Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-32055 February 26, 1988

REYNALDO BERMUDEZ, SR., and, ADONITA YABUT BERMUDEZ petitioners-appellants,

YAP, J.:

This is a direct appeal on pure questions of law from the Order of March 10, 1970 of the Honorable Judge (now Supreme
Court Justice) Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera of the defunct Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVII, dismissing
plaintiffs-appellants' complaint in Civil Case No. 77188 entitled "Reynaldo Bermudez, Sr. and Adonita Yabut Bermudez,
plaintiffs, versus Domingo Pontino y Tacorda and Cordova Ng Sun Kwan, defendants," and from the Order of May 7, 1970
denying plaintiffs-appellants' Motion for Reconsideration.

The background facts of the case are as follows:

A cargo truck, driven by Domingo Pontino and owned by Cordova Ng Sun Kwan, bumped a jeep on which Rogelio, a six-
year old son of plaintiffs-appellants, was riding. The boy sustained injuries which caused his death. As a result, Criminal
Case No.92944 for Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence was filed against Domingo Pontino by the Manila City
Fiscal's Office. Plaintiffs-appellants filed on July 27,1969 in the said criminal case "A Reservation to File Separate Civil
Action."

On July 28,1969, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil case for damages with the Court of First Instance of Manila docketed
as Civil Case No. 77188, entitled "Reynaldo Bermudez, Sr. et al., Plaintiffs vs. Domingo Pontino y Tacorda and Cordova
Ng Sun Kwan, Defendants." Finding that the plaintiffs instituted the action "on the assumption that defendant Pontino's
negligence in the accident of May 10, 1969 constituted a quasi-delict," the trial court stated that plaintiffs had already
elected to treat the accident as a "crime" by reserving in the criminal case their right to file a separate civil action. That
being so, the trial court decided to order the dismissal of the complaint against defendant Cordova Ng Sun Kwan and to
suspend the hearing of the case against Domingo Pontino until after the criminal case for Homicide Through Reckless
Imprudence is finally terminated. From said order, plaintiffs filed the present appeal, stating as their main reasons the
following:

I. The main issue brought before this Honorable Court is whether the present action is based on quasi-
delict under the Civil Code and therefore could proceed independently of the criminal case for homicide
thru reckless imprudence.

II. The second question of law is whether the lower court could properly suspend the hearing of the civil
action against Domingo Pontino and dismiss the civil case against his employer Cordova Ng Sun Kwan
by reason of the fact that a criminal case for homicide thru reckless imprudence is pending in the lower
court against Domingo Pontino

III. The last question of law is whether the suspension of the civil action against Domingo Pontino and the
dismissal of the civil case against his employer Cordova Ng Sun Kwan by reason of the pending criminal
case against Domingo Pontino for homicide thru reckless imprudence in the lower court could be validly
done considering that the civil case against said defendants-appellees also sought to recover actual
damages to the jeep of plaintiffs-appellants."

We find the appeal meritorious.

The heart of the issue involved in the present case is whether the civil action filed by the plaintiffs-appellants is founded on
crime or on quasi-delict. The trial court treated the case as an action based on a crime in view of the reservation made by
the offended party in the criminal case (Criminal Case No. 92944), also pending before the court, to file a separate civil
action. Said the trial court:

It would appear that plaintiffs instituted this action on the assumption that defendant Pontino's negligence
in the accident of May 10, l969 constituted a quasi-delict. The Court cannot accept the validity of that
assumption. In Criminal Case No. 92944 of this Court, plaintiffs had already appeared as complainants.
While that case was pending, the offended parties reserved the right to institute a separate civil action. If,
 in a criminal case, the right to file a separate civil action for damages is reserved, such civil action is to be
based on crime and not on tort. That was the ruling in Joaquin vs. Aniceto, L-18719, Oct. 31, 1964."

We do not agree. The doctrine in the case cited by the trial court is inapplicable to the instant case. In Joaquin vs. Aniceto,
the Court held:

The issue in this case is: May an employee's primary civil liability for crime and his employer's subsidiary
liability therefor be proved in a separate civil action even while the criminal case against the employee is
still pending?

To begin with, obligations arise from law, contract, quasi-contract, crime and quasi-delict. According to
appellant, her action is one to enforce the civil liability arising from crime. With respect to obligations
arising from crimes, Article 1161 of the New Civil Code provides:

Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by the penal laws,
subject to the provisions of article 21 77, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2,
Preliminary, Title, on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this book, regulating
damages.

xxx xxx xxx

It is now settled that for an employer to be subsidiarily liable, the following requisites must be present: (1)
that an employee has committed a crime in the discharge of his duties; (2) that said employee is insolvent
and has not satisfied his civil liability; (3) that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry. (1 Padilla,
Criminal Law, Revised Penal Code 794 [1964])

Without the conviction of the employee, the employer cannot be subsidiarily liable.

In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising
from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi- delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil
Code. If a party chooses the latter, he may hold the employer solidarity liable for the negligent act of his employee, subject
to the employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family.

In the case at bar, the action filed b appellant was an action for damages based on quasi-delict. 1 The fact that appellants
reserved their right in the criminal case to file an independent civil action did not preclude them from choosing to file a civil action for
quasi-delict.

The appellants invoke the provisions of Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which provide:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil action. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action
for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately.

Section 2. Independent civil action.-In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case,provided the right is
reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

Article 2177 of the Civil Code, cited in Section 2, of Rule 111, provides that

Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

The appellant precisely made a reservation to file an independent civil action in accordance with the provisions of Section
2 of Rule 111, Rules of Court. In fact, even without such a reservation, we have allowed the injured party in the criminal 1
case which resulted in the acquittal of the accused to recover damages based on quasi-delict. In People vs. Ligon, G.R.
No. 74041, we held:

However, it does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability. While
the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a
preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment
of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts
from which the civil liability might arise did not exist (Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).

WHEREFORE, we grant the petition and annul and set aside the appealed orders of the trial court, dated March 10, 1970
and May 7, 1970, and remand the case for further proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, J., took no part.