Also Couldnt Find The Re: Letters of Vitug Online Huhu

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Also couldnt find the Re: Letters of Vitug online huhu.

Pauline

The In Re: Letters of Justice Vitug was just mentioned in OCA Circular 75-2016 so do
we just use that?

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 176278 June 25, 2010

ALAN F. PAGUIA, Petitioner,


vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, and HON. HILARIO
DAVIDE, JR. in his capacity as Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the United
Nations, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J.:

At issue is the power of Congress to limit the Presidents prerogative to nominate ambassadors by
legislating age qualifications despite the constitutional rule limiting Congress role in the appointment
of ambassadors to the Commission on Appointments confirmation of nominees.1 However, for lack
of a case or controversy grounded on petitioners lack of capacity to sue and mootness, 2 we dismiss
the petition without reaching the merits, deferring for another day the resolution of the question
raised, novel and fundamental it may be.

Petitioner Alan F. Paguia (petitioner), as citizen and taxpayer, filed this original action for the writ of
certiorari to invalidate President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyos nomination of respondent former Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (respondent Davide) as Permanent Representative to the United
Nations (UN) for violation of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7157 (RA 7157), the Philippine Foreign
Service Act of 1991. Petitioner argues that respondent Davides age at that time of his nomination in
March 2006, 70, disqualifies him from holding his post. Petitioner grounds his argument on Section
23 of RA 7157 pegging the mandatory retirement age of all officers and employees of the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) at 65.3 Petitioner theorizes that Section 23 imposes an absolute
rule for all DFA employees, career or non-career; thus, respondent Davides entry into the DFA ranks
discriminates against the rest of the DFA officials and employees.

In their separate Comments, respondent Davide, the Office of the President, and the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs (respondents) raise threshold issues against the petition. First, they question
petitioners standing to bring this suit because of his indefinite suspension from the practice of
law.4 Second, the Office of the President and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (public respondents)
argue that neither petitioners citizenship nor his taxpayer status vests him with standing to question
respondent Davides appointment because petitioner remains without personal and substantial
interest in the outcome of a suit which does not involve the taxing power of the state or the illegal
disbursement of public funds. Third, public respondents question the propriety of this petition,
contending that this suit is in truth a petition for quo warranto which can only be filed by a contender
for the office in question.

On the eligibility of respondent Davide, respondents counter that Section 23s mandated retirement
age applies only to career diplomats, excluding from its ambit non-career appointees such as
respondent Davide.

The petition presents no case or controversy for petitioners lack of capacity to sue and mootness.

First. Petitioners citizenship and taxpayer status do not clothe him with standing to bring this suit.
We have granted access to citizens suits on the narrowest of ground: when they raise issues of
"transcendental" importance calling for urgent resolution.5 Three factors are relevant in our
determination to allow third party suits so we can reach and resolve the merits of the crucial issues
raised the character of funds or assets involved in the controversy, a clear disregard of
constitutional or statutory prohibition, and the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific
interest to bring the suit.6 None of petitioners allegations comes close to any of these parameters.
Indeed, implicit in a petition seeking a judicial interpretation of a statutory provision on the retirement
of government personnel occasioned by its seemingly ambiguous crafting is the admission that a
"clear disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibition" is absent. Further, the DFA is not devoid of
personnel with "more direct and specific interest to bring the suit." Career ambassadors forced to
leave the service at the mandated retirement age unquestionably hold interest far more substantial
and personal than petitioners generalized interest as a citizen in ensuring enforcement of the law. 1avvphi1

The same conclusion holds true for petitioners invocation of his taxpayer status. Taxpayers
contributions to the states coffers entitle them to question appropriations for expenditures which are
claimed to be unconstitutional or illegal.7 However, the salaries and benefits respondent Davide
received commensurate to his diplomatic rank are fixed by law and other executive issuances, the
funding for which was included in the appropriations for the DFAs total expenditures contained in the
annual budgets Congress passed since respondent Davides nomination. Having assumed office
under color of authority (appointment), respondent Davide is at least a de facto officer entitled to
draw salary,8 negating petitioners claim of "illegal expenditure of scarce public funds." 9

Second. An incapacity to bring legal actions peculiar to petitioner also obtains. Petitioners
suspension from the practice of law bars him from performing "any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience." 10 Certainly,
preparing a petition raising carefully crafted arguments on equal protection grounds and employing
highly legalistic rules of statutory construction to parse Section 23 of RA 7157 falls within the
proscribed conduct.

Third. A supervening event has rendered this case academic and the relief prayed for moot.
Respondent Davide resigned his post at the UN on 1 April 2010.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.


Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO


Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA


Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO


Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.


Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE C. MENDOZA


Associate Justice Associate Justice

C E R TI F I C ATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Section 16 (1), Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: "The President shall nominate
and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint x x x ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls x x x." The following comment on the interaction of the
constitutional spheres of power of the President, Senate (the Commission on Appointments
in this jurisdiction), and Congress in the nomination and confirmation process under the US
Constitutions Appointments Clause, the normative model of the first sentence of Section 16
(1), Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, is instructive:

The Constitution assigns the power of nomination for a confirmation appointment to


the President alone, and it allocates the power of confirmation appointments to the
President together with the Senate. Congress can pass laws x x x to help the
President and Senate carry out those functions, such as establishing an agency to
help identify and evaluate potential nominees. But x x x Congress cannot require that
the President limit his nominees to a specific group of individuals named by someone
else, or constrain appointments to people who meet a particular set of qualifications,
for confirmation appointments. (Hanah Metchis Volokh, The Two Appointments
Clauses: Statutory Qualifications For Federal Officers, 10 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 745,
763 [2007]) (internal citations omitted; emphasis supplied).

The Presidents exclusive power to nominate ambassadors is complimented by a


subsidiary doctrine treating ambassadorial selections as "based on the special trust
and confidence" of the President (Santos v. Macaraig, G.R. No. 94070, 10 April 1992,
208 SCRA 74, 84).

2
Prescinding from Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution limiting this Courts
jurisdiction to "cases."

3
Section 23 provides: "Compulsory Retirements. - All officers and employees of the
Department who have reached the age of sixty-five (65) shall be compulsorily and
automatically retired from the Service: Provided, however, That all incumbent non-career
chiefs of mission who are seventy (70) years old and above shall continue to hold office until
June 30, 1992 unless sooner removed by the appointing authority. Non-career appointees
who shall serve beyond the age of sixty-five (65) years shall not be entitled to retirement
benefits."

4
Imposed in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 462 Phil. 135 (2003).

5
Kilosbayan v. Morato, 320 Phil. 171, 186 (1995).

6
Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 838, 899 (2003) citing Kilosbayan v.
Guingona, G.R. No. 113375, 5 May 1994, 232 SCRA 110, 155-156 (1995) (Feliciano, J.,
concurring).

7
See e.g. Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 (1960) (involving the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 920 appropriating funds for public works); Sanidad v.
COMELEC, No. L-44640, 12 October 1976, 73 SCRA 333 (concerning the constitutionality of
presidential decrees calling for the holding of a national referendum on constitutional
amendments and appropriating funds for the purpose).

8
See Malaluan v. COMELEC, 324 Phil. 676, 696-697 (1996).

9
Rollo, p. 7.

10
Cayetano v. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, 3 September 1991, 201 SCRA 210, 214.

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