G.R. No.

L-9768 February 20, 1915 THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EULALIO MORELOS, defendant-appellant.

The defendant is charged with the crime of having violated his duty in relation of prisoners, while he was
acting as warden or alcaide of the Tondo police station of the city of Manila. The complaint alleges:

That on or about September 18, 1913, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said Eulalio
Morelos, being a duly appointed and qualified policeman, and as such acting as warden, jailer, and
person charged with the care and vigilance of the prisoners that were then in the prisoners' cells of the
police station of Tondo of said city, and among which prisoners was one Tomasa Clemente, did
willfully, and criminally and taking advantage of the fact that the said Tomasa Clemente was asleep
upon her, insert his sexual organ and male member in the genital organs of said offended woman, and
have carnal intercourse with her, demanding her love, making unchaste proposal to her, and
proposing to her illicit sexual relations and connections; in violation of the law.

Upon said complaint the defendant was duly arrested, arraigned, pleaded not guilty, was tried, found to be
guilty, and sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of three years six months and twenty-one days of prision
correccional, and to pay the costs, in accordance with the provisions of article 380 of the Penal Code, and for
a period of eleven years and one day of inhabilitacion temporal especial.

From that sentence the defendant appeals to this court. In this court the appellant presents two questions,
one of fact and one of law. The question of fact presented by the appellant relates to the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the complaint. The question of law relates to the application of article 380 to the facts in
the present case.

That Tomasa Clemente, the offended person, was a prisoner in the Tondo police station on the night of the
18th of September, 1913, and for two or three days theretofore, is a fact not denied; that the accused was in
charge of the prisoners in said police station on the night of said day, is a fact not disputed; that the defendant
entered the cell of Tomasa Clemente on the night in question and had illicit relations with her, is a fact fully
sustained by the proof.

Article 380 provides:

Any warden (alcaide) who shall solicit any woman in his custody, shall suffer the penalty of prision
correccional, in its medium and maximum degrees.

If the woman solicited be the wife, daughter, or sister, or a relative within the same degree of affinity,
of any person in the custody of such warden (alcaide), the penalty shall be prision correccional in its
minimum and medium degrees.

In every case a penalty ranging from temporal special disqualification in its maximum degree to
perpetual special disqualification, shall also be imposed.

It will be noted under said law that the same applies to any warden (alcaide) "who shall solicit any woman in
his custody," and that he shall suffer the penalty prescribed by the law. The appellant argues that he was not
the warden or alcaide and, therefore, said article does not apply to him. The word "warden" or "alcaide," as
used in said article, is used in a most general sense. From an examination of the word "warden" or
"alcaide," both in the English and Spanish dictionaries, we find that it means a person who has charged of
prisoners. In our opinion the word is used in that general signification in said article 380, and that the same is
therefore applicable to the defendant.

The appellant further argues that the proof fails to show that he had solicited a woman in his custody. It was
proven, however, that his illicit relations had been consummated. It would be strange interpretation to place
upon said law, that a failure in the proof to show a "solicitation" was sufficient to relieve the defendant from
responsibility, when the act solicited had been consummated.

In our opinion said article 380 is applicable to the facts in the present case. For all of the foregoing reasons,
the sentence of the lower court should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs.
G.R. No. L-16808 January 3, 1921

ANDRES BORROMEO, plaintiff,

vs.
FERMIN MARIANO, defendant.

Fisher and DeWitt for plaintiff.

Attorney-General Feria for defendant.

MALCOLM, J.:

Quo warranto proceedings have been instituted in this court to determine the right of the plaintiff and of
the defendant to the office of Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District.

The only facts, and these are undisputed ones, which need be noticed, are the following: Andres
Borromeo was appointed and commissioned as Judge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District,
effective July 1, 1914. He duly qualified and took possession of the office on that date. On February, 25,
1920, he was appointed Judge of the Twenty-first Judicial District, and Fermin Mariano was appointed
Judge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District. Judge Borromeo has since the latter date consistently
refused to accept appointment to the Twenty-first Judicial District.

Judges of First Instance are appointed by the Governor-General with the consent of the Philippine
Senate to serve until they reach the age of 65 years. (Adm. Code, secs. 65, 66, 148.) One Judge of First
Instance is commissioned for each judicial district, except the night. (Sec. 154.) The oath of office of the
judge is "filed with the clerk of the court to which the affiant pertains and shall be entered upon its
records." (Sec. 128.) Judges of First Instance may only be detailed by the Secretary of Justice to
temporary duty in a district other than their own for the purpose of trying land registration cases and for
vacation duty. (Sec. 155.) The concluding portion of section 155 of the Administrative Code, to which
particular attention is addressed by the Attorney-General, is, "but nothing herein shall be construed to
prevent a judge of first instance of one district from being appointed to be judge of another
district." A Judge of First Instance can be removed from office by the Governor-General only if in the
judgment of the Supreme Court sufficient cause shall exists involving serious misconduct or inefficiency
in office. (Sec. 173.)

The cardinal rule of statutory construction requires the court to give effect to the general legislative intent
if that can be discovered within the four corners of the Act. When the object intended to be accomplished
by the statute is once clearly ascertained, general words may be restrained to it and those of narrower
import may be expanded to embrace it, to effectuate the intent. Along with this fundamental principle is
another, equally well-established, that such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted, as will give effect
to all provision of the statute. (2 Lewis' Sutherland, Statutory Construction, pp. 662, et seq.; In re Allen
[1903], 2 Phil., 630; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 287.)

Leaving out of consideration for the moment the last part of section 155 of the Administrative Code, the
provisions of the Judiciary Law are plain and unambiguous. Judges of First Instance are appointed
judges of the courts of first instance of the respective judicial districts of the Philippines Islands. They are
not appointed judges of first instance of the Philippine Islands. They hold these positions of judges of
first instance of definite districts until they resign, retire, or are removed through impeachment
proceedings. The intention of the law is to recognize separate and distinct judicial offices.

The concluding portion of section 155 of the Administrative Code, although not beginning with the usual
introductory word, "provided," is nevertheless, in the nature of a proviso, and should be construed as
such. The office of a proviso is to limit the application of the law. It is contrary to the nature of a proviso to
enlarge the operation of the law. It should not be construed so as to repeal or destroy the main
provisions of the statute. A proviso which is directly repugnant to the purview or body of an Act is
inoperative and void. (See generally, 25 R. C. L., pp. 984, et seq.; and specifically, the leading cases of
McKnight vs. Hodge [1909], 55 Wash., 289, 104 Pac., 504, 40 L. R. A. [N.S.], 1207; McCormick vs. West
Duluth [1891], 47 Minn., 272, 50 N.W., 128; Idaho Power & Light Co. vs. Blomquist [1916], 26 Idaho,
222; 141 Pac., 1083, Ann. Cas. [1916 E], p. 282, where these principles concerning provisos are
applied.)

To arrive at a correct decision with reference to the proviso before us, let it first be recalled that the law is
emphatic in its specification that, save when judges of first instance are detailed to try land
registration cases or when assigned to vacation duty, "no judge of first instance shall be required
to do duty in any other district than that for which he is commissioned." The keyword to the proviso
which follows is "appointed." This word should here be given its usual signification. Many of the decisions
follow the definition of "appoint" found in the Century Dictionary and Encyclopedia. "Appoint" is there
defined as "to allot, set apart, or designate; nominate or authoritatively assign, as far a use, or to a
position or office." All the authorities united in saying that the term "appoint" is well-known in law and
whether regarded in its legal or in its ordinary acceptation, is applied to the nomination or designation of
an individual. Appointment signifies no more than selection for public office. (4 C. J., 1402, 1404, citing
numerous decisions.)

The effect to be given to the word "appoint" is corroborated by the principles of the law of public officers.
Appointment and qualification to office are separate and distinct things. Appointment is the sole act
of those vested with the power to make it. Acceptance is the sole act of the appointee. Persons may be
chosen for office at pleasure; there is no power in these Islands which can compel a man to accept the
office. (22 R. C. L. 423.) If, therefore, anyone could refuse appointment as a judge of first instance to a
particular district, when once appointment to this district is accepted, he has exactly the same right to
refuse an appointment to another district. No other person could be placed in the position of this Judge of
First Instance since another rule of public officers is, that an appointment may not be made to an office
which is not vacant. (29 Cyc., 1373.) In our judgment, the language of the proviso to section 155 of the
Administrative Code, interpreted with reference to the law of public officers, does not empower the
Governor-General to force upon the judge of one district an appointment to another district
against his will, thereby removing him from his district.

Returning again to the principle of statutory construction that a proviso should not be given a meaning
which would tend to render abortive the main portions of the law, it should further be recalled that judges
of first instance are removable only through a fixed procedure. Moreover, impeachment proceedings,
as conducted by the Supreme Court, may be in the nature of jurisdiction, conferred upon the Supreme
Court by ratification of the Congress of the United States, which, it has uniformly been held, cannot be
diminished. (We make no ruling on this point because unnecessary for the resolution of the case.) But,
certainly, if a judge could be transferred from one district of the Philippine Islands to another, without his
consent, it would require no great amount of imagination to conceive how this power could be used to
discipline the judge or as an indirect means of removal. A judge who had, by a decision, incurred the
ill-will of an attorney or official, could, by the insistence of the disgruntled party, be removed from one
district, demoted, and transferred to another district, at possibly a loss of salary, all without the consent of
the judicial officer. The only recourse of the judicial officer who should desire to maintain his self-respect,
would be to vacate the office and leave the service. Unless we wish to nullify the impeachment section of
the Administrative Code, and thus possibly to encroach upon the jurisdiction conferred upon the
Supreme Court by the Organic Law, section 155 must be interpreted so as to make it consistent
therewith.

What we have said is reinforced by the authorities most directly in point. In the early decision of Marbury
vs. Madison ([1803], 1 Cranch, 137), the Supreme Court of the United States, in unmistakable terms,
explained the powers of the Judiciary in enforcing the Constitution as the Supreme Law of the Land and
held that the President of the United States had no power to remove a justice of the peace of the District
of Columbia from office. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall said that "When the officer is not removable at the will
of the executive, the appointment is not revocable, and cannot be annulled: it has conferred legal rights
which cannot be resumed. The discretion of the executive is to be exercised, until the appointment has
been made. But having once made the appointment, his power over the office is terminated, in all
cases where, by law, the officer is not removable by him. The right to the office is then in the person
appointed, and he has the absolute unconditional power of accepting or rejecting it." The great
jurist further or observed that "It is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department, to say
what the law is"

In State of Louisiana vs. Downes ([1869], 21 La. Ann., 490), the Supreme Court of Louisiana said that a
judge of a court could, under the Constitution of that State, only be removed from office by impeachment,
by address of the Legislature, or by proceeding under the intrusion act. It was held that the appointment
and commissioning by the Governor of the State of a party to an office which has legally been filled,
without the vacancy being first declared according to law, was an absolute nullity.

The Attorney-General brings to our notice an obsolete law which had escaped us, and which, if any
lingering doubts exist, would serve to remove that. This law is Act No. 396, enacted by the Philippine
Commission in 1902. Section 4 thereof, separate and distinct from the other provisions of the Act, and
not tacked on as a proviso, provided that "any judge of a Court of First Instance . . . may be transferred
from one judicial district to another by order of the Civil Governor, with the advice and consent of the
Commission. Any judge so transferred shall, upon such transfer, cease the performance of judicial duties
in the district to which he was originally appointed, and shall be the regular judge thereafter in the judicial
district to which he as been so assigned." But Act No. 396 was thrice repealed by the Philippine
Legislature; the first time, impliedly by the enactment of Act No. 2347, the Judiciary Reorganization Act,
and subsequently, expressly by the Administrative Code of 1916 and the Administrative Code of
1917. Instead, also, of continuing the phraseology of section 4 of Act No. 396, the Legislature merely
included the proviso to which we have alluded. It cannot, therefore, admit of doubt that the members of
the Philippine Legislature had before them the Act of the Philippine Commission and preferred, not to
perpetuate the old law, but to insert language of their own. The purpose of the Philippine Legislature was
clearly to safeguard the interests of the judiciary, and this laudable purpose, it is for us now to effectuate.

Far more convincing than precedent or argument are great and basic principles long inherent in popular
government intended to create an independent judiciary. A history of the struggle for a fearless and an
incorruptible judiciary prepared to follow the law and to administer it regardless of consequences, can be
perused with ever-recurring benefit. Since the early days of the Republic, the judicial system in the
United States, with certain exceptions which only served to demonstrate more fully the excellence of the
whole, has been viewed with pride, and confidently relied upon for justice by the American people. The
American people considered it necessary "that there should be a judiciary endowed with substantial and
independent powers and secure against all corrupting or perverting influences; secure, also, against the
arbitrary authority of the administrative heads of the government." (Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional
Government in the United States, pp. 17, 142.) It was such a conception of an independent judiciary
which was instituted in the Philippines by the American administration and which has since served as
one of the chief glories of the government and one of the most priceless heritages of the Filipino people.

The Attorney-General in the argument in support of his motion for reconsideration, quotes the last
preceding sentence and says that he dissents therefrom. The number of authoritative replies to the
proposition advanced by the law officer of the government relative to the intention to establish an
independent judiciary in these Islands, is limited only by space in which to quote them. Possibly we can
do no better than to make our own the language of Mr. Justice Trent, speaking for a unanimous court, in
Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board of Occidental Negro ([1910], 16 Phil., 366, 384),
when he said: "This governments in the United States, now possesses a complete governmental
organization, with executive legislative, and judicial departments, which are exercising functions as
independent of each other as the Federal or State governments." (For the legislative version of the same
idea, see Administrative Code, sec. 17.)

On occasion, the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands has applied the accepted theory of the
division of powers, termed by the United States Supreme Court as "one of the chief merits of the
American system of written constitutional law" (Kilbourn vs. Thompson [1881], 13 Otto, 168), and has
unhesitatingly refused to interfere with the official acts of the Governor-General or to intrude on the rights
and privileges of the Philippine Legislature (In the Patterson [1902], 1 Phil., 93; Severino vs. Governor-
General and Provincial Board of Occidental Negros, supra; In re McCulloch Dick [1918], 38 Phil., 41;
U.S. vs. Bull [1910], 15 Phil., 7; U.S. vs. Ten Yu [1912], 24 Phil., 1; Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of
Leyte and Samar [1919], 39 Phil., 886.) As an instance of this class of decisions, in Veloso vs. Boards of
Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, supra, this court, in considering the right of the Philippine Senate to be
the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its elective members, said:

The grant of power to the Philippine Senate and the Philippine House of Representatives,
respectively is full, clear, and complete. . . . The judiciary, with its traditional and careful regard for
the balance of powers, must permit this exclusive privilege of the legislature to remain where the
sovereign authority has placed it. Since, therefore, the Philippine Senate is made the sole judge
of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its elective members, this tribunal neither can, nor
ought, to take jurisdiction of the case.

Although much more reluctantly, and also much more infrequently we are happy to add, the court has
had to defend the judiciary against legislative and executive encroachment. (Ocampo vs. Cabañgis
[1910], 15 Phil., 626; In re Guariña [1914], 24 Phil., 37; Barrameda vs. Moir [1913], 25 Phil., 44; and
Province of Tarlac vs. Gale [1913], 26 Phil., 338.) As an instance of the latter class of decisions, in
Province of Tarlac vs. Gale, supra, Mr. Justice Moreland, speaking for the court, said:

The judiciary is one of the coordinate branches of the Government. (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco, 16
Phil., 534; United States vs. Bull, 15 Phil., 7.) Its preservation in its integrity and effectiveness is
necessary to the present form of Government. . . . It is
clear . . . that each department is bound to preserve its own existence if it live up to the duty
imposed upon it as one of the coordinate branches of the government. Whatever a person or
entity ought to do or must do in law, it has the power to do. This being true, the judiciary has the
power to maintain its existence; and whatever is reasonably necessary to that end, courts may do
or order done. But the right to live, if that is all there is of it, is a very small matter. The mere right
to breathe does not satisfy ambition or produce results. Therefore, courts have not only the
power to maintain their life, but they have also the power to make that existence effective for the
purpose for which the judiciary was created. They can, by appropriate means, do all things
necessary to preserve and maintain every quality needful to make the judiciary an effective
institution of Government. Courts have, therefore, inherent power to preserve their integrity,
maintain their dignity and to insure effectiveness in the administration of justice. This is clear; for,
if the judiciary may be deprived of any one of its essential attributes, or if any one of them may be
seriously weakened by the act of any person or official, then independence disappears and
subordination begins. The power to interfere is the power to control, and the power to
control is the power to abrogate. The sovereign power has given life to the judiciary and
nothing less than the sovereign power can take it away or render it useless. The power to
withhold from the courts anything really essential for the administration of justice is the power to
control and ultimately to destroy the efficiency of the judiciary. Courts cannot, under their duty
to their creator, the sovereign power, permit themselves to be subordinated to any person
or official to which their creator did not itself subordinate them.

A stirring plea has been made by the learned representative of the Government for a decision which will
work for the public welfare. We agree that, under the peculiar conditions existing in the Philippines, it is
sometimes well for a judge not to remain indefinitely in a particular district. But it is a far cry from this
premise to the use of a method not sanctioned by existing law and savoring of military discipline. Our
conception of good judges has been, and is, of men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who
discharge their duties in accordance with law, who are permitted to perform the duties of the office
undeterred by outside influence, and who are independent and self-respecting human units in a judicial
system equal and coordinate to the other two departments of government. We are pleased to think of
judges as of the type of the erudite Coke who, three centuries ago, was removed from office because
when asked "if in the future he would delay a case at the King's order," replied: "I will do what becomes
me as a judge."

For the reasons given, we are of opinion that the reasonable force of the language used in the proviso
to section 155 of the Administrative Code taken in connection with the whole of the Judiciary Law,
and the accepted canons of interpretation, and the principles of the law of public officers, leave
from for no other construction than that a Judge of First Instance may be made a judge of another
district only with his consent.
It is our holding that the plaintiff Andres Borromeo is lawfully entitled to the possession of the office of
Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District. It is our judgment that the
defendant Fermin Mariano shall be ousted from the office of Judge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District,
and the plaintiff placed in possession of the same. The motion for reconsideration filed by the Attorney-
General is denied. No costs shall be allowed. Let this be entered as the order of the court. So ordered.

Araullo, Street and Avanceña, JJ., concur.

Johnson, J., signed the original decision, but was not present when the motion for reconsideration was
filed and when this decisions was promulgated.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-8583. July 31, 1956.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. FRANCISCO HILVANO, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION
BENGZON, J.:
When Mayor Fidencio Latorre of Villareal, Samar, departed for Manila on official business early in the morning of
September 22, 1952, he designated the herein Defendant Francisco Hilvano, councilor, to discharge the duties of his
office. Later, during office hours on that same day, Vice-Mayor Juan Latorre went to the municipal building; and having
found Hilvano acting in the place of the Mayor, he served written notices to the corresponding municipal officers, including
Hilvano, that he (Juan Latorre) as Vice-Mayor was assuming the duties of the absent mayor. However, Hilvano refused to
yield, arguing that he had been designated by the Mayor. Whereupon the Vice-Mayor sent a telegram to the Executive
Secretary informing the latter of the controversy. And the said Secretary replied by letter, that under sec. 2195 of the
Revised Administrative Code it was the Vice-Mayor who should discharge the duties of the Mayor during the latter’s
temporary absence. Shown this official pronouncement, Hilvano still refused to surrender the position. Again the Vice-
Mayor sought the opinion of the Provincial Fiscal, who by letter (Exhibit D), replied that the Vice-Mayor had the right to the
office. Notwithstanding such opinion which was exhibited to him — Hilvano declined to vacate the post, which he held for
about a month, appointing some policemen, solemnizing marriages and collecting the corresponding salary for mayor.
Wherefore Francisco Hilvano was prosecuted — and after trial — was convicted of usurpation of public authority under
Republic Act No. 10. He appealed in due time. The Solicitor-General and Appellant’s counsel agree that the penal
provision applicable to the case is Republic Act No. 379 which amended Art. 177 of the Revised Penal Code to read as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Usurpation of authority or official functions. — Any person who shall knowingly and falsely represent himself to be an
officer, agent or representative of any department or agency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign government,
or who, under pretense of official position, shall perform any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of
the Philippine Government or of any foreign government, or any agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so,
shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.”
It is contended however for the Appellant that he committed no usurpation of authority because he was a councilor, an
official of the Government, and that such crime may only be committed by private individuals. He cited a decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain of 1880 interpreting the corresponding article of the Spanish Penal Code, which is the origin of
our own Penal Code. But it appears that in subsequent decisions the same court convicted of the offense of usurpation
certain officials who without proper authority discharged the functions of other officials, e.g., a municipal judge (Jan. 22,
1890) and a vice-mayor (teniente de alcalde) who discharged the functions of the alcalde. (Oct. 15, 1891). See Viada 5th
Ed. Vol. IV pp. 227-230. 1
There is actually no reason to restrict the operation of Article 177 to private individuals. For one thing it applies to “any
person”; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Furthermore,
contrary to Appellant’s assumption that Articles 238-241 of the Revised Penal Code penalize all kinds of usurption of
official functions by public officers, said articles merely punish interference by officers of one of the three departments of
government (legislative, executive and judicial) with the functions of officials of another department. Said articles do not
cover usurption of one officer or employee of a given department of the powers of another officer in the same department.
For instance, the exercise by a bureau employee of the powers of his director.
There is no excuse for Defendant-Appellant. In the beginning he might have pleaded good faith, invoking the designation
by the Mayor; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut after he had been shown the letter of the Executive Secretary and the
opinion of the provincial fiscal, he had no right thereafter stubbornly to stick to the position. He was rightfully convicted.
But the penalty imposed on him should be modified, in accordance with the recommendation of the Solicitor General. He
is sentenced to an indeterminate term of 4 months of arresto mayor to two years of prision correccional. So modified, the
appealed judgment is affirmed with costs against Appellant.
Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix, JJ.,
concur.
Endnote:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. See also decision of Feb. 23 1893, Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, 6th Ed. Vol. II page 243, note
G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936

JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,

vs.
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR,
respondents.

LAUREL, J.:

This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a writ of
prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents, from taking further cognizance
of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent, against the election of said petitioner as member of the
National Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province of Tayabas.

The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as admitted by the respondents are as follows:

(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro
Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of the National
Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas;

(2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect
of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number of votes;

(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office;

(4) That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session assembled, passed the following
resolution:

[No. 8]

RESOLUCION CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS DE AQUELLOS DIPUTADOS CONTRA QUIENES

NO SE HA PRESENTADO PROTESTA.

Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los Diputados contra quienes no se hubiere presentado
debidamente una protesta antes de la adopcion de la presente resolucion sean, como por la
presente, son aprobadas y confirmadas.

Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935.

(5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a
"Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filed
after the passage of Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and praying, among other-things, that said respondent
be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of
said position be nullified;

(6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution, paragraph 6 of which
provides:

6. La Comision no considerara ninguna protesta que no se haya presentado en o antes de este dia.

(7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in the
aforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that
Resolution No. 8 of Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was
adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which
protests against the election of its members should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its
 object, and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of said period; and (c) that the protest in question was
filed out of the prescribed period;

(8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the Motion of
Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the presentation of a protest
against the election of a member of the National Assembly after confirmation;

(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, filed a "Reply" to the aforesaid
"Answer to the Motion of Dismissal";

(10) That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on
January 23, 1936, denying herein petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the Protest."

The application of the petitioner sets forth the following grounds for the issuance of the writ prayed for:

(a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the electoral Commission solely as regards the
merits of contested elections to the National Assembly;

(b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the power to regulate the proceedings of said
election contests, which power has been reserved to the Legislative Department of the Government or the
National Assembly;

(c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts created in pursuance of the Constitution, whose exclusive
jurisdiction relates solely to deciding the merits of controversies submitted to them for decision and to
matters involving their internal organization, the Electoral Commission can regulate its proceedings only if
the National Assembly has not availed of its primary power to so regulate such proceedings;

(d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is, therefore, valid and should be respected and obeyed;

(e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the ordinance appended to the Constitution and paragraph 6 of
article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the United States) as well as under
section 1 and 3 (should be sections 1 and 2) of article VIII of the Constitution, this Supreme Court has
jurisdiction to pass upon the fundamental question herein raised because it involves an interpretation of the
Constitution of the Philippines.

On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and filed an answer in behalf of the respondent Electoral
Commission interposing the following special defenses:

(a) That the Electoral Commission has been created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of the
Legislative Department invested with the jurisdiction to decide "all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly"; that in adopting its resolution of December 9,
1935, fixing this date as the last day for the presentation of protests against the election of any member of
the National Assembly, it acted within its jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of the implied powers
granted it by the Constitution to adopt the rules and regulations essential to carry out the power and
functions conferred upon the same by the fundamental law; that in adopting its resolution of January 23,
1936, overruling the motion of the petitioner to dismiss the election protest in question, and declaring itself
with jurisdiction to take cognizance of said protest, it acted in the legitimate exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions a an instrumentality of the Legislative Department of the Commonwealth Government, and hence
said act is beyond the judicial cognizance or control of the Supreme Court;

(b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the
members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed, could not and did not
deprive the electoral Commission of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of election protests filed within the
time that might be set by its own rules:

(c) That the Electoral Commission is a body invested with quasi-judicial functions, created by the
Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department, and is not an "inferior tribunal, or
 corporation, or board, or person" within the purview of section 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
against which prohibition would lie.

The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an answer in his own behalf on March 2, 1936, setting
forth the following as his special defense:

(a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, there
was no existing law fixing the period within which protests against the election of members of the National
Assembly should be filed; that in fixing December 9, 1935, as the last day for the filing of protests against
the election of members of the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission was exercising a power
impliedly conferred upon it by the Constitution, by reason of its quasi-judicial attributes;

(b) That said respondent presented his motion of protest before the Electoral Commission on December 9,
1935, the last day fixed by paragraph 6 of the rules of the said Electoral Commission;

(c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired jurisdiction over the protest filed by said respondent
and over the parties thereto, and the resolution of the Electoral Commission of January 23, 1936, denying
petitioner's motion to dismiss said protest was an act within the jurisdiction of the said commission, and is
not reviewable by means of a writ of prohibition;

(d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires confirmation by the National Assembly of the election
of its members, and that such confirmation does not operate to limit the period within which protests should
be filed as to deprive the Electoral Commission of jurisdiction over protest filed subsequent thereto;

(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent entity created by the Constitution, endowed with quasi-
judicial functions, whose decision are final and unappealable;

( f ) That the electoral Commission, as a constitutional creation, is not an inferior tribunal, corporation, board
or person, within the terms of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and that neither under
the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of article II (should be article VIII) of the Constitution and paragraph 13 of
section 1 of the Ordinance appended thereto could it be subject in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions
to a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court;

(g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the united
States) has no application to the case at bar.

The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it was submitted for decision, the petitioner prayed for
the issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction against the respondent Electoral Commission which petition was
denied "without passing upon the merits of the case" by resolution of this court of March 21, 1936.

There was no appearance for the other respondents.

The issues to be decided in the case at bar may be reduced to the following two principal propositions:

1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,

2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the
cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation
of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?

We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly upon the merits of the controversy. However, the
question of jurisdiction having been presented, we do not feel justified in evading the issue. Being a case primæ
impressionis, it would hardly be consistent with our sense of duty to overlook the broader aspect of the question and
leave it undecided. Neither would we be doing justice to the industry and vehemence of counsel were we not to
pass upon the question of jurisdiction squarely presented to our consideration.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express
provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. For example, the Chief Executive under
our Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws.
This, however, is subject to the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the
President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The
President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand,
the National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission
on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its
members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the
Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the
National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial
power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively
checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and
legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.

But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacing of
functions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one
leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department
is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the
several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.

As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was
within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression
of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and function as a
harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions
provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations
upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be
inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government
along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere
expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitation
and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United
States where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power
of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular
acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if
not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our constitution.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of
such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And
when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution
and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to
them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial
review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to
be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised
or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions
and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption
of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the
Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the governments of the government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it ought not the less to
be remembered that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the chief palladium of constitutional
liberty . . . the people who are authors of this blessing must also be its guardians . . . their eyes must be ever ready
to mark, their voice to pronounce . . . aggression on the authority of their constitution." In the Last and ultimate
analysis, then, must the success of our government in the unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible of
Filipino minds and hearts than in consultation rooms and court chambers.

In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the election of
the herein petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by resolution adopted on
December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the National
Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner, the resolution of the National Assembly has the effect of
cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission to entertain protests against the election, returns and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly, submitted after December 3, 1935, then the resolution of the Electoral
Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as contended by the respondents,
the Electoral Commission has the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the National
Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as the last
day for filing protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, should
be upheld.

Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between
the National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. From the very nature of the
republican government established in our country in the light of American experience and of our own, upon the
judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining
constitutional boundaries. The Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional
organ, created for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered
with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the
constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral
Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority
under the fundamental law between department powers and agencies of the government are necessarily
determined by the judiciary in justifiable and appropriate cases. Discarding the English type and other European
types of constitutional government, the framers of our constitution adopted the American type where the written
constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. In some countries which have declined to
follow the American example, provisions have been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts from
exercising the power to interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be the
rule that in the absence of direct prohibition courts are bound to assume what is logically their function. For instance,
the Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly provides that courts shall have no power to examine the validity of
statutes (art. 81, chap. IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a similar declaration. In countries whose
constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this power. This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia
and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to constitutional Charter of the
Czechoslovak Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitutional of the Republic of
1931) especial constitutional courts are established to pass upon the validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the
nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of
authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take cognizance of the
controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a
void be thus created in our constitutional system which may be in the long run prove destructive of the entire
framework? To ask these questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our
constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted
facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject mater of the
present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the
Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly."

Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall now proceed to pass upon the second proposition and
determine whether the Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in adopting its
resolution of December 9, 1935, and in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the
herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation thereof by the National Assembly on December 3, 1935.
As able counsel for the petitioner has pointed out, the issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of Article VI of
the Constitution which provides:

"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justice of the Supreme Court designated by
the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the
party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the second largest number of votes therein.
The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." It is
imperative, therefore, that we delve into the origin and history of this constitutional provision and inquire into the
intention of its framers and the people who adopted it so that we may properly appreciate its full meaning, import
and significance.

The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying down the
rule that "the assembly shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members", was taken
from clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the Constitution of the United States providing that "Each House shall be the
Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members, . . . ." The Act of Congress of August 29,
1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) modified this provision by the insertion of the word "sole" as follows: "That the Senate and
House of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their
elective members . . ." apparently in order to emphasize the exclusive the Legislative over the particular case s
therein specified. This court has had occasion to characterize this grant of power to the Philippine Senate and
House of Representatives, respectively, as "full, clear and complete" (Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and
Samar [1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.)

The first step towards the creation of an independent tribunal for the purpose of deciding contested elections to the
legislature was taken by the sub-committee of five appointed by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees of the
Constitutional Convention, which sub-committee submitted a report on August 30, 1934, recommending the creation
of a Tribunal of Constitutional Security empowered to hear legislature but also against the election of executive
officers for whose election the vote of the whole nation is required, as well as to initiate impeachment proceedings
against specified executive and judicial officer. For the purpose of hearing legislative protests, the tribunal was to be
composed of three justices designated by the Supreme Court and six members of the house of the legislature to
which the contest corresponds, three members to be designed by the majority party and three by the minority, to be
presided over by the Senior Justice unless the Chief Justice is also a member in which case the latter shall preside.
The foregoing proposal was submitted by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees to the Convention on
September 15, 1934, with slight modifications consisting in the reduction of the legislative representation to four
members, that is, two senators to be designated one each from the two major parties in the Senate and two
representatives to be designated one each from the two major parties in the House of Representatives, and in
awarding representation to the executive department in the persons of two representatives to be designated by the
President.

Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was also preparing its report. As submitted to the Convention on
September 24, 1934 subsection 5, section 5, of the proposed Article on the Legislative Department, reads as
follows:

The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of either house and all cases contesting the
election of any of their members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, constituted, as to each House,
by three members elected by the members of the party having the largest number of votes therein, three
elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and as to its Chairman, one
Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice.

The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional Security with comprehensive jurisdiction as proposed by the
Committee on Constitutional Guarantees which was probably inspired by the Spanish plan (art. 121, Constitution of
the Spanish Republic of 1931), was soon abandoned in favor of the proposition of the Committee on Legislative
Power to create a similar body with reduced powers and with specific and limited jurisdiction, to be designated as a
Electoral Commission. The Sponsorship Committee modified the proposal of the Committee on Legislative Power
with respect to the composition of the Electoral Commission and made further changes in phraseology to suit the
project of adopting a unicameral instead of a bicameral legislature. The draft as finally submitted to the Convention
on October 26, 1934, reads as follows:
 (6) The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly and all cases
contesting the election of any of its Members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of
three members elected by the party having the largest number of votes in the National Assembly, three
elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and three justices of the
Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, the Commission to be presided over by one of said justices.

During the discussion of the amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo, and others, proposing to strike
out the whole subsection of the foregoing draft and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "The National Assembly
shall be the soled and exclusive judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of the Members", the following
illuminating remarks were made on the floor of the Convention in its session of December 4, 1934, as to the scope
of the said draft:

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have a doubt here as to the scope of the meaning of the first four lines,
paragraph 6, page 11 of the draft, reading: "The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the
National Assembly and all cases contesting the election of any of its Members shall be judged by an
Electoral Commission, . . ." I should like to ask from the gentleman from Capiz whether the election and
qualification of the member whose elections is not contested shall also be judged by the Electoral
Commission.

Mr. ROXAS. If there is no question about the election of the members, there is nothing to be judged; that is
why the word "judge" is used to indicate a controversy. If there is no question about the election of a
member, there is nothing to be submitted to the Electoral Commission and there is nothing to be
determined.

Mr. VENTURA. But does that carry the idea also that the Electoral Commission shall confirm also the
election of those whose election is not contested?

Mr. ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation. As the gentleman knows, the action of the House of
Representatives confirming the election of its members is just a matter of the rules of the assembly. It is not
constitutional. It is not necessary. After a man files his credentials that he has been elected, that is sufficient,
unless his election is contested.

Mr. VENTURA. But I do not believe that that is sufficient, as we have observed that for purposes of the
auditor, in the matter of election of a member to a legislative body, because he will not authorize his pay.

Mr. ROXAS. Well, what is the case with regards to the municipal president who is elected? What happens
with regards to the councilors of a municipality? Does anybody confirm their election? The municipal council
does this: it makes a canvass and proclaims — in this case the municipal council proclaims who has been
elected, and it ends there, unless there is a contest. It is the same case; there is no need on the part of the
Electoral Commission unless there is a contest. The first clause refers to the case referred to by the
gentleman from Cavite where one person tries to be elected in place of another who was declared elected.
From example, in a case when the residence of the man who has been elected is in question, or in case the
citizenship of the man who has been elected is in question.

However, if the assembly desires to annul the power of the commission, it may do so by certain maneuvers
upon its first meeting when the returns are submitted to the assembly. The purpose is to give to the
Electoral Commission all the powers exercised by the assembly referring to the elections, returns and
qualifications of the members. When there is no contest, there is nothing to be judged.

Mr. VENTURA. Then it should be eliminated.

Mr. ROXAS. But that is a different matter, I think Mr. Delegate.

Mr. CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar question as that propounded by the gentleman from Ilocos Norte
when I arose a while ago. However I want to ask more questions from the delegate from Capiz. This
 paragraph 6 on page 11 of the draft cites cases contesting the election as separate from the first part of the
sections which refers to elections, returns and qualifications.

Mr. ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of clarity. In fact the cases of contested elections are already
included in the phrase "the elections, returns and qualifications." This phrase "and contested elections" was
inserted merely for the sake of clarity.

Mr. CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not the Electoral Commission, at its own instance, refuse to confirm
the elections of the members."

Mr. ROXAS. I do not think so, unless there is a protest.

Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. President, will the gentleman yield?

THE PRESIDENT. The gentleman may yield, if he so desires.

Mr. ROXAS. Willingly.

Mr. LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman from Capiz believe that unless this power is granted to the
assembly, the assembly on its own motion does not have the right to contest the election and qualification of
its members?

Mr. ROXAS. I have no doubt but that the gentleman is right. If this draft is retained as it is, even if two-thirds
of the assembly believe that a member has not the qualifications provided by law, they cannot remove him
for that reason.

Mr. LABRADOR. So that the right to remove shall only be retained by the Electoral Commission.

Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for misconduct.

Mr. LABRADOR. I mean with respect to the qualifications of the members.

Mr. ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission.

Mr. LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no member of the assembly has the right to question the eligibility
of its members?

Mr. ROXAS. Before a member can question the eligibility, he must go to the Electoral Commission and
make the question before the Electoral Commission.

Mr. LABRADOR. So that the Electoral Commission shall decide whether the election is contested or not
contested.

Mr. ROXAS. Yes, sir: that is the purpose.

Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would like to be informed if the Electoral Commission has power and authority
to pass upon the qualifications of the members of the National Assembly even though that question has not
been raised.

Mr. ROXAS. I have just said that they have no power, because they can only judge.

In the same session, the first clause of the aforesaid draft reading "The election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly and" was eliminated by the Sponsorship Committee in response to an
amendment introduced by Delegates Francisco, Ventura, Vinzons, Rafols, Lim, Mumar and others. In explaining the
difference between the original draft and the draft as amended, Delegate Roxas speaking for the Sponsorship
Committee said:
 xxx xxx xxx

Sr. ROXAS. La diferencia, señor Presidente, consiste solamente en obviar la objecion apuntada por varios
Delegados al efecto de que la primera clausula del draft que dice: "The elections, returns and qualifications
of the members of the National Assembly" parece que da a la Comision Electoral la facultad de determinar
tambien la eleccion de los miembros que no ha sido protestados y para obviar esa dificultad, creemos que
la enmienda tien razon en ese sentido, si enmendamos el draft, de tal modo que se lea como sigue: "All
cases contesting the election", de modo que los jueces de la Comision Electoral se limitaran solamente a
los casos en que haya habido protesta contra las actas." Before the amendment of Delegate Labrador was
voted upon the following interpellation also took place:

El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera

El Sr. PRESIDENTE. ¿Que dice el Comite?

El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto.

El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft, dando tres miembros a la mayoria, y otros tres a la minoria y tres
a la Corte Suprema, ¿no cree Su Señoria que esto equivale practicamente a dejar el asunto a los miembros
del Tribunal Supremo?

El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal o la Commission esta constituido en esa forma, tanto los
miembros de la mayoria como los de la minoria asi como los miembros de la Corte Suprema consideraran
la cuestion sobre la base de sus meritos, sabiendo que el partidismo no es suficiente para dar el triunfo.

El Sr. CONEJERO. ¿Cree Su Señoria que en un caso como ese, podriamos hacer que tanto los de la
mayoria como los de la minoria prescindieran del partidismo?

El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el triunfo.

xxx xxx xxx

The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo and others seeking to restore the power to decide
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly to the National
Assembly itself, was defeated by a vote of ninety-eight (98) against fifty-six (56).

In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.) sought to amend the draft by reducing the
representation of the minority party and the Supreme Court in the Electoral Commission to two members each, so
as to accord more representation to the majority party. The Convention rejected this amendment by a vote of
seventy-six (76) against forty-six (46), thus maintaining the non-partisan character of the commission.

As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft was made to read as follows:

(6) All cases contesting the elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly
shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of three members elected by the party having the
largest number of votes in the National Assembly, three elected by the members of the party having the
second largest number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice,
the Commission to be presided over by one of said justices.

The Style Committee to which the draft was submitted revised it as follows:

SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall
be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the second
largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its chairman. The Electoral
Commission shall be the sole judge of the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the
National Assembly.
When the foregoing draft was submitted for approval on February 8, 1935, the Style Committee, through President
Recto, to effectuate the original intention of the Convention, agreed to insert the phrase "All contests relating to"
between the phrase "judge of" and the words "the elections", which was accordingly accepted by the Convention.

The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislature
long lodged in the legislative body, to an independent, impartial and non-partisan tribunal, is by no means a mere
experiment in the science of government.

Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies (ninth edition, chapter VI, pages 57, 58), gives a vivid
account of the "scandalously notorious" canvassing of votes by political parties in the disposition of contests by the
House of Commons in the following passages which are partly quoted by the petitioner in his printed memorandum
of March 14, 1936:

153. From the time when the commons established their right to be the exclusive judges of the elections,
returns, and qualifications of their members, until the year 1770, two modes of proceeding prevailed, in the
determination of controverted elections, and rights of membership. One of the standing committees
appointed at the commencement of each session, was denominated the committee of privileges and
elections, whose functions was to hear and investigate all questions of this description which might be
referred to them, and to report their proceedings, with their opinion thereupon, to the house, from time to
time. When an election petition was referred to this committee they heard the parties and their witnesses
and other evidence, and made a report of all the evidence, together with their opinion thereupon, in the form
of resolutions, which were considered and agreed or disagreed to by the house. The other mode of
proceeding was by a hearing at the bar of the house itself. When this court was adopted, the case was
heard and decided by the house, in substantially the same manner as by a committee. The committee of
privileges and elections although a select committee. The committee of privileges and elections although a
select committee was usually what is called an open one; that is to say, in order to constitute the committee,
a quorum of the members named was required to be present, but all the members of the house were at
liberty to attend the committee and vote if they pleased.

154. With the growth of political parties in parliament questions relating to the right of membership gradually
assumed a political character; so that for many years previous to the year 1770, controverted elections had
been tried and determined by the house of commons, as mere party questions, upon which the strength of
contending factions might be tested. Thus, for Example, in 1741, Sir Robert Walpole, after repeated attacks
upon his government, resigned his office in consequence of an adverse vote upon the Chippenham election.
Mr. Hatsell remarks, of the trial of election cases, as conducted under this system, that "Every principle of
decency and justice were notoriously and openly prostituted, from whence the younger part of the house
were insensibly, but too successfully, induced to adopt the same licentious conduct in more serious matters,
and in questions of higher importance to the public welfare." Mr. George Grenville, a distinguished member
of the house of commons, undertook to propose a remedy for the evil, and, on the 7th of March, 1770,
obtained the unanimous leave of the house to bring in a bill, "to regulate the trial of controverted elections, or
returns of members to serve in parliament." In his speech to explain his plan, on the motion for leave, Mr.
Grenville alluded to the existing practice in the following terms: "Instead of trusting to the merits of their
respective causes, the principal dependence of both parties is their private interest among us; and it is
scandalously notorious that we are as earnestly canvassed to attend in favor of the opposite sides, as if we
were wholly self-elective, and not bound to act by the principles of justice, but by the discretionary impulse of
our own inclinations; nay, it is well known, that in every contested election, many members of this house,
who are ultimately to judge in a kind of judicial capacity between the competitors, enlist themselves as
parties in the contention, and take upon themselves the partial management of the very business, upon
which they should determine with the strictest impartiality."

155. It was to put an end to the practices thus described, that Mr. Grenville brought in a bill which met with
the approbation of both houses, and received the royal assent on the 12th of April, 1770. This was the
celebrated law since known by the name of the Grenville Act; of which Mr. Hatsell declares, that it "was one
of the nobles works, for the honor of the house of commons, and the security of the constitution, that was
ever devised by any minister or statesman." It is probable, that the magnitude of the evil, or the apparent
success of the remedy, may have led many of the contemporaries of the measure to the information of a
judgement, which was not acquiesced in by some of the leading statesmen of the day, and has not been
entirely confirmed by subsequent experience. The bill was objected to by Lord North, Mr. De Grey,
 afterwards chief justice of the common pleas, Mr. Ellis, Mr. Dyson, who had been clerk of the house, and Mr.
Charles James Fox, chiefly on the ground, that the introduction of the new system was an essential
alteration of the constitution of parliament, and a total abrogation of one of the most important rights and
jurisdictions of the house of commons.

As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England solved the problem of insuring the non-partisan settlement of
the controverted elections of its members by abdicating its prerogative to two judges of the King's Bench of the High
Court of Justice selected from a rota in accordance with rules of court made for the purpose. Having proved
successful, the practice has become imbedded in English jurisprudence (Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868 [31 & 32
Vict. c. 125] as amended by Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt Practices Act. 1879 [42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2;
Corrupt and Illegal Practices Preventions Act, 1883 [46 & 47 Vict. c. 51;, s. 70; Expiring Laws Continuance Act,
1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 22]; Laws of England, vol. XII, p. 408, vol. XXI, p. 787). In the Dominion of Canada, election
contests which were originally heard by the Committee of the House of Commons, are since 1922 tried in the courts.
Likewise, in the Commonwealth of Australia, election contests which were originally determined by each house, are
since 1922 tried in the High Court. In Hungary, the organic law provides that all protests against the election of
members of the Upper House of the Diet are to be resolved by the Supreme Administrative Court (Law 22 of 1916,
chap. 2, art. 37, par. 6). The Constitution of Poland of March 17, 1921 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Free City
of Danzig of May 13, 1922 (art. 10) vest the authority to decide contested elections to the Diet or National Assembly
in the Supreme Court. For the purpose of deciding legislative contests, the Constitution of the German Reich of July
1, 1919 (art. 31), the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic of February 29, 1920 (art. 19) and the Constitution
of the Grecian Republic of June 2, 1927 (art. 43), all provide for an Electoral Commission.

The creation of an Electoral Commission whose membership is recruited both from the legislature and the judiciary
is by no means unknown in the United States. In the presidential elections of 1876 there was a dispute as to the
number of electoral votes received by each of the two opposing candidates. As the Constitution made no adequate
provision for such a contingency, Congress passed a law on January 29, 1877 (United States Statutes at Large, vol.
19, chap. 37, pp. 227-229), creating a special Electoral Commission composed of five members elected by the
Senate, five members elected by the House of Representatives, and five justices of the Supreme Court, the fifth
justice to be selected by the four designated in the Act. The decision of the commission was to be binding unless
rejected by the two houses voting separately. Although there is not much of a moral lesson to be derived from the
experience of America in this regard, judging from the observations of Justice Field, who was a member of that body
on the part of the Supreme Court (Countryman, the Supreme Court of the United States and its Appellate Power
under the Constitution [Albany, 1913] — Relentless Partisanship of Electoral Commission, p. 25 et seq.), the
experiment has at least abiding historical interest.

The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their majority men mature
in years and experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history and political development of other
countries of the world. When , therefore, they deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission as a constitutional
organ and invested it with the exclusive function of passing upon and determining the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, they must have done so not only in the light of their own
experience but also having in view the experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the
Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant.
Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some members of the Convention to its creation, the plan, as
hereinabove stated, was approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is that, upon the
approval of the constitutional the creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom and "ultimate
justice of the people". (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.)

From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all
the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an
independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary
constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt need of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan
considerations which prompted the people, acting through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body
known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and minority
parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further endowed
with judicial temper by including in its membership three justices of the Supreme Court.

The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the performance and
execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it is not a power in our
tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an
independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative department than to any other. The location of the
provision (section 4) creating the Electoral Commission under Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our
Constitution is very indicative. Its compositions is also significant in that it is constituted by a majority of members of
the legislature. But it is a body separate from and independent of the legislature.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied
denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the
legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs.
Whisman, 36 S.D., 260; L.R.A., 1917B, 1). If we concede the power claimed in behalf of the National Assembly that
said body may regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the commission to lay
down the period within which protests should be filed, the grant of power to the commission would be ineffective.
The Electoral Commission in such case would be invested with the power to determine contested cases involving
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly but subject at all times to the
regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally
transferring this authority from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual authority would be created with the
resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral
Commission retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality without the
necessary means to render that authority effective whenever and whenever the National Assembly has chosen to
act, a situation worse than that intended to be remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate on
the part of the National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of
the entire proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the constitutional
grant. It is obvious that this result should not be permitted.

We are not insensible to the impassioned argument or the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the
importance and necessity of respecting the dignity and independence of the national Assembly as a coordinate
department of the government and of according validity to its acts, to avoid what he characterized would be
practically an unlimited power of the commission in the admission of protests against members of the National
Assembly. But as we have pointed out hereinabove, the creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex
necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance
should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every
particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, eight ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional provision
relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental
power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by
necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the petitioner, the Electoral Commission may abuse its
regulative authority by admitting protests beyond any reasonable time, to the disturbance of the tranquillity and
peace of mind of the members of the National Assembly. But the possibility of abuse is not argument against the
concession of the power as there is no power that is not susceptible of abuse. In the second place, if any mistake
has been committed in the creation of an Electoral Commission and in investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all
cases relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, the remedy is
political, not judicial, and must be sought through the ordinary processes of democracy. All the possible abuses of
the government are not intended to be corrected by the judiciary. We believe, however, that the people in creating
the Electoral Commission reposed as much confidence in this body in the exclusive determination of the specified
cases assigned to it, as they have given to the Supreme Court in the proper cases entrusted to it for decision. All the
agencies of the government were designed by the Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and each constitutional
organ working within its own particular sphere of discretionary action must be deemed to be animated with the same
zeal and honesty in accomplishing the great ends for which they were created by the sovereign will. That the
actuations of these constitutional agencies might leave much to be desired in given instances, is inherent in the
perfection of human institutions. In the third place, from the fact that the Electoral Commission may not be interfered
with in the exercise of its legitimate power, it does not follow that its acts, however illegal or unconstitutional, may
not be challenge in appropriate cases over which the courts may exercise jurisdiction.
But independently of the legal and constitutional aspects of the present case, there are considerations of equitable
character that should not be overlooked in the appreciation of the intrinsic merits of the controversy. The
Commonwealth Government was inaugurated on November 15, 1935, on which date the Constitution, except as to
the provisions mentioned in section 6 of Article XV thereof, went into effect. The new National Assembly convened
on November 25th of that year, and the resolution confirming the election of the petitioner, Jose A. Angara was
approved by that body on December 3, 1935. The protest by the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua against the
election of the petitioner was filed on December 9 of the same year. The pleadings do not show when the Electoral
Commission was formally organized but it does appear that on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for
the first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protest. When,
therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner
to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body had
actually been organized. As a mater of fact, according to certified copies of official records on file in the archives
division of the National Assembly attached to the record of this case upon the petition of the petitioner, the three
justices of the Supreme Court the six members of the National Assembly constituting the Electoral Commission
were respectively designated only on December 4 and 6, 1935. If Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly
confirming non-protested elections of members of the National Assembly had the effect of limiting or tolling the time
for the presentation of protests, the result would be that the National Assembly — on the hypothesis that it still
retained the incidental power of regulation in such cases — had already barred the presentation of protests before
the Electoral Commission had had time to organize itself and deliberate on the mode and method to be followed in a
matter entrusted to its exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution. This result was not and could not have been
contemplated, and should be avoided.

From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of members against whom
no protests had been filed at the time of its passage on December 3, 1935, can not be construed as a limitation
upon the time for the initiation of election contests. While there might have been good reason for the legislative
practice of confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at the time when the power to decide election
contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving
the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contest
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly", to fix the time for the
filing of said election protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the returns of its members against whose
election no protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary. As contended by the Electoral
Commission in its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the herein petitioner to dismiss the protest
filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua, confirmation of the election of any member is not required by the Constitution
before he can discharge his duties as such member. As a matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial board
of canvassers is sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat in the national Assembly and to render him eligible to
any office in said body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935).

Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of Commons and in the Congress of the United States,
confirmation is neither necessary in order to entitle a member-elect to take his seat. The return of the proper election
officers is sufficient, and the member-elect presenting such return begins to enjoy the privileges of a member from
the time that he takes his oath of office (Laws of England, vol. 12, pp. 331. 332; vol. 21, pp. 694, 695; U. S. C. A.,
Title 2, secs. 21, 25, 26). Confirmation is in order only in cases of contested elections where the decision is adverse
to the claims of the protestant. In England, the judges' decision or report in controverted elections is certified to the
Speaker of the House of Commons, and the House, upon being informed of such certificate or report by the
Speaker, is required to enter the same upon the Journals, and to give such directions for confirming or altering the
return, or for the issue of a writ for a new election, or for carrying into execution the determination as circumstances
may require (31 & 32 Vict., c. 125, sec. 13). In the United States, it is believed, the order or decision of the particular
house itself is generally regarded as sufficient, without any actual alternation or amendment of the return (Cushing,
Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, 9th ed., sec. 166).

Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was still in force, each house of the Philippine Legislature fixed
the time when protests against the election of any of its members should be filed. This was expressly authorized by
section 18 of the Jones Law making each house the sole judge of the election, return and qualifications of its
members, as well as by a law (sec. 478, Act No. 3387) empowering each house to respectively prescribe by
resolution the time and manner of filing contest in the election of member of said bodies. As a matter of formality,
after the time fixed by its rules for the filing of protests had already expired, each house passed a resolution
confirming or approving the returns of such members against whose election no protests had been filed within the
prescribed time. This was interpreted as cutting off the filing of further protests against the election of those
members not theretofore contested (Amistad vs. Claravall [Isabela], Second Philippine Legislature, Record — First
Period, p. 89; Urguello vs. Rama [Third District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature; Fetalvero vs. Festin [Romblon],
Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, pp. 637-640; Kintanar vs. Aldanese [Fourth District, Cebu], Sixth
Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, pp. 1121, 1122; Aguilar vs. Corpus [Masbate], Eighth Philippine
Legislature, Record — First Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp. 892, 893). The Constitution has repealed section 18 of the
Jones Law. Act No. 3387, section 478, must be deemed to have been impliedly abrogated also, for the reason that
with the power to determine all contest relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, is inseparably linked the authority to prescribe regulations for the exercise of that power. There was thus
no law nor constitutional provisions which authorized the National Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to have fixed on
December 3, 1935, the time for the filing of contests against the election of its members. And what the National
Assembly could not do directly, it could not do by indirection through the medium of confirmation.

Summarizing, we conclude:

(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of separation of
power into the legislative, the executive and the judicial.

(b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties often makes difficult
the delimitation of the powers granted.

(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary,
with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve
the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.

(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and
controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends
the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.

(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and
functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the
other two departments of the governments.

(f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly.

(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into effect, each house of the
legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective
members.

(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the legislature with
respect to contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral
Commission.

(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete,
and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as to
the time and manner of filing protests.

( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent
constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which object would be frustrated if the
National Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of
conducting said contests.

(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law making each
house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of
its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house to prescribe by
resolution the time and manner of filing contests against the election of its members, the time and manner of
 notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of
contest.

(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is contested or not, is not essential before
such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National
Assembly.

(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no protest had
been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental
power to prescribe the time within which protests against the election of any member of the National
Assembly should be filed.

We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election
of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can
not in any manner toll the time for filing protests against the elections, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission
might prescribe.

In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of the Electoral Commission as a constitutional
creation and as to the scope and extent of its authority under the facts of the present controversy, we deem it
unnecessary to determine whether the Electoral Commission is an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person
within the purview of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with costs against the
petitioner. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Diaz, Concepcion, and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-4017 March 28, 1908

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PEDRO MARIÑO, defendant-appellant.

Buencamino and Diokno for appellant.

Attorney-General Araneta for appellee.

TORRES, J.:

Owing to certain complaints and information received at the Bureau of Posts of certain irregularities committed by Pedro
Mariño, a postmaster stationed in the town of Taal, to which office he was appointed on the 1st of April, 1905, performing
the duties of the same until the 30th or 31st of December, 1906, the Director of Posts ordered an investigation, and to this
end detailed Inspector J.O. Jones, who, accompanied by C.J. Milleron, proceeded to the said town. From the municipal
building he sent for the postmaster, but as the latter was not in his house, the investigators proceeded thither. Upon
finding that the post-office, which was established in the said house of the accused, was closed, with the consent of his
wife they entered it, and then and there found a basket full of waste paper and torn-up letters together with some leaves
torn out of a mailing book. By direction of Inspector Jones, Milleron called the justice of the peace, and on his arrival a few
minutes later they placed in a box all the papers, books, and other things belonging to the post-office, and after closing
and sealing the same deposited it in the court of the justice of the peace. On the following afternoon the box was opened
in the presence of the accused and of the justice of the peace; erasures and alterations were discovered in a stub-book,
and some pages of the registry of registered letters were found to be destroyed and torn out, besides evidence of other
punishable deeds.

The provincial fiscal filed a complaint on the 19th of February, 1907, with the Court of First Instance of Batangas, charging
Pedro Mariño with the crime of infidelity in the custody of documents, and upon the present case being instituted the judge
sentenced the accused, on the 2nd of March, 1907, to the penalty of eight years and one day of prision mayor, to pay
Eleuteria Punsalan the sum of P5 stolen from a letter addressed to her, to suffer the accessory penalties, to pay a fine of
3,000 pesetas, to temporary special disqualification for eight years, and to pay the costs of the proceeding. From the said
judgment the counsel for the accused has appealed.

It results from the proceedings that Pedro Mariño, as postmaster stationed in the town of Taal, retained in his possession
without forwarding it to the addressee, a registered letter addressed by Juan Castillo, of Bauan, to Perpetuo Venturanza,
a resident of Taal; that he opened the said letter and stole therefrom the sum of P27.50. The letter was afterwards found,
in the course of investigation, between the pages of a book in his office, and the accused then returned the money to the
sender, requesting him not to give evidence against him.

He also retained without delivering to Teresa Leonor, three letters addressed to her from Bongao, Moro Province, by
Domingo Leonor, a resident of said town, and only delivered them to the addressee on the 31st of December, in
consequence of the action taken by certain persons on behalf of the interested party.

On the 10th of November, 1906, W.C. Boyer, a Constabulary officer, sent a registered letter to Candida Celedonio, a
resident of Aliaga, Nueva Ecija, remitting her P50 in bills, but the addressee did not receive said letter or the money until
after the 1st of January, 1907, after the officer had made an investigation as to the whereabouts of the letter; the accused
further counterfeited the signature of said officer in the corresponding book of receipts, for a registered letter addressed to
the latter.

Mariano Medina, a resident of Taal, delivered to the accused one day in the month of November, 1906, an open letter with
P50 in bills for Epifanio Elefaño of Calamba, and as the latter did not receive the letter with the money, Medina sent him
two others letters by mail and two by messenger; of all of which the last-named alone reached him. As Elefaño had never
received the letters sent by mail, Medina filed his complaint with the Director of Posts, and then in consequence of the
complaint, Elefaño received on the 24th of December, the letter of November together with the money. One of the letters
sent by the said Medina and not received by Elefaño was found in the basket by Inspector Jones.
Paula Isla, a resident of Taal, after trying several times to find out from the post-office of Taal if any letters had been
received for her from her husband residing in Zamboanga, remitting money, received from the accused one day the sum
of P20, and on the following day P10 more without receiving any letter from her husband, the accused stating that none
had been received; it afterwards appeared that a letter, No. 1001, addressed to Paula Isla, had been receipted for in the
receipt book with the name of the latter and a cross, together with a thumb print, all of which Paula Isla denied as hers
because she is able to read and write, a fact that was subsequently proven.

Among several torn-up letters found in the basket above referred to, and afterwards reassembled, there appears one
addressed to Vicente Garcia by his son Leandro Garcia for Maria Angeles, the latter's wife, Leandro inquiring therein
whether his wife had received two previous letters by registered mail, one written in May, and the other in September and
containing P25 each; said registered letters had never been received.

Eleuteria Punsalan, whose name appears to have been signed in the registered letter book on the 24th of August, 1906,
denied having so signed or that she ever received any letter from her uncle, Flaviano Ocampo, inclosing P5 which were
stolen by the accused.

Among the several letters found in said basket, addressed to persons residing in Taal by residents of other places and
vice versa, it results, upon the fragments of the same being assembled, that inquiries were made regarding the
whereabouts of registered letters that had not been received.

From the above stated and fully proven facts, it is logically inferred that the crime of infidelity in the custody of documents
has been committed.

Article 360 of Penal Code reads:

The public official who shall steal, destroy, or hide any documents or papers intrusted to him by virtue of his office
shall be punished —

1. With the penalties of prision mayor and a fine of from 625 to 6,250 pesetas, provided that a grave injury to a
third person or the public interests has resulted from his action.

2. With those of prision correccional in its minimum and medium degrees and a fine of from 325 to 3,250 pesetas
if the injury to the third person or to the public interests were not grave.

In either case there shall furthermore, be imposed the penalty of temporary special disqualification in its maximum
degree to perpetual special disqualification.

The accused, Pedro Mariño, as postmaster, is an officer or employee of the Bureau of Posts, and by virtue of his office he
was intrusted by the administration with the receiving, keeping, dispatch, and coursing of mail matter, both official and
private, with the obligation to enter in the corresponding books the letters, parcels, and papers received and forwarded to
their destination, and registered letters in particular; it was also his duty to comply with all the regulations, rules, and
instructions given by his official superiors; and notwithstanding all this, the accused, neglecting his duties and violating the
confidence reposed in him by the Government, committed the deeds described above, together with several other grave
crimes, all of which are punishable under the code.

It has been clearly proven in the case that the letters enumerated above were received at the post-office in charge of the
accused; they were opened, and the sums of money that they contained were stolen, and although after some months or
weeks some of the said amounts were delivered to the addressees or to the owners therefor, it has been noticed that the
bills returned were not the same ones that were remitted; such delivery or return being only made in view of a possible
prosecution.

The simple act of retaining the mail without forwarding the letters to their destination, even though without opening them
or stealing the moneys they contained, already constitutes the crime of infidelity on the part of the post-office official,
because he, seriously neglecting his duties, stole and concealed several letters and separated them from the ordinary and
legal course which they should follow in order to reach their destination without delay.

The supreme court of Spain, applying in its decision of the 5th of July, 1887, the provisions of article 375 of the Penal
Code of that country, analogous to article 360 of the code in force in these Islands, on appeal in cassation in a case
similar to the one herein, saw fit to establish the following doctrine:
 That the custody of packages sent through the national post-office is intrusted by the administration to all the
officers of this branch of the public service who intervene in the distribution thereof, it being their bounden duty,
and inherent in their respective offices, to remedy mistakes and prevent possible confusion in the mails where any
exist; therefrom, from the fact that an employee of said department stole a package with declared values which he
received mixed up with others, and hid the same without forwarding it to its proper destination, or presenting it to
his chief, he was unfaithful to his office and position of confidence, and committed at least the crime defined in
said article 375, which punishes the public functionary who shall steal or hide a document intrusted to him by
virtue of his office.

The alterations and corrections found in the books in charge of the accused and for which he was responsible; the tearing
out and the destruction of some of the pages of said books; the counterfeiting of the signatures of the addressees of
letters; the destruction and disappearance of many of the said letters, proven in a manner by the many complaints
receives at the Bureau of Posts, to such extreme that he did not transmit a complaint sent by wire to the Director of Posts;
all of the above facts, some of which are proven, and others being strongly indicated, corroborate the certainty and reality
of the crime at bar committed by the accused, whose responsibility as principal has been fully proven, notwithstanding his
denial and unproven exculpatory allegations; the case contains complete evidence, and produces on the mind a full
conviction, beyond all reasonable doubt, of the guilt of the accused.

In the commission of the crime no mitigating or aggravating circumstance is present; therefore, the proper penalty should
be applied in its medium degree.

The question set up by the defense and which has to be expressly determined is, that since there has been no serious
injury affecting a third person or the public interests, the penalty to be applied to the accused should be the one provided
for in No. 2 of article 360 of the Penal Code, instead of that fixed by No. 1 of the said article, which pretension is objected
to by the Attorney-General for the reasons stated by him, alleging that the great number of deeds performed by the
accused, and the alterations and counterfeiting of signatures made in the register, together with the destruction of some of
the pages thereof, clearly shows the gravity of the injury caused to the public interests.

If the injury of which article 360 of the code speaks is to be understood to mean the detriment or material damage suffered
in consequence of the crime, it is unquestionable that in order to accurately judge whether the injury caused is grave or
less grave, the court must abide by the provisions of articles 563 to 566 of the Penal Code.

Although there might be a doubt as to the importance of the injury or damage caused respectively to each of the parties
interested in the ordinary or registered letters stolen, hidden, or destroyed by the accused, there is none as to the effect of
the defendant's conduct so far as the public interests are concerned, inasmuch as the frequency and repetition of the
losses and disappearance of letters during the time that the accused was in office had caused uneasiness and a certain
alarm among many interested parties residing both in the locality and in other provinces; complaints were received by the
Director of Posts of the conduct of the accused, and as such deeds committed in a post-office contribute to alienate the
confidence of the public in a government service of the greatest necessity in social life, thus causing grave injury, of far-
reaching effects to the public interests. Therefore, the penalty that should be applied to the author thereof is that
prescribed in No. 1 of the said article 360 of the Penal Code in conformity with the jurisprudence established by the
aforesaid supreme court in its decisions of the 2d of December, 1895, and 7th of January, 1904.

For the considerations above set forth it is our opinion that Pedro Mariño should be sentenced to the penalty of eight
years and one day of prision mayor, to suffer the accessory penalties of article 61, to pay a fine of 3,000 pesetas, without
subsidiary imprisonment in view of the nature of the penalty, to twelve years temporary special disqualification from public
office, right of suffrage, active and passive, profession or occupation, to indemnify Eleuteria Punsalan in the sum of P5,
and to pay the costs of this instance; the judgment appealed from being hereby affirmed in so far as it is in conformity
herewith and reversed in so far as it is not. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Johnson, Carson, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-64750 January 30, 1984

ATTY. SELSO M. MANZANARIS, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Sandiganbayan finding petitioner Selso M. Manzanaris guilty of
infidelity in the custody of documents under Article 226, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Selso M. Manzanaris guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of
Violation of Art. 226, Revised Penal Code (Removal, Concealment or Destruction of Documents),
defined and penalized under paragraph 2 thereof, and there being no. mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances, he is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of Three (3) Months and Eleven
(11) Days of arresto mayor, as minimum, to One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21)
Days of prision correccional as maximum; to pay a fine of Five Hundred (P500.00) Pesos, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; to suffer the additional penalty of Eleven (11) Years
and One (1) Day of temporary special disqualification; and to pay the costs.

The facts upon which the judgment of conviction rests are summarized by the respondent court as follows:

... Accused is the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Basilan since 1963 up to the
present. As such, he is the custodian of all the records of the Court of First Instance of Basilan.
Among the cases filed in said court was Criminal Case No. 299, against Geronimo Borja for
malversation of public funds. Among the property constituting the property bond filed by said
accused was that covered by Certificate of Title No. 877 of the Register of Deeds of Basilan. When
accused discovered thru his subordinate that Original Certificate of Title No. 877 was not existing in
the Register of Deeds of Basilan he ordered a subordinate to deliver owner's copy of Certificate
of Title No. 877 to Mr. Borja for the purpose of administrative reconstitution thereof.

xxx xxx xxx

Borja was asked to sign a receipt for the title. The contents of the receipt stated "Received from the
Clerk of Court Selso M. Manzanaris. OCT No. 877 to be reconstituted in the Register of Deeds ... .
After reconstitution to be returned to the court."

xxx xxx xxx

The release and delivery of the owner's certificate of title to Geronimo Borja was done without any
written order from the presiding judge of the court. Mrs. Trinidad M. Borja, wife of Geronimo
Borja filed a petition with the Office of the Register of Deeds for the administrative reconstitution of
Original Certificate of Title No. 877. Although she succeeded in reconstituting the original of said title
in November, 1974, Certificate of Title No. 877 was not turned over to the court.

The records further reveal that on June 11, 1975 the building housing the Court of First Instance of Basilan including
all the records and documents of the court, were burned. Sometime in 1981, one Atty. Filoteo Jo filed a motion
with the court to borrow OCT No. 877. This motion was denied on the basis of the certification issued by petitioner
that said title was among the documents destroyed during the conflagration of 1975.

Atty. Jo later informed petitioner that Trinidad Borja had obtained possession of the said title and in fact had
succeeded in having the same reconstituted. Only then did petitioner remember that he had delivered said title
to Geronimo Borja and that the latter had issued a receipt therefor. Since then, petitioner had repeatedly asked
Mrs. Trinidad Borja to return the reconstituted title to the court. The latter, however, could not locate the same from
the files of her deceased mother, the registered owner, who was in custody thereof before her death.
Petitioner admitted having removed OCT No. 877 from the custody of the court and having delivered the same to
Geronimo Borja for the latter to cause its administrative reconstitution after he had found out that the original of said
title in the Office of the Register of Deeds was missing. He professed, however, that in delivering OCT No. 877 to
Borja, he was actuated with a lawful and commendable motive, i.e., to protect the interest of the State, since the
unreconstituted certificate of title, given as property bond of the accused Borja, was absolutely inefficacious for such
purpose.

The respondent court brushed aside petitioner's defense of good faith, notwithstanding complete lack of evidence to
the contrary.

We reverse. To warrant a finding of guilt of the crime of infidelity in the custody of documents, the act of removal as
a mode of committing the offense, should be coupled with criminal intent or illicit purpose. This calls to mind
the oft-repeated maxim "Actus non facit, nisi mens sit rea," which expounds a basic principle in criminal law that a
crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of be innocent. Thus, to
constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be accompanied by a criminal
intent. It is true that a presumption of criminal intent may arise from proof of the commission of a criminal act; and
the general rule is that if it is proved that the accused committed the criminal act charged, it will be presumed that
the act was done with criminal intention and that it is for the accused to rebut this presumption. But it must be borne
in mind that the act from which such presumption springs must be a criminal act. 1 In the case at bar, the act is not
criminal. Neither can it be categorized as malum prohibitum the mere commission of which makes the doer
criminally liable even if he acted without evil intent.

It is quite clear that in removing the certificate of title in question from the court's files and delivering the same to
Borja for the purpose of effecting its administrative reconstitution, petitioner was not prompted by criminal intent or
illegal purpose. Rather, he was motivated with a sincere desire to protect the interest of the Government. The
prosecution did not even attempt to impute bad faith on the part of petitioner, and there is nothing in the record to
insinuate that petitioner had profited from the act complained of.

In Kataniag vs. People, 2 this Court ruled:

Whether during or after office hours, if the removal by a public officer of any official document from
its usual place of safe-keeping is for an illicit purpose, such as to tamper with or to otherwise profit
by it, or to do in connection therewith an act which would constitute a breach of trust in his official
care thereof, the crime of infidelity in the custody of public documents is committed. On the other
hand, where the act of removal is actuated with lawful or commendable motives, as when the public
officer removes the public documents committed to his trust for examination in connection with
official duty, or with a view to securing them from imminent danger of loss, there would be no crime
committed under the law. This is so, because the act of removal destruction or concealment of
public documents is punished by law only when any of such acts would constitute infidelity
in the custody thereof.

Tested by this rule, petitioner cannot be punished criminally.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Sandiganbayan is hereby set aside and petitioner acquitted of the crime charged.
Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-19676 February 7, 1923

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GERARDO AGNIS, defendant-appellant.

Felipe Ysmael for appellant.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

While the accused was on May 9, 1921, discharging the function of his office as postmaster of the town of Dipolog,
Zamboanga, a C.O.D. package arrived at the post-office from the "Little Leather Library" of New York, addressed to R.
Vic. Oliva. The accused notified the sendee several times, but the latter could not make the required payment in
accordance with the nature of the correspondence, and asked him to advance the amount and to retain it until he could
reimburse him. The accused retained the package without paying for it, and about July 28th of that year, he opened the
package which proved to contain printed pamphlets which he carried to his house to show them to his sister.

At the inspection of that office on the 30th day of that month of July, the officer who made the inspection, Eugenio de
Mesa, learned that there was such correspondence in that post-office, but that the package was not in the safe where it
should have been kept. Asked as to the whereabouts of the package, the defendant brought it to the office by order of the
inspector, saying that he had carried it to his house to show to his sister the pamphlets contained therein. The rules of the
post-office as to correspondence of such a nature are to the effect that if a C.O.D. matter is not claimed and paid for by
the sendee within sixty days from receipt, it must be returned to the sender.

If the pamphlets in question can be considered as the documents or papers contemplated in article 360 of the Penal
Code, the application to the case now before us of this legal provision would be obvious. This court in the case of United
States vs. Orera (11 Phil., 596), defined the terms "documents" or "papers" employed in said article 360 of the Penal
Code, as: "A deed, instrument or other duly authorized paper by which something is proved, evidenced or set forth," ...
"every deed or instrument executed by a private person, without the intervention of a public notary or of other person
legally authorized, by which document some disposition or agreement is proved, evidenced or set forth," ... ."

The pamphlets in question cannot be said to evidence a fact, agreement or disposition. They are rather merchandise as
any other article usually sent by C.O.D. mail. For this reason we think that the act complained of does not come within the
sanction of said article 360 of the Penal Code.

Neither is section 1952 of the Administrative Code, in connection with 2757, subsection (e), of said Code applicable to it,
nor is article 362 of the Penal Code, because it does not appear from the evidence that the package in question was
closed; on the contrary it appears that it could be opened on one end.

Nor can the act complained of be held to constitutes theft, since it is not alleged in the information, nor was it proven, that
the accused took the package with intent of gain.

These are in substance the remarks of the Attorney-General, which we find correct, wherefore said officer recommends
the dismissal of the case and the acquittal of the defendant.

We find this petition to be well grounded, and that judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the appellant acquitted
with the costs de oficio. So ordered.

Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, and Johns, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-19676 February 7, 1923

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GERARDO AGNIS, defendant-appellant.

Felipe Ysmael for appellant.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

While the accused was on May 9, 1921, discharging the function of his office as postmaster of the town of Dipolog,
Zamboanga, a C.O.D. package arrived at the post-office from the "Little Leather Library" of New York, addressed to R.
Vic. Oliva. The accused notified the sendee several times, but the latter could not make the required payment in
accordance with the nature of the correspondence, and asked him to advance the amount and to retain it until he could
reimburse him. The accused retained the package without paying for it, and about July 28th of that year, he opened the
package which proved to contain printed pamphlets which he carried to his house to show them to his sister.

At the inspection of that office on the 30th day of that month of July, the officer who made the inspection, Eugenio de
Mesa, learned that there was such correspondence in that post-office, but that the package was not in the safe where it
should have been kept. Asked as to the whereabouts of the package, the defendant brought it to the office by order of the
inspector, saying that he had carried it to his house to show to his sister the pamphlets contained therein. The rules of the
post-office as to correspondence of such a nature are to the effect that if a C.O.D. matter is not claimed and paid for by
the sendee within sixty days from receipt, it must be returned to the sender.

If the pamphlets in question can be considered as the documents or papers contemplated in article 360 of the Penal
Code, the application to the case now before us of this legal provision would be obvious. This court in the case of United
States vs. Orera (11 Phil., 596), defined the terms "documents" or "papers" employed in said article 360 of the Penal
Code, as: "A deed, instrument or other duly authorized paper by which something is proved, evidenced or set forth," ...
"every deed or instrument executed by a private person, without the intervention of a public notary or of other person
legally authorized, by which document some disposition or agreement is proved, evidenced or set forth," ... ."

The pamphlets in question cannot be said to evidence a fact, agreement or disposition. They are rather merchandise as
any other article usually sent by C.O.D. mail. For this reason we think that the act complained of does not come within the
sanction of said article 360 of the Penal Code.

Neither is section 1952 of the Administrative Code, in connection with 2757, subsection (e), of said Code applicable to it,
nor is article 362 of the Penal Code, because it does not appear from the evidence that the package in question was
closed; on the contrary it appears that it could be opened on one end.

Nor can the act complained of be held to constitutes theft, since it is not alleged in the information, nor was it proven, that
the accused took the package with intent of gain.

These are in substance the remarks of the Attorney-General, which we find correct, wherefore said officer recommends
the dismissal of the case and the acquittal of the defendant.

We find this petition to be well grounded, and that judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the appellant acquitted
with the costs de oficio. So ordered.

Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, and Johns, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-6805 June 30, 1954

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
PEDRO LANCANAN, defendant-appellee.

LABRADOR, J.:

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Samar, dismissing an information on a motion to
quash. The motion to quash is based on the alleged failure of the information to allege facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action.

The principal allegations of the information which originated this criminal case are:

That on or about the 13th day of November, 1951 ... the above-named accused, being then the Chief of
Police ... and while entrusted with the custody or charge and vigilance of (name of persons detained), who
were detention prisoners ..., then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously consent to the escape of
said prisoners and evade detention by releasing them without the order of the court ….

The motion to quash alleged:

The original complaint for Illegal Possession of Firearms in Criminal Case No. 2580 was filed on December
19, 1951 although the six accused were arrested without warrant on November 12, 1951 at about 9:30 in
the evening. The fact therefore is clear that on November 13, 1951 when these six persons were allegedly
released by the accused, there was no pending charge against them.

The provincial fiscal opposed the motion to quash, alleging that it is not predicated on the insufficiency of the
facts alleged, but on the claim that the persons released were not yet charged with any valid complaint on
November 13, 1951, so their release was made when they were not yet prisoners detained by a court order —
facts which do not appear in the information, but which go to the merits of the case. The court a quo examined
the records of the case and found that on November 12, 1951, the complaint was sworn to before the municipal
mayor. It was to be presented to the Justice of the Peace, but the latter was absent; as a matter of fact the following
note was placed on the complaint RECEIVED AND FILED THIS 12TH DAY OF NOV. '51, but no signature
appears on the typewritten name of the justice of the peace below the note. Below the above note, the following
note appeared RECEIVED AND REFILED THIS 19TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 1951, under which appeared the
signature of the justice of the peace. There were affidavits attached to the complaint, also dated November 12,
1951, but nowhere does it appear that the municipal mayor made a preliminary investigation, or issued a
warrant for the arrest of the accused therein. On the basis of the above facts and findings the trial court held
that "the herein accused Pedro C. Lancanan has not committed the crime of infidelity in the custody of the
prisoners ..." and ordered the dismissal of the case.

The first error imputed to the trial court is its consideration of facts not alleged in the information. The facts, however,
are apparent from the record and these facts are not denied by the provincial fiscal. Though they may not constitute
admissions on the part of the fiscal, they certainly fall within the spirit and principle contained in People vs. Navarro,
75 Phil., 516. We find no difference between facts merely admitted and undeniable facts appearing on the
record of a case. If one is allowed, there is no reason for denying admission of the other. As the facts are clear and
not susceptible of contradiction, it would be idle ceremony to return the case to the trial court for trial at which the
same facts of record will have to be introduced. It seems more in accord with expendiency for us to overlook the
technical irregularity that the trial court is claimed to have committed, which irregularity we do not here admit to exist
because it was sanctioned by us in the case of Navarro, supra, and proceed to determine the validity of the order
of the court on the basis of the facts found in the record, rather than remand the case to the trial court. The
claim that the court acted improperly in the consideration of the motion to quash must be dismissed.

The conclusion of the trial court that the case was not filed until December 19, 1951 is borne out by the record and
is correct. The note RECEIVED AND FILED THIS 12TH DAY OF NOV. 1951 with the typewritten name of the
justice of the peace, but without his signature, shows that the complaint was merely intended to be filed with said
official. If the mayor had intended to receive it for filing, he should have signed the above note. There was,
therefore, merely an attempt and intent to file it with the justice of the peace, which attempt was not carried
out because the justice of the peace was absent. An attempt to file, which was not carried out because the
official before whom it was to be presented for filing was absent, can not be confused with actual filing. And
swearing a complaint before a municipal mayor is no filing either. The latter official is not a clerk or officer of the
court; no provision of the rules authorizes him to act for and on behalf of the justice of the peace in the
acceptance of complaints for filing. The fact also that the justice of the peace on December 19, 1951 may have
believed that on that day the complaint was being refiled, is no reason why we may conclude that it was filed
previously, i. e. on November 12. The alleged error imputed to the trial court for dismissing the complaint is,
therefore, also without merit.

For the foregoing reasons, the order appealed from is hereby confirmed. Without costs.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Concepcion, JJ., concur.