CASES :POWER OF EXPROPRIATION

Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs Secretary of Agrarian

Reform

175 SCRA 343 Political Law Constitutional Law Bill of Rights Equal Protection
Valid Classification

Eminent Domain Just Compensation

These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or
R.A. No. 3844).

Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights
includes a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall,
by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular
farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the
case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was
enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to provide for the compulsory
acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum
retention limits for landowners. In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228,
declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the
valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their
payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program
(CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its (PP131s)
implementation, was also enacted. Afterwhich is the enactment of R.A. No. 6657,
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law, while considerably changing the
earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are
not inconsistent with its provisions.

[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]

G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)

The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land
distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of landowners
of ricelands and cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that
since their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to distribute
their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown willingness to till
their own land. In short, they want to be exempted from agrarian reform program because
they claim to belong to a different class.

G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)

Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and
229) on the ground that these laws already valuated their lands for the agrarian reform
program and that the specific amount must be determined by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR). Manaay averred that this violated the principle in eminent domain which
provides that only courts can determine just compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated
due process for under the constitution, no property shall be taken for public use without just
compensation.

Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for their
land in bonds and not necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just compensation has
always been in the form of money and not in bonds.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.

2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.

3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms
of cash.

HELD:

1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class exempt
from the agrarian reform program. Under the law, classification has been defined as the
grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from
each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following
requirements:

(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;

(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.

Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated
alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The Association have not
shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The
argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to
share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial
distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who
will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is
allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded
recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to
the detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it appears that Congress is right in
classifying small landowners as part of the agrarian reform program.

2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts.
However, there is no law which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from
determining just compensation. In fact, just compensation can be that amount agreed upon
by the landowner and the government even without judicial intervention so long as both
parties agree. The DAR can determine just compensation through appraisers and if the
landowner agrees, then judicial intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law
however is that, the just compensation determined by an administrative body is merely
preliminary. If the landowner does not agree with the finding of just compensation by an
administrative body, then it can go to court and the determination of the latter shall be the
final determination. This is even so provided by RA 6657:
Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court
of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.

3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional
exercise of eminent domain. The agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of
eminent domain. The program will require billions of pesos in funds if all compensation have
to be made in cash if everything is in cash, then the government will not have sufficient
money hence, bonds, and other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for just
compensation.

(EUGENE)
Suguitan v. Mandaluyong | EmA
March 14, 2000
HEIRS OF ALBERTO SUGUITAN, petitioner, vs.
CITY OF MANDALUYONG, respondent.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J.:
SUMMARY: Mandaluyong City wanted to buy Suguitans lot for the expansion of the city
hospital. He refused, so the SP passed a resolution authorizing Mayor Abalos to file an
expropriation case. The RTC allowed the expropriation, and Mandaluyong took possession of
the property. On recourse by Suguitans heirs, the SC set aside the expropriation order, holding
that the exercise of the eminent domain power by Mandaluyong was in contravention of the
standards set by the Local Government Code. Under 19 of this law, an ordinance is a requisite
for the valid expropriation of property by an LGU. Mandaluyong cannot get away with its acts by
citing the IRR because IRRs cannot prevail over the laws they are supposed to implement. An
ordinance is different from a resolution. What the delegating statute and the procedural rules
require is the grant of authority to expropriate in the form of an ordinance.

DOCTRINE
The power of eminent domain is essentially legislative in nature. However, it may be
validly delegated to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. The scope of this delegated
legislative power is necessarily narrower than that of the delegating authority and may only be
exercised in strict compliance with the terms of the delegating law.
Courts have the duty of determining whether the power of eminent domain is being exercised in
accordance with the delegating law. Courts have adopted a more censorious attitude in
resolving questions involving the proper exercise of this delegated power by local bodies, as
compared to instances when it is directly exercised by the national legislature.
REQUISITES OF VALID EXERCISE OF EMINENT DOMAIN POWER BY LGUs: Ordinance,
purpose must be for public welfare etc., just compensation, a valid but unaccepted offer to buy
[see ratio below].
Ordinance and resolution, distinguished: An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a
declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance
possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature.
Additionally, the two are enacted differently a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but
not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.

NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Original action for expropriation before
the Pasig RTC.

FACTS
October 13, 1994, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaluyong City (MANDA) issued
Resolution No. 396, S-1994 authorizing then MAYOR Benjamin ABALOS to institute
expropriation proceedings over the property of Alberto SUGUITAN.
o LOCATION: Boni Avenue cor. Sto. Rosario Sts., Mandaluyong City, beside the
Mandaluyong Medical Center.
o AREA & PARTICULARS: 414 m2, covered by TCT No. 56264 of the Registry of
Deeds of Metro Manila District II. A 2-storey building stood on the lot.
 o PURPOSE OF EXPROPRIATION: Expansion of the Mandaluyong Medical
Center
Mayor Abalos wrote Suguitan a letter dated January 20, 1995 offering to buy his
property, but Suguitan refused to sell.
March 13, 1995 - Manda filed a complaint for expropriation with the Pasig RTC.
Suguitan moved to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds
o (1) the power of eminent domain is not being exercised in accordance with law
o (2) there is no public necessity to warrant expropriation of subject property
o (3) Manda seeks to expropriate the said property without payment of just
compensation
o (4) Manda has no budget and appropriation for the payment of the property being
expropriated
o (5) expropriation of Suguitan' s property is but a ploy of Mayor Abalos to acquire
the same for his personal use. Respondent filed its comment and opposition to
the motion.
October 24, 1995 - RTC denied Suguitan's motion to dismiss.
November 14, 1995 - Upon motion, RTC issued an order allowing Manda to take
immediate possession of Suguitan's property upon the deposit of P621,000 representing
15% of the fair market value of the lot based upon its current tax declaration.
December 15, 1995 - Manda assumed possession of the subject property by virtue of a
writ of possession issued by the RTC on December 14, 1995.
July 28, 1998 - RTC granted the assailed order of expropriation. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE (HELD): W/N the expropriation was valid (NO)

RATIO
Suguitan: Manda may only exercise its delegated power of eminent domain by means
of an ordinance as required by LGC 19 and not by means of a mere resolution. The
resolution mentioned in Art. 36 of the IRR is for purposes of granting administrative
authority to the local chief executive to file the expropriation case in court and to
represent the local government unit in such case, but does not dispense with the
necessity of an ordinance for the exercise of the power of eminent domain under 19 of
the Code.
Manda: Exercise of eminent domain power was valid and legal. Pursuant to Art. 36,
Rule VI of the LGCs IRR, a resolution is a sufficient antecedent for the filing of
expropriation proceedings. A "resolution" empowering the City Mayor to initiate such
expropriation proceedings [is sufficient] and thereafter when the court has already
determine[d] with certainty the amount of just compensation to be paid for the property
expropriated, then follows an Ordinance of the Sanggunian Panlungsod appropriating
funds for the payment of the expropriated property. Admittedly, title to the property
expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the
just compensation.
SC: LGU power of eminent domain comes from legislative delegation. It is therefore
subject to the same limitations as if the power was being exercised by the legislature
itself. The exercise by the LGUs has been guarded even more closely by the courts. The
nature of the LGUs eminent domain power must be analyzed.
NATURE AND ATTRIBUTES OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
Eminent domain is the right or power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property
to particular uses to promote public welfare.
It is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty; a power grounded in the primary duty of
government to serve the common need and advance the general welfare.
The right of eminent domain appertains to every independent government without the
necessity for constitutional recognition. Constitutional provisions on eminent domain do
not serve as grants of power but as checks on an otherwise unlimited power. Among
these checks are the just compensation, due process and equal protection clauses.
The power of eminent domain must be exercised with great circumspection, being an
infringement on the cherished constitutional right of property.
City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila: The exercise of the right of eminent
domain, whether directly by the State, or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in
derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly
construed. No species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity, and none
is guarded by the constitution and the laws more sedulously, than the right to the
freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right, and, for greater
public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without his consent, the plain
meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation.
The statutory power of taking property from the owner without his consent is one of the
 most delicate exercise of governmental authority. It is to be watched with jealous
scrutiny. Important as the power may be to the government, the inviolable sanctity which
all free constitutions attach to the right of property of the citizens, constrains the strict
observance of the substantial provisions of the law which are prescribed as modes of
the exercise of the power, and to protect it from abuse. (Dillon; Tenorio v. Manila
Railroad)
The power of eminent domain is essentially legislative in nature. However, it may be
validly delegated to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities.
Of course the scope of this delegated legislative power is necessarily narrower than that
of the delegating authority and may only be exercised in strict compliance with the terms
of the delegating law.
DELEGATION OF EMINENT DOMAIN POWER TO LGUs IN THE LGC; DUTY OF COURTS
The basis for the exercise of the power of eminent domain by local government units is
19 of RA 7160.
Although the legislature has granted the power to LGUs, courts still have the duty of
determining whether the power of eminent domain is being exercised in accordance with
the delegating law.
Courts have adopted a more censorious attitude in resolving questions involving the
proper exercise of this delegated power by local bodies, as compared to instances when
it is directly exercised by the national legislature.
REQUISITES OF VALID EXERCISE OF EMINENT DOMAIN POWER BY LGUs (Mun. of
Paraaque v. VM Realty)
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief
executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of
eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private
property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or
for the benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under 9, Art. III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property
sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
CASE AT BAR: Manda expropriated Suguitans property on the basis of a mere
resolution, in contravention of the first requisite. The law in this case is clear and free
from ambiguity. 19 of the Code requires an ordinance, not a resolution.
A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution.
ORDINANCE RESOLUTION
Law Declaration of the lawmaking bodys sentiment or
opinion on a specific matter
General and permanent in character Temporary
Requires 3rd reading 3rd reading not required unless provided for by a
majority of all Sanggunian members
Manda: An ordinance is needed only to appropriate funds after the court has determined
the amount of just compensation.
SC: Untenable. Ordinance is necessary to authorize the filing of a complaint with the
proper court since, beginning at this point, the power of eminent domain is already being
exercised.
Expropriation proceedings are comprised of two stages (ROC 67)
1) Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain
and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit
2 POSSIBLE RESULTS: Dismissal of the action or issuance of order of
condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property
sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the
complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint
2) Determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be
taken; this is done by the court with the assistance of not more than three
commissioners.
Although the determination and award of just compensation is indispensable to the
transfer of ownership, it is but the last stage of the expropriation proceedings, which
cannot be arrived at without an initial finding by the court that the plaintiff has a lawful
right to take the property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose
described in the complaint.
An order of condemnation or dismissal at this stage would be final, resolving the
question of whether or not the plaintiff has properly and legally exercised its power of
eminent domain.
 As soon as the complaint is filed the plaintiff shall already have the right to enter upon
the possession of the real property involved upon depositing with the court at least
fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax
declaration of the property to be expropriated (LGC 19).
Therefore, an ordinance promulgated by the local legislative body authorizing its local
chief executive to exercise the power of eminent domain is necessary prior to the filing
by the latter of the complaint with the proper court, and not only after the court has
determined the amount of just compensation to which the defendant is entitled.
NO INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN LGC & LGC-IRR
Manda: A resolution is enough under the LGC-IRR. Art. 36 (a), Rule VI provides that if
the LGU fails to acquire a private property for public use, purpose, or welfare through
purchase, it may expropriate said property through a resolution of the sanggunian
authorizing its chief executive to initiate expropriation proceedings.
SC: This has been settled in Mun. of Paraaque v. V.M. Realty: 19 of RA 7160, the
law itself, surely prevails over said rule which merely seeks to implement it. It is
axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere
administrative rule issued for its implementation. Besides, what the discrepancy seems
to indicate is a mere oversight in the wording of the implementing rules, since Art. 32,
Rule VI thereof, also requires that, in exercising the power of eminent domain, the chief
executive of the LGU must act pursuant to an ordinance.
SC remains aware of the constitutional policy of promoting local autonomy, but judicial
sanction cannot be granted to a LGU's exercise of its delegated power of eminent
domain in contravention of the very law giving it such power.
Manda is not precluded from enacting the necessary ordinance and thereafter
reinstituting expropriation proceedings, for so long as it has complied with all other legal
requirements.

DISPOSITION: Petition granted. RTC order reversed and set aside.

Percival Moday vs Court of

Appeals
268 SCRA 586 Political Law Municipal Corporation Eminent Domain Disapproval by
SP of SB Resolution

Percival Moday is a landowner in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur. In 1989, the Sangguniang
Bayan of Bunawan passed a resolution authorizing the mayor to initiate an expropriation
case against a 1 hectare portion of Modays land. Purpose of which was to erect a
gymnasium and other public buildings. The mayor approved the resolution and the
resolution was transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which disapproved the said
resolution ruling that the expropriation is not necessary because there are other lots owned
by Bunawan that can be used for such purpose. The mayor pushed through with the
expropriation nonetheless.

ISSUE: Whether or not a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a

municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
HELD: Yes. Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the
instant case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is
governments right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private
property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the
power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public
entities and public utilities. For the taking of private property by the government to be valid,
the taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation. The only ground
upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order
invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is beyond the powers conferred upon
the council or president making the same. This was not the case in the case at bar as the
SP merely stated that there are other available lands for the purpose sought, the SP did not
even bother to declare the SB resolution as invalid. Hence, the expropriation case is valid.

Heirs of Juancho Ardona vs. Reyes

Facts:
The Philippine Tourism Authority filed 4 complaints with the Court of First Instance of
Cebu City for theexpropriation of some 282 hectares of rolling land situated in barangay Alubog
and Babag, Cebu City, under PTAsexpress authority to acquire by purchase, by negotiation or
by condemnation proceedings any private land withinand without the tourist zones for the
purposes indicated in Section 5, paragraph B(2), of its Revised Charter (PD564). The heirs of
Juancho Ardona et. Al, ) filed their oppositions, and had a common allegation in that the taking
isallegedly not impressed with public use under the Constitution; alleging that there is no specific
constitutional provision authorizing the taking of private property for tourism purposes; that
assuming that PTA has such power,the intended use cannot be paramount to the determination of
the land as a land reform area; that limiting the amountof compensation by legislative fiat is
constitutionally repugnant; and that since the land is under the land reform program, it is the
Court of Agrarian Relations and not the Court of First Instance (CFI), that has jurisdiction over
theexpropriation cases. The Philippine Tourism Authority having deposited with the Philippine
National Bank, CebuCity Branch, an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1533,the lower court issued separate orders authorizing PTA
to take immediate possession of the premises and directingthe issuance of writs of possession.
The Heirs of Ardona, et. al. then filed a petition for certiorari with preliminaryinjunction before the
Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether the expropriation of parcels of land for the purpose of constructing a sports
complex by thePhilippine Tourism Authority be considered taking for public use.

Held:
The states power of eminent domain extends to the expropriation of land for tourism
purposes although thisspecific objective is not expressed in the constitution. The policy
objectives of the framers can be expressed only ingeneral terms such as social justice, local
autonomy, conservation and development of the national patrimony publicinterest, and general
welfare, among others. The programs to achieve these objectives vary from time to time
andaccording to place. To freeze specific programs like tourism into express provisions would
make the constitutionmore prolix than bulky code and require of the framers a prescience beyond
Delphic proportions. The particular mention in the constitution of agrarian reform and transfer of
utilities and other private enterprises to publicownership merely underscores the magnitude of
the problems sought to be remedied by this programs. They do not preclude nor limit the exercise
of the power of eminent domain for the purposes like tourism and other development program.

Case Digest - Political Law, Inherent Power

Municipality of Paraaque vs. VM Realty
292 SCRA 676
Panganiban, J.:

FACTS:
Pursuant to a Sanggunian Bayan Resolution of the petitioner municipality, an
expropriation complaint against the property of herein respondent for the purpose of
alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the
homeless through a socialized housing project. The RTC of Makati authorized petitioner
to take possession of subject property upon deposit to the court an amount of its fair
market value. Respondent filed a counter claim alleging that the complaint failed to state
a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance
as required by RA 7160.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Resolution of the Municipal council is a substantial compliance of the
statutory requirement of Section 19, RA 7160 in the exercise of the power of eminent
domain.

RULING:
The power of eminent by LGUs may be affected only by ordinance not by a mere
resolution. The following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise
the power of eminent domain.
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief
executive, in behalf of the LGUs to exercise the power of eminent domain to pursue
expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for
the benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Sec 9, Article III of the
Constitution and other pertment.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property
sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.

In the case at bar, the first requisite that there must be an ordinance was not complied
with by the local chief executive. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An
ordinance is a law, it possesses a general and permanent character while a resolution is
temporary in nature.
The petition is hereby denied without prejudice to petitioners proper exercise of its
power of eminent domain over subject property.