Whose Economy? Seminar Papers (Complete Series)

Oxfam Discussion Papers
Whose Economy? An
introduction
A Whose Economy Seminar Paper
Professor Mike Danson and Dr Katherine Trebeck

September 2011
www.oxfam.org.uk
About the authors
Katherine Trebeck is a Research and Policy Advisor with Oxfams UK Poverty
Programme in Scotland.
Email: ktrebeck@oxfam.org.uk
Mike Danson is Associate Dean of Research & Commercialisation

Reader in Economics and Management at the Business School of the University
of the West of Scotland
Email: michael.danson@uws.ac.uk
Whose Economy Seminar Papers are a follow up to the series of seminars held in
Scotland between November 2010 and March 2011. They are written to contribute to public
debate and to invite feedback on development and policy issues. These papers are work in
progress documents, and do not necessarily constitute final publications or reflect Oxfam
policy positions. The views and recommendations expressed are those of the authors and
not necessarily those of Oxfam. For more information, or to comment on this paper, email
ktrebeck@oxfam.org.uk
2 Whose Economy? An introduction

A Whose Economy Seminar Paper, June 2011
Whose Economy? Background and aims
Over the autumn and winter of 2010-2011, the University of the West of Scotland
and Oxfam organised the Whose Economy seminar series, with an agenda set by
the Oxfam discussion paper: Whose Economy? Winners and Losers in the Scottish
Economy by Katherine Trebeck.1 The publication of this paper set out the context
of poverty and inequality in Scotland today, and looked at the historical factors
and structural changes that have contributed to the current situation. The
seminar series brought together researchers, representative organisations, policy-
makers and people with experience of poverty. It aimed to examine key
developments that have influenced the livelihoods of communities in Scotland
and, from the perspective of vulnerable communities, to explore the implications
of structural changes in the Scottish economy. The series explored the questions:
what kind of economy is being created in Scotland and, specifically, to whose
benefit? It also looked forward to creating a new model for Scotland: one which
shares the benefits of growth fairly; creates high quality, sustainable jobs for
those who can work while protecting those who cant; and prioritises social goals
such as cohesion, strong communities, and empowerment.
Speakers at the four seminars which were held in Glasgow, Edinburgh, Stirling
and Inverness were invited to discuss the relevant actors and how the
interaction of the pursuit of economic growth and other policy trends (such as
welfare reform) has impacted on communities across Scotland. At each event,
there was highly informed participation from the floor, as well exploring the
specific themes in some depth, so that the arguments and ways forward could be
refined for the series of seminar papers and other dissemination.
As discussed at the opening seminars in Edinburgh and in Stirling, the papers by

McKendrick, Walsh, and Collins and McCartney explore the essential
dimensions of socio-economic divisions in Scotland, offering a forensic analysis
of the depths of inequality and the causes of poverty and deprivation.
Many Scots face a life characterised by high mortality, economic inactivity,

mental and physical ill-health, poor educational attainment, and increasing
exclusion, as addressed in the papers by Collins and McCartney, Walsh, and
Welford, and presented at the seminars in Glasgow and Stirling in particular.
Poverty is concentrated in geographical areas such as Glasgow and the West of
Scotland; and women, people from minority ethnic communities, and new
migrants are more likely to be poor than other groups. Poverty is often associated
with worklessness often due to unemployment, disability, illness or caring
responsibilities. Work, however, is not necessarily a route out of poverty, as
many jobs do not pay enough to live on, as discussed in Glasgow (see papers by
Warhurst and Sinfield).
The roots of poverty in Scotland are both historical and structural. In recent
decades, the economy has shifted from one based on manufacturing to a service-
led, supposedly knowledge economy (Scottish Executive, 2001), with retail and
1
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/right_heard/downloads/dp-whose-economy-winners-losers-scottish-
economy-070111-en.pdf)
Whose Economy? An introduction 3
call centres expanding as manufacturing declines (see the papers by Boyd and
Warhurst in particular). Glasgow, for example, was once the second city of the
British Empire.2 Now it is Britains second biggest shopping destination (see
papers by Carlisle and Hanlon, Hamilton, and Welford). In this new economic
landscape, people face increased risk in taking and attempting to keep a job; a
job which may offer them little security and require a high degree of flexibility on
their part. Despite this, work is seen by government and policy-makers as the
route out of poverty with the responsibility for becoming employable firmly
resting on the individual, who must acquire the skills and behaviours that will
make them attractive to employers (see papers by Sinfield and Warhurst).
Oxfams analysis of poverty around the world and in the UK uses the
Sustainable Livelihoods Approach. Individuals, families, communities and
societies are considered to require five types of assets financial (income and
capital), human (skills, talent, health), social (relationships and support
networks), natural (environment), and physical (infrastructure, services,
equipment, and transport) to prevent poverty and vulnerability over the long
term. In vulnerable communities the most important (and sometimes the only)
asset available to families and individuals is their family relationships and social
networks (Orr et al, 2006). These social assets enable poor families and
individuals to share resources, helping them to even out fluctuating fortunes and
to cope in difficult circumstances. Naturally, one of the topics visited at each of
the seminars, and as reported in several of the seminar papers, identified this as
the real Big Society in Scotland, where local residents and neighbours attempted
to ameliorate the worst effects of poverty on their families and communities. Yet
recent economic development in Scotland and the UK positions individuals as
cheap, flexible labour, akin to just-in-time inventory, available when business
needs them and expendable when it does not (see the paper by Boyd). This,
paradoxically, both relies on the crucial support systems in poor communities
and simultaneously threatens to destroy them.
But in response to economic restructuring and persistent poverty, anti-poverty

policy in Scotland (and the UK) has tended to prioritise only narrow economic
growth policies, emphasising employment and physical regeneration, but not
social goals such as community cohesion, strong relationships between people, a
sense of empowerment, and sustainability (see papers by Paton and Hastings).
Strong communities seem to be valued because they can contribute to economic
growth, rather than the other way round. The lessons from the vulnerable rural
communities in the Highlands and Islands are especially significant, as examined
in the paper by Braunholtz-Speight and in presentations by Watt, Gubbins,
Danson, and Trebeck. Such economic growth and regeneration strategies have
not reduced poverty and inequality in Scotland, and anti-poverty policies have,
in some cases, made things worse rather than better.
Oxfam believes that it is possible to overcome poverty, both in Scotland and the
UK. As the sixth richest country in the world, we certainly have adequate
2 This refers to Glasgows standing in the Victorian era, when it was one of the worlds pre-eminent centres
of engineering, shipbuilding and international trade.
resources to do so. Its about allocating those resources in a more effective and
sustainable way. It is a sad indictment of one of the richest countries in the world
that such a seminar series is still necessary in the twenty-first century. The papers
in this series offer expert analyses, prescriptions and suggestions for strategic
change. Actions are prescribed for all levels of government and society. The
statistics and proposals are consistent with the work of Oxfam on the
Humankind Index (www.oxfam.org.uk/humankindindex) and other agencies
for change in Scotland, including the public, social and private sectors. But there
is a key and essential role for all members of Scottish society in debating,
addressing and meeting the challenges of poverty and deprivation. The
discussions and debates on what sort of Scotland we want to build will come
ever more to the fore in the run-up to a Scottish independence referendum. The
issues raised and confronted here must be at the heart of those conversations,
and this series of papers offers valuable contributions to that debate.

References
Disanto, S. (2007) Different in Scotland? Public Attitudes to Poverty, Poverty Alliance (ed.) Poverty Alliance
Briefing, Glasgow, www.poverty.alliance.org.uk (downloaded April 9, 2009)
Orr, S., Brown, G., Smith, S., et al. (2006). When Ends Dont Meet: Assets, Vulnerabilities and Livelihoods An
Analysis of Householder in Thornaby-on-Tees, Church Action on Poverty, Thrive and Oxfam (eds.),
Manchester
Scottish Executive (2001). Scottish Executive report on the Knowledge Economy Cross-Cutting Initiative,
Scottish Executive, Edinburgh, www.scotland.gov.uk/government/ketf_ccr.pdf (downloaded 9 August
2010)

Oxfam GB September 2011
The text may be used free of charge for the purposes of advocacy, campaigning, education, and
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such use be registered with them for impact assessment purposes. For copying in any other
circumstances, or for re-use in other publications, or for translation or adaptation, permission
must be secured and a fee may be charged. Email publish@oxfam.org.uk
The information in this publication is correct at the time of going to press.
Oxfam is a registered charity in England and Wales (no 202918) and Scotland (SC039042).
Oxfam GB is a member of Oxfam International.
www.oxfam.org.uk

Whose welfare state now?

Adrian Sinfield
June 2011
www.oxfam.org.uk
About the author
Adrian Sinfield is Professor Emeritus of Social Policy at the University of
Edinburgh and a continuing student of social security, poverty, unemployment
and the social division of welfare. Past Chair and President of the Social Policy
Association, and recipient of its first lifetime achievement award. Co-founder of
the Unemployment Unit and Chair for its first ten years; and Vice-chair of the
Child Poverty Action Group for eight years. Publications include Which Way for
Social Work? (1969) and What Unemployment Means (1981).
Email: adrian.sinfield@ed.ac.uk
policy positions. The views and recommendations expressed are those of the author and not
necessarily those of Oxfam. For more information, or to comment on this paper, email
2 Whose welfare state now? A Whose Economy Seminar Paper, June 2011
Contents
Executive summary ................................................................................. 4
Introduction: The damaging myths of tax and benefits ....................... 5
In the UK unemployment and poverty are still linked ........................... 6
Too many paid more than they earn are part of the problem ............... 6
The wider costs of greater inequality ..................................................... 7
Conclusion - 'a society for people' ......................................................... 8
Recommendations ................................................................................... 9
References .............................................................................................. 10
Notes ....................................................................................................... 11
Whose welfare state now? A Whose Economy Seminar Paper, June 2011 3
Executive summary
Whose welfare state? is as important a question today as it was half a century
ago. Too many people believe that those on lower incomes only take and do not
contribute to society. The evidence shows that those in poverty are forced to
contribute a bigger share of their lower incomes in taxes, but receive inadequate
benefits that make life challenging and stressful for them and their families. Far
from helping people into work, these benefits trap people in poverty. The level of
demand not the behaviour of those out of work is the main factor affecting
both overall and long-term unemployment. Yet the widespread acceptance of tax
and benefit myths makes it even more difficult to obtain support for policies that
will reduce levels of poverty and inequality poverty and inequality which is
much higher in the UK than in most other market economies.
A fair welfare state needs a lower level of unemployment and better jobs, as well
as better benefits. Many countries socialise the responsibility of preventing
citizens from being poor much more successfully than the UK has done.1 We
need to learn from them and give greater priority to reducing inequalities.
This paper argues that, to be successful, the welfare state has to collect fairly from
all and redistribute fairly at the right time to meet the right needs. We must
vigorously challenge the myths of taxation and benefits. We need to work to
establish a society for people where the welfare state prevents poverty and
reduces inequality.
Introduction: the damaging myths of
tax and benefit
Whose welfare state? asked Brian Abel-Smith, a social economist, over 50 years
ago. The middle classes feel that too much is being given to too many at too high
a standard, and they are being forced to foot the whole bill.2 Today we the
people are told that we are not like them the poor: we are the givers; they are
the takers (see Mooney, this collection). We are hard-pressed, hardworking
taxpayers. They, said then Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair, are languishing
on benefits or resting on benefits, as Michael Forsyth, then Conservative
Minister for Employment, put it a lifestyle choice in the words of George
Osborne, the Coalition Chancellor of the Exchequer.
But these two distinct and distancing worlds of givers and takers do not exist.
Virtually all of us pay taxes: virtually all of us receive benefits over our lifetimes,
from child benefits to pensions. But there are many myths obscuring this reality.
In taxation, 33 per cent of personal income is collected in various taxes. Overall
the richest fifth of households pay no larger a share than most of us, but the
poorest fifth do 36 per cent.3 The main reasons for this are council tax even
with council tax benefit and, especially, indirect taxes (such as VAT). Their
impact is so regressive because the lower your income, the more of it you have to
spend to get by. By contrast, the better-off can take advantage of a plethora of tax
reliefs to save more and reduce their contribution to the revenue, and so to the
common good. A fair welfare state would reverse this upside-down outcome
where those in poverty pay a greater share of their income than the rich towards
funding the welfare state.
Why do we have less poverty than the United States, but much more than
Norway, Sweden and Denmark?4 The reasons lie very much more in the
distribution systems of the respective countries than in the personal behaviour of
people in poverty. Why some affluent Western democracies maintain substantial
poverty and others are more egalitarian and accomplish low levels of poverty is
mainly due to the generosity of the welfare state.5 Out of 24 European countries,
only one (Estonia) has more poverty among the unemployed than we do. Only
seven countries have higher rates of poverty among those in work; and when
poverty among all those aged 18-64 years is considered, only six EU countries are
worse: yet the UK is one of the richest nations.6
In the UK unemployment and poverty
are still linked
In the UK, unemployment and poverty are as linked as they were in the 1930s:
loss of employment is the single most significant cause of entry to poverty.7
Denmark had as much unemployment as us in the 1980s, but nothing like as
much poverty, because the society was organised differently with a more
civilised and decent system of benefits.
Lack of demand, not the behaviour of those left long out of work, is the most
important cause of long-term unemployment.8 Flying in the face of such
evidence, government ministers of all political persuasions tell us we need to
increase incentives to activate people who are out of work, not give them
passive benefits. But research shows inadequate benefits are harmful, not
passive, and make life harsher and more difficult for those out of work and their
families. They reinforce poor wages in work, and European Commission studies
show we have significantly poorer quality of work, and more poor quality jobs,
than many other European countries.9
Beveridges view of full employment was clear: decent jobs, fair wages, of such a
kind and so located that the unemployed can reasonably be expected to take
them.10 A very conventional liberal , did not think that any job was the
answer. A fairer welfare state can only work to produce a lower level of
unemployment with better jobs (see Boyd and Warhurst, this collection).
It is clear that unemployment heightens the risk of people falling into poverty,
and poverty in turn makes it more difficult for people to return to work.11 Out of
work without enough undermines individual and family resilience. So
inadequate benefits currently 67.50 a week for those over 24 trap people in
poverty and do not help to reduce unemployment.
Too many paid more than they earn

are part of the problem
If more people knew how far unemployment benefits have been run down, there
would be less talk of resting on benefits. In 1970, unemployment benefit was
about 20 per cent of the average wage: it is now less than 11 per cent, one of the
poorest rates in Europe. Over the same period the total remuneration of the chief
executives of FTSE 100 companies has risen by well over an extraordinary 1,000
per cent.12 Such salaries, now in the realm of some 3.5 million a year, compared
to that 67.50 a week for those out of work, sharpen growing inequalities with
alarming consequences for social cohesion. One investment banker told
colleagues arranging team bonuses in the mid-1990s: If the rest of the country
knew what we were being paid, there would be tumbrels on the streets and
heads carried around on pikes.13 That banker is Lord Freud, adviser to the last
Labour government on welfare reform and now the Coalition Governments
Minister for Welfare Reform, who has declared legal definitions of homelessness
too generous and needing to be made more realistic.
Outrage over such rewards flared and then flagged again after the credit crunch.
Inequalities in earnings and incomes are high in Britain, both compared with
other industrialised countries, and compared with 30 years ago. Over the most
recent decades earnings inequality has narrowed a little and income inequality
has stabilised on some measures, but the large inequality growth of the 1980s has
not been reversed.14
If we want a fairer society, we must tackle many being paid more than they earn
and many others earning more than they are paid. And those who are paid
more get more than pay. Hay Management has recommended a typical reward
package for middle management, where benefits far beyond the fringe multiply
basic salary by two-and-a-half times. Generous tax reliefs on such benefits further
erode any semblance of a fair contribution to taxes.
The art of taxation consists in so plucking the goose as to obtain the largest
amount of feathers with the least amount of hissing, as Jean-Baptiste Colbert, the
Chancellor to Louis XIV put it over three centuries ago. Yet, in Racing Away, the
Institute of Fiscal Studies showed how very well the most highly paid have been
doing.15 The richest tenth of the top one per cent has a pre-tax income which is 31
times the average. But the value of tax reliefs for people in this group are 86 times
the average, and this enables them to keep further ahead.16 Instead of taxation
operating to reduce inequality, as expected, it actually reinforces and widens
inequalities in many hidden ways. A fixed maximum limit to the value of tax
reliefs for every taxpayer would be much easier and fairer.
In 1958 Brian Abel-Smith wrote: the middle classes get the lions share of the
public social services, the elephants share of occupational welfare privileges and
in addition can claim generous tax allowances to reduce their tax liability.17 His
question, whose welfare state?, is even more urgent today.
The wider costs of greater inequality

The UK is a wealthy, but unequal, country. We know less about inequality in
wealth than income, but it also matters: mortality closely relates to wealth: more
than twice as many men, and nearly four times as many women, from the least-
wealthy fifth of over-50s die within a six year period, as of those from the
wealthiest fifth.18 It isnt just a matter of politics, but also of life and death (see
McCartney and Collins, this collection). Half a century ago Peter Townsend
argued that, if that overdone phrase a classless society means anything, it is a
society where differences in reward are much narrower than in Britain today
[1958] and where people of different background and accomplishment can mix
easily and without guilt; and also a society where respect for people is valued
most of all. For that brings a real equality.19
Yet, economic advantage reinforces itself across the lifecycle, and onto the next
generation. It matters more in Britain who your parents are than in many other
countries. Intergenerational mobility appears lower in more unequal societies
moving up a ladder is harder if its rungs are further apart, and those who start
higher up fight harder to ensure that their children do not slip down.20
This is why we need to take a much closer account of growing evidence that
more equal societies almost always do better, the subtitle of The Spirit Level.21
They work better for everyone, not just those at the bottom. The greater the
inequality in a country, the higher the level of poverty: the institutional and
structural arrangements maintaining inequality are also perpetuating poverty. As
G.D.H. Cole argued in the 1950s, the welfare state is only a way of redistributing
some income without interfering with the causes of its maldistribution.22 More
inequality means more poverty and social exclusion because inequality has a
dynamic of its own. Before the First World War, Richard Tawney pointed out:
what thoughtful rich people call the problem of poverty, thinking poor people
call, with equal justice, the problem of riches.23 Upstream policies are needed to
tackle the inequality while downstream services can help those already affected.
But without more effort upstream, support measures continue to be swamped.
Changes need to be structural to tackle structural problems. We need to prevent
the preservation and reinforcement of a class-fractured society.
Not only are these inequalities far worse now, but theres a wide gap between
media and political presentations of people trapped at the bottom of society and
the reality of their experience. We need to be challenging these myths much more
vigorously (see Mooney and Welford, this collection).
Conclusion a society for people

Iain Duncan Smith described his new welfare reform, Universal Credit, as
Beveridge for today, with a hint of Tebbit.24 He went out of his way to praise the
Beveridge of Voluntary Action, 1948, over his more famous report on Social
Insurance and Allied Services in 1942. But did the Minister read Voluntary Action
carefully enough? Beveridge calls its last chapter, First things first, and begins:
The Beveridge Report of 1942 set out a practical programme for putting first
things first. There was to be bread and health for all at all times before cake and
circuses for anybody at any time, so far as this order of priority could be enforced
by redistribution of money.25
Such redistributive priorities have been rejected by the present administration in

favour of a smaller state and a lower welfare bill. If you are constantly told that
people have got too much, youre not going to ask whether theyre getting all
or even any of what theyre entitled to. Making a fairer society for all is not
something that can be left to the government.
Recommendations
We, the people, need to play an active part in rebalancing priorities right
across society to achieve the aims of Beveridge in 1948 and Abel-Smith and
Townsend in 1958 and to show that more equal societies almost always do
better.26
We need higher benefit levels; better coverage and higher take-up, and more
help for caring to avoid excluding the most vulnerable and promoting a
genuine sense of social inclusion.
We need to challenge welfare and tax myths and propaganda much more
vigorously, and ensure a better distribution of resources and respect across
the whole of society.
We need fairer taxation so that all can contribute to building up the common
wealth of our society (see Boyd, this collection).
We need more and better jobs with decent pay, not dead-end ones that trap
people into poverty (see Warhust, this collection).
We need to prevent the preservation and reinforcement of a class-fractured

society.
We need, above all, more work upstream on the demand side, with
sustainable strategies that enrich and strengthen a democratic society for the
future. Then we will create what Brian Abel-Smith and Peter Townsend
called for half a century ago a society for people where the welfare state
prevents poverty and reduces inequality.
References
Abel-Smith, B. (1958) Whose Welfare State? McKenzie, N. (ed.) Conviction.
McGibbon & Kee. London.
Barnard, A. (2010) The Effect of Taxes and Benefits on Household Income 2008-09, ONS
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/taxesbenefits
Beveridge, William H. (1944) Full Employment in a Free Society. Allen and Unwin.
London.
Beveridge, William H. (1948) Voluntary Action. Allen and Unwin. London.
Brady, D. (2009) Rich Democracies Poor Societies: How Politics Explain Poverty.
Oxford University Press. Oxford.
Brewer, M., Sibieta, L. & Wren-Lewis, L. (2008) Racing away? Income Inequality and
the Evolution of High Incomes. Institute for Fiscal Studies, Briefing Note no. 76.
London.
www.ifs.org.uk
Cole, G. D. H. (1955) Socialism and the Welfare State. New Statesman and Nation,
23 July: 88-9.
EC (2003) Employment in Europe 2003. European Commission, Brussels.
Eurostat (2010) In-Work Poverty in the EU. EC. Luxembourg
Freud, D. (2008) Freud in the City. Bene Factum. London.
Gallie, D., Paugam, S. and Jacobs, S. (2002) 'Unemployment, Poverty and Social
Isolation: Is there a Vicious Circle of Social Exclusion?'. European Societies, 5, 1: 1-
32.
Higginson, R. and Clough, D. (2010) The Ethics of Executive Remuneration: A Guide

for Christian Investors. Church Investors Group. London.
Manifest/MM&K (2011) Executive Director Total Remuneration Survey 2011.
National Equality Panel (2010). 'Executive Summary' to An Anatomy of Economic

Inequality in the UK. Government Equalities Office & CASE, LSE. London.
Smith, N. and Middleton, S. (2007) A Review of Poverty Dynamics

Research in the UK. Joseph Rowntree Foundation. York.
Tawney, R. H. (1913) 'Poverty as an industrial problem'. Reproduced in
Memoranda on the Problem of Poverty. William Morris Press. London.
Webster, David (2005) Long-Term Unemployment, the Invention of Hysteresis

and the Misdiagnosis of Structural Unemployment in the UK. Cambridge Journal
of Economics. 29, 6, November: 975-95.
Wilkinson, R. and Pickett, K. (2009) The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies
Almost Always Do Better. Allen Lane. London. Their website
www.equalitytrust.org.uk provides the latest evidence and also discusses
criticisms of their work and their responses to these.
Notes
1 Brady (2009): 8
2 Abel-Smith (1958): 55
3 Barnard (2010): Table 3
4 Brady (2009)
5 Brady (2009): 5 and 166
6 Eurostat (2010): Table 1
7 Smith and Middleton (2007): 13
8 Webster (2005)
9 EC (2003)
10 Beveridge (1944): 18
11 European Household Panel survey in Gallie et al. (2002)
12 Higginson and Clough (2010): 4; Manifest/ MM&K (2011)
13 Freud (2008): 307
14 NEP (2010): 1
15 Brewer et al. (2008)
16 own estimates based on Brewer et al. (2008): Table 1
17 Abel-Smith (1958): 63
18 NEP (2010): 5
19 Townsend (1958/2009): 158
20 NEP (2010): 6
21 Wilkinson and Pickett (2009)
22 Cole (1955)
23 Tawney (1913): 10
24 Daily Telegraph (6 Nov 2010): headline
25 Beveridge (1948): 319
26 Wilkinson and Pickett (2009)
Oxfam GB June 2011
www.oxfam.org.uk
The Scottish economy

Stephen Boyd
June 2011
www.oxfam.org.uk
About the author
Stephen Boyd is an Assistant Secretary at the Scottish Trades Union Congress
(STUC) with responsibility for economic and industrial policy, utilities, transport,
the environment, and arts and culture. He serves on a number of Scottish
Government working groups including the First Ministers Energy Advisory
Board. Stephen has worked with the STUC since 2003.
Email: G.C.Mooney@open.ac.uk
2 The Scottish economy

Contents
Introduction .............................................................................................. 4
1. The Scottish economy in 2011 ......................................................... 5
2. Opportunities ..................................................................................... 5
3. The current policy framework........................................................... 6
4. Pervasive myths ................................................................................ 6
5. Conclusion a renewed policy framework ..................................... 7
Notes ....................................................................................................... 10
The Scottish economy 3

Executive summary
Scotland has become a more unequal society over the past 30 years, as it has
struggled to adapt to changing economic circumstances. Poorly handled
industrial change has left too many Scottish communities scarred by persistent
economic inactivity. Economic development policies have failed to create the
quality employment base on which all thriving societies are built.
However, significant opportunities now present themselves as Scotland seeks to

lead the world in the transition to a low-carbon economy. The implosion of
deregulated financial capitalism in the crash of 2007-09, provides the intellectual
justification for a new, more interventionist approach, which seeks to connect
sustainable economic growth to the living standards of all.
Introduction
Scotland, a small, comparatively wealthy nation on Europes periphery, has left a
mark on the world economy out of all proportion to its size. The Scottish
Enlightenment provided much of the intellectual foundations on which modern
democracies and economies were built; the pioneering of public education
Scotland was the worlds first literate nation had a palpable economic as well
as social payoff. This included the engineering prowess exported to all parts of
the world and the capacity for innovation the spirit of invention that led to
so many iconic and transformative products and technologies being developed
within Scotlands shores. It is no exaggeration to describe the Scotland of the
early twentieth century as an industrial superpower.
A decline in the mid part of the last century can be explained by over-
specialisation in heavy industry and failure to diversify into lighter consumer-
based industries. High levels of outward migration were witnessed, as decent
work opportunities grew scarcer with the decline of heavy industry. From the
1960s onwards, regional policy, inward investment, North Sea oil and the growth
of financial services at least partially arrested the decline.
In common with most of the developed world, Scotland experienced ongoing

deindustrialisation through the latter part of the twentieth century and first
decade of the twenty-first. The impact of the shift to a service-led economy was,
however, more severe in Scotland (and the UK) than in most other nations, as
income and wealth inequality grew exponentially, social mobility declined, and
persistent long-term worklessness became an apparently intractable problem.
Scotland does, however, continue to enjoy a number of enduring advantages: a

relatively highly-skilled workforce; strong comparative advantage in a number of
key industrial sectors; and a natural and cultural heritage that makes it a
desirable nation in which to live and work and, for many, a wonderful place to
visit.1

1. The Scottish economy in 2011
Some 30 months after the peak of the banking crisis and some 15 months since
the great recession of 2008/09 technically ended, the Scottish economy remains
in a precarious state. Small declines in the headline rate of International Labour
Organization (ILO) unemployment in the latter part of 2010 and early 2011 have
obscured a number of worrying labour market trends: youth unemployment is
stubbornly high; long-term unemployment continues to rise on a number of
measures; women are being disproportionately affected; and the rise in
underemployment people in work, but unable to access the full-time
permanent positions they seek is the great hidden story of the great recession
and its aftermath.2
Since the Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition UK government assumed

office in May 2010, the recovery has weakened; GDP growth has stalled since
September 2010. Real wages are estimated to be lower in 2011 than 2005; the last
time real wages fell over a six-year period was the 1920s.3 Real household income
4
fell in 2010 for the first time since 1981. All forward-looking indicators of
consumer confidence for example, the number of people expecting the general
economic situation to deteriorate over the next 12 months5 were collapsing
before the coalitions spending cuts programme started in earnest from April 2011.
There is little sign of the private sector investment boom the coalition is relying
on to drive growth as austerity bites.6
2. Opportunities
The challenges are profound, but there is little doubt that the Scottish economy
has significant opportunities, even as it continues to struggle out of recession. As
mentioned above, Scotland retains strong comparative advantage in a number of
areas: financial services, energy, life sciences, tourism, food and drink, health
services and education services. Although manufacturing employment has
declined precipitously over the past 30 years, a number of sub-sectors such as
aerospace, defence, and marine and advanced engineering continue to perform
well in competitive global markets. Scotlands natural environment, research
base and the strong political commitment expressed in the Climate Change
Scotland Act (2009) have combined to create massive opportunity in a range of
low-carbon industries. The industrial and employment benefits of developing
onshore and offshore renewable energy technologies is generally well
understood; less so are opportunities in areas such as improvement of the built
environment, and data storage and processing.

3. The current policy framework
On assuming office in 2007, the SNP minority Scottish Government published an
economic strategy that included, for the first time, a range of targets. These
included specific targets on GDP growth (to match the GDP growth rate of the
small independent EU countries by 2017, to raise Scotlands GDP growth rate to
the UK level) and productivity (to rank in the top quartile for productivity
amongst our key trading partners in the OECD by 2017); but also targets on
solidarity (to increase overall income and the proportion of income earned by
the three lowest income deciles as a group by 2017), cohesion (to narrow the gap
in participation between Scotlands best and worst performing regions by 2017)
and sustainability (to reduce emissions by 2011 and by 80% by 2050). The
solidarity, cohesion and sustainability targets became known as the golden
rules.
Given the Scottish Governments limited economic powers, setting growth

targets was regarded as a bold move at the time, although the financial crisis and
recession subsequently reduced the political and media focus on Scotlands
performance relative to other nations. In any case, the greater challenge always
lay in reconciling the growth targets with the golden rules.
Since the 1970s, in common with the UK, the proceeds of economic growth in
Scotland have been increasingly narrowly shared; too few quality jobs have been
created; policy development and implementation is increasingly the province of
business (usually financial) and government elites, with other economic
stakeholders relegated to marginal status; and 30 years of weak and irrelevant
supply side interventions, such as deregulation of product and labour markets,
have consigned communities to worklessness, undermined productive industry
and weakened final demand. Far-reaching reform is necessary if Scottish
Government targets on growth, productivity, solidarity and cohesion are to be
achieved. As things stand, both the policy framework and the theory that
underpins it are not up to the challenge.
4. Pervasive myths
Since devolution, debate over Scotlands economic future has been narrow
dominated by a few shrill voices, and a no-go area for most of Scotlands citizens
and their civic representatives. Recurring themes routinely expressed through
the interventions of employer organisations, the Scottish think-tank community,
media commentators and too many politicians are that the public sector is too
big and necessarily crowds out more productive private sector activity and jobs;
that Scotland is over-regulated and over-taxed and is therefore not a good place
to do business; and that proactive industrial policy will necessarily do more harm
than good.

The blind acceptance of these orthodoxies across a wide political spectrum limits
and skews debate and leads to irrelevant, and often damaging, policy (a prime
example is the Scottish Governments Small Business Bonus Scheme an
expensive scheme of very dubious economic value). This is all the more
7
disappointing given that evidence points in the other direction: the UK economy
is assessed by the OECD as having the third least regulated labour market in the
developed world and the second least regulated product market. The World
Bank ranks the UK economy as the fourth best country in the world in which to
do business and assesses the total tax rate for business at 37.3 per cent; well
below the average of 43 per cent.8 The Scandinavian countries, the most
enduringly successful in the world and highly competitive according to often-
cited measures,9 all have public sectors at least as large as Scotlands.
The downside of having a relatively deregulated economy is (deliberately?)

overlooked: growing inequality, a preponderance of bad jobs, and the tendency
to instability which was so vividly illustrated by the recent banking crisis.
5. Conclusion a renewed policy

framework
It would be helpful if a level of agreement could be achieved on whether the
2007/09 global financial crisis actually, as this writer firmly believes, represented
the end of a failed economic and social model. Compared with the period of
managed capitalism that preceded it, three decades of deregulation (particularly
of finance), flexible labour markets (making the workplace a less fair and
democratic place, inequality (weakening final demand), and lowering business
taxation (shifting the responsibility of funding vital public services increasingly
onto workers) achieved moderate GDP and productivity growth, an exponential
rise in inequality of income and wealth, and a decline in social mobility.
The global financial crisis of 2008 blew away many of the orthodoxies
(particularly around deregulation and the role of the state) which have
underpinned economic policy since the early 1980s. The crisis provided an
opportunity to create a new economic architecture to reconnect a strong, flexible
economy to the living standards of all, not just to the rich. Unfortunately, not
only was the opportunity not grasped, but those interests that promoted
deregulated financial capitalism have quickly reasserted almost unchallenged
primacy over economic policy development; witness the coalition governments
Plan for Growth which is almost exclusively based on business tax cuts and
deregulation.10
In terms of the fundamental reform necessary to create a fairer, more sustainable,

economic and social model, little can be achieved at Scottish level as long as the
devolution of powers remains so limited. Policy must change fundamentally in
three areas where the majority of powers are reserved to Westminster:

There must be substantial structural and regulatory reform of the UK
financial sector to avoid another crisis and to create a system that supports,
rather than undermines, the wider economy. It is widely recognised that the
UK financial system is uniquely bad at performing this basic function.
As is widely recognised across the political spectrum, a longer-term
rebalancing towards manufacturing is required. This will be dependent on
effective financial and corporate governance reform at UK level, and the
creation of a new, modern industrial strategy for Scotland which seeks to
utilise every devolved lever to help support manufacturing in
environmentally-sustainable industries. Policy-makers must realise that,
through the provision of middle-income, middle-status jobs, and the
sustenance of local supply chains, manufacturing is a force for social cohesion
in a way that services are not.
The rebuilding and careful nurturing of the economys equalising institutions
which mitigate the tendency of Anglo-Saxon style capitalism to create
extremes of wealth. These must include stronger trade unions, progressive
taxation, living wages, and a new, more balanced, approach to business
11
regulation. Current research is attributing the rise in income inequality in
the US and UK (outliers compared to most of the developed world) to
changes in norms and institutions and not, as is commonly assumed, to skill-
biased technological change, immigration and trade.
At the Scottish level, questions have to be asked as to whether an economic

development strategy that focuses so tightly on growing key sectors can achieve
the social goals encapsulated in the golden rules. This is especially true when
funding for local regeneration projects has diminished and when clarity is often
lacking over which arm of government has responsibility for such projects.
The financial crisis and subsequent recession represented a failure of politics on a

grand scale. Political parties will continue to argue over who is to blame, but it is
clear to Scotlands trade unions that all Scotlands major political parties were
complicit in propping up the failed economic model. All bought into the myth
that wanton deregulation and low business taxes are a prerequisite for economic
success. All failed to recognise that the weakening of the economys equalising
institutions would have a profoundly detrimental impact on equality, social
mobility and cohesion. Most importantly, all failed to recognise that their often
laudable social objectives could not be reconciled with a growth model that inevitably
concentrated wealth in the hands of a tiny portion of society.
If economic powers in Scotland continue to be so limited, and if economic

development policy continues to be developed primarily to satisfy business
interests, then inevitably Scotland will be a less fair and democratic place; it will
also be more unstable and prone to further systemic crises.
The prosperity of Scotlands citizens has to be prioritised over the demands of

mobile capital. Borrowing powers, if forthcoming, must be used to fund the
energy, transport and digital infrastructure necessary both to drive sustainable
growth and to ensure its benefits are broadly shared. The creation of rewarding,
decently-remunerated employment should be an explicit policy goal. Modern

industrial policy should be boldly implemented to maximise Scotlands
advantages and generate the benefits that would otherwise be lost to the
markets short-termism. The Scottish economy can support a vibrant and
prosperous society, but a new approach one that is radical in ambition and
challenging to prevailing economic orthodoxy is required.

Notes
1 This potted history of the Scottish economy is, I believe, uncontroversial. The Political Economy of
Scotland: Past and Present, Alexander, Armstrong, Ashcroft, Coyle and McLaren in New Wealth for Old
Nations: Scotlands Economic Prospects (Princeton University Press 2005) provides a helpful introduction,
while Tom Devines masterful The Scottish Nation 1700-2007 comprehensively examines the evolution of
the Scottish economy through the industrial revolution and beyond.
2 Office for National Statistics, Regional Labour Market, Monthly Data: Scotland, May 2011
3 See speech given by Mervyn King, Governor, Bank of England at the Civic Centre, Newcastle on 25
January 2011.
4 ONS figures March 2011; reported here and elsewhere:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/8414860/UK-household-incomes-fall-for-first-time-since-
1981.html
5 See, for instance, the GfK Consumer Confidence Barometer January 2011:
http://www.gfknop.com/pressinfo/releases/singlearticles/007214/index.en.html
6 ONS, Second estimate of Gross Domestic Product , 1st Quarter 2011 confirmed a 7.1% decline in
business investment over the quarter.
7 The international institutions do not assess Scotland separately, but given that policy in these areas is
largely or exclusively reserved, it is fair to assume Scotland would rank alongside the UK.
8 This average is skewed by outliers such as Ireland.
9 See, for instance, the World Economic Forums Global Competitiveness Index; a measure of dubious
value but one routinely cited by UK politicians arguing for tax cuts and deregulation. For a longer
discussion of these issues, see The Wrong Plan for Growth: Budget 2011, the Global Competitiveness
Report and the dangers of formulating policy on a false premise, Scottish Trades Union Congress 2011
10 ibid.
11 See, for instance, Inequality and Institutions in 20th Century America, Levy and Temin, MIT Department of
Economics Working Paper 2007; Inequality Patterns in Western-Type Democracies: Cross Country
Differences and Time Changes, Brandolini and Smeeding 2007; the work of MIT economists and, for a
general summary of current research, Paul Krugmans, The Conscience of a Liberal (2008)

Oxfam GB June 2011
www.oxfam.org.uk

Desperately seeking
poverty (alleviation):
towards poverty sensitive
budgeting in local
government
John H McKendrick
July 2011
www.oxfam.org.uk
About the author
Dr. John H McKendrick is a Senior Lecturer in the Glasgow School of Business
and Society at Glasgow Caledonian University. His research is primarily
concerned with informing the work of practitioners and campaigners beyond the
academy who seek to tackle poverty in Scotland, the UK and the EU. He is co-
author of Poverty in Scotland 2011 (CPAG) and recently completed three guides
for practitioners in Scotland, one on Measuring Poverty, one on Tackling Child
Poverty Locally and one on Poverty Sensitive Budgeting, Decision Making and
Practice (all published by the Scottish Government in 2011). He is a member of
Eurochild and has supported the work of two transnational workshops in the EU
(Child Poverty in 2009, and Active Ageing, Poverty and Social Inclusion in
2010). He is a member of the Expert Panel for Oxfam Scotlands The Humankind
Index.
Email: j.mckendrick@gcu.ac.uk
2 Desperately seeking poverty (alleviation): towards poverty sensitive budgeting in local

government A Whose Economy Seminar Paper, June 2011
Contents
1. Introduction ........................................................................................ 5
2. Hard Choices, Tough Decisions shaping the future of public

services in North Lanarkshire .......................................................... 6
The challenge ...................................................................................... 6
A progressive response participatory budgeting and acknowledging
need ..................................................................................................... 6
The shortcomings ................................................................................ 8
3. The benefits of poverty sensitive budgeting ................................... 8
4. Making poverty sensitive budgeting work....................................... 9
5. Towards a conclusion ..................................................................... 10
6. The final word Falkirk Councils Poverty Impact Assessment

Budget Tool ...................................................................................... 10
Notes ....................................................................................................... 12
Desperately seeking poverty (alleviation): towards poverty sensitive budgeting in local 3

Executive summary
Added to significant funding cuts in the years ahead, local government in
Scotland may also be faced with additional workload if the Third Sector and
private sector cannot absorb public sector job losses and/or are not able to
provide conditions of employment that allow existing standards of living to be
maintained. The prospect of local government being tasked with achieving more
with each unit of resource looms large. It is widely accepted that local
government will need to reduce costs and increase income; loss of services is
inevitable. Although there is much support for protecting frontline services,
particularly those meeting the needs of the most vulnerable, it is less clear exactly
how this is to be achieved.
In this paper, it is argued that poverty sensitive budgeting should be developed

as a means to ensure that public sector service restructuring (downscaling) is
undertaken in a manner that takes account of the needs of people experiencing
poverty. Innovations in North Lanarkshire do not quite manage to achieve this
and better models are required. The prospects for poverty sensitive decision
making is heightened in areas such as Falkirk, where local government has
implemented a Poverty Impact Assessment Budget Tool to assist the attainment
of its strategic goal to tackle poverty throughout the district.

1. Introduction
The social and economic problem that is poverty in Scotland is recognised across
Scottish civil society, demonstrated not least by the wide range of specialisms,
institutions and interest groups represented in Oxfams Whose Economy series.
Action to tackle poverty and regenerate Scotlands impoverished communities
can be found at the local level,i through the work of Community Planning
Partnershipsii and by Scottish Government, evidenced for example by the
prominence it accords to redressing the huge imbalances in household income.iii
However, despite these efforts, there is no shortage of poverty in Scotland. The

most recent estimate suggests that almost one million people are living in
poverty in Scotland, comprised of 250,000 children, 120,000 pensioners and
600,000 adults of working age (Scottish Government, 2011). Things are certainly
not getting better current levels of poverty in Scotland are higher than they
were five years ago.
What is also certain is that local government in Scotland will not be able to
sustain existing levels of service provision in the years ahead. Having agreed
with the Scottish Government not to increase the level of income which it can
raise through Council Tax, the swingeing cuts to its block grant have forced local
authorities to seek to simultaneously maximise income and reduce costs.
Thus, there is a pressing need for poverty sensitive decision-making to ensure

that Scotlands most vulnerable citizens the one in five who are living in
poverty are not further disadvantaged and marginalised through austerity cuts
to public services. When budgets are being set, the impact on poverty must be
central and integral to the decisions that are made.
This paper considers the prospects for poverty sensitive budgeting in Scottish
local government. It starts with a false dawn (North Lanarkshire Councils Hard
Choices, Big Decisions consultation) and ends with a note of optimism (Falkirk
Councils tool for Poverty Impact Budget Assessment). In between, it outlines the
benefits and prerequisites for successful poverty sensitive budgeting.

2. Hard Choices, Tough Decisions
shaping the future of public
services in North Lanarkshire
The challenge
Faced with the prospect of reducing its budget of 908m by 55m over the
financial years 2011/12 and 2012/13, North Lanarkshire Counciliv (NLC) sought
to face up to hard choices by making tough decisions. A savings programme
was designed by NLC management, with targets set for six areas: workforce
deployment (23m), service prioritisation (16m), asset management (5m),
income generation (5m), procurement (5m), and sharing services (16m) (NLC,
2009, p.5).
A progressive response participatory budgeting

and acknowledging need
In common with several local authorities in Scotland,v NLC canvassed the
opinions of those who live and work in the area, inviting them to have their say
in the future of their services (see Figure 1). Through Hard Choices, Tough
Decisions, stakeholders were introduced to the background pressures on the
budget, the Councils priorities, the scale of the savings that were required, the
budget, and current spending. Plans, current work and potential savings were
outlined for each of NLCs five priority areas (health and wellbeing,
environment, lifelong learning, regeneration, and development). Stakeholders
were invited to have their say: to comment on the savings options that were
being considered (particularly those pertaining to service prioritisation), make
other suggestions, and express their thoughts on the way in which NLC was
proposing to respond to the challenge.
NLCs approach is to be applauded. First and foremost, it engaged residents and

workers in the budget process, directly asking each for their priorities and
preferences. Furthermore, although the options were unpalatable, for example:
Unfortunately the financial position means we will have to reduce, in some cases
stop, some of our services with the potential loss of a further 253 posts (NLC,
2009, p.5), the necessity of, and ability to, continue to provide services to the
young, the elderly and the vulnerable was asserted (NLC, 2009, p.6).

Figure 1. Extracts from North Lanarkshire Councils Hard Choices, Big Decisions public consultation document
Desperately seeking poverty (alleviation): towards poverty sensitive budgeting in local government A Whose Economy Seminar Paper, June 2011 7
The shortcomings
Although a progressive step, there are limitations to what can be achieved
through NLCs approach.
First, the participation in this budgeting exercise is limited to expression of

opinion. It also not clear how the individual stakeholder responses were translated
into collective expressions of preference. Elsewhere in the UK, higher levels of
public responsibility and accountability are being promoted through
participatory budgeting, in which stakeholders are at the heart of the decision-
making process.vi
Second, the expressed opinions of stakeholders would only have made a

marginal contribution to the final decisions that were reached; for example, a
weighting of ten per cent was accorded to what our citizens want us to do in the
statistical exercise to robustly determine the priority of functions in the Housing
and Social Work Directorate. This can be compared to weightings of 20 per cent
for how our costs compare, 20 per cent for the priorities that were determined in
the Corporate Plan, and 50 per cent for statutory responsibilities (Executive
Director of Housing and Social Work Services, NLC, 2010).
Finally, although NLC discharged its public duty by undertaking an Equalities

Impact Assessment (EQIA) of the likely impact of the cuts that it proposed (Head
of Community Information and Learning, NLC, 2010), such an approach only
inadvertently and indirectly protects people experiencing poverty. This is, of
course, a general observation on the limitations of EQIA (rather than a particular
criticism of NLC); in EQIA, the policy priority is equity for equality groups,
rather than tackling the vulnerability of people living in poverty. However, NLC
should not be totally absolved of criticism; as will be considered later, local
government in Scotland is at liberty to take additional steps to ensure that the
budget decisions it makes are rooted in the need to protect people living in
poverty.
3. The benefits of poverty sensitive

budgeting
What could be gained by local government practising poverty sensitive
budgeting? Poverty sensitive budgeting pursues budget decisions that are rooted
in an understanding of local poverty and making a more effective contribution
toward the amelioration or eradication of this poverty.
At the level of senior management facing the challenge of resource allocation

across Directorates, it should be a tool to ensure that those Directorates which
make greatest contributions to tackling poverty are adequately resourced. Within
Directorates, it is a tool that should be used to ensure that service delivery is
focused and coherent. For example, when presented with a possible budget

saving of 600,000 if childcare services in council nurseries were to be scaled back
to term-time provision (NLC, 2009, p.11) knowledge of the practical difficulties
that this would present to working lone parents living on the margins of
povertyvii might be factored into the analysis, to counter what may have seemed
an attractive cut in purely financial terms.
This is not to suggest that local government managers are oblivious to the
implications of the decisions that they make. Rather, it is contended that tools to
facilitate poverty sensitive budgeting would enable them to make progressive
decisions with greater authority and consistency. Making more explicit the
impact on local poverty of service-related decisions would not only emphasise
the symbolic commitment of local government to tackle poverty, and provide the
means to caution against decisions that were either regressive or even non-
progressive,viii it would also have a formative impact on practice, as thinking
tackling poverty became embedded root and branch throughout the
organisation.
Taking poverty impact to the heart of local government decision-making is a

logical extension of, and a practical step to facilitate, mainstreaming of tackling
povertyix and the promotion of tackling poverty as everybodys business (HM
Treasury, DWP and DCSF, 2008) both of which have grown in prominence in
recent years.
4. Making poverty sensitive

budgeting work
Poverty sensitive budgeting is a tool that could facilitate more effective decision-
making. It will be most effective when it is viewed as a mechanism that assists
local government personnel to work toward achieving the poverty reduction/
amelioration targets of an anti-poverty strategy. Without an overarching strategic
vision to tackle poverty, and without a strong rationale for considering poverty
impact, poverty sensitive budgeting will not fulfil its potential.
It must also be acknowledged that this approach entails changes to working

practices, which will be more demanding of staff. For example, finance officers, in
addition to budget setting and management, might be required to have a working
knowledge of poverty and of how government services operate to tackle poverty.
On the other hand, those officers with primary responsibility for anti-poverty work
might also be required to acquire a working knowledge of macro-level budgeting
and financial planning. More probably, poverty sensitive budgeting will require a
closer working relationship between officers who have tended not to work
together, i.e. those responsible for budget setting and those responsible for tackling
poverty. This challenge is surmountable, but it must be recognised that poverty
sensitive budgeting is likely to make further demands of staff who already have
key responsibilities and heavy workloads within their organisation.
What is readily apparent is that poverty sensitive budgeting will only be

successful if it is accepted, valued and adopted wholeheartedly by staff. If the

concept and practice is not embraced, then there is a risk that it becomes merely
an administrative burden, which may serve to de-motivate staff rather than to
focus and invigorate them. For this reason, poverty sensitive budgeting is best
left to those local authorities that have adopted a strong anti-poverty focus, and
in which there is strong support for this work from Council leaders and across
the political spectrum. Elsewhere, the immediate priority should be to invest in
poverty awareness training.
5. Towards a conclusion
The need to protect the most vulnerable has featured in Scottish local government
austerity debates. However, this is rarely explicitly articulated as the need to
protect services for people experiencing poverty. Furthermore, at the critical stage
of budget setting, the poverty impact of decisions to reshape Scotlands public
services is an absent presence: present in the sense that it is implicit that decisions
will be taken to protect vulnerable groups (such as those living in poverty), yet
absent in the sense that information on poverty impact is not available and is not
therefore directly factored into the decision-making process.
The immediate challenge ahead is not to learn more about local poverty. Rather,
what is required is that we use what we already know in new ways.
Practitioners and analysts knowledge and understanding of local poverty needs
to be available to managers and finance officers in a manner that will enable key
decisions to take account of poverty impact.
6. The final word Falkirk Councils

Poverty Impact Assessment
Budget Tool
At present, poverty sensitive budgeting is more of a concept than a practice.
Nevertheless, the last year has brought some significant developments,
including: a roundtable of interested parties from across local and Scottish
Government; the work of an Action Learning Set of officers from local
government and the Third Sector; the publication by the Scottish Government of
a Learning Point on the Prospects for Poverty Sensitive Community Budgeting; and
the publication of a further, and more substantial Scottish Government report
(with sample tools) on Poverty Sensitive Decision-making, Practice and Analysis.x
Most pleasing of all, and to conclude this paper on a high note, has been the
introduction by Falkirk Council of a Poverty Impact Assessment Budget Tool
(see Figure 2). By its own admission, this is currently work-in-progress;xi
however, the Council is to be commended for taking a bold step forward towards
embedding poverty sensitive decision-making in the budget process.

Figure 2. Falkirk Councils Poverty Impact Assessment Budget Tool
Desperately seeking poverty (alleviation): towards poverty sensitive budgeting in local government A Whose Economy Seminar Paper, June 2011 11
References
HM Treasury, DWP and DCSF (2008) Ending Child Poverty: Everybodys Business.
London.
North Lanarkshire Council (2009) Hard Choices, Tough Decisions. Motherwell:

NLC.
Executive Director of Housing and Social Work Services, North Lanarkshire

Council (2010) Savings Options Service Prioritisation and Service Impact.
Motherwell: NLC.
http://www.northlanarkshire.gov.uk/CHttpHandler.ashx?id=5118&p=0
Head of Community Information and Learning, North Lanarkshire Council

(2010) Package of Draft Savings Options (2011-2014) Equality Impact
Assessment. Motherwell: NLC.
http://www.northlanarkshire.gov.uk/CHttpHandler.ashx?id=5117&p=0
Poverty Alliance, SCVO and Communities Scotland (2005) Community Planning

Toolkit. Edinburgh: Communities Scotland.
Scottish Government (2011) Poverty and Income Inequality in Scotland: 2009-10.

Edinburgh: Scottish Government.
Notes
i
For example, the Scottish Urban Regeneration Forum supports and encourages local work to regenerate
Scotlands most deprived communities through its Best Practice Awards:
http://www.scotregen.co.uk/knowledge/good.asp
ii
Community Planning Partnerships (CPPs) have assumed responsibility for tackling poverty in their areas.
Many Single Outcome Agreements have explicit tackling poverty targets. Another example of this
commitment is the toolkit that was published by the Poverty Alliance, SCVO and Communities Scotland in
2005 to assist CPPs in tackling local poverty: http://www.improvementservice.org.uk/library/view-
document-details/127-poverty-alliance-community-planning-toolkit/
iii
For more details, visit: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/About/scotPerforms/purposes/solidarity
iv
North Lanarkshire,centrally located between Glasgow and Edinburgh, is the fourth most populous local
authority in Scotland and an area with a rich industrial heritage.
v
For example, Renfrewshire and Moray were among those authorities that sought to directly engage
citizens to share their thoughts on service provision in the context of a smaller budget.
vi
For more details, visit: http://www.participatorybudgeting.org.uk/about/history-of-participatory-budgeting
vii
Lone parents are vulnerable to seasonal unemployment when the support infrastructures are scaled back
in the longer school summer holidays. Quite simply, it is difficult to sustain employment when adequate
childcare provision is not available.
viii
In contrast to progressive interventions (defined here as those which would tackle poverty), regressive
decisions are those that would either exacerbate the intensity of poverty or create new poverty, and non-
progressive decisions are those that would maintain the status quo.
ix
Mainstreaming has been promoted by the Scottish Government by the withdrawal of ringfenced funds
(such as the Fairer Scotland Fund) through which local government is required to deliver an agenda set by
the Scottish Government. Tackling poverty is to be addressed by local government as part of its core
work, where that local authority has judged it to be a priority.
x
Contact John McKendrick (author of this paper) at j.mckendrick@gcu.ac.uk for more information on each
of these outputs.
xi
Personal Communication with Linda Gilliland, Senior Practitioner (Policy), Falkirk Council, 31 May 2011.

Oxfam GB July 2011
www.oxfam.org.uk

Rethinking good and bad

jobs in Glasgow
Chris Warhurst
November 2011
www.oxfam.org.uk
About the author
Chris Warhurst is Professor of Work and Organisational Studies at the
University of Sydney. From 2001-10 he was Director of the Scottish Centre for
Employment Research at Strathclyde University in Glasgow. His research focuses
on skills and labour and he has published over a dozen books and has advised
government in the UK, Scotland, Australia and Hungary as well as the OECD.
He is a co-organiser of the ESRC-funded seminar series Making Bad Jobs Better:
http://ewds.strath.ac.uk/badjobsbetter/Home.aspx
Email: C.Warhurst@econ.usyd.edu.au
2 Rethinking good and bad jobs in Glasgow

A Whose Economy Seminar Paper, November 2011
Contents
Introduction .............................................................................................. 5
1. Good and bad jobs exist and will persist ....................................... 6
2. When good jobs go bad .................................................................... 7
3. When even bad jobs can be good but difficult to get ..................... 8
Conclusion.............................................................................................. 10
References .............................................................................................. 10
Notes ....................................................................................................... 14
Rethinking good and bad jobs in Glasgow 3

Executive summary
Scottish politicians are now beginning to recognise that job quality matters. It
affects individual and family wellbeing, rates of child poverty, company
productivity, social mobility and social exclusion. If the Scottish Government is
to create a fairer, wealthier Scotland, job quality needs to become embedded in
policy thinking.
As a new policy concern there is as yet very little understanding of job quality
and what makes jobs good or bad. This paper addresses this problem. It first
outlines job quality generally, then examines some of the good and bad jobs
pertinent to Glasgow, and ends with suggestions about how job quality can be
better understood and improved.
Good jobs can be created and bad jobs improved. Government emphasis in
Scotland has been on creating good jobs. Because good and bad jobs, and their
creation, are interdependent, both currently exist and will persist. It is time
therefore to also consider how bad jobs can be improved.
Using examples of the good and bad jobs created in Glasgow, through the
creative industries and routine interactive services respectively, this paper shows
how perceptions and experiences of job quality vary, and how better
understanding of job quality is needed and can be developed in order to push
forward policy. In particular, the examples highlight how supposedly good jobs
can go bad for some workers, and how supposedly bad jobs can be good for
other workers though can be difficult for them to get.
The Glasgow examples are then used to indicate interventions that might help
improve job quality and a new approach to understanding job quality.

Introduction
Scottish politicians are now beginning to recognise that job quality matters. Job
quality affects individual and family wellbeing, rates of child poverty, company
productivity, social mobility and social exclusion.1 Bad jobs in particular can
stretch and shred a countrys social fabric, and undermine its economic
potential.2 Given the current economic downturn, there is an even more pressing
need for government policy commitment to improving bad jobs. More generally,
if the Scottish Government is to create a fairer, wealthier Scotland, then job
quality not just job creation needs to become embedded in policy thinking.
Government has two strategic policy options for improving job quality in the
economy: creating more good jobs, or making bad jobs better. Over the past
decade or so, the emphasis in Scotland (as in the rest of the UK and EU) has been
the good jobs strategy. This has been pursued through the development of the
knowledge economy and creative industries, promoting the example of film and
TV industries. As this paper notes, these jobs are accessible only to certain, highly
educated workers, limiting job opportunities in these economically important
industries. There has been little strategic concern with improving bad jobs or,
until recently, even acknowledging that they exist. Instead a work first policy
has sought to lever excluded workers into the labour market, most obviously
through the New Deal. However, in-work poverty is a real issue now in
Scotland. Part of the problem is that, as a new or rather, newly revisited3
policy concern, there is as yet very little understanding of job quality and what
makes a job good or bad, beyond blunt measurements using pay and skills.
Drawing on examples of Glasgows job strategy, this paper highlights the need
for broader understanding, and indicates how these jobs might be improved.
The paper first outlines job quality debates generally. It then examines some of
the good and bad jobs pertinent to Glasgow, and how these jobs compound
disadvantage for some workers. The paper ends with suggestions about how job
quality can be better understood and improved.

1. Good and bad jobs exist
and will persist
Job quality is typically measured using skill and pay.4 Good jobs equate with
high skill and high pay; bad jobs with low skill and low pay. Long-term
structural changes to the economy driven by technology, a shift from
manufacturing to services, and the demands of a more educated workforce were
supposed to deliver good jobs and eradicate bad jobs. In reality, the Scottish and
UK economies have polarised into good and bad jobs or what economists Goos
and Manning call lovely and lousy jobs with the gap between them
widening.5 Glasgow is an exemplar of this polarisation: there are now more top
jobs in the professions and associate professions, and more routine jobs at the
bottom of the labour market in interactive services such as retail and hospitality.6
This polarisation is not coincidental; it has been encouraged respectively by the
development of creative clusters, particularly the TV and film industries around
Pacific Quay, and the promotion of Glasgow as a regional hub for shopping
Scotland with style.
It would be wrong, however, to regard this polarisation as creating two parallel

economies of unconnected good and bad jobs. It is more useful to regard them as
interdependent, with workers in bad jobs supporting those in good jobs. For
every scientist working in a laboratory there is an office cleaner and a canteen
worker; for every freelance software developer there is a barista serving coffee in
the caf in which the freelancer meets his or her clients; for every go-getting
business executive there is someone distributing and delivering the how to get
ahead in business books ordered online through Amazon. Moreover, workers in
the good jobs are often cash-rich and time-poor. As a consequence, they pay what
urban studies theorist Richard Florida calls a service class to do the tasks they
no longer have time to do themselves.7 This shift accounts for much of womens
employment in part-time services: as economist Sue Richardson says, women
often go from putting the dinner on the table at home to putting out a meal on a
table in a restaurant, and often both tasks in the same day.8
Thus good and bad jobs both exist and their persistence is encouraged. However,
the supposedly good jobs in Glasgow can be bad for some workers; conversely,
supposedly bad jobs can be good for other workers though difficult for them to
get despite the New Deal as the next two sections of this paper illustrate.

2. When good jobs go bad
It should be noted that even good jobs can go bad. According to Richard Florida,
the creative industries are the new engine of economic growth and job creation.
In this new economy competiveness is based on the ideas inside workers
heads, he claims, and workers sex, race and class are irrelevant so that good job
opportunities exist for all. Sold on this message, governments around the world,
including Scotland, have rolled out the red carpet for Florida.9 Indeed, Glasgow
was one of his stopovers.
It is true that jobs in the TV and film industries are high-skill if qualifications
are the measure. Skillset data shows that over two-thirds of workers in the audio-
visual industries are graduates, compared to just under one-third of the UK
workforce generally. Moreover, the number of graduates entering these
industries is increasing. Pay is good too, with the average annual salary higher
than that for the UK generally (32,239 against 29,331).10
However these headline facts mask significant inequalities. Not all workers
benefit equally in the creative industries. What should be good jobs in TV and
film can go bad for some workers. Data from the audio-visual industries that
include TV and film show that female and ethnic minority workers are under-
represented. Hiring is often done through informal networks, so that it is who
you know and who you are that matters. As one of the respondents put it in
Thanki and Jefferys research on the London media industry, employers
essentially employ people like themselves [white] this is not necessarily just
by race, but by class and gender (2006-07: 114).11 Having a degree is important
for getting into the labour market, but having contacts is what secures the job.
With the costs of higher education shifting onto students through loans in
Scotland, the first step towards is increasingly expensive. Being more risk averse
when it comes to borrowing money, and less connected to those already in the
industry than youth from middle class families,12 youngsters from working class
backgrounds consequently struggle to enter the audio-visual industries.
There are also wide differences in pay. Women earn less than men, workers from
ethnic minorities earn less than white workers, and both outcomes arise because
these workers are sorted, as economists would say, into lower-paid jobs in the
audio-visual industries. For example, women work in jobs such as make-up,
hairdressing and costumes; men work in higher-paid post-production, camera
and lighting departments; ethnic minorities are over-represented in cinema
cleaning and have low or no representation in higher-paid jobs in animation and
special effects departments. Significantly, graduate starting pay can be very low
or even non-existent: nearly two-fifths of graduates work unpaid as interns
before obtaining a paid job. The only way to overcome such initial low or no pay
is to have the support of wealthy parents, or by having another job in another
industry such as hospitality. For example, Karren, an aspiring young actor,
waits tables in between acting jobs.13 However by taking these jobs, middle class
youth can take away job opportunities for more disadvantaged workers the
unemployed and lone parents, for example as the next section highlights.

3. When even bad jobs can be good
but difficult to get
It was once assumed that technology would eradicate bad jobs. However, routine
interactive service jobsk, such as those in retail and hospitality, flourish because
they involve the human touch.14 With cost-cutting downward pressure on wages,
these jobs tend to pay at, or just above, the minimum wage. However, because
they require no or low qualifications and involve little prior training, they have
low entry barriers. For this reason they are targeted by the New Deal in Glasgow
as entry-level jobs into the labour market for lone parents15 and the long-term
unemployed. Unfortunately this work first approach ignores the quality of the
jobs being targeted and competition within the labour market for these jobs. In
this respect, because they have low entry barriers, these jobs are also useful to
middle class youth, such as those starting out in the creative industries or who
are studying at university. Given the choice, many employers favour middle
class workers for what are essentially working class jobs. As a consequence, lone
parents and the long-term unemployed are losing out in the competition for
these jobs. Indeed, one supermarket chain in Glasgow has even stopped
advertising in job centres and switched its recruitment to university campuses.16
There are two reasons why employers favour middle class students and aspiring
creative workers. The first centres on customer care skills and the working-hours
flexibility that employers now demand. Lone parents want to work, and
employers often have very good family friendly policies. Unfortunately these
policies are often undermined by operational practice, as research into food retail
shows. Supermarkets, for example, have two key criteria for workers:
The first is flexibility: We look for people who are flexible in their
working lives said one supermarket manager. This flexibility means
being able and willing to work what was called the troublesome feeding
time of 3-6pm, evenings, weekends and public holidays; all of which are
difficult for parents generally, and nigh impossible for lone parents.
The second criterion is the need for workers to have good soft skills:
things like customer focus, communication, impact and influence said
another supermarket manager. Unfortunately, as a result of being out of
the labour market sometimes for years and often isolated at home
with little adult interaction, many lone parents lack confidence in dealing
with people.
By contrast, middle class youth are said to have lots of confidence and good
communication skills, and students are always available to work unsocial hours
in the evenings, weekends and public holidays precisely the times when
childcare needs are paramount.

The second reason for employers favouring middle class students is most evident
in fashion retail and hospitality, and centres on what is called aesthetic labour
or the need to look good and sound right to get and do jobs in these industries.17
This need arises because employers want workers who embody the image of
their companies. With the country rebranding as part of Scotland with Style,
employee appearance is now considered paramount in Glasgows retail and
hospitality sectors. In one survey, 93% of employers considered it important to
their business. In other Glasgow research, one hotel manager explained that the
hotel hires people that look the part [who] fit in with the whole concept of the
hotel; a bar manager explained that if youve got nice-looking staff then it
brings in people [customers].
With the shift to mass (but still predominantly middle class) higher education,
there are now more students but with less financial support from the state. Many
students now have to work to pay their way through study. As a result, the
labour market is awash with students looking for jobs. Most of these students
work in retail, hospitality and other routine services, with employers often
drawing upon middle classness in deciding what appropriate employee
appearance is, and therefore who will be hired. For example, one hotel advertised
its jobs in the Sunday Times rather than the Evening Times because it wanted to
recruit the sons and daughters of the middle classes. As a result, its typical front-
of-house employee was a well-travelled graduate.
Thus just being middle class provides employability for jobs in retail and
hospitality. Lone parents and the unemployed are squeezed out of these entry-
level jobs because they appear to have soft skills deficits or rather because, not
surprisingly, they lack the required middle classness. The danger is that these
workers are further disadvantaged, and personally blamed for their exclusion
from the labour market.
Bad jobs can thus be good jobs for middle class youth on their way to getting
better jobs. They can also be good jobs for other workers seeking entry back into
the labour market. However, the latter can lose out in the competition for these
jobs because they lack the required availability and soft skills.

Conclusion
Job quality is again being recognised as important in Scotland. As with many
other cities, Glasgow has encouraged the growth of more good jobs with high
pay and high skill. Undoubtedly these jobs have been created, and more are
anticipated once the economy picks up.
However, the good job opportunities promised by the creative industries are
more restricted than policy-makers had anticipated. The TV and film industries
can reproduce the old social inequalities, with female and ethnic minority
workers and those from working class backgrounds being disadvantaged,
discriminated against, or just plain excluded. At the same time, economic
development in the city has encouraged the creation of bad jobs. These are
useful temporary safety net jobs for middle class youth whilst they gain the
qualifications or experience necessary to secure the good jobs. Because (the bad)
jobs are relatively easy to get, they can also be useful to workers currently out of
work, such as lone parents and the long-term unemployed, and are intended as
springboard jobs into the labour market. Unfortunately, such workers are losing
out to the middle class youth who are colonising these entry-level jobs.
Dealing with these problems requires addressing how employment in the TV

and film industries is organised. Recruitment and pay practices in particular
need greater transparency and monitoring. In the case of pay, that of internships
which are now common in these industries has to have better protection
through minimum wage legislation. Of course, in terms of how the TV and film
industries are organised, enforced cost-cutting exercises by the big companies
such as the BBC have led to the dismantling of internal labour markets and the
growth of precarious, project-based employment that allows nepotism to
flourish.
The work first approach into entry-level jobs in retail and hospitality for other
workers is necessary but clashes with other government policies, most obviously
the expansion of higher education and the promotion of the creative industries.
For the work first policy to be more effective, lone parents and the long-term
unemployed need to be better equipped to compete for entry-level jobs in these
industries. The evidence from Glasgow suggests training in soft skills would be
helpful. Research by Anne Marie Cullen reveals that this training is not being
sufficiently offered at the moment in Glasgow.18 Better, more comprehensive and
affordable childcare would also help these workers to navigate job opportunities
that clash with parenting responsibilities.19 Once in these entry-level jobs, it will
then be important to ensure that they are able to progress to better jobs. Middle
class youth already have an exit route out of such jobs, provided by their
education. To be springboard jobs, further training opportunities (whether
provided by employers, the state or trade unions) and the development of career
ladders will be needed for other workers.20 Without it, entry-level jobs will
become dead-end jobs for lone parents and the long-term unemployed, and the
temptation to avoid or quit them will be high.21 Compared to many other
countries, the UK has a more acute bad jobs trap, particularly for female and

poorly-educated workers, and mobility out of these jobs is juddering to a halt.22
The work first approach must be supplemented by employment enrichment
initiatives that make bad jobs better and provide exit routes out of these jobs.
Beyond interventions to improve job quality, the good and bad jobs examples
from Glasgow also raise a wider point about how job quality is to be understood.
Pay and skill levels are important in defining job quality but are not sufficient.
Career progression, training opportunities and employment protection matter
too. The Glasgow examples also indicate that understanding job quality requires
a jobs + approach, which envelops work and employment, industry
characteristics, and surrounding welfare infrastructure.23 To unravel these effects
on job quality it needs to be appreciated that:
relative and not just absolute employment standards influence perceived

job quality;
who job-holders are matters as much as the job itself in shaping

experiences of job quality;
subjective perceptions as well as objective criteria affect those experiences,

and these perceptions are affected by the life-stage of workers;
it might be useful to look at how employment is organised generally, and

for specific industries, in other countries.24
Only by rethinking job quality will policy be developed and jobs reclaimed to fit
the needs and aspirations of workers as well as those of employers and
Scotland as a whole for greater fairness and wealth.

References
Carr F., Findlay P., Tilly C. and Warhurst C. (2012) Job quality: scenarios, analysis and
interventions in C. Warhurst, P. Findlay, C. Tilly and F. Carr (eds) Are Bad jobs
inevitable? London: Palgrave.
Cullen A-M. (2010) The Real Mismatch? Training Supply and Demand amongst the
Unemployed, Briefing Paper, Skills Development Scotland, www.sds.org.uk
Dutton E., Warhurst C., Nickson D. and Lockyer C. (2005) Lone Parents, the New Deal
and the Opportunities and Barriers to Retail Employment, Policy Studies, 26:1, 85-101.
Eikhof D. and Warhurst C. (2010) The creative industries: You dont have to be male,
white and middle class to work here but it helps, paper to the Work, Employment and
Society Conference, University of Brighton.
Florida R. (2004) The Rise of the Creative Class, New York: Basic Books.
Goos M. and Manning A. (2007) Lousy and Lovely Jobs: The Rising Polarization of Work
in Britain, Review of Economics and Statistics, 89:1, 118133.
Grimshaw D., Lloyd C. and Warhurst C. (2008) Low Wage Work in the UK: A Synthesis
of Findings, the Institutional Effects and Policy Responses in C. Lloyd, G. Mason and K.
Mayhew (eds) Low Wage Work in the United Kingdom, New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Hakeney S., Neale I., Casey P. and Neat S. (2009) Staying In, Moving Up: Employment
Retention and Progression in London, London: London Development Agency.
Holmes C. (2011) Implications of polarisation for UK policymakers, SKOPE Issues Paper

26, Universities of Oxford and Cardiff.
Lloyd C. and Warhurst C. (2010) Bad Jobs Practice, Policy and Effects, paper to the
Making Bad Jobs Better Seminar 1, Glasgow.
http://ewds.strath.ac.uk/badjobsbetter/Home.aspx
Mason G., Mayhew K., Osborne M. and Stevens P. (2008) Low Pay, Labor Market
Institutions, and Job Quality in the United Kingdom in C. Lloyd, G. Mason and K.
Mayhew (eds) Low Wage Work in the United Kingdom, New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Nickson D., Warhurst C., and Dutton E. (2005) The Importance of Attitude and
Appearance in the Service Encounter in Retail and Hospitality, Managing Service Quality,
15:2, 195-208.
Nickson D., Warhurst C., Witz A. and Cullen A-M. (2001) The Importance of Being
Aesthetic: Work, Employment and Service Organisation in A. Sturdy, I. Grugulis and H.
Willmott (eds) Customer Service, London: Palgrave.
Nunn A., Johnson S., Monro S., Bickerstaffe T., and Kelsey S. (2007) Factors influencing
social mobility, DWP Research report no.450,
http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/rports2007-2008/rrep450.pdf
Pocock B. and Skinner N. (2012) Good jobs, bad jobs and the Australian experience in C.
Warhurst, P. Findlay, C. Tilly and F. Carr (eds) Are bad jobs inevitable?, London: Palgrave.

Richardson S. (2011) Labour Force, Industrial and Workplace Trends, paper to the Skills
Australia Scenario Development Seminar, Sydney.
Ross A. (2009) Nice work if you can get it, New York: New York University Press
Scottish Affairs Committee (2008) Poverty in Scotland and Child Poverty in Scotland:
Responses by the Government and Scottish Executive to the Committee Second and Third Reports
of Session 2007-08, London: TSO.
Scottish Enterprise Glasgow (2005) Future Jobs and Skills in Glasgow (2005-2010), Glasgow:
SE Glasgow.
Scottish Government (2008) Achieving our potential, Edinburgh: Scottish Government.
Thanki A. and Jeffreys S. (2006-07) Who are the Fairest? Ethnic segmentation in Londons
media production, Work Organisation, Labour and Globalisation, 1:1, 108-118.
Snower D.J. (1996) The low skill, bad-job trap in A.L. Booth and D.J. Snower (eds)
Acquiring Skills, New York: Cambridge UP.
Toynbee P. (2003) Hard Work, London: Bloomsbury.
Trebeck K. (2011) Whose Economy? Winners and losers in the new Scottish economy, Oxfam
Discussion Paper, www.oxfam.org.uk.
Truss E. (2011) Academic rigour and social mobility: how low income students are being kept out
of top jobs, CentreForum, London.
Warhurst C. (2002) Towards the Better Job: Scottish Work and Employment in the
Knowledge Age in G. Hassan and C. Warhurst (eds) Tomorrows Scotland: New Policy
Directions, London: Lawrence & Wishart.
Warhurst C., Furlong A., Commander J., Findlay J., Hurrell S., Nickson, D., Symeonides
A. and Wilson F. (2009) Higher and Further Education Students Income, Expenditure and Debt
in Scotland 2007-08, Edinburgh: Scottish Government.

Notes
1
Scottish Affairs Committee (2008); Scottish Government (2008)
2
Toynbee (2003); Trebeck (2011)
3
For an overview of policy concern with job quality over past decades, see Lloyd and Warhurst (2010)
4
For an overview of research of job quality see Carr F. et al (2012)
5
Goos and Manning (2007); also Truss (2011)
6
SE Glasgow (2005)
7
Florida (2004)
8
Richardson (2011)
9
Ross (2009)
10
This material is drawn from Eikhof and Warhurst (2010)
11
Thanki and Jefferys (2006-07: 114)
12
Warhurst et al (2009)
13
Eikhof and Warhurst (op cit)
14
Holmes (2011)
15
Almost all of whom are women
16
This material is drawn from Dutton et al (2005)
17
This material is drawn from Nickson et al (2001, 2005)
18
Cullen (2010)
19
For a discussion of a new deal for low waged workers in the UK see Grimshaw et al. (2008); see also Dutton
et al (2005)
20
See the London example (Hakeney et al 2009)
21
Cullen (op cit)
22
See for each point respectively: Snower (1996), Mason et al (2008) and Nunn et al (2007)
23
See also Pocock and Skinner (2012)
24
For a short discussion of the new approach to researching job quality see Carr et al (op cit)

Oxfam GB November 2011
www.oxfam.org.uk

Health inequalities in
Scotland: looking beyond
the blame game
Gerry McCartney and Chik Collins
June 2011
www.oxfam.org.uk
About the authors
Gerry McCartney is a consultant in public health medicine and Head of the
Public Health Observatory, NHS Health Scotland. He was a previously a General
Practitioner and public health doctor for NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde. He
trained in medicine at the University of Glasgow (MBChB 2001, MPH 2006, MD
2010) and has an honours degree in economics and development (University of
London, 2007). His MD thesis was on the host population impacts of the Glasgow
2014 Commonwealth Games. His main research interests and publications focus
on the causes of health inequalities and the health impacts of socio-economic,
political and environmental change. He writes here in a personal capacity and his
views are not necessarily representative of NHS Health Scotland.
Email: gmccartney@nhs.net
Chik Collins is Senior Lecturer in the School of Social Sciences at the University
of the West of Scotland. He holds a BA (Honours) in Social Science from Paisley
College of Technology (1987), a postgraduate diploma in housing from the
University of Stirling (1991), and a doctorate from the University of Paisley (1997)
published as Language, Ideology and Social Consciousness (Ashgate, 1999). He has
written on urban policy, community development, the role of language in social
change, and more recently, in collaboration with Gerry McCartney and others, on
health. He has also worked with Oxfam and the Clydebank Independent
Resource Centre in producing The Right to Exist: The Story of the Clydebank
Independent Resource Centre (2008) and To Banker from Bankies: Incapacity Benefit
Myth and Realities (2009).
Email: Chik.Collins@uws.ac.uk
2 Health inequalities in Scotland: looking beyond the blame game

Contents
Introduction: looking beyond the blame game.................................... 5
Health inequalities: separating myths from reality ............................... 6
Health inequalities arent inevitable ..................................................... 10
Inequalities: why we do care and why we should care ....................... 11
Conclusion.............................................................................................. 12
References .............................................................................................. 13
Health inequalities in Scotland: looking beyond the blame game 3

Executive summary
People in Scotland suffer from large and unjust inequalities in health. These
inequalities are best explained by considering the stark and growing inequalities
in income, wealth and power between groups. The likelihood that a child will
suffer premature mortality or debilitating health conditions is very substantially
determined by where the child is born, the resources it will have at its disposal
and the social class of its parents. If where one is born can be thought of as a
lottery, then life (and death) is indeed a gamble.
Health-determining inequalities are, like health inequalities themselves, neither

fixed nor natural, but arise from particular political choices and the values they
reflect. In the decades after WWII, the UK became a significantly less inequitable
country. Since the late 1970s, a series of neo-liberal economic and social policies
have served once again to widen the inequalities which do so much to shape
health outcomes. During this latter period, Scotland has suffered from growing
health inequalities, a faltering in its improvement in overall life expectancy
compared to other countries, and increasingly worse overall health outcomes
than might be expected even considering the high levels of poverty and
deprivation which prevail here. Moreover, the available evidence suggests that
the association between neoliberal policies and the observed trends in overall
health outcomes and health inequalities is of a causal nature.
Health inequalities have become, particularly in recent years, a source of great

social and political concern. The injustices they crystallise challenge our basic
humanity. It is inherently distressing to understand how a newborn child, losing
out in the lottery of birth, faces such a challenge to achieve a decent, healthy life
span. But such inequalities have much broader negative consequences for the
whole of society this is also a source of great concern. All of this concern should
and can be translated into activities likely to redress the still-heightening
inequalities in the socio-economic determinants of health.

Introduction: looking beyond the
blame game
One of us Gerry McCartney used to be a General Practitioner. Gerry left
General Practice frustrated: frustrated at the inability to make a sufficient
difference for too many of his patients; frustrated because the prevailing medical
model of health care urged him to prescribe more cholesterol medicines, more
aspirin and more inhalers for people who were not sick because of a lack of
medicine, but who were sick because they were suffering the consequences of
poverty, inequality and toxic politics.
Gerrys patients knew that the medicines were not very likely to solve their
problems, but they appreciated the effort and attention his practice and his
colleagues provided. Appreciation, however, doesnt always cut both ways.
Some find it difficult to be sympathetic to people who smoke, drink too much
alcohol, use heroin or eat too much. Its their own fault, isnt it? Yet, drinking and
eating too much, and using alcohol and drugs, are the well-recognised reactions
of significant proportions of people when faced with a system that disempowers,
stigmatises and undervalues them.1 Nonetheless, every day in the press there are
stories which portray poor people as feckless, careless, irresponsible or as
scroungers (see Welford and Mooney, both this collection). This hostility (sadly
there is no other word for it) has been encouraged by successive governments
seeking to evade responsibility for health inequalities.2 Blaming the sick for being
sick was actively promoted by the Thatcher government in response to the Black
report3 and by the post-1997 Labour government in relation to both health4,5 and
welfare policy.6
This discussion paper attempts to outline why inequalities in health exist (and in
many instances are worsening) in Scotland today, why we should care about
them, and how we could indeed can begin to address them.

Health inequalities: separating myths
from reality
Health inequalities are the unjust and avoidable differences in health between
groups or populations.i Most causes of premature mortality in Scotland (cancer,
cardiovascular disease, stroke, violence, suicide, alcohol-related deaths and
drugs-related deaths) are avoidable and disproportionately affect people born in
the poorest areas, people of the lowest social class and people who have the
lowest income and wealth.7 Despite an overall reduction in mortality over the
years in Scotland, mortality rates have improved more slowly than in other
Western European countries since around 1950. Furthermore, since around 1980,
Scotland has seen much less improvement than in other parts of western Europe.
The USA is somewhat similar to Scotland in this latter respect.8
Within Scotland, there are vast inequalities between the richest and poorest
communities, both in terms of health and in many of the factors which influence
health.9 The stark health inequalities can be illustrated by observing the drop in
life expectancy of 2.0 years for males and 1.2 years for females for each station as
you travel east on the railway across Glasgow, between Jordanhill and Bridgeton
(Figure 1).
Figure 1 The life expectancy gap across Glasgow (adapted from McCartney,
10
2010).
i Many authors describe health inequalities as the systematic differences in health observed between different
groups in a society, and health inequities as the unjust and avoidable differences in health observed between
groups. In practice, the terms are often used interchangeably with an implicit understanding that the
differences are unjust. The more commonly-used term, health inequalities, is used throughout this article.

Males - 75.8y
Females - 83.1y
Hillhead St Georges
Cross
Buchanan
Jordanhill Street
Hyndland
Partick Charing
Exhibition Cross QUEEN
Centre STREET
Anderston Argyll St.
Govan
St Enoch Bridgeton
Ibrox CENTRAL
Males - 61.9y
Cessnock
Females - 74.6y
Life expectancy data refers to 2001-05 and was extracted from the Glasgow Centre for Population Health
community health and wellbeing profiles. Adapted from the Strathclyde Partnership for Transport travel
map by Gerry McCartney.
While people at the bottom of the social hierarchy often smoke more, drink more
alcohol, take more drugs and have worse diets than their more affluent
counterparts, it is hardly reasonable to suggest that this in itself provides a
sufficient understanding as to why these people die younger. The sheer scale and
the clear social patterning of the problem defies such an individualistic or purely
behaviouralistic perspective. We need to grasp why unhealthy behaviours are
more prevalent in these groups. As Michael Marmot, editor of the World Health
Organisation report on health inequalities, puts it: only by grasping the causes of
the causes can we understand how health inequalities arise.11
Working class people suffer from worse health because they have less income,
less wealth and less access to the institutions and pathways in life that provide
life chances and confer status. These factors combined mean that they typically
have less control over how their lives turn out: they have less power.12
It is clear that, from 1979, working class people were exposed to a concerted and
sustained political attack across the UK.13 It was an explicit political aim during
the years of Conservative government, and a continuing aim during the years of
Labour government, to weaken, disempower and delegitimise the equalising
institutions (such as trade unions, council housing, local government, the
welfare state) which had in previous decades been created through the efforts of
working class people. The results have included rising income inequalities,
erosion of trade union rights, residualisation of council housing, the growth in
wealth and power of unelected elites, and the increasing stigmatisation of benefit
recipients.
This political attack has once again intensified since the formation of the
Conservative-Liberal coalition in 2010. Clearly schooled in the arts of
Friedmanite shock treatment, the coalition has insisted that that there is no
alternative to privatisation and cuts in public services because of the financial
crisis resulting from the banking collapse.14

But, of course, there are alternatives. And, as the aforementioned WHO report
has put it, the toxic politics which prevent these alternatives being discussed
and acted upon have been a key driver of the rise in health inequalities in many
parts of the world. Such politics and policies are also seen by many as
responsible for the faltering improvement in Scotlands life expectancy since
around 1980 (see Figure 2, overleaf) and the emergence of the so-called Scottish
Effect and Glasgow Effect.15
As already indicated, this kind of experience is by no means limited to Scotland.

Patterns of increasing health inequalities on the one hand, and an associated
disempowerment of ordinary people due to the implementation of a neoliberal
economic model on the other, are to be seen in many countries.16
The implications of all of this are as disconcerting as they are clear. There is
nothing fated or inevitable about the health inequalities in Scotland, or about the
nations distressing excess mortality.17 People live less healthy lives and die
unnecessarily young in our country because they are poor, live in the wrong
area and are more generally disempowered in their lives by the operation of the
prevailing economic and political system. If politics is, as Harold Laswell
famously put it, who gets what, when and how, then the prevailing politics
have created this situation.18
Figure 2 Trends in whole population life expectancy in Scotland (in red)

ii
compared with a selection of other nations (adapted from McCartney, Walsh,
8
Whyte and Collins).
ii Data extracted from the Human Mortality Database for: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile,
Denmark, England & Wales, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Northern Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Scotland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Taiwan, and West Germany.

85
Life expectancy at birth (years)
80
75
70
65
60
1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006
Year

Health inequalities arent inevitable
The differences in health outcomes between areas in the UK have not always
been as stark as they are today. Figure 3 (overleaf) shows that during the 1920s
and 1930s premature mortality in the worst tenth of areas was almost twice (1.9
times) that of the best tenth of areas. These differences rapidly reduced following
WWII and remained lower until the 1980s. This period in history was
characterised by a rise in the relative power of working class communities. It is
not that the working classes dominated far from it but it was a time when the
welfare state was introduced, state pensions became available, the NHS free at
the point of need was introduced, and basic working and trade union rights were
established. These equalising developments which were, we should
remember, initiated after a long and very costly war, when the nations finances
were under very great strain were in part funded by taxing the incomes of the
richest in society: the top rate of income tax was 84 per cent by 1979 and
corporation tax was set at 56 per cent. But from 1979 onwards the tide turned and
power flowed from working class communities to the richest in society. It was
also from this point, as Figure 3 shows, that health inequalities rapidly
worsened.21 iii
Not only have health inequalities in the UK been much narrower in the past than
they are today, there is great variation in the extent of health inequalities across
Europe.19 Again, this demonstrates that there is not some natural or inevitable
rate of health inequalities. It is also clear that those countries which adopted the
same kind of neoliberal economic model as implemented in the UK after 1979
have seen a rapid rise in inequalities.16,20
Health inequalities in Scotland are very likely to persist to the extent that
inequalities in the factors that determine health (income, wealth, power, status,
employment, housing etc.) remain. Inequalities in these health determinants are
not a consequence of some natural order, but are the result of a process by which
power (and all its consequences) has become concentrated in the hands of a
relative few. Redistribution of power from central government and corporate
interests, which is, after all, not where power is supposed to be located in a
democracy, would provide some basis for effective means of redress the
rediscovery of the value and purpose of equalising institutions in the life of our
nation and its communities.
iii The differences between areas illustrated here are not strictly inequalities, because the areas have not
been ordered by poverty, class or some other marker of social status. This is because there are no
consistent geographical areas with attached social status markers available for this prolonged time series.
It is likely that variations between areas in this instance represent inequalities, but this cannot be formally
demonstrated.

Figure 3 - Ratio of standardised mortality ratios (0-64years), UK local authorities,
iv 21
1921-2007 (adapted from Thomas, Dorling and Smith)
2.2
Ratio of best to worst deciles
for area-based mortality
1.8
1.6
1.4
1.2
1
0
7
93
93
95
96
97
98
99
00
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-2
21
31
50
59
69
81
90
99
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
Year
Inequalities: why we do care and why

we should care
The culture of blaming the poor and the sick for their hardships in a curious way
reflects something of the humanity of those who do the blaming. The hardships
of the poor and sick are distressing to us all as human beings. We actually do care,
but many people dont want to feel that someone other than the poor and the sick
themselves might have had a hand in causing their hardships, or that many
others might have somehow benefited from things which have caused those
hardships. But the blaming which then ensues, while reflecting something of our
humanity, ultimately represents a loss of humanity. However much some media
outlets or commentators might suggest that the poor and the sick must somehow
have deserved what was coming to them,22 others have had a very big hand in
causing their suffering, and many others have benefited from the things which
have caused it.
iv The figure is adapted from Thomas, 2010. The data series is not continuous, with no data for 1940s and
gaps in mid-50s, mid-60s, and from early 70s to early 80s; nor are time periods always of equal
duration. For 1980s, the harmonic mean of decile SMRs for two periods of which it was composed (1981-5
and 1986-9) were used. Confidence intervals were unavailable for data for 1950s-1980s.

To build a suitably human response on the basis of this initial human reaction a
response not of hostility and blame, but of care for and solidarity with our fellow
human beings requires that people grasp the fact that there are alternatives to
the inequalities which are causally implicated in producing unnecessary
hardship and suffering. It is absolutely not necessary that a baby boy born in North
West Paisley has a life expectancy of only 61.7 years, while a baby boy born only two
miles away in Houston has a life expectancy of 87.5 years a 26-year gap.23 We repeat:
this is not necessary, and the decisions which could begin to change the situation
can be made tomorrow, next week, or next month if there is the political will to
advocate them, to make them and to defend them.
But for those who do not suffer the worst effects of health inequalities there is,
perhaps, a more self-interested reason to care. Amongst relatively rich,
developed countries like Scotland, the greater the equality in society, the better
the outcomes are for everyone living there, across a whole range of health and
social indicators.24 Both richer and the poorer people within more equal societies
have better health, and experience less crime and greater happiness than those
living in less equal societies.
Conclusion
Tackling inequalities in general, and health inequalities in particular, should
therefore be a priority for every government. It is the human response, the just
response and also in everyones interests. Health is not a commodity that is to be
gained at someone elses expense. Health is a public good: people can enjoy good
health without detracting from anyone elses health; indeed the evidence is that
everyone will enjoy better health when politics is made to reflect this fact in the
social and economic policies it produces.
Health inequalities arise because of political decisions and processes that reflect
certain values and priorities values and priorities which are open to
deliberation and to alteration. Those concerned with public health, health
inequalities and as indicated above even those only concerned with their own
selfish interests, should actively campaign for a narrowing in the power, income
and wealth gaps which cause health inequalities.

References
1 Alexander, B. (2008) The globalization of addiction: a study in poverty of the spirit, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
2 Carlisle, S. (2001) Inequalities in health: contested explanations, shifting discourses and ambiguous
policies, Critical Public Health, 11(3): 267-281.
3 Townsend, P., Davidson, N. and Whitehead, M. (1988) Inequalities in Health: the Black Report and the
Health Divide, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
4 Shaw, M., Dorling, D., Gordon, D. and Davey Smith, G. (2005) Health inequalities and New Labour: how
the promises compare with real progress, British Medical Journal 330: 1016 [doi:
10.1136/bmj.330.7498.1016].
5 Shaw, M., Dorling, D., Mitchell, R. and Smith, G.D. (2005) Labours Black Report Moment? British
Medical Journal 331: 575 [doi: 10.1136/bmj.331.7516.575].
6 Collins, C. with Dickson, J., and Collins, M. (2009) To Banker, from Bankies. Incapacity Benefit: Myth and
Realities, Glagow: Oxfam and Clydebank Independent Resource Centre.
7 Leyland, A., Dundas, R., McLoone, P. and Boddy F.A. (2007) Inequalities in mortality in Scotland 1981-
2001, Glasgow: MRC Social and Public Health Sciences Unit.
8 McCartney, G., Walsh, D., Whyte, B. and Collins, C. (Forthcoming) Has Scotland always been the sick
man of Europe? (Manuscript submitted for publication).
9 Hanlon, P., Walsh, D. and Whyte, B. (2006) Let Glasgow Flourish, Glasgow: Glasgow Centre for
Population Health.
10 McCartney, G. (2010) Illustrating Glasgows health inequalities, Journal of Epidemiology and Community
Health [doi 10.1136/jech.2010.120451].
11 Commission on the Social Determinants of Health (2008). Closing the gap in a generation: health equity
through action on the social determinants of health. Final Report of the Commission on Social
Determinants of Health, Geneva: World Health Organization.
12 Hofrichter, R. and Bhatia, R. (eds) (2010). Tackling health inequities through public health practice: theory
to action, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
13 Collins, C. and McCartney, G. (2011). The impact of neo-liberal political attack on health: The case of
the Scottish Effect, International Journal of Health Services 2011; 41(3): 501523 [doi:
10.2190/HS.41.3.f].
14 Collins, C. and McCartney, G. (2010). TINA is back. In: Scottish Review. The annual anthology,
Kilmarnock: Institute of Contemporary Scotland.
15 McCartney, G., Collins, C., Walsh, D. and Batty, D. (2011) Explaining Scotlands mortality: towards a
synthesis. Glasgow: Glasgow Centre for Population Health [Downloaded from
http://www.gcph.co.uk/publications/238_accounting_for_scotlands_excess_mortality_towards_a_synthesis
on 26th May 2011].
16 Beckfield, J. and Krieger, N. (2009) Epi+demos+cracy: Linking Political Systems and Priorities to the
Magnitude of Health InequitiesEvidence, Gaps, and a Research Agenda, Epidemiologic Reviews, 31:
152-177 [doi: 10.1093/epirev/mxp002].
17 Dorling, D. (2010) Injustice: why social inequality persists, Bristol: Policy Press.
18 Lasswell H. D. (1990). Politics: who gets what, when and how. Gloucester MA: Peter Smith Publisher.
19 Mackenbach, J.P., Stirbu, I., Roskam, A.J.R., Schapp, M.M., Menvielle, G., Leinsalu, M., and Kunst, A.E.
(2008) Socioeconomic Inequalities in Health in 22 European Countries, New England Journal of
Medicine 358: 2468-81.
20 Leinsalu, M., Stirbu, I., Vagero, D., Kaledien, R., Kova, K., Wojtyniak, B., Wroblewska, W., Mackenbach, J.
P. and Kunst, A.E. (2009) Educational inequalities in mortality in four Eastern European countries:
divergence in trends during the post-communist transition from 1990 to 2000, International Journal of
Epidemiology 38: 512525 [doi:10.1093/ije/dyn248].
21 Thomas, B., Dorling, D. and Smith G.D. (2010) Inequalities in premature mortality in Britain: observational
study from 1921 to 2007, British Medical Journal 341: c3639 [doi:10.1136/bmj.c3639].
22 Raphael, D. (2011) Mainstream media and the social determinants of health: is it time to call it a day?
Health Promotion International 2011; [doi:10.1093/heapro/dar008].
23 Gasiorowski, A. and Stockton, D. (2010) Health and Wellbeing profiles 2010: Renfrewshire CHP,
Edinburgh: Information Services Division (ScotPHO).
24 Wilkinson, R. and Pickett, K. (2009) The Spirit Level. Why more equal societies almost always do better,
London: Allen Lane.

Oxfam GB June 2011
www.oxfam.org.uk

Wellbeing, consumer
culture and the new poor
Dr Sandra Carlisle and Professor Phil Hanlon
June 2011
www.oxfam.org.uk
About the authors
Sandra Carlisles academic background lies in medical social anthropology and
sociology, applied to community health and wellbeing. She has conducted
numerous public health and policy-related research and evaluation projects, in
academic and voluntary-sector settings. She is currently based in the Centre for
Population and Health Sciences at the University of Glasgow, working with
Professor Phil Hanlon on an investigation of the relationship between modern
culture and wellbeing.
Email: sandra.carlisle@glasgow.ac.uk
Phil Hanlon is Professor of Public Health at the University of Glasgow. He has

worked as Director of Health Promotion for the Greater Glasgow Health Board
and established the Public Health Institute of Scotland, before returning to full-
time academic life. He leads the Culture and Wellbeing study, funded by the
Scottish Government and the Glasgow Centre for Population Health. Phil is
actively engaged in developing new forms of thinking for the public health
community, given the stark challenges of the 21st century.
Email: phil.hanlon@glasgow.ac.uk.
Much of our work is accessible at: www.afternow.co.uk.
2 Wellbeing, consumer culture and the new poor

Contents
Introduction .............................................................................................. 5
1. Wellbeing and economics ................................................................. 5

The paradox of rising income and declining wellbeing ......................... 6
2. Wellbeing and modern culture ......................................................... 7

What is culture and why does it matter?............................................. 7
Are we consumers or commodities? .................................................... 8
3. The modern economy and the new poor ....................................... 8

Who are the new poor in modern society? ......................................... 8
4. Voices from Scotland ........................................................................ 9

In defence of the modern economy ..................................................... 9
Look out for yourself! ......................................................................... 10
Trapped in the cycle of consumerism ................................................ 10
5. An unsustainable economy ............................................................ 11

Facing a perfect storm...................................................................... 11
Conclusion.............................................................................................. 12
References .............................................................................................. 13
Notes ....................................................................................................... 15
Wellbeing, consumer culture and the new poor 3

Executive summary
The authors have been engaged in an exploration of the relationship between
wellbeing and modern culture for a number of years, drawing on knowledge
from many different academic disciplines. This paper summarises some key
insights and conclusions from that work.
Section 1 of this paper briefly rehearses some long-held assumptions about the
connection between the modern economy and wellbeing. It then describes the
flaws in such thinking that have been exposed by other economists and
psychologists, who have found that the connection between economic growth
and high levels of social wellbeing and individual happiness is questionable.
Section 2 suggests that individual and social wellbeing is shaped, at least in part,
by the beliefs, meanings and values that lie at the heart of modern society our
culture, in other words. Evidence from many disciplines now suggests that the
individualised, materialist, consumerdriven culture produced by the modern
economy results in increased mental distress and static happiness levels for many
people. There are profound implications here for how we create our identities in
society, and for what we take to be the good life.
Section 3 describes how modern society has also seen the emergence of a new
category of poor people, described by one sociologist as flawed consumers (see
Hamilton in this series of papers) who suffer because of their perceived lack of
value to the modern economy. This damages social cohesion and undermines our
capacity for compassion.
Section 4 briefly presents some findings from the authors qualitative research in
this field, conducted with different socio-economic groups across Scotland.
Section 5 turns to the emergence of a perfect storm of global problems, and

argues that these have been driven by certain aspects of the modern economy
and the kinds of society and cultural value systems that it has produced.
The paper concludes by arguing that a very sharp turn is needed in some of the
basic assumptions that underpin modern life, if we are to protect and promote
human wellbeing, lead lives worth living, and create a sustainable society over
the longer term.

Introduction
We have been investigating the relationship between wellbeing, modern
culture, and the modern economy for a number of years. Our work draws on
knowledge and insights from experts in many disciplines.i We focus on
wellbeing not just because this is essential to how we function in society, but to
how we feel about ourselves and our lives. Research (briefly referred to in
Sections 1 and 2 below) suggests that too many people in our communities
neither function well, nor feel good in modern society. These are complex issues
that cannot fully be explored here, so this paper highlights just some of our key
findings and the conclusions these lead us to.
The connection between the modern economy and our wellbeing is important.
Most economists would agree that the primary function and over-riding purpose
of any countrys economy is to serve the wellbeing of all its citizens, and that
economic growth increases wellbeing. Economic growth has, over many decades,
brought health and social benefits to many people. Yet research evidence is
accumulating that such growth is subject to diminishing returns in terms of
human wellbeing, and represents a potential threat to global human society, as
we explain in Sections 3 and 5 below.
In sum, this paper briefly sets out some of the multi-disciplinary evidence that
modern society and its economic system, and the cultural values and beliefs that
support it, have produced widening health and social inequalities, rising rates of
mental health problems (such as anxiety and depression), and larger global
problems (such as recurrent economic crises and climate change). We also make
the connections between the economy, our wellbeing, and the emergence of a
new kind of poor person (see Section 3 below): one judged by their inability to
fully participate in consumer culture. This might encourage indifference, by
those who are affluent, to the plight of poorer people, and thus represents a real
threat to social cohesion and compassion.
1. Wellbeing and economics

To massively over-simplify, economists have traditionally assumed that we are
all rational beings who maximise our wellbeing through making rational choices
in life. The more choices we have, the happier we are, and choice is facilitated by
income and wealth. As research has found that richer individuals in all societies
are happier than their poorer peers, it looks like economists have got this right.
Economists have also assumed that increases in average levels of happiness in a
society can be related to increases in its purchasing power. If the economy does
well, so does our wellbeing.
i Readers are welcome to contact us (email sandra.carlisle@glasgow.ac.uk) for copies of any of our
publications, as listed in the references at the end of this paper. Many shorter papers are also available to
download from our website, www.afternow.co.uk.

So the assumption has always been that more is better for all of us, as individuals
and across society. These key assumptions of economic theory were developed in
times of scarcity, when it was unimaginable that we might be faced with
problems of excess. However, a number of flaws in traditional economic thinking
about wellbeing have been exposed through research, described briefly below.
The paradox of rising income and declining

wellbeing
No-one doubts that poverty, whether absolute or relative, is a cause of profound
individual and social misery, damaging to human health and wellbeing.
However, a number of surprising findings have emerged from decades of
research into the connection between the economy, income and wellbeing.
Richard Easterlin is an economist who has found that societies do not necessarily
get happier as they get richer.1 He, and many others since, have found that levels
of happiness have stayed static since the 1950s, although our incomes have risen
four-fold in real terms.
Research shows that average levels of wellbeing in society increase up to middle

income levels (around 15,000 per person per year), but then rapidly level off.
The main point is that, after basic needs are met, then extra income produces
diminishing returns for average levels of wellbeing.ii Since wellbeing has been
regularly measured from the 1950s onward the percentage of people who
judge themselves as very happy has not increased at all, and levels of wellbeing
seem to be declining, despite real increases in income.2,3
Many authors point to the socially-embedded nature of wellbeing. Wellbeing is

protected and promoted through strong social relationships friends, family,
and community. Being engaged in meaningful work also matters, as does having
a purpose in life, and living in a tolerant society that values freedom.
Nevertheless, psychologist Oliver James suggests that many people in modern

society fail to understand what really promotes wellbeing. We suffer from what
he calls affluenza - a painful, contagious, socially-transmitted condition of
overload, debt and anxiety that results from efforts to keep up with the Joneses.4
Affluenza is an epidemic of stress, overwork, waste and indebtedness caused by
the pursuit of what we imagine to be the good life. This insight points us to the
influence of modern culture over that vision of the good life, as our modern
economic and cultural systems are closely connected.5
ii We need to bear in mind that what counts as basic needs varies across societies, and changes with time.
Also, even in an affluent society such as the UK, we know that the basic needs of many people are not
being met.

2. Wellbeing and modern culture
Research by an Australian public health researcher, Richard Eckersley, indicates
that the culture of modern society is fundamentally damaging to our health and
happiness.6 Eckersley concludes that modern Western culture seems to be based
on the very things that are detrimental to health and happiness. Many people
might see this as an odd claim. We know that modernity has brought us lasting
health and social benefits and most of us, regardless of income, live in ways
unthinkable to ancestors only a few generations removed from us. Nevertheless,
there is now a burgeoning body of research that indicates that we are now
experiencing diminishing returns from modern society, in terms of our health
and wellbeing.
We have, for example, seen a dramatic rise in rates of mental health problems
(particularly depression and anxiety), increasing rates of various types of
addictions (drugs, alcohol, gambling, the obesity epidemic etc), all of which
seem to have been accompanied by a general decline in social cohesion, a sense
of community and so on.7,8 Eckersleys point is that the culture of modern society
is, at least in part, to blame.9
What is culture and why does it matter?

There is no single definition of culture, but it can be roughly understood as the
learned system of meanings and symbols which frame the way people see the
world. Culture is the means by which we make sense of life. Cultural aspects of
life are often taken for granted and misrecognised as part of the natural order of
things, rather than as a human construct.
Culture matters in relation to wellbeing because it influences the goals in life

which we value and pursue.10,11 Moreover, as culture can also influence the
distribution and availability of resources necessary to attain such goals, it has
relevance for our understanding of how social inequalities are created and
perpetuated.12,13 Cultural beliefs and assumptions matter because they reflect the
values that lie at the heart of society.
Eckersley suggests that modern society is dominated by four particular cultural

values:
Economism this is the tendency to view the world through the lens of
economics, to regard a country as an economy rather than a society, and to
believe that economic considerations and values are the most important ones
for our wellbeing.
Materialism in modern society, non-material aspects of life (such as
spirituality or aesthetics) may be squeezed out.

Individualism has brought us many freedoms and benefits. The downside is
that the onus of success in life rests with us as individuals. We are also seen
as responsible for failure. We are subject to the tyranny of higher expectations
in life and reduced social support and social control, all of which result in a
sense of increased risk, uncertainty and insecurity.
Consumerism, which is the attempt to acquire meaning, happiness and
fulfilment through the acquisition and the possession of material things.14
Are we consumers or commodities?

Bauman observes that the hidden truth of the modern economy is not that we are
all transformed from citizens into consumers that much is blatantly obvious.15
Rather it is our more subtle transformation, through consumerism, into sellable
commodities with market value. In the so-called affluent economy of modern
society we ourselves are consumer goods, obliged to sell ourselves in various
markets in order to have jobs and careers, social standing and even intimate
relationships. Yet social analysts note that, however much the economy grows, it
will always produce unhappiness, frustration and dissatisfaction because the
unlimited production of goods is intimately tied to the unlimited production of
wants.
What this suggests is that, unless we change our values and the things we believe
to be worthwhile then, no matter how much life may improve in material terms,
we will never feel we have enough (in terms of material possessions) and we will
never feel we are good enough (in terms of what we have achieved). In short, we
will never get off the treadmill that keeps us pursuing potentially unrealisable
goals that, even if achieved, may not bring lasting wellbeing.
3. The modern economy and the new

poor
Evidence from many disciplines now suggests that the individualised,
materialist, consumerdriven culture produced by the modern economy results
in increased mental distress and static happiness levels for many people. Social
commentators have observed that many of us live with ambient fear, anxiety and
insecurity. In the modern economy, jobs for life are now only for the privileged
few, with compulsory flexible working practices for the rest of us. And we have
also seen the emergence of what sociologist Zygmunt Bauman calls the new
poor.16
Who are the new poor in modern society?

In the UK and other Western-type societies, the social structure and economy
have changed: we have changed from a society and an economy that was built on

production to one that is dependent on consumption.17 In the past, unemployed
people were viewed as the reserve army of labour able to be recalled to
work, whether in the factory or the battlefield. But the modern economy means
that we are no longer a society of full employment based on the productive
capability of labour, and may never be so again.
Bauman suggests that, in a society where consumers are seen as the driving force
of economic prosperity, unemployed people or anyone living on a low income
are in danger of being seen as having little worth or value. 18 They carry no
credit cards; they cannot rely on bank overdrafts (so are forced to turn to payday
loans and doorstep lenders); and the commodities they need are in the basic
rather than luxury category and thus carry little profit for their traders. From the
perspective of purely economic rationality, keeping poorer people in decent,
humane conditions (the principal objective of the welfare state) is devoid of
common sense. This creates new sets of social relations with real and dangerous
consequences for society and for social policy not least, the danger of an
emerging indifference to the plight of the excluded by the relatively affluent, and
thus an increase in social fragmentation.19
4. Voices from Scotland

We investigated, through qualitative research appproaches, whether the isms of
modern culture identified above are experienced in everyday life across Scotland.
We interviewed individuals and groups from very different socio-economic
positions and backgrounds, such as senior executives from the private sector,
public sector people working in community health development, and people
living on a low income and/or experiencing social exclusion. We give below just
a very brief flavour of the different perspectives we found across these different
groups, as a fuller account is provided elsewhere.20,21 We were left in no doubt
that economism, individualism, materialism and consumerism are powerful
forces in many lives, although how these are experienced clearly differs across
different socio-economic groups.
In defence of the modern economy

An organisation representing the interests of consumers defended our present
economic system, saying that:
The market economy is the prevailing culture and ideology of the modern world,
including Scotland. Alternative social models tend to be coercive and corrosive of
freedom so there really is no alternative to market capitalism. Markets remain the most
efficient and least unjust way of organizing society, even though this involves great
disparities of wealth. All we can do is find mechanisms to mitigate the excesses.
Consumer Council

Look out for yourself!
However, one of the public health groups we spoke to felt that, in an
individualised society, people need to look out for themselves as there is little
real protection to be found elsewhere. They told us that:
Youve got families growing up with no expectations of ever working and any jobs
there are, are crap work for crap money. In days gone by when you had mining or
manufacturing you had your union, which was strong, and you were part of a
community. But now the only jobs you can get are call centres where there are no
unions. So you just look out for yourself.
Health Promotion Group
Trapped in the cycle of consumerism

Several groups spoke at length about the sense of isolation, pressure and
resulting vulnerability that many people feel nowadays. As one said:
People live in their own bubble, getting in their own car to drive to work, staying in
their own home. Community spirit has gone and this compounds the issue. Were all in
debt. Youre stressed, you go to work, you go home. You sit in front of the TV. Theres
no family dinner, no time to talk problems through, sort things out. Youre just
working to afford that TV. Theres no time for your children when you come home at
night. No time to talk.
Prisoner Group
The experience of exclusion and stigma associated with low social status and low
income was voiced by a group of people who had all suffered mental health
problems. As one said:
In a third world society I would be a millionairess with money, a home, warmth. Im
low down in my society because I dont work and live on benefits.
Mental Health Advocacy Group
Another member of this group suggested that the cultural values we referred to
are symptomatic of a society that values possessions, rather than people. They
also suggested that, for some groups in society it might be becoming okay to
sneer at the poor (see Mooney, this series of papers).
A particularly powerful critique of how modern society can damage us all was
articulated by one of the groups we spoke to, who said:
Our focus needs to go down to the spiritual to the value and worth of a human
being. Virtually nothing in society promotes that. We are exploitable because we are
fearful. Were all trapped in the cycle of consumerism.
Prisoner Group

5. An unsustainable economy
As a society we are also facing a set of larger trends and problems, driven by
certain aspects of the modern economy and the society and cultural value system
that it has produced. In already developed and affluent societies, the modern
economy has enticed us all with visions of the good life that are unsustainable
at the global level. The high levels of consumption involved in pursuing affluent
lifestyles draw so extensively on planetary resources that we have seen the
emergence of much larger problems which threaten us all.22
Those include global economic crises; climate change; the decline of key non-
renewable resources such as oil; and massive global increases in inequality and
injustice.23,24,25 Modern society and its neoliberal economy has produced a system
obsessed with limitless economic growth. That is now a global ideal exported
everywhere, and its consequences for the longer-term sustainability of human
society are alarming.
Facing a perfect storm

Research by the new economics foundation, amongst others, demonstrates that
all affluent societies are now living well beyond the capacity of the earth to
sustain a condition known as overshoot.26 If the whole world were to live at
UK levels of consumption, we would need more than three earth-like planets to
sustain us. If we follow USA patterns of consumption, we will need five or more.
It is clear that it is not people on a low income who have contributed much to this
problem: their resource use is comparatively low, and their ecological footprint is
comparatively light. However, in the absence of radical change, they are very
likely to bear the brunt of the coming storm.27
Change appears inevitable, given that patterns and levels of consumption in

affluent societies are not sustainable on a global scale. And it is becoming clear
that they contribute little to human wellbeing. So we urgently need to think
about how we can all find ways of living differently that will promote and
sustain wellbeing for us as individuals, for our families, communities and the
society we live in, and for the world as a whole.

Conclusion
A very sharp turn is needed, if we are to change. This will involve not just
questioning the way we live, but giving up some of its most sacrosanct
assumptions, such as believing that economic growth is an unqualified good,
despite damage done to the human condition and the natural world.
For example, Zygmunt Bauman recommends that we decouple individual

income entitlement from income-earning capacity.28 The taxation system should
provide all with a means to a decent life. This would preserve the ethical values
and social arrangements that underpin Western civilisation, in a context where
our institutions no longer guarantee their implementation.
There are also other ideas and models that can help us think differently and
challenge conventional thinking. Perhaps one of the most significant is the
concept of contraction and convergence developed by Aubrey Meyer of the
Global Commons Institute, in response to the threat of runaway climate change.29
Meyer notes that the whole world needs a contraction in the production of
carbon dioxide an output of increased industrialisation and economic growth.
Rich and poor nations must eventually converge in their carbon production, to
avoid catastrophe. Less developed nations must be allowed to develop so their
carbon use goes up whilst industrialised and post-industrial nations must
make substantial reductions.
This model of redistribution can, of course, be applied to many resources and not
just the carbon resources on which affluent societies depend. Increasingly, the
evidence suggests no really viable and sustainable alternative to this
propositition.
Yet it seems likely that changing the social structure and the economy will not, in
itself, achieve this even if we knew how to do it. If we are to survive and thrive,
then cultural change is also necessary. What we take to be the good life needs to
be re-thought and re-worked if our society is to be sustainable over the longer
term.30 And for our society to be worth living in, we need to develop a far greater
sense of care and compassion for others than presently seems to be the case.

References
Alexander B.K. (2008) The Globalisation of Addictions: a study in poverty of the spirit.
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Bauman Z. (1998) Work, Consumerism and the New Poor. Buckingham: Open
University Press.
Bourdieu P. (1984) Distinction: a Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. London:

Routledge.
Carlisle S., Hanlon P. and Hannah M. (2008) Status, taste and distinction in
consumer culture: acknowledging the symbolic dimensions of inequality. Public
Health, 122, 631-637.
Carlisle S., Hanlon P., Reilly D., Lyon A. and Henderson G. (forthcoming) Is
modern culture bad for our wellbeing? Views from elite and excluded
Scotland.
Easterlin R.A. (1980) Does Economic Growth Improve The Human Lot? Some
Empirical Evidence. Social Indicators Research, 8: 199-221.
Eckersley, R. (2005). Is modern Western culture a health hazard? International

Journal of Epidemiology 35(2): 252-258
Hanlon P. and Carlisle S. (2009) Is Modern Culture bad for our wellbeing?
Global Health Promotion, 16(4): 2734.
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) (2007) Fourth Assessment

Report. New York: Cambridge University Press.
James O. (2008) The Selfish Capitalist. London, Vermilion.
Lane, R.E. (2000) The Loss of Happiness in Market Democracies. London: Yale
University Press.
Layard, R. (2006) Happiness: Lessons from a New Science. Middlesex: Penguin

Books Ltd.
Lury, C. (2003) Consumer Culture. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Marks N., Abdallah A., Simms A. and Thompson S. (2006) The (un)Happy Planet
Index. An Index of Human Wellbeing and Environmental Impact. London: nef (new
economics foundation).
Meyer A. (2000) Contraction and Convergence: the global solution to climate change.
Devon: Schumacher Briefing No.5.

Ransom P. (2005) Work, Consumption and Culture: Affluence and Social Change in the
21st Century. London: Sage.
Rifkin J. (2009) The Empathic Civilization: the race to global consciousness in a world in
crisis. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Roberts B (2005) The End of Oil. London: Bloomsbury.
Sennett R. (2006) The culture of the new capitalism. New Haven: Yale University
Press.
Simms A., Woodward D. and Kjell P. (2004) Cast adrift: how the rich are leaving the
poor to sink in a warming world. nef (new economics foundation): London.
Simms A. and Smith J. (eds) (2007) Do good lives have to cost the earth? London:
Constable & Robinson.
Wilkinson R. and Pickett K. (2009) The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies
Almost Always Do Better. London: Allen Lane.
World Health Organisation (2001) Mental health: new understanding, new hope.
Geneva: World Health Organisation.

Notes
1. Easterlin (1980)
2. Lane (2006)
3. Layard (2006)
4. James (2008)
5. Lury (2003)
6. Eckersley (2006)
7. Alexander (2008)
8. WHO (2001)
9. Eckersley (2006)
10. Bourdieu (1984)
11. Offer (2006)
12. Wilkinson and Pickett (2009)
13. Carlisle, Hanlon and Hannah (2008)
14. Eckesley (2006)
15. Bauman (1998)
16. Ibid.
17. Ransom (2005)
18. Bauman (1998)
19. Sennett (2006)
20. Carlisle et al (forthcoming)
21. Hanlon and Carlisle (2009)
22. Rifkin (2009)
23. IPCC (2007)
24. Roberts (2005)
25. Simms et al (2004)
26. Marks et al (2006)
27. Simms et al (2004)
28. Bauman (1998)
29. Meyer (2000)
30. Simms and Smith (2007)

Oxfam GB June 2011
www.oxfam.org.uk

Keeping up appearances:
consumption and masking
poverty
Kathy Hamilton
June 2011
www.oxfam.org.uk
About the author
Kathy Hamilton is a senior lecturer in the Department of Marketing at the
University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. Her teaching and research interests fall
within the area of Consumer Culture Theory. Specifically she is interested in
consumer disadvantage and gender differences in consumer behaviour. She has
completed a qualitative study which focused on understanding the lived
experience of poverty against the backdrop of a society that is increasingly
dominated by consumption. In particular she considered the coping strategies
employed by low-income families to help them negotiate the marketplace, access
goods and services (including brands) and avoid stigmatisation. This work has
been published in a variety of journals including Journal of Marketing Management,
European Journal of Marketing, Advances in Consumer Research, Journal of Consumer
Behaviour and International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy.
Email: kathy.hamilton@strath.ac.uk
2 Keeping up appearances: consumption and masking poverty

Contents
Introduction .............................................................................................. 5
1. Poverty in consumer culture ............................................................ 5
2. Methodology ...................................................................................... 5
3. Findings and discussion ................................................................... 6

Experiences of stigma ......................................................................... 7
Masking poverty through consumption ................................................ 8
Discretionary and non-discretionary consumption ............................... 8
Conclusion................................................................................................ 9
References ................................................................................................ 9
Notes ......................................................................................................... 9
Keeping up appearances: consumption and masking poverty 3

Executive summary
Low-income consumers are unable to obtain the goods and services needed for
an adequate and socially acceptable standard of living.1 Drawing on
qualitative analysis, this paper highlights the lived experience of low-income
families in a consumer culture.
Findings demonstrate that, as well as dealing with the practical hardships of

providing for a family on a restricted budget, the interviewees have to cope with
negative attitudes and reactions from others. Some families perceive they are
already judged on the basis of their welfare dependency and do not want to fuel
stigmatisation in other ways. As a result, they turn to consumption as a coping
strategy.
Some families are skilled at reducing the visibility of poverty and overcoming
societys ability to alienate. This was especially important for the children in the
study who did not want to appear different from their peers. Masking poverty
through consumption could be viewed as a disconfirmation of the stereotype. By
displaying brand-name or on-trend products that are regarded as socially
acceptable among peer groups, low-income consumers distance themselves from
the stigma of poverty.
Findings indicate that low-income families may prioritise the consumption of

visible goods, such as brand-name clothing, over invisible, private goods, such as
food and other goods consumed in the home. As such, this research has
demonstrated the need to develop a critical assessment of consumerism and, by
extension, the role of marketing in it.

Introduction
This paper is based on a qualitative research project in Northern Ireland in 2004
to 2005 involving low-income families, mostly headed by single mothers. It aims
to demonstrate the lived experience of poverty in consumer culture.
Within consumer culture, individuals are expected to respond to marketplace

temptations. Shopping and consumption provide consumers with resources for
the construction and maintenance of identity. Within this context, those who are
constrained in consumption opportunities face exclusion and stigmatisation.
1. Poverty in consumer culture

Low-income consumers are individuals whose financial resources or income
results in them being unable to obtain the goods and services needed for an
adequate and socially acceptable standard of living.2 The mass media defines
socio-cultural ideals of what it means to be successful. Having access to the
right things has become vital as social identity centres on the visibility of
consumer goods and possessions. As a result, the poor of a consumer society are
socially defined, and self-defined, first and foremost as blemished, defective,
faulty and deficient in other words, inadequate consumers.3
2. Methodology
This paper draws on qualitative analysis of 30 in-depth interviews with low-
income families who encounter consumption constraints in the marketplace. The
study involved 25 single parent families (24 single mothers) and five two-parent
families. Families were selected from urban areas of Northern Ireland; the
majority of respondents were unemployed, although a small number were
working in low-paid jobs. The income level of the families averaged at 150 per
week. As poverty can affect the whole family unit, a family approach was
adopted in that all households included at least one child under the age of 18. In
16 families, a parent (normally the mother) was interviewed alone and in 14
families it was possible to arrange an interview with the main consumer
decision- maker along with their partner and/or children (aged 11 to 18).
Interview topics included everyday life (evaluation of circumstances relative to
other families and friends, feelings about shortage of money and its effect on
children), budgetary strategies (management of the household budget,
acquisition sites for goods and services), hopes for the future, family background
information, and financial circumstances (sources of income, attitudes to credit).

3. Findings and discussion
Low-income consumers are often treated as a homogeneous group. However,
findings from this study highlight the diversity of the low-income consumer
population. Each family has its own unique ideology in relation to structure,
background, values, communication patterns, employment status of main
breadwinner, roles and responsibilities. As such, strategies employed in response
to poverty can vary from family to family. Yet what is common is the difficultly
of negotiating consumer culture. Shopping is rarely considered an enjoyable
activity and indeed was described by some as a nightmare, hateful, struggle
and stressful. These consumers are forced to search for value for money and
need to be good at economising. Tedious financial planning is a necessity for
many of the families in the study and impulse spending is rarely an option.
Instead, respondents follow a variety of financial management strategies and
practice smart budgeting, such as making lists, shopping in discount stores and
searching for bargains. The examples below profile some of the study
participants.
Case 1
Denise (43) and Barry (40) had two teenage sons, aged 15 and 17. Both were
unemployed and believed that remaining on welfare benefits was their best
financial option. A re-occurring topic of conversation was the difficulty of buying
clothes for their sons and they gave examples of 49 branded designer or sports
T-shirts and 130 pairs of trainers. Barry commented, its ridiculous, they wont
wear cheap stuff. They just refuse point blank. Denise and Barry blamed peer
pressure in that they have to look as good as everybody else and nobody wants
their kids to be laughed at on the streets. Although they did not agree with using
their limited budget on expensive clothing, they felt there was little option: You
have to let them have it, you dont want them out stealing.
Case 2
Lorraine was 43, a widow with three children (aged 23, 21 and 14). She described
herself as a smart shopper and a bargain hunter. However, one area where she
felt she couldnt control expenditure as much as she would like was on clothing
for Lisa, her 14-year-old daughter: It seems to be that its the done thing to dress
your kids; I have to do it now, she has reached an age. For years I fooled her, as
long as I could, but I was never going to make her stand out from the rest of
them. Lisa agreed that she often picked clothes just because of their name and
because her friends would slag her if she did not wear brand-named clothing.

Case 3
Julie (24) was a single mother with a five-year-old daughter. She was a full-time
university student with income from a student loan and a dependence grant. She
described her lifestyle as very, very budgeted, very sacrificing and pressured.
Julie was very aware of societal expectations: Society is just geared to getting
that job, that 20 grand plus type of job, and you are expected to have the house
and the car so you are pretty much judged. Single parents are judged a lot and it
really annoys me. She continued, the media portrays this image that you have
to be slim and tall and beautiful and be very well groomed and be wearing
certain labels on clothes to be beautiful.
Case 4
Eva (45) had separated from her husband after 25 years of marriage. She had a
12-year-old daughter and two older children who no longer lived in the family
home. Eva had been part of a secretarial group until three years previously, when
the charity she worked for lost its funding. She had been unsuccessful in finding
new employment: Everything is for younger ones and when you get to my age
youre nearly put on the shelf, you cant get jobs or nothing. Its all for younger
ones. Theres nothing really for you. As a result, Eva was very lonely. She
didnt have enough money to socialise, and spent most of her time home alone.
Case 5
Janice was 23, a single mother with two children aged six and four. She was
unemployed and having difficulty finding employment that fit around caring for
her children. She shopped in low-cost and second-hand outlets and was very
aware of potential stigmatisation: I know people do judge you, there are people
who look down on you for what you wear and the way you talk, there are people
who will look down on you for any reason My friends back home all have jobs
and houses and cars. My mum has a big house, my brother, who is four years
younger than me, has his own house and car, and I feel like Im stuck on the
outside.
Experiences of stigma
As indicated in these cases, as well as dealing with the practical hardships of
providing for a family on a restricted budget, the interviewees have to cope with
the negative attitudes and reactions of others. Respondents surviving on welfare
encounter stigmatisation and negative reactions from other members of society,
and during the interviews many noted that they met contempt in everyday life.
Some believe that the prioritisation of paid work creates stigma for those on
benefits. These families perceive they are judged for their welfare dependency
and do not want to fuel stigmatisation in other ways. They are already perceived

as other and do not want to display further visible signs of social difference. As
a result, they turn to consumption as a coping strategy.
Masking poverty through consumption

Findings show that some low-income consumers are skilled at reducing the
visibility of their poverty and overcoming the consumer societys tendency to
alienate. Masking poverty from outsiders was especially important for the
children in the study, who did not want to appear different from their peers. Peer
pressure and fear of social difference affected almost all the families, highlighting
the strong social pressure to conform. Within consumer culture there is a large
emphasis on designer brand names that have high brand-awareness among
children, even those younger than school age. Children are presented with the
ideologies of the consumer culture through a variety of socialisation agents such
as the media, peer groups and even other family members. Consequently, they
are very aware of their projected image, and place a large emphasis on brand-
named products in terms of the clothes they wear and even the food they eat.
Masking poverty through consumption could be viewed as a disconfirmation of
the stereotype. By displaying brand-name products that are regarded as socially
acceptable among peer groups, low-income consumers distance themselves from
the stigma of poverty.
Discretionary and non-discretionary consumption

Youd have to cut back, maybe instead of having a full dinner youd have maybe beans
and toast or egg and chips. Eva
Findings indicate that low-income families may prioritise the consumption of

visible goods, such as brand-name clothing, over invisible, private goods, such
as food and other goods consumed in the home. Thus, current categories of
discretionary and non-discretionary spending need to be revisited when
considering the behaviour of those experiencing poverty, as do hierarchy-of-
needs frameworks that suggest consumers meet basic needs for food and shelter
before buying the more discretionary social goods, such as branded trainers.
For low-income consumers, with food spending (in terms of quantity and quality
at least) there is some discretion. By contrast, spending on branded clothing and
footwear is in fact non-discretionary: these consumers present themselves to the
world through their spending on visible goods, giving added meaning to the
term conspicuous consumption. Any lack is an indicator of poverty, bringing
with it the associated stigma and shame.4 This suggests that new categories of
consumption are needed for low-income families, of visible and invisible goods.

Conclusion
This research has demonstrated the need to develop a critical assessment of
consumerism and, by extension, the role of marketing in it. Through various
marketing communication messages, marketers promote a consumption lifestyle
that advocates the abundance of consumption opportunities and constructs an
ideology of free choice. However, free choice is dependent upon the necessary
financial resources so this choice is significantly reduced for families
experiencing poverty. They are made to feel inadequate if they are unable to
partake in the consumer culture and acquire their share of the ever-increasing
range of consumer goods and services. Consequently, the display of consumer
goods becomes an important coping strategy for low-income families.
References
Bauman, Z. (2005). Work, Consumerism and the New Poor, Buckingham: Open
University Press
Darley, W. K. and Johnson, D. M. (1985) A Contemporary Analysis of the Low

Income Consumer: An International Perspective in Tan, C.T. and Sheth, J. N.
(Eds.), Historical Perspectives in Consumer Research: National and International
Perspectives (pp. 206-210). Association for Consumer Research: Provo, UT.
Hamilton, K. and Catterall, M. (2007) Love and Consumption in Poor Families

Headed By Lone Mothers, Advances in Consumer Research, Vol. 34, pp. 559-564.
Notes
1 Darley and Johnson (1985)
2 Darley and Johnson (1985)
3 Bauman (2005)
4 Hamilton and Catterall (2007)

Oxfam GB June 2011
www.oxfam.org.uk

Stigmatising poverty?
The Broken Society and
reflections on anti-
welfarism in the UK today
Gerry Mooney
June 2011
www.oxfam.org.uk
About the author
Gerry Mooney is Senior Lecturer in Social Policy and Criminology, Department
of Social Policy and Criminology, Faculty of Social Sciences at The Open
University. Among other publications he is co-author of Understanding Social
Welfare Movements (Policy Press, 2009); co-editor of Community: Welfare, Crime and
Society (Open University Press, 2009) and of Criminal Justice in Scotland (Willan,
2010); and co-editor of Social Justice and Social Policy in Scotland (Policy Press,
forthcoming 2012).
Email: G.C.Mooney@open.ac.uk
2 Stigmatising poverty?
The Broken Society and reflections on anti-welfarism in the UK today
Contents
Introduction: the state of welfare in the contemporary UK .................. 4
1. The UK as a Broken Society ........................................................... 5
2. Anti-welfarism and anti-poor: poverty porn .................................. 6

The Scheme: misrepresenting poverty? .............................................. 7
3. Conclusion: in defence of welfare .................................................... 7
Recommendations ................................................................................... 8
References ................................................................................................ 9
Notes ....................................................................................................... 10
Stigmatising poverty? 3
Executive summary
In the context of deep economic and financial crisis, and amidst rising
inequalities, blame for several of the main social problems affecting the
contemporary UK is being apportioned to some of the most disadvantaged
sections of society.
This blaming is driven by a strong anti-welfarism that regards social welfare

provision as among the key factors contributing to a social and moral crisis in the
UK today.
The media also plays a key role in producing and reproducing anti-poor and
anti-welfare ways of thinking, sensationalising some of the more negative aspects
of life in disadvantaged communities. This representation of people experiencing
poverty serves to set them as a group apart from normal and mainstream
society.
Anti-poor narratives, together with media misrepresentations of poverty

increasingly referred to as poverty porn,1 work to harden attitudes to social
welfare in general and to people in poverty specifically.
Introduction: the state of welfare in

the contemporary UK
We are living in a period characterised by a virulent and comprehensive assault
not on poverty, but on people experiencing poverty. At one level, such an assault
is evidenced by UK Coalition Government pronouncements and policies2 that
talk of a renewed phase of welfare reform, which in essence is a concerted
attack on welfarism and welfare benefits. This attack is also marked by policies
that will introduce even tighter controls on the recipients of welfare, more
conditionality, and harsher penalties for offenders and transgressors. This is
accompanied by an ideological onslaught on people experiencing severe poverty
and disadvantage, constructing them as among the central problematic
populations in the contemporary UK.
Of course, in some respects this is not new: for much of the past century and a
half, welfare, of whatever shape or form, has been accompanied by a narrative
which divides the poor into two groups: those whose poverty and predicament
is largely due to factors outside their immediate control, a respectable poor,
alongside another group, the disreputable, disorderly or problem poor who
are held up as in some way responsible for their own position.
In the periods in which anti-poor narratives and thinking have come to the fore,
the wider economic and social contexts are also of crucial importance. Today this
is also the case. We are in the midst of one of the deepest and most far-reaching
assaults on public services and social welfare, and on some of the most
disadvantaged groups in society, with a UK government committed to
accelerating and deepening the 13 years of New Labour attacks which set the
stage for this current onslaught.
That this is a period of deep recession and economic crisis is also significant, in
that this is being used to legitimate a series of austerity measures and the
wholesale restructuring and reform of welfare provision. While the economic
and financial crisis gains the news headlines and much of the attention, for the
UK government accompanied by an assortment of observers and sections of the
media there is another crisis. This social and moral crisis, captured by the term
Broken Society, has been construed as contributing to the economic problems
that the country is experiencing.
This paper highlights some of the main features and elements of the Broken
Society perspective, and argues that this works to other and to stigmatise
people experiencing poverty. How social problems are constructed, including the
language and terminology used, have always been key indicators of the form that
subsequent policy interventions will take. The Broken Society is no different:
driven by a language that speaks of the problems of welfare dependency, it
works to mobilise and legitimate a harsher regime for welfare recipients, as well
as encouraging a strong anti-welfarism in general.
1. The UK as a Broken Society

Among the most virulent anti-welfare messages in the contemporary UK is
captured in the phrase Broken Society itself. Initially popularised by Iain
Duncan Smith and the Conservatives Centre for Social Justice (CSJ),3 the term
Broken Britain has become a recurring staple of media and popular
commentaries about the social health of UK society, and has increasingly
featured across a range of narratives regarding the future shape and direction of
social welfare.
What helps to make the Broken Society idea so potent and pervasive that it is a
very flexible notion, able to be deployed as an explanation for a range of social
problems and popular social ills. For Conservatives such as Iain Duncan Smith
and David Cameron, a central argument is that the broken and failing society has
its roots in broken families. Teenage pregnancies, increasing numbers of one-
parent households caught-up in a dependency culture, feature prominently in
this perspective. Also, according to the Conservatives, Labours failure to defend
and support marriage is a key factor accounting for the prevalence of street
violence, drug addiction and a range of other social problems.
While five poverty drivers are identified: family breakdown, welfare
dependency, educational failure, addiction to drugs and alcohol, and serious
personal debt, it is clear from the CSJs report Every Family Matters,4 that marriage
and a stable two-parent family life are seen by the government as central to
mending Broken Britain and thereby reducing levels of poverty.
The idea that family life in Britain is increasingly dysfunctional provides for a
renewed familialism (i.e. the idea that individual and public wellbeing are
increased through support for heterosexual nuclear families), with the
Conservatives promising to bring back some recognition of marriage to the UK
tax system if they won the 2010 general election. However, such familialism is far
from being an exclusively Conservative viewpoint. New Labour before them
drew a distinction between hardworking families and other families, who
clearly were seen as loafers. In his 2009 Labour Party Conference speech, for
example, the then Prime Minister Gordon Brown spoke of problem, chaotic
and dysfunctional families, 50,000 of which are seemingly a primary source of
much of the anti-social behaviour across Britain.5
Stigmatising language is being deployed that talks of aspirational deficits,

dysfunctional and deviant behaviours, an absence of social capital, and a
seemingly expanding range of moral and behavioural problems. Poor people and
poor communities are all too frequently talked about (and less often talked with)
in terms of deficit, inadequacies and lackings (aside from their lacking an
adequate income!). Much of this echoes the largely discredited culture of
poverty6 arguments of the early 1970s now dusted down and deployed in a
new format.
2. Anti-welfarism and anti-poor:

poverty porn
The anti-welfare and anti-poor political and policy-making approach highlighted
above is accompanied by a wide-ranging media assault on people experiencing
poverty. This can be seen across a diverse range of formats in the 24/7 news
media: through newspapers, television, and increasingly on the internet, in blogs
etc, that seize on any case of apparent dysfunctionality in poor communities.7
Once again, this serves to both produce and reproduce dominant attitudes to
poverty and to welfare in general while at the same time also expressing
largely middle and upper class fear and distrust of the poor. These then serve to
harden attitudes to poverty and to justify harsher welfare policies. Alongside
these, television documentaries and reality TV shows also allow experts to
adjudicate on the faults of working class and disadvantaged lifestyles,
emphasising the need for self-improvements and self-help.8 Television
programmes such as Jeremy Kyle, Tricia, Secret Millionaire, and Saints and Sinners
are among the most notable in a seemingly growing list of what is increasingly
referred to as the poverty porn genre. The messages presented are pervasive
reflecting and forging an anti-welfarism that fits neatly with, and legitimates,
state agendas for welfare reform and austerity policies.
Together with the expressions of middle class fear and distrust of poor people,
there is also a fascination with poverty and the supposedly deviant lifestyles of
those affected where viewers are encouraged to find the worst and weakest
moments of peoples lives funny and entertaining. This is offered up for
consumption on a wider, cross-class basis yet it is clear that it reflects middle
class antipathies and angst. At the same time, it delineates working class
communities as the real poor who need to be controlled. In this respect it plays
to wider government- and media-generated narratives about scroungers and
the undeserving poor.
The Scheme: misrepresenting poverty?

A key illustration of poverty porn is BBC Scotlands reality television
programme The Scheme. The first two parts of this four-part series was broadcast
across Scotland in May 2010, 9 presenting the community of a deprived housing
scheme Onthank in Kilmarnock as entertainment for public consumption. The
Scheme purported to offer a warts n all documentary account of life in
Onthank. It positioned the viewer in judgement over the behaviour and lifestyles
of those exhibited and showcased the dysfunctional elements of family
relationships, unemployment, addictions and violence.
The series provoked a great deal of debate and controversy across Scotland and
beyond, reflected in considerable press coverage and presence on social
networking sites and online discussion forums. One of the most forceful
criticisms of The Scheme and poverty porn more generally is that it provides
a view of poverty, and people experiencing poverty, out of context, with no
consideration of the underlying social and economic factors that work to
generate and reproduce poverty over time (in this case, for example, the
devastating economic change in East Ayrshire). The Scheme and similar
programmes depend upon a largely cultural and behaviour-centred approach
one which focuses on the individual and family, and on specific lifestyles which
are seen as working to keep people in poverty.
3. Conclusion: in defence of welfare

The central argument to emerge from this discussion is that, in the contemporary
UK, there is a strong anti-welfare agenda that is increasingly informing policy
approaches to poverty and to poor people. Echoing through UK coalition
government pronouncements is a perspective that welfare is both morally and
socially corrupting. It undermines individual responsibility, encourages
worklessness and fecklessness, and is associated with a range of other
problematic and troublesome behaviours.
People experiencing poverty are all too often stigmatised in government, political
and policy-making rhetoric. They are the targets of policy interventions, yet
underpinning this is a view that welfare is, in itself, problematic.
Where does this leave those who are interested in combating such otherings and
stigmatisation? A starting point must surely be the defence of welfare itself (see
Sinfield, this series of papers). In the not too distant past, social security was
seen as a bedrock of the UK welfare state. It did not carry the negative
connotations that are now associated with welfare, even if welfare itself was in
the past also regarded as a public good, a right. The negativity and morally
disrupting sense of welfare today, initially imported from the USA in the late
1970s and increasingly reinforced by successive UK governments since, must be
challenged by those of us who wish to see a progressive sense of welfare upon
which can be built a socially just and effective approach to ending poverty.
Welfare is a contested idea,10 but an idea that must be defended.
Recommendations
Those interested in defending social welfare and producing a more socially-
just approach to poverty must be continually alert to the language and
terminology used and to the continuing pervasiveness of anti-poor
sentiments and thinking.
In developing a socially-just approach to poverty, attention should be

refocused on the entire income distribution. This means considering the
privileges and lifestyles of the rich, whose often problematic and disorderly
behaviour attracts little of the antipathy attached to problematic behaviour
among some of those in poverty.
There needs to be understanding that social welfare and the creation of a

more equal society brings benefits to all people living in that society.
References
Brown, G. (2009) Speech to the Annual Conference of the Labour Party, Brighton,
September 29.
Centre for Social Justice (2009) Every Family Matters, London: CSJ available at
http://www.centreforsocialjustice.org.uk/default.asp?pageRef=266
Daly, M. (2011) Welfare, Cambridge: Polity Press.
DWP (2011) Welfare Reform Bill 2011, London: Department for Work and
Pensions, available at: http://www.dwp.gov.uk/policy/welfare-
reform/legislation-and-key-documents/welfare-reform-bill-2011/index.shtml
Ellen, B. (2010) Please give generously, but not to Poverty TV, The Guardian,
May 23.
Kane, P. (2010) Its not about people or poverty. The Scheme is quite simply
porn, The Herald June 1.
Lewis, O. (1959) Five Families: Mexican Case Studies in the Culture of Poverty, New
York: Basic Books.
Lewis, O. (1996 (1966)) The Culture of Poverty, in G. Gmelch and W. Zenner

(eds) Urban Life, Prospect Heights, Waveland Press.
McLaughlin, M. (2010) Brutal eye-opener or poverty porn? The Scotsman, May

28.
Mooney, G. (2009) The Broken Society Election: Class Hatred and the Politics of
Poverty and Place in Glasgow East, Social Policy and Society, 3, 4: 1-4.
Mooney, G. and Hancock, L. (2010) Poverty Porn and the Broken Society,
Variant, 39/40, Winter.
Mooney, G. and Wright, S. (2011) Presenting and Representing Poverty, in J.

McKendrick, G. Mooney, J. Dickie and P. Kelly (eds) Poverty in Scotland 2011:
Towards a More Equal Scotland? London: CPAG.
Skeggs, B. (2005) The making of class and gender through visualising moral
subject formation, Sociology, 39, 5: 965-982.
Notes
1 See Barbara Ellen 2010; Pat Kane 2010; and Martyn McLaughlin 2010
2 For example, the 2011 Welfare Reform Bill, see DWP 2011
3 See Mooney 2009
4 Centre for Social Justice (2009)
5 Gordon Brown 2009
6 See Oscar Lewis 1959 and 1966/1996
7 See Mooney 2009
8 See Bev Skeggs 2005
9 The second two programmes in the series were not broadcast due to a legal case involving someone who
appeared in the final two programmes. The entire series was subsequently broadcast in May 2011. See
also Gerry Mooney and Sharon Wright 2011 and Gerry Mooney and Lynn Hancock 2010
10 See Mary Daly 2011
Oxfam GB June 2011
www.oxfam.org.uk
Housing, class and

regeneration: exploring the
new inequalities
Kirsteen Paton
June 2011
www.oxfam.org.uk
About the author
Dr Kirsteen Paton is a researcher and lecturer in Sociology at the University of
Glasgow. Her main research interests are urban restructuring and stratification
and new working-class studies. She recently completed her ESRC CASE PhD
study with West Glasgow Against Poverty (Westgap) and Oxfam: The hidden
injuries and hidden rewards of urban restructuring on working-class communities: a case
study of gentrification in Partick, Glasgow. This critically examined the impacts of
the governments use of gentrification as a regeneration strategy on working-
class lives and community.
Email: kirsteen.paton@glasgow.ac.uk
2 Housing, class and regeneration: exploring the new inequalities

Contents
Introduction .............................................................................................. 5
Housing policy in historical context ....................................................... 6
Contemporary housing policy: regeneration or privatisation? ............ 6

Case study: gentrification and regeneration policy ..................................... 7
Conclusion: housing and privatisation in hard times

back to the future? ................................................................................. 11
Notes ....................................................................................................... 12
Housing, class and regeneration: exploring the new inequalities 3

Executive summary
This paper explores issues of class-based inequalities in housing, particularly
housing regeneration. It argues that housing is an inherently classed issue and an
ongoing source of inequality. Hard fought gains in the 20th century in improving
access through social housing provisions are being subtly and profoundly
undermined. In the 21st century the states investment in social housing provision
in the UK has receded. Housing has altered in its role as a collective social
welfare provision to a more privatised and individualised form. These processes
are compounded by an ideological shift towards home-ownership, whereby
home-ownership is seen as the preferred tenure, and social housing a non-choice;
a necessity or a last resort. This creates a new set of inequalities in urban
regeneration which are often hidden from view in working-class
neighbourhoods: these people and places are often marginalised in regeneration
processes.
The findings in this paper are taken from a research project into the impacts that
urban regeneration in Partick, Glasgow has on the local working-class
community. This research was carried out from 2005 until 2009. The project was
the result of collaboration between Westgap (West Glasgow Against Poverty),
Oxfam and the University of Glasgow. All three groups came together with a
shared concern about the effects that regeneration policies were having on the
communities and neighbourhoods that they claimed to help. This was borne out
of Westgaps concern around the changes they saw happening in Partick,
particularly with the redevelopment of the former granary site into the Glasgow
Harbour housing development, which began in 2003. Westgap has been a
registered charity operating in Partick for over ten years. It is an anti-poverty
group run by and for people who have first-hand experience of poverty. Westgap
is concerned with the experiences of poverty and inequality of groups and
individuals who are often marginalised and obscured from view.
In this paper the focus is primarily on the experience of some of the inequalities in
relation to housing and regeneration taking place in the neighbourhood giving
voice to residents experiencing such processes. Regeneration often takes the form
of gentrification, which sees the local government promote land sale and private
housing developments in neighbourhoods as a strategy of dealing with social or
economic problems. Social housing has also changed in form: burdened with the
responsibility of generating revenue, it has shifted away from the social welfare
model to an increasingly business-oriented one. Both these aspects of housing
regeneration limit the housing opportunities for local working-class residents in
Partick. This paper highlights the hidden injuries of regeneration: the heightened
insecurity of tenure, and evidence of the displacement of local residents as they
find it increasingly difficult to secure a tenancy or buy a home in their own
neighbourhood. This demonstrates the need for state investment and
intervention in housing provision. It is argued that this requires a return to

public-subsidised housing, and a focus on housing inequality on the basis of a
rights-based agenda rather than in terms of consumerism.
Introduction
Housing is an inherently classed issue. The ability to access and secure ones
housing tenure continues to be a source of inequality in UK society. Hard fought
gains throughout the 20th century in improving access through public housing
provisions are being subtly yet profoundly undermined. Social housing in the
21st century has faced disinvestment and increasing privatisation, compounded
by an ideological shift towards homeownership. This is epitomised by, this paper
argues, gentrification. Gentrification has been described as a blueprint for urban
regeneration in the UK,1 used to improve working-class neighbourhoods by
increasing both private housing stock and the population of middle-class
residents. I offer a sociological exploration of how gentrification has been used as
a local government policy, and what this represents in broad terms political
restructuring that heralds the shift away from collective consumption towards
neoliberalism, a form of political economy which relates to marketisation.
Neoliberalism holds that the state is best regulated by the market, so that state
actions and policies are submitted to the considerations of profitability, and the
social contract of state welfare, previous notions of citizenship and collective
consumption are dismantled. This has serious ramifications for state-subsidised
housing, seen in policy changes such as Right to Buy which will be discussed in
the following section. It also creates a new set of inequalities in housing in
relation to regeneration, which will also be discussed, that are often obscured
from view. Working-class people and places are frequently marginalised from
housing policy, yet are the targets of policy, whilst simultaneously being at the
sharpest end of market change. Dispossessing or depriving someone of their own
home is a heinous act of injustice2 which is why it is important that we give
voice to these experiences. In doing so, this paper highlights the hidden
inequalities caused by housing regeneration, as a way of demonstrating the need
for state investment and intervention in housing provision.

Housing policy in historical context
In order to understand the changes that have taken place in housing policy it is
useful to have some historical context, albeit concise.3 Historically, inequality in
housing stems from a marketised, unregulated system, as it largely was under
early industrial capitalism. The Industrial Revolution saw inequality in access to
housing, poor standards, public health issues and the emergence of a new class
of landlords profiteering in what was a mostly unregulated market. Market
supply of housing, particularly in the rental sector, had the effect of reducing the
quality and security of tenancies and increasing rent rates.
Therefore state intervention has been critical in mediating housing inequalities.

This has seen the task of clearing British slums, providing affordable subsidised
housing, ensuring rent controls and the setting of building standards come to
dominate social policy for much of the 20th century.4 It is important to note that
these gains were hard fought for; the infamous challenging of private landlords
by working-class women resulted in the 1914 Rent Restrictions Act.
As such, municipal housing became the accepted tenure choice for families in
Britain. So much so that in 1979 council housing represented just under one-third
of all UK housing stock;5 while in Scotland this peaked in 1981, by which time
over half the population had lived in homes provided by the public sector.6
However, this was to be undermined with the 1979 Conservative government
who introduced the Right to Buy policy which gave long-term council residents
a discount to buy their rented property. In doing so, the state subsidised the sale
of a large proportion of council housing stock. This was a landmark policy and
signalled the curtailing of investment in municipal housing. This erosion of the
collective housing provision saw the introduction of the notion of consumer
citizenship: the private consumption of formerly state-subsidised collective
goods. A more recent housing policy strategy has further crystallised this via the
local governments use of gentrification as a regeneration strategy.
Contemporary housing policy:

regeneration or privatisation?
Gentrification is a process whereby working-class neighbourhoods are
transformed when middle-class families move in to the extent that a process of
class succession can take place and working-class residents can be outpriced and
displaced. From the 1990s onwards, gentrification became tightly woven with
policy, becoming the mainstay of urban regeneration.7

This was manifest in two key ways. First, self-financing imperatives of local
governments have seen them work more closely with private business to
generate revenue. Gentrification has been central to this, particularly the selling
off of disused or devalued land. Thus we see the redevelopment of sites once
given over to industry into new-build properties, shopping malls, casinos and so
on. Second, gentrification in policy relates to governance of local social processes.
This is evident in urban policies, such as the Urban Task Force report, Towards an
Urban Renaissance8 and the Scottish Executives People and Place policy statement.9
Middle-class settlement in working-class neighbourhoods is promoted in policy
through mixing tenure and in Scotlands community regeneration statement.10
This is underpinned by the idea that socially-mixed neighbourhoods provide a
solution to poverty. Middle-class residents bring the neighbourhood up by
improving the value, demanding greater services and acting as role models. The
belief is that the middle-classes are not just financially better off, they also have
high stocks of cultural, social and economic capital that can be transmitted
throughout neighbourhoods, having a positive, relational effect. Thus, their
settlement is believed to create virtuous circles and opportunity effects to
provide the means for the degenerated to regenerate themselves, rather than
relying on traditional state welfare provisions. Controversially, this essentially
blames the victims of deindustrialisation, disinvestment and housing policy such
as slum clearances, whose neighbourhoods and lives have been stigmatised.
Gentrification is a political strategy which typifies this change in housing policy in

the way that it fundamentally promotes housing privatisation. Social landlords
stock levels have been decreasing each year since the 1980s. The picture is one of
long-term disinvestment in municipal housing, and an ideological shift towards
market forms. In England, this latest statement of disinvestment is evident in the
2010 Comprehensive Spending Review, which saw a budget cut for the
construction of affordable new homes over the next few years by nearly 50 per
cent, from 8.4 billion to 4.5 billion.11 Scotland pertains to be taking different
action to England. The Scottish policy paper, Homes Fit for the 21st Century,12 billed
as a housing action plan for 2020, offers a range of initiatives for housing. Yet, in
the end, these initiatives effectively amount to cuts in public grants for housing
which suggests, despite the Scottish Governments efforts to the contrary, a
gradual shift to the English business model. As it stands, social housing has hit a
50-year low in Scotland,13 yet demand has increased. In 2001 there were 3.9 people
on council waiting lists for every let. This rose to 6.6 people per let in 2008.14
Across the UK, social housings role and institutional form has changed from a
primary concern with social wellbeing to a neoliberal model, through the partial
privatisation of associations precipitated by the Right to Buy and the 1988
Housing Act and 1988 Housing Act (Scotland), and compounded by Housing
Stock Transfer across the UK. More self-financing arrangements of council housing
are to be introduced. The very principal of secure tenancies within social housing,
which has protected against people being evicted in the UK, has been undermined.
This is familiar territory: a revival of the unequal conditions of marketised private

landlordism which was prevalent at the beginning of the 20th century. Today there
is a new privatisation of housing, seen in the promotion of home-ownership as

the ideal tenure, and also in privatisation of the social housing sector itself. This
shift highlights the potent yet often hidden effects of housing regeneration namely
creating insecurity in tenures which can, for some, end in eviction. This leads to
new inequalities in housing which are both cultural and material in form:
punitive treatment of working-class behaviours, including the stigmatisation of
renting social housing and claiming benefits; and economic inequalities, creating
greater insecurity around tenancies and limited access to housing.
Case study: gentrification and regeneration policy

Research undertaken from 2005-2009 in Partick, Glasgow, demonstrates the
effects of housing regeneration policy via gentrification on this formerly
industrial, working-class neighbourhood. The area of land next to the River
Clyde was regenerated into Glasgow Harbour: a private luxury-housing
development. Discreet forms of displacement are created by this regeneration
policy. I do not focus on the impacts of the Harbour development in causing
displacement per se but rather the changes within the neighbourhood relating to
the social housing provider, Partick Housing Association (PHA): social housing
stock has historically protected tenants from the effects of gentrification and
displacement by offering secure tenancies and regulated rent.
Changes have seen housing associations turn their attention to revenue-

generating activities. An example of this is the Associations use of property
development to create revenue. PHA created a risk isolator to build West 11, a
private luxury-housing development on Dumbarton Road. In 2011, a two-bed
apartment here was listed for sale at 270,000. Thus PHA contributed to
gentrification in the neighbourhood, enticing affluent homeowners and
increasing the number of privately-owned and rented stock. This can increase
house prices throughout the neighbourhood as it becomes increasingly desirable,
rebranded as the beating heart of the West End and, over time, middle-class
residents can outnumber the working-class population.
The impact of this is evident in the increased demand for social housing. In 2002,
there were 208 applicants on PHAs waiting list. By 2006 this was 400. In this
time, PHA barely built any new properties.15 This can lead to displacement
through lack of choice or suitable stock. Social housing tenants then face a
dilemma if their family size increases or circumstances change. Accessing a more
suitable property in their neighbourhood can be difficult. Instead, families have
to move out of Partick to a cheaper neighbourhood or attempt to transfer to the
private renting sector.
The local demand for housing is demonstrated in the following two residents
accounts. Gordon, 24, lives with his parents in Partick after being evicted from
his privately-rented flat. When the landlord increased the rent, believing the flats
value was increasing due to gentrification, Gordon couldnt afford to pay:
it just bothers me because you know I cant get anywhere to stay around where I
live now. I cant afford it and thats something that annoys me because the prices are so
expensive

This was echoed by another resident, Fi (63):
Its a big issue. I cant get my son a house but other people do. A whole generation of
people cant get a house, you cant buy. They are with their mothers.
Historically, housing list points were awarded to individuals who were either
from the neighbourhood originally or who had family there. However, this
Local Connection policy was scrapped in favour of a policy which allocates
sensitively. This means that associations are given autonomy to intervene in
housing allocation in order to uphold a balanced community. This, as PHA
states, allows them to identify trends, and take appropriate action to try to
redress imbalances.16 This means that if the neighbourhood has too many
residents on a low income they can redress this by introducing residents to the
neighbourhood who they deem more desirable.
This illustrates the notion of deserving and undeserving poor that underpins
much regeneration policy and the shift away from a rights-based agenda. It is in
contrast to some respondents on low-incomes who lived in fear of eviction for
missing rent payments. Sean, 25, worked two jobs one in a fish factory, the
other audio-typing and transcribing. As a young person he had been through the
homelessness system, but had eventually moved to Partick where he had been
settled for the past few years, although he had amassed some debts:
Im just worried about my rent arrears. Partick Housing have threatened to take me to
court a few times. Ive got all my furniture in that flat, if I was to lose that flat I would
have nowhere to put that stuff.
Steve, a single, unemployed man suffered from depression and had debt
problems. Steve found himself threatened with eviction by PHA for rent arrears:
they do this traffic light thing; three strikes and youre out. I'm on amber. But
surely you're entitled to a couple of hundred pounds [arrears]? I mean its not the
greatest of wee flats I've got, but its a roof over my head and I need it.
Steve contacted homelessness charity Shelter as he felt that PHA was determined
to evict him even if he paid his arrears. Shelter intervened and the matter was
resolved.
Rent arrears are a significant issue for housing associations since the 1988 Housing
Act (Scotland) required them to use a proportion of private finance in their
building projects. Rent payments from tenants are an important part of housing
associations income. Disputes over arrears are often easily resolved through one-
to-one communication and agreement of a plan to pay the amount owed, but the
processes are, in reality, overly bureaucratic. In many cases late payments offered
are rejected by associations. This raises the question of whether immediate profit is
the main goal. There may be moral imperatives in evicting particular tenants from
properties. Indeed, the number of Notice of Proceedings17 given to residents in
the 2005-2007 period has since doubled.18 PHAs mixing strategy and need to
generate revenue could result in strategic evictions, whereby residents with rent
arrears, or who are seen to be economically or socially undesirable, are treated
punitively. This highlights the long-term financial gains also being pursued
through moralising discourses which operate at the expense of the most marginal

groups. This is an often hidden injury of regeneration, whereby working-class
residents deemed morally and materially unproductive can be unfixed from place,
in order to make it more profitable.

Conclusion: housing and
privatisation in hard times back to
the future?
This case study is not intended to single out Partick or PHA; the practices
discussed are pervasive in housing associations throughout Scotland and the UK.
Such changes indicate a return to private landlordism which characterised the
early 20th century, but which was fought against. As it did then, reliance on
market supply of housing, particularly in the rental sector, has the effect of
reducing quality and security of tenancies and increasing rent rates. The unsold
gentrified flats neatly become private rental properties taken up by the next
generation of Partick residents who cannot secure a socially rented property at
affordable costs. The outcome is that residents are put at greater risk of eviction
through this broad privatisation of housing.
The effects of this are not fully manifest, but it highlights the serious need for
investment in public housing in Scotland, as well as an awareness of the punitive
role of social housing providers. Ironically, as housing associations undertake
ever more self-financing opportunities such as those described in this paper,
residents their customers find that their housing opportunities are
increasingly limited. Shelter19 reports that there were 3,577 evictions by councils
and housing associations from 2007-2008 in Scotland. Glasgow Housing
Association was the most punitive, with the highest number of evictions (558), 97
per cent of which were caused by arrears. The most marginal groups face
increasing housing problems, often at the hands of those organisations designed
to assist them. A solution to this would lie in more publicly-subsidised housing
which eradicates the competition and quest for profit, and addresses housing
inequality in relation to rights, rather than in terms of consumerism.

Notes
1
Lees, L. and Ley, D. (2008) Introduction to a special issue on gentrification and public policy Urban
Studies 45(12): 2379-2384.
2
Smith D. M. (1994) Geography and Social Justice. Oxford: Blackwell. p.152
3
For UK housing in historical context see Shapley, P. (2007) The Politics of Housing: Power Consumers
and Urban Culture. Manchester University Press. Manchester.
4
See Shapley, P. (2007).
5
Glynn, S. (2009) Towards a New Era of Public Housing: an alternative agenda paper presented at
conference, Housing Privatisation, 30 Years On: Time for a Critical Reappraisal, University of Leeds, July
2010. http://www.sarahglynn.net/documents%20to%20download.html (accessed, 29th March 2011)
6
McKee, K. (2010) The end of the Right to Buy and the future of social housing in Scotland Local
Economy 25 (4): 319-327.
7
Lees, L. and Ley, D. (2008) Introduction to a special issue on gentrification and public policy Urban
Studies 45(12): 2379-2384.
8
Urban Task Force Report (1999) Towards and Urban Renaissance: final report of the task force, chaired
by Lord Rodgers of Riverside. London: Spon.
9
Scottish Executive, (2006) People and Place: Regeneration Policy Statement. Edinburgh: Scottish
Executive.
10
SEU, (Social Exclusion Unit) (1998) Bringing Britain Together a national strategy for neighbourhood
renewal. Cmnd 4045. London: Stationary Office
and Scottish Executive, (2002) Better Community in Scotland: closing the gap the Scottish Executives
community regeneration statement. Edinburgh: Scottish Executive.
11
Gray, N. (2010) The Housing Question Redux Variant 39/40.
http://www.variant.org.uk/39_40texts/modern39_40.html (accessed, 29th March 2011)
12
Scottish Government, (2011) Homes Fit for the 21st Century: The Scottish Government's Strategy and
Action Plan for Housing in the Next Decade: 2011-2020. Available at
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2011/02/03132933/0 (accessed, 29th March 2011)
13
Shelter (2009) Building Pressure: Access to Housing in Scotland in 2009.
Available at www.scotland.shelter.org.uk (accessed, 29th March 2011)
14
Available at www.scotland.shelter.org.uk (accessed, 29th March 2011)
15
Scottish Housing Regulator (2009) Annual Performances and Statistical Return on Registered Social
Landlords. Scottish Housing Regulator.
16
PHA (2003) Partick Housing Association Allocation Policy and Procedures reviewed January 2003.
www.scottishhousingregulator.gov.uk/stellent/groups/.../RSLCS_010100.pdf (accessed, 29th March
2011)
17
The process is as follows: first, a Notice of Proceedings is sent, followed by legal proceedings, and
tenants will be sent a summons telling them when their case will be heard at court. When the case goes to
court the Sheriff can grant a decree for eviction. Sheriff Officers will be sent to remove tenants from the
property. They are entitled to use reasonable force to enter the home and remove tenants and their
possessions.
18
Scottish Housing Regulator (2009) Annual Performances and Statistical Return on Registered Social
Landlords. Scottish Housing Regulator.
19
Available at www.scotland.shelter.org.uk (accessed 29 March 2011)

Oxfam GB June 2011
www.oxfam.org.uk

The experience of poverty

in an unequal society
Sarah Welford
June 2011
www.oxfam.org.uk
About the author
Sarah Welford is a Policy and Parliamentary Officer for Poverty Alliance. Sarah
currently works on the Evidence Participation Change project which aims to
create more participatory forms of policy-making and to create spaces for the
voices of people experiencing poverty to be heard in policy debates.
Sarah previously worked for the international anti-poverty and human rights
organisation ATD Fourth World, and has worked alongside people living in
poverty in the UK and abroad developing participatory methods of working.
Sarah is a strong believer in the empowerment and participation of people in

policy-making processes that ultimately affect their lives, and in working
towards a society in which everyone has access to all of their human rights.
Email: sarah.welford@povertyalliance.org
2 The experience of poverty in an unequal society

Contents
Introduction .............................................................................................. 4
Repercussions of our obsession with the economy ............................ 5
The worst thing about living in poverty ................................................. 5
The rationale behind stigma.................................................................... 6
The myth: the biggest injustice of all? ................................................... 7
Discrimination and language .................................................................. 7
The deserving and undeserving poor ................................................. 8
Conclusion................................................................................................ 9
Notes ....................................................................................................... 10
The experience of poverty in an unequal society 3

Executive summary
This paper focuses on the experience of poverty in an unequal society, from the
perspective of a policy worker who has years of experience working alongside
people living in poverty in the UK and abroad.
The paper looks at the relationship between poverty, the way that our economy
is structured, and the precarious nature of our reliance on consumption. It argues
that heavy dependence on consumption is not only environmentally
unsustainable, but is also detrimental to all people who make up society
including those at the very top and those who find themselves at the bottom.
It also looks at the stigma and the humiliation at the heart of the experience of
poverty, and offers an insight into why it is that, as a nation, we are so quick to
place the blame on individuals who find themselves in difficult circumstances.
The paper touches on the discrimination that people living in poverty are subject
to and argues that this discrimination is on a par with racism, sexism and other
prejudices, yet is still to be recognised. People living in poverty are the last group
of people for whom it is acceptable to label and discriminate against without
repercussion.
Lastly, it offers a possible course of action that could help realise support for
better policies and contribute to better service delivery. The paper argues that in
order to effectively tackle poverty, we need to tackle stigma and raise awareness
of the realities of the lives of people living in poverty.
Introduction
The economy: the social and environmental elephant in the
room
The Oxfam Whose Economy? seminar series and subsequent papers get to the
real crux of the matter, which all too often goes unmentioned in poverty debates
like a large, invisible elephant in the room. Social and environmental injustice
hang as repercussions of the precarious situation we are in, with regards to our
dependency on an economy that is not only environmentally unsustainable and
unrealistic, but is also detrimental to our very wellbeing as individuals and as a
nation.
The UK, alongside the rest of Europe, is obsessed with the notion of economic
growth. We have become dependent on this idea as the only definition of
progress. Our economy relies on an insatiable thirst for shopping, buying and

wasting. This uses up resources and is contributing to climate change at an
alarming rate.
as we enter a new century, this unprecedented consumer appetite is

undermining the natural systems we all depend on, and making it even harder
for the worlds poor to meet their basic needs. (Mayell, 2004)1
Yet, just as the economy is rarely mentioned in governmental debates on poverty,

it is also rarely mentioned in debates on the environment. Our way of life is not
sustainable and is contributing towards the breakup of society.
Repercussions of our obsession with

the economy
Progress in our society relies on a constant undermining of confidence. We are
bombarded daily with messages telling us that we are lacking in some way our
skin, our hair, our clothes, our holidays (Leonard, 2010).2 We are victims of a
culture that breeds vanity, competition and a life that is way beyond our means
and the resources of the planet.
To the average person, this leads to a general discontentment with life and a
nagging dissatisfaction that begs to be alleviated by buying a new pair of shoes
or new handbag.3 This obsession has led to people working longer, more stress-
filled hours and spending less time with family, friends and the community.
However, for people at the bottom end of the income scale, there are far more
detrimental issues at stake. The deluded obsession with economic growth has led
to a culture of blame, stigma and discrimination against those who are the most
vulnerable in our society. This impacts most visibly on the most disadvantaged,
but also has a more subtle impact on the rest of society, with increased divisions
and a normalising of damaging attitudes and preconceptions.4
The worst thing about living in

poverty
The worst thing is the contempt of your fellow citizens. I and many other families live
with that contempt. Moraene Roberts, National Poverty Hearing, UK
We are not inferior, we are not deficient, but we are made to feel that way.
Voices from Caia Park: Communities Against Poverty, Wales
The one thing that unites people whether in the global north or global south
in their experience of poverty is the stigma that they experience due to their lack

of resources.i This is something that many people single out as being the worst
thing about living in poverty not the struggling to make ends meet, although
that is highly stressful; nor the bad housing conditions and the health
repercussions of that, despite all its difficulties. They feel that the worst aspect of
living in poverty is the way in which they are treated by their fellow citizens; the
lack of respect and the blame and judgement upon their lives. This experience is
what many people living in poverty find completely unbearable; it is this aspect
that breaks them; what in the end makes people lose hope and give up.
The rationale behind stigma

What explains these preconceptions of people experiencing poverty held by the
general population? Why is it so easy for people to quickly judge and blame?
Some argue it is so that we can shift the responsibility for this situation from
ourselves to the individual.
However, it seems more complex than this. In order to fuel constant economic
growth, the general population has to be encouraged to consume. People have to
be convinced that we need to go ever above and beyond our basic necessities;
therefore a culture of individualism and competition is spawned. Citizens are
turned into consumers and fear and insecurity are cultivated. This leaves little
space to get to know the community undermining opportunities to create an
understanding its most vulnerable members, who become increasingly isolated.
It leads to very inward-looking lives and encourages distance from those who are
not able to live up to consumer ideals.
Another reason for stigma is that our society is firmly rooted in the belief that we
are all born free and equal as set out in the universal declaration of human
rights.5 On that understanding, it is down to all individuals to make the most of
the opportunities that are supposedly laid at our feet. Any failure to do so is seen
to lie with the individual because they have clearly not put enough effort in; it is
the American Dream syndrome. This belief is exacerbated by a view (often
promoted by the current UK government) that the welfare state rewards people
for being lazy, and allows people to languish at home whilst the rest of the
conscientious population are slogging it out at work.
You're leaving the house at seven in the morning or whatever to go to work and
paying your taxes - and then the person down the street is defrauding the welfare
system.(Woodcock, 2010)6
This is one of the most ubiquitous myths in this country. Despite all efforts to
eradicate it, the general population alongside the people who govern our
country (regardless of political standing) are hook, line and sinker under its
spell. This myth lies at the heart of the stigma that enshrouds the experience of
i From my own personal observations during work with International Movement ATD Fourth World:
http://www.atd-quartmonde.org/International-Movement-ATD-Fourth.html

living in poverty, and in many ways defines it; it also stands in the way of real
progress on poverty issues. ii
The myth: the biggest injustice of all?

Workshy, lacking in morals, scroungers: these are some of the terms that are
bandied about with intensity and resentment. There is excessive and misplaced
anger about people living on state benefits, and this is where the real injustice
lies. In addition to being condemned to a life on the breadline, people in poverty
have to cope with the fervent belief that they are to blame for their own situation,
and the ensuing impact that this has on their psyche.
When you meet people instead of stereotypes, a completely different picture

emerges. Hardworking, excellent at money management, tenacious, strong and
wilful: many people living in poverty defy a system that seems as though it is out
to break them, and defy the scorn that is heaped upon them. Not only do they
cope with poverty in their own lives; many campaign and get their voices heard
to improve things for others in similar situations. So much for lacking in morals;
where are the morals of a population and a government that scapegoats and
blames the most vulnerable people in our society?
Discrimination and language

The worst thing about it is the fact that we have created a culture where it is
acceptable to speak this way about a whole group of people, the majority of whom are
living very difficult lives. Participant in Poverty Alliance Evidence Participation
Change project, 2011
We live in a society where it is now unacceptable to make sweeping

generalisations about people who are of a certain sex, colour, disability, religion
or sexual orientation. However, it is still completely acceptable to speak about
benefit cheats, scroungers, neds, townies, scallies. Yet, could it not also be
argued that this is discriminatory language? Society stigmatises a whole group of
people those living on benefits because everyone is assumed to be taking
unfair advantage at a cost to the taxpayer.
This discrimination has led to an increase in conditionality for benefit recipients,

and policies based on a widespread assumption that everyone is cheating the
system.7 If all benefit recipients were of a particular ethnic background this
would be classed as racism; if they were all women it would be called sexism. Yet
it is normal to speak about people living on benefits in this way it is accepted,
rather than frowned upon. But the repercussions are extremely serious.
ii This myth that is fed to society on a daily basis is the polar opposite to what I have observed in six years
of working alongside people living in poverty.

I have recently been supporting a woman in Glasgow who has been put through
the humiliating and hugely stressful experience of the Work Capability
Assessment as a condition of continued benefit receipt.iii She has a long-term
condition that is deteriorating, and has been deemed unfit for work repeatedly
by her regular doctor. Yet, following a ten-minute assessment, she was classified
as fit for work by an independent assessor. It was very difficult to understand
what her rights were and to get access to a welfare rights advisor. Amidst a
myriad of letters and phone calls, at one point she found herself having to get by
on just 38 a week to support herself, her partner and her 13-year-old daughter.
Sleeping tablets had stopped working by then and the stress was taking its toll.
She confided that suicide had crossed her mind.
The change in welfare regulations in the UK, and the widespread use of
discriminatory language will do nothing but increase the stigma and blame that
already exist, and increase the incidence of experiences such as that highlighted
above.
The deserving and undeserving

poor
Sharon Wrights thesis on Jobcentre staff and client perspectives (2003)8
highlights some revealing interactions between frontline staff and Jobcentre
clients. She argues that the creation of policy is carried out as much by the people
on the front line as the people who created the policy at an earlier stage. In her
thesis she uncovers how policy implementation is interpreted and carried out
differently with different people, and how a process of moral categorisation
happens which affects the way in which the client receives their service. Stigma
and povertyismiv9 on the part of frontline staff can often mean the difference
between an individual accessing a service or not. On the one hand, there can be
fear on the side of the service user; on the other is a moral categorisation of a
person which can act as a barrier to that person getting the service that they need.
Policy implementation is, therefore, also affected by the perceptions and beliefs
that staff themselves bring to their jobs (Wright, 2003). This is clearly an
important issue with regards to the stereotypes and misconceptions that exist
around people claiming benefits.
iii The Work Capability Assessment is the main assessment for Employment Support Allowance claims.
Employment Support Allowance provides financial help to those who are unable to work because of illness
or disability. It also provides personalised support for those who are able to work.
iv
Povertyism is a term used to refer to the discrimination of people on the grounds of their poverty.

Conclusion
The experience of poverty is fundamentally brought about because of an unjust
system that does not distribute on a fair basis, but the experience manifests itself
in relative measures. The experience lies in a persons knowledge that they are at
the bottom, and everyone confirming this through discrimination, stereotypes
and exclusion. It is about not being able to provide your children with the same
access to opportunities as their friends; it is about having to constantly say no
when everyone else is saying yes. It is about feelings, respect, self-esteem and
how we treat one another which is why, above all else, the experience of
poverty is a human rights issue.
People should have access to an income that allows a dignified life. Sixty years
ago we committed to an ideal and an aspiration, yet we still seem far away from
achieving it. The eradication of poverty is framed in a language that belies a
preoccupation with economic growth and the belief that if you are not
contributing to the economy, you are not of value. This is not only reflected in
pay scales,10,11 but more sharply in the way that we treat people who have fallen
on hard times and who need extra support.
Individuals, it seems, must increase their employability, be more flexible, more mobile,
and participate more actively in the consumption-based economy. This leaves little room
for consideration, let alone valuing, of non-economic activities and motivations, such as
care for community, or lifestyles not based on consumption. (Trebeck, 2011)12
In order to tackle poverty better we need to address the basis of our economy
which is unsustainable and detrimental. Continuing on this path is not leading to
an increase in happiness or wellbeing and is resulting in a society that values
things that are detrimental to all members of society, and in particular those who
are the most disadvantaged.13
However, research carried out by the Fabian Society (2005)14 has proven that
despite an initial limitation in knowledge and a harbouring of ideas based on
stereotypes, peoples attitudes can be changed relatively quickly when they are
made properly aware of the realities. If people were more aware of what living in
poverty is like, they would not be able to support the kind of policies that are
being implemented.
Tackling stigma should therefore be a priority in any anti-poverty policy. In

doing so, we can harness public support for more progressive anti-poverty
policies. At the same time, we can bring back a bit of respect to the way that we
treat our fellow citizens, and thus regain some of our own lost humanity as a
society.

Notes
For information on the Poverty Alliance Stick your Labels A Campaign to Tackle
Poverty and Stigma please visit
http://www.povertyalliance.org.uk/campaigns_detail.asp?camp_id=10
1 Mayell H. (2004) As Consumerism Spreads, Earth Suffers, Study Says, National Geograhic, January
2004
2 Leonard A., (2010) The Story of Stuff: How our Obsession with Stuff is Trashing the Planet, Our
Communities and Our Health and a Vision for Change, USA: Simon and Schuster
3 James O. (2007) Affluenza, How to be Successful and Stay Sane, London: Vermilion
4 Conway E. (2010) Poor Cows or Dangerous Beasts? The representation of underclass women in
broadsheet newspapers: media portrayals, political identity and policy, paper presented at the Social
Policy Association Conference, Lincoln, 2010
5 United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
http://www.ohchr.org/en/udhr/pages/language.aspx?langid=eng, (accessed March 2011)
6 Woodcock A. (2010) Benefit cheats are mugging taxpayers says Osbourne the Independent, October
2010
7 Curtis P. (2010) Britain more Thatcherite now than in the 80s says Survey, the Guardian, December
2010
8 Wright S. (2003) Confronting Unemployment in a Street-Level Bureacracy: JobCentre Staff and Client
Perspectives, University of Stirling
9 Davies M. (2008) Eradicating child poverty: the role of policy key policy areas. The effects of discrimination
on families in the fight to end child poverty, York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation
10 Treanor J. (2011) RBS to reveal 300 staff paid on average over more than 1m,The Guardian, March
2011.
11 Unison (2003) Working for Communities: a Unison briefing for the NJC, London: Unison
12 Trebeck K. (2011) Whose Economy? Winners and losers in Scotlands new economy, Oxford: Oxfam
13 Kasser T. (2002) The High Price of Materialism, Cambridge: MIT Press
14 The Fabian Commission on Life Chances and Child Poverty (2005), Life Chances: What does the public
really think about poverty?, London: Fabian Society

Oxfam GB June 2011
www.oxfam.org.uk

To what extent does

poverty explain Scotlands
poor health profile?
David Walsh
June 2011
www.oxfam.org.uk
About the author
David Walsh is a Public Health Programme Manager at the Glasgow Centre for
Population Health (GCPH), where he co-leads the organisations Observatory
Function, managing and undertaking a range of public health research projects
the latter include a programme of work related to so-called Scottish Effect or
Glasgow Effect. He is also an Honorary Senior Lecturer at the University of
Glasgow.
Email: David.Walsh@drs.glasgow.gov.uk
2 To what extent does poverty explain Scotlands poor health profile?

Contents
Introduction .............................................................................................. 5
Scotlands health profile: the sick man of Europe .............................. 5
Traditional explanations for poor health in Scotland ........................... 5
The Scottish Effect and Glasgow Effect............................................. 6
New explanations?................................................................................... 7
Conclusion.............................................................................................. 10
References .............................................................................................. 11
To what extent does poverty explain Scotlands poor health profile? 3

Executive summary
Scotland has the poorest health (lowest life expectancy) of any Western European
nation. Given the undisputed link between poverty and poor health, traditional
explanations for the countrys poor health status have focussed on socio-
economic deprivation and the underlying effects of deindustrialisation.
However, a considerable amount of evidence has emerged in recent times
suggesting that these explanations are simply not sufficient: deprivation does not
explain all of Scotlands higher mortality relative to England and Wales; many
other European countries deindustrialised regions appear poorer than the main
deindustrialised region of Scotland, and yet tend to have better and faster-
improving health; the deprivation profile of Glasgow is strikingly similar to that
of Liverpool and Manchester, yet mortality is significantly higher; and studies of
individuals (rather than areas) also point to unexplained worse health among
Scots.
If the answer is not poverty and deprivation alone, then what is it? A number of
possible explanations are discussed, many of which are the subject of on-going
research.

Introduction
Poverty causes poor health. It is important to be clear about this from the outset
of this discussion. Health is created and destroyed by a complex array of diverse,
but interacting, factors (e.g. income, education, environment, behaviour,
genetics) which operate at different levels and at different stages of life; and of all
these determinants, material circumstances are hugely important. There is an
abundance of research evidence from all over the world demonstrating the clear
link between wealth (or a lack of wealth) and health.
This discussion paper will not, therefore, question this relationship in any way.
What it will debate, however, is the extent to which the particular poor health
profile of Scotland (and particular parts of Scotland) can be explained by material
circumstances alone, or whether other, additional, explanations are also required.
Scotlands health profile: the sick

man of Europe
Scotland has been christened the sick man of Europe on account of its poor
health status. This unenviable tag is justified: on average people die younger in
Scotland than in any other Western European country.1,2 On the basis of current
trends, life expectancy in Scotland will soon be lower than in a number of Eastern
European countries as well.
This has not always been the case. Analysis of long-term trends of life expectancy
in Europe shows that from around the middle of the 19th century through to the
post-war years of the 20th century, Scotlands life expectancy was in the middle
of the pack, similar to that of a large number of Western European nations.3,4
Since the 1950s, however, life expectancy in every one of these countries has
increased faster than in Scotland, leaving the country with the lowest life
expectancy figures for both males and females, and seemingly deserving of that
sick man label. The question is: why?
Traditional explanations for poor

health in Scotland
As outlined in the introduction, the link between socio-economic circumstances
(poverty, deprivation) and health is well established, and traditional
explanations for Scotlands poorer, and relatively slower-improving, health
status have tended to focus on these issues. Specifically, the blame has been
placed almost exclusively on two factors: higher levels of deprivation (principally
in comparison with other parts of the UK); and, related to this, the effects of

deindustrialisation i.e. Scotland, and in particular West Central Scotland (WCS),
has never recovered from the effects of the loss of huge amounts of industrial
employment since the 1970s and 1980s.5,6,7,8
However, in recent years, a number of studies have brought into question the
extent to which Scotlands and particularly WCSs poor health profile can be
attributable solely to deindustrialisation and levels of deprivation. As is briefly
summarised below, authors have speculated that other factors may be at play:
that there may be something particular about Scotland a Scottish Effect.
The Scottish Effect and Glasgow

Effect
At the start of the 1980s, nearly all of Scotlands higher mortality compared to
England and Wales could be statistically explained by its higher levels of
deprivation. By 2001, however, this was no longer the case. Even when
differences in levels of deprivation across the countries had been accounted for,
Scotlands mortality was still eight per cent higher than that of England and
Wales.9 This excess was seen in all parts of Scotland, but was most pronounced
in WCS, leading to discussion of a WCS effect or, given its status as the
principal city of that region, a Glasgow Effect.
Further evidence of this emerged from studies comparing WCS (as the region of
Scotland most affected by deindustrialisationi) with other, similarly
deindustrialised, regions in the UK and mainland Europe. This showed that
overall levels of mortality in these other regions tended to be lower than in WCS
and crucially were improving much faster (thus mirroring the trends for
Scotland as a whole compared to other European countries). Despite this,
however, detailed analyses showed that the majority of these regions actually
had worse socio-economic profiles than WCS, particularly (and importantly) the
post-industrial regions of Eastern Europe.10,11
Results from a detailed investigation into the specific Glasgow Effect were
published in 2010.12,13 These were based on in-depth analyses of small-area based
deprivation (levels of poverty measured in communities of around 1,500 people)
and mortality in Glasgow, compared to Liverpool and Manchester. This research
highlighted a number of important points:
The deprivation profiles of the three cities were almost identical in all three
cities around one-quarter of the population was classed as being socio-
economically deprived,ii and there were no significant differences in the
patterning of (or inequalities in) deprivation across the three cities.
i The report cited above estimated that between 1971 and 2005 there was a 62 per cent decrease in the
number of industrial jobs in WCS (from around 500,000 jobs in 1971 to 190,000 in 2005).
ii Based on a measure of income deprivation: see the two reports cited above for full details.

Despite this, levels of premature mortality (i.e. deaths under the age of 65)
were more than 30 per cent higher in Glasgow compared to Liverpool and
Manchester, with mortality at all ages around 15 per cent higher.
This excess level of unexplained higher mortality in Glasgow was seen
across the whole population: both males and females, of all ages (except
children), in both deprived and non-deprived areas.
The excess premature mortality was particularly driven by significantly
higher numbers of deaths from alcohol-related causes, drugs misuse, suicide
and violence.
There was little evidence of a change in levels of poverty in Glasgow relative
to Liverpool and Manchester in recent decades; however, the gap in mortality
between Glasgow and the other two cities had widened since the late
1970s/early 1980s.
These area-based studies described above have been complemented by further

research based on individuals: for example, one such study showed Scots to have
a 50 per cent higher risk of being diagnosed with ischaemic heart disease
compared to people in England, even once individual social circumstances (and
other risk factors such as smoking and alcohol consumption) had been controlled
for.14 Taken together, the message from all these studies is clear: while
deprivation, poverty, and socio-economic status are extremely important
determinants of health, they do not appear to be sufficient explanations for
Scotlands and within Scotland, WCSs and Glasgows particular poor health
profile. Additional explanations are required. What else is going on?
New explanations?
Publication of the recent research examining deprivation and mortality in
Glasgow, Liverpool and Manchester prompted further discussion of possible
explanations for the higher levels of Scottish in this case, Glasgows mortality.
These were identified, assessed and summarised in a report written by Gerry
McCartney (another of the authors in this series of papers) and published in 2011
by the Glasgow Centre for Population Health.15 In all, 17 candidate hypotheses
were identified, ranging from downstream health determinants to upstream
societal phenomena. The hypotheses were grouped into four principal categories:
1. Artefactual explanations: deprivation and migration.
The deprivation hypothesis is that Scotland/WCS actually is more relatively

deprived in socio-economic terms, but that the research has failed to measure
this properly. On the one hand this is a feasible explanation, given the
limitations of routine, administrative recording systems that are used for
measuring poverty and deprivation; on the other hand, however, excess
levels of poor health (over and above that explained by socio-economic
factors) have been demonstrated for Scotland, WCS and Glasgow at a
number of different levels, and within a number of different analyses: for

example, within national-based analyses;9 regional analyses;10 analyses using
small and very small spatial units of analysis;13 and within analyses based on
individual level data.14,16,17 For these reasons, it seems unlikely that the entire
explanation can be purely artefactual.
The migration hypothesis suggests that there has been a greater degree of
emigration of healthy individuals from Scotland. If significant numbers of the
countrys healthiest population had left, and were continuing to leave, then
the health profile of the whole country would clearly be affected. However,
recent research has shown that although there has been substantial
emigration, the health status of recent migrants is actually very similar to that
of the non-emigrating population.18,19,20,21,22 Thus, it seems unlikely that
migration is the driving force behind Scotlands (or WCSs or Glasgows)
poor health.
2. Downstream explanations: poorer health behaviours; and different

individual values.
The health behaviours hypothesis is not supported by evidence: survey data

suggest that smoking, alcohol consumption, diet and obesity levels are all
strikingly similar in Glasgow, Liverpool and Manchester. In fact this is not
surprising: health behaviours are directly linked to levels of deprivation and,
as already mentioned, the deprivation profiles of these three cities are almost
identical. In any case, it is important to look at the causes of the causes: even
if the survey data are incorrect and true levels of alcohol consumption,
smoking and drugs misuse are higher in Glasgow (as, indeed, the mortality
data suggest may be the case), why should that be? If alcohol, tobacco and
drugs are seen as coping mechanisms closely linked to the socio-economic
circumstances in which individuals live, why should behavioural factors be
more prevalent in Glasgow compared to cities with identical deprivation
profiles?
The individual values hypothesis suggests that there may be a relatively

higher prevalence of individuals in Scotland who have lower aspirations,
who perhaps lack hope for the future, or who are more hedonistic; and that
this in turn leads to a higher prevalence of adverse health behaviours and
higher mortality. This hypothesis lacks any data with which it can be proved
or disproved, and is consequently the subject of new, on-going, research
discussed below.
3. Midstream explanations: that there is a different culture of substance

misuse in Scotland, i.e. the way in which substances (illicit drugs, tobacco and
alcohol) are used differs from elsewhere, and/or that there is a unique
culture surrounding their use which exacerbates their effects; there is a
different culture of boundlessness and alienation in Scotland and the more
deprived parts of Scotland; there are differences in family, gender relations
and parenting which impact on health status; there are lower levels of social
capital; there is an impact of sectarianism; there is a culture and reality of
limited social mobility compared to elsewhere; there are differences in health

service supply or demand; there are differences in the spatial concentration
and patterning of deprivation within Scotland and parts of Scotland.
Some of these suggestions (e.g. sectarianism and health service issues) seem
unlikely for a number of reasons outlined in the GCPH report. Many of the
other hypotheses also lack robust data and evidence, and are also, therefore,
the subject of new research.
4. Upstream explanations: climate (e.g. in relation to a lack of vitamin D from

lower levels of sunlight); greater inequalities (e.g. greater differences in
income levels between rich and poor); the severity of deindustrialisation, and
political attack (i.e. poor health is a direct legacy of particular political
policies implemented in Scotland in the 1980s23).
The question of greater income inequalities is potentially important, given the

published evidence on the impact of such inequalities on health
outcomes:24,25,26,27 Wilkinson and colleagues have argued that more unequal
societies exhibit a range of adverse health- and wellbeing-related outcomes
compared to societies of comparable wealth but more equal distribution.
Again, however, the evidence suggests that this is not pertinent here: income
inequality in WCS appears to be very similar to that seen in Merseyside,11
while at a city level inequalities in area-based levels of deprivation in
Glasgow and Liverpool are virtually identical.
Similarly, the impact of deindustrialisation cannot be ignored, but the

research cited above showed Merseyside to have experienced almost
identical levels of industrial employment loss and yet it experiences better,
and faster improving, health compared to WCS.10
Some of the other suggestions are also being considered in a new programme
of research.
In addition, a fifth hypothesis of a genetic explanation (i.e. that the WCS

population is either predisposed to negative health behaviours, or is particularly
vulnerable to the effects of such behaviours due to genotype) is also discussed in
the report.iii
The programme of research that has been established to test some of these
hypotheses is being undertaken by GCPH and NHS Health Scotland (alongside
other colleagues in Scotland and England). It is based on a combination of
quantitative and qualitative research in the three post-industrial cities of
Glasgow, Liverpool and Manchester. It is anticipated that the results of this
research will be published in 2012.
iii Further details of this, and all the other hypotheses listed above, are available from the Glasgow Centre
for Population Health report cited above.

Conclusion
Poverty and deprivation are extremely important determinants of health. In this
short discussion paper, the evidence presented has included comparative
analyses of Glasgow, Liverpool and Manchester: these three cities are the most
deprived in the UK, and it is no coincidence that they have the lowest life
expectancy in the UK. However, in the case of Glasgow, and more generally of
West Central Scotland and the country as a whole, these explanations do not
appear to be sufficient. Evidence from national, regional, city-level and
individual level studies suggest that the particular poor health profile of Scots
cannot be explained simply in terms of poverty and deprivation, nor in relation
to related, underlying causes stemming from the effects of deindustrialisation.
Additional explanations are required. Many hypotheses have been suggested, of

which a number are being tested through on-going research. Until those results
are available, we can only speculate as to what lies behind the particular poor
health profile of Scotland and its population.

References
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Oxfam GB June 2011
www.oxfam.org.uk

Community ownership
through land reform?
A review of the Land Reform
(Scotland) Act 2003
Tim Braunholtz-Speight
June 2011
www.oxfam.org.uk
About the author
Tim Braunholtz-Speight is a researcher at the University of the Highlands and
Islands (UHI) Centre for Remote and Rural Studies, working on community
assets, poverty and rural development issues. He is also studying for a PhD on
community land reform with the UHI.
Email: tim.braunholtz-speight@inverness.uhi.ac.uk
2 Community ownership through land reform?

Contents
Introduction .............................................................................................. 5
1. Community Right to Buy ................................................................... 6

How the Community Right to Buy works .............................................. 6
Use of the Community Right to Buy ..................................................... 7
Why hasnt it been used more? ........................................................... 8
Suggestions for change from community groups ............................... 10
2. Crofting Community Right to Buy .................................................. 11
Conclusion.............................................................................................. 12
Notes ....................................................................................................... 13
Acknowledgements ............................................................................ 13
References ........................................................................................ 13
Community ownership through land reform? 3

Executive summary
The passing of the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003 (the Act) is one of the most
celebrated achievements of the Scottish Parliament. The 1990s had seen the
development of a community land reform movement in Scotland, born of
frustration with the high concentration of Scottish land in the hands of relatively
few landowners. It also arose from the belief that neglect by landowners treating
their properties only as glorified holiday cottages (McKee and Warren) was
contributing to economic stagnation, poverty and population decline in rural
areas, particularly the more remote parts of the Highlands and Islands. The Act
gave communities legal powers to take land into collective ownership.
Five years after the Act came into force, the Parliament commissioned research
into how the Act was working. This chapter focuses on community groups
experiences of Parts Two and Three of the Act, the Community Right to Buy, and
Crofting Community Right to Buy.
Communities across Scotland have used the Community Right to Buy to register
interest in pieces of land. However, compared to the wave of land reform activity
outwith the Act, there have been few registrations and even fewer purchases of
land. The willing seller nature of the Right to Buy, where nothing happens
unless a landowner decides to sell, is one reason for this. Communities also
reported that the complexity of using the legislation, and the confrontational
nature of the process, were obstacles to using the Act.
In contrast, the Crofting Community Right to Buy can be used to force a sale, but
has seen even less uptake. It was seen as particularly complex and costly to use
by community groups. No community group has yet purchased land through the
Crofting Community Right to Buy. One group used an application to use the Act
as a bargaining tool; another is trying to use the Act at present.
Nevertheless, community groups were glad that the Act existed. They had plenty
of suggestions for changing it, from sorting out minor inconsistencies to
fundamental changes. The latter included removing the need to register interest
in advance seeing the Act mainly as an emergency tool or prioritising funding
and support for community land reform. There has recently been some political
support for reform of the Act, as well as campaigning from community
organisations. But what the new Scottish Government will do with the Act
remains unclear.

Introduction
In 1997 the Scottish Government established the Land Reform Policy Group to
look into proposals for land reform in Scotland, aiming to remove the land-
based barriers to the sustainable development of rural communities (Scottish
Government, 2011a). This process led to many changes in law and policy.
Perhaps the best known of them, and the most controversial (see Figure 1), is the
Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003.i
Figure 1: Front page of the Scottish Daily Mail on the passing of the Land Reform
(Scotland) Act 2003.
Source: Alastair McIntosh http://www.alastairmcintosh.com/articles/2006-wild-scots.htm
Scotland has a highly concentrated pattern of land ownership (Bryden and

Geisler, 2007). Many parts of rural Scotland, especially the more remote areas,
have experienced a long-term decline in population, and are economically
fragile. This has been linked to the control of land, with the Scottish Office Land
Reform Policy Group (1998: section 2) noting that:
i The Act has three parts. Part One relates to outdoor access rights and responsibilities. These are
important for determining who has what rights to Scotlands environment. However, for reasons of space,
this paper will focus on the community ownership legislation contained in Parts Two and Three of the Act:
the Community Right to Buy, and the Crofting Community Right to Buy.

Land is a key resource [but] the interests of the majority have been damaged by the
interests of the few who control that resource. Land reform is needed on grounds of
fairness, and to secure the public good present systems of land ownership and
management in rural Scotland still serve to inhibit opportunities for local enterprise
have also resulted in serious degradation of the natural heritage [and] can have a
critical impact upon the lands ability to sustain rural populations.
In the 1990s, a movement of community buyouts of land emerged, with

community groups (mainly in the Highlands and Islands) organising and
fundraising to buy the privately-owned estates that they lived on. Their aims
included halting population decline, increasing jobs and business opportunities,
providing affordable housing, and environmental conservation or improvement.
One aim of land reform legislation was to support such community initiatives by
giving communities legal powers to take land into collective ownership.
In this paper I will be looking at how the Act is working in practice. The paper
draws on recent research for the Scottish Parliament on community groups
experiences of land reform, both using the Act and outwith it (please see
Acknowledgements for more details). Quotations are from participants in this
research people we interviewed or who completed our surveys. References to
interview and survey numbers refer to data collected for this research.
1. Community Right to Buy
How the Community Right to Buy works

The Community Right to Buy is a willing seller land reform measure. In other
words, it gives communities the right of first refusal when a piece of land comes
up for sale; but it cannot force a landowner to sell any land.
The process works in two stages, registration and activation. Firstly, a

community applies to the Scottish Government to register an interest in a piece of
land. If the Government judges that the application has met the various
conditions (community support, structure of community organisation, etc.), the
communitys interest is entered on the Register of Community Interests in Land.
Then, if the land comes up for sale, the community can apply to activate the
registration and purchase the land. Again, there are multiple stages to go
through (see Figure 2), and the community must raise the money within a time
limit, before being able to purchase the land.
If the land does not come up for sale, essentially nothing happens. Communities
must re-register their interest every five years, in a process again involving
demonstrating community support and other requirements.

Figure 2: Activating a communitys registered interest in a piece of land
Timeline: activities and deadlines set out in Act Community body activities
Owner decides to sell
Owner notifies community body and Scottish
Government Ministers
1 week
Ministers write to community body to ask whether they
wish to proceed with Right to Buy
Community consultation
4 weeks Apply for technical assistance
funding
Community body confirms to Ministers that it wishes to
Instruct feasibility study
proceed with Right to Buy
1 week
Ministers appoint valuer
6 weeks
Note: until this point, community body

Valuation given to community body does not know how much money they
must raise to purchase the land
Complete feasibility study
4 weeks Carry out ballot
Publish ballot results
Community body notifies Ministers of ballot results
3 weeks
Ministers write to community body giving consent to Note: until this point, community body
Right to Buy does not know if they can purchase
the land
12 weeks Raise funds for purchase

Instruct solicitors
Date of entry and payment
Source: Highlands and Islands Enterprise (undated).
Use of the Community Right to Buy

The Community Right to Buy has been used by 74 groups across Scotland (see
Table 1). A wide range of locations and land types are represented in the
registrations; from crofting and sporting estates (e.g. the Assynt Foundation) to
former military bases (Comrie Development Trust, Machrihanish Airbase
Community Company) and even a residential retirement park (Willow Wood
Community Company) and a former bank in a small town (Neilston
Development Trust).
At the time of writing, nine community bodies have purchased land under the
Act, with one purchase in progress. Many groups have tried to purchase, but
failed (often because they couldnt raise the money in time, but sometimes for
other reasons e.g. landowner withdrawing from the sale). Most of the purchases
that did happen were classed as late registrations, i.e. the land was already up
for sale. And that total of nine groups that have purchased land looks rather
small compared to the more than 140 groups that Highlands and Islands

Enterprise has assisted with purchasing land. Indeed, many more groups have
acquired land outwith the Act than have even registered an interest in land
through it. It is clear that the great majority of community land acquisition that
has happened in Scotland has taken place outwith the Act through private
negotiation between community groups and landowners.
Table 1: Applications to use the Community Right to Buy
Stage of Comment Number of Number of

application applications to Community
register an interest Bodies making
ii
in land an application
Total 131 74
Deleted at Withdrawn at registration stage 15 12
registration Rejected at registration stage 29 18
stage
Registration expired 5 4
Registered Registered but not yet activated 51 31
Registered, activation aborted 4 1
Pending approval 5 4
Reached Successful purchase complete 9 9
activation Approved purchase in progress 1 1
stage
Unsuccessful deleted 12 11
Source: Scottish Government 2010 (Community Assets Branch notes), and Scottish Government
Register of Community Interests in Land, 19 April 2011.
Participants in our research had mixed views on the usefulness of the Act. They
pointed out problems with the Act and suggested changes. However, many felt
that having a land reform act at all was an important step for Scotland to have
taken. One recalled the days of the Land Reform Policy Group and the passing of
the Act:
Having land reform on the agenda created a good bargaining environment. Not just
the Act but the broader debates and discussions. It was a good climate. Estates did not
want to appear unreasonable against that wider background [but] the Act has raised
expectations that arent fulfilled.
Why hasnt it been used more?

Community groups had various reasons for avoiding using the Act. It was seen
as carrying a heavy administrative burden, yet giving communities insufficient
power. Others felt that the procedures of the Act were confrontational and
tended to provoke community conflict.
ii Community Bodies may make multiple applications to register interest in a piece of land, e.g. if their first
application is rejected, if the area of land they are interested in is split between multiple owners, or if they
are interested in more than one piece of land.

Administrative burden
The Act has already become infamous for being complex and time-consuming to
use. Many community groups echoed this, despite mostly positive comments on
the helpfulness of Scottish Government officials, and widespread praise for
support from Highlands and Islands Enterprise.
However, it was notable that some groups said that they had not found the Act
complex to use. The key factor seems to be the knowledge and skills of the group
in areas such as law, land management, business and accountancy, community
development and project planning, etc. Some groups get these services for free
from members often qualified professionals or are well-established enough to
have experienced staff. Others face either the expense of buying in such services,
or the headache of trying to navigate through the Act without them.
What this means is that, for many groups, using the Act takes a lot of effort but
with a very uncertain outcome. Property law professionals have also noted this.
A briefing by CKD Galbraith criticised the Act for forcing both vendors and
purchasing community bodies [to] endure significant uncertainty and anxiety
while the right to buy process unfolds (CKD Galbraith, 2005). Another law
firm has a web page on Derailing a registered community interest which
encourages landowners not to throw in the towel when a community applies to
use the Act, as what might seem like a mere technicality can end up derailing the
entire registration of a Community Interest (Semple Fraser, 2009).
Weakness of the right to buy

Some participants expressed their frustration that a registration of interest did
nothing to force a landowner to sell land. This was particularly an issue where the
land or asset (a building in one case) was seen to be neglected and deteriorating.
Political risk
However, if some groups were frustrated at the weakness of the Act, others
found that landowners were very wary of its power. Many participants said that
they avoided using the Act for fear of disrupting relations with local landowners
sometimes meaning large estate owners, but also farmers or just homeowners.
Using the Act was perceived as adversarial, and it was seen as a clumsy tool for
securing land. Negotiation with landowners was preferred by many groups as
less likely to provoke conflict. One comment from a community group activist
summarises this position:
The Act is a useful piece of legislation to community groups, but has to be used
carefully. Pursuing an aggressive right to buy is quite a confrontational approach and
happiness in using it depends how remote the landowner feels to the community
(absentee or state body possibly). A community would be reluctant to use the Act
against a local farmer who has been previously friendly and co-operative, for example.
Even if a landowner near the community is unfriendly and unco-operative, using the

Act against them can lead to a lifetime of obstruction and pettiness which is
unproductive.
From this point of view, the Act is something to be used only when relations with
a landowner are non-existent or have broken down.
Suggestions for change from community groups

Many participants called for the Act to be made simpler to use. They said there
was a need to iron out oddities and inconsistencies. They suggested changes such
as making access to the full electoral register easier, and being more flexible
about what constitutes a community body (various long-established community
development groups found that their constitution had to be changed to meet the
strict criteria of the Act).
More substantially, there were various suggestions about changing the Act
fundamentally. One was to treat late registrations as normal, i.e. to see the Act
mainly as an emergency tool, to be used as a last resort when a community asset
was about to be lost. Others thought that there was a place for a process to
encourage communities to plan ahead and identify pieces of land or buildings
that were of strategic importance for their development: but that this needed to
be less cumbersome, and less confrontational.

2. Crofting Community Right to Buy
Unlike the Community Right to Buy, the Crofting Community Right to Buy
allows a successful community to force a sale: it does not require a willing
seller. However, it is also more complex and costly to undertake. In addition, its
use is restricted to the crofting counties of the Highlands and Islands.
Only two groups, both on the island of Lewis, have submitted applications. The
Galson Estate Trust eventually purchased its land privately, although it felt that
its application to use the Act was helpful in negotiations with the landowners.
The Pairc Trust is still pursuing a land purchase using the Crofting Community
Right to Buy. After a long wait, it has recently seen its application approved by
the Scottish Government (Scottish Government, 2011c).
The main barriers to uptake are the complex and costly administrative
requirements involved in making an application, in particular the mapping of the
land to be purchased. As one solicitor involved in many community land
purchases noted:
The Act requires the mapping of every household, boundary, ditch, pipe, sewer etc.
and definition of the land itself. This extreme level of detail would cost potentially more
to produce than the cost of buying the land. And, once the application had been
submitted, the detail could not be amended, but could be challenged.
(Highland Council, 2010)
Existing maps of crofting areas are not adequate for the purposes of the Act, and
establishing definitive title deeds for every inch of land in crofting townships
requires lengthy historical research.
There is also some legal uncertainty over the use of the Act, with some
landowners suggesting that it violates safeguards to private property in the
European Convention on Human Rights. It seems that, until a land acquisition
under the Crofting Right to Buy has been completed, there will be widespread
uncertainty as to whether this part of the Act is workable in practice.

Conclusion
Both the Community and Crofting Community Rights to Buy Acts have made a
difference to communities in various parts of Scotland. However, using these
Acts is a complex and lengthy process, that many communities also feel is too
confrontational. Land reform activity has been driven more from the bottom, by
community demand and peer support, than from the top, by legislation. Where
public policy has made a practical difference is in providing funding and
technical guidance to community groups. The Scottish Land Fund (now closed)
was set up specifically to finance community land ownership. The Community
Asset Team (formerly Community Land Unit) of Highlands and Islands
Enterprise offers advice and support to community groups pursuing land
ownership, regardless of whether they are using the Act or not.
Some suggest that the main purpose of the Act was to encourage landowners and
communities to negotiate, rather than to be directly used by communities (SQW
2005). But can the Rights to Buy be amended to be more practically useful, as
well as symbolically important? We have seen that community groups suggested
that making it simpler would help, as well as recognising the emergency role
that late registrations play. Indeed, if communities will mostly be reluctant to
use the Act proactively against local landowners, then the power to make an
emergency late registration when land does go on the market might be the most
practically useful aspect of the legislation. There were also widespread calls to
promote the Act more (including clearer information for landowners).
What are the prospects of the Rights to Buy being reformed by the new Scottish
Government? There is increasing pressure from community groups.
Community land groups recently formed an umbrella body, Community Land
Scotland, in part to lobby for renewed political support for community land
ownership. And others are pushing for wider action on land reform: see, for
example, the report from the Scottish Community Alliance (Wightman, 2011).
Addressing the Rural Affairs and Environment Committee in February 2011,

Roseanna Cunningham, the minister, promised a review of the legislation and
emphasised the need to make it faster and easier to negotiate (Scottish
Government, 2011b). While this will be welcomed by many, the Committee
seems to suggest that more fundamental changes are needed:
The Committee is clear that solving the main problems identified in the report is not
simply a matter of improving the administration of both sets of right to buy provisions
in the 2003 Act. There are parts of the Act itself that need to be amended We
hope this work will be taken forward by the next administration. We also hope,
and expect, that there would be extensive consultation with stakeholders as part of it.
(Rural Affairs and Environment Committee, 2011, emphasis added)

Notes
Acknowledgements
This paper is based on research into the working of the Land Reform (Scotland)
Act 2003 (the Act) carried out for the Scottish Parliament in 2010, by a team of
researchers led by Dr Calum Macleod at the UHI Centre for Mountain Studies.
The research covered all three parts of the Act (including Outdoor Access), and
involved literature reviews, interviews with experts, and interviews and surveys
with stakeholders and users of the Act.
The full team was: Dr Calum Macleod, UHI Centre for Mountain Studies; Tim
Braunholtz-Speight and Dr Issie Macphail, UHI Centre for Remote and Rural
Studies; Derek Flyn, crofting law expert; Sarah Allen and Davie Macleod, Rural
Analysis Associates.
The report can be downloaded from the Scottish Parliament and Centre for
Remote and Rural Studies websites:
Scottish Parliament Rural Affairs and Environment Committee

http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/s3/committees/rae/currentInquiries.htm
Centre for Remote and Rural Studies

http://www.crrs.uhi.ac.uk/publications/reports/reports-andother-papers
References
Bryden, J. and Geisler, C. (2007) Community-based land reform: lessons from
Scotland, Land Use Policy, 24, 24-34.
CKD Galbraith (2005) Land reform and the impact of the community right to buy,
online news briefing from 9 August 2005, accessed in August 2010 from
http://www.ckdgalbraith.co.uk/land-reform-and-impact-of-community-
right-to-buy
Daily Mail (2003) Front page, Friday 24 January 2003, image accessed May 2011
from website of Alastair McIntosh: www.alastairmcintosh.com/articles/2006-
wild-scots
Highlands and Islands Enterprise (undated) The Community Right to Buy Your
Questions Answered, accessed May 2011 from http://www.hie.co.uk/support-for-
communities/community-assets/community-right-to-buy.html
Highland Council (2010) Conference Report of Land Reform Rights to Buy Where To
Now?, 23 March 2010, Inverness
Land Reform Policy Group (1998) Identifying the Problems, accessed May 2011
from http://www.scotland.gov.uk/library/documents1/lrpg00.htm

Macleod, C., Braunholtz-Speight, T., Macphail, I., Flyn, D., Allen, S., and
Macleod, D. (2010) Post Legislative Scrutiny of the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003,
Perth: The Centre for Mountain Studies
Macleod, C. and Braunholtz-Speight, T. (2010) The Community Right To Buy In

Practice, briefing paper for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation seminar The
Community Right to Buy: Learning Lessons from the Scottish Experience, 29
October 2010
McKee, A. and Warren, C. (unpublished) The Scottish revolution? evaluating the

impacts of post-devolution land reform
Scottish Parliament (2011) Implementation of the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003,
Correspondence from the Convenor of the Rural Affairs and Environment
Committee to the Minister, accessed April 2011 from
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/s3/committees/rae/documents/MWtoRCL
andReformActMarch2011formatted.pdf
Scottish Government (2010) Unpublished notes and summaries of Community

Right to Buy statistics provided by the Scottish Governments Community Assets
Branch
Scottish Government (2011a) Land Reform History, accessed April 2011 from
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/farmingrural/Rural/rural-land/right-to-
buy/Resources/Land-Reform
Scottish Government (2011b) Land Reform Review, accessed April 2011 from
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2011/03/02115136
Scottish Government (2011c) Lewis Community Free To Buy Estate, accessed April
2011 from http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2011/03/21132924
Scottish Government (2011d) Register of Community Interests in Land,

http://rcil.ros.gov.uk/RCIL/default.asp?category=rcil&service=home (accessed
April 2011)
Semple Fraser (2009) Derailing a registered community interest, accessed May 2011
from http://www.semplefraser.co.uk/a/DerailingCommInt
SQW (2005) Evaluation of the Community Land Unit - a final report to Highlands and
Islands Enterprise, Edinburgh: SQW Ltd.
Wightman, A. (2011) Land Reform: The Way Ahead, Edinburgh: Scottish

Community Alliance

Oxfam GB June 2011
www.oxfam.org.uk

Can public services protect

the vulnerable in the age of
austerity?
Considering the evidence on street-
cleaning services in the age of growth
Annette Hastings
June 2011
www.oxfam.org.uk
About the author
Annette Hastings is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Social and Political
Sciences at the University of Glasgow. She convenes the Neighbourhoods and
Wellbeing Research group and has worked at the University for 17 years. Her
research and teaching focuse on exploring the causes and consequences of
neighbourhood segregation and disadvantage. She is currently researching, for
the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, how poor neighbourhoods are being affected
by the significant cuts to local authority budgets and how middle class political
activism affects public service provision for the Arts and Humanities Research
Council. She previously worked in housing management.
Email: Annette.Hastings@glasgow.ac.uk
This paper is based on research evidence from a project for the Joseph Rowntree
Foundation carried out by the author together with Nick Bailey and Rob
Croudace from the University of Glasgow, and Professor Glen Bramley and
David Watkins from Heriot Watt University. The final report from the project
Street cleanliness between deprived and better-off neighbourhoods. A Clean Sweep?
(2009) can be accessed at http://www.jrf.org.uk/sites/files/jrf/neighbourhood-
street-cleanliness-full.pdf. The views expressed in the paper are the authors.
2 Can public services protect the vulnerable in the age of austerity?

Contents
Introduction .............................................................................................. 5
1. The outcome gap between deprived and better-off

neighbourhoods ................................................................................ 6
2. What puts places at risk of poor street cleanliness? ..................... 7
3. Does service provision reflect risk? ................................................ 8
Conclusion................................................................................................ 9
Notes ....................................................................................................... 10
Can public services protect the vulnerable in the age of austerity? 3

Executive summary
This paper focuses on whether public service provision serves the needs of
disadvantaged neighbourhoods in the UK. It raises questions over whether the
needs of more vulnerable groups can be addressed in the period of public
spending constraint introduced by the Coalition Government in May 2010. To do
this, it examines some of the evidence on whether the needs of disadvantaged
neighbourhoods were met in the previous period, which was characterised by
public spending growth and a policy framework which brought these needs to
the fore.
The core of the paper summarises evidence from an in-depth study of the street-
cleaning service in the UK. It reports on the gap in cleanliness between more and
less disadvantaged neighbourhoods. It also provides new evidence of the range
of neighbourhood characteristics which put some places at risk of poor
cleanliness outcomes, calling into question explanations which highlight the
behaviour and attitudes of residents.
Evidence is also presented which shows that resource allocation does not always
follow risks and needs. Indeed, it shows that a superficial examination of
resource allocation can suggest that disadvantaged neighbourhoods do indeed
receive enhanced resources. However, more detailed forensic research can
uncover the more subtle ways in which resource allocation can actually be
skewed towards better-off, less needy areas.
The paper concludes by highlighting some of the challenges involved in

redistributing public services towards needs, yet points to one model which can
deliver appropriate service levels to disadvantaged communities whilst not
antagonising defensive, better-off areas. It argues that, whilst the age of austerity
presents significant challenges for those who wish to protect the most vulnerable,
it may still be possible to find ways to deliver services which do not simply
reinforce inequality.

Introduction
As the effects of the banking crisis and fiscal austerity begin to bite, the impact of
the contraction of the welfare state and public services on the most vulnerable
households and communities is of key concern. However, prior to austerity we
had a period of sustained growth, not just in the economy, but in spending on
public services. Not only was there more resource on the table in this period, but
there was also a policy and practice agenda which suggested that poor
neighbourhoods and households should get a bigger share of this resource. This
mainstreaming agenda gave an increased impetus to the potential role of public
services in narrowing the gap between more deprived and other
neighbourhoods. Indeed, mainstream service provision was identified as the
main weapon in tackling disadvantage.1 There were exhortations to develop
new approaches to service delivery which were more sensitive to a diversity of
needs, as well as encouragement to bend the spend towards disadvantaged
service users.
With the election of the Coalition Government in May 2010, the focus of the
debate has changed. The emphasis is now on a reduced, residual role for the
welfare state and on public services endeavouring to do more with less
resource. Arguably, there remains some encouragement that public services
should aim to protect the vulnerable from the worst impacts of public
expenditure reductions. While a number of commentators question whether this
is a feasible ambition,2 only detailed research evidence in the years to come will
be able to assess how disadvantaged groups have been served by public services
in the era of public spending retrenchment.
Given this, it is perhaps important to consider how well public services actually
served poor neighbourhoods in the period of spending growth. Did
mainstreaming work? Were better outcomes delivered for the most
disadvantaged areas? The big picture is that the evidence is mixed. In terms of
outcomes, there is certainly some evidence of improvements in some spheres, but
the evidence varies on whether the gap in outcomes between poorer and better-
off places actually narrowed.3 Indeed, most of the research evidence on the
implementation of mainstreaming highlights the range of difficulties
encountered in delivering greater redistribution, such as problems with budget
disaggregation, as well as a lack of commitment to the idea.4 What emerges is a
less-than-hopeful account of the potential of public services to make a real
difference to improving the relative position of disadvantaged neighbourhoods.
This paper shares some detailed research evidence on the provision and impact
of street-cleaning services in the UK during the period of public spending
growth.5 It begins by discussing the nature of the gap in the cleanliness outcomes
between poor and better-off neighbourhoods. It then goes on to explore what
characteristics put neighbourhoods at risk of poor cleanliness outcomes and, in a

third section, considers whether service provision tackles these risk factors. In so
doing, the paper shows that mainstream services can sometimes be part of the
problem faced by people living in deprived neighbourhoods, with service
provision not necessarily reflective of relative or diverse needs. However, it also
points to some key ways in which the mainstreaming agenda can be made to
work such that needs are met and relative outcomes are improved. Furthermore,
the research suggests that improving the position of deprived neighbourhoods
may be achievable within existing resources. There may therefore be some
lessons from this research for public service providers grappling with how to
protect the vulnerable in the current fiscal climate.
1. The outcome gap between

deprived and better-off
neighbourhoods
The research project on which this paper is based synthesised English and
Scottish evidence from the mid-2000s on cleanliness outcomes and
neighbourhood characteristics. It also involved more in-depth analysis of three
local authority case studies.
The study exposed a clear national problem in terms of a gap in neighbourhood

cleanliness between better-off and more disadvantaged neighbourhoods. This
pattern was evident in the self-reporting of litter and rubbish by neighbourhood
residents in England and Scotland. It was also evident when cleanliness levels
were assessed by independent surveyors as part of the Local Environmental Survey
of England. Across the country, more affluent neighbourhoods tended to show a
cleanliness level above the standard expected in national performance
monitoring,6 while less affluent neighbourhoods tend to perform much worse.
Indeed, some local authorities were achieving high average scores, but failing to
maintain more deprived neighbourhoods to the desired standard.
There was some evidence of a national narrowing of the gap in the period 2004
until 2008, although significant variation between authorities remained. The
three case studies exemplified the reality of an uneven picture. In two, there was
clear evidence of a narrowing gap between cleanliness scores in disadvantaged
and better-off areas. In the remaining case study, there was evidence of an
improvement in overall outcomes, but the gap between poor and better-off areas
had widened slightly.
The research considered whether the introduction of national performance

monitoring and audit systems such as Best Value can influence outcomes. The
systems certainly appeared to have helped raise overall standards, and there was
some evidence that they had also helped to narrow the gap. Given that the
Coalition Government has de-emphasised the importance of performance

monitoring in England, it will be interesting to observe whether such trends
continue.
2. What puts places at risk of poor

street cleanliness?
It is perhaps no surprise to discover that there is a gap in cleanliness between
more and less disadvantaged neighbourhoods. There is a tendency to blame poor
neighbourhood cleanliness on the behaviours and attitudes of neighbourhood
residents. This research aimed to go beyond common understandings of this
problem. In particular, it was interested to discover if residents (and indeed
street-cleaning staff) face a level playing field when it comes to keeping
different kinds of neighbourhoods clean.
This research made an important contribution to explaining why there is a

cleanliness gap. It went beyond analysing outcomes relating to deprivation, and
explored the particular aspects of neighbourhoods which put them at risk of
environmental problems. This was done at the national (England and Scotland)
level and case study level.
The study found that there are a number of risk factors for poor street
cleanliness. Crucially, whilst area deprivation (as measured by official indexes) is
an important predictor of environmental problems, there are also a range of
specific factors that contribute to poor cleanliness outcomes wherever they occur.
Some of these are more prevalent in poor areas such as low-income households,
high child densities and disused buildings. Others are more evenly spread
young adult households, high housing densities, and homes with small or no
gardens.
This evidence allows us to reflect on what it is about deprived neighbourhoods

which makes them more likely to have environmental problems. Given that
disadvantaged neighbourhoods tend to be more littered than others, it can be
easy to suggest that poorer households care less about the upkeep of their
environment than other kinds of households. But it is cause for reflection that
when we control for area deprivation characteristics such as high housing or
child density also predict poor cleanliness in more advantaged neighbourhoods.
The patterns identified here suggest that there can be structural as well as
behavioural causes to neighbourhood cleanliness problems causes which are
outwith the control of individual residents.

3. Does service provision reflect
risk?
This is clearly a key, yet complex, question. While the limitations of the data
available meant it was not able to assess expenditure relative to all of the risk
factors identified, it did find that:
There was evidence that resources were skewed towards deprived
neighbourhoods, both within the case studies and at a national level. In one
of the case studies, for example, the authority spent five times as much in
streets in the most deprived decile compared to the least deprived decile.
Resources also tended to be skewed towards areas with high density housing
both at a national level and within the case studies.
An assessment of expenditure relative to lower-income households was
possible in relation to the three case studies. In only one was expenditure
targeted towards streets with higher proportions of such households.
These patterns suggest that authorities were targeting needs and putting
mainstreaming into practice. At this stage, the research seemed to suggest that
there was little potential to use better, more targeted service provision to tackle
the outcome gap. However, as part of the study, a more fine-grained analysis of
the nature and purpose of resource allocation in the three case studies was
conducted. This deeper analysis which mapped particular aspects of service
provision onto actual streets produced a more surprising set of results.
In one case study, when routine, programmed expenditure on the core service
was distinguished from responsive (catch up) expenditure, it was apparent that
more affluent streets tended to have a bigger share of programmed expenditure
than less affluent streets. Thus, what had appeared as a progressive pattern of
expenditure relative to deprivation related only to the provision of responsive
services. Moreover, responsive services were more expensive, and it was this
which gave the appearance of a skew in expenditure towards deprived streets. In
the same case study, when the workloads of operational staff were examined,
deprived streets tended to be serviced by staff with larger workloads (greater
street length to service, as well as more households) than those operating in more
affluent areas. At a very practical level, staff working in deprived places were
doubly disadvantaged: they worked in locations with more risk factors
contributing to environmental problems, yet also had more street length to cover.
Indeed, the allocation of staff workloads relative to area needs emerged as a key
issue in the research. In a second case study, there was an attempt to engineer the
relative workloads of street cleaners to take account of the diversity of needs
across neighbourhoods. Staff operating in areas with higher levels of risk factors
associated with environmental problems had fewer dwellings or shorter street
lengths to service. This authority had the most equal outcomes of the three case
studies. Thus, very few locations were assessed as falling below the acceptable
threshold for cleanliness and very few exceeded it.

Absolute levels of service appeared as important as relative resource allocation.
The third case study had a high relative difference between areas (spending five
times as much in its most deprived streets compared to the least), but the
absolute level of routine, programmed services delivered to these areas was still
below the level of service provided to similar streets in the other two case
studies. In this case, acceptable outcomes were achieved via special initiatives
and responsive top-up services. This appeared an expensive approach relative to
the cost of providing a more appropriate level of routine, ordinary street
cleaning.
The research suggested that there is a need for a broad understanding of the
different aspects of targeting to be developed. Skewing resources towards more
deprived areas is a start, but may not be enough. Effective targeting involves
providing the right level and the right kind of services. This suggests that, by
identifying inappropriate or inefficient forms of service, more equal outcomes
could be achieved within existing budgets.
Conclusion
The insight offered here into the workings of the street-cleaning service in the UK
suggests that we need to keep a close watch on how disadvantaged
neighbourhoods fare as public services contract and service provision is pared
back. Even in a period when there was relatively generous public spending,
together with a policy environment where the needs of deprived
neighbourhoods were to the fore, it was not clear that poorer neighbourhoods
were always well served by public services. Inevitably, budget cuts will lead to
services being pared back, and there will be winners and losers in the new period
of fiscal austerity. It will be important not to underestimate the capacity of better-
off households and neighbourhoods to defend the quality and level of public
services they are used to receiving. It is notable that the case study authority in
which staff workloads reflected needs, and where there was a minimal outcome
gap took great pains to ensure that the distribution of resources towards
needier areas was not apparent to the public. So, rather than have more frequent
servicing in disadvantaged areas, staff working in such places had a hidden
capacity to get the job done. Protecting the vulnerable may require innovation
and ingeniuty as well as resources in the period to come.

Notes
1 Social Exclusion Unit, (2001) A New Commitment to Neighbourhood Renewal: National Strategy Action
Plan, London: Social Exclusion Unit.
2 For example, see Polly Toynbee: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/feb/11/defence-brutal-
cuts-attack-lies-blame
3 CLG (2010) Evaluation of the National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal Final Report, London:
Department for Communities and Local Government.
4 See Fyfe A. (2009) Tackling multiple deprivation in communities: considering the evidence, Edinburgh:
Scottish Government Social Research.
5 See Hastings A., Bailey N. et al. (2009) Street cleanliness between deprived and better-off
neighbourhoods. A Clean Sweep?, York: York publishing services.
http://www.jrf.org.uk/sites/files/jrf/neighbourhood-street-cleanliness-full.pdf
6 The Best Value indicator on environmental cleanliness was introduced in 2001. Among other things, it
stipulates an acceptable standard for street cleanliness.

Oxfam GB June 2011
www.oxfam.org.uk

Conclusion: Our Economy

Professor Mike Danson and Dr Katherine Trebeck

September 2011
www.oxfam.org.uk
About the authors
Katherine Trebeck is a Research and Policy Advisor with Oxfams UK Poverty
Programme in Scotland.
Email: ktrebeck@oxfam.org.uk
Mike Danson is Associate Dean of Research & Commercialisation

Reader in Economics and Management at the Business School of the University
of the West of Scotland
Email: michael.danson@uws.ac.uk
2 Conclusion: Our Economy, A Whose Economy Seminar Paper, June 2011

Contents
Whose economy? .................................................................................... 4
A way forward ...................................................................................... 4
So what next? ...................................................................................... 5
Conclusion: Our Economy, A Whose Economy Seminar Paper, June 2011 3

Whose economy?
The authors of the Whose Economy papers and the ideas, comments and
observations of participants at the four Whose Economy seminars reveal that the
model of the economy that has dominated the UK for most of the last century has
proved itself outmoded, outdated, and has failed all but the few.
The seminars explored to what extent persistent poverty exists alongside high
economic prosperity, leading to significant inequalities in income and wealth,
and in life chances and lifestyles, between individuals and communities. They
asked why this is the case and, why, despite decades of economic growth,
regeneration and anti-poverty policies, many Scots face a life characterised by
high mortality, economic inactivity, mental and physical ill-health, poor
educational attainment, and increasing exclusion.
Presenters in the seminars explored the roots of poverty in Scotland, examining

their historical and structural origins and how, in recent decades, the economy
has shifted from one based on manufacturing to a service-led, supposedly
knowledge economy,1 with retail and call centres expanding as manufacturing
declines. Yet, as explored in the seminars, work in such an economy is not
necessarily a route out of poverty, as many jobs do not pay enough to live on.
Discussion probed deeply into the implications of this mode of economic

development, particularly for those experiencing poverty. As the contributions to
this series of papers show, being poor in a rich country like the UK is intensely
stressful, and made worse by stigmatisation both in the media and as result of
political rhetoric. Pressures to consume stem from a culture that elevates
passions and image above relationships, community contribution, and care for
others and the environment.
A way forward
Yet the seminars contained an undercurrent of optimism, that it is possible to
overcome poverty, both in Scotland and the UK. As the sixth richest country in
the world2 we certainly have adequate resources to do so. Participants called for
the allocation of these resources in a more effective and sustainable way.
They acknowledged a greater role for businesses whether by paying taxes,

increasing their employment of people further from the labour market, or by
offering decent jobs in sustainable industries. Higher expectation needs to be
placed on businesses to deliver social sustainability, particularly in return for the
array of state support that businesses receive.
Many seminar presentations and several of the papers in this series explained
how social protection measures such as education, minimum wage regulations
and social safety nets are strong mechanisms to increase equality. They argue
that social protection needs to be advocated and delivered as a collective good on
which we all depend and from which we all benefit, not as a financial drain.
Social protection needs to be funded fairly by progressive taxation so that those

with most ability to contribute (often due to an unequal head start in life) do so,
and those who need support at various points in their life receive it, according to
their needs.
The seminars also considered the scope for collective ownership particularly of
renewable energy projects to enable community development and lead to
greater equality. While the limitations of community ownership were heeded,
participants in the seminars saw shared economic activity through collective
ownership and, crucially, shared decision-making and agenda-setting, as crucial
in creating a new way of doing things.
Participants were clear that this needs to be more than merely reclaiming the
economy at the margins: the economy needs to be repositioned to serve the
people, not the other way around. Public contracts, for example, need to deliver
real, tangible benefits for local communities from business activity that takes
place on their terms (not simply token benefits at the margins to secure consent).
This also means genuine participation in all economic activity sharing
ownership, sharing work, and sharing rewards.
More broadly, the discussion at all four of the seminars called for an
interrogation of economic growth, how we pursue it and how equally the
benefits from growth are shared. Many participants have linked this to better
measuring of our prosperity that is not limited to the narrow measurement of
economic growth as a means to reframe what constitutes the success of the
economy and the success of communities and individuals. To this end, the
Oxfam Humankind Index, developed through widespread public consultation,
will enable Scotland to measure itself by those aspects of life that make a real
difference to people. It will enable the people of Scotland to hold policy-makers,
and those who implement and deliver policy at all levels, to be held to account.
So what next?
For Oxfam, the seminars demonstrate the need for a radical re-think of our goals
those of individuals and of the complex world of policy-making and economic
processes to refocus on the true purpose of the economy.
We will shortly set out a picture of a new prosperity, a shared future where we
are simply better at sharing, where there are fewer extremes of money and
wealth, esteem and status, power and position. In particular, at the heart of this
new prosperity is a community-led economy which focuses on the quality and
distribution of growth, where the assets of communities and the value of
individuals are utilised and enhanced to promote social and environmental
sustainability.
Oxfams advocacy work in Scotland will seek to build momentum behind this
vision, working with our strategic partners and linking with new partners to
build a robust case for a new way of doing things. The Humankind Index is an
important part of this, but translating the messages from the Index into coherent
policy changes will require the expertise, energy and support of a wide range of
organisations.

In many ways Oxfams programme work in Scotland is already getting on with
this task, demonstrating different ways of working together to shape outcomes in
communities and for individuals. We will look to the work of our programme
partners for not only inspiration, but for evidence of what works, for challenges
to the received wisdom, and for the model of a socially and environmentally
sustainable economy.
Notes
1 Scottish Executive (2001)

2 International Monetary Fund figures (2009)

Oxfam GB September 2011
www.oxfam.org.uk

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Oxfam Discussion Papers

Professor Mike Danson and Dr Katherine Trebeck

Mike Danson is Associate Dean of Research & Commercialisation

2 Whose Economy? An introduction

As discussed at the opening seminars in Edinburgh and in Stirling, the papers by

Many Scots face a life characterised by high mortality, economic inactivity,

But in response to economic restructuring and persistent poverty, anti-poverty

Whose Economy? An introduction 5

6 Whose Economy? An introduction

Whose Economy? An introduction 7

Whose welfare state now?

Introduction: The damaging myths of tax and benefits ....................... 5

In the UK unemployment and poverty are still linked ........................... 6

The wider costs of greater inequality ..................................................... 7

Conclusion - 'a society for people' ......................................................... 8

Too many paid more than they earn

The wider costs of greater inequality

Conclusion a society for people

Such redistributive priorities have been rejected by the present administration in

We need to prevent the preservation and reinforcement of a class-fractured

Beveridge, William H. (1948) Voluntary Action. Allen and Unwin. London.

EC (2003) Employment in Europe 2003. European Commission, Brussels.

Eurostat (2010) In-Work Poverty in the EU. EC. Luxembourg

Freud, D. (2008) Freud in the City. Bene Factum. London.

Higginson, R. and Clough, D. (2010) The Ethics of Executive Remuneration: A Guide

Manifest/MM&K (2011) Executive Director Total Remuneration Survey 2011.

National Equality Panel (2010). 'Executive Summary' to An Anatomy of Economic

Smith, N. and Middleton, S. (2007) A Review of Poverty Dynamics

Webster, David (2005) Long-Term Unemployment, the Invention of Hysteresis

The Scottish economy

2 The Scottish economy

1. The Scottish economy in 2011 ......................................................... 5

3. The current policy framework........................................................... 6

4. Pervasive myths ................................................................................ 6

5. Conclusion a renewed policy framework ..................................... 7

The Scottish economy 3

However, significant opportunities now present themselves as Scotland seeks to

In common with most of the developed world, Scotland experienced ongoing

Scotland does, however, continue to enjoy a number of enduring advantages: a

4 The Scottish economy

Since the Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition UK government assumed

The Scottish economy 5

Given the Scottish Governments limited economic powers, setting growth

6 The Scottish economy

The downside of having a relatively deregulated economy is (deliberately?)

5. Conclusion a renewed policy

In terms of the fundamental reform necessary to create a fairer, more sustainable,

The Scottish economy 7

At the Scottish level, questions have to be asked as to whether an economic

The financial crisis and subsequent recession represented a failure of politics on a

If economic powers in Scotland continue to be so limited, and if economic

The prosperity of Scotlands citizens has to be prioritised over the demands of

8 The Scottish economy

The Scottish economy 9

10 The Scottish economy

The Scottish economy 11

2 Desperately seeking poverty (alleviation): towards poverty sensitive budgeting in local

2. Hard Choices, Tough Decisions shaping the future of public

3. The benefits of poverty sensitive budgeting ................................... 8