24 Ople Vs Torres

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
WHEREAS, a concerted and collaborative effort among the various basic

services and social security providing agencies and other government
intrumentalities is required to achieve such a system;
EN BANC
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the

Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby direct
the following:
Sec. 1. Establishment of a National Compoterized Identification Reference
System. A decentralized Identification Reference System among the key
basic services and social security providers is hereby established.
G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998

BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner,
vs.
RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO,
ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA,
TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
Sec. 2. Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee. An Inter-Agency Coordinating

Committee (IACC) to draw-up the implementing guidelines and oversee the
implementation of the System is hereby created, chaired by the Executive
Secretary, with the following as members:
Head, Presidential Management Staff
Secretary, National Economic Development Authority
PUNO, J.:
Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local Government
The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the
shrinking of the right to privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." 1 Petitioner Ople prays
that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional
grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it
impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition
for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further
erosion.
Secretary, Department of Health

Administrator, Government Service Insurance System,
Administrator, Social Security System,
Administrator, National Statistics Office
A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos On December 12, 1996 and reads as
follows:
ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED
IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM
WHEREAS, there is a need to provide Filipino citizens and foreign residents
with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and
social security providers and other government instrumentalities;
WHEREAS, this will require a computerized system to properly and
efficiently identify persons seeking basic services on social security and
reduce, if not totally eradicate fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations;
Managing Director, National Computer Center.

Sec. 3. Secretariat. The National Computer Center (NCC) is hereby
designated as secretariat to the IACC and as such shall provide
administrative and technical support to the IACC.
Sec. 4. Linkage Among Agencies. The Population Reference Number (PRN)
generated by the NSO shall serve as the common reference number to
establish a linkage among concerned agencies. The IACC Secretariat shall
coordinate with the different Social Security and Services Agencies to
establish the standards in the use of Biometrics Technology and in computer
application designs of their respective systems.
Sec. 5. Conduct of Information Dissemination Campaign. The Office of the

Press Secretary, in coordination with the National Statistics Office, the GSIS
and SSS as lead agencies and other concerned agencies shall undertake a
massive tri-media information dissemination campaign to educate and raise
public awareness on the importance and use of the PRN and the Social
Security Identification Reference.
B. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] WAS ISSUED WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE AND
ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT
ENCROACHING ON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS;
C. THE FUNDS NECESSARY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM MAY BE SOURCED FROM THE
BUDGETS OF THE CONCERNED AGENCIES;
Sec. 6. Funding. The funds necessary for the implementation of the system
shall be sourced from the respective budgets of the concerned agencies.
Sec. 7. Submission of Regular Reports. The NSO, GSIS and SSS shall
submit regular reports to the Office of the President through the IACC, on
the status of implementation of this undertaking.
Sec. 8. Effectivity. This Administrative Order shall take effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 12th day of December in the year of Our
Lord, Nineteen Hundred and Ninety-Six.
D. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] PROTECTS AN INDIVIDUAL'S INTEREST IN

PRIVACY. 3
We now resolve.
I
As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the
standing to sue of the petitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically,
respondents aver that petitioner has no legal interest to uphold and that the implementing rules
of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.
(SGD.) FIDEL V. RAMOS

A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and
January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents,
then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as
members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of
A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its
implementation.
Petitioner contends:
A. THE ESTABLISNMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED
IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE
ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS
OF THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.
B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
USURPATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO
APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR EXPENDITURE.
C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE
GROUNDWORK FOR A SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF
RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION. 2
Respondents counter-argue:
A. THE INSTANT PETITION IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE CASE AS WOULD
WARRANT A JUDICIAL REVIEW;
These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished
member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring
suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. 4 As
taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also
impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to
implement A.O. No. 308. 5
The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the
implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No.
308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to
be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents themselves have
started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19,
1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for the
manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card. 6 Respondent Executive Secretary Torres
has publicly announced that representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have completed the
guidelines for the national identification system. 7 All signals from the respondents show their
unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait for the formality of the rules to
pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that we tighten the
rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an important
constitutional principle and a fundamental right.
II
We now come to the core issues. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere
administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He
alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing
in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and
more particularly, violates their right to privacy.
Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of
Congress is understandable. The blurring of the demarcation line between the power of the
Legislature to make laws and the power of the Executive to execute laws will disturb their
delicate balance of power and cannot be allowed. Hence, the exercise by one branch of
government of power belonging to another will be given a stricter scrutiny by this Court.
The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power is
"the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them." 8 The
Constitution, as the will of the people in their original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has
vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. 9 The grant of legislative power to
Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. 10 The legislative body possesses plenary
power for all purposes of civil government. 11 Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and
tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it
elsewhere. 12 In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly,
legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to matters of general concern or common
interest. 13
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws. 14 The
executive power is vested in the Presidents. 15 It is generally defined as the power to enforce
and administer the laws. 16 It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and
enforcing their due observance. 17
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the
government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of
his department. 18 He has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This
means that he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department,
bureau and office or interfere with the discretion of its officials. 19 Corollary to the power of
control, the President also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the
maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over
bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively. 20
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing
orders as determined by proper governmental organs. 21 It enables the President to fix a
uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his
agents. 22 To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not
appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is:
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to
particular aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of his
duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative
orders. 23
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to
specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in
harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the
law and carrying out the legislative policy. 24 We reject the argument that A.O. No.
308 implements the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987. The Code is
a general law and "incorporates in a unified document the major structural, functional
and procedural principles of governance." 25 and "embodies changes in administrative
structure and procedures designed to serve the
people." 26 The Code is divided into seven (7) Books: Book I deals with Sovereignty
and General Administration, Book II with the Distribution of Powers of the three
branches of Government, Book III on the Office of the President, Book IV on the
Executive Branch, Book V on Constitutional Commissions, Book VI on National

Government Budgeting, and Book VII on Administrative Procedure. These Books
contain provisions on the organization, powers and general administration of the
executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, the organization and
administration of departments, bureaus and offices under the executive branch, the
organization and functions of the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional
bodies, the rules on the national government budget, as well as guideline for the
exercise by administrative agencies of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. The
Code covers both the internal administration of government, i.e, internal organization,
personnel and recruitment, supervision and discipline, and the effects of the functions
performed by administrative officials on private individuals or parties outside
government. 27
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code
of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference
System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies
the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by
government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that
the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important freedom of thought.
HEART OF THE CASE (Atty Bronce)
As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our
citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the administrative power of the
President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals
with a subject that should be covered by law.
Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.D. No. 308 is not a law because it confers
no right, imposes no duty, affords no proctection, and creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a
citizen cannot transact business with government agencies delivering basic services to
the people without the contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this
identification card for no one can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as daylight
that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges.
Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right and imposes no duty cannot
stand.
Again, with due respect, the dissenting opinions unduly expand the limits of administrative
legislation and consequently erodes the plenary power of Congress to make laws. This is
contrary to the established approach defining the traditional limits of administrative legislation.
As well stated by Fisher: ". . . Many regulations however, bear directly on the public. It is here
that administrative legislation must he restricted in its scope and application. Regulations are not
supposed to be a substitute for the general policy-making that Congress enacts in the form of a
public law. Although administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe
rules and regulations is not an independent source of power to make laws." 28
III
Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot
pass constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because facially it violates the
right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone." 29 In the 1965 case of
Griswold v. Connecticut, 30 the United States Supreme Court gave more substance to the right of
privacy when it ruled that the right has a constitutional foundation. It held that there is a right of
privacy which can be found within the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth
Amendments, 31 viz:
Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras formed by

emanations from these guarantees that help give them life and substance . .
. various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association
contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have
seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of
soldiers "in any house" in time of peace without the consent of the owner is
another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the
''right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures." The Fifth Amendment in its
Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy
which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The
Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people."
In the 1968 case of Morfe v. Mutuc, 32 we adopted the Griswold ruling that there is a
constitutional right to privacy. Speaking thru Mr. Justice, later Chief Justice, Enrique
Fernando, we held:
xxx xxx xxx
The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of
contraceptives a criminal offence on the ground of its amounting to an
unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy of married persons; rightfully
it stressed "a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several
fundamental constitutional guarantees." It has wider implications though.
The constitutional right to privacy has come into its own.
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded
recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully
deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is
particularly apt: "The concept of limited government has always included the
idea that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the
personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions
between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of
the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state.
In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private sector,
which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector,
which the state can control. Protection of this private sector protection, in
other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual has become
increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a
technological age industrialization, urbanization, and organization
operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In
modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private
life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society."
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is recognized and
enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. 33 It is expressly recognized in section 3 (1)
of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be
inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or
order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
Other facets of the right to privacy are protectad in various provisions of the Bill of
Rights, viz: 34
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the
court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health as may be provided by law.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and
private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that
"[e]very person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors
and other persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and
prying into the privacy of another. 35 It also holds a public officer or employee or any private
individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, 36 and
recognizes the privacy of letters and other private communications. 37 The Revised Penal Code
makes a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, 38 the revelation of trade and industrial
secrets, 39 and trespass to dwelling. 40Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the
Anti-Wiretapping Law, 41 the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act 42 and the Intellectual Property
Code. 43 The Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise recognize the privacy of
certain information. 44
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental
right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No.
308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is
predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provides our citizens and foreigners with the
facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and
other government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent
transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether
these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not
arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if
implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger.
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference
Number (PRN) as a "common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned
agencies" through the use of "Biometrics Technology" and "computer application designs."
Biometry or biometrics is "the science of the applicatin of statistical methods to biological facts; a
mathematical analysis of biological data." 45 The term "biometrics" has evolved into a broad
category of technologies which provide precise confirmation of an individual's identity through
the use of the individual's own physiological and behavioral characteristics. 46 A physiological
characteristic is a relatively stable physical characteristic such as a fingerprint, retinal scan, hand
geometry or facial features. A behavioral characteristic is influenced by the individual's
personality and includes voice print, signature and keystroke. 47 Most biometric idenfication
systems use a card or personal identificatin number (PIN) for initial identification. The biometric
measurement is used to verify that the individual holding the card or entering the PIN is the
legitimate owner of the card or PIN. 48
A most common form of biological encoding is finger-scanning where technology scans a
fingertip and turns the unique pattern therein into an individual number which is called a biocrypt.
The biocrypt is stored in computer data banks 49 and becomes a means of identifying an
individual using a service. This technology requires one's fingertip to be scanned every time
service or access is provided. 50 Another method is the retinal scan. Retinal scan technology
employs optical technology to map the capillary pattern of the retina of the eye. This technology
produces a unique print similar to a finger print. 51 Another biometric method is known as the
"artificial nose." This device chemically analyzes the unique combination of substances excreted
from the skin of people. 52 The latest on the list of biometric achievements is the thermogram.
Scientists have found that by taking pictures of a face using infra-red cameras, a unique heat
distribution pattern is seen. The different densities of bone, skin, fat and blood vessels all
contribute to the individual's personal "heat signature." 53
In the last few decades, technology has progressed at a galloping rate. Some science fictions
are now science facts. Today, biometrics is no longer limited to the use of fingerprint to identify
an individual. It is a new science that uses various technologies in encoding any and all
biological characteristics of an individual for identification. It is noteworthy that A.O. No. 308
does not state what specific biological characteristics and what particular biometrics technology
shall be used to identify people who will seek its coverage. Considering the banquest of options
available to the implementors of A.O. No. 308, the fear that it threatens the right to privacy of our
people is not groundless.
A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will show that it does not state
whether encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for identification purposes. In
fact, the Solicitor General claims that the adoption of the Identification Reference System will
contribute to the "generation of population data for development planning." 54 This is an
admission that the PRN will not be used solely for identification but the generation of other data
with remote relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O.
No. 308 can give the government the roving authority to store and retrieve information for a
purpose other than the identification of the individual through his PRN.
The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be
undarplayed as the dissenters do. Pursuant to said administrative order, an individual must
present his PRN everytime he deals with a government agency to avail of basic services and
security. His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be recorded whether it
be in the computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The individual's file may include his
transactions for loan availments, income tax returns, statement of assets and liabilities,
reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of the PRN, the
better the chance of building a huge formidable informatin base through the electronic linkage of
the files. 55 The data may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes; but the
existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a
temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist. 56
We can even grant, arguendo, that the computer data file will be limited to the name, address
and other basic personal infomation about the individual. 57 Even that hospitable assumption will
not save A.O. No. 308 from constitutional infirmity for again said order does not tell us in clear
and categorical terms how these information gathered shall he handled. It does not provide who
shall control and access the data, under what circumstances and for what purpose. These
factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the
information. 58 Well to note, the computer linkage gives other government agencies access to the
information. Yet, there are no controls to guard against leakage of information. When the access
code of the control programs of the particular computer system is broken, an intruder, without
fear of sanction or penalty, can make use of the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate
the data stored within the system. 59
It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information which
will be gathered about our people will only be processed for unequivocally specified
purposes. 60 The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the
individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it
may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the
right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by government
authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. 61 The possibilities
of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we
consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less
verify the correctness of the data encoded. 62 They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of
Rights seeks to prevent. 63
The ability of sophisticated data center to generate a comprehensive cradle-to-grave dossier on
an individual and transmit it over a national network is one of the most graphic threats of the
computer revolution. 64 The computer is capable of producing a comprehensive dossier on
individuals out of information given at different times and for varied purposes. 65 It can continue
adding to the stored data and keeping the information up to date. Retrieval of stored date is
simple. When information of a privileged character finds its way into the computer, it can be
extracted together with other data on the subject. 66 Once extracted, the information is putty in
the hands of any person. The end of privacy begins.
Though A.O. No. 308 is undoubtedly not narrowly drawn, the dissenting opinions would dismiss
its danger to the right to privacy as speculative and hypothetical. Again, we cannot countenance
such a laidback posture. The Court will not be true to its role as the ultimate guardian of the
people's liberty if it would not immediately smother the sparks that endanger their rights but
would rather wait for the fire that could consume them.
We reject the argument of the Solicitor General that an individual has a reasonable expectation
of privacy with regard to the Natioal ID and the use of biometrics technology as it stands on
quicksand. The reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test:
(1) whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2)
whether this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable. 67 The factual
circumstances of the case determines the reasonableness of the expectation. 68 However, other
factors, such as customs, physical surroundings and practices of a particular activity, may serve
to create or diminish this expectation. 69 The use of biometrics and computer technology in A.O.
No. 308 does not assure the individual of a reasonable expectation of privacy. 70 As technology
advances, the level of reasonably expected privacy decreases. 71 The measure of protection
granted by the reasonable expectation diminishes as relevant technology becomes more widely
accepted. 72 The security of the computer data file depends not only on the physical
inaccessibility of the file but also on the advances in hardware and software computer
technology. A.O. No. 308 is so widely drawn that a minimum standard for a reasonable
expectation of privacy, regardless of technology used, cannot be inferred from its provisions.
The rules and regulations to be by the IACC cannot remedy this fatal defect. Rules and
regulations merely implement the policy of the law or order. On its face, A.O. No. gives the IACC
virtually infettered discretion to determine the metes and bounds of the ID System.
Nor do your present laws prvide adequate safeguards for a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Commonwealth Act. No. 591 penalizes the disclosure by any person of data furnished by the
individual to the NSO with imprisonment and fine. 73 Republic Act. No. 1161 prohibits public
disclosure of SSS employment records and reports. 74 These laws, however, apply to records
and data with the NSO and the SSS. It is not clear whether they may be applied to data with the
other government agencies forming part of the National ID System. The need to clarify the penal
aspect of A.O. No. 308 is another reason why its enactment should be given to Congress.
Next, the Solicitor General urges us to validate A.O. No. 308's abridgment of the right of privacy
by using the rational relationship test. 75 He stressed that the purposes of A.O. No. 308 are: (1)
to streamline and speed up the implementation of basic government services, (2) eradicate
fraud by avoiding duplication of services, and (3) generate population data for development
planning. He cocludes that these purposes justify the incursions into the right to privacy for the
means are rationally related to the end. 76
We are not impressed by the argument. In Morfe v. Mutuc, 77 we upheld the constitutionality of
R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as a valid police power measure. We
declared that the law, in compelling a public officer to make an annual report disclosing his
assets and liabilities, his sources of income and expenses, did not infringe on the individual's
right to privacy. The law was enacted to promote morality in public administration by curtailing
and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in
the public service. 78
The same circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. For one, R.A. 3019 is a statute,
not an administrative order. Secondly, R.A. 3019 itself is sufficiently detailed. The law is
clear on what practices were prohibited and penalized, and it was narrowly drawn to
avoid abuses. IN the case at bar, A.O. No. 308 may have been impelled by a worthy
purpose, but, it cannot pass constitutional scrutiny for it is not narrowly drawn. And we
now hod that when the integrity of a fundamental right is at stake, this court will give the
challenged law, administrative order, rule or regulation a stricter scrutiny. It will not do for the
authorities to invoke the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. Nor is it
enough for the authorities to prove that their act is not irrational for a basic right can be
diminished, if not defeated, even when the government does not act irrationally. They must
satisfactorily show the presence of compelling state interests and that the law, rule or regulation
is narrowly drawn to preclude abuses. This approach is demanded by the 1987 Constitution
whose entire matrix is designed to protect human rights and to prevent authoritarianism. In case
of doubt, the least we can do is to lean towards the stance that will not put in danger the rights
protected by the Constitutions.
The case of Whalen v. Roe 79 cited by the Solicitor General is also off-line. In Whalen, the United
States Supreme Court was presented with the question of whether the State of New York could
keep a centralized computer record of the names and addresses of all persons who obtained
certain drugs pursuant to a doctor's prescription. The New York State Controlled Substance Act
of 1972 required physicians to identify parties obtaining prescription drugs enumerated in the
statute, i.e., drugs with a recognized medical use but with a potential for abuse, so that the
names and addresses of the patients can be recorded in a centralized computer file of the State
Department of Health. The plaintiffs, who were patients and doctors, claimed that some people
might decline necessary medication because of their fear that the computerized data may be
readily available and open to public disclosure; and that once disclosed, it may stigmatize them
as drug addicts. 80 The plaintiffs alleged that the statute invaded a constitutionally protected zone
of privacy, i.e., the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and the interest
in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions. The U.S. Supreme Court held
that while an individual's interest in avoiding disclosuer of personal matter is an aspect of the
right to privacy, the statute did not pose a grievous threat to establish a constitutional violation.
The Court found that the statute was necessary to aid in the enforcement of laws designed to
minimize the misuse of dangerous drugs. The patient-identification requirement was a product of
an orderly and rational legislative decision made upon recommmendation by a specially
appointed commission which held extensive hearings on the matter. Moreover, the statute was
narrowly drawn and contained numerous safeguards against indiscriminate disclosure. The
statute laid down the procedure and requirements for the gathering, storage and retrieval of the
informatin. It ebumerated who were authorized to access the data. It also prohibited public
disclosure of the data by imposing penalties for its violation. In view of these safeguards, the
infringement of the patients' right to privacy was justified by a valid exercise of police power. As
we discussed above, A.O. No. 308 lacks these vital safeguards.
Even while we strike down A.O. No. 308, we spell out in neon that the Court is not per se agains
the use of computers to accumulate, store, process, retvieve and transmit data to improve our
bureaucracy. Computers work wonders to achieve the efficiency which both government and
private industry seek. Many information system in different countries make use of the computer
to facilitate important social objective, such as better law enforcement, faster delivery of public
services, more efficient management of credit and insurance programs, improvement of
telecommunications and streamlining of financial activities. 81 Used wisely, data stored in the
computer could help good administration by making accurate and comprehensive information for
those who have to frame policy and make key decisions. 82 The benefits of the computer has
revolutionized information technology. It developed the internet, 83 introduced the concept of
cyberspace 84 and the information superhighway where the individual, armed only with his
personal computer, may surf and search all kinds and classes of information from libraries and
databases connected to the net.
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all
incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological
advancements that enhance public service and the common good. It merely requires that the
law be narrowly focused 85 and a compelling interest justify such intrusions. 86 Intrusions into the
right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent
unconstitutional invasions. We reiterate that any law or order that invades individual privacy will
be subjected by this Court to strict scrutiny. The reason for this stance was laid down in Morfe v.
Mutuc, to wit:
The concept of limited government has always included the idea that
governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of
the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic disctinctions between absolute
and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in
all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a
system of limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to
the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state
can control. Protection of this private sector protection, in other words, of
the dignity and integrity of the individual has become increasingly
important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological
age industrialization, urbanization, and organization operate to narrow
the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the
capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the
difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society. 87
IV
The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society.
The threats emanate from various sources governments, journalists, employers, social
scientists, etc. 88 In th case at bar, the threat comes from the executive branch of
government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by
giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services.
Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent fail to perceive the danger
that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to compile a devastating dossier against
unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take note of the well-worded warning of Kalvin, Jr., "the
disturbing result could be that everyone will live burdened by an unerasable record of his past
and his limitations. In a way, the threat is that because of its record-keeping, the society will have
lost its benign capacity to forget." 89 Oblivious to this counsel, the dissents still say we should not
be too quick in labelling the right to privacy as a fundamental right. We close with the statement
that the right to privacy was not engraved in our Constitution for flattery.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Adminisrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption
of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and void for being
unconstitutional.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo and Martinez, JJ., concur.
Initially recognized as an aspect of tort law, it created giant waves in legal circles with the
publication in the Harvard Law Review 2 of the trail-blazing article, "The Right to Privacy," by
Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis.
Whether viewed as a personal or a property right, it found its way in Philippine Constitutions and
statutes; this, in spite of the fact that Philippine culture can hardly be said to provide a fertile field
for the burgeoning of said right. In fact, our lexicographers have yet to coin a word for it in the
Filipino language. Customs and practices, being what they have always been, Filipinos think it
perfectly natural and in good taste to inquire into each other's intimate affairs.
One has only to sit through a televised talk show to be convinced that what passes for
wholesome entertainment is actually an invasion into one's private life, leaving the interviewee
embarrassed and outraged by turns.
With the overarching influence of common law and the recent advent of the Information Age with
its high-tech devices, the right to privacy has expanded to embrace its public law aspect. The Bill
of Rights of our evolving Charters, a direct transplant from that of the United States, contains in
essence facets of the right to privacy which constitute limitations on the far-reaching powers of
government.
So terrifying are the possibilities of a law such as Administrative Order No. 308 in making
inroads into the private lives of the citizens, a virtual Big Brother looking over our shoulder, that it
must, without delay, be "slain upon sight" before our society turns totalitarian with each of us, a
mindless robot.
Separate Opinions
I, therefore, VOTE for the nullification of A.O. No. 308.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion;

VITUG, J., separate opinion;
What marks offs man from a beast?
Aside from the distinguishing physical characteristics, man is a rational being, one who is
endowed with intellect which allows him to apply reasoned judgment to problems at hand; he
has the innate spiritual faculty which can tell, not only what is right but, as well, what is moral
and ethical. Because of his sensibilities, emotions and feelings, he likewise possesses a sense
of shame. In varying degrees as dictated by diverse cultures, he erects a wall between himself
and the outside world wherein he can retreat in solitude, protecting himself from prying eyes and
ears and their extensions, whether form individuals, or much later, from authoritarian intrusions.
Piercing through the mists of time, we find the original Man and Woman defying the injunction of
God by eating of the forbidden fruit in the Garden. And when their eyes were "opened" forthwith
"they sewed fig leaves together, and made themselves aprons." 1 Down the corridors of time, we
find man fashioning "fig leaves" of sorts or setting up figurative walls, the better to insulate
themselves from the rest of humanity.
Such vague stirrings of the desire "to be left alone," considered "anti-social" by some, led to the
development of the concept of "privacy," unheard of among beasts. Different branches of
science, have made their own studies of this craving of the human spirit psychological,
anthropological sociological and philosophical, with the legal finally giving its imprimatur by
elevating it to the status ofa right, specifically a private right.
One can appreciate the concern expressed by my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Reynato S.
Puno, echoing that of the petitioner, the Honorable Blas F. Ople, on the issuance of
Administrative Order No. 308 by the President of the Philippines and the dangers its
implementation could bring. I find it hard, nevertheless, to peremptorily assume at this time that
the administrative order will be misused and to thereby ignore the possible benefits that can be
derived from, or the merits of, a nationwide computerized identification reference system. The
great strides and swift advances in technology render it inescapable that one day we will, at all
events, have to face up with the reality of seeing extremely sophisticated methods of personal
identification and any attempt to stop the inevitable may either be short-lived or even futile. The
imperatives, I believe, would instead be to now install specific safeguards and control measures
that may be calculated best to ward-off probable ill effects of any such device. Here, it may be
apropos to recall the pronouncement of this Court in People vs. Nazario 1 that
As a rule, a statute or [an] act may be said to be vague when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men "of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of
the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle. 2
Administrative Order No. 308 appears to be so extensively drawn that could, indeed,
allow unbridled options to become available to its implementors beyond the
reasonable comfort of the citizens and of residents alike.
Prescinding from the foregoing, and most importantly to this instance, the subject covered by the
questioned administrative order can have far-reaching consequences that can tell on all
individuals, their liberty and privacy, that, to my mind, should make it indispensable and
appropriate to have the matter specifically addressed by the Congress of the Philippines, the
policy-making body of our government, to which the task should initially belong and to which the
authority to formulate and promulgate that policy is constitutionally lodged.
WHEREFORE, I vote for the nullification of Administrative Order No. 308 for being an undue and
impermissible exercise of legislative power by the Executive.

with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic services and
efficiently identify persons seeking basic services and social security and
reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations;
instrumentalities is required to achieve such a system;
PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion;

I concur only in the result and only on the ground that an executive issuance is not legally
sufficient to establish an all-encompassing computerized system of identification in the country.
The subject matter contained in AO 308 is beyond the powers of the President to regulate
without a legislative enactment.
I reserve judgmeht on the issue of wherher a national ID system is an infringement of the
constitutional right to privacy or the freedom of thought until after Congress passes, if ever, a law
to this effect. Only then, and upon the filing of a proper petition, may the provisions of the statute
be scrutinized by the judiciary to determine their constitutional foundation. Until such time, the
issue is premature; and any decision thereon, speculative and academic. 1
Be that as it may, the scholarly discussions of Justices Romero, Puno, Kapunan and Mendoza
on the constitutional right to privacy and freedom of thought may stil become useful guides to
our lawmakers, when and if Congress should deliberate on a bill establishing a national
identification system.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Repubic of the

the following:
Sec. 1 Establishment of a National Computerized Identification Reference
Head Presidential Management Staff
Let it be noted that this Court, as shown by the voting of the justices, has not definitively ruled on
these points. The voting is decisive only on the need for the appropriate legislation, and it is only
on this ground that the petition is granted by this Court.
Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local

Government
KAPUNAN, J., dissenting opinion;
Administrator, Government Service Insurance System
The pioneering efforts of the executive to adopt a national computerized identification reference
system has met fierce opposition. It has spun dark predictions of sinister government ploys to
tamper with the citizen's right to privacy and ominous forecasts of a return to authoritarianism.
Lost in the uproar, however, is the simple fact that there is nothing in the whole breadth and
lenght of Administrative Order No. 308 that suggests a taint constitutional infirmity.
Administrator, Social Security System

Managing Director, National Computer Center
A.O. No. 308 issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on 12 December 1996 reads:
ADMTNISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 308


Press Secretary, in coordination with the National Statistics Offices, the
GSIS and SSS as lead agencies and other concerned agencies shall
undertake a massive tri-media information dissemination campaign to
educate and raise public awareness on the importance and use of the PRN
and the Social Security Identification Reference.
1. Payment of SSS and GSIS benefits

2. Applications for driver's license, BIR TIN, passport,
marriage license, death certificate, NBI and police
clearances, and business permits
3. Availment of Medicare services in hospitals
4. Availment of welfare services
5. Application for work/employment
6. Pre-requisite for Voter's ID. 4
The card may also be used for private transactions such as:
submit regular reports to the Office of the President, through the IACC, on
Sec. 8 Effectivity. This Administartive Order shall take effect immediately.
In seeking to strike down A.O. No. 308 as unconstitutional, petitioner argues:
A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED
ACT. THE ISSUACE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF
THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.
RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION.
The National Computerized Identification Reference system to which the NSO, GSIS and SSS
are linked as lead members of the IACC is intended to establish uniform standards for ID cards
isssued by key government agencies (like the SSS) 1 for the "efficient identification of
persons." 2 Under the new system, only one reliable and tamper-proof I.D. need be presented by
the cardholder instead of several identification papers such as passports and driver's
license, 3 to able to transact with government agencies. The improved ID can be used to
facilitate public transactions such as:
1. Opening of bank accounts

2. Encashment of checks
3. Applications for loans, credit cards, water, power,
telephones, pagers, etc.
4. Purchase of stocks
6. Insurance claims
7. Receipt of payments, checks, letters, valuables, etc. 5
The new identification system would tremendously improve and uplift public service in our
country to the benefit of Filipino citizens and resident aliens. It would promote, facilitate and
speed up legitimate transactions with government offices as well as with private and business
entities. Experience tells us of the constant delays and inconveniences the public has to suffer in
availing of basic public services and social security benefits because of inefficient and not too
reliable means of identification of the beneficiaries.
Thus, in the "Primer on the Social Security Card and Administrative Order No. 308" issued by
the SSS, a lead agency in the implementation of the said order, the following salient features are
mentioned:
1. A.O. 308 merely establishes the standards for I.D. cards issued by key
government agencies such as SSS and GSIS.
2. It does not establish a national I.D. system neither does it require a
national I.D. card for every person.
3. The use of the I.D. is voluntary.
4. The I.D. is not required for delivery of any government service. Everyone
has the right to basic government services as long as he is qualified under
existing laws.
only absolute separation that has ever been possible was that in the
theoretical writings of a Montesquieu, who looked across at foggy England
from his sunny Gascon vineyards and completely misconstrued what he
saw. 7
5. The LD. cannot and will not in any way be used to prevent one to travel.
6. There will be no discrimination Non-holders of the improved I.D. are still
entitled to the same services but will be subjected to the usual rigid
identification and verification beforehand.
I
The issue that must first be hurdled is: was the issuance of A.O. No. 308 an exercise by the
President of legislative power properly belonging to Congress?
It is not.
The Administrative Code of 1987 has unequivocally vested the President with quasi-legislative
powers in the form of executive orders, administrative orders, proclamations, memorandum
orders and circulars and general or special orders. 6 An administrative order, like the one under
which the new identification system is embodied, has its peculiar meaning under the 1987
Administrative Code:
particular aspects of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as
administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders.
The National Computerized Identification Reference System was established pursuant to the
aforaquoted provision precisely because its principal purpose, as expressly stated in the order,
is to provide the people with "the facility to conveniently transact business" with the various
government agencies providing basic services. Being the "administrative head," it is
unquestionably the responsibility of the President to find ways and means to improve the
government bureaucracy, and make it more professional, efficient and reliable, specially those
government agencies and instrumentalities which provide basic services and which the citizenry
constantly transact with, like the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Social Security
System (SSS) and National Statistics Office (NSO). The national computerized ID system is one
such advancement. To emphasize, the new identification reference system is created to
streamline the bureaucracy, cut the red tape and ultimately achieve administrative efficiency. The
project, therefore, relates to, is an appropriate subject and falls squarely within the ambit of the
Chief Executive's administrative power under which, in order to successfully carry out his
administrative duties, he has been granted by law quasi-legislative powers, quoted above.
Understandably, strict adherence to the doctrine of separation of power spawns differences of
opinion. For we cannot divide the branches of government into water-tight compartment. Even if
such is possible, it is neither desirable nor feasible. Bernard Schwartz, in his work Administrative
Law, A Casebook, thus states:
To be sure, if we think of the separation of powers as carrying out the
distinction between legislation and administration with mathematical
precision and as dividing the branches of government into watertight
compartments, we would probably have to conclude that any exercise of
lawmaking authority by an agency is automatically invalid. Such a rigorous
application of the constitutional doctrine is neither desirable nor feasible; the
A mingling of powers among the three branches of government is not a novel concept. This
blending of powers has become necessary to properly address the complexities brought about
by a rapidly developing society and which the traditional branches of government have difficulty
coping with. 8
It has been said that:
The true meaning of the general doctrine of the separation of powers seems
to be that the whole power of one department should not be exercised by
the same hands which possess the whole power of either of the other
department, and that no one department ought to possess directly or
indirectly an overruling influence over the others. And it has been that this
doctrine should be applied only to the powers which because of their nature
are assigned by the constitution itself to one of the departments exclusively.
Hence, it does not necessarily follow that an entire and complete separation
is either desirable of was ever intended, for such a complete separation
would be impracticable if not impossible; there may be-and frequently areareas in which executive, legislative, and judicial powers blend or overlap;
and many officers whose duties cannot be exclusively placed under any one
of these heads.
The courts have perceived the necessity of avoiding a narrow construction
of a state constitutional provision for the division of the powers of the
government into three distinct departments, for it is impractical to view the
provision from the standpoint of a doctrinaire. Thus, the modern view of
separation of powers rejects the metaphysical abstractions and reverts
instead to more pragmatic, flexible, functional approach, giving recognition
to the fact that then may be a certain degree of blending or admixture of the
three powers of the government. Moreover, the doctrine of separation of
powers has never been strictly or rigidly applied, and indeed could not be, to
all the ramifications of state or national governments; government would
prove abortive if it were attempted to follow the policy of separation to the
letter. 9
In any case A.O. No. 308 was promulgated by the President pursuant to the quasi-legislative
powers expressly granted to him by law and in accordance with his duty as administrative head.
Hence, the contention that the President usurped the legislative prerogatives of Congress has
no firm basis.
II
Having resolved that the President has the authority and prerogative to issue A.O. No. 308, I
submit that it is premature for the Court to determine the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of
the National Computerized Identification Reference System.
Basic in constitutional law is the rule that before the court assumes jurisdiction over and decide
constitutional issues, the following requisites must first be satisfied:
1) there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of rights susceptible of judicial
determination;
2) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper party;
1) A.O. No. 308 does not specify the particular Biometrics Technology that
shall be used for the new identification system.
3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and

4) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the resolution of the case.
The majority opinion has enumerated various forms and methods of Biometrics Technology
which if adopted in the National Computaized Identification Reference System would seriously
threaten the right to privacy. Among which are biocrypt retinal scan, artificial nose and
thermogram. The majority also points to certain alleged deficiencies of A O. No. 308. Thus:
10
In this case, it is evident that the first element is missing. Judicial intervention calls for an actual
case or controversy which is defined as "an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or
ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory." 11 Justice Isagani A. Cruz further
expounds that "(a) justifiable controversy is thus distinguished from a difference or dispute of a
hypothetical or abstract character or from one that is academic or moot. The controversy must
be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. It
must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of special relief through a decree that is
conclusive in character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts. . . ." 12 A.O. No. 308 does not create any concrete or substantial
controversy. It provides the general framework of the National Computerized Identification
Reference System and lays down the basic standards (efficiency, convenience and prevention of
fraudulent transactions) for its cretion. But as manifestly indicated in the subject order, it is the
Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee (IACC) which is tasked to research, study and formulate
the guidelines and parameters for the use of Biometrics Technology and in computer application
designs that will and define give substance to the new system. 13 This petition is, thus, premature
considering that the IACC is still in the process of doing the leg work and has yet to codify and
formalize the details of the new system.
The majority opines that the petition is ripe for adjudication even without the promulgation of the
necessary guidelines in view of the fact that respondents have begun implementation of A.O.
No. 308. The SSS, in particular, has started advertising in newspapers the invitation to bid for
the production of the I.D. cards. 14
I beg to disagree. It is not the new system itself that is intended to be implemented in the
invitation to bid but only the manufacture of the I.D. cards. Biometrics Technology is not and
cannot be used in the I.D. cards as no guidelines therefor have yet been laid down by the IACC.
Before the assailed system can be set up, it is imperative that the guidelines be issued first.
III
Without the essential guidelines, the principal contention for invalidating the new identification
reference system that it is an impermissible encroachment on the constitutionally recognized
right to privacy is plainly groundless. There is nothing in A.O. No. 308 to serve as sufficient
basis for a conclusion that the new system to be evolved violates the right to privacy. Said order
simply provides the system's general framework. Without the concomitant guidelines, which
would spell out in detail how this new identification system would work, the perceived violation of
the right to privacy amounts to nothing more than mere surmise and speculation.
What has caused much of the hysteria over the National Computerized Identification Reference
System is the possible utilization of Biometrics Technology which refers to the use of
autnomated matching of physiological or behavioral characteristics to identify a person that
would violated the citizen's constitutionally protected right to privacy.
2) The order dots not state whether encoding of data is limited to biological
information alone for identification purposes;
3) There is no provision as to who shall control and access the data, under
what circumstances and for what purpose; and
4) There are no controls to guard against leakage of information, thus
heightening the potential for misuse and abuse.
We should not be overwhelmed by the mere mention of the Biometrics Technology and its
alleged, yet unfounded "far-reaching effects."
There is nothing in A.O. No. 308, as it is worded, to suggest that the advanced methods of the
Biometrics Technology that may pose danger to the right of privacy will be adopted.
The standards set in A.O. No. 308 for the adoption of the new system are clear-cut and
unequivocably spelled out in the "WHEREASES" and body of the order, namely, the need to
provide citizens and foreign residents with the facility to conveniently transact business
with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities; the
computerized system is intended to properly and efficiently identify persons seeking basic
services or social security and reduce, if not totally eradicate fraudulent transactions and
misreprentation; the national identification reference system is established among the key basic
services and social security providers; and finally, the IACC Secretariat shall coordinate with
different Social Security and Services Agencies to establish the standards in the use of
Biometrics Technology. Consequently, the choice of the particular form and extent of Biometrics
Technology that will be applied and the parameters for its use (as will be defined in the
guidelines) will necessarily and logically be guided, limited and circumscribed by the afore-stated
standards. The fear entertained by the majority on the potential dangers of this new technology
is thus securedly allayed by the specific limitations set by the above-mentioned standards. More
than this, the right to privacy is well-esconced in and directly protected by various provisions of
the Bill of Rights, the Civil Code, the Revised Penal Code, and certain laws, all so painstakingly
and resourcefully catalogued in the majority opinion. Many of these laws provide penalties for
their violation in the form of imprisonment, fines, or damages. These laws will serve as powerful
deterrents not only in the establishment of any administrative rule that will violate the
constitutionally protected right to privacy, but also to would-be transgressors of such right.
Relevant to this case is the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Whalen v. Roe. 15 In that case, a
New York statute was challenged for requiring physicians to identify patients obtaining
prescription drugs of the statute's "Schedule II" category (a class of drugs having a potential for
abuse and a recognized medical use) so the names and addresses of the prescription drug
patients can be recorded in a centralized computer file maintained by the New York State
Department of Health. Some patients regularly receiving prescription for "Schedule II" drugs and
doctors who prescribed such drugs brought an action questioning the validity of the statute on
the ground that it violated the plaintiffs' constitutionally protected rights of privacy.
In a unanimous decision, the US Supreme Court sustained the validity of the statute on the
ground that the patient identification requirement is a reasonable exercise of the State's broad
police powers. The Court also held that there is no support in the record for an assumption that
the security provisions of the statute will be adiministered improperly. Finally, the Court opined
that the remote possibility that judicial supervision of the evidentiary use of particular items of
stored information will not provide adequate protection against unwarranted diclosures is not a
sufficient reason for invalidating the patient-identification program.
To be sure, there is always a possibility of an unwarranted disclosure of confidential matters
enomously accumulated in computerized data banks and in government records relating to
taxes, public health, social security benefits, military affairs, and similar matters. But as
previously pointed out, we have a sufficient number of laws prohibiting and punishing any such
unwarranted disclosures. Anent this matter, the observation in Whalen vs. Roe is instructive:
. . . We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation
of vast amounts of personal information in computerized data banks or
other massive government files. The collection of taxes, the distribution of
welfare and social security benefits, the supervision of public health, the
direction of our Armed Forces and the enforcement of the criminal laws all
require the orderly preservation of great quantities of information, much of
which is personal in character and potentially embarrassing or harmful if
disclosed. The right to collect and use such data for public purposes is
typically accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid
unwarranted disclosures. . . . 16
The majority laments that as technology advances, the level of reasonably expected privacy
decreases. That may be true. However, court should tread daintily on the field of social and
economic experimentation lest they impede or obstruct the march of technology to improve
public services just on the basis of an unfounded fear that the experimentation violates one's
constitutionally protected rights. In the sobering words of Mr. Justice Brandeis:
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave
responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious
consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to
the rest of the country. This Court has the power to prevent an experiment.
We may strike down the statute which embodies it on the ground that, in our
opinion, the measure is arbitary, capricious or unreaonable. We have power
to do this, because the due process clause has been held by he Court
applicable to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure.
But in the exercise of this high power, we must be ever on our guard, lest
we erect our prejudices into legal principles. If we would guide by the light of
reason, we must let our minds be bold. 17
Again, the concerns of the majority are premature precisely because there are as yet no
guidelines that will direct the Court and serve as solid basis for determining the constitutionality
of the new identification system. The Court cannot and should not anticipate the constitutional
issues and rule on the basis of guesswok. The guidelines would, among others, determine the
particular biometrics method that would be used and the specific personal data that would be
collected provide the safeguard, (if any) and supply the details on how this new system in
supposed to work. The Court should not jump the gun on the Executive.
III
On the issue of funding, the majority submits that Section 6 of A.O. No. 308, which allows the
government agencies included in the new system to obtain funding form their respective
budgets, is unconstitutional for being an illegal transfer of appropriations.
It is not so. The budget for the national identification system cannot be deemed a transfer of
funds since the same is composed of and will be implemented by the member government
agancies. Morever, thses agencies particularly the GSIS and SSS have been issuing some form
of identification or membership card. The improved ID cards that will be issued under this new
system would just take place of the old identification cards and budget-wise, the funds that were
being used to manufacture the old ID cards, which are usually accounted for under the "Supplies
and Materials" item of the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual, could now be utilized to
fund the new cards. Hence, what is envisioned is not transfer of appropriations but a pooling of
funds and resources by the various government agencies involved in the project.
WHEREFORE, I vote to dismiss the petition.
MENDOZA, J., separate opinion;

My vote is to dismiss the petition in this case.
First. I cannot find anything in the text of Administrative Order No. 308 of the President of the
Philippines that would warrant a declaration that it is violative of the right of privacy. So far as I
can see, all the Administrative Orders does is
establish an Identification Reference System involving the
following service agencies of the government:
Presidential Management Staff
National Economic Developemnt Authority
Department of the Interior and Local Government
Department of Health
Government Service Isurance System
Social Security Office
National Computer Center
create a committee, composed of the heads of the agencies
concerned, to draft rules for the System;
direct the use of the Population Reference Number (PRN)
generated by the National Census and Statistics Office as the
common reference number to link the participating agencies into
an Identification Reference System, and the adoption by the
agencies of standards in the use of biometrics technology and

computer designs; and
political or scientific, expands, there is strong psychological pressure to yield some ground of
privacy. 6
provide for the funding of the System from the budgets of the
agencies concerned.
But this is a fact of life to which we must adjust, as long as the intrusion into the domain of
privacy is reasonable. In Morfe v. Mutuc, 7 this Court dealt the coup de grace to claims of
latitudinarian scope for the right of privacy by quoting the pungent remark of an acute observer
of the social scene, Carmen Guerrero-Nakpil:
Petitioner argues, however, that "the implementation of A.O. No. 308 will mean that each and
every Filipino and resident will have a file with the government containing, at the very least,
his PRN and physiological biometrics such as, but not limited to, his facial features, hand
geometry, retinal or iris pattern, DNA pattern, fingerprints, voice characteristics, and signature
analysis."
In support of his contention, petitioner quotes the following publication surfed from the Internet:
The use of biometrics is the means by which an individual may be
conclusively identified. There are two types of biometrics identifiers;
Physical and behavioral characteristics, Physiological biometrics include
facial features, hand geometry, retinal and iris patterns. DNA, and
fingerprints characteristics include voice characteristics and signature
analysis. 1
I do not see how from the bare provisions of the Order, the full text of which is set forth in the
majority opinion, petitioner and the majority can conclude that the Identification Reference
System establishes such comprehensive personal information dossiers that can destroy
individual privacy. So far as the Order provides, all that is contemplated is an identification
system based on data which the government agencies involved have already been requiring
individuals making use of their services to give.
For example, under C.A. No. 591, 2(a) the National Statistics Office collects "by enumeration,
sampling or other methods, statistics and other information concerning population . . . social and
economic institutions, and such other statistics as the President may direct." In addition, it is in
charge of the administration of the Civil Register, 2 which means that it keeps records of
information concerning the civil status of persons, i.e., (a) births, (b) deaths, (c) marriages and
their annulments; (d) legitimations, (e) adoptions, (f) acknowledgments of natural children, (g)
naturalizations, and (h) changes of name. 3
Other statutes giving government agencies the power to require personal information may be
cited. R.A. No. 4136, 23 gives the Land Transportation Office the power to require applicants
for a driver's license to give information regarding the following: their full names, date of birth,
height, weight, sex, color of eyes, blood type, address, and right thumbprint; 4 while R.A. No.
8239, 5 gives the Department of Foreign Affairs the power to require passport applicants to
give information concerning their names, place of birth, date of birth, religious affiliation, marital
status, and citizenship.
Justice Romero, tracing the origin of privacy to the attempt of the first man and woman to cover
their nakedness with fig leaves, bemoans the fact that technology and institutional pressures
have threatened our sense of privacy. On the other hand, the majority would have none of the
Identification Reference System "to prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy, once regarded
as "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."" 5Indeed,
techniques such as fingerprinting or electronic photography in banks have become
commonplace. As has been observed, the teaching hospital has come to be accepted as
offering madical services that compensate for the loss of the isolation of the sickbed; the
increased capacity of applied sciences to utilize more and more kinds of data and the cosequent
calls for such data have weakened traditional resistance to disclosure. As the area of relevance,
Privacy? What's that? There is no precise word for it in Filipino, and as far
as I know any Filipino dialect and there is none because there is no need for
it. The concept and practice of privacy are missing from conventional
Filipino life. The Filipino believes that privacy is an unnecessary imposition,
an eccentricity that is barely pardonable or, at best, an esoteric Western
afterthought smacking of legal trickery. 8
Justice Romero herself says in her separate opinion that the word privacy is not even
in the lexicon of Filipinos.
As to whether the right of privacy is "the most valued right," we do well to remember the
encomiums paid as well to other constitutional rights. For Professor Zechariah Chafee, "The writ
of habeas corpus is "the most important human rights provision in the fundamental law,"" 9 For
Justice Cardozo, on the other hand, freedom of expression "is the matrix, the indispensable
condition of nearly every other form of freedom." 10
The point is that care must be taken in assigning values to constitutional rights for the purpose of
calibrating them on the judicial scale, especially if this means employing stricter standards of
review for regulations alleged to infringe certain rights deemed to be "most valued by civilized
men.''
Indeed, the majority concedes that "the right of privacy does not bar all incursions into individual
privacy . . . [only that such] incursions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards
and well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions." 11 In the case of the
Identification Reference System, the purpose is to facilitate the transaction of business with
service agencies of the government and to prevent fraud and misrepresentation. The personal
identification of an individual can facilitate his treatment in any government hospital in case of
emergency. On the other hand, the delivery of material assistance, such as free medicines, can
be protected from fraud or misrepresentation as the absence of a data base makes it possible
for unscrupulous individuals to obtain assistance from more than one government agency.
Second. Thus, the issue in this case is not really whether A.O. No. 308 violates the right of
privacy formed by emanations from the several constitutional rights cited by the majority. 12 The
question is whether it violates freedom of thought and of conscience guaranteed in the following
provisions of our Bill of Rights (Art. III):
Sec. 4. No law Shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble
and petition the government for redress of grievances.
Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
be forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of
civil or political rights.
More specifically, the question is whether the establishment of the Identification Reference
System will not result in the compilation of massive dossiers on individuals which, beyond their
use for identification, can become instruments of thought control. So far, the next of A.O. No.
308 affords no basis for believing that the data gathered can be used for such sinister purpose.
As already stated, nothing that is not already being required by the concerned agencies of those
making use of their servides is required by the Order in question. The Order simply organizes
service agencies of the government into a System for the purpose of facilitating the identification
of persons seeking basic services and social security. Thus, the whereas clauses of A.O. No.
308 state:
efficiently identify persons seeking basic services and social security, and
misrepresentations;
Third. There is no basis for believing that, beyond the identification of individuals, the System will
be used for illegal purposes. Nor are sanctions lacking for the unauthorized use or disclosure of
information gathered by the various agencies constituting the System. For example, as the
Solicitor General points out. C.A. No. 591. 4 penalizes the unauthorized use or disclosure of
data furnished the NSO with a fine of not more than P600.00 or imprisonment for not more than
six months or both.
At all events, at this stage, it is premature to pass on the claim that the Identification
Reference System can be used for the purpose of compiling massive dossiers on
individuals that can be used to curtail basic civil and political rights since, if at all, this
can only be provided in the implementing rules and regulations which have yet to be
promulgated. We have already stated that A.O. No. 308 is not a statute. Even in the case of
statutes, however, where implementing rules are necessary to put them into effect, it has been
held that an attack on their constitutionality would be premature. 17 As Edgar in King Lear puts it,
"Ripeness is all." 18 For, to borrow some more Shakespearean lines,
The canker galls the infants of the spring
Too oft before their buttons be disclos'd. 19

instrumentalities is required to achieve such a system:
The application of biometric technology and the standardization of computer designs
can provide service agencies with precise identification of individuals, but what is
wrong with that?
Indeed, A.O. No. 308 is no more than a directive to government agencies which the
President of the Philippines has issued in his capacity as administrative head. 13 It is not a
statute. It confers no right; it imposes no duty; it affords no protection; it creates no
office. 14 It is, as its name indicates, a mere administrative order, the prescise nature of which is
given in the following excerpt from the decision in the early case of Olsen & Co. v. Herstein: 15
[It] is nothing more or less than a command from a superior to an inferior. It
creates no relation except between the official who issues it and the official
who receives it. Such orders, whether executive or departmental, have for
their object simply the efficient and economical administration of the affairs
of the department to which or in which they are issued in accordance with
the law governing the subject-matter. They are administrative in their nature
and do not pass beyond the limits of the department to which they are
directed or in which they are published, and, therefore, create no rights in
third persons. They are based on, and are the product of a relationship in
which power is their source and obedience their object. Disobedience to or
deviation from such an order can be punished only by the power which
issued it: and, if that power fails to administer the corrective, then the
disobedience goes unpunished. In that relationship no third person or
official may intervene, not even the court. Such orders may be very
temporary, they being subject to instant revocation or modification by the
power which published them. Their very nature, as determined by the
relationship which prodecued them, demonstrates clearly the impossibility of
any other person enforcing them except the one who created them. An
attempt on the part of the courts to enforce such orders would result not
only in confusion but, substantially, in departmental anarchy also. 16
That, more than any doctrine of constitutional law I can think of, succinctly expresses
the rule on ripeness, prematurity, and hypothetical, speculative, or conjectural claims.
Of special relevance to this case is Laird v. Tatum. 20 There, a class suit was brought seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief on the claim that a U.S. Army intelligence surveillance of civilian
political activity having "a potential for civil disorder" exercised "a present inhibiting effect on
[respondents'] full expression and utilization of their First Amendment rights." In holding the case
nonjusticiable, the U.S. Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger. said: 21
In recent years this Court has found in a number of cases that constitutional
violations may arise from the deterrent or ''chilling," effect of governmental
regulations that fall short of a direct prohibition against the exercise of First
Amendment rights. [Citation of cases omitted] In none of these cases,
however, did the chilling effect arise merely from the individual's knowledge
that a governmental agency was engaged in certain activities or from the
individual's concomitant fear that, armed with the fruits of those activities,
the agency might in the future take some other and additional action
detrimental to that individual. Rather, in each of these cases, the challenged
exercise of governmental power was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory
in nature, and the complainant was either presently or prospectively subject
to the regulations, proscriptions, or compulsions that he was
challenging. . . .
[T]hese decisions have in no way eroded the "established principle that to
entitle a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the
validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he was
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the
result of that action. . . .
The respondents do not meet this test; [the] alleged "chilling" effect may
perhaps be seen as arising from respondents' perception of the system as
inappropriate to the Army's role under our form of government, or as arising
from respondents' beliefs that it is inherently dangerous for the military to be
concerned with activities in the civilian sector, or as arising from
respondents' less generalized yet speculative apprehensiveness that the

Army may at some future date misuse the information in some way that
would cause direct harm to respondents. Allegations of a subjective "chill"
are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm
or a threat of specific future harm: "the federal courts established pursuant
to Article III of the Constitution do not render advisory opinions." United
Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 US 75, 89, 91 L Ed 754, 766, 67 S Ct 556
(1947).
Fourth. Given the fact that no right of privacy is involved in this case and that any objection to
the identification Reference System on the ground that it violates freedom of thought is
premature, speculative, or conjectural pending the issuance of the implementing rules, it is clear
that petitioner Blas F. Ople has no cause of action and, therefore, no standing to bring this
action. Indeed, although he assails A.O. No. 308 on the ground that it violates the right of
privacy, he claims no personal injury suffered as a result of the Order in question. Instead, he
says he is bringing this action as taxpayer, Senator, and member of the Government Service
Insurance System.
Insofar as petitioner claims an interest as taxpayer, it is sufficient to say that A.O. No. 308 does
not involve the exercise of the taxing or spending power of the government.
Insofar as he purports to sue as a member of the GSIS, neither does petitioner have an intertest
sufficient to enable him to litigate a constitutional question. Petitioner claims that in providing that
the funds necessary for implementing the System shall be taken from the budgets of the
concerned agencies. A.O. No. 308 violates Art. VI, 25(5) which. provides:
No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however,
the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item
in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in
other items of their respective appropriations.
But, as the Solicitor General states:
Petitioner's argument is anchored on two erroneous assumptions: one, that
all the concerned agencies, including the SSS and the GSIS, receive
budgetary support from the national government; and two, that the GAA is
the only law whereby public funds are appropriated. Both assumptions are
wrong.
The SSS and GSIS do not presently receive budgetary support from the
National Government. They have achieved self-supporting status such that
the contributions of their members are sufficient to finance their expenses.
One would be hard pressed to find in the GAA an appropriation of funds to
the SSS and the GSIS.
Furthermore, their respective charters authorize the SSS and the GSIS to
disburse their funds (Rep. Act No. 1161 [1954], as amended, Sec. 25; Pres.
Decree No. 1146 [1977], as amended, Sec. 29) without the need for a
separate appropriation from the Congress.
Nor as Senator can petitioner claim standing since no power of Congress is alleged to have
been impaired by the Administrative Order in question. 22 As already stated, in issuing A.O. No.
308, the President did not exercise the legislative power vested by the Constitution in
Congress. He acted on the basis of his own powers as administrative head of the
government, as distinguished from his capacity as the Executive. Dean Sinco elucidates
the crucial distinction thus:
The Constitution of the Philippines makes the President not only the
executive but also the administrative head of the government. . . . Executive
power refers to the legal and political function of the President involving the
exercise of discretion. Administrative power, on the other hand, concerns
itself with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined
by proper governmental organs. These two functions are often confused by
the public: but they are distinct from each other. The President as the
executive authority has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for
the maintenance of general peace and public order. As administrative head,
his duty is to see that every government office is managed and maintained
properly by the persons in charge of it in accordance with pertinent laws and
regulations.
. . . The power of control vested in him by the Constitution makes for a
strongly centralized administrative system. It reinforces further his position
as the executive of the government, enabling him to comply more effectively
with his constitutional duty to enforce the laws. It enables him to fix a
uniform standard of a administrative eficiency and to check the official
conduct of his agents. The decisions of all the officers within his department
are subject to his power of revision, either on his own motion or on the
appeal of some individual who might deem himself aggrieved by the action
of an administrative official. In case of serious dereliction of duty, he may
suspend or remove the officials concerned. 23
For the foregoing reasons, the petition should be DISMISSED.
# Separate Opinions
ROMERO, J., separate opinion;
What marks offs man from a beast?
Aside from the distinguishing physical characteristics, man is a rational being, one who is
endowed with intellect which allows him to apply reasoned judgment to problems at hand; he
has the innate spiritual faculty which can tell, not only what is right but, as well, what is moral
and ethical. Because of his sensibilities, emotions and feelings, he likewise possesses a sense
of shame. In varying degrees as dictated by diverse cultures, he erects a wall between himself
and the outside world wherein he can retreat in solitude, protecting himself from prying eyes and
ears and their extensions, whether form individuals, or much later, from authoritarian intrusions.
Piercing through the mists of time, we find the original Man and Woman defying the injunction of
God by eating of the forbidden fruit in the Garden. And when their eyes were "opened" forthwith
"they sewed fig leaves together, and made themselves aprons." 1 Down the corridors of time, we
find man fashioning "fig leaves" of sorts or setting up figurative walls, the better to insulate
themselves from the rest of humanity.
Such vague stirrings of the desire "to be left alone," considered "anti-social" by some, led to the
development of the concept of "privacy," unheard of among beasts. Different branches of
science, have made their own studies of this craving of the human spirit psychological,
anthropological sociological and philosophical, with the legal finally giving its imprimatur by
elevating it to the status ofa right, specifically a private right.
Initially recognized as an aspect of tort law, it created giant waves in legal circles with the
publication in the Harvard Law Review 2 of the trail-blazing article, "The Right to Privacy," by
Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis.
Whether viewed as a personal or a property right, it found its way in Philippine Constitutions and
statutes; this, in spite of the fact that Philippine culture can hardly be said to provide a fertile field
for the burgeoning of said right. In fact, our lexicographers have yet to coin a word for it in the
Filipino language. Customs and practices, being what they have always been, Filipinos think it
perfectly natural and in good taste to inquire into each other's intimate affairs.
One has only to sit through a televised talk show to be convinced that what passes for
wholesome entertainment is actually an invasion into one's private life, leaving the interviewee
embarrassed and outraged by turns.
With the overarching influence of common law and the recent advent of the Information Age with
its high-tech devices, the right to privacy has expanded to embrace its public law aspect. The Bill
of Rights of our evolving Charters, a direct transplant from that of the United States, contains in
essence facets of the right to privacy which constitute limitations on the far-reaching powers of
government.
So terrifying are the possibilities of a law such as Administrative Order No. 308 in making
inroads into the private lives of the citizens, a virtual Big Brother looking over our shoulder, that it
must, without delay, be "slain upon sight" before our society turns totalitarian with each of us, a
mindless robot.
I, therefore, VOTE for the nullification of A.O. No. 308.
VITUG, J., separate opinion;

One can appreciate the concern expressed by my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Reynato S.
Puno, echoing that of the petitioner, the Honorable Blas F. Ople, on the issuance of
Administrative Order No. 308 by the President of the Philippines and the dangers its
implementation could bring. I find it hard, nevertheless, to peremptorily assume at this time that
the administrative order will be misused and to thereby ignore the possible benefits that can be
derived from, or the merits of, a nationwide computerized identification reference system. The
great strides and swift advances in technology render it inescapable that one day we will, at all
events, have to face up with the reality of seeing extremely sophisticated methods of personal
identification and any attempt to stop the inevitable may either be short-lived or even futile. The
imperatives, I believe, would instead be to now install specific safeguards and control measures
that may be calculated best to ward-off probable ill effects of any such device. Here, it may be
apropos to recall the pronouncement of this Court in People vs. Nazario 1 that
As a rule, a statute or [an] act may be said to be vague when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men "of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of
the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle. 2
Administrative Order No. 308 appears to be so extensively drawn that could, indeed,
allow unbridled options to become available to its implementors beyond the
reasonable comfort of the citizens and of residents alike.
Prescinding from the foregoing, and most importantly to this instance, the subject covered by the
questioned administrative order can have far-reaching consequences that can tell on all
individuals, their liberty and privacy, that, to my mind, should make it indispensable and
appropriate to have the matter specifically addressed by the Congress of the Philippines, the
policy-making body of our government, to which the task should initially belong and to which the
authority to formulate and promulgate that policy is constitutionally lodged.
WHEREFORE, I vote for the nullification of Administrative Order No. 308 for being an undue and
impermissible exercise of legislative power by the Executive.
PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion;

I concur only in the result and only on the ground that an executive issuance is not legally
sufficient to establish an all-encompassing computerized system of identification in the country.
The subject matter contained in AO 308 is beyond the powers of the President to regulate
without a legislative enactment.
I reserve judgmeht on the issue of wherher a national ID system is an infringement of the
constitutional right to privacy or the freedom of thought until after Congress passes, if ever, a law
to this effect. Only then, and upon the filing of a proper petition, may the provisions of the statute
be scrutinized by the judiciary to determine their constitutional foundation. Until such time, the
issue is premature; and any decision thereon, speculative and academic. 1
Be that as it may, the scholarly discussions of Justices Romero, Puno, Kapunan and Mendoza
on the constitutional right to privacy and freedom of thought may stil become useful guides to
our lawmakers, when and if Congress should deliberate on a bill establishing a national
identification system.
Let it be noted that this Court, as shown by the voting of the justices, has not definitively ruled on
these points. The voting is decisive only on the need for the appropriate legislation, and it is only
on this ground that the petition is granted by this Court.
KAPUNAN, J., dissenting opinion;

The pioneering efforts of the executive to adopt a national computerized identification reference
system has met fierce opposition. It has spun dark predictions of sinister government ploys to
tamper with the citizen's right to privacy and ominous forecasts of a return to authoritarianism.
Lost in the uproar, however, is the simple fact that there is nothing in the whole breadth
and lenght of Administrative Order No. 308 that suggests a taint constitutional infirmity.

Managing Director, National Computer Center
A.O. No. 308 issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on 12 December 1996 reads:
ADMTNISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 308


efficiently identify persons seeking basic services and social security and
misrepresentations;

Press Secretary, in coordination with the National Statistics Offices, the
GSIS and SSS as lead agencies and other concerned agencies shall
undertake a massive tri-media information dissemination campaign to
educate and raise public awareness on the importance and use of the PRN
and the Social Security Identification Reference.

instrumentalities is required to achieve such a system;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Repubic of the

the following:
submit regular reports to the Office of the President, through the IACC, on
Sec. 1 Establishment of a National Computerized Identification Reference

Sec. 8 Effectivity. This Administartive Order shall take effect immediately.

Head Presidential Management Staff
Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local
Government
Administrator, Government Service Insurance System
Administrator, Social Security System
In seeking to strike down A.O. No. 308 as unconstitutional, petitioner argues:
A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED
ACT. THE ISSUACE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF
THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.
RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION.
The National Computerized Identification Reference system to which the NSO, GSIS and SSS
are linked as lead members of the IACC is intended to establish uniform standards for ID cards
isssued by key government agencies (like the SSS) 1 for the "efficient identification of
persons." 2 Under the new system, only one reliable and tamper-proof I.D. need be presented by
the cardholder instead of several identification papers such as passports and driver's
license, 3 to able to transact with government agencies. The improved ID can be used to
facilitate public transactions such as:
1. A.O. 308 merely establishes the standards for I.D. cards issued by key
government agencies such as SSS and GSIS.
2. It does not establish a national I.D. system neither does it require a
national I.D. card for every person.
3. The use of the I.D. is voluntary.
1. Payment of SSS and GSIS benefits

4. The I.D. is not required for delivery of any government service. Everyone
has the right to basic government services as long as he is qualified under
existing laws.
2. Applications for driver's license, BIR TIN, passport,

marriage license, death certificate, NBI and police
clearances, and business permits
5. The LD. cannot and will not in any way be used to prevent one to travel.
3. Availment of Medicare services in hospitals
6. There will be no discrimination Non-holders of the improved I.D. are still
entitled to the same services but will be subjected to the usual rigid
identification and verification beforehand.
4. Availment of welfare services

6. Pre-requisite for Voter's ID. 4
I
The issue that must first be hurdled is: was the issuance of A.O. No. 308 an exercise by the
President of legislative power properly belonging to Congress?
The card may also be used for private transactions such as:
It is not.
1. Opening of bank accounts
2. Encashment of checks
3. Applications for loans, credit cards, water, power,
telephones, pagers, etc.
4. Purchase of stocks
The Administrative Code of 1987 has unequivocally vested the President with quasilegislative powers in the form of executive orders, administrative orders, proclamations,
memorandum orders and circulars and general or special orders. 6 An administrative
order, like the one under which the new identification system is embodied, has its
peculiar meaning under the 1987 Administrative Code:
particular aspects of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as
administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders.

6. Insurance claims
7. Receipt of payments, checks, letters, valuables, etc. 5
The new identification system would tremendously improve and uplift public service in our
country to the benefit of Filipino citizens and resident aliens. It would promote, facilitate and
speed up legitimate transactions with government offices as well as with private and business
entities. Experience tells us of the constant delays and inconveniences the public has to suffer in
availing of basic public services and social security benefits because of inefficient and not too
reliable means of identification of the beneficiaries.
Thus, in the "Primer on the Social Security Card and Administrative Order No. 308" issued by
the SSS, a lead agency in the implementation of the said order, the following salient features are
mentioned:
The National Computerized Identification Reference System was established pursuant to the
aforaquoted provision precisely because its principal purpose, as expressly stated in the order,
is to provide the people with "the facility to conveniently transact business" with the various
government agencies providing basic services. Being the "administrative head," it is
unquestionably the responsibility of the President to find ways and means to improve the
government bureaucracy, and make it more professional, efficient and reliable, specially those
government agencies and instrumentalities which provide basic services and which the citizenry
constantly transact with, like the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Social Security
System (SSS) and National Statistics Office (NSO). The national computerized ID system is one
such advancement. To emphasize, the new identification reference system is created to
streamline the bureaucracy, cut the red tape and ultimately achieve administrative efficiency. The
project, therefore, relates to, is an appropriate subject and falls squarely within the ambit of the
Chief Executive's administrative power under which, in order to successfully carry out his
administrative duties, he has been granted by law quasi-legislative powers, quoted above.
Understandably, strict adherence to the doctrine of separation of power spawns differences of
opinion. For we cannot divide the branches of government into water-tight compartment. Even if
such is possible, it is neither desirable nor feasible. Bernard Schwartz, in his work Administrative
Law, A Casebook, thus states:
To be sure, if we think of the separation of powers as carrying out the
distinction between legislation and administration with mathematical
precision and as dividing the branches of government into watertight
compartments, we would probably have to conclude that any exercise of
lawmaking authority by an agency is automatically invalid. Such a rigorous
application of the constitutional doctrine is neither desirable nor feasible; the
only absolute separation that has ever been possible was that in the
theoretical writings of a Montesquieu, who looked across at foggy England
from his sunny Gascon vineyards and completely misconstrued what he
saw. 7
A mingling of powers among the three branches of government is not a novel concept. This
blending of powers has become necessary to properly address the complexities brought about
by a rapidly developing society and which the traditional branches of government have difficulty
coping with. 8
It has been said that:
The true meaning of the general doctrine of the separation of powers seems
to be that the whole power of one department should not be exercised by
the same hands which possess the whole power of either of the other
department, and that no one department ought to possess directly or
indirectly an overruling influence over the others. And it has been that this
doctrine should be applied only to the powers which because of their nature
are assigned by the constitution itself to one of the departments exclusively.
Hence, it does not necessarily follow that an entire and complete separation
is either desirable of was ever intended, for such a complete separation
would be impracticable if not impossible; there may be-and frequently areareas in which executive, legislative, and judicial powers blend or overlap;
and many officers whose duties cannot be exclusively placed under any one
of these heads.
The courts have perceived the necessity of avoiding a narrow construction
of a state constitutional provision for the division of the powers of the
government into three distinct departments, for it is impractical to view the
provision from the standpoint of a doctrinaire. Thus, the modern view of
separation of powers rejects the metaphysical abstractions and reverts
instead to more pragmatic, flexible, functional approach, giving recognition
to the fact that then may be a certain degree of blending or admixture of the
three powers of the government. Moreover, the doctrine of separation of
powers has never been strictly or rigidly applied, and indeed could not be, to
all the ramifications of state or national governments; government would
prove abortive if it were attempted to follow the policy of separation to the
letter. 9
In any case A.O. No. 308 was promulgated by the President pursuant to the quasilegislative powers expressly granted to him by law and in accordance with his duty as
administrative head. Hence, the contention that the President usurped the legislative
prerogatives of Congress has no firm basis.
II
Having resolved that the President has the authority and prerogative to issue A.O. No. 308, I
submit that it is premature for the Court to determine the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of
the National Computerized Identification Reference System.
Basic in constitutional law is the rule that before the court assumes jurisdiction over and decide
constitutional issues, the following requisites must first be satisfied:
1) there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of rights susceptible of judicial
determination;
2) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper party;
3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
4) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the resolution of the case.
10
In this case, it is evident that the first element is missing. Judicial intervention calls for an actual
case or controversy which is defined as "an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or
ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory." 11 Justice Isagani A. Cruz further
expounds that "(a) justifiable controversy is thus distinguished from a difference or dispute of a
hypothetical or abstract character or from one that is academic or moot. The controversy must
be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. It
must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of special relief through a decree that is
conclusive in character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts. . . ." 12 A.O. No. 308 does not create any concrete or substantial
controversy. It provides the general framework of the National Computerized Identification
Reference System and lays down the basic standards (efficiency, convenience and prevention of
fraudulent transactions) for its cretion. But as manifestly indicated in the subject order, it is the
Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee (IACC) which is tasked to research, study and formulate
the guidelines and parameters for the use of Biometrics Technology and in computer application
designs that will and define give substance to the new system. 13 This petition is, thus, premature
considering that the IACC is still in the process of doing the leg work and has yet to codify and
formalize the details of the new system.
The majority opines that the petition is ripe for adjudication even without the promulgation of the
necessary guidelines in view of the fact that respondents have begun implementation of A.O.
No. 308. The SSS, in particular, has started advertising in newspapers the invitation to bid for
the production of the I.D. cards. 14
I beg to disagree. It is not the new system itself that is intended to be implemented in the
invitation to bid but only the manufacture of the I.D. cards. Biometrics Technology is not and
cannot be used in the I.D. cards as no guidelines therefor have yet been laid down by the IACC.
Before the assailed system can be set up, it is imperative that the guidelines be issued first.
III
Without the essential guidelines, the principal contention for invalidating the new identification
reference system that it is an impermissible encroachment on the constitutionally recognized
right to privacy is plainly groundless. There is nothing in A.O. No. 308 to serve as sufficient
basis for a conclusion that the new system to be evolved violates the right to privacy. Said order
simply provides the system's general framework. Without the concomitant guidelines, which
would spell out in detail how this new identification system would work, the perceived violation of
the right to privacy amounts to nothing more than mere surmise and speculation.
What has caused much of the hysteria over the National Computerized Identification Reference
System is the possible utilization of Biometrics Technology which refers to the use of
autnomated matching of physiological or behavioral characteristics to identify a person that
would violated the citizen's constitutionally protected right to privacy.
The majority opinion has enumerated various forms and methods of Biometrics Technology
which if adopted in the National Computaized Identification Reference System would seriously
threaten the right to privacy. Among which are biocrypt retinal scan, artificial nose and
thermogram. The majority also points to certain alleged deficiencies of A O. No. 308. Thus:
1) A.O. No. 308 does not specify the particular Biometrics Technology that
shall be used for the new identification system.
2) The order dots not state whether encoding of data is limited to biological
information alone for identification purposes;
3) There is no provision as to who shall control and access the data, under
what circumstances and for what purpose; and
4) There are no controls to guard against leakage of information, thus
heightening the potential for misuse and abuse.
We should not be overwhelmed by the mere mention of the Biometrics Technology and its
alleged, yet unfounded "far-reaching effects."
There is nothing in A.O. No. 308, as it is worded, to suggest that the advanced methods of the
Biometrics Technology that may pose danger to the right of privacy will be adopted.
The standards set in A.O. No. 308 for the adoption of the new system are clear-cut and
unequivocably spelled out in the "WHEREASES" and body of the order, namely, the need to
provide citizens and foreign residents with the facility to conveniently transact business
with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities; the
computerized system is intended to properly and efficiently identify persons seeking basic
services or social security and reduce, if not totally eradicate fraudulent transactions and
misreprentation; the national identification reference system is established among the key basic
services and social security providers; and finally, the IACC Secretariat shall coordinate with
different Social Security and Services Agencies to establish the standards in the use of
Biometrics Technology. Consequently, the choice of the particular form and extent of Biometrics
Technology that will be applied and the parameters for its use (as will be defined in the
guidelines) will necessarily and logically be guided, limited and circumscribed by the afore-stated
standards. The fear entertained by the majority on the potential dangers of this new technology
is thus securedly allayed by the specific limitations set by the above-mentioned standards. More
than this, the right to privacy is well-esconced in and directly protected by various provisions of
the Bill of Rights, the Civil Code, the Revised Penal Code, and certain laws, all so painstakingly
and resourcefully catalogued in the majority opinion. Many of these laws provide penalties for
their violation in the form of imprisonment, fines, or damages. These laws will serve as powerful
deterrents not only in the establishment of any administrative rule that will violate the
constitutionally protected right to privacy, but also to would-be transgressors of such right.
15
Relevant to this case is the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Whalen v. Roe. In that case, a
New York statute was challenged for requiring physicians to identify patients obtaining
prescription drugs of the statute's "Schedule II" category (a class of drugs having a potential for
abuse and a recognized medical use) so the names and addresses of the prescription drug
patients can be recorded in a centralized computer file maintained by the New York State
Department of Health. Some patients regularly receiving prescription for "Schedule II" drugs and
doctors who prescribed such drugs brought an action questioning the validity of the statute on
the ground that it violated the plaintiffs' constitutionally protected rights of privacy.
In a unanimous decision, the US Supreme Court sustained the validity of the statute on the
ground that the patient identification requirement is a reasonable exercise of the State's broad
police powers. The Court also held that there is no support in the record for an assumption that
the security provisions of the statute will be adiministered improperly. Finally, the Court opined
that the remote possibility that judicial supervision of the evidentiary use of particular items of
stored information will not provide adequate protection against unwarranted diclosures is not a
sufficient reason for invalidating the patient-identification program.
To be sure, there is always a possibility of an unwarranted disclosure of confidential matters
enomously accumulated in computerized data banks and in government records relating to
taxes, public health, social security benefits, military affairs, and similar matters. But as
previously pointed out, we have a sufficient number of laws prohibiting and punishing any such
unwarranted disclosures. Anent this matter, the observation in Whalen vs. Roe is instructive:
. . . We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation
of vast amounts of personal information in computerized data banks or
other massive government files. The collection of taxes, the distribution of
welfare and social security benefits, the supervision of public health, the
direction of our Armed Forces and the enforcement of the criminal laws all
require the orderly preservation of great quantities of information, much of
which is personal in character and potentially embarrassing or harmful if
disclosed. The right to collect and use such data for public purposes is
typically accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid
unwarranted disclosures. . . . 16
The majority laments that as technology advances, the level of reasonably expected privacy
decreases. That may be true. However, court should tread daintily on the field of social and
economic experimentation lest they impede or obstruct the march of technology to improve
public services just on the basis of an unfounded fear that the experimentation violates one's
constitutionally protected rights. In the sobering words of Mr. Justice Brandeis:
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave
responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious
consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to
the rest of the country. This Court has the power to prevent an experiment.
We may strike down the statute which embodies it on the ground that, in our
opinion, the measure is arbitary, capricious or unreaonable. We have power
to do this, because the due process clause has been held by he Court
applicable to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure.
But in the exercise of this high power, we must be ever on our guard, lest
we erect our prejudices into legal principles. If we would guide by the light of
reason, we must let our minds be bold. 17
Again, the concerns of the majority are premature precisely because there are as yet no
guidelines that will direct the Court and serve as solid basis for determining the constitutionality
of the new identification system. The Court cannot and should not anticipate the constitutional
issues and rule on the basis of guesswok. The guidelines would, among others, determine the
particular biometrics method that would be used and the specific personal data that would be
collected provide the safeguard, (if any) and supply the details on how this new system in
supposed to work. The Court should not jump the gun on the Executive.
III
On the issue of funding, the majority submits that Section 6 of A.O. No. 308, which allows
the government agencies included in the new system to obtain funding form their
respective budgets, is unconstitutional for being an illegal transfer of appropriations.
create a committee, composed of the heads of the agencies

concerned, to draft rules for the System;
direct the use of the Population Reference Number (PRN)
generated by the National Census and Statistics Office as the
common reference number to link the participating agencies into
an Identification Reference System, and the adoption by the
agencies of standards in the use of biometrics technology and
computer designs; and
It is not so. The budget for the national identification system cannot be deemed a transfer of
funds since the same is composed of and will be implemented by the member government
agancies. Morever, thses agencies particularly the GSIS and SSS have been issuing some form
of identification or membership card. The improved ID cards that will be issued under this new
system would just take place of the old identification cards and budget-wise, the funds that were
being used to manufacture the old ID cards, which are usually accounted for under the "Supplies
and Materials" item of the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual, could now be utilized to
fund the new cards. Hence, what is envisioned is not transfer of appropriations but a pooling of
funds and resources by the various government agencies involved in the project.
Petitioner argues, however, that "the implementation of A.O. No. 308 will mean that each and
every Filipino and resident will have a file with the government containing, at the very least,
his PRN and physiological biometrics such as, but not limited to, his facial features, hand
geometry, retinal or iris pattern, DNA pattern, fingerprints, voice characteristics, and signature
analysis."
WHEREFORE, I vote to dismiss the petition.
In support of his contention, petitioner quotes the following publication surfed from the Internet:
MENDOZA, J., separate opinion;

My vote is to dismiss the petition in this case.
First. I cannot find anything in the text of Administrative Order No. 308 of the President of the
Philippines that would warrant a declaration that it is violative of the right of privacy. So far as I
can see, all the Administrative Orders does is
establish an Identification Reference System involving the
following service agencies of the government:
Presidential Management Staff
National Economic Developemnt Authority
Department of the Interior and Local Government
Department of Health
Government Service Isurance System
Social Security Office
provide for the funding of the System from the budgets of the
agencies concerned.
The use of biometrics is the means by which an individual may be

conclusively identified. There are two types of biometrics identifiers;
Physical and behavioral characteristics, Physiological biometrics include
facial features, hand geometry, retinal and iris patterns. DNA, and
fingerprints characteristics include voice characteristics and signature
analysis. 1
I do not see how from the bare provisions of the Order, the full text of which is set forth in the
majority opinion, petitioner and the majority can conclude that the Identification Reference
System establishes such comprehensive personal information dossiers that can destroy
individual privacy. So far as the Order provides, all that is contemplated is an identification
system based on data which the government agencies involved have already been requiring
individuals making use of their services to give.
For example, under C.A. No. 591, 2(a) the National Statistics Office collects "by enumeration,
sampling or other methods, statistics and other information concerning population . . . social and
economic institutions, and such other statistics as the President may direct." In addition, it is in
charge of the administration of the Civil Register, 2 which means that it keeps records of
information concerning the civil status of persons, i.e., (a) births, (b) deaths, (c) marriages and
their annulments; (d) legitimations, (e) adoptions, (f) acknowledgments of natural children, (g)
naturalizations, and (h) changes of name. 3
Other statutes giving government agencies the power to require personal information may be
cited. R.A. No. 4136, 23 gives the Land Transportation Office the power to require applicants
for a driver's license to give information regarding the following: their full names, date of birth,
height, weight, sex, color of eyes, blood type, address, and right thumbprint; 4 while R.A. No.
8239, 5 gives the Department of Foreign Affairs the power to require passport applicants to
give information concerning their names, place of birth, date of birth, religious affiliation, marital
status, and citizenship.
National Computer Center

Justice Romero, tracing the origin of privacy to the attempt of the first man and woman to cover
their nakedness with fig leaves, bemoans the fact that technology and institutional pressures
have threatened our sense of privacy. On the other hand, the majority would have none of the
Identification Reference System "to prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy, once regarded
as "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."" 5Indeed,
techniques such as fingerprinting or electronic photography in banks have become
commonplace. As has been observed, the teaching hospital has come to be accepted as
offering madical services that compensate for the loss of the isolation of the sickbed; the
increased capacity of applied sciences to utilize more and more kinds of data and the cosequent
calls for such data have weakened traditional resistance to disclosure. As the area of relevance,
political or scientific, expands, there is strong psychological pressure to yield some ground of
privacy. 6
But this is a fact of life to which we must adjust, as long as the intrusion into the domain of
privacy is reasonable. In Morfe v. Mutuc, 7 this Court dealt the coup de grace to claims of
latitudinarian scope for the right of privacy by quoting the pungent remark of an acute observer
of the social scene, Carmen Guerrero-Nakpil:
Privacy? What's that? There is no precise word for it in Filipino, and as far
as I know any Filipino dialect and there is none because there is no need for
it. The concept and practice of privacy are missing from conventional
Filipino life. The Filipino believes that privacy is an unnecessary imposition,
an eccentricity that is barely pardonable or, at best, an esoteric Western
afterthought smacking of legal trickery. 8
Justice Romero herself says in her separate opinion that the word privacy is not even
in the lexicon of Filipinos.
As to whether the right of privacy is "the most valued right," we do well to remember the
encomiums paid as well to other constitutional rights. For Professor Zechariah Chafee, "The writ
of habeas corpus is "the most important human rights provision in the fundamental law,"" 9 For
Justice Cardozo, on the other hand, freedom of expression "is the matrix, the indispensable
condition of nearly every other form of freedom." 10
The point is that care must be taken in assigning values to constitutional rights for the purpose of
calibrating them on the judicial scale, especially if this means employing stricter standards of
review for regulations alleged to infringe certain rights deemed to be "most valued by civilized
men.''
Indeed, the majority concedes that "the right of privacy does not bar all incursions into individual
privacy . . . [only that such] incursions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards
and well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions." 11 In the case of the
Identification Reference System, the purpose is to facilitate the transaction of business with
service agencies of the government and to prevent fraud and misrepresentation. The personal
identification of an individual can facilitate his treatment in any government hospital in case of
emergency. On the other hand, the delivery of material assistance, such as free medicines, can
be protected from fraud or misrepresentation as the absence of a data base makes it possible
for unscrupulous individuals to obtain assistance from more than one government agency.
Second. Thus, the issue in this case is not really whether A.O. No. 308 violates the right of
privacy formed by emanations from the several constitutional rights cited by the majority. 12 The
question is whether it violates freedom of thought and of conscience guaranteed in the following
provisions of our Bill of Rights (Art. III):
Sec. 4. No law Shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble
and petition the government for redress of grievances.
Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or

prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
be forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of
civil or political rights.
More specifically, the question is whether the establishment of the Identification Reference
System will not result in the compilation of massive dossiers on individuals which, beyond their
use for identification, can become instruments of thought control. So far, the next of A.O. No.
308 affords no basis for believing that the data gathered can be used for such sinister purpose.
As already stated, nothing that is not already being required by the concerned agencies of those
making use of their servides is required by the Order in question. The Order simply organizes
service agencies of the government into a System for the purpose of facilitating the identification
of persons seeking basic services and social security. Thus, the whereas clauses of A.O. No.
308 state:
efficiently identify persons seeking basic services and social security, and
misrepresentations;
instrumentalities is required to achieve such a system:
The application of biometric technology and the standardization of computer designs
can provide service agencies with precise identification of individuals, but what is
wrong with that?
Indeed, A.O. No. 308 is no more than a directive to government agencies which the
President of the Philippines has issued in his capacity as administrative head. 13 It is not a
statute. It confers no right; it imposes no duty; it affords no protection; it creates no
office. 14 It is, as its name indicates, a mere administrative order, the prescise nature of
which is given in the following excerpt from the decision in the early case of Olsen & Co.
v. Herstein: 15
[It] is nothing more or less than a command from a superior to an inferior. It
creates no relation except between the official who issues it and the official
who receives it. Such orders, whether executive or departmental, have for
their object simply the efficient and economical administration of the affairs
of the department to which or in which they are issued in accordance with
the law governing the subject-matter. They are administrative in their nature
and do not pass beyond the limits of the department to which they are
directed or in which they are published, and, therefore, create no rights in
third persons. They are based on, and are the product of a relationship in
which power is their source and obedience their object. Disobedience to or
deviation from such an order can be punished only by the power which
issued it: and, if that power fails to administer the corrective, then the
disobedience goes unpunished. In that relationship no third person or
official may intervene, not even the court. Such orders may be very
temporary, they being subject to instant revocation or modification by the
power which published them. Their very nature, as determined by the

relationship which prodecued them, demonstrates clearly the impossibility of
any other person enforcing them except the one who created them. An
attempt on the part of the courts to enforce such orders would result not
only in confusion but, substantially, in departmental anarchy also. 16
Third. There is no basis for believing that, beyond the identification of individuals, the System will
be used for illegal purposes. Nor are sanctions lacking for the unauthorized use or disclosure of
information gathered by the various agencies constituting the System. For example, as the
Solicitor General points out. C.A. No. 591. 4 penalizes the unauthorized use or disclosure of
data furnished the NSO with a fine of not more than P600.00 or imprisonment for not more than
six months or both.
At all events, at this stage, it is premature to pass on the claim that the Identification Reference
System can be used for the purpose of compiling massive dossiers on individuals that can be
used to curtail basic civil and political rights since, if at all, this can only be provided in the
implementing rules and regulations which have yet to be promulgated. We have already stated
that A.O. No. 308 is not a statute. Even in the case of statutes, however, where implementing
rules are necessary to put them into effect, it has been held that an attack on their
constitutionality would be premature. 17 As Edgar in King Lear puts it, "Ripeness is all." 18 For, to
borrow some more Shakespearean lines,
The canker galls the infants of the spring
The respondents do not meet this test; [the] alleged "chilling" effect may
perhaps be seen as arising from respondents' perception of the system as
inappropriate to the Army's role under our form of government, or as arising
from respondents' beliefs that it is inherently dangerous for the military to be
concerned with activities in the civilian sector, or as arising from
respondents' less generalized yet speculative apprehensiveness that the
Army may at some future date misuse the information in some way that
would cause direct harm to respondents. Allegations of a subjective "chill"
are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm
or a threat of specific future harm: "the federal courts established pursuant
to Article III of the Constitution do not render advisory opinions." United
Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 US 75, 89, 91 L Ed 754, 766, 67 S Ct 556
(1947).
Fourth. Given the fact that no right of privacy is involved in this case and that any objection to
the identification Reference System on the ground that it violates freedom of thought is
premature, speculative, or conjectural pending the issuance of the implementing rules, it is clear
that petitioner Blas F. Ople has no cause of action and, therefore, no standing to bring this
action. Indeed, although he assails A.O. No. 308 on the ground that it violates the right of
privacy, he claims no personal injury suffered as a result of the Order in question. Instead, he
says he is bringing this action as taxpayer, Senator, and member of the Government Service
Insurance System.
Insofar as petitioner claims an interest as taxpayer, it is sufficient to say that A.O. No. 308 does
not involve the exercise of the taxing or spending power of the government.
Too oft before their buttons be disclos'd. 19

That, more than any doctrine of constitutional law I can think of, succinctly expresses
the rule on ripeness, prematurity, and hypothetical, speculative, or conjectural claims.
Of special relevance to this case is Laird v. Tatum. 20 There, a class suit was brought seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief on the claim that a U.S. Army intelligence surveillance of civilian
political activity having "a potential for civil disorder" exercised "a present inhibiting effect on
[respondents'] full expression and utilization of their First Amendment rights." In holding the case
nonjusticiable, the U.S. Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger. said: 21
In recent years this Court has found in a number of cases that constitutional
violations may arise from the deterrent or ''chilling," effect of governmental
regulations that fall short of a direct prohibition against the exercise of First
Amendment rights. [Citation of cases omitted] In none of these cases,
however, did the chilling effect arise merely from the individual's knowledge
that a governmental agency was engaged in certain activities or from the
individual's concomitant fear that, armed with the fruits of those activities,
the agency might in the future take some other and additional action
detrimental to that individual. Rather, in each of these cases, the challenged
exercise of governmental power was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory
in nature, and the complainant was either presently or prospectively subject
to the regulations, proscriptions, or compulsions that he was
challenging. . . .
[T]hese decisions have in no way eroded the "established principle that to
entitle a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the
validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he was
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the
result of that action. . . .
Insofar as he purports to sue as a member of the GSIS, neither does petitioner have an intertest
sufficient to enable him to litigate a constitutional question. Petitioner claims that in providing that
the funds necessary for implementing the System shall be taken from the budgets of the
concerned agencies. A.O. No. 308 violates Art. VI, 25(5) which. provides:
No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however,
the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item
in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in
other items of their respective appropriations.
But, as the Solicitor General states:
Petitioner's argument is anchored on two erroneous assumptions: one, that
all the concerned agencies, including the SSS and the GSIS, receive
budgetary support from the national government; and two, that the GAA is
the only law whereby public funds are appropriated. Both assumptions are
wrong.
The SSS and GSIS do not presently receive budgetary support from the
National Government. They have achieved self-supporting status such that
the contributions of their members are sufficient to finance their expenses.
One would be hard pressed to find in the GAA an appropriation of funds to
the SSS and the GSIS.
Furthermore, their respective charters authorize the SSS and the GSIS to
disburse their funds (Rep. Act No. 1161 [1954], as amended, Sec. 25; Pres.
Decree No. 1146 [1977], as amended, Sec. 29) without the need for a
separate appropriation from the Congress.
Nor as Senator can petitioner claim standing since no power of Congress is alleged to have
been impaired by the Administrative Order in question. 22 As already stated, in issuing A.O. No.
308, the President did not exercise the legislative power vested by the Constitution in Congress.
He acted on the basis of his own powers as administrative head of the government, as
distinguished from his capacity as the Executive. Dean Sinco elucidates the crucial distinction
thus:
The Constitution of the Philippines makes the President not only the
executive but also the administrative head of the government. . . . Executive
power refers to the legal and political function of the President involving the
exercise of discretion. Administrative power, on the other hand, concerns
itself with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined
by proper governmental organs. These two functions are often confused by
the public: but they are distinct from each other. The President as the
executive authority has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for
the maintenance of general peace and public order. As administrative head,
his duty is to see that every government office is managed and maintained
properly by the persons in charge of it in accordance with pertinent laws and
regulations.
. . . The power of control vested in him by the Constitution makes for a
strongly centralized administrative system. It reinforces further his position
as the executive of the government, enabling him to comply more effectively
with his constitutional duty to enforce the laws. It enables him to fix a
uniform standard of a administrative eficiency and to check the official
conduct of his agents. The decisions of all the officers within his department
are subject to his power of revision, either on his own motion or on the
appeal of some individual who might deem himself aggrieved by the action
of an administrative official. In case of serious dereliction of duty, he may
suspend or remove the officials concerned. 23
For the foregoing reasons, the petition should be DISMISSED.

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Republic of the Philippines

WHEREAS, a concerted and collaborative effort among the various basic

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the

G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998

Sec. 2. Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee. An Inter-Agency Coordinating

Secretary, Department of Health

Managing Director, National Computer Center.

Sec. 5. Conduct of Information Dissemination Campaign. The Office of the

D. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] PROTECTS AN INDIVIDUAL'S INTEREST IN

(SGD.) FIDEL V. RAMOS

Executive Branch, Book V on Constitutional Commissions, Book VI on National

Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras formed by

ROMERO, J., separate opinion;

ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED

PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Repubic of the

Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local

KAPUNAN, J., dissenting opinion;

Administrator, Government Service Insurance System

Administrator, Social Security System

Sec. 3. Secretariat. The National Computer Center (NCC) is hereby

Sec. 4. Linkage Among Agencies. The Population Reference Number (PRN)

1. Payment of SSS and GSIS benefits

1. Opening of bank accounts

3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and

MENDOZA, J., separate opinion;

agencies of standards in the use of biometrics technology and

WHEREAS, a concerted and collaborative effort among the various basic

respondents' less generalized yet speculative apprehensiveness that the

VITUG, J., separate opinion;

PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion;

KAPUNAN, J., dissenting opinion;

Administrator, National Statistics Office

Sec. 3. Secretariat. The National Computer Center (NCC) is hereby

ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED

Sec. 4. Linkage Among Agencies. The Population Reference Number (PRN)

WHEREAS, a concerted and collaborative effort among the various basic

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Repubic of the

Sec. 1 Establishment of a National Computerized Identification Reference

Sec. 8 Effectivity. This Administartive Order shall take effect immediately.

Sec. 2. Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee. An Inter-Agency Coordinating

1. Payment of SSS and GSIS benefits

2. Applications for driver's license, BIR TIN, passport,

4. Availment of welfare services

5. Application for work/employment

create a committee, composed of the heads of the agencies

WHEREFORE, I vote to dismiss the petition.

MENDOZA, J., separate opinion;

The use of biometrics is the means by which an individual may be

National Computer Center

Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or

power which published them. Their very nature, as determined by the

Too oft before their buttons be disclos'd. 19

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