UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ROBERT BURCK d/b/a THE NAKED

COWBOY,

Plaintiff,

v. C.A. No. 08 Civ. 1330-DC

MARS, INCORPORATED

and

CHUTE GERDEMAN, INC.,

Defendants.

OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANT MARS,

INCORPORATED’S FAIR USE AND PARODY AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................... 1

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS ......................................................................................................... 2

ARGUMENT.................................................................................................................................. 3

A. Standard of Review..................................................................................................3

B. Mars’s Answer Properly Pleads the Affirmative Defenses of Parody and

Fair Use....................................................................................................................5

1. Burck’s Motion Mischaracterizes Second Circuit Trademark

Parody Jurisprudence ...................................................................................5

a. Courts in this Circuit Consider Parody in the Context of the

Polaroid Factors...............................................................................6

b. First Amendment Balancing Approach to Trademark

Parody Cases..................................................................................11

2. The Parody Doctrine is Not Limited to Situations Where the

Defendant is Selling Novelty Products ......................................................15

C. Burck Cannot Demonstrate that Parody—as a Matter of Law—Is Not a

Viable Defense to His Right of Publicity Claim....................................................20

CONCLUSION............................................................................................................................. 21

i
 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Defendant Mars, Incorporated (“Mars”), by and through counsel, hereby submits this

memorandum in opposition to Plaintiff Robert John Burck’s d/b/a The Naked Cowboy (“Burck”)

motion to dismiss certain of Mars’s affirmative defenses pursuant to Rule 12(f) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure (“Motion”). Because Mars’s defenses are viable based on the facts as

alleged, Burck’s Motion should be denied.

Burck’s motion, asking the Court to strike Mars’s affirmative defenses of fair use and

parody, is premised on a flawed reading of Second Circuit jurisprudence. Contrary to Burck’s

view it is clearly not the case that parody is never a viable defense when the parody at issue is

used in a commercial context. Nor is it the case that a trademark infringement defendant may

invoke parody only where the defendant’s goods are themselves parodies. Courts in the Second

Circuit regularly apply the Polaroid factors in examining claims of parody. Under this approach,

even where the defendant uses parody to sell ordinary consumer goods and services, the

defendant will prevail if differences in the parties’ marks and goods make it clear to consumers

that the defendant’s use is a parody, thereby preventing a likelihood of confusion among

consumers that the defendant’s use is actually endorsed by the plaintiff.

Here, Mars’s M&M’S® Cowboy Characters constitute parody, not infringement, because

consumers will clearly recognize the obvious comical adaptation of Burck’s “trademarked get-

up” as the joke it was intended to be. This is particularly true since the context in which the

M&M’S® Cowboy Characters appear—amongst numerous other parodies of familiar New York

characters and experiences—underscores the fact that this is an obvious parody. Applying the

Polaroid analysis, courts have found parody, not infringement, where the defendant sells

ordinary consumer goods, such as beer, jeans and casino gambling services, in light of the fact
that other differences, e.g., differences between the parties’ marks and goods, rendered consumer

confusion unlikely. That is exactly the situation here. Mars’s M&M’S® Cowboy Characters

contain obvious differences from Burck’s “trademarked get-up,” namely, the insertion of the

famous M&M’S® Characters into cowboy attire, such that the joking imitation of Burck’s

“trademarked get-up” will be obvious to consumers. 1

Burck’s contention that parody, as a matter of law, is not a viable defense to a right of

publicity claim is also unfounded. Burck cites no authority—nor can he—for this novel

contention and quite to the contrary, courts across the country have concluded that parody can

indeed be a viable defense to a right of publicity claim. Moreover, as fully set forth in

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and for Judgment on the Pleadings, Burck’s right of publicity

claim is defective on its face because it does not allege that Defendants used Burck’s “portrait or

picture,” and as a result, fails as a matter of law.

For these reasons, Burck has not met his burden of showing that Mars’s parody and fair

use defenses should be stricken and his Motion should therefore be denied.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Burck alleges that over the past decade, he has “performed as a street entertainer in New

York City’s Times Square under the persona known as The Naked Cowboy.” (Compl. ¶ 5.)

Burck alleges that he “has performed live for hundreds of thousands of people in his trademarked

get-up, which features a white cowboy hat, white cowboy boots, white underpants, and an

acoustic guitar.” (Id. ¶ 6.) According to Burck’s Complaint, his “name and likeness are

registered trademarks” and as a result of his appearances in a variety of television programs,

1
It has long been common practice for Mars to “dress” the M&M’S® Characters in
clothing or with accessories.

2
movies and music videos, Burck is a “prominent and well-known persona.” (Id. ¶¶ 10-17, 20-

21.)

Burck contends that Defendants have violated his rights because “[s]ince April 2007, on

two oversize video billboards situated in the heart of Times Square, Mars has been running an

animated cartoon advertisement featuring a blue ‘M&M’ dressed up exactly like The Naked

Cowboy—white underwear, white cowboy hat, white cowboy boots, and white guitar included.”

(Compl. ¶ 26.) Burck asserts that this usage is “unmistakably a reference to, and incorporation

of, The Naked Cowboy’s trademarked likeness.” (Id. ¶ 27.) In addition, Burck asserts that

“[t]here is also a pictorial version of the ‘Naked Cowboy’ M&M … [which] depicts a yellow

M&M [sic] posing in the same trademarked get-up” used by Burck. (Id. ¶ 30.) The two

M&M’S® Character images with which Burck takes issue are hereinafter referred to as the

“M&M’S® Cowboy Characters.” Burck contends that Mars is liable for both false endorsement

under Lanham Act Section 43(a) and for violating his right of publicity under section 51 of the

New York Civil Rights Law.

In its Answer Mars admits that its Times Square video depicted the Blue M&M’S®

Character wearing “a white cowboy hat, white gloves, cowboy boots, white briefs, holding a

guitar, standing in Times Square.” (Answer ¶ 26.) Mars also admits that in the interior of its

M&M’S WORLD® store, it displayed a mural that included an image of the Yellow M&M’S®

Character dressed in the same cowboy attire. (Id. ¶ 30.)

ARGUMENT

A. Standard of Review

It is well-established that “[m]otions to strike an affirmative defense for legal

insufficiency under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) are not viewed favorably by the courts.” Bennett v.

3
Spoor Behrins Campbell & Young, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 562, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). Thus, “[t]hree

prerequisites must be satisfied before a motion to strike an affirmative defense will be granted.”

Estee Lauder, Inc. v. Fragrance Counter, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 269, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). First, the

motion “will not be granted ‘unless is appears to a certainty that plaintiff[] would succeed despite

any state of the facts which could be proved in support of the defense.’” Id. (quoting William Z.

Salcer, Panfeld, Edelman v. Envicon Equities Corp., 744 F.2d 935, 939 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated

on other grounds, 478 U.S. 1015 (1986)). In making this determination, the court must construe

the pleadings liberally in the defendant’s favor, and the court “must accept the matters well

pleaded as true.” Bennett, 124 F.R.D. at 564; Durant v. Traditional Invs., Ltd., No. 88 Civ. 9048

(PKL), 1990 WL 160672, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 1990); see also Tompkins v. R.J. Reynolds

Tobacco Co., 92 F. Supp. 2d 70, 80 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (“the defendant’s pleadings are to be

construed liberally so as to give the defendant a full opportunity to support its claims after

discovery has been made”).

Second, “there may be no substantial question of law, a resolution of which could allow

the defense to succeed.” FDIC v. Pelletreau & Pelletreau, 965 F. Supp. 381, 389 (E.D.N.Y.

1997); see also Oliner v. McBride’s Indus., Inc., 106 F.R.D. 14, 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (“If the

sufficiency of the defense depends upon disputed questions of law or fact, then a motion to strike

will be denied.”). In this regard,

even when the facts are not disputed and the defense presents a purely legal
question, the courts are very reluctant to determine disputed, substantial questions
of law on a motion to strike … [because] [t]hese questions are viewed as more
properly determinable only after adequate discovery and, if necessary, a complete
hearing on the merits.

Bennett, 124 F.R.D. at 563-64 (citing Sample v. Gotham Football Club, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 160, 169

(S.D.N.Y. 1973)).

4
 Finally, “a motion to strike will be granted only if there is a clear showing that the

challenged defense has no bearing on the subject matter” of the litigation and that “permitting the

defense to stand would prejudice the plaintiff.” Oliner, 106 F.R.D. at 17.

B. Mars’s Answer Properly Pleads the Affirmative Defenses of Parody and Fair
Use. 2

1. Burck’s Motion Mischaracterizes Second Circuit Trademark Parody

Jurisprudence.

Burck’s Motion is premised on a misunderstanding of this Circuit’s trademark

parody jurisprudence. Contrary to Burck’s argument on brief, it is clearly not the case that

parody can never be a viable defense when the parody at issue is used in a commercial context.

Nor is it the law that the message conveyed by a trademark parody must meet the rigorous

copyright fair use standard enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose

Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 3 Rather, courts in this Circuit have used two approaches in

2
Mars’s affirmative defenses of parody, fair use, and the “free speech provisions of the
First Amendment” are all related. As explained by the court in Yankee Publishing, Inc. v. News
America Publishing, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), “parody is merely an example
of the types of expressive content that are favored in fair use analysis under the copyright law
and First Amendment deference under the trademark law.” Id. The court also explained that
under Second Circuit cases “the message of [those] cases is not merely that parody is accorded
First Amendment deference, but rather that the use of a trademark in the communication of an
expressive message is accorded such deference.” Id. Thus, a court may find that a trademark
defendant’s expressive work is entitled to First Amendment or “fair use” protection, even if the
work does not technically meet the definition of a “parody.” See id. at 279-80.
3
Burck cites only one decision that has applied the language of Campbell v. Acuff-Rose to
a trademark parody case. That case, Harley Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806 (2d Cir.
1999), involved much different facts than those at issue here. In Grottanelli, the defendant
adopted a modified bar-and-shield logo that was highly similar to Harley Davidson’s bar-and-
shield logo, and used it as a trademark for his competing motorcycle repair business. On those
facts, the court held that the defendant was plainly attempting to take a free ride on Harley-
Davidson’s goodwill, rather than making any comment on Harley-Davidson. See id. at 812-13.
Here, in stark contrast, and as detailed more fully below, Mars has not used Burck’s
“trademarked get-up” as a trademark for Mars’s business, Mars is not a competitor of Burck, and
Mars’s use is in the context of an expressive work. Consequently, Grottanelli is not helpful to
Burck’s position. Moreover, as discussed below, the analysis used by courts in this Circuit for

5
analyzing trademark parody cases. Under either approach, Mars’s M&M’S® Cowboy Characters

constitute parody as a matter of law.

a. Courts in this Circuit Consider Parody in the Context of the Polaroid

Factors.

Courts in this circuit approach trademark parody cases by applying the factors

delineated in Polaroid Corp. v. Polaroid Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961)

(“Polaroid factors”). 4 As this Court has explained, “parody is not really a separate ‘defense’ as

such, but merely a way of phrasing the traditional response that customers are not likely to be

confused as to source, sponsorship or approval.” Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs,

LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also Schieffelin v. Jack Co. of Boca, Inc.,

725 F. Supp. 1314, 1323-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“Courts in this Circuit have considered the

ramifications of parody in terms of the [Polaroid] factors … more specifically, in terms of

whether the products are similar and whether actual consumer confusion could exist as to the

source of the allegedly infringing product.). In this regard, “[w]hen satire or parody is taken to a

certain degree … it becomes clear that the owner of the trademark was not involved in the

manufacture or sponsorship of the defendant’s product.” Schieffelin, 725 F. Supp. at 1324.

trademark parody does not require reference to Campbell’s copyright fair use standard. Instead,
courts typically analyze trademark parody solely in the context of the Polaroid factors, or
alternatively by first analyzing the First Amendment interests at stake in the defendant’s use, and
then applying the Polaroid factors to determine whether there is any likelihood of consumer
confusion.
4
The “Polaroid factors” are the factors first enunciated by the Second Circuit in Polaroid
Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961), and which are now
routinely used by courts in this Circuit to analyze Lanham Act claims. Specifically, those factors
are (1) the strength of the plaintiff’s trademark; (2) the degree of similarity between the parties’
marks; (3) the proximity of the products; (4) the likelihood that the plaintiff will “bridge the gap”
between the products; (5) the existence of actual confusion; (6) the defendant’s good faith; (7)
the quality of the defendant’s product; and (8) the sophistication of the consumers. Id.; see also
Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).

6
 Under this approach, even where the defendant uses parody in connection with ordinary

consumer products, courts find in favor of the defendant where the differences in the parties’

marks and goods—and application of the other Polaroid factors—makes it clear to consumers

that the defendant’s use is a parody, thereby preventing the mistaken impression that the

defendant’s use is actually endorsed by the plaintiff. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v.

Nintendo Co., 746 F.2d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding that defendant’s video game was a

parody, not infringement, because “the fact that Donkey Kong so obviously parodies the King

Kong theme strongly contributes to dispelling confusion on the part of consumers”).

For example, the court in New York Stock Exchange, Inc. v. New York, New York Hotel

LLC, 293 F.3d 550 (2d Cir. 2002) held that a New York-themed casino’s use of variations of the

plaintiff’s trademarks constituted parody, not infringement. In New York Stock Exchange, the

plaintiff complained that the defendant had infringed its “NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE”

and “NYSE” marks by using the names “New York $lot Exchange” and “NY$E” in its New

York-themed casino in Las Vegas. Id. at 553-54. The casino also featured famous New York

“neighborhoods” and “notable icons of New York City throughout its interior and exterior

decor,” including the use of a “Las Vegas showgirl dressed as the Statue of Liberty, the

Manhattan Express roller coaster, as well as any number of other similar thematic devices.” Id.

at 555. The Second Circuit analyzed the parody issue in the context of the Polaroid factors, 5

stating that under the “similarity of the marks” factor, the defendant’s “versions of NYSE’s

marks … are so obviously modified that any viewer would understand that the Casino was

engaged in a parody or humorous play on words.” Id. Moreover, the court reasoned, the

5
The Second Circuit did not conduct any separate First Amendment analysis, making it
clear that such analysis is not a prerequisite in parody analysis in the Second Circuit. See also
Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 502 (2d Cir. 1996) (“In this
circuit, claims for infringement usually are analyzed under the eight-factor Polaroid test.”).

7
defendant’s “other playful uses of the New York City theme … would further underline the

obvious” parody embodied in the defendant’s use. Id. Thus, the Court upheld the district court’s

entry of summary judgment for the defendant on the plaintiff’s trademark infringement claim.

Likewise, the court in Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Productions, Inc., 73 F.3d 497,

502 (2d Cir. 1996), noting that “[i]n this circuit, claims for infringement usually are analyzed

under the eight-factor Polaroid test,” held that the defendant’s sale of merchandise under the

name “Spa’am” was a parody, and did not infringe the plaintiff’s SPAM trademark. Id. at 502.

Applying the Polaroid analysis, the court emphasized that because “the two marks appear in

strikingly different contexts and project wholly different visual displays,” consumers would see

the defendant’s use as an obvious parody, and would not be confused. Id. at 504.

Other jurisdictions have taken this same approach, relying solely on analysis of the

likelihood-of-confusion factors to find that a defendant’s use is parody and not infringement.

See, e.g., Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1485 (10th Cir. 1987)

(because of dissimilarity of the parties’ marks, namely, defendant’s sale of jeans under

“Lardashe” name and accompanying logo featuring a “large, brightly colored pig head and two

hooves,” the defendant’s use would be understood by consumers as a parody of the plaintiff’s

JORDACHE trademark); Eveready Battery Co. v. Adolph Coors, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 440, 450

(N.D. Ill. 1991) (the “unmistakable differences between the Energizer Bunny and [Mr.] Nielsen

in modified rabbit attire” would convey to consumers that the defendant’s use was a parody).

Applying the Polaroid analysis here, it is readily evident that Mars’s M&M’S® Cowboy

Characters are parodies. Like the parodies in New York Stock Exchange and Hormel, Mars’s

M&M’S® Cowboy Characters embody numerous obvious changes to Burck’s “trademarked get-

up” that clearly convey to consumers that the use is a parody. The marks at issue are Burck’s

8
alleged “trademarked likeness” (consisting of Burck dressed in a white cowboy hat, underpants,

and boots while holding a guitar) and Defendants’ famous M&M’S® Characters, which consist

of the famous Yellow and Blue M&M’S® Characters with the visible “M” on their M&M’S®

bodies, white gloves, mouths, large oval eyes, eyebrows, hands and feet, attired in an alleged

imitation of the Naked Cowboy’s “trademarked get-up.” 6 On the facts as alleged, Mars’s

Characters are classic examples of parody. The images conjure up just enough of Burck’s

trademark—specifically, the hat, boots, underpants and guitar—for consumers to recognize the

target of the parody, while at the same time making “obvious changes to the marks that

constitute the joke,” namely, the depiction of the cowboy attire on the bodies of animated

M&M’S® Characters, rather than on Burck himself. See Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc., 221 F.

Supp. 2d at 416.

Over the last decade, if not longer, Mars has been dressing and accessorizing its

M&M’S® Characters in every imaginable outfit in humorous imitation of literally hundreds of

figures, ranging from the Phantom of the Opera to Clint Eastwood in The Good, the Bad and The

Ugly. Much like the Muppet characters, the M&M’S® Characters and their humorous antics and

imitations have become a widely enjoyed brand of humor. Mars’s humorous parodies are

perfectly analogous to those at issue in Hormel, a decision which could be applied virtually

verbatim to support the finding here that Mars’s imitation of Burck’s Naked Cowboy “is simply

another in a long line of [M&M’S® Character] lampoons. Moreover, this [M&M’S® Character]

6
While Burck’s Complaint does not detail the characteristics of the M&M’S® Characters,
the Court may take judicial notice of them as they are available on Mars’s M&M’S® website at
http://us.mms.com/us/about/characters. See Fed. R. Evid. 201; Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 45
F. Supp. 2d 276, 278 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (taking judicial notice of historical information on
Liberia on the “Geocities” website). See also Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Blackmore Sewer
Constr., Inc., 298 F.3d 600, 607 (7th Cir. 2002) (taking judicial notice of information regarding a
bank's ownership from the bank's website).

9
brand of humor is widely recognized and enjoyed. Thus, consumers of [Mars’s] merchandise, all

of which will display the [M&M’S® trademarks], are likely to see the [M&M’S® Cowboy

Characters] as the joke it was intended to be.” Hormel, 73 F.3d at 503.

Moreover, as in New York Stock Exchange, the context in which Mars’s M&M’S®

Cowboy Characters appear underscores that this is a parody of familiar New York characters. In

both the mural and video, the M&M’S® Cowboy Characters do not appear in isolation, but are

depicted amongst numerous other parodies of New York characters and scenes, including an

image of the Green M&M’S® Character dressed as the Statue of Liberty and Marilyn Monroe,

and the Red M&M’S® Character as King Kong scaling the Chrysler Building. As such, these

“other playful uses of the New York City theme … would further underline the obvious” fact

that Mars’s use is a parody, rather than an endorsement by Burck. See New York Stock

Exchange, Inc., 293 F.3d at 555.

For these same reasons Mars could dress it’s M&M’S® Characters up in a baseball

uniform—even one with the number ‘2’ on it—and it would be permissible parody. Burck

suggests such a scenario with his rhetorical question: “[i]f Mars had dressed its M&Ms [sic] up

in Yankees pinstripes bearing the number ‘2,’ can it really be the case that Derek Jeter would just

have to accept the fact that he is now an unwitting endorser of candy?” (Mot. 2.) Burck ignores

the not-so-subtle difference between dressing an a male actor up in a baseball uniform with the

number ‘2’ and dressing an M&M’S® Character in the same attire. In the latter case, it is

axiomatic that the M&M’S® Character dressed as a baseball player with whatever number on it,

is still quite obviously a big round or oval, colored, animated M&M’S® Character—not a person.

As the Tenth Circuit concluded in Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95

F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996), affirming the district court’s grant of declaratory judgment against

10
major league baseball on its infringement claim, there was no likelihood of confusion since “no

one would mistake MLBPA and its members as anything other than the targets of the parody

cards.” Id. at 967. By definition, a parody plays off of the difference between the original mark

and the disputed product in order to create a humorous result and it is this humorous association,

not public confusion as to the source of the disputed work or product, which makes a parody

successful. See id. Nor would Mars dressing up its M&M’S® Character as a baseball player

violate Mr. Jeter’s right of publicity. As this court explained in Allen v. National Video, Inc.,

610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), merely suggesting “some aspect of a person’s public

persona” is not actionable so long as the use does not amount to a “portrait or picture” of the

plaintiff. Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 623. Thus, if Mars’s use did no more than suggest a

resemblance to Mr. Jeter’s public persona by using pin-striped navy and white uniform, sans

“Yankees,” but with a number ‘2,’ as it did with Burck’s likeness, such use is plainly not

actionable under section 51 of the Civil Rights Law.

Consequently, under the Polaroid analysis, not only has Mars adequately pled its

affirmative defense of parody and fair use, on the facts alleged by Burck, Mars’s M&M’S®

Cowboy Characters are parodies as a matter of law and judgment should be entered in Mars’s

favor on all claims.

b. First Amendment Balancing Approach to Trademark Parody Cases

A minority of courts in this Circuit have analyzed trademark parody cases by first

evaluating the First Amendment interests at stake in the defendant’s work and then applying the

Polaroid factors to determine whether the defendant’s use is likely to cause consumer confusion.

Courts taking this approach recognize that although commercial speech is entitled to lesser First

Amendment protection than non-commercial speech, even commercial actors have a First

11
Amendment right to comment on a trademark owner. Thus, even in a commercial context, a

defendant’s use will be deemed a parody if the following conditions are met: (1) the defendant’s

use comments on the trademark owner; and (2) the defendant has not used the parody as an

indicator of source for the defendant’s product.

This approach was well summarized by the court in Yankee Publishing, Inc. v. News

America Publishing, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1992):

[T]he First Amendment confers a measure of protection for the unauthorized use
of trademarks when that use is a part of the expression of a communicative
message. … When another’s trademark (or a confusingly similar mark) is used
without permission for the purpose of source identification, the trademark law
generally prevails over the First Amendment. . . . However, when unauthorized
use of another’s mark is part of a communicative message and not a source
identifier, the First Amendment is implicated in opposition to the trademark right.
In recognition of this conflict, the Second Circuit has construed the Lanham Act
narrowly when the unauthorized use of the trademark is for the purpose of a
communicative message. . . .

Id. at 275-76 (second emphasis added ); see also Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc., 221 F. Supp.

2d at 414 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Cases finding that First Amendment interests prevail involve

nontrademark uses of [a] mark—that is, where the trademark is not being used to indicate the

source or origin of consumer products, but rather is being used only to comment upon and, in the

case of parody, to ridicule, the trademark owner.”) (Emphasis added). In conducting this review

the courts “allow[] greater latitude for works such as parodies, in which expression, and not

commercial exploitation of another’s trademark, is the primary intent, and in which there is a

need to evoke the original work being parodied.” Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, 221 F. Supp. 2d at

414-15 (citation omitted).

Under this approach, Mars’s M&M’S® Cowboy Characters are parodies as a matter of

law because they comment on the trademark owner, Burck, and in full context on New York City

as a whole, and because they do not function as indicators of source for Mars’s goods. Contrary

12
to Burck’s assertion, Mars’s M&M’S® Cowboy Characters do in fact comment on Burck. By

dressing its M&M’S® Characters in attire that imitates notable New York Characters, including

Burck’s Naked Cowboy, and by having them act in humorous ways in their various attires, Mars

reminds consumers to see the humor in these familiar New York characters. That is all that is

required of a trademark parody. As explained by this Court in Tommy Hilfiger Licensing,

“[t]rademark parodies … do convey a message. The message may be simply that business and

product images need not always be taken too seriously; a trademark parody reminds us that we

are free to laugh at the images and associations linked with the mark.” Tommy Hilfiger

Licensing, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 415 (quoting L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d

26, 34 (1st Cir. 1987)). Thus, Mars’s M&M’S® Cowboy Characters sufficiently comment about

Burck for purposes of a trademark parody. See Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell

Publ’g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1989) (“parody may be sophisticated as well as

slapstick”); L.L. Bean, Inc., 811 F.2d at 34 (“[d]enying parodists the opportunity to poke fun at

symbols and names which have become woven into the fabric of our daily life, would constitute

a serious curtailment of a protected form of expression”). The Naked Cowboy, by his own

admission, is “a fixture of New York City culture, as well as one of the top tourist attractions for

visitors to Times Square.” (Compl. ¶ 7.)

Second, Mars does not use the M&M’S® Cowboy Characters as an indicator of source for

Mars’s goods. Quite the opposite, the appearance of Burck’s “trademarked get-up” serves only

as a source of humor in Mars’s video and mural—expressive works designed primarily to

entertain viewers. Indeed, the images that serve as indicators of source for Mars in the works at

issue are the famous M&M’S® Characters, with whom consumers have a long and loyal

association.

13
 Mars’s use is plainly distinguishable from the case of Harley Davidson, Inc. v.

Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806 (2d Cir. 1999), which Burck mistakenly relies upon. In Grottanelli,

the plaintiff motorcycle manufacturer Harley Davidson sued the defendant Grottanelli for

trademark infringement when Grottanelli adopted a “bar-and-shield” logo for his motorcycle

repair business that was highly similar to Harley Davidson’s bar-and-shield logo. Id. at 809.

Grottanelli argued that his use should be protected as parody. Id. at 812. The court held that

Grottanelli’s use could not constitute parody, as a matter of law, because Grottanelli was using

the parody as a trademark for his own competing motorcycle business. See id. at 813 (“In this

context, parodic use is sharply limited.”). The court also reasoned that Grottanelli’s use could

not be parody because it “makes no comment on Harley’s mark.” Id.

Likewise, other decisions have found infringement, not parody, where a defendant used

the plaintiff’s mark, or a confusingly similar mark, as a trademark to sell the defendant’s own

products, rather than to comment on the plaintiff. See Nabisco Brands, Inc. v. Kaye, 760 F.

Supp. 25, 28 (D. Conn. 1991) (finding defendant’s use of mark “A.2” for meat sauce infringed

plaintiff’s “A.1” mark for steak sauce); Gucci Shops, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 446 F. Supp. 838,

840 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (defendant’s use of mark “GUCCHI GOO” for diaper bags infringed

plaintiff’s GUCCI mark for handbags); Grey v. Campbell Soup Co., 650 F. Supp. 1166, 1173-75

(C.D. Cal. 1986) (DOGIVA dog biscuits held to infringe GODIVA chocolates), aff’d, 830 F.2d

197 (9th Cir. 1987).

Here, as noted above, unlike the defendants in Grottanelli and the other foregoing cases,

Mars did not use Burck’s “trademarked get-up” as a trademark to sell competing products. Quite

the opposite, Mars used Burck’s “trademarked get-up” as part of an expressive work that

parodies Burck and numerous other familiar New York characters and experiences. The purpose

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of Mars’s work is to entertain consumers and to poke fun at the New York characters that

consumers recognize as part of their daily lives. To communicate its humorous message with

respect to Burck, Mars dressed its famous M&M’S® Characters in cowboy attire. In that context,

the cowboy attire does not function as a trademark for Mars’s products, but instead serves to

“conjure up” just enough of Burck’s alleged trademark for consumers to recognize the target of

the parody, while at the same time making “obvious changes to the marks that constitute the

joke,” namely, the depiction of the cowboy attire on the bodies of animated M&M’S®

Characters, rather than on Burck himself. See Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 2d

at 416. Indeed, in Mars’s parody, it is the M&M’S® Characters, with whom consumers have a

long and loyal association, and not Burck’s “trademarked get-up,” that serves a trademark

function.

Thus, because Mars is using the cowboy attire not as an indicator of source for Mars’s

products, but rather as part of an expressive work to humorously comment on familiar New York

characters, including Burck, Mars’s use is a parody as a matter of law.

2. The Parody Doctrine is Not Limited to Situations Where the Defendant is

Selling “Novelty Products.”

Burck argues that the parody defense is only valid where the parody is embodied in the

defendant’s product itself, i.e., where the defendant is selling novelty products. This is not the

law. The nature of a defendant’s goods is simply another factor considered by courts when

conducting the Polaroid analysis. Specifically, the fact that a defendant’s goods are novelty

products often strengthens the defendant’s parody, because the outrageousness of the defendant’s

products dispels any possibility that consumers would think the defendant’s products are in fact

authorized by the plaintiff. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Vibra Approved Labs. Corp., No. 87

CIV 8840 (CSH), 1989 WL 39679, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 1989) (replica of American

15
Express card containing condom and phrase “DON’T LEAVE HOME WITHOUT IT” deemed a

parody).

However, it is not required that a defendant’s goods be novelty products in order to

constitute parody, and numerous courts have found parody, not infringement, even where the

defendant used parody to sell ordinary consumer goods, such as beer, jeans, and casino gambling

services. See, e.g., New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. New York, New York Hotel, LLC, 293 F.3d 550,

553-55 (2d Cir. 2002) (use of parody to promote casino gambling services held non-infringing);

Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 746 F.2d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1984) (use of parody to

sell video game held non-infringing); Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d

497, 503-04 (2d Cir. 1996) (use of parody to sell dolls and other merchandise held non-

infringing); Eveready Battery Co. v. Adolph Coors, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 440, 450 (N.D. Ill. 1991)

(use of parody to sell beer held non-infringing); Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828

F.2d 1482, 1485-86 (10th Cir. 1987) (use of parody to sell jeans held non-infringing).

The rationale in those cases was that obvious differences between the parties’ marks and

goods would clearly convey to consumers that the defendant’s use was a parody, and thus would

not cause consumer confusion. See, e.g., Eveready Battery Co., 765 F. Supp. at 450 (finding

parody, not infringement, because “the unmistakable differences between the Energizer Bunny

and Leslie Nielsen in modified rabbit attire arguably generate much of the humor in the Coors

parody” and prevent consumer confusion). 7

7
See also Hormel Foods Corp., 73 F.3d at 503-04 (despite fact that defendant used parody
to sell merchandise—namely, stuffed animals—rather than novelty products, the use was a
parody and not infringing because the visual dissimilarities between defendant’s “Spa’am” mark
and plaintiff’s SPAM mark, and the “parodic context in which the name ‘Spa’am’ appears will
distinguish the marks in the consumer’s mind”); Universal City Studios, Inc., 746 F.2d at 116
(use in a video game of “Donkey Kong” character that was similar to plaintiff’s “King Kong”
character was a permissible parody, not infringement, because “the fact that Donkey Kong so

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 The same conclusion is warranted here. Just as in Eveready where the defendant’s use of

Leslie Nielsen in a bunny suit was an obvious parody of the Energizer Bunny, so too is Mars’s

use of its M&M’S® Characters in an adaptation of Burck’s “trademarked get-up.” Indeed,

Mars’s modification of Burck’s “trademarked get-up” “reinforce[s] the imitative, yet comedic

scheme inherent in a humorous takeoff” and is a classic trademark parody. Tommy Hilfiger

Licensing, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 2d at 417.

Burck’s reliance on Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826

(S.D.N.Y. 1990) is misplaced as it ignores the difference between copyright and trademark law.

Ignoring the significant differences between the two, Burck argues that under Tin Pan Apple,

where a parody is used to sell an unrelated product, “it cannot constitute fair use.” (Mot. 10.) In

Tin Pan Apple, the plaintiffs—on behalf of the rap group the “Fat Boys,” sued the defendants,

including Miller Brewing Co., for producing a commercial that used music that sounded like Fat

Boys’ recordings, and actors who looked like and performed like the Fat Boys. The defendants

filed a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss all claims, arguing among other things that the defendants’ use

of the Fat Boys look-alikes was protected under the parody doctrine.

The bulk of the Tin Pan Apple court’s analysis centers on the plaintiff’s copyright claim.

In this regard, the court noted that for parody to be viable in a copyright context, it must be a

“fair use” as defined under Section 107 of the Copyright Act. Id. at 830. One of the factors to be

considered in a copyright fair use analysis is whether the defendant’s work is of a commercial

nature. Id. at 832. Thus, the court reasoned, the fact that the defendant’s work had a

“commercial purpose [is] a factor militating against fair use.” Id. The Tin Pan Apple court

obviously parodies the King Kong theme strongly contributes to dispelling confusion on the part
of consumers”); Jordache Enters., 828 F.2d at 1485 (defendant’s use of “striking, brightly
colored and far from subtle” pig design for its “Lardashe” jeans was an obvious parody of
plaintiff’s JORDACHE jeans, and would not cause consumer confusion).

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therefore held that because the defendant’s work was “entirely for profit,” this factor weighed

against the defendant in the fair use analysis and, ultimately, the defendant could not demonstrate

that its work was a “fair use” for purposes of seeking to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim. Id. at 833.

Without any separate analysis, the court also denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss with

respect to the plaintiff’s trademark claim. Id. at 834.

Significantly, the Tin Pan Apple court did not hold that a parody used in a commercial ad

could never constitute “fair use” under either copyright or trademark infringement analysis.

Indeed, as noted above, numerous decisions have upheld exactly such commercial uses of parody

to promote a defendant’s product. See, e.g., New York Stock Exch., Inc., 293 F.3d at 553-54

(holding that defendant’s use of comical adaptations of plaintiff’s marks in advertisements to

promote defendant’s casino gaming services was a parody, and not infringement). Moreover,

unlike the defendant in Tin Pan Apple, Mars’s M&M’S® Cowboy Characters were not made to

appear to actually be Burck, i.e., Mars did not employ a look alike. Nor was Mars’s parody of

Burck used in a commercial designed solely to promote a product. Instead, Mars’s parody was

displayed in a video and mural designed to entertain viewers by parodying numerous familiar

New York characters. Further, the procedural posture of the Tin Pan Apple decision was quite

different than in the present Motion. The Tin Pan Apple court did not strike the defendant’s

parody defense, nor did it enter judgment for the plaintiff, but held only that as pled, the

plaintiffs had stated a viable claim for infringement under the Lanham Act. Tin Pan Apple, 737

F. Supp. at 833-34.

Likewise, Burck’s reliance on D.C. Comics, Inc. v. Crazy Eddie, Inc., 205 U.S.P.Q. 1177

(S.D.N.Y. 1977) is misplaced. In D.C. Comics, the court analyzed only the plaintiff’s copyright

claim, and held that the because the defendant’s commercial represented a “detailed copying of

18
plaintiff’s trailers,” and used it solely for “personal profit” it did not qualify as fair use under the

Copyright Act. Id. at 1178. The facts here could not be more different. First, this is a

trademark, not copyright action. Second, Mars’s parody merely “conjures up” enough of

Burck’s trademark to make the target of its parody clear, while simultaneously making obvious

changes to Burck’s trademarked likeness to avoid any possibility of consumer confusion. Third,

Mars used the parody not “solely for personal profit” but in the context of an expressive work

designed to entertain viewers. D.C. Comics therefore is wholly inapposite.

Similarly, Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y.

1987)—cited by Burck—is irrelevant to the case at bar. In Steinberg, the plaintiff again asserted

only a copyright claim, and alleged that the defendant’s copying of the plaintiff’s iconic drawing

of New York City and use of it in a movie poster to promote the defendant’s movie constituted

copyright infringement. Steinberg, 663 F. Supp. at 708. In analyzing the fair use factors, the

court held that the defendant’s work could not constitute fair use because the work did not

parody the plaintiff’s illustration at all, but instead merely copied the plaintiff’s work in order to

promote the defendant’s movie. Id. at 715. The facts here are patently different. Unlike the

Steinberg defendant’s movie poster, Mars’s expressive work does in fact comment on Burck. As

noted above, Mars’s M&M’S® Cowboy Characters convey the humorous message that familiar

New York characters such as Burck, or the fellow stealing your cab, should be taken lightly, and

that consumers should see the humor in familiar New York characters and experiences. Hence

the conclusion of the video: “I ♥ NY,” with the Red M&M’S® Character standing in the place of

19
the heart. Accordingly, because Mars’s work conveys an expressive message, Burck’s reliance

on Steinberg is misplaced. 8

C. Burck Cannot Demonstrate that Parody—as a Matter of Law—Is Not a Viable

Defense to His Right of Publicity Claim.

Burck argues that parody is not a viable defense to a plaintiff’s right of publicity claim

under section 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law. The only case Burck cites for this

proposition, Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), does not support

his assertion. In fact, Allen did not involve a parody claim at all, and held that the plaintiff could

not sustain his right of publicity claim on the ground that the defendant’s use of a celebrity look-

alike was not, as a matter of law, a “portrait or picture” of the plaintiff. Id. at 624. Allen

therefore does not support Burck’s position, and Burck has pointed to no decision—nor could

he—holding that a parody defense is not viable as a matter of law against a right of publicity

claim under New York law.

Moreover, the case law suggests that a defendant’s parodic use is indeed a valid defense

to a right of publicity. Indeed, in the factually similar case of World Wrestling Fed’n v. Big Dog

Holdings, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 413, 434 (W.D. Pa. 2003), the court entered summary judgment

for defendants who used “dogified” images of professional wrestlers on defendant’s t-shirts. The

court noted that the images used by the defendant were not “literal depictions” but were instead

8
Burck’s reliance on Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. 221 F. Supp. 2d at 414 also is
unavailing. The court in Hilfiger held that the defendant’s use of the name “Timmy Holedigger”
for pet perfume was an obvious “pun” or comical adaptation on the plaintiff’s TOMMY
HILFIGER marks. Although the court noted that pet perfume, as a novelty product, helped
clarify the fact that the defendant’s use was parody, the court did not hold that only defendants
selling novelty products can avail themselves of the parody defense. Indeed, as noted above,
many decisions have held otherwise, and have found a defendant’s use to be parody even where
it sold ordinary consumer products. See, e.g., New York Stock Exch., Inc., 293 F.3d 553-55
(defendant’s use of comical adaptations of plaintiff’s marks in connection with casino gambling
services was a parody, not infringement).

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caricatures. Id. at 445. In finding the defendant’s images to be parodies, rather than violations

of the plaintiffs’ rights of publicity, the court reasoned that “Big Dog’s use of dogs to poke fun at

celebrities and societal icons is an important form of entertainment and expressive commentary

that deserves First Amendment protection.” Id. The same conclusion is warranted here. By

dressing the famous M&M’S® Characters in cowboy attire, Mars has, at most, suggested aspects

of Burck’s public persona. In addition, Burck, like the WWE celebrities in Big Dog, claims to

have attained “celebrity status” and thus is a “prime target of satire and parody” of the type that

Mars has utilized. Id.

Consequently, Burck cannot show that parody is not viable—as a matter of law—as a

defense to Burck’s right of publicity claim.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons Burck’s motion to strike Mars’s affirmative defenses of fair use and

parody should be denied.

Dated: May 16, 2008 Respectfully submitted,

ARENT FOX LLP

________/s/_________________________
Leslie K. Mitchell, N.Y. Bar No. LM2811
Joseph R. Price (admitted pro hac vice)
Ross Q. Panko
ARENT FOX LLP
1675 Broadway
New York, New York 10019
Telephone: (212) 484-3900
Facsimile: (212) 484-3990
Price.joseph@arentfox.com

Counsel for Defendants

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