ThemePaperAffordableHousing PDF
ThemePaperAffordableHousing PDF
ThemePaperAffordableHousing PDF
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6.0 Subsidies 35
7.0 Tenure 37
Background
Affordable Housing is the buzz word in the housing circles. Since the onset of
recession in the real estate market, real estate developers have been announcing
launch of Affordable Housing projects. Most of these projects aim to provide houses
in a price range of Rs. 12-25 lakh with an area of 700-1200 sq.ft. These projects are
apparently aimed at middle and upper middle income groups. Following the huge
pile-up of inventories in ambitious luxury housing projects launched during the boom
period in the real estate sector, the developers had no survival option but to reduce
the prices. But along with reduction in price, there has been a significant reduction
in specifications of the product.1
The paper is divided into five sections. Section I defines the concept of affordable
housing for different income groups and issues thereof. Section II explores the
capacity/competence of the market in providing affordable housing for different
income groups and specifically for the urban poor. Section III briefly describes and
1 Concept of Affordability
MIG > 1200 > 40% of households gross > 5 times households gross
sq.ft monthly income annual income
There is another category of urban poor which is also (or ought to be) part of
governments inclusive policy of providing Affordable Housing for all namely BPL
(Below Poverty Line). This category needs to be considered separately and not as
part of EWS. The affordability level of households in this category would be not
more than 5 per cent of the income. The income categories and affordability levels
thus can be defined as follows:-
Affordability is to be defined not only in terms of purchase price of the house (in case
of ownership housing) or rent but must also include other charges/fees (registration
charge, search cost etc.) payable at the time of purchase/renting of the house as
also recurring cost over the lifetime of stay in the house. These would include taxes,
maintenance cost, utility cost. One may also include cost of commuting to work
place or other places of different members of family.
Given the limitations on ATP (Affordability to Pay) of various (and especially the
lowest) income groups, housing options for these are decided in terms of whatever is
`possible within these limits. Housing defined as being a package of multiple
characteristics including location, tenure, size, infrastructure et.el. compromise is
made mainly on locations and size. In fact issue of affordability, especially for the
poor is closely linked with location of housing. Most of the poor work in the informal
sector. Most appropriate locations for these are near their work places. Since, most
of them get paid according to work done, time consumed in commuting from places
for off from (potential) work places would mean fewer hours of work, lower income
and lower ATP. The increased cost of commuting from far off work places would
have a further negative impact on `money available for housing. Besides, the
objective of providing Affordable Housing for all is not only to provide housing within
their affordability limits but to provide a superior package of housing than what they
have at present. The trade-off between location and tenure/infrastructure may not
always be a preferred option for the poor.
The objective of Housing policy thus should be not only to provide AH but to provide
housing which satisfies minimum adequate norms. One is to define Adequate
Housing and then deliberate as to how to make this housing affordable for different
income groups.2
The affordability limits (in terms of income prices ratio) are defined for the country as
a whole. So is the size of housing which is within this affordability limit. It is quite
obvious that such cannot be the case for all urban areas in the country. Thus there
may be very few households in Mumbai with incomes below the EWS limit but still
find it impossible to afford even one sq.ft of land in the city. In some small cities,
income levels of the poor may be at the lower end of EWS income limits and despite
low prices of housing, the problem of unaffordability will remain. There will be not
only inter state but also intra state differences in affordability levels of income
groups. Housing is a location specific issue. The income limits, the affordability
levels of the EWS, LIG and MIG need to be defined at the local level. Formulating
policies based on such generalized affordability norms may not be bring about
desired results.
Definition of Adequate Affordable Housing will differ from place to place and for
different categories of households within each income group. This needs to be
defined at the local level.
The market does respond to purchasing power of different income groups and
provides some kind of shelter to all. The only shortcoming is that this housing is far
from `adequate. The level of inadequacy is highest in case of the poor and is
deficient in almost all characteristics of housing. The reason for high (unaffordable)
price of housing in the market lies in:-
(i) high land prices,
(ii) cost of construction
(iii) transaction cost
(iv) taxes & legal charges, and
(v) profit margins of private operators.
Price of land is the single most expensive component in the cost of housing in urban
areas. High price of land is a consequence of the inability of land market to respond
quickly to increased demand for land with growth of urbanization. The sluggish
response of land market is partly due to inherent inefficiencies and imperfections of
this market. Land/housing market is characterized by small size of the market
(number of buyers and sellers in each submarket is quite small); low levels of
substitutability between houses/land plots in different submarkets; lack of information
about price and availability of houses/land in different areas leading to limited
competition. Further it takes a long time to make land available for residential use.
Increased demand combined with slow response of supply leads to higher prices
setting a benchmark. Even when supply is increased over medium to long term,
prices do not decline. Prices are normally downwardly rigid. High and increasing
land prices fuel expectations and add speculative demand to users demand leading
to further increases. Excess demand for land for new or existing uses is also partly
responsible for increase in prices. Quite often public sector/state projects are
provided land at much-below market (subsidised) prices leading to wasteful use of
land thus drawing away excessive land from the market and reducing supply. Low
cost of use of land in existing uses also creates excess demand. If the cost were put
at more `realistic (near-market) levels, land from existing uses could be released for
new uses. This would have some softening impact on price of land. Supply of land
could also be increased if conditions could be created for quicker turnover of use of
land. Land could be released from obsolete uses and put to use for newly emerging
uses. Examples of such obsolete uses in cities abound [see R.M. Kapoor1990]. In
India, the high transaction costs of shifting houses reduce mobility of households.
Many households may like to shift to different locations or different sized units over
their life cycle but continue to be rooted in the same house forever. A notable
example of such a phenomenon is old retired persons continuing to stay on in prime
locations in the urban areas, which if vacated could release some housing for the
new working population and would have positive impact on prices.
In the past few years, a booming economy has given rise to a segment of population
with very high income. This coupled with low interest rates on home loans and fiscal
incentives had enhanced their affordability levels significantly. This has given a
further fillip to demand for housing by a certain section. Increasing prices have fed
expectations of continuing increments emboldening the builders to amass huge
amounts of land at inflated prices. It is due to this fact that despite the present
decline in demand, builders are wary of reducing prices significantly. Reducing
prices to `equilibrium level would mean huge losses for most of them.
Increase in prices at the (top) end of the market has impacted on prices at the
middle and lower ends. This phenomenon has priced out not only the poor but many
a middle income groups also from the market. Housing inequalities have increased.
The decade 1991-2001 had seen an increase in housing inequality. If a census of
housing conditions were to be taken up in 2009, one would see further widening of
this inequality.
The market has thus failed to provide land at affordable prices to different sections of
population. The most deprived being the poor. Government has intervened in the
market through physical, legislative and economic instruments.
The interventions have not had a high rate of success. The major reason for that
being that these instruments have rarely attempted to `correct market failures. More
often, these have been imposed on the existing market system and in trying to swim
against the tide have been swept away. These solutions have also introduced
further distortions in the market. The cumulative impact of various policy measures
has been to aggravate the problem rather than solve it. In the following paragraphs
we briefly review few selected policy measures adopted by the government to
provide affordable housing to public. Some of the instruments have been directed to
reduce prize of housing per se while others have specifically targeted poorer
sections of population.
Land Acquisition by public agencies and Land Banking and direct participation by the
government in the housing market by providing built housing for different sections of
population have been the major physical instruments. Legislative policies
specifically formulated to make housing more affordable have included Rent Control
Act (RCA) and Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act (ULCRA). Economic policies
have mainly focused on making housing finance more accessible and cheaper for
the public. Fiscal incentives and directed credit by commercial banks have been two
major planks of this policy.
Despite all these measures, decent housing continues to be out-of-reach for a large
section of population. The reason/cause for their limited sources need to be
explored.
Land Acquisition and Land Banking was adopted by the state with the major
objective of making land available in the market as and when required at state-fixed
prices. It was assumed that this would help in stabilizing price of land in the market.
Under this scheme, the city level development authorities (or Housing Boards at the
Apart from the explicit policy of making land available in the market at
`reasonable/affordable prices, there have been other city level interventions which
had impacted land prices. Master plans, zoning regulations and building bye- laws
are prominent among these. Master Plans have been utilized by the government to
project demand for land for different uses and allocate the same. Master Plans are
long term plans and by their very nature cannot respond to dynamics of urban areas.
By rigid allocation (through zoning) of land for different uses, they create more
problems than solve. Similarly, excessive norms relating to building codes reduce
supply of housing and increase cost. Under Master Plans, land has normally been
allocated for housing of the poor. In most cases, this land has been usurped by
other uses.
Land reservation for the Poor in new housing projects has been another measure
employed by many state governments. This policy also has not succeeded in
providing land for housing to the poor. New projects are mostly (if not in all cases) in
peripheral areas. It was found (in case studies conducted in Uttar Pradesh and
Madhya Pradesh) that plots of land allocated by the `developers for the poor were
the farthest from the city area and were poor topographically. The cost of
developing such land (which is to be borne by the beneficiary) would be much higher
than would be the case otherwise. These locations anyway are inappropriate for the
poor even if land is made available free of cost (which is not the case). These
locations would become appropriate for the poor only after (the completion of the
project and) when the project is inhabitated and demand for services normally
provided by the poor (namely domestic servants, drivers etc.) emerges. The poor do
Rent Control Acts are in operation in all states of the country. The terms of tenancy
in the `controlled premises are governed by the provisions of the acts. The major
provisions of the RCA include
a) control on rent and rent revisions,
b) restrictions on eviction and,
c) enjoinment on the landlord to maintain property in habitable conditions.
Under the acts, the tenant has statutory protection of law and can be evicted only on
grounds specified in the Act. The long term impact of this act has been shrinkage of
supply of rental housing in the market, increased rents, fast deterioration of housing
stock, disincentive to investment in housing in general and rental housing in
particular and emergence of black money and various other malpractices in the
rental housing market. The RCAs have been only partially effective. The
beneficiaries are mostly occupants of old tenancies. The poor have seldom
benefited. They neither had the time nor money to go to court in case the provisions
of the RCA were not adhered to.
Under the policy of Priority Sector Lending (PSL), scheduled commercial banks are
to lend 40% of their net bank credit every year to priority sectors. The priority
sectors include Agriculture, Small Scale industry and 8 other sectors. Housing is
one of these. Whereas a sub-target has been fixed for agriculture and tiny sectors,
none has been fixed for housing. Lending for housing under this program thus
becomes a residual rather than a priority. In the last few years the credit given for
housing by commercial banks increased manifold due to slow offtake by other
sectors.
The loans by commercial banks can be either direct loans to individuals or indirect
loans for housing to Housing Intermediary agencies and all investments in financing
of housing.
The Reserve Bank of India has been continuously `liberalising the terms of PSL for
housing. The loan limit for direct loans has been increased from Rs.3 lakh to Rs.5
lakh in 1997 to Rs. Rs.20 lakh in 2009 as part of the fiscal stimulus. The private
sector is `demanding a further increase to Rs.50 lakh. It is clear that the
governments priority in housing sector, as defined in its credit policy is not confined
to housing for the Poor but housing per se. The rate of interest on loans below Rs.2
lakh is subsidised whereas those above this limit are deregulated. The commercial
banks thus would have no incentive to lend for the poorer sections of population.
(directly or thru the indirect route via NGOs, cooperative banks or other intermediary
agencies).
Tax benefits have also been made available to tenants and employers providing staff
housing. Under section 80GG of the Income Tax Act, any expenditure incurred on
payment of rent in excess of 10 per cent of assessees income is deductible from his
income upto a limit of 25 per cent of income or Rs.2000 whichever is lower.
Employee housing is exempted from wealth tax provided the employees income
does not exceed Rs.5 lakh per annum.
Twenty per cent of profits of housing finance companies are exempt from taxation if
they are put in a special reserve.
The Government had provided complete exemption from income tax to private
builders on incomes from sale of small sized dwelling units (with a built up area of
1000 sq.ft if located in Delhi or Mumbai or 1500 if located elsewhere).The
developers continued to clamour for increasing the permissible size limits. The
concession was misused in most cases. (Section 80 1B is no longer in force)
Section 80 1A provides 100 per cent tax exemption (for 10 years) to any housing
project being an integral part of a highway project. Section 80 HHBA permits 50 per
cent deduction from income of housing projects aided by the World Bank.
Tax concessions under sections 24 and 80C reduce the effective rate of interest and
monthly installments payable. The main impact of these has been to improve the
affordability for housing of tax paying individuals who borrow for purchase of their
house. The poor pay no income tax and hence do not benefit.
Further, since income tax is progressive, benefit would be higher for higher income
groups. The effective interest rate will be reduced by 1.03 per cent for persons in
the marginal tax bracket of 10 per cent and by 2.53 per cent for those in the marginal
tax bracket of 30 per cent. The effective EMI (Equated Monthly Installment) will be
reduced by 8-24 per cent for different tax brackets)
The net impact of the tax concessions might have been an increase in housing
prices for 2 reasons. One, tax incentives would be capitalized and translate into
higher property prices. Two, combination of concessions on housing loans, low
housing cost and exemption from capital gains would inflate investment (read
speculative) demand for residential properties.
Thus, whereas tax incentives benefited a few, their impact on increasing housing
prices made housing less affordable for all others.
A number of specific programs for the poor have included: slum upgradation and
redevelopment, land reservation for poor in new projects; sites and services; night
shelters; Environmental Improvement of Urban Slums, EWS-LIG housing program,
VAMBAY, Million Housing Program etc. Various states have their own housing-
specific programs targeted towards the poor. To facilitate operationalisation of these
programs, institutional mechanisms were set up including Housing Boards and
Development Authorities at state/city level. Housing and Urban Development
In the initial years of independence, ambitious housing programs for the poor were
launched. Under the Rental Housing Scheme, it was proposed to provide two room
houses to the poor on subsidised rent. Huge difference between the market price
and rent payable by the allotted acted as an inducement to `sell the occupancy
rights. Most such housing changed hands in the first few years itself. The program
was not successful due to the high quantum of subsidy involved. Maintenance cost,
which were to be borne by the Government were much higher than the rent. Many
allottees defaulted even on the low rent payments. Unable to bear the heavy
subsidy burden, the program was shelved and existing units were `sold to the
occupants. Same was the fate of housing provided on ownership basis.
It was realized that given the magnitude of housing problem, it will not be possible
for the government is to provide subsidised housing to all the poor. The next set of
programs hit upon Cross-subsidisation as the solution wherein the burden of
subsidised housing for the poorer sections was to be borne by the middle and high
income groups. The state governments initiated composite housing programs
including housing for all income groups. Housing provided for different income
groups varied in size and specifications with lower size/specifications for EWS-LIG
as compared to those for the MIG and HIGs. The success of such a program would
depend upon the number of dwelling units built for different income groups, the
quantum of subsidy required for EWS-LIG housing and the viable price for MIG-HIG
housing units. Given the fact that the requirement for EWS-LIG units was much
higher, and subsidy needed per unit quite-high, the MIG-HIG housing would have to
be `priced very high. High price however discourage demand for such housing. The
public agencies responsible for implementing the program decided to build more
MIG-HIG units to cross-subsidise the EWS-LIG units. The needs of the poor were
not met. Nor of the MIG-HIG since the demand for these too was much higher. A
significant number of subsidised housing for the EWS-LIG too filtered up to
accommodate unsatiated demand for housing of the MIG-HIGs.
Attempts to provide housing to the poor within their affordability limits took the form
of provision of serviced sites (Sites and Services) with nil or skelton structures. The
poor had to pay for the sites and build or complete structure on their own. Since
what was provided under these schemes already stretched the budget of the poor to
the limit, they did not have financial capacity to build/complete the shelter. Further,
in most cases the sites were in far-off peripheral areas suffering from locational
disadvantage for the target group. The housing package provided under these
schemes was inferior to the existing habitats and was unacceptable. These
locations were good investment options for the moneyed class.
Most of the public housing projects were conceived on a large scale. Given the
financial constraint, these had to be located on cheaper lands which would be in
peripheral areas. Due to this factor, housing provided by these agencies have not
been successful in the short run. In the long run however these have emerged as
viable units for the LIGs especially in cases where initial support in terms of cheaper
transport to workplaces has been provided or other earning opportunities created for
the target group.
The Government is thus confronted with the dilemma. Low amount of subsidy fails
in providing even minimal amount of housing. On the other hand, high amount of
subsidy leaks out to higher income groups. Higher amount of subsidy per unit would
also mean that the `benefit will accrue only to limited number of the poor given the
financial constraint. If the limited amounts of funds have to be spread over a large
Despite good design the scheme did not take off and very few Night Shelters were
built all over the country.
The scheme of Slum Improvement and Upgradation has had better record of
success. The development under this scheme is done in-situ and the likelihood of
beneficiaries selling of the improved units is much lower. Due to fund constraints the
scheme could not be taken on a large scale and only a small percentage of slums
could be covered. The problem of keeping up the `improvements after the initial
upgradation by the public agency has been acute. At times, improved slums have
become preferred habitats for LIGs or lower MIGs. In other cases, the rents payable
by the tenants in improved slums have increased.
In addition to the few schemes described above, state governments have had their
own schemes with mixed results. The Government of India has launched a variety
of schemes like Million Housing Program, programs linking poverty eradication with
provision of housing (see Annexure 2 for details ) It can be surmised that the
housing situations would have been much worse in the absence of all these
schemes. The situation however, is far from satisfactory as can be seen from the
report of Housing Conditions in various government reports. The policy makers are
still in search of a viable solution to provide Affordable Housing for all.
In the past 60 years (1950 onwards) Government of India has adopted a plethora of
policies and programs to solve burgeoning housing problem of the country. The
cumulative impact of these policies has been quite limited as is evident from the
continuing worsening of housing situation especially for the poor. Percentage of
urban population living in slums had increased from 17 per cent in 1981 to 27.8 per
cent in 2001. As per 2001 Census, population living in slums was as high as 61
million. Percentage of households having no exclusive room increased from 0.04 in
1991 to 2.3 per cent in 2001. The Technical Group constituted for assessment of
housing shortage at the end of 10th Five Year Plan (2007) estimated the total (urban)
housing shortage in the country to be 24.7 million dwelling units. Approximately 98
to 99 per cent of this shortage pertains to EWS-LIG.
The problem however is not only of number of livable housing units equaling or
exceeding number of household. Unless the supply responds to requirement in
different segments, we might have surpluses in some segments and shortage in
others. This is evidenced by high vacancy rate (at 9 per cent) in urban housing.
The Government of India has adopted a dual policy for providing Affordable Housing
for all. The fiscal incentives and housing sector reforms mainly target the middle and
upper income groups who will be provided housing through the market processes.
Special housing programs had been devised for the poor both at the centre and
state level. In fact there has been a succession of such programs. In the beginning
of the planning period, social housing schemes were devised for EWS-LIG-MIGs.
Later programs however have been directed towards the poor only. These included
Integrated Subsidised Housing Scheme for Industrial workers and economically
weaker sections (1952); Low Income Group Housing Scheme (1956); Slum
improvement/Clearance Scheme (initiated in 1956 and discontinued in 1972 at
national level). Environmental Improvement of Urban Slums (1972); National slum
development Program (1996), Scheme for Housing and Shelter Upgradation
(SHASHU as part of Nehru Rozgar Yojna, introduced in 1989 and discontinued in
1997); the Shelter Upgradation Scheme under PMIUPEP (Prime Ministers Urban
Poverty and Employment Program had even a shorter life span 1996-97); Night
shelter (1988-89). Two Million Housing Programs, VAMBAY (Valmiki Ambedkar
Awas Yojna (launched in 2001-02) and the latest JNNURM (Jawaharlal Nehru
National Urban Renewal Mission). In addition various ministries have had their own
programs targeted towards their constituencies. Ministry of Textile launched
workshed-cum-housing scheme for artisans and handloom weavers. Ministry of
Labor launched housing scheme for workers engaged in beedi industry, for
HAMALS (persons engaged in carrying head load at public places such as railway
stations, bus terminals, market places etc.) and for Mathadi workers. The fisherman
housing scheme was promoted by Ministry of Agriculture.
Many of the above programs have been launched with much fanfare as the final
answer to the housing problems of the poor and replaced by other programs at times
coinciding with the installing of different political set up. The low success rate could
be also another reason. The reasons for the low success rate have seldom been
critically and rigorously explored. Many of the subsequent programs would thus
suffer from the same shortcomings and will have to be jettisoned. Offhand one could
surmise two major reasons for their limited success; One, the programs were
generally fully funded by Government of India initially and later on shifted to state
government and local bodies. Lack of funding constrained the states to discontinue
these programs. Inefficient implementation due to absence of requisite
skills/capacities at the local level could be another reason.
The short life span of most of these programmes has acted as a serious constraint to
exploitation of full potential of these. Their substitution by subsequent programs
would also be quite costly. The institutional setup to operationalise the programs will
have to be substituted by a different mechanism devised for the new program.
Further, hardly would have the administrators acquired the requisite skills for
operationalising the program that they have to unlearn these and learn new skills. It
is therefore very important that any new policy/program is well thought of and
carefully designed. The experience from the old programs should be a definite input
while designing any new program. Same holds for housing policies.
In the following paragraphs we take a look at Indias National Urban Housing and
Habitat Policy 2007, housing policies of selected states; a few state housing
programs and the latest ambitious programs launched by the Government of India
namely the JNNURM, BUSP and IHSDP.
Housing being a state subject the NUHHP plays only an advisory role. Concrete
steps to operationalise the policy are to be taken by the state governments. For the
same reason the NUHHP does not put a time-frame to achieve the aims of Housing
Policy. Setting the goal of Affordable Housing for All, the NUHHP, as noted above
adopts dual policy. For the MIG-HIGs the suggestions include, among others, fiscal
incentives (even though these fall in the domain of Central Government, no concrete
suggestions have been made); development of innovative financial instruments like
Mortgage based securities to increase flow of finance to the housing market; reform
of rent control act, rationalization of stamp duties and promotion of rental housing.
The section on Legal and Regulatory reforms lists sixteen reform areas to be taken
up by the state governments. Important among these are reform of rent control acts,
repeal of ULCRA, single window approach for approval of building plans. For the
poor, the policy seeks to assist poorest of the poor who cannot afford to pay the
entire price of a house by providing them access to reasonably good housing on
rental and ownership basis with suitable subsidization (GOI: 2007 p.11). At another
place, the policy stance is different. It emphasises shifting to a demand driven
approach and from subsidy based housing schemes to cost recovery-cum-subsidy
schemes for housing through a proactive financial policy including micro-finance and
self help groups (GOI: 2007 p.14). The two statements taken together point towards
a limited subsidy approach towards housing the urban poor. Other recommended
policy instruments include land reservation for the poor and higher FAR in lieu of
that, capital and interest subsidies; setting up of a National Shelter Fund for
providing subsidy support to EWS-LIG; spatial and financial incentives for slum
redevelopment schemes and in-situ slum upgradation. It is also suggested that the
states/UTs prepare 10 year Perspective Housing Plans with emphasis on EWS-LIG
sectors.
Most of the suggestions are worded in general termsspecifies being left for the
states to work out. In two cases however specific suggestions are given. (i)
reservation of 20-25 per cent of the FAR to be reserved for EWS-LIG (relaxation of
FAR to facilitate the same) and (ii) proposed outline of reform in the Model Rent Act.
The various State Housing Policies have taken their cue from the NHHP and
formulated their policies accordingly. Major policy initiatives towards the goal of
Affordable Housing include reform of rent control act, increased supply of land,
reservation of land for the poor, in-situ slum upgradation, reduction in stamp duty
especially for the poor, creation of State Shelter Funds for increased flow for EWS-
LIG housing, interest subsidy, increased FAR, simplification of procedures for getting
various permissions for building housing. The above mentioned features are
common to all state housing policies being analysed. Madhya Pradesh and
Maharashtra housing policies also propose to provide transit shelters for new
migrants. Madhya Pradesh plans to levy shelter fee on projects in lieu of land
reservation for the EWS-LIG. The revenue from this shelter fee will be used for
providing dwelling units for the EWS. In case the private sector allocates higher than
prescribed (15 per cent) proportion of land for EWS-LIG, the permissible FAR will be
increased further as financial incentive. The Madhya Pradesh Government also
proposes complete exemption from stamp duty to the poor. In order to overcome
the constraint of land for housing projects, Madhya Pradesh government also would
provide government land (wherever available) for such projects especially to public
housing agencies. It is stated that the aim of housing policy is to have slumless
cities and programs for relocation, rehabilitation, slum upgradation and mandatory
provision of staff housing by employers is provided for. Even though, the
government has prepared a comprehensive housing policy responding to major
housing issues in the state, no time frame is set for achieving the objectives of
Housing Policy.
Kerala Governments housing policy puts forth the idea of promoting EWS-LIG
housing as part of corporate social responsibility. The private sector would be given
incentives to invest part of the profits for housing needs of the poor. It is also stated
in the Policy that the government will initiate the setting up of a `Bhavan Nidhi from
NRIs and corporates of Kerala for investment in EWS-LIG housing projects. A very
important component of Keralas state Housing Policy is setting up of a Housing
Risk Fund to cover repayment risk on loans upto Rs.1 lakh provided by HFIs to
EWS-LIG. This would encourage HFIs to lend to the EWS-LIGs.
Almost all state housing policies make a pitch for providing for EWS-LIG. It is a
moot point as to how far would these succeed in making available Affordable
Housing. Of foremost importance is the question whether these policies will get
implemented. Thus e.g. the earlier housing policies had also recommended
simplification of procedures etc. On ground the impact has been negligible, if any.
Promises to make land available do not necessarily mean that the land will be made
available at affordable prices. Similarly, reserving land for EWS-LIG in new housing
projects neither means that the price fixed for such lands is affordable nor that this
land will be taken up by the EWS-LIG. Increased FAR and TDR also may not
translate into lower housing prices. Nor will reduction in stamp duty. The ambitious
plans for slumless cities may hit the roadblock of funds availability.
Reform of rent control act will have a beneficial impact on investment in housing.
However since most of the proposed reforms leave out the existing tenancies which
are in prime areas of the city untouched, the total impact on affordability will be
marginal. The impact however will be significant in the long run. Since as is the
case in many `reformed rent acts, the low-rent properties continue to be protected, it
is unlikely that there would be any significant investment in low-rent housing. The
major constraint to investment in rental housing was not only the rent control act but
Another important legislative reform namely repeal of ULCRA is also unlikely to have
any impact on land prices. The recent decline in land prices is due to recession in
the economy rather than repeal of ULCRA.
Apart from the housing policy which is more of a statement of intent, the state
governments have various housing programs specifically for the weaker sections.
As in the case of Central Government, the State Governments also have had a
succession of programs targeted towards the poor. Kerala had Rajiv One Million
Housing Scheme and Mathri Housing Scheme (mainly cash loan schemes),
Karnataka Ashraya and Ambedkar Housing Scheme.
Uttar Pradesh initiated a housing programme for the poor wherein the beneficiaries
would be provided built housing. The beneficiary had to repay the loan at the rate of
Rs.5, Rs.10 or Rs.15 per day over a repayment period of 20 years. The Rs.5 per
day plan will fetch him one room-kitchen and open space for future expansion on a
25 sq.m. plot of land. Rs.10-15 plan will provide for toilet also. Eligible population
was to be BPL households with an income of less than or equal to Rs.11850 p.a. It
is clear that this would have required heavy amount of subsidization since even the
highest income group among the BPL would not be (or barely) able to afford to pay
the installment even in a Rs.5 plan. As per the program, some amount of subsidy
had to be borne by the development authorities from their internal resources. It is
unlikely that the development authorities will have the requisite amount to subsidise
this program. This program has been substituted by a new program after the BSP
came to power.
The Uttar Pradesh Government initiated two schemes for the poorer sections of
population. The first one was initiated in June 2008 named Manyavar Shri Kashiramji
Shahri garib Awas Yojna with the objective of building 1,01,000 dwelling units in the
first phase (2008-2009) for the poor. Land was to be made available at appropriate
The scheme was ambitious. The cost to the exchequer @ 1.75 lakh per dwelling
unit for 1, 01,000 would be 17,67,50,00,000 (Rs.176.8 crores approx) and even at
this cost would be able to cover only a small segment of the needy.
As noted in section I of this paper, such a scheme was initiated by the Central
Government with subsidised rentals. The scheme was an abysmal failure. The poor
sold off their occupancy rights; the local bodies could not bear the expense of
maintenance and ultimately the government was constrained to sell of the property.
The UP governments scheme does not seem to have incorporated any element to
ward of such a probability. The condition that the beneficiary cannot transfer the
occupancy right or lease to any other person for next ten years is not a sufficient
disincentive for transfer. What happens if the beneficiary sells of the occupancy right
which under the current market conditions will fetch a lucrative price? There is no
penalty prescribed in the scheme for such an action. Even the penalty of depriving
The high amount of subsidy per unit would be unsustainable given the magnitude of
the problem. The problem of targeting would remain. With the huge housing deficit
for EWS, LIG and MIGs a 2 room dwelling unit will have high demand and market
value. The government seems to have no adequate policy for the other income
group. While the scheme was still being implemented, the government came up with
another scheme. The target group was again BPL individuals or households living in
unplanned, informal and unauthorized settlements.The objective were to give these
people secure tenure by giving ownership rights on their dwelling units. The scheme
was named `Sarvjan Hitay Garib Awas (Slum Area) Malikana Haq Yojna. The
scheme is a slum redevelopment scheme. Under the scheme the beneficiaries will
be allotted plots ranging from 15-30 sq.m and charged a price for the same. The
price would be Rs.20 per sq.m in municipal corporation area, Rs.15 in nagarpalika
and Rs.10 in Nagar Panchayat. The beneficiaries would not have to pay any
conversion fee, development fee or shaman fee.
The reach of this scheme is even more limited than the earlier scheme. All
slum/unauthorized colonies are not eligible under this scheme. Within these
eligibility is limited to BPL families. The ineligible slums etc. include (all slums on
lands of central government or of their enterprises, industrial, forest areas. Etc.) eight
categories. Further, even though the layout plan will be prepared and plots allotted
at a subsidised price, there is no assurance of provision for basic infrastructure like
drainage, roads etc. This would be conditional upon availability of budget. Security
of tenure, however, might induce the slum dwellers to improve their shelter structure.
Considering the fact that eligible individuals are below poverty line, it is a moot point
whether they would have the financial wherewithal to do that. The possibility of
infrastructure improvement on their own is even less. For one, it is inconceivable
that all the slum dwellers in a particular slum will belong to BPL category. Thus not
all will get Patta. Improvement on a slum-scale can happen only if all are involved.
Apart from the fact of financial constraint which such a program would face, the
government seems to have taken a static view of the problem. The number of
It is recognized that in order to improve housing condition of all the urban poor would
require a massive dose of funds. It was estimated that to meet the housing
th
requirement during the 11 Five Year Plan (2007-2012) would need an investment
of about Rs.5,10,000 crores. Buoyed by the high rate of growth of the Indian
economy and rising rate of growth of revenue, the Government of India launched
JNNURM with the Sub -Missions of BSUP (Basic Services to the Urban Poor) and
IHSDP (Integrated Housing and Slum Development Program. This major objective
of the programs being provision of affordable housing to the poor. The JNNURM
has a target of construction of 1.5 million units.
The BSUP is being implemented in 63 mission cities and IHSDP in all other towns.
Both have a 7 point charter including security of tenure at affordable prices,
improved housing, water supply and sanitation and integration of provision of other
existing universal services of health, education and social security under various
government programs. The existing centrally sponsored housing programs of
VAMBAY and NSDP will become part of IHSDP.
Under BSUP the central government will give a grant of 50 to 90 per cent for various
categories of cities. The rest of the finance will have to be through state government
grant/loan and beneficiary contribution.
The JNNURM is a reform-linked (see Annexure 3 for suggested reforms in the urban
sector).
More important than the coverage is the design of the program which could become
a model for future (or be replaced by another program). The integrated approach of
providing housing with infrastructure, involving communities in the process of project
preparation and viewing the problem of slums in the context of development of city is
an `ideal concept. So is link with the urban sector reforms. Preparation of City
Development Plan is a precondition for acceptance of projects. Signing of MOA with
the Ministry of Urban Development, undertaking to carry out the agreed reforms is
another precondition. As of January 2009 against the target of 1.5 million houses
countrywide, projects for 1.2 million have already been sanctioned. The success or
otherwise of the program will be known only after its implementation.
Even though the program is designed to include skill development of slum dwellers
as its part, the danger of its sliding down to the level of mere slum upgradation in
some areas cannot be ignored. Skill development, education and health is even
more important because this component will help in achieving the goal of slumless
cities in future.
The most important part is linkage with urban sector reforms. Enticed by the use of
central government grants, many states have undertaken the required reforms.
It is understandable that given the magnitude of the problem, the program can cover
only a small proportion (less than 6 per cent) of the target population.
1. the first conclusion we can draw from earlier programs is that high amount of
subsidy per unit is not a workable solution to achieve the goal of Affordable Housing
for All. As noted above, the benefit of such a program accrues to a few in the first
stage (i.e. till allotment). Post allotment the beneficiaries quite often are a different
group altogether. The problem of housing for the poor remains the same. High
level of subsidy (calculated as difference between the market price and cost to the
beneficiary) also leads to speculative demand.
5. The poor are not a homogeneous group. To define them only in terms of
income level of the households and formulate a program based on
affordability (calculated as percentage of income) alone can lead to wrong
conclusion about their housing preferences. Other important elements
which need to be taken into account are length of stay in the city, stability
of job, type of job, composition of family, consumption/expenditure pattern
etc.
7. Provision of housing (even at highly subsidised rates) may not induce the
target groups to opt for the house. Apart from the fact that the house may
still (despite subsidies) be unaffordable (even in the narrow sense of the
term), the willingness to pay for the house may be very low or nil. In order
to create demand for housing of the target groups, one is to cater not only
their ATP (affordability to pay) but also WTP (willingness to pay). Closer
is house to their preference pattern, higher will be the WTP. A higher
WTP even increases ATP by inducing the target group to cut down on
other expenditure or increase their income by various means.
8. It is not necessary to plan for mass housing program for the poor. Such
programs normally hit against the roadblock of non-availability of land in
large chunks at cheap prices. The projects then per se.. have to be
located in far off peripheral areas. Small chunks of land available within
the city can be utilized. The ULCRA had provided for such an opportunity
which was not exploited.
10. The exit or much reduced role of Housing Boards and Development
Authorities from participation in the housing market has been a major
setback for Affordable Housing agenda. These parastatal agencies
performed two important functions: (i) provided housing for all sections of
population at rates lower than that of the private sector; (ii) availability of
`cheaper housing of these agencies acted as a restraint on the profit
margins of the private sector and lead to more competitive pricing. The
12. Fiscal incentives in terms of tax breaks have not succeeded in making
housing affordable for 2 reasons: (i) A significant part of these gets
capitalized in the price and (ii) house prices despite subsidies are too high
to be affordable. This is also the cause of high rentals.
13. Despite subsidies many households (in all income categories) find
housing unaffordable. The option of ownership is not viable for many.
There are a few rental housing schemes for EWS but none for the LIGs
and MIGs. There is no rental housing market in the organized sector
which could be made to provide affordable housing to general public.
On the basis of above conclusions one can put forward a few workable
suggestions for providing affordable housing to general public. It may be clarified
that it is necessary to have a number of options to suit differing requirements and
financial capacities of various groups. There can be no one solution or scheme
which will meet the needs of ALL.
2. Subsidy should be need based. The needs of different habitats of the poor
will be different. It is not possible for a generalized scheme to cater to the
needs of all habitats. The need may be assessed in consultation with the
community and a specific program of subsidization be formulated taking into
account the paying capacity of the habitants and their priorities. Involvement
of the habitants will lead to better success rate as also in minimal need for
subsidization. The willingness to pay for any good or service is higher if the
provision is in line with ones preference structure.
5. Central and many state governments have been able to provide 2 room +
kitchen + Bath + WC + balcony units within a cost of approximately Rs. 2
lakh. This excludes the land cost. Slightly bigger houses (3 or 4 room) could
be provided for MIGs at the cost of Rs.3-4 lakh excluding land cost. Housing
Boards, Development authorities could be involved in this program. There
will be huge demand for such housing in the country. This would help in
satiating the demand for housing of the MIGs (who will then not have the
incentive to invade subsidised housing of the poor). This would also rein in
speculative demand for housing. Housing Boards and Development
authorities need to be revitalized to take up this task. State Housing Boards
can compete for these contracts in all states. The cost of land can be
recovered from the allottees over a long period. This is not suggesting a
leasehold system (though that can be considered too). The ownership of
land will accrue over a longer period while the shelter structure can be owned
faster.
(c) Under RCA the burden of subsidizing the tenant is on landlord, the
government can create a class of social landlords who are agreeable
to charge reasonable rents (rate of return of (say) 5 per cent or so);
assure them this return (if due to some reason house is vacant). In
case of poor tenants the differential between affordable rent and
`reasonable rent be paid by the government to the `social landlord.
This could be implemented through housing boards or urban local
bodies.
3. Capital gains tax exemption given only after holding the property for
three years encourages speculative investment. The exemption may
The major cause of unaffordability of housing is the high cost of land. The
government has to formulate a land policy which can make land available
for different uses to all categories of population at reasonable prices.
Prices are high due to artificial `scarcity of land created by developers
(amassing/hoarding huge chunks of land for long period of time),
speculative investors (facilitated by existing fiscal policy) and by users
(who prepone their demand for land in order to beat anticipated inflation
land prices in future). In order to bring down land prices to affordable
levels, The land policy will have to operate both on supply and demand
side tools to increase supply and curb excess demand for land. These
could include:
(a) increasing the holding cost of vacant land by imposing vacant land tax
after a holding period of maximum of 1-2 years.
(e) Reduction in minimum plot size (< 50 sq.m) and prescribe maximum
plot size. The minimum and maximum can be different for different
locations.
(f) Land planning for future should reserve central (or more productive)
areas for uses which result in turnover of population. One such use is
rental housing which is transient housing.
(h) Increase (flow of) supply of land from existing stock of developed land.
Thus , for instance, a reasonable increase in property taxes of houses
which at present are paying very low tax (thus with minimum holding
cost) may induce the occupants to release some stock in the market.
Land has become the most expensive component of housing cost in urban
India. An appropriate land policy will have to be an essential component of the
housing policy. Second important component could be Tenure. Focus of discussion
on housing policies must shift from preoccupation with ownership housing to other
forms of tenure suitable for different income, professional and age groups.
The role of non- housing policies and strategies also cannot be overlooked.
These could include transport policy, regional planning etc. In this context it is
important to take a re-look at Governments existing fiscal and monetary policies,
especially those directed towards housing.
***
Footnotes:-
1. This is not correction in prices (which would be thee case when the prices of
existing high-valued properties decline. Prices of these have fallen by small
percentages. The builder lobby is busy proclaiming that prices are unlikely to
fall any further thus trying to boost demand by working on expectations of
individuals