phone: (703) 6931365 or DSN 223-1365

PLU-5: Maj Dan Bates- EUCOM- Western Europe, NATO (Turkish FAO)
EMAIL: daniel.l.bates@usmc.mil: (703) 692-4367 or DSN 222-4367
PLU-6: Major Yohannes Negga - Eastern Europe, Caucasus, Africa and
Israel
(Sub-Saharan Africa FAO) EMAIL: yohannes.negga@usmc.mil Phone:
(703) 6924368 or DSN 222-4368
PLU-7: LtCol Chili Hesford - Security Cooperation and Programs (W.
Europe
FAO) EMAIL: john.hesford@usmc.mil Phone: (703) 692-4341 or DSN 2224341
PLU-8: LtCol Chris Sill- International Affairs Officer Program Coordinator
(Russia/Eurasia FAO) EMAIL: christopher.sill@usmc.mil Phone: (703) 6924365
or DSN 222-4365
USMC Foreign Language Officer:
Capt Russ Harris: HQMC, DC (I), IOP
EMAIL: russell.d.harris@usmc.mil Phone: (703) 614-3938
Admin Support from MSGBN in Quantico
MSGBN Personnel Officer
Phone (703) 784-4781, DSN 278-4781
US Navy FAO Proponent
CDR Dawn Driesbach, FAO Officer Community Manager
703-697-8761 (primary) 703-693-2394 (alternate)
Dawn.Driesbach@navy.mil
U.S. AIR FORCE FAO Proponent
Col Rob Sarnoski, (703) 588-8349, Chief, International Airmen Division
Lt Col Deborah Determan - Chief, International Affairs Specialist (IAS)
Branch Comm (703) 588-8346, DSN 425-8346
Lt Col Cathy Carter - Deputy Chief, International Affairs Specialist (IAS)
Branch, Reserve Advisor (Reserve IAS Program, Rosetta Stone, Transparent Language) Comm (703) 588-8337, DSN 425-8337
Maj JJ Casey - Chief, Strategic Plans and Programs (European RAS)
(Outreach, Public Affairs, Strategic Issues) Comm (703) 588-8321, DSN
425-8321
Capt Jason Kollars - IAS Force Development
(Force Management Issues, RAS/PAS Inquiries) Comm (703) 588-8322,
DSN 425-8322
MSgt Jackie Phillips - IAS Education and Training Manager (FSI, LASI,
JSOU)
https://fao.hq.af.mil
Comm (703) 588-8904, DSN 425-8904
IAS Program FAX - Comm (703) 588-6396, DSN 425-6396

Board of Governors
Steve Norton, COL, USA (Retired),
European FAO, President

Robert Olson, LTC, USA (R), Latin

American FAO

Kevin T. Ryan, BG, USA, Eurasia FAO

Steve Gotowicki, LTC, USA (R), Middle

East FAO

Stew Barnett, CAPT, USN (R),

European FAO

John Robert Dacey, MAJ, USA,

Southeast Asian FAO

Dave Smith, COL, USA (R), South Asia

COL John Blumenson, USA
FAO
Kurt M. Marisa, Col, USAF, European
FAO

Col Dan Hahne, USMC

CDR William Reynolds, USN

Rick Herrick, LTC, USA (R), European

FAO

FAOA
P.O. Box 295
Mt. Vernon, VA. 22121

IN THIS ISSUE:

WarriorDiplomats: The Role of

the Marine Attach
Insurgency and the Role of the
21st Century FAO
The Other End of the Red Sea, or
Has Anyone Considered a Base
in Puntland?

LtCol Stephen Hughes, USAF