G.R. No.

L-30389 December 27, 1972

PEDRO LEE HONG HOK, SIMEON LEE HONG HOK, ROSITA LEE HONG HOK
and LEONCIO LEE HONG HOK, petitioners,
vs.
ANIANO DAVID, THE HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Augusto A. Pardalis for petitioners.

Luis General, Jr. for respondent Aniano David.

Office of the Solicitor General for other respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:p

Petitioners 1 in this appeal by certiorari would have us reverse a decision of respondent

Court of Appeals affirming a lower court judgment dismissing their complaint to have the
Torrens Title 2 of respondent Aniano David declared null and void. What makes the task for
petitioners quite difficult is that their factual support for their pretension to ownership of
such disputed lot through accretion was rejected by respondent Court of Appeals. Without
such underpinning, they must perforce rely on a legal theory, which, to put it mildly, is
distinguished by unorthodoxy and is therefore far from persuasive. A grant by the
government through the appropriate public officials 3 exercising the competence duly vested
in them by law is not to be set at naught on the premise, unexpressed but implied, that land
not otherwise passing into private ownership may not be disposed of by the state. Such an
assumption is at war with settled principles of constitutional law. It cannot receive our
assent. We affirm.

The decision of respondent Court of Appeals following that of the lower court makes clear
that there is no legal justification for nullifying the right of respondent Aniano David to the
disputed lot arising from the grant made in his favor by respondent officials. As noted in the
decision under review, he "acquired lawful title thereby pursuant to his miscellaneous sales
application in accordance with which an order of award and for issuance of a sales patent
was made by the Director of Lands on June 18, 1958, covering Lot 2892 containing an area
of 226 square meters, which is a portion of Lot 2863 of the Naga Cadastre. On the basis of
the order of award of the Director of Lands the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources issued on August 26, 1959, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209 pursuant to
which OCT No. 510 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Naga City to defendant-appellee
Aniano David on October 21, 1959. According to the Stipulation of Facts, since the filing of
the sales application of Aniano David and during all the proceedings in connection with said
application, up to the actual issuance of the sales patent in his favor, the plaintiffs-
appellants did not put up any opposition or adverse claim thereto. This is fatal to them
because after the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title
based on a public land patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes under the
operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all the safeguards provided therein.... Under
Section 38 of Act 496 any question concerning the validity of the certificate of title based on
fraud should be raised within one year from the date of the issuance of the patent.
Thereafter the certificate of title based thereon becomes indefeasible.... In this case the land
in question is not a private property as the Director of Lands and the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources have always sustained the public character thereof for
having been formed by reclamation.... The only remedy therefore, available to the
appellants is an action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud. In this case we do not see
any fraud committed by defendant-appellant Aniano David in applying for the purchase of
the land involved through his Miscellaneous Sales Application No. MSA-V-26747, entered in
the records of the Bureau of Lands [Miscellaneous Sales] Entry No. V-9033, because
everything was done in the open. The notices regarding the auction sale of the land were
published, the actual sale and award thereof to Aniano David were not clandestine but open
and public official acts of an officer of the Government. The application was merely a
renewal of his deceased wife's application, and the said deceased occupied the land since
1938." 4

On such finding of facts, the attempt of petitioners to elicit a different conclusion is likely to
be attended with frustration. The first error assigned predicated an accretion having taken
place, notwithstanding its rejection by respondent Court of Appeals, would seek to
disregard what was accepted by respondent Court as to how the disputed lot came into
being, namely by reclamation. It does not therefore call for any further consideration.
Neither of the other two errors imputed to respondent Court, as to its holding that
authoritative doctrines preclude a party other than the government to dispute the validity
of a grant and the recognition of the indefeasible character of a public land patent after one
year, is possessed of merit. Consequently, as set forth at the outset, there is no justification
for reversal.
1. More specifically, the shaft of criticism was let loose by petitioner aimed at this legal
proposition set forth in the exhaustive opinion of then Justice Salvador Esguerra of the
Court of Appeals, now a member of this Court: "There is, furthermore, a fatal defect of
parties to this action. Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands, or the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void
certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent (Lucas vs. Durian, 102 Phil. 1157;
Director of Lands vs. Heirs of Ciriaco Carlo, G.R. No. L-12485, July 31, 1959). This was not
done by said officers but by private parties like the plaintiffs, who cannot claim that the
patent and title issued for the land involved are void since they are not the registered
owners thereof nor had they been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings of Naga
Cadastre after claiming it as their private property. The cases cited by appellants are not in
point as they refer to private registered lands or public lands over which vested rights have
been acquired but notwithstanding such fact the Land Department subsequently granted
patents to public land applicants." 5 Petitioner ought to have known better. The above
excerpt is invulnerable to attack. It is a restatement of a principle that dates back
to Maninang v. Consolacion, 6a 1908 decision. As was there categorically stated: "The fact
that the grant was made by the government is undisputed. Whether the grant was in
conformity with the law or not is a question which the government may raise, but until it is
raised by the government and set aside, the defendant can not question it. The legality of
the grant is a question between the grantee and the government." 7 The above citation was
repeated ipsissimis verbis in Salazar v. Court of Appeals. 8 Bereft as petitioners were of the
right of ownership in accordance with the findings of the Court of Appeals, they cannot, in
the language of Reyes v. Rodriguez, 9 "question the [title] legally issued." 10
The second
assignment of error is thus disposed of.

2. As there are overtones indicative of skepticism, if not of outright rejection, of the well-
known distinction in public law between the government authority possessed by the state
which is appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty, and its capacity to own or
acquire property, it is not inappropriate to pursue the matter further. The former comes
under the heading of imperium and the latter of dominium. The use of this term is
appropriate with reference to lands held by the state in its proprietary character. In such
capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources,
including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution. Dean Pound did speak of
the confusion that existed during the medieval era between such two concepts, but did note
the existence of res publicae as a corollary to dominium." 11 As far as the Philippines was
concerned, there was a recognition by Justice Holmes in Cario v. Insular Government, 12 a
case of Philippine origin, that "Spain in its earlier decrees embodied the universal feudal
 13
theory that all lands were held from the Crown...." That was a manifestation of the
14
concept of jura regalia, which was adopted by the present Constitution, ownership
however being vested in the state as such rather than the head thereof. What was stated by
Holmes served to confirm a much more extensive discussion of the matter in the leading
case of Valenton v. Murciano, 15 decided in 1904. One of the royal decrees cited was
16
incorporated in the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias in these words: "We having
acquired full sovereignty over the Indies and all lands, territories, and possessions not
heretofore ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining to
the royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are held without proper
and true deeds of grant be restored to us according as they belong to us, in order that after
reserving before all what to us or to our viceroys audiences, and governors may seem
necessary for public squares, ways, pastures, and commons in those places which are
peopled, taking into consideration not only their present condition, but also their future and
their probable increase, and after distributing to the natives what may be necessary for
tillage and pasturage, confirming them in what they now have and giving them more if
necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of
as we may wish." 17

18
It could therefore be affirmed in Montano v. Insular Government" that "as to the
unappropriated public lands constituting the public domain the sole power of legislation is
vested in Congress, ..." 19 They continue to possess that character until severed therefrom by
state grant. 20 Where, as in this case, it was found by the Court of Appeals that the disputed
lot was the result of reclamation, its being correctly categorized as public land is
undeniable. 21 What was held in Heirs of Datu Pendatun v. Director of Lands 22
finds
application. Thus: "There being no evidence whatever that the property in question was
ever acquired by the applicants or their ancestors either by composition title from the
Spanish Government or by possessory information title or by any other means for the
23
acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be public domain." For it is well-
settled "that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express
24
or implied, from the government." It is indispensable then that there be a showing of a
25
title from the state or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. The most recent
26
restatement of the doctrine, found in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, follows: "The
applicant, having failed to establish his right or title over the northern portion of Lot No.
463 involved in the present controversy, and there being no showing that the same has been
acquired by any private person from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, the
27
property is and remains part of the public domain." To repeat, the second assignment of
error is devoid of merit.
3. The last error assigned would take issue with this portion of the opinion of Justice
Esguerra: "According to the Stipulation of Facts, since the filing of the sales application of
Aniano David and during all the proceedings in connection with said application, up to the
actual issuance of the sales patent in his favor, the
plaintiffs-appellants did not put up any opposition or adverse claim thereto. This is fatal to
them because after the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate
of title based on a public land patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes under
the operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all the safeguards provided therein ... Under
Section 38 of Act 496 any question concerning the validity of the certificate of title based on
fraud should be raised within one year from the date of the issuance of the patent.
28
Thereafter the certificate of title based thereon becomes indefeasible ..." Petitioners
cannot reconcile themselves to the view that respondent David's title is impressed with the
quality of indefeasibility. In thus manifesting such an attitude, they railed to accord
deference to controlling precedents. As far back as 1919, in Aquino v. Director of
Lands, 29 Justice Malcolm, speaking for the Court, stated: "The proceedings under the Land
Registration Law and under the provisions of Chapter VI of the Public Land Law are the
same in that both are against the whole world, both take the nature of judicial proceedings,
30
and for both the decree of registration issued is conclusive and final." Such a view has
31
been followed since then. The latest case in point is Cabacug v. Lao. 32 There is this
revealing excerpt appearing in that decision: "It is said, and with reason, that a holder of a
land acquired under a free patent is more favorably situated than that of an owner of
registered property. Not only does a free patent have a force and effect of a Torrens Title,
but in addition the person to whom it is granted has likewise in his favor the right to
33
repurchase within a period of five years." It is quite apparent, therefore, that petitioners'
stand is legally indefensible.

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of January 31, 1969 and its
resolution of March 14, 1969 are affirmed. With costs against petitioners-appellants.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-50464 January 29, 1990

SUNBEAM CONVENIENCE FOODS INC., CORAL BEACH DEVELOPMENT
CORP., and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BATAAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Filoteo T. Banzon for petitioners.

SARMIENTO, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, Convenience Foods Corporation (hereafter simply
SUNBEAM) and Coral Beach Development Corporation (hereafter simply CORAL BEACH)
bring to our attention the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in "Republic of the
Philippines v. Hon. Pedro T. Santiago, et al.," disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted. The order of the respondent judge dated
October 7, 1977, dismissing Civil Case No. 4062 is set aside, and respondent judge is
ordered to require private respondents to file their answer to the complaint in said Civil
Case No. 4062 and thereafter to proceed with the trial of the case on the merits and to
render judgment thereon.'

The following facts stated by the respondent Court in its decision and restated by the
petitioners in their petition are accurate:

(a) On April 29, 1963, the Director of Lands caused the issuance of a Sales Patent in favor of
defendant Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc., over the parcels of land both situated in
Mariveles, Bataan and more particularly described and bounded as follows:

Lot 1-Sgs-2409 (area 3,113,695 sq. m )

Lot 2-Sgs-2409 area 1,401,855 sq. m

(b) On May 3, 1963, the aforesaid Sales Patent was registered with the defendant Register
of Deeds of Bataan who in turn issued Original Certificate of Title No. Sp-24 in favor of
defendant Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc., for the two parcels of land above-described;
(c) Subsequently, Original Certificate of Title No. Sp-24 was cancelled and in lieu thereof,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-12421 was issued over Lot 1, Sgs-2409, while Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 12422 was issued over Lot 2, Sgs-2409, both in favor of defendant
Coral Beach Development Corporation I

(d) On May 11, 1976, the Solicitor General in the name of the Republic of the Philippines
instituted before the Court of First Instance of Bataan, an action for reversion docketed as
Civil Case No. 4062. 2

SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds:

1. The Republic of the Philippines should have exhausted all administrative remedies before
filing the case in court;

2. The title issued to SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH had become indefeasible and
imprescriptible;

3. The action for reversion was defective, having been initiated by the Solicitor General and
not by the Director of Lands. 3 The then Court of First Instance of Bataan dismissed the
complaint in the Order of October 7, 1977, 4adopting mainly the theory that since the titles
sought to be cancelled emanated from the administrative act of the Bureau of Lands
Director, the latter, not the courts, had jurisdiction over the disposition of the land.

The Solicitor General received the copy of the Order on October 11, 1977 and filed a Notice
of Appeal dated October 25, 1977 . 5 The Solicitor General then moved for an extension of
thirty days within which to file the Record on Appeal and to pay the docket fee in order to
perfect the appeal. This was to be followed by another motion for extension filed by the
Solicitor General, resulting in the Court of Appeals granting the petitioner another
extension of fifteen days from December 10, 1977. Finally before this period of extension
lapsed, instead of an appeal, a petition for certiorari with the respondent Court of Appeals
was filed.

According to the Solicitor General, the Court of First Instance committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the complaint and in

a. Not finding that since the lower court acted in a Motion to Dismiss, the correctness of its
decision must be decided in the assumed truth and accuracy of the allegations of the
complaint. The complaint alleges that the lands in question are forest lands; hence,
inalienable.

b. Finding that Lots I and 2 are alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
the jurisdiction of the Director of Lands despite clear and positive evidence to the contrary.

c. Concluding that the complaint for reversion is defective as it was not initiated by the
Director of Lands.

d. Finding that the complaint for reversion states no cause of action for alleged failure of
petitioner to exhaust administrative remedies. 6

The Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition for certiorari, set aside the Order of
Dismissal rendered by the Court of First Instance in Civil Case No. 4062, and ordered the
presiding judge Hon. Pedro T. Santiago to receive the answers of the private respondents
SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH in the action for reversion.

Hence Sunbeam and Coral Beach filed this petition for review.

A review is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, and is granted only when
there are special and important reasons therefore. The following, while neither controlling
nor fully measuring the Court's discretion, enumerates the premises for granting a review:

(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not theretofore
determined by the Supreme Court or has decided it in a way probably not in accord with
law or the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court; and

(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings or so far sanctioned such departure by a lower court as to call for
supervision . 7

We agree with the Court of Appeals' granting of the petition filed by the Republic of the
Philippines charging the then Court of First Instance with grave abuse of discretion. The
filing of the Motion to Dismiss the complaint for reversion by SUNBEAM and CORAL
BEACH on the ground of lack of cause of action, necessarily carried with it the admission,
for purposes of the motion, of the truth of all material facts pleaded in the complaint
instituted by the Republic.
An important factual issue raised in the complaint was the classification of the lands as
forest lands. This material allegation stated in the Republic's complaint' was never denied
specifically 9 by the defendants (petitioners herein) SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH.

If it is true that the lands are forest lands, then all these proceedings become moot and
academic. Land remains unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open
to disposition. 10

Our adherence to the Regalian doctrine subjects all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands
to the dominion of the State. 11 Thus, before any land may be declassified from the forest
group and converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes,
there must be a positive act from the government. Even rules on the confirmation of
imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in
an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain. 12

The mere fact that a title was issued by the Director of Lands does not confer any validity
13
on such title if the property covered by the title or patent is part of the public forest.

The only way to resolve this question of fact as to the classification of the land is by
remanding the case to the lower court for a full- dress trial on the issues involved.

Generally, the rules of procedure must be observed so that the efficient administration of
justice is ensured. However, the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed
to facilitate the attainment of justice. 14They must lead to the proper and just determination
of litigation, without tying the hands of the law or making it indifferent to realities.

Certiorari is one such remedy. Considered extraordinary, it is made available only when
there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the
law. 15 The long line of decisions denying the petition for certiorari, either before appeal was
availed of or specially in instances where the appeal period has lapsed, far outnumbers the
instances when certiorari was given due course. The few significant exceptions were: when
public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate; or when the broader interests
16
of justice so require, or when the writs issued are null, or when the questioned order
17
amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.
We find nothing disagreeable with the action of the Court of Appeals to give due course to
the petition considering that the issue affected a matter of public concern which is the
disposition of the lands of our matrimony No less than the Constitution protects its policy.

We therefore find no compelling reason to disturb the findings of the appellate court, in the
absence of a clear showing that the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance in
a manner inconsistent with jurisprudence, or that the respondent Court has departed from
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings. In sum, no reversible error has been
committed by the respondent court. 18

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-60413 October 31, 1990

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. SOFRONIO G. SAYO, Judge, Br. I, C I, Nueva Vizcaya, HEIRS OF CASIANO
SANDOVAL, HEIRS OF LIBERATO BAYAUA, JOSE C. REYES, and PHILIPPINE
CACAO AND FARM PRODUCTS, INC., respondents.

Celso D. Gangan respondent Heirs of Liberato Bayaua.

Acosta & Associates fox Phil. Cacao and Farm Products, Inc.

Jose Reyes & Associates for Heirs of Casiano Sandoval, et al.

NARVASA, J.:

Sought to be annulled and set aside in this special civil action of certiorari is the decision of
respondent Judge Sofronio G. Sayo rendered on March 5, 1981 in Land Registration Case
No. N-109, LRC Record No. 20850, confirming, by virtue of a compromise agreement, the
title of the private respondents over a tract of land.
The spouses, Casiano Sandoval and Luz Marquez, filed an original application for
registration of a tract of land identified as Lot No. 7454 of the Cadastral Survey of Santiago,
BL Cad. 211 (July 17, 1961) and having an area of 33,950 hectares. The land was formerly
part of the Municipality of Santiago, Province of Isabela, but had been transferred to Nueva
Vizcaya in virtue of Republic Act No. 236.

Oppositions were filed by the Government, through the Director of Lands and the Director
of Forestry, and some others, including the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua. 1 In due course, an
order of general default was thereafter entered on December 11, 1961 against the whole
world except the oppositors.

The case dragged on for about twenty (20) years until March 3, 1981 when a compromise
agreement was entered into by and among all the parties, assisted by their respective
counsel, namely: the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval (who had since died), the Bureau of Lands,
the Bureau of Forest Development, the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua, and the Philippine Cacao
and Farm Products, Inc. Under the compromise agreement, the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval
(as applicants) renounced their claims and ceded

1) in favor of the Bureau of Lands, an area of 4,109 hectares;

2) in favor of the Bureau of Forest Development, 12,341 hectares;

3) in favor of the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua, 4,000 hectares; and

4) in favor of Philippine Cacao & Farm Products, Inc., 8,000 hectares.

The remaining area of 5,500 hectares was, under the compromise agreement, adjudicated to
and acknowledged as owned by the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval, but out of this area, 1,500
hectares were assigned by the Casiano Heirs to their counsel, Jose C. Reyes, in payment of
his attorney's fees. In consideration of the areas respectively allocated to them, all the
parties also mutually waived and renounced all their prior claims to and over Lot No. 7454
of the Santiago Cadastre.

In a decision rendered on March 5, 1981, the respondent Judge approved the compromise
agreement and confirmed the title and ownership of the parties in accordance with its
terms.

The Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, has taken the present
recourse in a bid to have that decision of March 5, 1981 annulled as being patently void and
rendered in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The Solicitor General
contends that

1) no evidence whatever was adduced by the parties in support of their petitions for
registration;

2) neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of Forest Development had legal authority
to enter into the compromise agreement;

3) as counsel of the Republic, he should have been but was not given notice of the
compromise agreement or otherwise accorded an opportunity to take part therein;

4) that he was not even served with notice of the decision approving the compromise; it was
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Quirino Province that drew his attention to the "patently
erroneous decision" and requested him to take immediate remedial measures to bring about
its annulment.

The respondents maintain, on the other hand, that the Solicitor General's arguments are
premised on the proposition that Lot 7454 is public land, but it is not. According to them, as
pointed out in the application for registration, the private character of the land is
demonstrated by the following circumstances, to wit:

1) the possessory information title of the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest;

2) the fact that Lot 7454 was never claimed to be public land by the Director of Lands in the
proper cadastral proceedings;

3) the pre-war certification of the National Library dated August 16, 1932 to the effect that
the (Estadistica de Propiedades) of Isabela issued in 1896 and appearing in the Bureau of
Archives, the property in question was registered under the 'Spanish system of land
registration as private property owned by Don Liberato Bayaua, applicants' predecessors-
in-interest;

4) the proceeding for registration, brought under Act 496 (the Torrens Act) presupposes that
there is already a title to be confirmed by the court, distinguishing it from proceedings
under the Public Land Act where the presumption is always that the land involved belongs
to the State.
Under the Regalian Doctrine 2 all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Hence it is that all applicants in land
registration proceedings have the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land thus
sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. 3 Unless the applicant succeeds in
showing by clear and convincing evidence that the property involved was acquired by him or
his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory
information title, or any other means for the proper acquisition of public lands, the property
must be held to be part of the public domain . 4 The applicant must present competent and
persuasive proof to substantiate his claim; he may not rely on general statements, or mere
5
conclusions of law other than factual evidence of possession and title.

In the proceeding at bar, it appears that the principal document relied upon and presented
by the applicants for registration, to prove the private character of the large tract of land
subject of their application, was a photocopy of a certification of the National Library dated
August 16, 1932 (already above mentioned) to the effect that according to the
Government's (Estadistica de Propiedades) of Isabela issued in 1896, the property in
question was registered under the Spanish system of land registration as private property
of Don Liberato Bayaua. But, as this Court has already had occasion to rule, that Spanish
document, the (Estadistica de Propiedades,) cannot be considered a title to property, it not
being one of the grants made during the Spanish regime, and obviously not constituting
primary evidence of ownership. 6 It is an inefficacious document on which to base any
finding of the private character of the land in question.

And, of course, to argue that the initiation of an application for registration of land under
the Torrens Act is proof that the land is of private ownership, not pertaining to the public
domain, is to beg the question. It is precisely the character of the land as private which the
applicant has the obligation of establishing. For there can be no doubt of the intendment of
the Land Registration Act, Act 496, that every applicant show a proper title for registration;
indeed, even in the absence of any adverse claim, the applicant is not assured of a favorable
decree by the Land Registration Court, if he fails to establish a proper title for official
recognition.

It thus appears that the decision of the Registration Court a quo is based solely on the
compromise agreement of the parties. But that compromise agreement included private
persons who had not adduced any competent evidence of their ownership over the land
subject of the registration proceeding. Portions of the land in controversy were assigned to
persons or entities who had presented nothing whatever to prove their ownership of any
part of the land. What was done was to consider the compromise agreement as proof of title
of the parties taking part therein, a totally unacceptable proposition. The result has been
the adjudication of lands of no little extension to persons who had not submitted any
substantiation at all of their pretensions to ownership, founded on nothing but the
agreement among themselves that they had rights and interests over the land.

The assent of the Directors of Lands and Forest Development to the compromise agreement
did not and could not supply the absence of evidence of title required of the private
respondents.

As to the informacion posesoria invoked by the private respondents, it should be pointed out
that under the Spanish Mortgage Law, it was considered a mode of acquiring title to public
lands, subject to two (2) conditions: first, the inscription thereof in the Registry of Property,
and second, actual, public, adverse, and uninterrupted possession of the land for twenty
(20) years (later reduced to ten [10] years); but where, as here, proof of fulfillment of these
conditions is absent, the informacion posesoria cannot be considered as anything more
thanprima facie evidence of possession. 7

Finally, it was error to disregard the Solicitor General in the execution of the compromise
agreement and its submission to the Court for approval. It is, after all, the Solicitor
General, who is the principal counsel of the Government; this is the reason for our holding
that "Court orders and decisions sent to the fiscal, acting as agent of the Solicitor General
in land registration cases, are not binding until they are actually received by the Solicitor
General." 8

It thus appears that the compromise agreement and the judgment approving it must be, as
they are hereby, declared null and void, and set aside. Considerations of fairness however
indicate the remand of the case to the Registration Court so that the private parties may be
afforded an opportunity to establish by competent evidence their respective claims to the
property.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Judge complained of is ANNULLED and

SET ASIDE. Land Registration Case No. N-109 subject of the petition is REMANDED to
the court of origin which shall conduct further appropriate proceedings therein, receiving
the evidence of the parties and thereafter rendering judgment as such evidence and the law
may warrant. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 129401. February 2, 2001]

FELIPE SEVILLE in his capacity as judicial administrator of the estate of

JOAQUIN ORTEGA and/or FELIPE SEVILLE, EMILIA ESTRADA, MARIA S.
TELLDER, MA. ISABEL SEVILLE, MA. TERESITA LICARDO, FRANCISCO
SEVILLE, RAMON O. SEVILLE, JOSE MARIE SEVILLE, GEMMA
ALVAREZ-ASAYAS, ANNABELLE ALVAREZ-GONZALES, SYLVIA ALVAREZ-
LIOK, ADOLFO O. ALVAREZ JR., DIANA ALVAREZ-DABON, MARIA
SALVADOR O. POLANCOS and JOAQUIN ORTEGA II as successors-in-
interest of JOAQUIN ORTEGA and his estate, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LEYTE SAB-A BASIN DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATED SMELTING AND REFINING
CORPORATION, LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING CO., PHILIPPINE
PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER CORPORATION, CALIXTRA YAP and
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LEYTE, respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Unless a public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or actually

alienated by the State to a private person, that piece of land remains part of the public
domain. Hence, occupation thereof, however long, cannot ripen into ownership.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the November 29, 1996
Decision of the Court of Appeals [1] (CA), as well as the May 19, 1997 CA
Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive part of the CA
[2]

Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Another judgment is
hereby rendered dismissing the complaint. The counterclaims of appellants are
denied. Costs against plaintiffs-appellees. [3]

The Facts
 The appellate court narrated the undisputed facts in this manner:

1. By virtue of Presidential Decree No. 625, Leyte Sab-A Basin Development Authority
(LSBDA) was created to integrate government and private sector efforts for a planned
development and balanced growth of the Sab-a Basin in the [P]rovince of Leyte, empowered
to acquire real property in the successful prosecution of its business. Letter of Instruction
No. 962 authorized LSBDA to acquire privately-owned lands circumscribed in the Leyte
Industrial Development Estate (LIDE) by way of negotiated sales with the landowners.

2. On June 14, 1980, [Respondent] Calixtra Yap sold to LSBDA Lot No. 057 SWO 08-000047
consisting of 464,920 square meters, located at Barangay Sto. Rosario, Isabel, Leyte,
covered under Tax Declarations Nos. 3181, 3579, 3425, 1292 and 4251 under the name of
said vendor.

3. On June 1, 1982, appellant LSBDA filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application with the
Bureau of Lands covering said lot together with other lots acquired by LSBDA with an
aggregate area of 442, 7508 square meters.

4. After due notice and investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands, Miscellaneous
Sales Patent No. 9353 was issued in the name of [Respondent] LSBDA on the basis of which
Original Certificate of Title No. P-28131 was transcribed in the Registration Book for the
[P]rovince of Leyte on August 12, 1983 in the name of [Respondent] LSBDA. On December
14, 1989, LSBDA assigned all its rights over the subject property to its [Co-respondent]
National Development Company (NDC) as a result of which a new Transfer Certificate of
Title was issued on March 2, 1990 by the Registry of Deeds for the province of Northern
Leyte in the name of NDC. The subject property was leased to [Respondents] Philippine
Associated Smelting & Refining Corporation (PASAR), Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer
Corporation (PHILPHOS) and Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., Inc. (LEPANTO).

5. On November 29, 1988, the Estate of Joaquin Ortega represented by judicial

administrator Felipe Seville filed with the Regional Trial Court (Branch 12) of Ormoc City,
a complaint for recovery of real property, rentals and damages against the above-named
[respondents] which complaint was later on amended on May 11, 1990. [Respondents] filed
their respective Answers. After trial, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, [a] decision is hereby rendered for [petitioners] and against [respondents].
1. The Deed of Sale executed by Calixtra Yap on June 14, 1980 in favor of LSBDA, (Exhibit
PP and 25) conveying the subject property to said LSBDA is declared NULL and VOID ab
initio;

2. The intestate estate of JOAQUIN ORTEGA is declared the owner in fee simple of the
735,333 square meters real property subject of the present action and defendant NDC is
ordered to segregate the same area from OCT P-28131 and CONVEY the same to the
Estate of Joaquin Ortega;

3. Upon the segregation of the 735,333 square meters from OCT No. P-28131 the Register of
Deeds of the Province of Leyte is ordered to issue a new title to the said portion in the name
of the Intestate Estate of Joaquin Ortega;

4. [Respondents] LSBDA, NDC, PASAR, are ordered to pay jointly and severally to
[petitioners] the sum of FOUR MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY FOUR
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SIX PESOS (P4,784,846.00) as rentals due from
1979 to the present, plus accrued interest pursuant to par. 2 of the Lease Contract between
NDC and PASAR. (Exhibit 54)

5. [Respondents] LSBDA, NDC, and PHILPHOS are also ordered to pay jointly and
severally [petitioners] the sum of TWO MILLION EIGHTY SIX THOUSAND THREE
HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT PESOS AND SIXTY CENTAVOS (P2,086,398.60) as accrued
rentals of PHILPHOS from 1979 to present, plus the accrued interest for non-payment
pursuant to paragraph 2 of the same Lease Contract cited above;

6. [Respondents] are ordered to pay jointly and severally [petitioners] P200,000.00 as

indemnity for the value of the ancestral home;

7. [Respondents] are also ordered to pay jointly and severally [petitioners] the sum of
P250,000.00 as reimbursement for attorneys fees and the further sum of P50,000.00 as
expenses for litigation;

8. Finally, [petitioners] and [respondents] are ordered to sit down together and discuss the
possibility of a compromise agreement on how the improvements introduced on the
landholding subject of the present suit should be disposed of and for the parties to submit to
this Court a joint manifestation relative thereto. In the absence of any such compromise
agreement, such improvements shall be disposed of pursuant to Article 449 of the New Civil
Code.
Costs against [respondents].

SO ORDERED.[4]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Citing the Regalian doctrine that lands not appearing to be privately owned are
presumed to be part of the public domain, the CA held that, first, there was no competent
evidence to prove that the property in question was private in character. Second, possession
thereof, no matter how long, would not ripen into ownership, absent any showing that the
land had been classified as alienable. Third, the property had been untitled before the
issuance of the Miscellaneous Sales Patent in favor of the LSBDA. Fourth, petitioners were
guilty of laches, because they had failed to apply for the judicial confirmation of their title, if
they had any. Fifth, there was no evidence of bad faith on the part of LSBDA in dealing with
Yap regarding the property.

Hence, this Petition.[5]

The Issues

In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following issues for the consideration of
the Court:[6]

A. Whether or not the sale by Calixtra Yap of the Estate of the Late Joaquin Ortega in favor
of LSBDA was null and void.

B. Whether or not the issuance of a Miscellaneous Sales Patent and an Original Certificate
of Title in favor of LSBDA was valid.

C. Whether or not petitioners are guilty of laches.

D. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to the remedy of reconveyance and the damages
awarded by the trial court.

In the main, the Court is called upon to determine the validity of LSBDAs title. In
resolving this issue, it will also ascertain whether, before the issuance of the title, the land
was private or public.

The Courts Ruling

 The Petition has no merit.

Main Issue:

Validity of LSBDAs Title

Petitioners argue that LSBDAs title to 73 hectares of the 402-hectare Leyte Industrial
Development Estate was void, having allegedly been obtained from Calixtra Yap who had
no right to it. They maintain that they acquired title to the disputed property by acquisitive
prescription, because they and their predecessors in interest had been in possession of it for
more than thirty years.[7] Although it was the subject of settlement proceedings, petitioners
further claim that Yap sold the same to LSBDA without the permission of the trial court.

Disputing these contentions, respondents and the appellate court maintain that
petitioners have not shown that the land had previously been classified as alienable and
disposable. Absent such classification, they argue that possession of it, no matter how long,
could not ripen into ownership.

We agree with respondents and the appellate court. First. There was no showing that
the land had been classified as alienable before the title was issued to LSBDA; hence,
petitioners could not have become owners thereof through acquisitive prescription. Second,
petitioners challenge to LSBDAs title cannot be granted, because it is based on a wrong
premise and amounts to a collateral attack, which is not allowed by law.

Public Character of the Land

Under the Regalian doctrine, all the lands of the public domain belong to the State,
which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. All lands not otherwise
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
[8]
In Menguito v. Republic,[9] the court held that [u]nless public land is shown to have been
reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable
public domain. Indeed, occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long,
cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. To overcome such presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land
sought to be registered remains inalienable.

A person in open, continuous, exclusive an notorious possession of a public land for

more than thirty years acquires an imperfect title thereto. That title may be the subject of
judicial confirmation, pursuant to Section 48 of the Public Land Act, which provides:
SECTION 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest thereon, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefore, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) those who by themselves or through their predecessor in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. They shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall he entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this Chapter.

Under Section 4 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1073, [10] paragraph b of the aforecited
provision applies only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. The provision
reads:

SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48 (b) and Section 48 (c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land
Act, are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-
interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.

It should be stressed that petitioners had no certificate of title over the disputed
property. Although they claim that their title was based on acquisitive prescription, they
fail to present incontrovertible proof that the land had previously been classified as
alienable. They simply brush aside the conclusion of the CA on this crucial point by saying
that it was without factual basis. [11] Instead, they maintain that the private character of the
land was evidenced by various tax declarations, Deeds of Sale, and Decisions of the trial
court and even the Supreme Court.[12]

Petitioners arguments are not convincing. Tax declarations are not conclusive proofs of
ownership, let alone of the private character of the land. At best, they are merely indicia of
a claim of ownership.[13] In Spouses Palomo v. CA,[14] the Court also rejected tax declarations
as proof of private ownership, absent any showing that the forest land in question had been
reclassified as alienable.

Moreover, the Deeds of Sale of portions of the disputed property, which Joaquin Ortega
and several vendors executed, do not prove that the land was private in character. The
question remains: What was the character of the land when Ortega purchased it? Indeed, a
vendee acquires only those rights belonging to the vendor. But petitioners failed to show
that, at the time, the vendors were already its owners, or that the land was already
classified as alienable.

Also misplaced is petitioners reliance on Ortega v. CA,[15] in which the Supreme Court
allegedly recognized the private character of the disputed property. In that case, the sole
issue was whether the respondent judge xxx acted in excess of jurisdiction when he
converted Civil Case No. 1184-O, an action for quieting of title, declaration of nullity of sale,
and annulment of tax declaration of a parcel of land, into an action for the declaration of
who is the legal wife, who are the legitimate children, if any, and who are the compulsory
heirs of the deceased Joaquin Ortega.[16] The Court did not all make any ruling that the
property had been classified as alienable.

In any event, Ortega arose from a suit for quieting of title, an action quasi in rem that
was binding only between the parties.[17] The present respondents as well as the Bureau of
Lands, which subsequently declared that the land was public, are not bound by that ruling,
because they were not impleaded therein.

While petitioners refer to the trial court proceedings supposedly recognizing the private
character of the disputed property, they make no claim that these cases directly involve the
classification of the land, or that the Bureau of Lands is a party thereto.

Clearly, the burden of proof that the land has been classified as alienable is on the
claimant.[18] In the present case, petitioners failed to discharge this burden. Hence, their
possession of the disputed property, however long, cannot ripen into ownership.

LSBDAs Title

Equally unmeritous is the argument of petitioners that the title of LSBDA is void. As
earlier stated, they claim that such title was derived from Calixtra Yap, who was allegedly
not the owner of the property. Petitioners assume that LSBDA, having acquired the rights
of Yap, resorted to a confirmation of her imperfect title under Section 48 of the Public Land
Act. This argument is devoid of factual or legal basis.

Petitioners fail to consider that the title of LSBDA was based, not on the conveyance
made by Yap, but on Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 9353 issued by the director of the
Bureau of Lands. In fact, after LSBDA had filed an application for patent, the Bureau of
Lands conducted an investigation and found that the land was part of the public
domain. After compliance with the notice and publication requirements, LSBDA acquired
the property in a public auction conducted by the Bureau of Lands.[19]

Petitioners insist, however, that LSBDA was estopped from claiming that the land was
public, because the Deed of Sale executed by Yap in its favor stipulated that the seller is the
absolute owner in fee simple of the xxx described property. [20] It is scarcely necessary to
address this point. To begin with, the power to classify a land as alienable belongs to the
State, not to private entities. Hence, the pronouncements of Yap or LSBDA cannot effect the
reclassification of the property. Moreover, the assailed misrepresentation was made by Yap
as seller. Hence, objections thereto should be raised not by petitioners but by LSBDA, the
contracting party obviously aggrieved.

In any case, the actions of LSBDA after Yaps conveyance demonstrated its position that
the disputed land was part of the public domain. That this was so can be inferred from
LSBDAs subsequent application for a Miscellaneous Sales Patent and, in a public auction,
its purchase of the property from the Bureau of Lands. Indeed, Yap merely conveyed a
claim, not a title which she did not have.

Collateral Attack

There is another reason for denying the present Petition. Petitioners insist that they
are not seeking the re-opening of a decree under the Torrens system. Supposedly, they are
only praying for the segregation of 735,333 square meters of land, or 73 hectares more or
less from the OCT No. P-28131 issued to LSBDA. [21] This disputation is mere quibbling over
the words, plain and simple.

Semantics aside, petitioners are effectively seeking the modification of LSBDAs OCT,
which allegedly encompassed even a parcel of land allegedly belonging to them. Hence, the
present suit, purportedly filed for the recovery of real property and damages, is tantamount
to a collateral attack not sanctioned by law. Section 48 of PD 1529, the Property
Registration Decree, expressly provides:
SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. -- A certificate of title shall not be
subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law.

It has been held that a certificate of title, once registered, should not thereafter be
impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished, except in a direct proceeding
permitted by law. Otherwise, the reliance on registered titles would be lost.[22]

Moreover, the title became indefeasible and incontrovertible after the lapse of one year
from the time of its registration and issuance. [23] Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that [u]pon
the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title
shall become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved buy such decree of registration in any
case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or other persons
responsible for the fraud. Although LSBDAs title was registered in 1983, petitioners filed
the amended Complaint only in 1990.

Reconveyance

Petitioners also claim that the disputed property should be reconveyed to them. This
cannot be allowed. Considering that the land was public before the Miscellaneous Sales
Patent was issued to LSBDA, petitioners have no standing to ask for the reconveyance of
the property to them. The proper remedy is an action for reversion, which may be instituted
only by the Office of the Solicitor General, pursuant to section 101 of the Public Land Act,
which reads as follows:

SEC. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or
improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his
stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the [Republic] of the Philippines.

Verily, the prayer for reconveyance and, for that matter, the entire case of petitioners
rest on the theory that they have acquired the property by acquisitive prescription; and that
Yap, without any right or authority, sold the same to LSBDA.

Conclusion

In the light of our earlier disquisition, the theory has no leg to stand on. Absent any
showing that the land has been classified as alienable, their possession thereof, no matter
how lengthy, cannot ripen into ownership. In other words, they have not become owners of
the disputed property. Moreover, LSBDAs title was derived from a Miscellaneous Sales
Patent, not from Yap. Finally, petitioners cannot, by a collateral attack, challenge a
certificate of title that has already become indefeasible and incontrovertible.

If petitioners believe that they have been defrauded by Yap, they should seek redress,
not in these proceedings, but in a proper action in accordance with law.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision

AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Melo (Chairman), Gonzaga-Reyes, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

Vitug, J., in the result.

G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO.
INC., ETC., respondents.

D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.

NARVASA, J.:

The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the
Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela,
which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of
land measuring 481, 390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer
Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.

The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of

Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act). as amended: and the appealed judgment
sums up the findings of the trial court in said proceedings in this wise:
1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a
corporation duly organized in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
December 23, 1959;

2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can
acquire real properties pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation
particularly on the provision of its secondary purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-l');

3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally
acquired by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from Mariano
Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural
minorities;

4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as

the sale took place on October 29, 1962;

5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was discovered by
Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and occupied the land from
generation to generation until the same came into the possession of Mariano Infiel
and Acer Infiel;

6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is
continuous, adverse and public from 1962 to the present and tacking the possession
of the Infiels who were granted from whom the applicant bought said land on
October 29, 1962, hence the possession is already considered from time immemorial.

7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions
of Republic Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-
Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the
alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain;

8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than Forty-
Five Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements, said improvements were
seen by the Court during its ocular investigation of the land sought to be registered
on September 18, 1982;
 9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the
applicant was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of
Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for the donation of the townsite from Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this negotiation came to reality when the Board of
Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part of the land
bought by the Company from the Infiels for the townsite of Maconacon Isabela (Exh.
'N') on November 15, 1979, and which donation was accepted by the Municipal
Government of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'), during their special session on
November 22, 1979.

The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the applicability
of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he asserts that, the
registration proceedings have been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973
Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicable law; and since section
11 of its Article XIV prohibits private corporations or associations from holding alienable
lands of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not
found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands
in question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree registration in favor of Acme
Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, reads:

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose
titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in

open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for
at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this chapter.
 (c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open. continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture,
whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years
shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.

The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted findings of the trial
court which were cited and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no longer
controvert before this Court-the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme
purchased the lands in question on October 29, 1962, are members of the national cultural
minorities who had, by themselves and through their progenitors, possessed and occupied
those lands since time immemorial, or for more than the required 30-year period and were,
by reason thereof, entitled to exercise the right granted in Section 48 of the Public Land Act
to have their title judicially confirmed. Nor is there any pretension that Acme, as the
successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to acquire and register ownership of said
lands under any provisions of the 1973 Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article XIV
already referred to.

Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title that the
Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the latter in
proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect,
having in mind the prohibition therein against private corporations holding lands of the
public domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.

The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of
institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of the public
domain, it must be answered in the negative. If, on the other hand, they were then already
private lands, the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private
corporations or associations obviously does not apply.

In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome,
et al, 1 where a similar set of facts prevailed. In that case, Manila Electric Company, a
domestic corporation more than 60% of the capital stock of which is Filipino-owned, had
purchased in 1947 two lots in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots had been
possessed by the vendors and, before them, by their predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos,
since prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco
applied to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch, for confirmation of title to
said lots. The court, assuming that the lots were public land, dismissed the application on
the ground that Meralco, a juridical person, was not qualified to apply for registration
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which allows only Filipino citizens or natural
persons to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to public land. Meralco
appealed, and a majority of this Court upheld the dismissal. It was held that:

..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the
issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section
48(b). Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is
disqualified to apply for its registration under section 48(b), Meralco's application
cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed.

Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction

between (on the one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no
occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the public
domain as to which an occupant has on imperfect title subject to judicial
confirmation.

Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any
distinction or qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to
which a Torrens title may be secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under
section 48(b) 'presupposes that the land is public' (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands,
L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).

The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases beginning
with Carino in 1909 2thru Susi in 1925 3 down to Herico in 1980, 4 which developed,
affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of
alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the
land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or
other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property. That said dissent
expressed what is the better and, indeed, the correct, view-becomes evident from a
consideration of some of the principal rulings cited therein,

The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the Decree/Regulations of
June 25, 1880 for adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in
the Philippine Islands. It was ruled that:

It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to those 'who may
prove' possession for the necessary time and we do not overlook the argument that
 this means may prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English
conveyancer would have recommended an application under the foregoing decree,
but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion
that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it. The
words 'may prove' (acrediten) as well or better, in view of the other provisions, might
be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications
that registration was expected from all but none sufficient to show that, for want of
it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made,
was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree,
if not by earlier law. ...

That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more categorical
language, in Susi:

.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de
jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No.
926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were
complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and
through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly,
continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a right to a certificate
of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when
Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired,
by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is
not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may
be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions
of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the
land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public
domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi,
beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in
question of Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he
had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect,
6
and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right.

Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, likeof Lacaste vs. Director of
Lands, 7 Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs. Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of
Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and affirming the Susi doctrine have
firmly rooted it in jurisprudence.
 11
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:

.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent
Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven
occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his
predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate
the land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under
the Public Land Act as by free patent. ....

xxx xxx xxx

As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing

provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation
of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate
of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and
beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for
confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of
the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon
the strength of said patent. 12

Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of
public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of
13
an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself that the possessor(s)
"... shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title .... " No proof being
admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth
be little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession
claimed is of the required character and length of time; and registration thereunder would
not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would
not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a
conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment the required period of
possession became complete. As was so well put in Carino, "... (T)here are indications that
registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it,
ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to
confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier
law."
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels
had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it
from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such
acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that matter,
in the 1973 Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting corporations from
acquiring and owning private lands.

Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite
immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor was
actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no
serious question of Acmes right to acquire the land at the time it did, there also being
nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to prohibit corporations from
purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had already acquired
that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only limitation then extant was
that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024
hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought
under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of
the public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law came into effect, or
invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already held, in
analogous circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights.

14
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition has no retroactive application to
the sales application of Binan Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired
a vested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect.

That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new
Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private
corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand and
twenty-four hectares. Petitioner' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of
vested rights in constitutional law.

xxx xxx xxx

The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A state may not
impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent
repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State,
except in a legitimate exercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78).
 xxx xxx xxx

In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution the right of the corporation to purchase the land in question had
become fixed and established and was no longer open to doubt or controversy.

Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a
patent had the effect of segregating the said land from the public domain. The
corporation's right to obtain a patent for the land is protected by law. It cannot be
deprived of that right without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil.
919).<re||an1w> 15

The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own
name must be regarded as simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a defect
hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right
of ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's
entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts, the
Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had title in themselves
confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny the
same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which violates no
constitutional mandate.

The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority ruling
in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent. The correct
rule, as enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable public land held
by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and
exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as
amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said
period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land
subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it was acquired from the
Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no
prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning private land. The objection that, as
a juridical person, Acme is not qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under
section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical, rather than substantial and, again, finds
its answer in the dissent in Meralco:

6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality

that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural
 persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just
give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error
not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses
as the original owners and vendors, still it is conceded that there is no prohibition
against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any
prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name
of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of
their application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of
ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in
their favor. It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost
of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded
court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now.
(See Francisco vs. City of Davao)

The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications
for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of
the original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal
confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and
mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein
corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own
private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private
lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.

There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the
latter from themselves applying for confirmation of title and, after issuance of the
certificate/s of title in their names, deeding the lands back to Acme. But this would be
merely indulging in empty charades, whereas the same result is more efficaciously and
speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal application of the rule on
amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in the dissent in Meralco.

While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent vintage, in a
real sense, it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and re-established, as it were,
doctrines the soundness of which has passed the test of searching examination and inquiry
in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority opinion, as well as the
concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested
chiefly on the proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical person, was disqualified
from applying for confirmation of an imperfect title to public land under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act. Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was
only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the main opinion, and may, in that context,
be considered as essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no constitutional question.

WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the

Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this instance.

SO ORDERED.

Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 63786-87. April 7, 1993.

UNITED PARACALE MINING COMPANY, INC., AND COCO GROVE, INC., petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSELITO DELA ROSA, in his capacity as the former Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Norte, Branch 2, et al., respondents.

G.R. No. 70423. April 7, 1993.

ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. ALFREDO L.

BENIPAYO, as Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and PHILZEA MINING &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

G.R. No. 73931. April 7, 1993.

JOSEPH V. LOPEZ and MIGUEL C. ANDRADE, petitioners,

vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT MARSMAN & COMPANY, INC. and
UNITED PARACALE MINING COMPANY, INC., respondents.

Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez and Gatmaitan for United Paracale and Coco Grove, Inc.

Pedro A. Venida for respondents in G.R. 63786-87 and petitioners in G.R. 73931.

J.V. Natividad & Associates for Zambales Chromite.

SYLLABUS

1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; INTERPRETATION OF A STATUTE; PROPER ONLY

WHEN THERE IS DOUBT OR AMBIGUITY IN ITS LANGUAGE; CASE AT BAR. The
view of the petitioner that by virtue of the registration of the mining claims under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 624, the mining claims became private property and
thereby brought outside the control and supervision of the Director of Mines is without
legal basis. The abovecited law does not distinguish between private property and lands of
the public domain. The provision of law involved is clear and is not susceptible to
interpretation. A condition sine qua non before the court may construe or interpret a
statute is that there be doubt or ambiguity in its language. Section 7 of P.D. 1281 quoted
above defining the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Director of Mines is clear. Time
and again, it has been repeatedly declared by this Court that where the law speaks in clear
and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation. There is only room for
application. [Cebu Portland Cement Company vs. Municipality of Naga, Cebu, 35 SCRA 708
(1968)] Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it
says and the court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed. [Chartered
Bank Employees Association vs. Ople, 138 SCRA 273 (1985)].

2. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDICIAL RELIEF; NOT A VESTED RIGHT;

A MERE STATUTORY PRIVILEGE, NOT A PROPERTY RIGHT. There can be no vested
right in a judicial relief for this is a mere statutory privilege and not a property right. The
distinction between statutory privileges and vested rights must be borne in mind for
persons have no vested rights in statutory privileges. The state may change or take away
rights which were created by the law of the state, although it may not take away property
which was vested by virtue of such rights.(16A Am. Jur. 2d, pp. 652-653) Besides, the right
to judicial relief is not a right which may constitute vested right because to be vested, a
right must have become a title, legal or equitable, to the present or future enjoyment of
property, or to the present or future enforcement of a demand or legal exemption from a
demand made by another. (National Carloading Corporation v. Phoenix-E1 Paso Express,
Inc., cited in 16A Am, Jur. 2d, p. 651) Definitely, the judicial relief herein referred to by the
petitioner does not fall under any of these.

3. CIVIL LAW; PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1214; A VALID EXERCISE OF THE

SOVEREIGN POWER OF THE STATE AS OWNER OF LAND OF PUBLIC DOMAIN;
SUSTAINED IN CASE AT BAR. The heart of these twin petitions is the question of
constitutionality of P.D. 1214. Unless P.D. 1214 is successfully assailed, the petitioners will
be but mere applicants for the lease of the mining claims involved and would thus have no
causes of action against private respondents. This question has been resolved by this Court
in Santa Rosa Mining Company, Inc. vs. Leido, Jr. [156 SCRA 1 (1987), which ruling was
reiterated in Zambales Chromite Mining Company, Inc. vs. Leido, Jr., 176 SCRA 602 (1989)]
thus: "(W)e hold that Presidential Decree No. 1214 is not unconstitutional.' It is a valid
exercise of the sovereign power of the State, as owner, over lands of the public domain, of
which petitioner's mining claims still form a part, and over the patrimony of the nation, of
which mineral deposits are a valuable asset. It may be underscored, in this connection, that
the Decree does not cover all mining claims located under the Phil. Bill of 1902, but only
those claims over which their locators had failed to obtain a patent. And even then, such
locators may still avail of the renewable twenty-five year (25) lease prescribed by Pres.
Decree No. 463, the Mineral Development Resources Decree of 1974. Mere location does not
mean absolute ownership over the affected land or the mining claim. It merely segregates
the located land or area from the public domain by barring other would-be locators from
locating the same and appropriating for themselves the minerals found therein. To rule
otherwise would imply that location is all that is needed to acquire and maintain rights over
a located mining claim. This, we cannot approve or sanction because it is contrary to the
intention of the lawmaker that the locator should faithfully and consistently comply with
the requirements for annual work and improvements in the located mining claim. This, we
cannot approve or sanction because it is contrary to the intention of the lawmaker that the
locator should faithfully and consistently comply with the requirements for annual work
and improvements in the located mining claim. Presidential Decree No. 1214 is in accord
with Sec. 8, Art. XIV of the 1973 Constitution. The same Constitutional mandate is found in
Sec. 2, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution.

DECISION

CAMPOS, JR., J p:

The cases herein were consolidated upon the representations of petitioners that they involve
the same issues or questions of law or at the very least, revolve around the same set of facts.
A perusal of the records, however, reveals the contrary. Only two petitions are properly
consolidated. Thus, it behooves Us to discuss the cases separately.

In blatant violation of Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which in part, provides:

"Sec. 2. Contents of the petition The petition shall contain a concise statement of the
matters involved, the assignment of errors made in the court below, and the reasons relied
on for the allowance of the petition, . . . (Emphasis Ours.).

"Only questions of law may be raised in the petition and must be distinctly set forth . . ."
this petition devotes nine (9) pages under the subtitle "Summary statement of the matters
involved" to a discussion of matters off tangent from the real issues in the case. Definitely,
the question of whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Regional Trial
Court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing an order suspending hearing
pending the resolution of their motion to dismiss, does not involve the Philippine Bill of
1902, Executive Order No. 141, much less P.D. 1214. The counsel for petitioners even
discussed pending cases in this Court (G.R. No. 63786 - 87 and 69203) which have
completely nothing to do with the instant petition except for the fact that the parties therein
are being represented by the same counsel as in this petition. In several pleadings
subsequent to their petition, petitioners insisted that the proceedings in the court below
must be restrained until this Court resolves the pending cases abovecited. For this reason
this case was consolidated thereto.

A summary of the real matters involved in this petition is found in the respondent Court's
decision, to wit:

"This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin the Regional Trial Court, Branch
XL, in Camarines Norte from issuing a writ of preliminary injunction in Civil Case No.
5148 and to disqualify the respondent judge from acting in that case. The case was brought
by the respondents Marsman and Co., Inc. and United Paracale Mining, Inc., to enjoin the
petitioners, Joseph V. Lopez and Miguel Andrade, from entering and conducting mining
operations within the "McDonald" and "San Antonio" Tunnels in Paracale, Camarines
Norte, in which the private respondents have mining claims ("Tulisan," "Santa Marta,"
"California," and "Rocky Mountain Fraction"). On December 11, 1984 the RTC issued a
restraining order against the petitioners.

On December 12 the petitioners filed their answer alleging that, in accordance with PD
1214, the private respondents had forfeited their right to the mining claims. They likewise
argued that in view of PD 605, the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the case. On the
same day the petitioners moved for the disqualification of the respondent judge of the RTC,
claiming (sic) that in issuing the restraining order of December 11, 1984, he showed his
"bias, prejudice and personal hatred of and hostility to the [petitioners'] counsel [Atty. Pedro
A. Venida]."

On December 24, 1984 the petitioners filed a motion for a preliminary hearing on their
defense that the RTC lacked jurisdiction under PD 605 to issue a temporary restraining
order or injunction in cases involving or growing out of the action of administrative officials
on the applications for permits for the disposition, exploitation, utilization, or exploration or
development of the natural resources. Accordingly the RTC, in its order of September 5,
1985, suspended the hearing of the case until the resolution of the petitioners' motion to
dismiss. It is at this point that the present petition was filed." 1

The respondent Court denied this petition on grounds that: (1) the questions being raised
are not proper in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 but rather defenses which should be
raised in the action itself; (2) the question of jurisdiction which has yet to be resolved by the
trial court pending resolution of the motion to dismiss is prematurely raised; and (3) there
was no basis for determining whether or not the judge must be disqualified. 2

The review of this decision is what is on appeal before.

We refuse to be persuaded by the petitioners that the RTC must be enjoined from exercising
its jurisdiction in settling the case presented before it for the reason that the
constitutionality of the law involved in the said case is being questioned before this Court.
This case should have been disposed of independently of the other petitions herein.

The respondent Court of Appeals committed no reversible error. Neither did it commit grave
abuse of discretion as what petitioners want this Court to believe. The petitioners fail to
point out any assigned error which the respondent Court had supposedly committed but
simply narrate the action taken by it. Much less have they stated the reasons relied upon
for the allowance of the instant petition. For being insufficient in substance and in form, the
instant petition lacks merit and must be dismissed.

G.R. No. 70423

This is a petition involving the question of jurisdiction of regular courts in cases which had
been placed under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Mines under P.D.
1281.

This petition seeks to reverse the order of then Judge, now Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals, Hon. Alfredo L. Benipayo, dismissing the complaint filed by petitioner herein on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction, citing Section 7 of P.D. 1281 and the doctrine enunciated
in Twin Peaks Mining Association, et al. vs. Navarro, 3 that an action for the enforcement of
mining contracts, in this case cancellation of a mining contract, is outside the competence of
regular courts in view of the law cited. 4

The complaint filed with the then CFI of Manila, Branch XVI, was one for the rescission of
its mining contract with herein private respondent on grounds of violations of the terms
and conditions thereof, with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order. The trial court, however, upon motion of the defendant therein,
dismissed the case.

Petitioner wants Us to construe Section 7 of P.D. 1281 as applicable only to mineral lands
forming part of the public domain and not to mining claims located and registered under
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 624 as is its case.

Section 7 of P.D. 1281 reads as follows:

Sec. 7. In addition to its regulatory and adjudicative functions over companies, partnerships
or persons engaged in mining exploration, development and exploitation, the Bureau of
Mines shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving:

(a) a mining property subject of different agreements entered into by the claim holder
thereof with several mining operators;

(b) complaints from claimowners that the mining property subject of an operating
agreement has not been placed into actual operations within the period stipulated therein;
and

(c) cancellation and/or reinforcement of mining contracts due to the refusal of the
claimowner/operator to aside by the terms and conditions thereof.

All actions and decisions of the Director of Mines on the above cases are subject to review,
motu proprio or upon appeal by any person aggrieved thereby, by the Secretary of Natural
Resources whose decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days
from receipt by the aggrieved party of said decision, unless appealed to the President in
accordance with the applicable provisions of Presidential Decree No. 309 and Letter of
Instructions Nos. 119 and 135.

The view of the petitioner that by virtue of the registration of the mining claims under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 624, the mining claims became private property and
thereby brought outside the control and supervision of the Director of Mines is without
legal basis. The abovecited law does not distinguish between private property and lands of
the public domain. The provision of law involved is clear and is not susceptible to
interpretation. A condition sine qua non before the court may construe or interpret a
statute is that there be doubt or ambiguity in its language. 5 Section 7 of P.D. 1281 quoted
above defining the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Director of Mines is clear. Time
and again, it has been repeatedly declared by this Court that where the law speaks in clear
and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation. There is only room for
application. 6 Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly
what it says and the court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed. 7

This Court in Benguet Corporation vs. Leviste, 8 made these pronouncements:

"We grant the petition. Presidential Decree No. 1281 which took effect on January 16, 1978
vests the Bureau of Mines with jurisdictional supervision and control over all holders of
mining claims or applicants for and/or grantees of mining licenses, permits, leases and/or
operators thereof, including mining service contracts and service contractors insofar as
their mining activities are concerned. To effectively discharge its task as the Government's
arm in the administration and disposition of mineral resources, Section 7 of P.D. 1281
confers upon the Bureau quasi-judicial powers as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

Analyzing the objective of P.D. 1281, particularly said Section 7 thereof, the Court in Twin
Peaks Mining Association, the case relied upon by petitioner, noted that the trend is to
make the adjudication of mining cases a purely administrative matter. This observation was
reiterated in the more recent case of Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals."

The petitioner further argues that to hold that P.D. 1281 retroactively applies to its mining
claims which according to it is private property would constitute impairment of vested
rights since by shifting the forum of the petitioner's case from the courts to the Bureau of
Mines, as urged by private respondent, the substantive rights to full protection of its
property rights shall be greatly impaired and prejudiced. The judicial relief available for the
redress of private property rights violated, now being enjoyed by petitioner shall be lost
altogether.

This argument does not merit Our approval. There can be no vested right in a judicial relief
for this is a mere statutory privilege and not a property right. The distinction between
statutory privileges and vested rights must be borne in mind for persons have no vested
rights in statutory privileges. The state may change or take away rights which were created
by the law of the state, although it may not take away property which was vested by virtue
of such rights. 9 Besides, the right to judicial relief is not a right which may constitute
vested right because to be vested, a right must have become a title, legal or equitable, to the
present or future enjoyment of property, or to the present or future enforcement of a
demand or legal exemption from a demand made by another. 10 Definitely, the judicial relief
herein referred to by the petitioner does not fall under any of these.

The case at bar falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Mines,
hence, the trial court did not err in dismissing the petitioner's complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction.

G.R. Nos. 63786-87

In these petitions filed by petitioners United Paracale Mining Company, Inc. and Coco
Grove, Inc., petitioners seek to set aside the Order of dismissal of the case they filed with
the trial court for the ejectment of their respective defendants from the mining claims
which were allegedly privately owned by them having been located and perfected under the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 624.

The heart of these twin petitions is the question of constitutionality of P.D. 1214. Unless
P.D. 1214 is successfully assailed, the petitioners will be but mere applicants for the lease of
the mining claims involved and would thus have no causes of action against private
respondents.

This question has been resolved by this Court in Santa Rosa Mining Company, Inc. vs.
Leido, Jr. 11 thus:

"(W)e hold that Presidential Decree No. 1214 is not unconstitutional. ** It is a valid exercise
of the sovereign power of the State, as owner, over lands of the public domain, of which
petitioner's mining claims still form a part, and over the patrimony of the nation, of which
mineral deposits are a valuable asset. It may be underscored, in this connection, that the
Decree does not cover all mining claims located under the Phil. Bill of 1902, but only those
claims over which their locators had failed to obtain a patent. And even then, such locators
may still avail of the renewable twenty-five year (25) lease prescribed by Pres. Decree No.
463, the Mineral Development Resources Decree of 1974.

Mere location does not mean absolute ownership over the affected land or the mining claim.
It merely segregates the located land or area from the public domain by barring other
would-be locators from locating the same and appropriating for themselves the minerals
found therein. To rule otherwise would imply that location is all that is needed to acquire
and maintain rights over a located mining claim. This, we cannot approve or sanction
because it is contrary to the intention of the lawmaker that the locator should faithfully and
consistently comply with the requirements for annual work and improvements in the
located mining claim.

Presidential Decree No. 1214 is in accord with Sec. 8, Art. XIV of the 1973 Constitution
which states:

'All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines
belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential
and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and
no license, concession, or lease for the exploration, development, and exploitation, or
utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-
five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, except as to water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than development of water
power, in which cases, beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.'

The same Constitutional mandate is found in Sec. 2, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution,
which declares:

'All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other
natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of
natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State . . .'"

Notwithstanding Our ruling , in favor of the constitutionality of P.D. 1214, petitioners

contend that having filed mining lease applications on the mining claims they have
previously located and registered under then existing laws, pursuant to the requirements of
this Presidential Decree, and despite the waiver of their rights to the issuance of mining
patents therefor (emphasis theirs), they cannot be placed in equal footing with those who
forfeit all rights by virtue of non-filing of an application within the prescribed period such
that they (petitioners) have no causes of action against private respondents.

We are not persuaded by this contention.

Although We may agree that those who filed their mining lease applications have better
rights than those who forfeited all their right by not filing at all, this, however, does not
amount to any vested right which could be the basis for their cause of action against herein
private respondents. What is precisely waived is their right to the issuance of a mining
patent upon application. This in effect grants the government the power, in the exercise of
its sound discretion, to award the patent to the applicant most qualified to explore, develop
and exploit the mineral resources of the country in line with the objectives of P.D. 463, and
not necessarily to the original locator of the mining claim. To sustain their contention that
they can question the award of mining patents to applicants other than them would put to
naught the objectives of P.D. 1214 as enunciated in its WHEREAS clauses.

We agree with the trial court that with the waiver of their right to the issuance of a mining
patent upon their application for a mining lease, their status is reduced to a mere applicant,
their only advantage over the others is the fact that they have already conducted
explorations at the site and this exploration may he ongoing. But still, this credential, so to
speak, is not intended to tie the hands of the government so as to prevent it from awarding
the mining patent to some other applicants, which in its belief may he more qualified than
them.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 73931 is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit; the
Order of dismissal assailed in G.R. No. 70423 is AFFIRMED and this petition is hereby
likewise DISMISSED; the Order of dismissal assailed in G.R. Nos. 63786-87 is AFFIRMED
and these petitions are hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncements as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C .J ., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon,
Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ ., concur.

RAMON ITURALDE, petitioner, vs. ALFREDO FALCASANTOS, respondent.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

The case is an appeal via certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals reversing
that of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Basilan province, and dismissing petitioner's
complaint for recovery of possession and ownership of a parcel of land with the
improvements existing thereon, situated at Barangay Upper Baas, municipality of
Lantawan, province of Basilan, with an area of 7.1248 hectares.
 The facts may be related as follows:

On October 17, 1986, petitioner acquired by purchase from the heirs of Pedro Mana-ay a
parcel of land located at Baas, Lantawan, Basilan Province, with an area of 6.0000
hectares, more or less, more particularly described as follows:

"A parcel of land, situated at Baas, Lantawan Basilan. Bounded on the North by property of
Alejandro Marso; on the East by property of Ramon Bacor; on the South by property of Atty.
Ricardo G. Mon and on the West by property of Librada Guerrero. Containing an area of
6.0000 hectares, more or less."

However, on November 3, 1986, respondent applied with the Bureau of Lands in

Isabela, Basilan province, for the award to him of the same parcel of land under free
patent. On November 17, 1986, petitioner filed a protest to such application.

On February 7, 1989, the Regional Director of Lands rendered a decision giving

respondent a period of one hundred twenty (120) days to exercise the right to repurchase
the land by reimbursing petitioner of all expenses he incurred in the purchase of the
property in question, and held in abeyance respondent's application for free patent.

On October 11, 1989, the Regional Director issued an order declaring that respondent
had waived his right of repurchase, and rejected his application for free patent for lack of
interest, and allowed petitioner to file a public land application for the subject land.

On May 8, 1990, the Regional Director ordered respondent to vacate the land in
question, but respondent refused.

On July 24, 1990, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, Basilan province, a
complaint for recovery of ownership and possession with preliminary injunction of the
subject parcel of land.

In answer to the complaint, respondent alleged that the land occupied by him belonged
to the Republic of the Philippines, and that he had introduced improvements thereon such
as coconut and other fruit trees.

After trial on the merits, on March 20, 1993, the trial court rendered decision declaring
petitioner the owner and possessor of the subject parcel of land with all the improvements
existing thereon, situated at Barangay Upper Baas, municipality of Lantawan, province of
Basilan, with an area of 3.1248 hectares, and ordering respondent to vacate the land in
question, to pay petitioner the amount of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) as attorneys fee,
the amount of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) as litigation expenses, and three hundred
pesos (P300.00) as judicial cost.

In due time, petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals.

On December 20, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered decision reversing the appealed
decision, and entering a new judgment dismissing petitioner's complaint without prejudice
to any action that petitioner may take if the subject land was declassified from forest land to
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

Hence, the present recourse.

Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the trial court's
decision in his favor and dismissing the complaint because when the Director of Lands
allowed petitioner to file a public land application for said property, it was equivalent to a
declaration that said land was no longer part of the public domain.

We deny the petition. The Court of Appeals correctly held that "the evidence is
unrebutted that the subject land is within the Forest Reserve Area as per L.C. Map No.
1557 certified on August 13, 1951." [1] and, hence, not capable of private appropriation and
occupation.[2]

In Republic vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon, we held that "Forest lands, like mineral or
timber lands which are public lands, are not subject to private ownership unless they under
the Constitution, become private properties. In the absence of such classification, the land
remains unclassified public land until released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.
[3]

In Sunbeam Convenience Foods Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, we said: Thus, before any
land may be declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act from the
government. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until
the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that
it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain." [4]

Hence, a positive act of the government is needed to declassify a forest land into
alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.[5]
 And the rule is Possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership.[6]

What is more, there is yet no award or grant to petitioner of the land in question by free
patent or other ways of acquisition of public land. Consequently, he can not lawfully claim to
be the owner of the land in question.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the appealed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G. R. CV No. 42306, dismissing the complaint of petitioner before the
Regional Trial Court, Basilan province, in Civil Case No. 441-63.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Kapunan, and Martinez, JJ., concur.