StephendeWijze

PoliticalAccountability
andMoralPollution:Defending
DemocraticDirtyHands

It is a testament to the genius of Machiavelli that I am writing and arguing about issues
which he first raised on the 500th anniversary of the completion of his path breaking work
The Prince.1 As is well known, Machiavellis views, especially those articulated in The Prince,
were highly controversial and deeply shocked many of his contemporaries.2 His advice
to princes, that they avoid ruling according to the values of justice and compassion, but
instead employ deceit, cruelty, fear and violence, was seen as the teaching of the Devil.
Pope Clement VIII denounced his work, and the term Machiavellian soon came to refer
to those who acted immorally and without conscience or humanity. The scholarship on
Machiavelli today is vast and his work has been interpreted in many, often contradictory,
ways. There have been attempts to rehabilitate Machiavelli so that he is not seen as a
teacher of evil (Strauss 1958, 9-10) but rather as a political realist or pragmatist (Croce),
or simply an amoralist pointing to the facts of political life without being distracted by
normative concerns. Others (Berlin, Hampshire) argue for Machiavelli as the purveyor of
a political morality tied to virta code of conduct needed for politicians to create and
maintain a strong stable state where citizens are free to pursue their valued and desired
ends. But however one interprets Machiavellis work, what is without doubt is that he
has inspired generations of philosophers and historians and found his insights central
to arguments about warfare, diplomacy, and much else besides. Machiavelli is touted
as the first theorist to introduce the modern concept of the state, one stripped of the Aris-
totelian normative evaluations concerning legitimacy and its relationship to power. In
short, many argue that Machiavellis civic humanist republicanism served as a needed link
between the ancients and the moderns. The plethora of different interpretations of his
views results from his particular way of trying to bridge these two opposing approaches
to understanding the relationships between the effective use of political power and the
generic demands of morality.3

1 My thanks to Beatrice Magni for inviting me to write this paper to read at the Responsible Politics
and Dirty Hands: Machiavellian Insights workshop which took place at the University of Milan on 18
November 2013. I am also indebted to the two discussants on my paper, Luca Mori and Beatrice Magni, for
their insightful comments, and to Eve Garrard who commented on an earlier draft of this paper.
2 Although The Prince was completed in 1513 it was only published in 1532, five years after Machiavellis

death in 1527.
3 This point is made by Nederman 2009.

Bibliotecadellalibert,XLIX(2014),
gennaioaprile,n.209onlineISSN20355866 45
http://www.centroeinaudi.it
 StephendeWijze
PoliticalAccountabilityandMoralPollution:
DefendingDemocraticDirtyHands

In this paper I argue that certain key Machiavellian insights remain germane for democrat-
ic societies, and that the central issues that define the problem of dirty hands (hereafter
DH) do not change given the particular values that underlie a democratic form of govern-
ance. The argument that a democratic form of governance changes (if not demolishes)
our understanding of the standard DH scenario are based on a twofold error: (i) the mis-
understanding of the necessary conditions for DH and (ii) the ways in which democracy
constrains political actions in the face of intractable moral conflicts. I shall argue that
Machiavellian insights concerning the relationship between power, political legitimacy,
and effective governance, apply equally to democratic societies as they did to medieval
princedoms. What does change given our concern with democratic dirty hands (hereafter
DDH) is the issue of whether political agents ought to be held accountable to democratic
citizens for getting dirty hands. There is also the important issue of whether a politicians
dirty acts transfer moral pollution to the citizens who elected her. However, in all other
respects the DH problem remains as relevant today in democratic societies as it was in
the turbulent Florentine political milieu in which Machiavelli wrote The Prince. Successful
politicians who strive to ensure a viable and enduring state in order to provide the great
benefits of peace and stability need to develop virt and take heed of the vicissitudes
of fortuna. Machiavellis advice remains as salient as ever and democratic societies ignore it
at their peril.
In what follows, I will outline the standard account of DH. I then explore the core
claims made about DDH and offer an account of how we can best understand them
through the standard model of DH. I then outline and explore two key Machiavellian
insights, the notions of virt and fortuna, and rebut three main arguments against the very
possibility of DDH. Finally I briefly explore two issues where the democratic form of
governance does indeed make a difference to our understanding of the DH problem.
These two issues concern the specific accountability of democratic politicians to the
democratic public, and the extent to which moral pollution devolves onto the citizens in
whose names politicians have dirtied their hands.

1. DH THE STANDARD ACCOUNT

The problem of DH is best understood as a specific kind or type of unavoidable moral
wrongdoing.4 However, this is a deeply controversial claim that is firmly rejected by a
wide range of moral theorists from both the deontological and consequentialist perspec-
tives. Such critics argue that the very notion of unavoidable moral wrongdoing
especially the claim that we must sometimes do wrong in order to do rightindicates, at
best, a deep confusion and misunderstanding of moral theory. I shall not engage here with
these arguments concerning the conceptual coherence of DH scenarios as I have done
4 Gowans (1994) argues that inescapable moral wrongdoing unavoidably occurs when specific and
important moral obligations to persons clash with universal principles of a Kantian or Utilitarian kind.
This leads to moral tragedy where no matter how one decides to act, there is some moral pollution for so
acting. Also see Gardner (2007) where he argues that justifications for wrongdoing do not negate or annul
the reasons against so acting. Consequently, justified wrongdoings leave a moral remainder that needs to be
acknowledged.

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so at length elsewhere (see de Wijze 1994, 1996 and 2005). Rather the focus in this paper
is on a different kind of criticism; namely the claim that democratic governance with
its specific normative values renders the standard accounts of DH scenarios otiose (see
Walzer 1973, Hollis 1982, Stocker 1990 and de Wijze 1994).
However, to assess the notion of DDH we need some sense of the standard account
of DH. It is not easy to give a simple and uncontroversial characterization of DH position
as the literature offers a number of different albeit overlapping accounts. While all agree
that DH scenarios are special kinds of moral conflicts, just why they arise, what form they
take, and how to characterize their necessary and sufficient conditions, differ considera-
bly. One well-established view understands the problem of DH as essentially the Machia-
vellian means/ends problem in politics.5 Here worthwhile and morally important ends
can only be achieved by employing immoral means. Here a special kind of moral conflict
arises, as there are two incompatible reasons for action in a particular situation, such that
neglecting either consideration is seriously wrong, but they cant both be acted on. Nei-
ther consequentialist nor deontological descriptions of the situation can properly capture
this difficult aspect of our moral reality. In DH scenarios politicians face incompossible
moral demands. Or, to put it differently, political agents are required to make choices in
situations of intractable moral conflicts, which sometimes take the form of acute dilem-
mas. Typically, politicians encounter a tension between acting in accordance with moral
principles yet also knowing that to so act may result in terrible or even catastrophic moral
costs. Resolving this tension by giving primacy either to principles and duties or to conse-
quentialist reasoning does not eradicate the moral stain whichever action-guiding decision
is finally chosen. In such situations there are no morally cost free ways of acting. As Hollis
(1982, 388) points out, in politics the best is the enemy of the good and a proper
concern and balance with respect to both principles and consequences are needed for
successful and responsible political agents. Furthermore, advocates of the means/ends
problem account of DH point to the tension between what is required qua politicians
given their special duties and obligations and what is prohibited in private life in terms
of the generic demands of morality. In short, politicians will at times unavoidably face an
irresolvable conflict between the normative demands of their public duties and those of
their private lives.6
However, the means/ends in politics account of DH is just one way of characterizing
DH scenarios and why they arise. A related but different approach is to understand the
notion of DH as the inevitable clash between consequentialist and deontological moral
theories (see Walzer 1973, Nagel 1978 and Nielsen 2000). In this account, DH scenarios
occur in both public and private domains (albeit more frequently in the political domain)
since what matters is the clash between acting in terms of what is right in contrast to
focusing on the consequences of the actions taken. At times, these different approaches
require diametrically opposed actions and cannot be reconciled.7

5 This position is explored most notably by Hampshire 1989, Nagel 1978, Thompson1987 and Gowans
1994.
6 For an extended discussion of this position see Hampshire 1978.
7 Some attempts to resolve the tension is found in accounts of threshold deontology and Rule Utili-

tarianism. However, both of these approaches fail to acknowledge the unavoidable moral residue that
results from acting in cases of genuine moral conflicts/dilemmas.

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A third way of accounting for DH scenarios is by rejecting a monist account of moral

values, which underlie both consequentialist and (some) deontological moral theories
(see Hampshire 1989, Williams 1981 and Berlin 2003). A pluralist account of moral value
explains why DH scenarios inevitably arise in all domains of our lives. If we cherish dif-
ferent values (such as liberty and equality), and they cannot be hierarchically ordered or
subsumed under one supreme value (eg. justice), then intractable conflicts are unavoida-
ble. Similarly, if it is not possible given pluralism to commensurate values in terms of
a commonly accepted non-moral good, as Utilitarians for example attempt to do, then
moral conflicts become a persistent part of our moral experiences. Any action in such
conflict situations will violate a cherished value leaving a moral remainder that needs to be
recognized and taken into account.
Finally, a useful way in which to characterize DH scenarios is to use a formal defini-
tion. Stocker (1990, 9-10) offers such an account when he contends that DH scenarios
involve an action which is at once (1) justified, even obligatory, but also (2) nonetheless
somehow wrong and shameful. This formal definition is a useful way to approach the
problem of DH as it enables the incorporation of insights from the previous characteri-
zations of DH. By exploring the possible meanings of each of the sub-clauses, and by
demonstrating why such scenarios are conceptually possible, we can provide a set of
necessary and sufficient conditions for identifying DH scenarios. Consequently, for the
purposes of this paper I will employ Stockers account and set out what I take to be the
core aspects common to all cases of DH.

All cases of DH involve situations of unavoidable genuine moral conflict.

There can be no resolution of this moral conflict without a moral remainder.
All cases of DH involve the justified violation of persons or cherished values.
Agents with DH are motivated by moral considerations to commit a moral violation.
DH scenarios are those situations where the action taken seeks to bring about the
lesser evil.

The above list is not complete and the five claims need much commentary, but this will
suffice for our purposes here.8 I will remain agnostic on why DH conflicts arise and take
no stand on the issue of whether we should endorse value monism or pluralism. I shall
also accept that the occurrence of DH scenarios is more frequent in the political domain,
but there is nothing in the notion of DH itself that prohibits or prevents its occurrence in
private life. DH scenarios, then, are those unfortunate and difficult moral situations where
no matter how the agent (committee, government) acts, there can be no avoiding the vio-
lation of a cherished moral principle. Genuine DH scenarios, then, lie on a continuum
ranging from those involving relatively minor moral infractions to cases where there is
the commission of terrible moral crimes. Fortunately, the most serious cases are relatively
rare, but they nevertheless dramatically highlight an important part of our moral reality,
which is either ignored or rejected by the standard moral theories.

8 I have explored in some details the necessary and sufficient conditions for DH in de Wijze 1994, 1996

and 2005. In this article I am not concerned with defending a particular account of DH. Here I have other
fish to fry.

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My account of DH above, just as the other approaches mentioned, is open to the charge
that it ignores the normative influences and requirements of contemporary democratic
forms of governance. The sui generis moral and political context within which contempo-
rary democratic societies operate makes the standard account (mine and others) deeply
problematic undermining any possible justification for such scenarios. These critics insist
that democratic governance generates a number of additional duties for both politicians
and the citizens which make DH scenarios redundant. At a minimum, and in addition
to the usual moral constraints on what can be legitimately done to others, a democracy
requires its politicians to act impartially and within the constraints of a constitution and
system of public laws. What is more, since politicians act on behalf of their citizens, they
become trustees of the public interest and are duty bound to protect the fabric of a demo-
cratic society from threats both internal and external. Consequently, they hold a special
relationship with the citizens of the state and are duty bound to refrain from acting in
ways that would undermine the fundamental principles of democracy. Honesty, openness,
accountability to the public, maintenance of the rule of law, enables a fiduciary relation-
ship between citizens and politicians in a democracy where the former confer legitimacy
and authority on the activities of the latter. Consequently, democratic politicians are
duty bound to provide full disclosure of their future intentions and stand accountable to
the general public for their past actions. In short, the additional duties and obligations
on democratic politicians raise serious doubts as to whether DH scenarioswhere
principles are deliberately violated for the public goodare at all possible in a proper-
ly functioning democratic society. The thought here is that violating the democratic
principles could undermine the very system of democracy and as such could never be the
lesser evil.

2. ARE DDH POSSIBLE?

There is not a great deal written on the problem of DDH in the existing literature. The
analysis of the DH problem has historically focused on the actions of kings and princes
who transgressed the conventional morality of their time for reasons of state (Thompson
1987, 11). More recently the spotlight has shifted to the dramatic problems faced by
revolutionaries, typically lone actors or small groups of militants making hard choices in
the face of terrible dilemmas in the course of resisting oppression. Literary works such as
Sartres Dirty Hands, Camus Just Assassins and Brechts The Measures Taken best illustrate
this approach and offer excellent literary analyses that encourage moral philosophers to
engage with the problem (see Sartre 1971, Camus 2006 and Brecht 1977). However, as
Thompson points out, the focus on the dilemma of revolutionaries tends to overlook
what occurs within properly functioning democracies. He argues for the occurrence of
DH in democratic societies but he thinks that contemporary theorists fail to appreciate
the difference that democracy makes (Thompson 1987, 11). Democratic politicians not
only violate conventional morality in the defence of the public good, they also commit
a further wrong that involves the willing violation of democratic principles from which
they obtain their authority and legitimacy to act on the behalf of citizens. Thompson puts
it this way:

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Because democratic officials are supposed to act with the consent of citizens, they face a fur-
ther dilemma. If they gain that consent, they are not uniquely guilty in the way the problem in
its traditional form presumes. If they act without that consent, they not only commit a further
wrong (a violation of the democratic process), but they also cast doubt on the justifiability of
the decision itself. They undermine some of the conditions of moral discourse that are neces-
sary to judge the morality of any decision in a democracy. (Thompson 1987, 11)
By dirtying ones hands in a democracy, Thompson is claiming that the very question of
whether one indeed did do wrong in order to do right, becomes very hard, if not impossi-
ble, to answer. The violation of the principles underlying the democratic moral discourse
(e.g. engaging in deceit and obfuscation) undermines the ability of citizens to assess the
moral status of any actions. The reason is that in a democracy the legitimacy and rightful-
ness of actions are dependent on the democratic will or consent expressed through an
open and transparent process. On this view, deceiving the citizenry or undermining
the core principles of democratic governance (such as rigging elections) would be self-
defeating and never justifiable in service of the public good.9
This analysis has been adopted and taken further by others theorists who make the
stronger claim that DDH are simply not possible in a properly functioning democracy.10
Shugarman (2000, 240), for example, insists that the very idea of DDH is oxymoronic,
a contradiction in terms such as referring to a free slave.11 A democratic politician who
undermines the values within which it is possible to assess the normative status of politi-
cal actions is doing wrong simpliciter. What is more, critics of the very idea of DDH argue
that an understanding of DH based on the intentions of a lone agent facing an unavoida-
ble moral conflict distorts the essential nature of democratic politics.12 It fails to recognize
that all democratic political actions ought to occur under a constitution and rule of law. If
there is a need for deceit or manipulation, or the use of violence to ensure the common
good, then this needs to be agreed to and authorized in advance through democratic pro-
cedures. For example, the deception that is used by the police to help apprehend criminals
is acceptable as it has been approved beforehand and regulated by appropriate institutions

9 Similar views are expressed by theorists who reject the need for, and the justifiability of, immoral
actions in a democracy. For example, Bok (1999, 180-181) argues that the only deception that is acceptable
in a democracy is that which has been debated and consented to in advance within the appropriate institu-
tions. For example, the deception that is used by the police to apprehend criminals is acceptable as it has
been approved beforehand and regulated by appropriate laws endorsed within the democratic society.
10 Thompson does not reject the possibility of DDH. He rightly points out that it is highly plausible to

suppose that conventional politicians in established contemporary democratic societies will face situations
and moral conflicts that require them to break the rules of conventional morality. Democratic politicians
will get DH when they lie to protect the economy or use manipulation and violence to ensure national
security. Consequently, he simply seeks to show how the values and principles of democracy require us to
understand the difference this form of governance has on the standard model.
11 Shugarman is specifically referring to Walzers example of making a deal with corrupt ward bosses

in order to win an election. For Shugarman, vote rigging fatally undermines the electoral process that is
fundamental to the very possibility of proper democratic governance. Consequently, engaging in such a
practice is not a moral paradox, as DH theorists would suggest, but impossible since it involves a contradic-
tion in terms.
12 This point is forcefully made by Sutherland (2000, 223) and is endorsed by Shugarman.

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within the democratic society. Any deception that goes beyond what has been agreed
would be morally unjustifiable. Consequently, the idea of a lone actor breaking the laws or
committing moral violations for the public good undermines the very essence of demo-
cratic governance rendering the notion of DDH incoherent.
As is plain from the above, the possibility or otherwise of DDH rests heavily on a par-
ticular understanding of what a properly functioning democratic governance entails, and
the more specifically, how the normative values underlying this form of governance place
constraints on political action. This is not the place to engage in a detailed account of the
meaning of the term democracy, given the long history and vast literature on the topic.
However, whatever form of democracy adopted, be it aggregative or deliberative, repre-
sentative or direct, procedural or substantive, there are a number of underlying principles
that are uncontroversial and definitive of this concept. I contend that for a government
to be properly labeled democratic (whatever version or particular manifestation it finally
adopts) the following minimal (or necessary) conditions must obtain:

Political authority/power is established in a specific manner. It is transferred from citi-

zens to political agents by some form of voting preferences. This power is always a
derived authority given by way of delegation from the citizens. It does not recognize
any other basis for political authority other than the will of citizens.
Democratic societies are based on a rule of law, which applies equally to all citizens.
Since citizens contingently confer political power, politicians always remain ultimately
accountable to them for their actions and decisions. In addition, politicians are re-
quired to be open and forthcoming about their intentions, plans and views, not least to
ensure that citizens can choose their politicians on the basis of accurate information
about past actions and future intentions. This enables a fiduciary relationship between
citizens and politicians where the former give consent and trust to the latter to use
their institutional power in a manner consistent with their stated promises, best judg-
ments, goodwill and integrity.13

I take it that the above minimal conditions for a proper democracy, whatever the particu-
lar variations concerning electoral process or nature of representative, are uncontrover-
sial.14 I have deliberately not included the controversial claim that democracy is a good
in itself. Further, I have not claimed how, or by what means, politicians are accountable
to citizens as this too can be done in a number of ways that are the open to considerable

13 I have examined this fiduciary relationship at length in de Wijze 2003. If democratic politicians fail to

act with the consent of citizens or deliberately act contrary to their mandate, they do undermine the very
rationale of the democratic process.
14 I should qualify this to say that I mean by uncontroversial here that those who reject the possibility of

DDH would accept these necessary conditions for a proper democratic form of governance. My view is that
any plausibly functioning democracy would need to accept my three conditions for a genuine democratic
mode of government. I am aware that some may think that these conditions are what underlie specifically
a liberal democracy rather than democracy more widely understood. However, I reject this view since there is
nothing in the three conditions which are exclusively liberal notions.

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debate.15 And, most importantly for my concerns here, I have not claimed that democracy
demands a particular approach to doing politics, no matter the circumstances. The
rejection of DDH, by Shugarman and Sutherland in particular, rests in large part on their
strong claim that a healthy functioning democracy must always engage in a certain type of
activity which is antithetical to dirty hands practices. It is my contention that this view,
combined with a number of misunderstandings about the essence of a DH, leads to their
erroneous claim that DDH are not possible.

3. MACHIAVELLIAN INSIGHTS VIRT AND FORTUNA

Is it the case that democracies are able, and ought, to engage in a form and method of
politics that is substantially different from that of other forms of governance? The answer
is both yes and no. When it is possible, and this hopefully should be for the bulk of po-
litical action in a democracy, politicians ought to act within the law and publicly disclose
their plans, goals and methods for achieving them. However, to acknowledge this is not
to exclude another unavoidable aspect of all political activity. Democratic politicians, as
do all politicians from every form of government, sometimes face situations that require
an urgent response (preventing wide-ranging and open consultation) and where the only
effective choices may not be moral (or legal). These situations typically and most dramati-
cally arise when there are serious risks to lives of citizens or when effectively combating
ruthless enemies can only be done if violence, deceit, and manipulation are used. In such
situations, politicians may need to violate democratic values to successfully combat the
serious danger to the state and its citizens and ensure the continuation of the society as a
free and fully functioning democracy. Here lies a paradoxit may take undemocratic and
immoral actions to protect a system of government that has as its very rationale the goal
of upholding the very values that are violated in its defence. It is the first and most im-
portant duty of a government, and democratic governments are no exception, to protect
its citizens from threats both internal and external. To argue, as Sutherland (2000, 223)
does, that when facing such situations, democratic politicians have a higher and prior
moral duty to not bypass or corrupt the democratic process of deliberation and disclosure
is to seriously misunderstand the nature of politics and some of the challenges that will
almost inevitably arise. In short, democratic politicians in certain circumstances may not
be able to avoid getting DH.
Here it is useful to return to Machiavellis work to recall some of his key insights about
the relationship between power, morality and politics. His contribution was to strip politi-
cal agency of any extraneous moralizing influences (Nederman 2009), forcefully pointing
out that successful power politics requires agents to exhibit virt in the face of fortuna.
Virt refers to those qualities required of a successful leader that enable him/her to be
flexible, ruthless in the face of enemies, tenacious, and courageous. But most importantly,

15 Shugarman (2000, 233), for example, claims that a participatory democratic model calls for elected

leaders to exhibit transparency and accountability to citizens on an ongoing basis rather than every five years
when facing elections. The latter he refers to as the elitist view and the tone of his analysis makes it clear
he thinks this approach to accountability is morally deficient and inferior to his participatory model.

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he argues that when necessary a politician must learn how not to be good and use this to
ensure a strong and stable state that is the precondition for enabling the great human
achievements of science and art. Hampshire, echoing Machiavellis insight, argues that
politics is where we routinely experience shabby compromises, necessary disownings,
deceit, ruthless manipulation and violence. This is a world that has lost its innocence. The
political world is a place of experience, a domain that is characterized by the
idea of guilty knowledge and the expectation of unavoidable squalor and imperfection, of
necessary disappointments and mixed results, of half success and half failure. A person
of experience comes to expect that her usual choice will be the lesser of two or more evils.
(Hampshire 1989, 170)
Virt is needed to effectively and successfully engage with fortuna, which for Machiavelli
is the blind, malevolent and uncompromising fount of human misery, affliction and disas-
ter (Nederman 2009). In contemporary terms, political experience is characterized by
sudden turns of events16 where decisions of great moment are made in situations of
uncertainty and where the goal is to choose the lesser evil in order to prevent the greater
misery and the worse injustice (Hampshire 1989, 172).
Machiavellis problem, the ends/means problem in politics, arises because moral inno-
cence and purity are often incompatible with the effective use of political power. The vir-
tues of democracy are considerable but they are not always sustainable and protected by
acting in accordance with them.17 For this reason, DDH are sometimes unavoidable and
getting ones hands dirty is the right thing to do in the circumstances.
The scholarship concerned with DDH is small and can be divided into two groups.
The first group are critics (Shugarman and Sutherland) who reject the very possibility
of DDH. The second group (Archard, Bellamy and Thompson18) accept the possibility of
DDH scenarios but believe that the democratic context makes a difference to our way of
understanding the concept itself, specifically with regard to the issues of political account-
ability and the extent and scope of moral pollution that occurs. I consider the first group
in section 4 and turn to the second in section 5 below.

4. REJECTING DDH THREE ERRONEOUS ARGUMENTS

Shugarman and Sutherland object to the possibility of the notion of DDH. Collectively
they offer three reasons for their position:

16 The comment events dear boy, events attributed to Harold Macmillan sums up the unpredictable

and most difficult aspect of daily politics.

17 Karl Popper (1945) famously referred to the paradox of democracy where it is possible that a major-

ity could vote for a tyrant who would then destroy the very system by which he was elected. Democratic
governance needs to be alert to the different ways in which it is vulnerable and could be subverted. Some-
times, the defence of democracy paradoxically requires the breaking of cherished democratic principles.
Provided this is a rare event and the violations cease as soon as the danger has been eradicated, such actions
protect rather than undermine the democratic system.
18 See Archard 2013, Bellamy 2010 and Thompson 1987.

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DH erroneously seen as the staple of politics.

Democracy as a new form of politics makes DH scenarios redundant.
DH scenarios erroneously based on heroic lone actor assumption.

4.1. DH scenarios as the staple of politics

Both Sutherland and Shugarman claim that those who argue for the possibility of DH
hold to the view that such scenarios are the staple of politics (Shugarman 2000, 230) or
that they capture the important aspects, or the heart, of politics (Sutherland 2000, 208).
If this is correct, then DH scenarios have no purchase in democratic societies since the
staple of politics will be public accountability, adherence to a rule of law. In the place of
violence and conflict we find negotiations and compromise. However, this claim is based
on an erroneous understanding of what constitutes proper DH scenarios. As shown
in section 1 above, there is nothing in the definition of DH or the nature of politics
itself that entails that the former are the staple of politicsdemocratic or otherwise. DH
theorists certainly do not claim that such scenarios are the staple or the core of political
activity. Indeed, to think that this is the case is to deeply misunderstand the idea of DH
one form of unavoidable moral wrongdoingand its place in our moral lives.
Why is this? Firstly, it is worth noting that DH scenarios are not tied or limited to the
political. We face such scenarios in our private lives. What is also clear, and which may be
the source of confusion, is that DH cases arise much more frequently in the political
domain because the sui generis nature of politics. Political activity, even in the most pacific
regions of the world, is much more likely to throw up conflicts of interest and moral
dilemmas than we will face in our private lives. But this is emphatically not to say that DH
scenarios are all that there is to politics, or even that they will dominate or be the core
of political life. In fact, the number of genuine cases of DH in politics should be relatively
infrequent in a fully functioning democracy. There is nothing about DH itself that makes
such scenarios the key focus of political life.

4.2. Democracy heralds a new kind of politics

The second reason why Sutherland and Shugarman want to reject the very idea of DDH
is because of the unique way in which democracy does politics. While they rightly imbue
democracy with special and unique values, they incorrectly conclude:
i) that these values create a wholly different kind of politics and
ii) that, consequently, the Machiavellian insights concerning virt and fortuna are rendered
obsolete.
Shugarman is explicit on this. He chides DH theorists19 for treating politics as if it has
changed little from the lawless, embattled atmosphere of Machiavellis Italy (Shugarman
2000, 231). As a result, they slide easily and disturbingly back and forth between condi-
tions and principles of authoritarian rule on the one hand and democracy on the other.
What is more, Shugarman contends that the version of democracy DH theorists have
in mind is elitist with a very restrictive understanding of the nature of citizenship and the

19 He refers to DH advocates as moral Machiavellians to distinguish them from the commonly held
view that Machiavellians reject all talk of morality.

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relationship between politicians and citizens (Shugarman 2000, 232). This narrow under-
standing leads to the erroneous view that DH and democracy are compatible.
However, Shugarmans rejection of the elitist view presupposes that a proper demo-
cratic society must be based on something like a deliberative model and that, if this were
the case, all political problems that arise could be resolved by persuasion and deliberation.
Of course, where this is possible, deliberation, persuasion and compromise are preferable
to coercion. But to claim that this preferred method of doing politics can and must always
be the way that democracies operate is unsustainable and nave in the face of overwhelm-
ing empirical evidence to the contrary. Part of Machiavellis profound influence over the
last 500 years is due to his debunking of a normative form of politics that fails to properly
understand the relationship between successful politics and ethical constraints. By claim-
ing that DDH is a contradiction in terms, Shugarman (and Sutherland) seem to reject
any possibility of situations arising where there will be irresolvable moral conflicts; and
furthermore, if such scenarios do arise, they still see no reason to dirty our hands. They
reject, in essence, the tragic view of politics that Machiavelli highlights with his claims
about the need for virt in the face of fortuna.
What is particularly odd with Shugarman and Sutherlands views here, if I have charac-
terized them correctly, is that they do acknowledge that politics can throw up situations
that require immoral and drastic action. Shugarman backtracks on his assertion that DDH
is a contradiction in terms when he admits that there are cases of what he calls defensible
DH in extreme situations. Shugarman thinks of such extreme situations as occurring
when democracy is denied, or democratic processes are subverted, or when it is a matter
of self-defence or the defence of others under attack, or when all other avenues have been
exhaustedbut only then. Given this list, it seems that Shugarman has no problems with
the definition of DH I set out in section 1 and he does not think under certain circum-
stances that getting our hands dirty is a contradiction in terms. It seems that Shugarmans
real concern is not with DDH but rather with its misuse and abuse by the unscrupulous.
With this I heartily concur (Shugarman 2000, 246).20
It is worth stressing again that there is nothing intrinsic to the concepts of DH or
democracy as a particular form of political governance that requires ineffective (or no)
action in the face of dire threats to its very existence. The conditions for democratic
governance set out in section 2 do not in principle exclude DH scenarios and for good
reason. Democratic governance is not a suicide pact between citizens and their leaders.
When necessary, democratic politicians must employ whatever means are required to de-
fend the system and ensure its future continuation. Unless we hold an entirely unrealistic
view that democracies will always be able to prevent situations where politicians will face
irresolvable moral conflicts, getting DDH is inevitable, justifiable and necessary.

20 Sutherland (2000, 233) also admits that conflicts can arise which makes democratic politics a problem.

But she equivocates here and insists that this is where political institutions matter and that the processes of
a democratic society must be engaged. It is not clear if she thinks that engaging democratic society would
be effective in every situation. In short, she does not properly address the salient issue of DH in the face of
irresolvable moral conflicts that leave no morally cost free course of action.

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4.3. DH scenarios are predicated on the actions of a lone actor

Both Shugarman and Sutherland argue that there is a third intrinsic problem with the very
idea of DDH. The problem is this: DH scenarios focus invariably on the lone politician
trapped in a moral dilemma making difficult, wise, and heroic choices for the public good.
This emphasis on the intentions of solitary agents is deeply problematic for two reasons.
Firstly, it pays insufficient heed to the fact that democracies operate within a constitution
and rule of law and not at the whim or discretion of a solitary leader. Secondly, the lone
actor offers an illusion that a wise and good politician is able to make sound judgments
about when to violate moral principles (including the very principles of democracy) to
bring about a lesser evil. With the latter point, Sutherland argues that lone actors are un-
likely to bring about the desired lowest-cost sacrifices since individual judgment is often
unreliable, especially in situations where there is a need to make quick decisions often un-
der conditions of considerable uncertainty. A better way of achieving good choices is to
ensure that politicians adhere to normative constraints created by democratic retrospec-
tive-deliberative processes, those that set out the appropriate kinds of responses to chal-
lenges politicians may face in the future. As Sutherland (2000, 223) puts it, political
institutions matter and political responsibility must always be situated in public structures
and processes of the political framework. When this happens, public judgment properly
substitutes for the problematic self-judgment of the lone actor.
However, this claim that DH focuses on lone actors arises from the error of taking
specific examples used by influential DH theorists and generalizing them to all cases. The
focus on Walzers lone politician making deals with a corrupt ward boss or deciding to
order torture in a ticking bomb scenario seem to be taken as definitive and exhaustive of
what constitutes a DH situation (Walzer 1973, 164-168). However, it is an error to assume
that because such examples have been widely used, they properly define the limits or
boundaries of DH or exclude other possibilities besides lone actors. DH theorists use
the model of the lone actor to simplify the analysis of the agents intentions and also for
assessing the possible moral emotions that result from the moral pollution for having so
acted. What is more, in a democracy, as in any other political system, there is usually a
person or small committee who are charged to make the most difficult decisions in situa-
tions of emergency. So when examining DH scenarios it is natural to offer examples
where there is a lone actor agonising over which action ought to be taken. What is indeed
different for a democracy is that such decisions must then retrospectively be justified
to the public. Citizens ultimately pass judgement on these actions through the ballot
box and in extreme cases can punish politicians for acting as they did. But there is no
reason in principle to restrict DH scenarios to the actions of individuals or single agents.
DH scenarios occur when, in the face of moral conflicts, hard decisions are made in dem-
ocratic societies by small groups of people or larger committees or even legislative bodies.
Even entire electorates could theoretically make such decisions, such as voting to engage
in humanitarian intervention knowing that this will result in heavy casualties and suffering
for many innocent people.
What is more, the claim that public judgment is a better and more reliable way of
ensuring good choices may be correct when dealing with normal political activity. But
the very nature of DH scenarios makes this approach very difficult and often impossible.
Moral conflicts that leave two unpalatable options combined with a scarcity of relevant

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information and the need to take quick and decisive action, leave the retrospective-
deliberative process unfit for purpose.
Overall, the three reasons for rejecting the notion of DDH as a contradiction in terms
are based on a set of claims that commit the Strawman Fallacy. The way in which DH is
understood is either too simplistic or based on unwarranted assumptions about its essen-
tial characteristics. As I have tried to show, a more sophisticated understanding of the
necessary and sufficient conditions for DH in no way rules out the existence of such sce-
narios in democratic societies. Politicians, whether as individuals acting alone or as mem-
bers of a committee or legislative body, will face DH situations in properly functioning
liberal democratic societies. It is only by positing a Strawman version that the critics of
DDH can make their objections seem prima facie strong. However, if we accept that DDH
situations are possible and unavoidable, there are some interesting implications that arise
because of the fiduciary relationship between the citizens and their politicians. In the fol-
lowing section I briefly outline and remark on some of these issues.

5. DDH ACCOUNTABILITY AND MORAL POLLUTION

Recently there has been a growing body of work (see Thompson 1987 and 1993, Bellamy
2010 and Archard 2012) that explores the implications of DDH given the special funda-
mental values inherent in democratic governance and the unique relationship that this
constitutes between citizens and politicians. As political legitimacy and political power are
derived ultimately from citizens, this creates a fundamentally different normative context
from that which characterises the political world of a Machiavellian prince.21 This raises
two issues which need to be addressed. Firstly, how and to what extent are democratic
politicians accountable to those who elected them?22 Secondly, given that politicians act
with the authority and on the behalf of their citizens, does their moral dirt transfer onto
citizens?

5.1. Accountability
It seems clear that if politicians are ultimately chosen and authorized by citizens to act on
their behalf, this sets up a special relationship of accountability that is unique to democrat-
ic societies. To my knowledge, no one disputes this claim but what proves difficult in DH
21 This normative context takes us beyond Machiavellis key insights about the relationships obtaining

between legitimacy, morality and power. The accountability and moral pollution issues in DDH situations
raise normative issues that Machaivelli would not have considered pertinent to the exercise of political
power.
22 Mendus (2009) concludes her essay entitled Democratic Dirty Hands stating that the conflicting

answers we get regarding how we are to think about political leaders that do moral wrong is due to an
equivocation over what we mean by democracy. More specifically, this concerns what we mean by
accountability of our democratically elected politicians. Mendus argues that the confusion arises because
accountability for actions might pull in both directions at oncethat is to say, how it might prompt both
the thought that wrongdoing is unjustifiable in political leaders and the thought that it is justifiable. To
resolve this problem we need to clear up the confusion over the concept of democracy. But unfortunately,
Mendus does not offer more than this and leaves the reader pondering what kind of confusion about
accountability might make us reject the idea of DDH.

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situations is establishing when and how this accountability is exercised. Politicians often
dirty their hands in situations where there is either a need for secrecy and/or there is no
prior opportunity to consult with the electorate for permission to so act. What is more, as
Bellamy, Hollis and others have argued, to be effective and succeed in politics, and this is
what the electorate empower politicians to do, it may be necessary to get dirty hands but
also deny having done so.
There are two separate issues here and I briefly comment on each in turn. Firstly, when
ought politicians to be accountable to citizens for dirtying their hands? If it is possible to
consult before acting, then this is clearly the preferred option. But this raises two further
issues itself. Firstly, if politicians act with the knowledge and express authority of citizens
to violate moral principles, this cannot then be DDH in the sense that they have under-
mined cherished democratic values. It may then be a case of DH in that the act violated
the generic demands of morality (those, for example, which are adhered to in private life)
but the very feature that generates the problem of DDH has been eliminated.23 At any
rate, in politics it is never quite this simple. Here again Machiavellian insights are instruc-
tive. Politicians sometimes cannot practice the virtues of honesty and integrity without be-
traying the interests of citizens. Politicians, and democrats are no exception, are required
to act in a world full of snares and wolves and to succeed it is necessary to use cunning
and guile (Machiavelli 1995, 53). Consequently, very often, to achieve the desired result,
a justified dirty political act needs to be done with the pretense that it is virtuous and
above suspicion, and that no moral violation took place. The politician needs to get dirty
hands but wear clean gloves.24 So to be clear, even if there were sufficient time to consult
citizens on a particular DH action, it might be counter-productive to do so. As Hollis
eloquently puts it, politics
is an arena where the best is the enemy of the good, where we license our agents to pursue
the good and where they can succeed, only if they operate partly beyond our ken and our
control. (Hollis 1982, 398)
What of accountability at the time of acting or in the future? Even if we put aside the
clean gloves issue, both time periods for enabling adequate accountability pose severe

23 There is also the issue that if moral acceptability or otherwise in a democracy arises solely through the
normative discourse within the democracy, then it might be argued that the politician has done no wrong
at all qua politician. Newey goes still further by arguing that, in certain circumstances, political lies in a
democracy are not only justified but obligatory. Politicians in a democratic society have an obligation to lie
to citizens who have a legitimate expectation that they be lied to (Newey 1997, 112).
24 This point is made by Hollis 1982 and Bellamy 2010. Bellamy raises this issue when discussing the

inability of many liberal theorists of justice to recognise the true nature of politics. As he succinctly points
out, with the phenomenon of dirty hands we have the two aspects of real politics that liberal idealists
tend to ignorethe uses of violence, on the one hand, and the need for dissimulation, on the other. Yet,
throughout his analysis Machiavelli (and following him, Weber) offers two politically motivated reasons for
restraint. The first is a loose notion of proportionalityprinces should be bad to the extent necessary to
deal with wolves and traps and no further. The second is the importance of appearing all the while to be
good. In each case the need for such limits is the same: politics may employ force and guile but neither can
substitute for some degree of willing consent on the part of the ruleda requirement that is all the more
important in a democracy. Thus, a democratic Prince may have dirty hands, but must wear clean gloves. (Bellamy
2010, 424-425, my emphasis).

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problems. The turmoil of day-to-day politics and the need more often than not for
quick decisive action (especially in the face of imminent danger) makes seeking public
approval for such acts impossible. Consequently, the only realistic possibility is to be
accountable for actions post hoc. This can be done in a number of ways, for example, by
the politician facing a select committee to justify past actions, facing a criminal trial, or
by revealing what was done and then standing for re-election.25 However, whether politi-
cians must be retrospectively praised or criticized for dirtying their hands is very difficult
to assess even if the principles of how to do this are clear. The reason is that the judg-
ments made about a politicians actions must ultimately be based on many factors that
make up the overall context within which the action took place. Those evaluating the
claim of DH need to understand the nature of the threat faced, the severity of the viola-
tion committed, the extent to which democracy has been undermined, the intention
of the politician at the time action was taken, as well as the actual effects of the actions
taken. Into this mix it is important to add the character of the politician and his specific
duties given his/her institutional role. These evaluations will need to take place within
specific institutional structures, which will then pass judgment on the moral (and legal)
status of the action and decide how the society ought to respond to it. Getting this
process right will depend on our ability to gather all the relevant details needed to make
a proper judgment. There are no easy and simple rules for doing this and at times those
guilty of immoral actions will be let off while those who get genuine DH will face unfair
punishment. This unavoidable state of affairs is partly what gives the problem of DH a
tragic dimension.26

5.2. Moral pollution

The standard account of DH captures a particular paradoxical aspect of our moral reality
that the standard moral theories refuse to acknowledge as a genuine problem. They argue
that claiming it is possible to do wrong in order to do right is a serious confusion in our
moral thinking. When agents are faced with what appear to be incompossible oughts,
either the action taken was the right thing to do all things considered, or it was unequivo-
cally wrong and should not have been done. There is no middle ground where it is pos-
sible to commit a justified, even obligatory wrong in order to bring about a lesser evil.
However, DH theorists argue that what is unique about DH scenarios is that not only
is it possible to do wrong to do right, but that there is a moral cost to having so acted and
this ought to be properly acknowledged by the agent. Those who dirty their hands ought

25 There have been some attempts to set out what could be done to ensure that politicians are retrospec-
tively held to account for their actions. See de Wijze 2003, 40-41. Also see Thompsons notion of mediated
corruption (Thompson 1993, 377). This is a notion that differs from conventional corruption in that the
gain the politician seeks is political and not personal. While the method of achieving this benefit is improper
(involves an immoral action), the benefits citizens receive are not. And finally the motive for obtaining this
benefit is not corrupt but based on seeking the public good. If a politician can reasonably demonstrate that
he/she is guilty of mediated corruption rather than the conventional kind, this would allow for a retrospec-
tive endorsement of his/her actions by the public.
26 This leads to another vexed issue. If politicians are found to have genuinely and properly dirtied their

hands, ought they to be punished for so doing and what should such a punishment be in these unusual
circumstances? For a discussion of whether we ought to punish those with DH see de Wijze 2013.

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to feel the moral stain for having violated (albeit for the right reasons) a profoundly im-
portant moral principle.
With DDH the same moral pollution arises but there is an added twist because of the
special and unique relationship between politicians and the public. Recall that in a democ-
racy political power and legitimacy are derived from the explicit and continual consent of
the citizens who elect their representatives. We (the public) empower politicians to act, so
when politicians commit moral violations they do so in our name. If they get DH, then
so do we.27 Archard puts it this way:
... if we have authorized our politicians to act in our name then their actions are also and in the
last analysis our own. We do not thereby escape getting our hands dirty, even if they are not as
dirty. The inauthentic donning of clean gloves should not disguise our complicity. (Archard
2013, 785)
What then is the level of complicity that the public have in DH decisions made by their
politicians? The simple view (offered by Hollis) is that the publics hands are as dirty as
the politicians who acted in their name. However, there are a number of reasons to think
that this is not a defensible position. Archard, in my view correctly, points to a number of
factors that enable the public to escape full but not all complicity in what is done (Ar-
chard 2013, 784). He argues that there is a moral division of political labour such that pol-
iticians dirty their hands to a greater extent than the public even though the type of dirt
is the same. Put another way, the responsibility for DH differs quantitatively by not quali-
tatively. The reason for the quantitative difference is that politicians are autonomous and
closer to the immoral act (they choose to so act and can make errors of judgment) such
that they have a greater amount of dirt on their hands albeit the same kind of dirt that
devolves to the general public.
I am inclined to agree with Archards position concerning the extent and reasons for
the complicity of the public when politicians get DDH. It does open up a set of new
questions that need to be addressed but which cannot be adequately dealt with here. Does
public complicity require some form of public restitution and if so what? Are all citizens
equally dirty even those who explicitly reject authorising DH scenarios? Again, echoing
Archard, are there any specific dangers to democratic governance if politicians are given
the discretion to violate democratic principles when they judge fit? And if there are too
many cases of DDH will these affect the integrity of democratic politicians who then may
become fatally compromised? (Archard 2013, 788).

27 It is important to point out that if politicians commit crimes, citizens are then under a clear and
unambiguous moral obligation to remove them and see them punished. With DH scenarios the issue
is complicated since the immoral act was done to bring about the lesser evil and for our benefit. While we
abhor the moral violation we praise the politician for acting in the public good and bringing about the lesser
evil. The table below sets out five dimensions that illustrate the differences (and similarities) between
immoral and DH actions.
Contrasting immoral actions with DH cases Five dimensions
Moral Justified? Public Remove politician Punish
pollution complicity from power politician
Straightforward immoral action Yes No No Yes Yes
DH action Yes Yes Yes No (?) Yes (?)

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CONCLUSION
I have argued that DDH are not only possible but also an unavoidable part of our moral
reality. Politicians in a democracy face serious moral dilemmas that cannot always be
resolved without the violation of a fundamental moral principle. The Machiavellian insight
that successful and effective politicians need to learn how not to be good applies to
democratic as much as any other form of political governance. Attempts by critics to
argue that DDH scenarios are incoherent are unpersuasive and based on an erroneous
understanding of both the conditions for getting DH and a controversial and overly sub-
stantive account of democracy. What does change with DDH is that politicians are
accountable to the democratic public for their decisions and that the moral pollution that
results from so acting applies both to the politicians and the public. However, teasing out
the implications of these changes is difficult and complicated and I leave a detailed analy-
sis of these issues for another article.

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