PEOPLE vs. Lacson, October 7, 2003
PEOPLE vs. Lacson, October 7, 2003
the case may be revived only within the periods provided in the new rule. On the other
hand, if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed without the express consent of the
accused or over his objection, the new rule would not apply. The case may be revived or
refiled even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the right of the accused to oppose the
same on the ground of double jeopardy or that such revival or refilingz is barred by the
statute of limitations. Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or
in writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication
to supply its meaning.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the 5 Associate Justices inhibit themselves from deciding in the Motion for
Reconsideration given they were only appointed in the SC after his Feb. 19, 2002 oral arguments.
The rule should be applied prospectively. The court upheld the petitioners contention that while Sec.8
secures the rights of the accused, it does not and should not preclude the equally important right of the
State to public justice. If a procedural rule impairs a vested right, or would work injustice, the said rule
may not be given a retroactive application.
2. WON the application of the time-bar under Section 8 Rule 117 be given a retroactive
application without reservations, only and solely on the basis of its being favorable to the
accused.
The Court is not mandated to apply rules retroactively simply because it is favorable to the
accused. The time-bar under the new rule is intended to benefit both the State and
the accused. When the rule was approved by the court, it intended that the rule be applied
prospectively and not retroactively, for to do so would be tantamount to the denial
of the States right to due process. A retroactive application would result in absurd, unjust
and oppressive consequences to the State and to the victims of crimes and their heirs.
arraignment, they were assisted by counsel de parte and pleaded not guilty to
the crime charged. rial thereafter ensued, finding both of them guilty.
Petitioners moved for recon but was denied. Dissatisfi ed, they appealed to CA
who affi rmed in toto the RTC decision. They then fi led a motion for recon which
CA denied. In their petition to the SC, petitioners raise for the fi rst time the
issue that the information charging them with libel did not contain allegations sufficient
to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Iloilo City.
Issue:
'WON the RTC of Iloilo "City had jurisdiction over the offense of libel as charged.
Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the
allegations of the complaint or information, and the off ense must have been
committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court. Considering that the Information failed to allege the venue
requirements for a libel case under Article 360, the Court finds that the RTC of Iloilo City had
no jurisdiction to hear this case. Thus, its decision convicting petitioners of the crime of
libel should be set aside for want of jurisdiction without prejudice to its fi ling
with the court of competent jurisdiction.
6. Designation of Offense
PEOPLE V. CANARES
METROPOLITAN V. REYNALDO
There are situations however when the SC would disagree with the public
prosecutor or the DOJ on the issue of probable cause. In Metropolitan Bank
and Trust Company v. Reynaldo, G.R. No. 164538, August 9, 2010, the OCP
found that the evidence of the complainant was insufficient to hold the
respondent liable for estafa. On petition for review, the DOJ agreed that
there was no estafa committed. The bank then went to the CA which
affirmed the resolution of the DOJ. The SC disagreed holding that novation is
not a ground to extinguish criminal liability. It then directed the public
prosecutor to file the corresponding Information for estafa against the
respondent.