MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY

Any attempt to define 'medieval philosophy' runs the risk of over-simplification and distortion. We shall assume here that it
began with the thought of Augustine, the greatest 'patristic' philosopher, in the fourth century though there is certainly some
overlap between the writings of the early Church fathers and the final period of post-Aristotelian philosophy. Proclus, for
example, although born later than Augustine, has been included above under Greek Neoplatonism. Generally we can say that from
Augustine to John Scotus Eriugena in the ninth century philosophy is characterized primarily by attempts to utilize the insights of
Plato (via Neoplatonism), and to a lesser extent of Aristotle, in support of their Christian beliefs. However, Aristotle became
increasingly important from the middle of the twelfth century as more of his works became available in the West in Latin
translations from Greek and Arabic. Full use was now made, within the newly emerging schools and universities, of dialectic
disputation, which employed Aristotelian techniques of argument, and which had been revived in the previous century. Moreover
while most philosophers were still mainly concerned to use the writings of the two major Greek thinkers to articulate and support
one or other of the three monotheistic faiths, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, they
tended also increasingly to engage in studies of specifically philosophical issues independent of theological presuppositions
though, as far as possible, not inconsistent with them. Medieval philosophy is usually considered as having ended with William of
Ockham whose nominalism and anti-realist epistemology undermined metaphysics and natural theology, with the consequence
that Christianity once again became a matter of faith alone and largely inaccessible to reason.

AUGUSTINE (354 430)

CHRISTIAN NEOPLATONISM

Aurelius Augustinus, now known as Augustine, was born in Tagaste, near Tunis in North Africa. He studied Latin literature in
Madaura and then rhetoric in Carthage. Although brought up as a Christian by his mother, he was for many years a disciple of
Manichaeism, a religion which supposed there to be two ultimate principles, good and evil. He opened his own school, firstly in
Carthage, where he was living with his mistress and son, and later in Rome. He had already begun to find difficulties with the
Manichaean system; and after he had become a professor in Milan the influence of Neoplatonic writings and the sermons of
Ambrose led him to make a complete break and convert to Christianity in 386. He tells us in his Confessions that it was on
hearing a child calling "tolle, lege" ("take up and read") that prompted him to open the Letter of Paul to the Romans in the New
Testament; and that this was the turning point in his return to the faith. He returned to Africa to establish a monastic community,
and in 395 he was made Bishop of Hippo, where he continued to develop doctrines to combat major 'heresies'. He was never
concerned to construct a systematic philosophy. Rather he sought to make use of those aspects of the thought of his predecessors
which he supposed to be true in support of his own insights about God and the soul, which he claimed to know from his own
direct experience or from the scriptures and teachings of the Church.

KNOWLEDGE/ LANGUAGE

[1] Augustine rejected scepticism, arguing that knowledge is possible [a]. He distinguished a number of stages in its acquisition
[see, for example, On the Greatness of the Soul, XXIII; On the Trinity, IX]. Firstly there is sense-experience of mutable things in
the world though this does not give us certain knowledge [b]. To explain it he introduces the notions of 'corporeal sight', which
refers to the changes undergone by sense organs when affected by objects, and 'spiritual sight', which refers to the having of
images. (In instances of imagination, as against sense-perception, spiritual sight occurs without corporeal sight.) The rendering
intelligible of sense-experience is attributable to 'intellectual sight' the working by the reason on the data provided by the other
kinds of sight. Reason also gives him memory and enables him to make judgements about physical objects in accordance with
eternal and incorporeal standards [On the Trinity, X and XII] [c]. The senses can of course deceive us. However, he thinks it
necessary for our practical life that we should believe sense experience to be generally reliable [Confessions, VI, vi, 7]. And even
if a particular experience is non-veridical, we can be certain that we are having it [Against the Academics, III, 11] [d]. This kind of
knowledge (scientia) includes also the mind's own self-consciousness as when it perceives through its own inner experience
(though the soul cannot, in its sinful condition, know itself directly); and also the many truths we can be certain about, for
example, the truths of mathematics and logic [e] (such as the principle of non-contradiction, A or not-A), and other first principles
[see On Free Will, II, 3; XII, 34; On the Trinity, XV, 12]. Likewise, we know in fact that we do exist: as he says, "Si fallor, sum"
("If I an deceived, I exist") [On Free Will, II, 3]; in our very doubting lies the certainty of our existence [f]. Lastly, the mind can
pass to a higher form of knowledge or wisdom (sapientia) which gives us insight into eternal truth and goodness immutable
forms, ideas, moral judgements and the like [g]. Beyond this lies the possibility of a mystical knowledge of God [h]. However, it
must be emphasized that Augustine was concerned primarily with the problem of how man can attain certain knowledge of eternal
truths rather than with the question whether such knowledge is in fact attainable at all. Knowledge, as he understands it, is
possible only within a religious framework grounded in revealed truth and love for God [i]. Reason assists man to come to
faith [i], but beyond that its function must be limited to articulating and clarifying what is accepted on authority and this means
that of the Church.

A combination of sense-experience and his God-given mind also forms the basis of Augustine's account of how language is
acquired. [Confessions I, VIII.] As a child he did not learn to speak simply by following the instructions of his elders. Rather, he
used his memory to note the words that things were called by or the gestures or facial appearances which accompanied their use,
and the ways they were put together appropriately in sentences. With practice he came to pronounce them correctly and was able
to infer that they were the names of the things signified [j].

[2] Augustine tried to account for certain cognition in terms of divine illumination [see Soliloquies, sI, 1 and 8; On the Trinity,
XII, 15] [a]. Just as sunlight falling on material objects renders them perceptible to the sense organs, so are the higher objects
introduced into the soul illuminated and made intelligible by the 'light' of God. These ideas, which include number, goodness, and
being, are immutable and eternal; and while they are not derived from experience they are not 'innate' in the strict Platonic
sense [b] and do not presuppose any pre-existence of the soul. The illuminated ideas give us certainty (as against the sceptic) in
our judgements about concepts derived from both the senses [b] and the inner self-consciousness [b]. Augustine, however, did not
thereby suppose that men can know the mind of God 'intellectually' His view was rather that through God's illumination of the
human mind it becomes capable of perceiving or 'participating' in eternal truth and the relationship of the created world to the
supersensible realm [c][c].

RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY/ METAPHYSICS

[3] Augustine's emphasis on religious experience and on theology rather than on strictly philosophical problems accounts for
the lack of any 'formal' proofs for the existence of God in his writings. His arguments, such as they are [see On Free Will II
and Soliloquies I, for example], appeal firstly to his self-consciousness and awareness of eternal and necessary truths. Thus, in
recognising the inferiority of the mind in the face of eternal truths, he says such truths reflect a Ground or Being which must be
God [a] all-perfect, absolutely good, unchangeable, necessary, Truth itself [a][a]. Indeed, he was the first philosopher to
assimilate the Greek concept of Being to the Christian God the "I am that I am" [Exodus, 3, 14]. He also argues to the
existence of the Divine eternal world from the world of impermanent physical bodies [b]. Similarly he refers to the order, beauty,
and goodness of the world [c] as pointing to God as its creator [c][c], albeit inadequately; and this, he adds, will be evident to all
rational men.

[4] Augustine postulated a hierarchy of created beings composed of matter and form [a]. It is rationally demonstrable that God as
active intelligence has freely created both matter and form out of nothing. [see, for example, On True Religion] [b], but being
omniscient he already knew what things he would actually create, species of created things being in Him as archetypal forms or
ideas (rationes), that is, as models orexemplars [for example, On Ideas, II; On the Trinity, IX, 6; XII, 14] [c][c]. Augustine also
refers to these ideas as eternal numbers, in that they represent proportion, order, and beauty [On Free Will, II, 8 and 13] [d].
Created bodies are then temporal numbers. And to account for the process of development he supposes that when first created
bodies were in a state of potency he calls them seminal reasons (rationes seminales) or invisible powers of things [e] which
in the course of time unfolded into the actual objects themselves [On Genesis, VI, 5]. In terms of his number theory the seminal
reasons are latent numbers, while bodies are sensible or manifest numbers.

[5] What Augustine says about seminal reasons and God's omniscience gives rise to the problem of evil and human freedom. It
would seem that the development of the individual formally and materially from 'seed' to actuality is a predetermined process. But
Augustine stresses that man must be free to respond to God's love and ask for His grace or to reject it [a]. Yet it might be argued
that man cannot really be free if God already knows in advance what choices will be made. And if God had foreseen that man
would commit evil then surely He could have arranged things differently. Augustine's solution is that moral evil is not something
positive but rather a privation that is, a lack of good, a falling-away from God [b] [On Free Will, I, 16; II, 19; Enchiridion 11]. As
for God's foreknowledge, it belongs to His very essence and existence to 'penetrate' His creation; and a man's decision is his own
decision even if God knows how that man will choose [ On Genesis, VIII, 26; On the Trinity, XV, 7].

[6] The issue of God's foreknowledge and creation of the world out of nothing also prompted Augustine to examine the concept of
time. [See Confessions, XI, 14-28.] "What happened before time?" This question made no sense to him. Time itself is not like an
event in time; neither is it the measure of motion by the mind. Rather it is to be understood as that which relates events . However,
he also argued that time is a function he called it a 'distention' of the mind (distentio animi), that is, it measures the mind itself
not the motion of external bodies. It was created with the universe by the non-temporal eternal God [a]. Such a view, Augustine
felt, could help him to understand how both the past and the future could be said to have reality rather than being reduced to a
point instant.

PSYCHOLOGY

[7] [See On the Soul and its Origin, I; On the Immortality of the Soul, I n VI.] Augustine's view of the soul essentially follows the
Platonic dualist view: it must be clearly distinguished from the corruptible matter in which it is embodied and from which it must
be cleansed; but it needs the body to exercise its capacity for sensation. He also says it is immortal, and he follows Plato's
arguments in the Phaedo [a]. Thus, he says, it is alive it 'participates' in life; the principles from which life derives cannot
admit a contrary; and therefore the soul must be immortal. Furthermore, in so far as the soul can apprehend the eternal ideas, it
must be akin to them and hence eternal, indestructible, and divine. He also argues that the soul desires perfect happiness, which is
realizable only if it never dies. Rationality is a property of human souls created individually by God(animal souls possessing only
the capacity for sensation), but Augustine stresses intellect is subordinate to the free will [b] in so far as the latter is innately
directed towards goodness by God .
ETHICS
[8] [See On the Trinity, XIII; Confessions, passim; The City of God] According to Augustine perfect happiness, the summum
bonum, can be found only in the active love of God, who unifies the all the cardinal moral virtues [a]. Thus, as we might expect,
he attempts to interpret the Greek notion of eudaimonia in the context of Christian theology. Virtue, the "act of living well and
rightly" [CG, XIV, 9], is, for him, achieved when the free will is directed towards the love of God. Indeed this love of
God [CG XII, 8]. But because of man's finitude and original sin his willing or reaching out for God, on whom he must be
ultimately dependent, requires the creator's merciful assistance the Christian concept of grace. He argues also that the human
mind is able to perceive moral or practical principles with certainty, just as it can perceive theoretical truths, through God's
illuminating power [b]. Augustine's ethics thus presupposes knowledge and wisdom, which is in turn possible only within a
religious framework grounded in revealed truth. And it is in this context that the criterion for judging sinful man's moral worth is
to be found; for what matters is not a sterile conformity to an external human law but man's willingness to attend to the interior
divine law revealed in conscience and to receive God's grace Augustine thus emphasizes inner life attitude, motivation or
intention [c]. And that is why it is unwise to judge people; for there are actions which could be done with a good or bad spirit
[Sermon on the Mount, 2.18]. Such actions are 'neutral' [as Aquinas calls them] [d].
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
[9] [The City of God] Augustine's political philosophy is characterized by a distinction between the 'earthly' city and the 'heavenly'
city [a] between the City of Babylon and Jerusalem, the City of God. These are not, however, identifiable with different kinds
of human society. Rather they are 'states' or 'conditions' in which citizens find themselves according to whether they follow God,
who is acting through the Church, or live a life of selfishness. Man is naturally social but not political. Augustine takes a society
of family units as his model; and it is in this context that man can fulfil himself as a rational and moral being. Nevertheless,
political authority is needed to maintain order and secure justice, given man's fallen 'condition' [b]. Thus even a pagan state can
promote a degree of justice, though Augustine makes it clear that a state can be truly just (and thus superior) only if it is founded
on the moral principles exemplified by the City of God [c].
CRITICAL SUMMARY
Augustine was not a systematic thinker; and, as has been seen, his philosophical speculations are subordinated to the demands of
his religious commitment: faith is given primacy over reason. But within this limitation the contribution he made to medieval
thought through his use of Neoplatonic concepts to articulate Christian theology was considerable. The doctrine of an inner
illumination; the soul as an immaterial substance, directly created by God, and the active ruling principle of the body; the theory
of the 'seminal reasons' all were to have a powerful impact on later 'Augustinian' philosophers and to present a continuing
challenge to Aristotelians and Thomists until well into the thirteenth century. They are also notions which from a strictly
philosophical standpoint are open to criticism in particular his view that the inner light is the source and test of truth. His
political philosophy, the central feature of which is the distinction between the 'city of men' and the 'city of God', was likewise
influential throughout the Middle Ages and in the Reformation, although it was in some respects, like his theology, pessimistic
and reactionary. For other issues which need to be looked at critically one might mention the problems of free-will and evil, which
are not easily reconciled with the belief in an omnipotent and omniscient God (though it is doubtful whether a satisfactory
solution was provided by any other later Christian philosopher). There is also a tension between Augustine's acceptance of the
Incarnation as a unique temporal event and his admittedly speculative notion of time as a function of the mind.

BOETHIUS (c. 480 524)

CHRISTIAN NEOPLATONISM
Anicius Boethius was born in Rome and studied in Athens. He became chief of the Roman Senate and was later appointed a
general magistrate and consul under Theodoric, King of the Goths. Accused of treason for his support of the Romans he was
executed after captivity, during which time he wrote his famous On the Consolation of Philosophy. He also translated into Latin a
number of works from Aristotle's Organon, including the Categories and the Prior and Posterior Analytics, as well as
the Isagoge (an introduction to the Categories) by the Neoplatonic philosopher Porphyry a pupil of Plotinus.

RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY/ METAPHYSICS

[1] Boethius employed philosophical reasoning to the full to support ecclesiastical authority and to articulate what he supposed to
be revealed truth. Thus he accepted the primacy of faith [a]. He distinguished between matter and form as the components of
substance. Form is the causal principle by which (quo est) a substance is what it is its being (esse), while its matter is that
which is (id quod est) the totality of parts, which provides the basis for substantial change [On the Consolation of
Philosophy and 'In what manner substances'] [b]. God, however, is pure Form (without matter), in the sense that in Him
alone esse is identical with that which is (exists) [c]. He is also a 'substance', but as applied to individual created beings,
whose esse 'flows from Him,' this term belongs to a different category [see Consol. III, and On the Trinity]. Furthermore, while
we may say that a man is great and good, when we predicate these qualities of God we must mean not that He is great (or good)
but that He is Greatness and Goodness. (In his De hebdomadibus he raises the question whether created beings are good in
themselves by virtue of their own being or substance or whether they derive their goodness through 'participation' in something
else [d]). It is from a recognition of the imperfection of beings and of change in the world that we can argue to the necessary
existence of God as Being itself, the Perfect Being and first cause [e]. But Boethius has a negative conception of evil as privation,
or absence of good; it is thus not real [f]. He argues that God created the world from nothing: it overflows (defluit) from the
Divine Goodness but God's substance and will remain distinct from this creation and undiluted by it [g]. As for the problem
of human free-will [Consol. V] and God's providence, Boethius says that God does not really foresee anything because He is in
eternity [Def. 118], and what God knows is eternally present, so human acts cannot be said to be necessitated by Him [h].
Boethius also deals with the nature of universals [Commentary on Porphyry's 'Isagoge', I]. He suggests tentatively that genera and
species might both exist mentally as (universal) thoughts, as a consequence of the mind's working on sense-experience of what
'subsists' extra-mentally as common qualities in real individual things [i].

ETHICS
[2] Boethius did not set out any formal ethical system. He accepted that God exists as the summum bonum [a]. And in his own
life he exhibited a Stoic resignation to God's will, arguing that man can be happy despite life's adversities, and that virtue would
eventually be rewarded [b].
CRITICAL SUMMARY
Although exhibiting some Neoplatonic features in his thought, Boethius is significant as a transmitter of Aristotle's logic and
methods. His use of analytic or dialectic techniques to elucidate and support the faith was adopted by the Scholastics; and his
provisional treatment of universals initiated an intense debate in the twelfth century. Likewise his view of the individual as
composed of both matter and determining form was influential in the thirteenth. The issue of free-will and God's foreknowledge
was also to prove controversial throughout the Middle Ages (in connection with the dispute concerning the relationship of God's
will to his intellect). Boethius's account of God's eternal knowledge of temporal events is also problematical.
Pseudo-DIONYSIUS (fl. c. 500) CHRISTIAN NEOPLATONISM
'Pseudo-Dionysius' is the name given to an anonymous author of important writings who sought to reconcile Neoplatonism with
Christianity. He was formerly identified with Dionysius the Areopagite (mentioned in the Acts of the Apostles as St Paul's
convert): but he is now thought to have been a Syrian monk.
RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY/ METAPHYSICS
[1] Pseudo-Dionysius regarded the insights of human reason as entirely consistent with faith though subordinate to it [a].
However his philosophy is highly speculative and 'mystical'. He said that God, "who is above all essence, knowledge, and
goodness" can be approached both positively and negatively [Mystical Theology, I-III]. The affirmative way (kataphatike)
involves attributing to God appropriate perfections, such as goodness and wisdom, found in created beings, but presupposes that
God possesses them in a superior fashion. Other qualities, for example, air, stone, belong to God only in the sense that He is the
cause of them. As for the negative way (apophatike) we must start by denying of God what is most remote from Him (such as
anger, hatred) and then move upwards denying further qualities until we reach "the super-essential Radiance of the Darkness of
Unknowing" [M.T., I] a darkness due to excess of light and a consequence of the finitude of the human mind [b]. God for
Dionysius is the Transcendent First Cause from whom all things proceed (proodos 'procession') or emanate and come into
existence [see M.T., IV and V] [c]. God thereby 'multiplies' Himself the plurality participating in the unity yet he remains
One and distinct from His creation [d]. But Goodness flows out of the archetypal Ideas in him giving rise to the
Celestial Hierarchies (and through which it is manifested especially as the beautiful). He is thus both transcendent and 'in' his
creation [see Celest. Hierarch, Introd.] [e]. God is also the Final Cause to which created things are drawn back [f]. The emanating
world is thus an intermediary between God as beginning and end. Every created thing is good through its participation in God's
goodness. Evil is therefore understood as an absence or privation [g], in that a sinner may not live up to the moral standard; or, in
nature, a condition, such as disease, may constitute a falling away from health which is completely good [Divine Names, IV].
CRITICAL SUMMARY
The importance of Pseudo-Dionysius lies primarily in his doctrines of (1) the creation of a hierarchical manifestation of God, who
is both immanent and transcendent; and (2) negative and affirmative approaches to God. However, while Dionysius supposed
reason and faith to be entirely consistent with each other, many of the Neoplatonic themes to which he subscribed do not fit too
well with some of the Christian dogmas he accepted, for example, the Incarnation and the Trinity. This issue of compatibility was
also to be a stumbling block for many of his successors and led to more sophisticated and subtle metaphysics.
JOHN SCOTUS (ERIUGENA) ( c. 810 c. 875)
CHRISTIAN NEOPLATONISM
As his name implies, John was born in Ireland and was educated in one of the monastic schools. An outstanding Greek scholar he
translated the works of Pseudo-Dionysius and others into Latin. He was for some years at the court of the Frankish king Charles
the Bald and became head of the Palace School about 845. He is noted for his highly original work On the Divisions of Nature.
RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY/ PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE/ METAPHYSICS
[1] By 'Nature' John means the totality of (1) everything which exists 'actually' (that is, things which we perceive through the
senses or conceive through the intellect, and human nature which is reconciled to God through grace); and (2) those things which
'are' in some way only potentially (all objects which transcend the power of reason, changeable material things in space and time,
and human nature alienated from God). Nature thus includes God and the natural world [a]. John holds also that while one must
accept revealed Christian dogma as a matter of faith, its 'authoritative' interpretation by the Church must be subject to the test of
reason. Moreover, faith derives ultimately from reason which is in God. There is thus no real distinction between faith and
reason [b]. In On the Division of Nature he identifies four divisions.
(1) [Book I] Nature which creates and is not created. This is God the Uncaused cause the primary principle of all things
created out of nothing [c]. God in this first aspect is known (i) mainly negatively [d] in that his essence transcends anything which
is in the natural world; (ii) affirmatively in that natural things are predicated of Him as first cause [d]. He is thus super-essential,
that is, simultaneously essence and non-essence. God therefore both transcends the world and is 'in' all things [e]
(2) The second division [Book II] Nature which both is created and creates refers to the Divine Ideas as prototypes
(prototypia, praedestinationes) of natural things. They are creative, in the sense that they are primary 'exemplary' causes or eternal
reasons (rationes aeternae), that is, they are the archetypes [f] on which natural things in the world are patterned when created by
God. They may be said to be created in so far as they exist in the Word (God the Son), which emanates eternally from God the
Father [g] It is only logically prior; for they are generated with it. But, although in their effects they are a plurality, in their origin
in the Word they are one and not separate; and indeed are identical with God's essence [h].
(3) [Book III] Nature which is created but does not create. Creatures, external to the mind of God and constituting the spatio-
temporal world, participate in or derive from the prototypes and yet are created from nothing[i]. They are thus
called participationes. God, the Divine Goodness, pours Himself into and is diffused through his creation [i]. The 'hidden God'
thereby manifests Himself as the "form of the formless". This created world is essentially good, evil being understood as a
privation of the good [j].
(4) Lastly [Book V] Nature which neither creates nor is created. John means by this that Nature is God as the end or final cause of
the creative process God as all in all [k]. The created world, including man redeemed through the Incarnation of the Word
returns to and is united with the rationes aeternae in God respiritualized, as it were.
CRITICAL SUMMARY
John is the only significant and original thinker in the West throughout the long period from Pseudo-Dionysius in the sixth
century to Anselm in the eleventh. His Neoplatonic doctrine of nature as an eternal reflection of God a theophany and of
God as all in all led some later medieval thinkers to regard him as a pantheist. This brought him into conflict with the Church and
resulted in the condemnation of his book. It is fair to say that in his thought there sometimes seems to be a tension between the
concepts of creator and created. On the one hand God is identified with Nature, and creation seen as a 'procession'. On the other
hand John views God as prior to being and distinct from the created world. The role of the Divine Ideas is clearly central here;
they seem to be both identical with God's essence and yet are the 'entities' which spatio-temporal beings derive from and
participate in. However, this is a problem common to Neoplatonic thinkers generally; and in the context of his system as a whole
John's views are generally regarded as philosophically consistent.
AVICENNA ( 980 1037)
ISLAMIC NEOPLATONISM
Avicenna (Ibn Sina) came from Bokhara in Persia, where his father was a government official. A polymath from an early age
(compiling an encyclopaedia of the sciences when only 21), he practised medicine and wrote over a hundred books, including the
million word Canon of Medicine. He was also a statesman, and in 1024 became a senior minister to the Emir of Hamdan. He is
regarded as the first major systematizer of philosophy in the Islamic world.
METAPHYSICS/ RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY
[1] Although generally Neoplatonic, Avicenna's metaphysics was strongly influenced by Aristotle, and he regarded metaphysics as
the study of Being as being and its transcendental attributes [a]. He considered there to be three modes or levels in which essences
or 'intelligibles' can exist: (1) in God's Intellect as immaterial Ideas (ante rem); (2) in individual material things (first 'intention', or
'natural sign in the soul' signifying things) (in rebus); and (3) as mental constructions or abstractions, 'universals' (second
'intention' signifying concepts or other signs) (post rem) [b]. Essences, however, are what they are regardless of their mode of
existence. Avicenna supposed existence in individual things to be an accidental property of their essence. He meant by this that
while in itself an individual, say, Socrates exists as a possible thing, its existence is necessitated by the essence 'humanity' of
which it is but one realization or embodiment; there are no essences without any existent instances. Essence is thus logically prior
to existence and is thus far separable from it [c]. Similarly essences, although 'contingent' (they might not have existed), derive
their existence necessarily from other essences. An infinitely regressive chain is not possible; there must be a necessarily existent
essence to cause and sustain in existence the universe. This necessary essence is God, the uncaused and eternal being whose
essence and existence are identical [d]. All such derived beings may therefore also be said to be necessary by virtue of this
necessary relationship to their causes [d]. However, while for Avicenna 'being' is in general a univocal concept, it would seem
that these derived beings (including Aristotle's 'primary substances') are necessary beings in a different and analogical sense from
the one truly necessary Being, that is, God [e][e]. Avicenna also supposed there to be a plurality of forms constituting the essence
of an individual [f]. Socrates, for example, possesses the forms of corporeality, animality, and humanity (the soul), as well as
accidents which contribute to his individuality.
[2] Avicenna distinguished between potency and actuality, on which potency is dependent. Potentiality is the principle by which a
thing can change into another. It can exist as active potency (in agents) or as passive potency (in the patient, that is, what is acted
upon); and he said that there is a gradation from pure potential, 'formless' being, which is prime and eternal matter, to pure
actuality which again is identified with God alone [a]. Further, because God has no potentiality or lack, He must be absolute
Goodness from which all other divine (and equally necessary) attributes, such as Truth and Love, are indistinguishable [b].
[3] Avicenna argued that 'creation' was an eternal and necessary generative emanation of the temporal world from the eternal God
as a result of His self-knowledge and the radiation of His goodness out of the necessity of His own nature [a]. But because He
is simple He can have no knowledge of multiplicity; and because He is spirit He cannot create material things directly. He
therefore 'creates' the First Intelligence [b]; that is, it 'proceeds' from him, and is thus like Himself. However, in this First
Intelligence existence and essence are distinct and its knowledge of itself (as 'possible') is separate from its knowledge of God (as
'necessary') [c]. Nine more 'intelligences' are supposed by Avicenna to emanate hierarchically from the First Intelligence, the
successive causal stages exhibiting ever greater multiplicity [d]. The last and tenth ('Active Intelligence') (1) gives the form of
corporeality and specific (essential) forms [e] to pure potentiality (matter) [e] thus producing bodies composed of form and
matter [e] (this being that which individuates concrete objects, including individuals sharing these forms) [e]; (2) serves as a
single Active Intellect which enables each individual soul to grasp through abstraction the 'intelligibles', that is, universal essences
in the mind (post rem) [f]. Consistent with his account of God's knowledge and the necessity of his acts that Avicenna rejected
providence and free-will [g]; and he regarded evil as a privation [h].
PSYCHOLOGY
[4] There are three kinds of soul received from the Active Intelligence by and within appropriate compositions of matter . The
animal soul takes up the vegetative; while the individual human rational, 'possible' or potential soul or intellect takes over the
other two [a]. It is a separate spiritual substance but is not the form of the body (matter being the principle of
individuation) [b]. Through the agency of the Active Intellect (Intelligence) the 'possible' soul is transformed into the 'acquired' or
material intellect [c]. The latter can survive bodily death and, depending on the kind of life it has led (that is, its degree of
'actualization'), it exists as an individual soul in a state of eternal happiness or of torment, seeking its body (Avicenna thus does
not accept the doctrine of monopsychism) [d].

KNOWLEDGE
[5] Avicenna distinguished between primary intelligibles, such as logical truths, and secondary intelligibles, which are concepts
and demonstrative inferences. Knowledge of secondary intelligibles presupposes sense-experience as a starting-point. The
'possible' soul must pass through three stages if knowledge is to be possible. It starts as pure passive potentiality; it then becomes
'positive' (partially in act) when it receives the images from sense experience; and finally, when it becomes the 'acquired' material
intellect, it can receive the secondary intelligibles as 'intentional objects' and grasp universal essences with the help of the
illuminating and 'actualizing' power of the Active Intelligence [a]. Knowledge of the primary intelligibles is gained directly from
the Divine emanation [b]. Avicenna also argued that the concepts of being and individual thing, although generally gained through
sense-impressions, can be grasped necessarily through one's consciousness of the self [c]. He supposed further that
certain 'prophets' by means of their 'imaginative faculty' can acquire through direct revelation what is reached and translated
through philosophy, and can express it in symbolic language; so, although philosophy and theology are separate domains, there is
no incompatibility between faith and reason [d]. Avicenna says we can have no positive knowledge of God as he is in Himself;
our approach can only be negative. But appropriate spiritual exercises can enable the prophets to achieve a superior mystical
vision of God which transcends knowledge and language altogether [e].

CRITICAL SUMMARY
Avicenna's subtle blend of Neoplatonism with Aristotelian concepts proved to be a major stimulus both to other Arabian thinkers
and to Christian scholastics of the thirteenth century. The key features of his philosophy are his emphasis on essences as existing
in three modes, and on existence as an accident of essence (except in God). However, many of his doctrines were not accepted
uncritically. The more Platonic and rationalist elements in particular were subjected to close scrutiny for possible conflict with
Islamic orthodoxy, and were also to prove problematical for later Christian philosophy especially his view of the necessity of
God's actions, his rejection of a creation in time in favour of the emanation account, and his denial that God has knowledge of
multiplicity.

ANSELM (10331109)

AUGUSTINIANISM
Anselm was born of a noble family at Aosta in the Piedmont (now in Italy) and studied in Burgundy and Normandy (Bec), where
he entered the Benedictine Order. He became Abbot in 1078, and in 1093 succeeded his teacher Lanfranc as Archbishop of
Canterbury. He subsequently came into conflict with the king and was exiled.

RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY/ METAPHYSICS

[1] Anselm showed little interest in metaphysical issues for their own sake. His main concern, as a medieval scholastic, was to use
reason to explore and support both the revealed and the natural truths of Christianity[a]: as he said, "Credo ut intelligam" ("I
believe so that I may understand") [Proslogion I]. He is known primarily for his attempts to prove that God exists. In
his Monologion [II,1] he developed Neoplatonic arguments based upon the supposed presence of various qualities to a degree
corresponding to their place in the hierarchy of created things. Thus we observe being, goodness, and greatness in objects of
experience, which reflect that in which they participate. Moreover, whatever exists finitely must have derived its being from
that is, be caused by something else [b]. So there must be an Ultimate Being which is absolutely good and great, that is,
possesses these qualities to a perfect degree. This is God [c]; only He can possess qualities which are absolutely better for Him to
have than not to have. Underlying Anselm's arguments is a commitment to a realist theory of universals (ante rem) [d].
Anselm regarded the arguments of the Monologion as a connected chain. But in the Proslogion [III, 3], which was originally
titled Fides quaerens intellectum ("faith seeking understanding"), he set out a "single argument" the ontological argument (as
Kant called it), which moves from the idea of God to the claim that God must exist in reality. The argument may be summarized
as follows:
(1) God is that than which no greater (or better) can be thought.
(2) What actually exists objectively has more reality, is greater than the idea.
(3) Therefore God must exist in reality; for if He existed only as an idea in the mind, that idea would not be that than which
nothing greater can be thought.
The argument was criticized by the monk Gaunilo. He said that Anselm's view would also license us to move from our idea of the
most beautiful island to assert that the island necessarily exists. In reply Anselm said that, unlike that of the island, God's
existence is necessary because God as a possible being is absolutely perfect, and absolute perfection must include existence [e];
otherwise such a being would not be absolutely perfect. God, as absolute and existent being, is supreme Truth. Individual things
have truth to the extent that they embody and exemplify absolute Truth [f]. Judgements of course remain true by virtue of their
correspondence to what actually exists in the world [g].

CRITICAL SUMMARY
Although Anselm stressed the primacy of faith and regarded philosophical reasoning as its handmaid, considered as a contribution
to philosophy his arguments and claims may be legitimately criticized. His view in the Monologion, for example, that the
common qualities point to 'absolutes' is open to the objections to which Plato's theory of Forms is prone. As for the ontological
argument, Anselm seems (1) to confuse God's actual existence with the existence of the concept of God in the mind; (2) to regard
existence itself as a predicate (as Kant pointed out). So there is no inconsistency in saying God is absolutely good and yet does
not exist. However, many philosophers throughout the ages have accepted the argument. In the 20th century he has been
interpreted as having (in the Proslogion) attributed necessary existence to God as the absolute perfect and infinite Being; and it
has been argued that if God's existence is not logically impossible it must therefore be logically necessary. However, against this it
has been said that advocates of this approach have failed to distinguish logical (de dicto) necessity from ontological (de re)
necessity, and that Anselm's argument must therefore still be considered invalid.

ABELARD (1079 1142)

CHRISTIAN ARISTOTELIANISM (DIALECTICS)
Peter Abelard, the son of a knight, was born near Nantes and studied in Paris and later in Laon. He established schools of his own
and came to be recognised as a brilliant but controversial dialectician. A liaison with Heloise led to his being castrated at the
instigation of her uncle. Abelard continued to teach, and in 1125 became Abbot of St Gilas in Brittany. His theological writings
were denounced by Bernard of Clairvaux at the Council of Sens in 1040 on the questionable grounds that his intellectualism was
undermining the faith.

RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY
[1] [See 'Thus and Not.] Although a powerful dialectician Abelard recognised that human reason, in attempting to grapple with
the mysteries of the faith has its limits, and that it should where necessary give way to authority [a]. He conventionally
regarded God as the supreme good and as the omnipotent creator of the world. We can have no knowledge of God's essence, but
we can suppose Him positively to possess all attributes to an infinite degree [b]. And we can infer that He exists from a
recognition of the impermanence of the world as contrasted with the eternal, and from the dependence of the body on the
mind [c]. As for the world, Abelard said that God created it necessarily from His own nature in accordance with pre-existing ideas
or exemplary forms (formae exemplares) which are both in His mind and identical with the Divine Essence[d].

KNOWLEDGE/ LOGIC
[2] [See especially Dialectical Treatises.] Abelard made a major contribution to the theory of universals. Two positions in
particular were current in his own day. (1) Realists held that 'universal' terms, such as, for example, 'man' (a genus) and 'rational'
(a species), as in 'X is a man; X is rational', correspond to realities ('manness', rationality), which actually exist outside the mind.
(2) Nominalists argued that universals are but words (or, at the most, concepts which exist solely in the mind all things in the
world being individual substances lacking any real shared universal features). Abelard rejected both realism and nominalism and
said that, while the universal is a name (nomen) or term (sermo), it exists as a 'common nature' in individual things. We recognise
a number of things as being alike in various respects. For example, different individuals Socrates, Aristotle, etc. are all
human; This and that object are red. Such logical predicates refer to universal features or images of things which can be
'abstracted' and thus have some kind of 'mental' existence as adequate representations of the properties each thing possesses
individually. These common representations the mind attends to while ignoring other accidental features of the individuals.
However, for Abelard these 'mental' universals have essentially psychological and logical rather than metaphysical status [a].
Abelard's contribution to logic which underlies his theory of universals is also important. Building on the work of Aristotle
and Boethius, he examined the syllogism and especially conditional propositions and the concept of implication [b]. He also
studied signification. He said that signs are used primarily to refer to 'facts' in the world and thence to thoughts about them. It
follows that propositions are true or false by virtue of their relation to their 'contents'. Abelard also allowed that we can talk of
truth and falsity in a secondary sense as applicable to propositions themselves a categorical proposition being true if both the
subject term and predicate terms have the same referent. (This was to influence the later doctrine of the suppositio of
terms) [c]. As for modalities, such as necessity, possibility, contingency, he said that these terms might be applied to propositions
with reference to their meaning (sensus), but strictly modalities are de rebus concerned with things. 'Contingency' can be
defined as 'possibility' which is 'non-necessity' [d]. But in a wider sense, especially when applied to future events, contingency
means not necessary; and he seemed to believe that such propositions are indeterminately true in the sense that they could be true
on some occasions but false on others. If Aristotle could be understood as making this claim, then he would not be in breach
of the principle of bivalence [e].

ETHICS
[3] [See Know Thyself.] Abelard rejected the 'privation' view of evil as having no content [a]. He said that the rightness or
wrongness of actions depended on the intentions of an agent [b]; and although an objective good is presupposed, he
stressed individual certainty as the basis of moral judgement. As a result he saw no role for divine grace; morality was a matter for
individual conscience [c].

CRITICAL SUMMARY
The significance of Abelard lies primarily in his skill as a dialectician, both within philosophy itself and for explaining the faith to
the unbeliever; and for his employment of reason while recognising its limits and the superiority of authority. Although he is not
generally regarded as a particularly original thinker, his treatment of the problem of universals was a stimulus to subsequent
thought, as was his emphasis on the role of intentions in ethics. There has been much dispute as to whether he was a 'moderate
realist' or a 'conceptualist'. He was certainly criticized by Aquinas for regarding universals only as mental 'constructs', but it seems
correct to regard him as having attempted to steer a middle path between realism and nominalism, and as holding universals to be
real 'mental' concepts which yet relate to an extra-mental reality. Nevertheless it has been argued that in so far as his account of
universals as genera and species, predicable of particular things, remained at the level of logic, he gave little if any consideration
to the metaphysical and epistemological aspects of the problem. He was also criticized in his own day for his apparent
subordination of the mysteries of faith to the demands of his dialectic. However, this accusation was probably unjustified. He
himself protested both his orthodoxy and his acceptance of the supremacy of faith over (an intrinsically limited) reason; and it is
arguable that his concern was not to question faith as such but rather to apply his dialectic to its theological and thus linguistic
expression. As he wrote in a letter to Heloise in 1041 after his condemnation, "I shall never be a philosopher if this means to
speak against St Paul; I should not wish to be Aristotle if this were to separate me from Christ" [Letter 17].

MAIMONIDES (1135 1204)

JUDAIC ARISTOTELIANISM
The son of a judge, Maimonides (Moses Ben Maimon) was born in Cordoba, Spain but left when young owing to the persecution
of the Jews. In 1160 he went to Fez, the sacred city of Morocco, and then to Cairo, where he became the Court Physician and
leader of the Jewish community. He later also became physician to Saladin's family.

METAPHYSICS/ RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY

[1] [Guide, I and II.] Much of Maimonides' thinking is concerned with the conflict between religious teaching and what can be
known by the intellect. In general he says that when what we learn through our reason seems to be inconsistent with scripture the
latter should be interpreted allegorically. However, while his aim was to harmonize reason with faith he recognised that reason
may not always be adequate and may have to give way [a]. Thus, while religion tells us the temporal world was created by God's
will in time and out of nothing, when we see that the causes of things are grounded in Nature we can well conclude that the world
must always have had the same structure and is thus eternal and necessary. The creation therefore cannot be demonstrated and
seems miraculous [b]. Nevertheless it may be that the empirical data from which the conclusion is drawn are insufficient and that
what reason gives us must then be rejected.
[2] God for Maimonides is regarded as immaterial, pure intellectual act, at once efficient, formal, and final cause, the Prime
Mover, the only necessary being; and He is One transcendent, and omnipotent, having the absolute power to suspend the laws of
Nature [a]. However, strictly speaking, qualities can be attributed to the 'being' of God only negatively: we can say only what He
is not, and any terms applied to Him even 'existence' itself will have an equivocal sense. But Maimonides allows that we
can describe him positively by reference to His effects [b]. Thus we may describe Him as merciful or vengeful, for this is how we
interpret His activity in and his control of natural events. Indeed it is from recognition of change and contingency in the natural
created world that we can prove God's existence [c]. God produces both matter and form freely from his intellect:. For Him to
know is in effect to create [d]. Being, that is, existence, says Maimonides, is an 'accident' of essences in that essences may or may
not be actualized to form substances [e]. Between God and the corporeal world is a hierarchy of pure, immaterial Intelligences or
spirits (Maimonides confines hylomorphism to corporeal beings): but in so far as He knows these intelligible principles He is in a
sense identical with them [f]. The tenth (and last) Intelligence is called the Active Intellect, and through which God 'informs' and
thereby actualizes essences [g].
[3] Maimonides distinguishes between natural and moral evil. Natural evil is real from the point of view of individual men, but it
should be seen as a consequence of the cosmic order. Moral evil, on the other hand, is attributable to man's free-
will [a]. Maimonides sees no incompatability between this and God's providence [b] His foreseeing of all that will happen.

KNOWLEDGE/ PSYCHOLOGY
[4] [Ibid.] Maimonides distinguishes between the soul's passive and an external Active Intellect (the tenth 'Intelligence') [a]. To
acquire knowledge our passive intellects, on receiving sensory data, must be endowed with forms by this Active Intellect [a]; and
conclusions reached by the reason through deductive inference will be true if the experiences which constitute the starting-point
are reliable. He seems to regard man's intellect as similar in kind to God's in that there is an identity between the intellect, the act
of intellection, and the object cognised [b]. He accepts immortality, but only in a limited sense. The soul, although form of the
body, is a 'sensitive' soul and perishes with the body. The 'actualized' individual intellects of those who, through their exercise of
their freedom of will have become just, do survive. However, no individuality survives death [c], although individual knowledge
can advance to the Intelligence [c] which everybody is affected by. The Active Intellect working through special men (the
prophets) gives them the capacity to receive divine revelation and thence by means of the imagination to experience visions and
similar phenomena [d]. Nevertheless, Maimonides rejects any suggestion of a mystical ascent as being on the same level or
comparable to an intellectual one [e] and this is limited: we can have no knowledge of the transcendent God as He is in
Himself; through the intellect we can know Him only negatively. But positive knowledge of Him is possible through His effects
in Nature [f].

ETHICS/ POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

[5] [Guide, III.] Maimonides distinguishes between ordinary people and rulers. Ordinary people should be guided by their leaders
and follow the rules of their society and the scriptures. They should aim at moderation, control of the passions [a]. The rulers,
however, should be more ascetic. There is no place in their lives for passion. They should seek to love God both by knowledge
(through science and metaphysics) and in their actions (by imitating His activity in the world). They should also endeavour to
realize an ideal state, in which their concern should be for the majority without regard to the individual [b] (thereby reflecting
God's attitude towards the natural order).

CRITICAL SUMMARY
Maimonides' concerns are very much those of his contemporaries though from a Judaic perspective. Of particular interest is his
attempt to harmonize faith and reason. Broadly Aristotelian rather then Neoplatonic his philosophy is important for its influence
on Christian Scholasticism. However, his rejection of personal immortality and his view that the survival of the passive intellect
depends on the universal active intellect gives rise to difficulties for theological orthodoxy. There is also arguably an
inconsistency between his commitment to the negative way and his assertion that human cognition is similar to God's.
AVERROES (1126 1198)

ISLAMIC ARISTOTELIANISM
Averroes (Ibn Rushd) was born in Cordoba, Spain, the son of a judge, and in addition to philosophy studied law, theology,
medicine and mathematics. He became a judge himself in Seville and then practised medicine in Spain and later in Morocco. He
wrote on astronomy, medicine and law but is notable primarily as an eminent and influential commentator on Aristotle; and
indeed in the later medieval period was known as 'The Commentator'.

RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY/ METAPHYSICS

[1] [See Harmony between Philosophy and Religion and The Incoherence of the Incoherence.] In dealing with the problem of the
relationship of reason to faith Averroes regarded philosophy and theology as operating at different levels or in different ways.
While the philosopher seeks certainty as far as possible through reason, the theologian's presentation may be only probable. A
truth might be formulated 'scientifically', that is, in philosophy, when it is regarded as knowledge; while in theology it is
understood allegorically. According to Averroes, conflicts over Muslim orthodoxy arose because disputants failed to recognise the
fundamental irreconcilability of some religious doctrines with what is philosophically demonstrable. The non-philosopher accepts
faith on authority: but Averroes rejected the primacy of faith over reason [a].
[2] [See Commentaries on Aristotle especially Physics and Metaphysics.] In his metaphysics Averroes emphasized the
individual existent thing and argued that existence can not be separated from either essence or accidents and is the primary
notion [a]. To be an essential substance is to exist. Indeed, everything that has being exists, especially God. 'Being' thus seems to
have been used as a univocal term, that is, one which has the same meaning whether referring to the categories of substance or
accidents though the meaning might be said also to be analogous by virtue of the common 'possession' of existence [b].
Averroes distinguished between necessity and possibility (or potentiality). For him necessity belongs to being as such and does
not refer to any necessary connection between 'contingent' beings and their causes. Rather beings are potential to the extent that
they are not fully actualized and are dependent on some other being for their existence [c]. God as pure Act is pure Form, the
unmoved mover, identical with the First Intelligence, and both final uncaused cause and efficient creative cause [d] the 'world
force' (natura naturans) [d]. He produces the world out of necessity because He knows it and this can be proved
philosophically [e]. At the other extreme is pure potentiality prime matter, uncreated and coeternal with God [f]. Between the
two is Nature as a unified, single structure (natura naturata) [g], containing bodies in a hierarchical process from potentiality
(matter) to actuality (form) which makes each individual what it is [g]. This does not emanate from God: rather He creates,
actualizes the celestial spheres and the other Intelligences (which are pure act) in the hierarchy as intermediate causes [g].
Through these God passes down His power to the last Intelligence, the Active Intellect, which converts potential being (matter)
into actual being rather than bringing forms into the created world [h].

KNOWLEDGE/ PSYCHOLOGY
[3] [Commentaries on Aristotle especially De Anima.] Knowledge is essentially a knowledge of Being at its various levels
as studied by natural science, natural philosophy, metaphysics which is concerned with being as such, and culminating in a
mystical knowledge of ultimate reality [a]. Averroes distinguishes between the universal active intellect and a corporeal passive
intellect or understanding [b]. This is, however, distinct from the soul and is a capacity to receive forms [b]. He utilizes this
distinction in his account of how knowledge is gained. When 'illuminated' by the active intellect the passive intellect becomes the
non-corporeal material intellect and a property of the active intellect itself the two together constituting the 'acquired' intellect
and initiating the thinking and knowing process which involves the 'abstracting' of the intelligible forms from material
things [c]. The individual soul as such is not a so-called 'possible' soul but 'sensitive', the form of the body (corporeal form), and
perishes with it [d]. The acquired intellect, however, isseparable from matter. Survival after death is therefore possible. But this is
not a personal immortality, as the separated forms or substances do not exist as individuals but rather subsist as aspects in the
common active human intellect of the human species within the universal hierarchy of being. He thus espoused the doctrine
of monopsychism [e].

CRITICAL SUMMARY
Although influenced by some Neoplatonic methods and metaphysics, Averroes was essentially Aristotelian but not uncritically
so; and he is important for this greater emphasis on Aristotle as against the Neoplatonic bias of earlier Islamic thought. He also
sought to make philosophy more independent of religious presuppositions while denying any incompatibility between them. The
inseparability of essence and existence; necessity and possibility as an intrinsic feature of beings; God as creative unmoved mover
and first cause; and restoration of the form-act, matter-potential distinction these are all significant claims in his thought. His
writings were condemned by the Christian Church, but they were avidly studied by major philosophers before the ban was lifted
in the mid-thirteenth century, and were influential on the 'Latin Averroests' (as their opponents called them). Nevertheless, aspects
of his philosophy, such as his affirmation of one universal active intellect and his rejection of personal immortality were later
criticized by Christian thinkers.
GROSSETESTE (c. 1170 1253) AUGUSTINIANISM
Robert Grosseteste was born in Stradbroke, Suffolk and studied at Oxford and Paris. From about 1198 he taught at Oxford,
subsequently becoming Chancellor of the University and later the first lecturer to the Franciscans. In 1235 he was appointed
Bishop of Lincoln. A friend of Simon de Montfort, he was often involved in disputes with both the Church and King Henry III.
He translated a number of works from the Greek, including the Nicomachean Ethics; and his own writings encompass not only
original philosophical works but also a wide range of other subjects including mathematics and agriculture.

METAPHYSICS/ PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE

[1] The central concept in Grosseteste's philosophy is that of original light (lux) [see On Light]. He understands this to have
been created by God, together with unextended finely divided prime matter, as a dimensionless point. Light is temporal and the
first 'corporeal form', that is, it unites with matter to produce a non-dimensional simple substance [a] which then, by virtue of its
property of diffusion, multiplies itself and spreads out in all directions to produce the extended outermost sphere, the
firmament. Diffusion of reflected light (lumen) from the firmament back towards the centre then occurs, giving rise to nine
unchanging celestial spheres [b] and within these the four perishable infra-celestial spheres fire, air, water, and lastly
earth. God Himself can be identified with Light, but in this case it is pure and eternal, and is the exemplary form of individual
things [c] which He has created as existing in time [c] [On the Unique Form of all Things] . All things thus share the same
corporeal form of prime matter, but each is individual by virtue of its possession of its own hierarchy of forms added to its body .
Grosseteste therefore accepts the doctrine of a plurality of forms and also that of universal hylomorphism [d]. Light is held to
account for colour ("light embedded through transparency"), whiteness (as abundance in "pure transparency"), and blackness
("scarcity in impure transparency") [see On Colour]; and also motion ("the multiplied force of light") [On Corporeal Motion and
Light]. It is light which enables to soul to act on the body [e].

KNOWLEDGE
[2] [See On the Truth of First Principles.] Sense experience of itself cannot provide knowledge in a strict sense; it has to be
corrected by reason, to eliminate any imperfections or distortions introduced through the imagination. But as a result of sensory
stimuli the intellect, the higher aspect of the soul, is illuminated by divine spiritual light and is thereby enabled to acquire
knowledge of individual essences or things and their conformity to the eternal Word, that is, knowledge of truth [a]. The mind,
however, does not perceive God directly and need not even be aware that is the divine illumination that makes knowledge
possible [b].

PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
[3] [See especially Commentaries on Aristotle's Physics and Posterior Analytics.] Grosseteste was perhaps the first philosopher to
describe scientific method in terms of an 'analytic-synthetic' (resolutio-compositio) process. A scientific problem is first broken
down into its simplest aspects (the 'analysis'). A hypothesis is then constructed to show how these basics might be combined to
account for the phenomenon (this is 'synthesis'). Experiments can be conducted, both to help in the framing of the hypothesis and
to test its truth or falsity. By controlling observations it might be possible to show a particular cause always produces a given
effect [a]. The scientist then is not just an empirical observer; reason has a major role to play in the construction of deductive
systems and in the apprehension of first principles and the laws of nature. And mathematics which for Grosseteste deals not
with real or objective entities but with abstract concepts [b] could be used to describe local motion.

CRITICAL SUMMARY
With his combination of an Augustinian Neoplatonic philosophy with an empirico-mathematical view of science Grosseteste
epitomized the influential Oxford school of thought in the thirteenth century. And he also represented one of several significant,
and more positive responses to the encroaching Aristotelianism seen by many as posing a threat to Christian orthodoxy. His
original use of the concept of light is a key feature of his thought, as is his advocacy of the analytic-synthetic method in the
natural sciences. However, it can be argued that if his science and metaphysics are complementary and mutually consistent this
has been achieved at the cost of subordinating the former to the latter. Likewise one may be critical of his limitation of the role
given to sense-experience in his account of knowledge and truth as the counterpart of his appeal to divine illumination.

WILLIAM OF AUVERGNE (c. 1180 1249)

(MODIFIED) AUGUSTINIANISM
Born in Aurillac and educated in Paris, William taught theology there and was made Bishop in 1228, thereby becoming
responsible for the university. He was criticized by Pope Gregory IX the following year for alleged administrative shortcomings.
He was one of the earliest medieval philosophers to attempt a synthesis of Christianity and Aristotelianism (as received in the
West from the Arabs), but within an Augustinian framework.

METAPHYSICS/ RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY

[1] [See especially On the Universe and On the Trinity.] While William accepted the supremacy of faith, he regarded philosophy
as an autonomous discipline in its own sphere, philosophical disputes being subject to examination by the reason alone [a],
although he stressed it should remain sensitive to the requirements of Christian doctrine. He held a view of Being (esse) in a broad
inclusive sense as that which is possessed by all things. But while he distinguished between being (esse) as essence, as connoted
by a thing's definition, and the existence (ratio) of that thing [Universe, I, 3; Trinity I and II] this is not to be thought of as the
distinction between possible being and being as necessary existence [b]. William therefore rejected the theory of necessary
emanation and intermediate beings [ibid] (though he accepted the existence of immaterial angelic intelligences) [Universe, II,
2] [c]. Prior to creation, beings exist in God as exemplary forms, God being their exemplary cause [Universe, I, l] [d]. Created
corporeal beings (which alone are composed of prime matter as well as form) exist in the world only 'accidentally' as a
consequence of God's free will. They thus exist by 'participation' in the Divine Being [e]. In so far as they, together with the whole
of Nature, are dependent on God's will and providence it would seem that there is little room in William's philosophy for
individual free-will [f]. He argued that the world was created with or in time [Universe, I, 2]. It cannot have existed from eternity,
because it would then have had to pass through an infinite time. This is impossible, for there cannot be an infinite regress [g]. So
there must have been a first moment of time when the creation occurred. William believed that God's existence as Being can be
proved [Trinity, VI]. In God alone are existence and essence identical; existence belongs to His definition. From the attributes of
accidental being, such as 'dependent', 'caused', and 'secondary' we can therefore argue to the concepts of 'essential' being
'independent', 'uncaused', and 'primary' and thus to God's existence [h]. Further, given that objects have their being through
participation, they cannot be self-dependent or self-caused. There must therefore be a necessary Being, God, to cause them and
the universe as a whole [i]. William said we can talk about God as being or existing in Himself but only by using
language analogically; the descriptive terms cannot be used univocally [Trinity, VII] [j].

PSYCHOLOGY
[2] [See On the Soul.] Each human being has a soul and a material body. The soul is the immaterial form of the body: it perfects
and 'realizes' it [I, 1] [a]. William said it plays on the body as a harpist plays on his instrument. He stressed the simplicity and
unity of the soul [for example, I, 2; IV, 1-3]. The vegetative, sensitive, and rational 'souls' are all functions of the one soul; and
understanding, perceiving, willing are not regarded as separate faculties but as integrated aspects of the soul itself . He therefore
thought of the soul as itself a spiritual substance [b]. There can be no active intellect in man, separable or otherwise [VII, 3].
Rather, activity is said to be a function of the soul when exercising its capacity to know the soul as 'active understanding'. The
'active intellect' as such is more properly understood as being identical with God who has created all souls directly and actualizes
their ('possible') substance (quod est) by 'informing' them (the quo est) [V, 1] [c]. The soul in its totality is immortal [V,
1 passim] [d]. This is clear, because it possesses the power to animate the body, and this cannot be destroyed by the body's death.
(He also utilizes Plato's other proofs.) The soul is said by William to be at the limits of the two worlds the world of sensible
objects and the world of the Divine.

KNOWLEDGE
[3] According to William the soul has direct knowledge of itself [for example, On the Soul, III, 13] [a]. As for the acquisition of
knowledge of the sensible world, this involves initially the reception by the senses of particular experiences. Such data are then
worked on by the active understanding of the soul itself [V, 6], images being abstracted and given to the imagination. Images,
however, can provide only incomplete and vague knowledge. If full, true knowledge is to be obtained, divine illumination is
required [V, 7; VII, 6] [b]. God as the 'exemplar' or 'mirror' impresses universal and abstract ideas, the intelligible forms, as well
as first principles and the laws of morality on the human intellect now passive in relation to God. True forms are thus known
intuitively not via ideas or images [c]. God, however, can be known only through Being [d].

CRITICAL SUMMARY
William in Paris, like Grosseteste in Oxford, sought to stem the advancing tide of Aristotelianism. But rather than
uncompromisingly opposing to it a thoroughgoing Platonism he tried to assimilate into an Augustinian framework what he
supposed to be the most valid features of the thought of Avicenna and Averroes though he treated their writings and those of
Aristotle himself critically. Thus we find discussions of, for example, the relationship of existence to essence, God's freedom to
create directly in time, and the unity and immortality of the soul, all of which continued to engender controversy throughout the
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Understandably there are difficulties in William's philosophy. One might mention the apparent
tension between human and divine freedom; the concept of a unitary soul which is separate from the material body and yet
'perfects' it; and an understanding which is active in relation to sensory experience yet passive in relation to God's illuminating
power. William's concept of God as Being, and thus as simple and indefinite, was also criticized by some as failing to comprehend
or signify the full richness and power of the Creator. Nevertheless William was an original and systematic thinker who was to
influence both Bonaventura's Augustinianism and the Aristotelianism of Aquinas.

ALEXANDER of HALES (1185 1245)

AUGUSTINIANISM
Born in Halesowen, Gloucestershire, Alexander studied in Paris. He entered the Franciscan Order some time during the 1230s and
became the first Franciscan professor of theology at Paris. He was active in both university and church matters. He was given the
honorific title 'Doctor Irrefragabilis' (The Irrefutable Teacher). His philosophical ideas come to us principally through students'
lecture notes (Gloss and Disputed Questions). They are not always consistent with the views set out in the Compendium of
Theology (Summa Theologica). However, he is not now regarded as having been the author of this text, although his influence on
it is apparent.

METAPHYSICS/ RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY

[1] According to Alexander [Gloss I] God possesses the attributes of unity, truth, eternity, goodness, power, and wisdom; He is
simple 'what He is' (quod est) is identical to 'that by which He is' (quo est); He is the efficient and final cause of the world; and
He is totally free even to the extent of being able to order a breach of the moral law [a], unless it contradicts himself as the
final end of man's actions, that is, as the source of the natural law. Man (like all creatures) is a 'composite' being: the quod est (his
substance) constituting his 'concreteness', while his quo est is his essence which makes him what he is, namely, human; and
this humanity comes from God [b]. Man, like God, is free, his freedom being found in both his intellect and will working
together [Questions] [c]. Evil is seen as a privation [d]. Alexander rejected the theory of emanation and held the view that God
created the world of matter and form immediately and freely, all things being contained within Himself as 'exemplars', and
hylomorphism applying only to corporeal beings [e]. His creatures, as effects, derive qualities, for example, goodness, from Him
by 'participation' [f]. Alexander said it can be proved the world is not eternal [g]. God's existence too can be proved through both
authoritative faith and reason: the arguments Alexander employed include appeals to contingency, causality, the eternity of truth,
goodness, and unity (the transcendental attributes), the idea of perfection, and the soul's awareness that it had a beginning [h].

PSYCHOLOGY
[2] [Gloss II; Questions] The soul is created directly by God. In the Summa it is argued that it is composed of a 'spiritual matter'
and a spiritual form (as are the angels). It is thus itself a simple substance which, as the principle of motion and perfection,
is united with and animates the body, much in the way that a sailor inhabits his ship. However, it is uncertain that this actually was
Alexander's own view, as statements in Gloss II contradict this 'composition' view of the soul. Nevertheless the soul is said to
have three 'powers', which are distinct from its essence: vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual or rational. The rational power is
both active and passive two different intellects in the same soul; and these (if this is Alexander's view) correspond to the soul's
form and 'spiritual matter'. He rejects the idea of a separate active intellect; the rational soul is a single unity [a].

KNOWLEDGE
[3] God being incomprehensible cannot be directly known by man, though what He is can be known analogically by the natural
light of reason as a consequence of 'participation'. Knowledge of God is implanted 'actually' in the human intellect [a] (even in
that of unbelievers), though this knowledge may not be explicit or brought to consciousness when the soul is turned towards the
world of creatures instead of toward God. The active intellect is able to abstract both the forms of corporeal things and spiritual
forms, but God's illumination is needed for the latter [b].

CRITICAL SUMMARY
Alexander is important for developing systematically the Augustinian tradition of Paris which was to have considerable influence
in the thirteenth century. He made no radical changes to it, but while generally critical of Aristotle he felt able to incorporate some
of its elements, together with Neoplatonic doctrines, provided they did not conflict with Christian revelation. The various aspects
of Alexander's thought are subject to the kinds of criticism which we have already seen levelled against Augustinianism.

ALBERTUS MAGNUS
(c. 1200 1280 )

CHRISTIAN ARISTOTELIANISM
Albertus Magnus (the 'Great'), known as Doctor Universalis (universal teacher) on account of his wide learning, was born at
Lauingen (Swabia) in Germany, and studied at Padua and Cologne. He entered the Dominican Order in 1223 and then taught for
many years in Germany, then in Paris as Regent Master (1240-48) before returning to Cologne. He was Bishop of Ratisbon 1260-
62. Like Aristotle, he was interested in the physical sciences, and he had considerable knowledge of Arabian and Jewish
philosophy. He wrote many commentaries on Aristotle and other philosophers. He is particularly notable for having been the
teacher of Aquinas.

METAPHYSICS/ RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY

[1] Albert distinguished clearly between faith and reason. Each has a particular role to play in its own sphere. Theology is
concerned with revelation [for example, Compendium of Theology, I, iv] while reason deals with Being, which is manifested in
natural experience, and is the the object of metaphysics. (This for him included natural phenomena; he placed great value on the
observation of nature and on scientific knowledge.) There is no incompatibility between faith and reason, but reason is recognised
as having limits [ibid., I, iii, 13] [a]. God is the 'first Being (ens)' or Principle and First Intelligence. He is also omnipotent, self-
knowing, pure act, and free to create. His existence is His substance and essence which is indistinguishable from His
will [b]. All these attributes are in reality but abstractions which we cannot predicate of Him because He transcends all our
concepts; we can refer to Him only analogically [for example, Book of Causes, I, iii, 6] [c]. However, Albert believes we can
prove that God exists because of the presence of motion in the world: an infinite chain of 'beginnings' would be contradictory;
there must be a first mover [ibid., I, i, 7]. But he rejects the ontological argument [d]. He supposes the world was created freely by
God in time and not from eternity, but this remains a probability and cannot be proved [e]. He also describes creation in terms of
an emanation from God as first principle and Agent Intelligence [ibid., I, iv, 1] and accepted the existence of 'seminal
reasons' [f]. Further successive 'intelligences', exhibiting ever greater diffusion of goodness [g], produce their own sphere of the
universe, ending in the formation of the Earth, but God is in no way lessened by the creative process [g]. As for the production of
individual beings, Albert says that this is brought about through the imposition of forms (which are images of God's Ideas) on
matter as potentiality and by which it is actualized [h]. Forms are thus ante rem as the Divine Ideas, and also in re as universals in
things. In so far as the soul can 'abstract' forms from individual things they are also said to be post rem [i]. It is matter which
makes a thing a particular individual [Metaphysics, 12, I, 7] [j]. He is uncertain as to whether there is a multiplicity of forms in
individuals but he rejects hylomorphism in so far as he considers form as dependent on a separate intelligence [k] and as not in
itself constituting a composite with matter.

PSYCHOLOGY/KNOWLEDGE
[2] [See especially On the Nature and Origin of the Soul.] What the soul is (quod est) is a non-material spiritual substance: that by
which it is (quo est), as possibility, actualized and given its function as soul is form which it receives from God, of whom it is
thereby the image. The soul is the 'animating' principle of the body [a]. Because it does not depend on the body for its proper
operations Albert reasons that the soul is immortal [2, vi] [b]. He says each individual has both a possible and a separate active
intellect but argues that there is not a single active intellect for all men [c]. This would be inconsistent with the possession by each
man of his own individual being (esse), that is, the act of the rational soul.
[3] The forms in things are knowable by virtue of God's agent intellect which contains His Ideas [Metaphysics, 12, I, 9] [a]. This
illuminates the active intellect of the individual soul thus enabling it to 'abstract' images from experience of sensible
objects [b]. The possible intellect can thereby come to understand the sensible forms in things. From the understanding of sensible
forms we can move on to ultimate knowledge of God. But we are here at the limits of our abstractive power. God as transcendent
can be known only negatively or through His Ideas. Strictly speaking He lies beyond such predications as 'being' or
'substance' [c].

CRITICAL SUMMARY
Albert is important for his clear demarcation of faith from reason and for his eclectic system which, perhaps to a greater extent
than in any previous philosophy, attempted to incorporate Aristotelian elements into a framework which drew on both
Neoplatonist and Arabian thought. While he did go some way towards resolving the conflict between illumination and sense-
experience as the source of knowledge (supported by his emphasis on scientific observation and experimentation) by limiting the
role of the former, it is arguable that his philosophy remains essentially Neoplatonic and open to the standard objections, and that
genuine Aristotelian features are not adequately integrated. Indeed there are often serious inconsistencies in some of Albert's
positions (for example, in relation to creation). Some scholars also claim that he was not an original thinker so much as an
encyclopaedic but only partially successful systematizer. Nevertheless, Albert undoubtedly laid the foundations for the more
coherent synthesis of his pupil Thomas Aquinas.

BACON (Roger) (c. 1214 1292 or later) AUGUSTINIANISM

Roger Bacon, philosopher and scientist, was born of a wealthy family either in Ilchester (Somerset) or Bisly (Gloucestershire),
and studied arts at Oxford (under Grosseteste) and Paris. As Regent Master he lectured there on Aristotle in about 1237. He
returned to Oxford some ten years later to pursue further studies in a wide range of subjects, including languages, mathematics,
and experimental science, and later entered the Franciscan Order. In 1257, at the request of Pope Clement II, he undertook to
produce an encyclopaedia of universal learning. He was imprisoned in 1278 because of allegedly suspect teaching. He became
known as the Doctor Mirabilis ('wonderful teacher').

METAPHYSICS/ RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY

[1] [See the Greater Work, II and VII.] Bacon seems to have made little original contribution to metaphysical thinking. He
accepted the identity of essence and existence [a] that what makes a thing what it is cannot be distinguished from what makes
it that thing; the doctrine of an immortal, spiritual soul, the plurality of forms and a universal corporeal form for all
matter [b]; hylomorphism in all created things (including spiritual beings) [c]; and 'seminal reasons' [d]. We have knowledge of
God and can prove His existence from a consideration of the inner light [e]. But ultimately, although reason is needed for
philosophy, what we discover through it must be subordinated to faith [f]; reason is of God and must return to him. Bacon thus
emphasizes the primacy of theology over other sciences.

KNOWLEDGE
[2] Bacon said that we may start from any philosophy be it Christian or pagan but must seek to eliminate ignorance and
prejudice [ibid. I]. He accepted that knowledge is grounded in reason and experience. However, he distinguished between 'inner'
or 'divine' experience, which follows on illumination by God (as the Active Intellect) and leads to increasing degrees of certainty
culminating in mystical states [ibid. II; Third Work, 74] [a], and 'external' or 'human' experience, which involves evidence of the
senses, experimental sciences, as well as mathematics and languages [ibid. VI]. External experience cannot of itself lead directly
to truth; it can only serve to verify or confirm the conclusions of reason and inner experience [b]. His emphasis on the 'concrete' is
exhibited also in his rejection of universals in favour of individuals [Metaphysics II, 95] [c].

CRITICAL SUMMARY
Bacon was generally Augustinian in his metaphysics and religious philosophy and indeed, by comparison with most of his
contemporaries, may be regarded as somewhat reactionary, keeping himself aloof from new developments in scholastic
philosophy and theology. Nevertheless he had a good understanding of Aristotle's writings, and the influence of the 'Peripatetic' is
evident in his own thought. But although he is important in that he accorded a role to sense experience and experiment as a means
of confirming the discoveries of reason and inner experience, he can be criticized in so far as his natural science was not freed
from its ultimate dependence on divine illumination. Perhaps because his concerns were primarily practical rather than theoretical
he was often inclined to be uncritical readily accepting the opinions of others, and appealing too readily to astrology and occult
sciences, and thereby failing to follow his own canons of evidence.

BONAVENTURA (1221 1274)

AUGUSTINIANISM
Giovanni di Fidanza, the Doctor Seraphicus ('Angelic Teacher'), known as San Bonaventura (or St Bonaventure), was born in
Bagnorea, Tuscany. He entered the Franciscan Order in 1238 and studied in Paris under Alexander of Hales. He taught theology
there and was appointed to the Franciscan Chair in 1257. As Minister-General of the Order he was actively involved in worldly
affairs. In 1273 he was made Bishop of Albano and Cardinal by Pope Gregory X.

RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY/ METAPHYSICS

[1] Although Bonaventura makes a clear distinction between faith and reason and grants that philosophy is a rational activity and
need not make use of theological dogma, he starts from the assumption that philosophy must be incomplete or erroneous unless
guided by the light of faith [a]; all knowledge must presuppose and depend on revelation [see, for example, Commentary on the
Sentences, II, 1; On the Six Days, I, 13]. And in general he tends to write as a theologian rather than as a philosopher interested in
philosophical problems as such. His primary concern is with the soul's ascent to God. He accepts that God's existence can be
proved from the material world [Sentences I, 3; Six Days III, 4; On the Mystery of the Trinity I, 1], but he sees such proofs as little
more than reinforcing what he supposes to be the soul's prior awareness of God's existence through its own reflection on itself .
We do not, however, have such knowledge from birth; indeed in many adults it may be only implicit or unclear. It is to them
primarily that he addresses his proofs. Thus our recognition that the sensible world is finite and imperfect draws our attention to
and clarifies the awareness we have of infinitude and perfection. He argues further that there must be a simple unchanging, self-
caused Being to bring about composite and changeable things. Another argument starts from the human desire for happiness
[Mystery I, 1]. This can be realized only when we possess the supreme Good, that is, God. But the desire for happiness
presupposes we have knowledge in our soul that the Supreme Good exists [b]. Bonaventura also uses arguments which do not
start from the sensible world. Thus he adopts the ontological argument [Ibid.; Sentences I, 8]. (As soon as we understand the idea
of God as that than which nothing greater can be thought we have to accept that God's existence cannot be doubted and that we
cannot think of Him as not existing. He rejects Gaunilo's objection by saying that his assumption is self-contradictory: that than
which nothing greater can be thought is a perfect being, whereas 'island' refers to an imperfect thing.) And he appeals further to an
argument from truth [Sentences I, 8] [c]. Every affirmative proposition presupposes a foundation for truth; and this, he says, can
be understood only by reference to a first Truth God.
[2] Bonaventura accepts the doctrine of exemplarism, the view that God is seen as the supreme cause of everything in that the
Ideas of all things possible, actual, universals, particulars are contained in the Divine Word [a]. He uses the term 'emanation'
to describe the procession of the world freely created by and from God [b], but he stresses that this must be understood in the
context of the Christian account. Creation as a whole is a sign of God [Sentences II, 25]. Within God these infinitely various Ideas
are identical with the divine essence and are not therefore distinct from each other: but as conceived by rational creatures they
may be supposed to be distinct in that they connote different things. [See Six Days I and XII; Sentences I, 35.] Everything that can
happen, whether good, evil, or possible, is already known to God in infinite and eternal act. While there is change and succession
in the things mirrored in divine knowledge, there is no time or motion in God's act itself. Indeed, Bonaventura argues that the idea
of creation requires time to have had a beginning; the world cannot be eternal. And he offers several arguments against eternal
motion. For example, he suggests that as it is impossible for something to pass through an infinite series [c]; an eternal time
would never have reached the present moment. Likewise if the world were eternal there would now be an infinity of rational souls
and this is impossible [Ibid. II, 1].
[3] As for individual creatures, these are clearly dependent on God; and according to the doctrine of exemplarism they must
resemble God in some way. [See, for example, ibid. I, 35 and 39; II, 16.] Bonaventura says this involves an imitation of
something in God and not a univocal participation. By this he means that what is in God is not possessed by his creatures in the
same sense; if it were it would lead to pantheism. Rather we must understand resemblance in terms of analogy [a] of
proportionality (as between things of different kinds) and especially of likeness. Creatures, he says, are 'traces' (vestigia) of God
as exemplata, that is, as effects of God, conforming to the divine ideas, and in proportion in that creatures too can produce
effects. Rational creatures resemble God more closely in so far as they can have rational knowledge of Him and are thus images
(imagines) of Him [b]. Irrational creatures on the other hand are directed to God only mediately as effects and differ from rational
creatures proportionately. Bonaventura thus accepts a hierarchy of being[c] though again of course this is a hierarchy only as
viewed from the standpoint of created beings. From a conception of sensible beings we ascend to rational beings, rational beings
in a state of grace, and ultimately souls themselves in heaven enjoying the beatific vision of God. Thus in the ascent we find an
ever closer likeness of the Divine, and ever greater expression of the Word. The created world, Bonaventura adds, is thus perfect
in the sense that it serves the purpose God intended. God could of course have created things differently [d]. He could, for
example, have created a world in which all beings have better essences. Indeed, one could suppose that even within this actual
world its substances could be changed into a higher class (in which case He would be making a different world), or that individual
men might be improved morally or intellectually. Nevertheless we finite creatures cannot know God's reasons for acting as He
does.
[4] Bonaventura's account of created beings and their production is subtle. Unlike God, who is immaterial and pure act, all created
beings (corporeal and spiritual) are said to be composed of matter and form (the doctrine of hylomorphism) [Ibid. II,
3] [a]. Matter cannot exist on its own; it exists in association with form: but it is potential in so far as it is the basis of forms
(having a disposition to receive them) of all beings [b]. Considered either in itself, abstracted from all forms, or potentially as the
foundation for being as such, matter is the same in all things. But in relation to motion it differs as between substances that can
change on receiving component forms (namely, bodies) and substances which cannot change (for example, spiritual beings or
angels). Bonaventura argues for a plurality of forms in all bodies [c]. Moreover, in addition to their own forms they possess the
form of light (lux) as the one basic substantial form their position in the hierarchy of being reflecting their degree of
participation in the form of light. Light is a central concept in Bonaventura's metaphysics. [Ibid. II, 13] He understands it as the
composite of form and 'spiritual' matter. It is not itself material in the bodily sense but it represents the form of corporeal matter;
and it is through light that corporeal matter is actualized, brought into being [d]. Light (lumen) is the principle of activity.
Radiating from the heavenly bodies it is a power which permeates the universe as a kind of spiritual life-force, active in
reproduction and in effect mediating between soul and body [e]. It also acts as an agent in the eliciting of 'seminal reasons'
(rationes seminales) from matter [f]. Bonaventura explains the doctrine of seminal reasons in the following way. Matter as
potentiality contains within itself most natural forms which are actualized through the action of light (in its 'illuminating' role).
Matter, he supposes, contains these forms virtually; they are created within it. The agent's role is thus solely to bring to act what
already exists potentially. It is these virtual forms he identifies as seminal reasons. Only God can create out of nothing. [On the
above see, for example, ibid. II, 7, 13, 15, and 18.]
The composite of matter and form is the individuating factor that which makes things what they are. Within this it is matter
which is responsible for the distinctness and multiplicity of individual things as apart from others, while it is form that makes the
individual a specific kind. For example, I am a man (form); I differ numerically from other men (matter): but matter and form
together make me the individual I am. Moreover, because the form is rational the highest substantial form I am thereby
made an individual person [g].

PSYCHOLOGY
[5] [See Sentences II, 17, 18, 24.] Of the numerous created beings, the human soul is unique in that it is created by God out of
nothing. According to Bonaventura it is composed of both form and matter, but both of these are 'spiritual' [a]. Although an
individual's soul is 'simple' in that it contains no measurable parts, and its matter is unextended and unchangeable , it has four
functions, that is, faculties which are not distinct vegetative, sensitive, rational (and its several aspects), and volitional
(will). The rational soul animates the body and has the desire to perfect it [b] in the same way that the body has the desire to
follow the soul [ibid.II, 17, I]. The body too is composed of matter and form, and is transmitted seminally through the generations
of men. The relationship of soul to body is thus a union of two complete beings, each of which has its own form and matter; it is
not a relationship of soul as form and body as matter [c]. Bonaventura also distinguishes two different but inseparable aspects of
the rational soul the active intellect, which is unique to each individual soul, and the passive or possible intellect. There is no
separate universal active intellect. However, the possible intellect is not completely passive, and the active intellect is not wholly
'in act' [see under 'Knowledge' below sec. 6] [d]. Given his theological presuppositions and 'proofs', and his account of the
nature of the human soul as simple and self-subsistent, Bonaventura took it for granted that the soul is immortal eventually to
enjoy a vision of God. But he does also offer a number of proofs [ibid. II, 19]. Two in particular should be mentioned. (1) Because
it is the function and ultimate end of the soul to possess God as the supreme Good, it must be made in His image and therefore
cannot be mortal. Moreover, the spiritual matter united to the form of the body must also be immortal, since its own satisfaction is
found fully within this union. (2) The natural desire of the soul for happiness itself constitutes a proof in its own right [e]. The
soul must be immortal, for otherwise there could be no possibility of this perfect happiness being attained. (Bonaventura regards
'ethical' proofs as superior to more metaphysical ones involving, for example, consideration of the soul's ability to reflect on itself
or of its incorruptibility in contrast to corporeal matter.)

KNOWLEDGE
[6] According to Bonaventura, our knowledge starts from sense perception; the intellect when created is an 'empty tablet' (tabula
rasa) and has no knowledge of sensible things. He thus rejects innate ideas as understood in a strict sense [a]. In the process
whereby sensible knowledge is acquired the sensible object acts on the passive sense organ and produces in it a sensible species
which itself acts on the active faculty of sensation. This latter can become aware of and 'judge' the content of the sensation and
thence perceive the quality of the object. The various sensations are unified by the imagination acting on a 'common sense'.The
job of the passive or possible intellect (aided by the active intellect) is to abstract the species from the imagination and to judge it.
In this respect the passive intellect exhibits activity [b]. The active intellect can itself have no knowledge unless it receives
information from the possible intellect, towards which therefore it is in a sense not 'in act' [See Sentences II, 24].
If thus far Bonaventura's theory of knowledge is empirical, and if he rejects 'crude' innatism, how does he account for intelligible
knowledge of spiritual realities and virtues [see sec. 7]? His answer [see, for example, Six Days, XII; Journey of the Soul; The
Mystery of the Trinity] is that the soul has a capacity (or 'virtual innateness') to come to such knowledge as soon as it has
knowledge of the relevant ideas or species; and this capacity may be said to be a natural light. The soul as the 'image of God'
naturally leads towards God in its desire and will for happiness a will to which the intellect is subordinate (he calls the will the
"rational affection of appetite" [Sentences III, 33]). The soul has a dim awareness of God [c] as its object but to make this
awareness explicit to turn it into reflective (non-intuitive) knowledge, the soul must rely on theillumination provided by the
activity within it of the Divine Ideas (rationes aeternae) [c]. These Ideas, although in themselves unknown to man, stimulate and
regulate the intellect so that what is unchanging, certain and real can be revealed in fallible sensory experience [c]. The intellect is
thereby enabled to ascend the hierarchy of being. The soul thus exhibits different degrees of reason as it comes progressively to
apprehend ever 'higher' aspects of being. It sees sensible things as the effects of God, in which he is still present; contemplates
God as active in the soul in both its natural operations and when 'elevated' by grace; and finally contemplates God as the Good
and ultimate Being the limits of knowledge beyond which there is only mystical experience [d].

ETHICS
[7] [See, for example, Sentences II, 25 & 28; III, 33.] As one might expect, Bonaventura's ethics were Christian and firmly
grounded in the Augustinian tradition. Morally virtuous actions are actions directed towards the cardinal virtues of wisdom,
fortitude, temperance, and justice but which are, as it were, transformed and exalted through His gifts of faith, hope, and
charity [a]. To bring about good ends requires the collaboration of the will and the subordinate intellect. Through i ntellectual
apprehension of first principles ('synderesis') and through conscience, which is informed by the practical intellect, the soul is
habituated to judge the fundamental principles according to which one should act [b] and which should conform to the law of
God. The will, which possesses natural 'affections' or inclinations towards ends, intends and initiates the actions required to bring
them about. It is the goodness of ends, that makes the will good, and correspondingly, the moral goodness of actions depends on
those right ends, that is, the motives or intentions of the agent. But because of the fallibility of the conscience and the limitations
of the will in the face of vacillating sensory impressions and bodily desires man requires divine illumination if he is to do
good [c]. Given this, and through habitual exercise of the practical intellect and the good will, the soul will gradually become
morally virtuous. Human imperfection is not considered by Bonaventura to be either good or evil: it is not good because it is not
itself some thing; it is not evil because it is not a privation of a good. Rather the imperfection arises from the nature of the human
condition [see ibid. II 7 and 34]. Evil acts result from a bad conscience one which is directed away from God. But man remains
free to respond to God's love [d].

CRITICAL SUMMARY
In Bonaventura we find the most complete expression of medieval Augustinianism which came to be regarded as one of the
two main traditions in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries (Thomism being the other). While a number of Aristotle's ideas are
accepted into his system, this is only to the extent that they are consistent with or reinforce his fundamentally Augustinian world
view. And, as one might expect, his philosophy as a whole is subordinated to what is revealed through faith by God's grace. For
example, as a result of the spread of Aristotelian philosophy and empirical science he found it necessary to take greater account of
the sensible world than some of his predecessors. He nevertheless regarded all created beings as 'exemplars' or manifestations of
God and as possessing both matter and form (even spiritual beings). Truth, knowledge of spiritual reality and of virtues, properly
speaking is to be attained only through the Divine Ideas the substantial soul finds within itself though he also allows sensible
knowledge as a result of abstraction by the individual soul. It was precisely this assimilation of the sensible world into the
theological that philosophers in the opposing Thomist tradition were to criticize. (And the doctrine of divine illumination raises a
further difficulty in that it is questionable whether God's intervention can be sufficient to overcome man's inherent imperfection
without undermining his freedom.). But Bonaventura held fast to the Augustinian heritage as, for example, in his acceptance of
a plurality of forms and seminal reasons. As a result his system lacks the unity of Aquinas's synthesis and tends to be dualistic as
regards the sensible and intelligible realms.

THOMAS AQUINAS (1225 1274) CHRISTIAN ARISTOTELIANISM/ THOMISM

Thomas (the 'Doctor Angelicus') was born near Naples in the castle of Rocasecca (owned by his father, the Count of Aquino). He
was educated first in the Monastery of Monte Cassino and then studied Liberal Arts at the University of Naples. Influenced there
by the Dominicans he joined the Order of Preachers in 1244, despite family opposition. He studied philosophy and theology at
Dominican schools in Paris and Cologne (where his teacher was Albertus Magnus) and then returned to Paris, gaining his
bachelor's degree in theology in 1252. While continuing advanced studies he lectured there and in Cologne. However, he did not
receive his Master of Theology (teaching) degree until 1257 because of the hostility of the Paris University authorities to the
mendicant orders. He was highly regarded by several popes, who sought his advice, but he refused the offer of the Archbishopric
of Naples in favour of the religious life. He spent ten years from 1259 preparing commentaries on Aristotle's works, teaching
again at Paris and becoming embroiled in several academic and administrative controversies. He lectured at Naples in 1272 and
became a member of the papal court. He died while on the way to attend the Council of Lyons where he would have defended the
use of Aristotle in theology.

Sources: A variety of texts are referred to in this Profile (see the Reading list), but the primary sources are Aquinas's major texts,
the Summa Theologiae and the Summa Contra Gentiles. The standard reference notation has been employed: I, II, etc. are the
numbers of the books within a work; 1, 2, 3, etc. are the chapters; 'q' refers to the 'questions', and 'a' to the 'articles'.

METAPHYSICS/ RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY

[1] [See especially Summary against the Gentiles, I, 4.] Philosophy for Aquinas enjoys a degree of autonomy relative to theology.
He distinguishes between divinely revealed truths, for example, the doctrine of the Trinity, which are the proper concern of the
dogmatic theologian, and non-revealed truths, which the philosopher examines by means of the "natural light of the reason". He
also accepts that some truths, for example, that God is the creator, are both given in revelation and determinable by reason and
thus falls within the purview of philosophy as 'natural' or 'philosophical' theology. However, for Aquinas human reason has its
limits: while it gives us knowledge [see sec. 6], there is much that it cannot grasp unaided about the nature of God and man's
supernatural purpose. Any rationally constructed metaphysical system without reference to revelation must therefore be
incomplete and imperfect. Philosophy is the 'handmaid' of theology: it is not incompatible with faith but complements it [a].
Nevertheless Aquinas stresses that man should make the fullest use of his reason, not only for the sake of acquiring knowledge
itself but also, more importantly, in so far as, in conjunction with the exercise of natural virtue, it will enable him to attain to a
degree of happiness, albeit imperfect, in this life.
Metaphysics is the 'First Philosophy', in the sense that it deals with what comes first in the 'real order' of things, namely Being as
such, manifested in sensible reality, unlike the various 'sciences' which study different kinds of beings. It is the quest for an
ultimate explanation of everything a first 'cause' or principle [b]. But what is meant by the term 'being'? To make this clear we
need to look at Aquinas's use of a number of technical terms.
(1) [Commentary on the Metaphysics, V, lect. 9, 1ff.] All particular things, whether spiritual or corporeal, are said to be beings,
that is, entities (entia) or existents. An entity (ens) is 'that which is' (quod est). Aquinas distinguishes between essential being (ens
per se) and coincidental being (ens per accidens). Entities possessing being in this first sense are individuals, that
is, substances (for example, Socrates), and real properties (accidents), such as qualities, quantities, relations, and so on (pale,
heavy, son of, for example) [ibid., V, 19; VII, 1; also Summa Theologia, I, q.29 a.2]. While paleness, heaviness, and so on,
although and inseparable from and dependent on a substance for their existence, are yet real existents in their own right [c],
nevertheless the being or state of affairs represented by, say, the complex 'Socrates is pale' is only coincidental. When we
predicate 'pale' of 'Socrates' we are saying the accident coincides in the existent subject. [See also Quodlibetal Questions, II.]
(2) Entities have essence (essentia). In Aquinas's early writings essence is that by which a thing is what it is. But later and more
generally he thinks of it as that which determines the nature or 'quiddity' ('whatness') of an entity, that which makes it a particular
kind of being [ibid; also On Being and Essence].
(3) He also uses the term 'esse'. Esse (existence or 'present actuality') is an 'act' of being (actus essendi) by which essence has
being [see also S.G., I, 22, 4]. Existence is to essence as form is to matter [sec. 2 below]. Esse and essentia are therefore distinct
but correlative (esse gives being to essentia, while essentia, we may say, limits esse), and are thus inseparable in individual
things. (Essences may not of course actually exist, though we can still grasp their nature intellectually. Thus we can understand
what is meant by a phoenix even though no such creature exists in reality. We can perhaps talk here of a mental existence. But he
rejects any notion of an essence having a prior existence in some kind of eternal Platonic realm ). Existence for Aquinas is an
'accident' in the sense that it is the actuality of any substance it is not an accident 'in itself' [Quodlib., II, a. 3] [d].
(4) Individual being is composed of actual and potential being [On Power I, l; see also Comm. Metaphys V, lectio 9,
13]. 'Actuality' and 'potentiality' relate to the degree to which an entity has been fully realized or fulfilled in accordance with its
nature. Actuality is thus prior to potentiality ontologically, in the sense that the becoming of a thing only makes sense with
reference to what it is to become (an acorn becomes an oak tree, for example). It follows that existence is superior to essence in so
far as actuality is superior to potentiality [e].
(5) Aquinas also uses the term 'esse' to express the truth of a proposition, as when we say 'it is true that Socrates exists' or 'it is a
fact that Socrates is pale' [Comm. Metaphys. V, lectio 9, 11-12]. The truth (which Aquinas calls esse ut verum) of such judgements
does, however, depend on what actually exists. Indeed true and existent, he says [On Truth q.1 a.2, 1], are 'convertible' terms. He
thinks of truth as a cognitive power (awareness) implicit in a relation of conformity of 'adequacy' (aedequatio) of a thought (as
individualization of a form in the intellect) to the individualization of the form in the world [f].
Essence, existence, truth, and beauty for Aquinas are essential attributes of being. He calls them transcendentals [On Truth, q.1
a.1 Whereas substance and the various accidents such as quality, quantity, and the like are categories which apply to particular
kinds of being, the transcendentals apply to all types or degrees of being. They are not predicates in that they are already
themselves attributes or principles of being. In addition to essence, existence, and truth Aquinas identifies other transcendentals:
one or unity (which is "undivided being"); distinctness, in so far as being in revealing itself as a something implies some other
thing; and the good, which Aquinas understands as the object of desire for all things and is manifested in a harmonious relation to
the will [g].
[2] Finite beings. [See Comm. Metaphysics, VIII lect. 2; also S.T. I q.66 aa. 1 & 2.] What makes an individual a human being, or
a particular thing red, heavy, and so on? According to Aquinas it is, respectively, a substantial and an accidental form. That feature
of a substance which is 'informed' is its 'prime matter'. It is the form which actualizes the matter as potentiality to give rise to the
individual thing. In the case of substances the (substantial) form and the matter together constitute its nature (hylomorphism): but
Aquinas confines hylomorphism to the corporeal world [a]. Prime matter cannot of course exist on its own without being
'informed': it is itself only potentiality to all forms. The matter is the principle of individuation [b]. Socrates and Plato are different
bits of matter but having the same human form which although formally identical in each person is nevertheless a distinct
individual in that it 'informs' a particular piece of matter. Aquinas also argues in favour of there being only one substantial form in
any substance. And he rejects any doctrine of potential forms of non-spiritual things ('seminal reasons', for example) as prior to
prime matter which in itself lacks act [c]. While form and matter are inseparable in the corporeal world, Aquinas says that
between the created and embodied souls of men and the uncreated infinite God there are immaterial, created but disembodied
pure forms angels, each of which is also uniquely specific (there being no matter to individuate them).
Aquinas identifies several different kinds of change. We can talk of a change of position in space. Of more interest, however,
are changes of accidents and changes of substance [d]. The change of colour of a leaf in autumn from green to red is an example
of the former. In such cases we have an enduring individual substance losing one accident but acquiring another. Changes of
substance occur when a given 'piece' of matter takes on a different substantial form. Consider a tree. When the tree dies the matter
remains but is redistributed and becomes the material of other substances air, plants growing in the soul, animals, and so on. As
for angels, although they are immaterial they still have the capacity for non-substantial change.
Individual beings and events in general have the tendency to move from possibility to actuality. Aquinas talks here of such
potentiality as active, having existence in the subject, and as 'first actuality'. (This is to be contrasted with potentiality as 'second
actuality' [e], which is a potentiality arising out of and dependent on the functioning of the former. Socrates's potentiality to
commit suicide by drinking hemlock would be an example.) The transition from possibility to actuality is closely connected with
Aquinas's account of causation [See On the Principles of Nature and On Causes.] The matter a thing is made out of is the material
cause(or 'causal factor'). That which makes the thing what it is, gives it its characteristic shape and nature, is the formal cause.
The efficient cause is the agency which brings about a change (turning a lump of stone into a piece of sculpture, for example).
Lastly, there is the final cause. This is the goal or end (telos) towards which an action is directed, its function or purpose (the
sculptor has it in mind to produce this particular work of art). The actuality, we may say, is the 'goal' or purpose of the
potentiality [f]. The end is finality of being.
[3] The nature of God. [See especially S.G., I 13.]. All finite things are beings and have being. God, however, as infinite is not a
being but is absolute transcendent Being, separate from His creation. In God alone existence is included in essence. His nature is
'act itself' (ipsum esse); it belongs to His essence to be. He is also the eternal, free, 'necessary being', the ultimate final and formal
cause. And in so far as he is a simple being there are no distinctions in him as between intellect and will [a]. This raises problems
about the relationship of finite beings to God and of the meaning of finite 'being' to infinite 'Being'. As to the former Aquinas
appeals to the concept of participation [see. for example, S.T. I 44, 1; S.G., I 22, 9; also Comm. on Boethius's De Hebdomadibus,
2]. All finite beings participate in existence in general (esse commune) to varying degrees according to their place in the
'hierarchy of being'. Esse commune participates in the divine existence or Being ('subsistent existence' esse subsistens), who
contains within Himself and knows the divine ideas, that is, His ideas of all things he has created. In so far as these ideas, as
'exemplary forms', share in the diivine essence they are not distinct from each other. Plurality lies in God's knowledge of them
(considered as rationes) [b]. Aquinas avoids pantheism, because whereas God is Being, finite created things are not; they only
'have' it in the sense that they are actualized within the limits imposed by their essentiae. It follows that 'Being' (and its
transcendental attributes) as applied to God is neither a univocal nor an equivocal term. Rather, for Aquinas, it is
used analogously. [See On Truth, q.2 a.11 and S.T. I q.13, aa.1-6 & 12; S.G. I 34] [c]. He argues that when we apply the term
'being' or some other quality both to God and to a finite being we are not using them in the same sense, but neither are the senses
totally different. To illustrate analogical usage he gives the example of the sun's heat. We call hot both the sun itself and the heat
generated by it. He in fact distinguishes between what he calls 'Analogy of Proportionality' and the 'Analogy of Attribution'. By
means of the first we move from a statement about the way in which the qualities of a created being are related to its nature to a
statement about how the attributes of uncreated Being (God) are related to its nature. This involves an extrapolation of a
relationship from finite being to infinite Being. The difficulty here, Aquinas recognises, is that this does not tell us anything about
what God is actually like. So it is necessary to extend the analogy by attributing to God properties experienced in ourselves. Thus
we may talk of human wisdom or fatherhood and then apply these terms to the relationship we say obtains between us and God.
This presupposes for Aquinas that there is a relation of causal dependence between creature and creator. Indeed the concept of
causality is central to his proofs for God's existence.
Aquinas rejected Anselm's proofs on the grounds that he had moved illegitimately from the realm of concepts or thought to the
realm of being [d]. He supposed instead that the existence of God as the ultimate final cause could be demonstrated by natural
reason, starting from our experience of the existing real world [e]. His arguments are called the Five Ways [On Power, III
5c; S.G., I 13; S.T. I q. 2, a.3.]
(1) The argument from motion or change (efficient causation). We observe change everywhere. This has to be explained, that is,
we must find a cause which possesses the 'perfection' (property, characteristic) to pass on to the thing which is changed (the
effect). A thing cannot change itself; it cannot at the same time both possess and gain a property. So motion has to be produced by
something else. But there cannot be an infinite chain of "intermediate causes". So there has to be an unchanged First Cause,
namely, God; otherwise there would be no change to impart.
(2) The argument from causation in general. This is similar to the first argument. The fact that there is causation in general in the
world requires a First uncaused Cause again because of the impossibility of an unending chain.
(3) The argument from contingency (possibility) and necessity. Many things we observe in Nature are generated and decay, cease
to be. Their existence is contingent and not necessary [e]. If all things were like this, there would have been a time when nothing
existed, in which case there would be nothing existing now. So something must exist of a necessity which it has of itself and does
not get from something else. Otherwise, once again, there would be an infinite regress.
Aquinas says God created the world freely in time out of nothing as a direct manifestation of His Goodness. He does not in fact
deny that the world may in fact be eternal, but he says it cannot be proved philosophically one way or the other, though he rejects
it as a matter of faith [see S.T. I q.10, aa.1,4; On Power, III 17]. And it seems that, while the first three 'proofs' are based on the
alleged impossibility of an infinite sequence of contingent causes, there would be no contradiction in asserting both that the world
is eternal and that there can be no infinite series of causes. We may conceive of the possibility that series of dependentevents (for
example, one's existence by virtue of one's parents, and their parents before them, and so on) may be endless, but we still have to
account for the existence of that total infinite series [f]; and, for Aquinas, an explanation in the strict sense requires a first
principle which brings about change but is itself unchanged. This is God, the prime unmoved mover not in a temporal sense
but in the ontological order.
(4) The argument from the gradation of things [g]. Some things, Aquinas says, are more good, more true, and so on than others.
Comparative states require there to be superlative states, that is, there must be a best, a truest, and so on, which act as standards
for all things in the hierarchy. There must therefore be an ultimate being in which all these absolutes are combined. This is the
One or God.
(5) The teleological argument [h]. We can see in the activity of all natural things and processes an end or purpose, whether or not
they have awareness. Those that lack awareness, however, are directed by beings that are aware, that possess a mind. Ultimately
there must be a single intelligence which directs all things, in other words God.
[4] Evil, human freedom, and God's providence [S.G., III 10 and 97-8; On Evil, III 1-2, and VI; On Evil, VI; S.T. I q.83 a.1 and
q.103 aa. 7-8; see also Comm. on Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias, lect. 14]. Now if God has created and directs all things, how can we
account for the presence of evil? Is this compatible with His omniscience and omnipotence? The world as God's creation is
necessarily good. But as God's goodness and power are infinite we can certainly conceive of his being able to create a better
world, that is, one from which certain kinds situations or events had been omitted. So why did he not do so? According to Aquinas
we finite beings cannot know what lay behind God's decision to create as he did. However, while recognising evil as real Aquinas
says it is a privation, in the sense that it is an absence or deficiency of goodness in human nature, but that this is a consequence of
man's free choice. God knows all future events by virtue of their being coexistent in eternity and thus foresees human actions. To
that extent they might be supposed to be predetermined. However, although in that sense necessitated, man's actions remain
contingently free considered from the temporal standpoint, and for the sake of that freedom and its proper use to love him and
to do His will God permits even evil actions. As for physical or natural evil, this is a necessary consequence of the existence of
sentient creatures living in a dynamic changing universe [a]. Aquinas seems in effect to be saying that only in a static universe
could there be no earthquakes, disease, and so on. The universe as a whole is good. Moreover, man's suffering can be borne with
God's assistance.

PSYCHOLOGY
[5] [S.T. I qq.75-90; On the Soul, I; S.G., II 58-90; Comm. on Aristotle's 'Peri Psuche'; On Truth, q.8 a.6.] Plants can grow, take in
food, reproduce. This is because they have a vegetative principle or 'soul'. Animals have a sensitive 'soul' which allows them,
additionally, to perceive, feel, and move around. But man not only can do all these things but also has distinct intellectual and
volitional faculties by virtue of his possession of a rational soul. Nevertheless this is single and unitary [a] assimilating the
vegetative and sensitive functions. The faculties or powers are subdivided and analysed in some detail by Aquinas. Thus, he
distinguishes at the sensory level five external functions (sight, hearing, taste, smell, and touch); four internal functions: 'common
sense' (which involves the grasping in perception of the whole object), imagination, memory, and particular 'cogitations' of
individual things; and two sensory appetites comprising respectively six 'concupiscible' and five 'irascible' appetites the former
(for example, love, hate) being tendencies towards or away from what is felt to be good or evil; the latter (for example, fear,
anger) tendencies to meet perceived danger by attack, retreat, or acceptance. At the cognitive level the intellect (or
understanding), which is responsible for apprehending, judging, and reasoning about 'universals', is divided into the active
intellect and the passive intellect [On Truth, q.10 aa.4-6; S.T. I q.84 aa.1 & 6, and q.86 a.1]. These are not separate intellects but
rather different functions of the one intellect in the individual soul [b]. Aquinas also identifies intellectual appetites, which are
either (i) natural tendencies to approve of, for example, justice, and which are adjudged as good without qualification; or (ii)
willed movements towards or away from things which are judged to be partly desirable or undesirable. The deliberating will for
Aquinas is subordinate to intellect [c]; and he says that while man necessarily wills the end of his actions (happiness) he has free
will in that he can choose the means to that end. Despite the language of 'powers' or 'faculties' Aquinas stresses that it is the whole
man, the animated or 'ensouled' body which thinks, acts, desires, perceives, and knows [d]. But in so far as the rational soul has
the capacity to know bodies in general (unlike, say, vision and hearing, which are dependent on a particular sense organ) it must,
he says, be immaterial and spiritual, a single 'subsistent form' of the body, and therefore is incorruptible. It follows that it
possesses personal immortality [On the Soul, 14; S.T. I q.75 a.6] for which man has a natural desire, but he does not believe the
survival of the human person can be established by philosophical argument [e]. (A resurrected body is also required if the
immortal soul is to realise its capacity to inform the body after the latter's death: but again acceptance of this is a matter of faith.)
Accordingly he argues against the idea of a single universal human agent intellect (monopsychism) [f], as this would be
inconsistent with the survival of individual thinking souls.

KNOWLEDGE
[6] [S.T. I qq.79-85; On Truth, q.10. aa.4-6.] For Aquinas the human intellect has as its primary object essences of being in
material things [S.T. I, q.12. a.4] [a]; and knowledge is an activity of the ensouled body as a whole [a]. But he says the rational
soul cannot be affected directly by material things. So how does he account for knowledge? He distinguishes three operations of
the intellect. The first is simple apprehension(intelligentia indivisibilium 'understanding of non-complex things'), an abstractive
capacity by means of which it can form or grasp the 'essences', that is, common features of things. The second
is judgement(compositio et divisio 'putting together and dividing'). This involves the attributing of properties to things and
gives rise to propositions bearers of truth or falsity. Lastly he talks of reasoning (ratiocinatio). Here the mind structures
syllogistically the propositions obtained by means of the second operation and attains either certain or probable
conclusions. Complete and certain 'seeing' of the truth of something, which includes both conceptualization and judgement,
constitutes knowledge (scientia). 'Cognition' which is the result of non-demonstrative dialectical or probable reasoning constitutes
'opinion'. (Faith, like scientia and in contrast to opinion or belief requires an 'assent' to its object but differs from knowledge
in that the will is required to effect the assent because the truth of the object is not adequately 'seen' by the intellect) [b].
All knowledge is grounded in sense-experience and derivative memory images: "there is nothing in the intellect which was not
first in the senses" [S.T. I q.1. a.9]. The exterior senses (sight, hearing, and so on) are concerned with the perceiver's own body.
Corporeal objects in general are the proper object of the interior senses the 'common sense' and the imagination through
which 'phantasms' (perceptions, images, memories), representing external objects, arise [c]. The 'active' or agent
intellect 'illuminates' (metaphorically speaking) the phantasms in the passive intellect and then abstracts from them what Aquinas
calls 'intelligible species'. (The human intellect having its own 'natural light', Aquinas has no need of a divine illumination to
obtain certain knowledge n though this light may perhaps be conceived of as a vestige or remnant of the divine.) The intelligible
species are, as it were, formal 'likenesses', which are potentially universal aspects of the phantasms [S.T. I q.85 a.1], and are non-
material as is the intellect. "Whatever is received is received after the manner in which the recipient exists" [On Truth, q. 10,
a.4]. What he means is that the cognising soul is 'assimilated' to the cognised object in so far as the object's particular form enters
the soul as a universal intelligible species. [See ibid., aa. 4, 5; and, for example, ST I q.17, a. 3; q.75, a.5.] As objects of thought
they are said to have 'intentional existence' (esse intentionale) [d]. Presented to the 'passive' intellect as species impressa
Aquinas talks of the agent intellect as 'turning' (conversio) towards the phantasms [S.T. I q. 83, a.1] the universal elements
become species expressa or universal concepts. These concepts, which have real existence only in so far as they are individuated
in natural things [On the Soul, aa.l & 2] are the means whereby the forms of material objects are cognised by the
intellect. Knowledge for Aquinas is thus of particulars, although it is indirect, being gained through knowledge of the
universals (forms, essences) in them. Moreover, this latter knowledge is of universals as the formal element in the particulars. In
so far as universals do not exist apart from particulars they are not in themselves proper objects of knowledge; and considered as
'abstracted' ideas they are known only in a secondary sense. They are, however, real in so far as they are grounded in extramental
being; and in this respect Aquinas is a 'moderate realist' [e]. It follows from his account that he rejects innate ideas except in the
trivial sense that the human mind has the capacity for abstraction and formation of concepts [f]. Likewise the soul can have no
knowledge of itself except in its acts of abstracting intelligible species. Knowledge for Aquinas is thus ultimately dependent on
sense-perception as converted into phantasms. Nevertheless he makes it clear that while in this life the mind needs the body as its
natural object, it is capable of being active qua mind even when separate from the body, and indeed it can then know itself and
other souls perfectly [g].
[7] Knowledge of God [Comm. on Boethius's De Trinitate, q.6 a.3; S.T. I, qq.86-8; S.G. I 14.] Granted that God's existence can be
proved, can we know anything of His nature? If, as Aquinas says, knowledge is ultimately dependent on sense-experience, does
this mean we can have no knowledge of God (or of other non-corporeal beings) at least in this life? His answer is that it is
particular material things which are approached through the senses; the rational soul is directed towards Being in general. And
although while embodied it cannot know non-corporeal beings directly it does have imperfect analogical knowledge revealed
through sensory experience. He identifies both an affirmative way (per excessum) and a negative way (per remotionem) [a]. The
former involves attributing to God without limit properties possessed by a finite being. However, in so far as God cannot be
directly known we may also say He possesses various properties a finite being has, but not to a lesser degree. This is the negative
approach. Aquinas seems to advocate the use of both ways. [See also sec. 3 above.]

ETHICS
[8] [See, for example, Comm. on Aristotle's Ethics, 9-10; S.T. I-ii qq.18-20, 55-6, 90-4; S.G., III 114-38.] All acts of a rational
human being, when done deliberately and freely, are directed to the attainment of some end perceived as good, such as wealth,
knowledge, pleasure. But none of these 'goods' fully satisfies the human will. According to Aquinas there is only one final end
which can give man 'well-being', or 'happiness' (felicitas), namely, the universal good, which he identifies with God. To do good
and avoid evil is the fundamental principle of practical reasoning and is intuited intellectually by means of the quality of
'synderesis' [a]. To achieve this end one's actions must be morally good, and this requires three factors to be taken into account: (i)
[S.T. I-ii q.18 a.2] their objective must be 'fitting' and agree with "the reasonable order of life" (just as the basic goodness of a
natural thing is provided by its specific form which makes it the kind of thing it is); (ii) [ibid., a.8] 'special circumstances'
these are comparable to the qualities which characterize the specific nature given to man by his substantial form; (iii) [ ibid. aa.4 &
6] the end (finis operantis), that is the motive or agent's intention, intended by the will. This formally specifies the act pointing to
its objective (its purpose, finis operis). The test of the moral goodness or rightness of an action is the mean, to achieve which one
must avoid excess or defect. What constitutes a mean in a given situation will depend on the circumstances and motives or
intentions. Chastity, for example, when pursued for selfish reasons (for example, self-aggrandisement), might seem to be a defect
(licentiousness being the corresponding excess): but if undertaken, say, for the love of God it is a mean. By adhering to the mean
a man will acquire the moral virtues, which when combined with the intellectual virtues of understanding and prudence will
develop practical judgement, that is, moral conscience [b] "a sort of dictate of reason... application of knowledge to action"
[S.T. I-ii q.19 a.5] and this will enable him to live rightly. To perceive the mean presupposes conformity to the 'order of reason' as
manifested in the natural law which is grounded in human nature and is concerned with guiding man towards the achieving of his
natural end, that is, his 'intellectual form' (his final and all-embracing value). This end is reasonable and good in so far as it agrees
with reason which is directing the will towards it. But Aquinas allows that some actions (for example, taking a walk) may involve
nothing at all related to reason, as contrasted with, say, almsgiving which is by definition good in so far as it is agreeable to
reason. They are therefore morally 'neutral' [ibid. q.18 a.8]. (Natural law is contrasted with divine positive law, which is
concerned with man's supernatural end, and God's eternal law, which orders the universe as a whole [S.T. I-ii qq.90ff.] ). Natural
moral law, Aquinas says, depends not on God's will but on the divine reason or essence in so far as God sees the law of human
nature in the eternal idea of man he possesses within himself; and thus it is in general not open to alteration [c]. What exactly is
the universal good and in what sense is it God? Man, says Aquinas, has a natural desire for God which can be realized only in a
'beatific vision' of him. To have knowledge of God's essence is of course not possible through philosophical demonstration; and
the knowledge implicit in 'vision' is more than can even be revealed to us through faith. To achieve it supernatural grace is
required. [See Comm. on Peter Lombard's Sentences, Book 4, 49.]. However, he wished to keep moral theology (and faith)
separate from philosophy (and reason). [On the problem of evil see sec. 4.]
[9] [See, for example, ST I q.81, 2 & 3; II q.77 a2; I-ii qq.22-48.] If morality and the achieving of happiness by aiming at the
universal good is a matter of reason and knowledge, how does Aquinas account for weakness of will? How is it that a man might
perceive what is properly good for him and yet act in a way contrary to his best interests? Aquinas distinguishes between
involuntary actions such as those in which one reacts instinctively out off, say, fear, and voluntary actions where one is rationally
aware of ends and the means required to realize them. The problem of weakness applies essentially to the latter. In such cases the
reason of the 'incontinent' man is hindered or obscured by passion and therefore fails to direct the will in the manner appropriate
for the achieving of the right end [a]. Reason must therefore seek to harness the 'irascible' appetites inclinations which assist us
to overcome whatever inhibits our 'concupisciple' appetites (inclinations to seek what is appropriate or to avoid what is harmful).
Proper exercise of the will thus presupposes cultivation of the reason reinforced by the exercise of moderation in one's actions in
the light of natural law.

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
[10] [Especially On the Governance of Rulers and S.T. I-ii passim.] Man is by nature a social and political animal as is evident
from his possession of language. However, he also needs society to provide a framework in which individual talents can be
developed and the virtuous life achieved. Now, given the egocentric tendencies of many people, a society needs to be ordered and
controlled by a wise government (just as the soul controls the passions and appetites). In so far as human nature was created by
God, government is ultimately justified by Him; and the ideal governance would be one which provides for the needs of its
citizens, secures peace and order in the interest of the common good. This would be a perfect society. Nevertheless, says
Aquinas, even such a society must be subordinated to the authority of the Church in matters spiritual or supernatural [a]. This is
because man's natural end cannot be achieved without God's grace. The role of the legislator is to define and apply the natural law
to specific concrete situations, and thereby to enact human positive law which regulates the social behaviour of the people. Laws
which are unjust, in that they are not derived from natural law, may be disobeyed in conscience. But it can never be right to
disobey just laws, or laws which run counter to the divine eternal law [b] (revealed through Christ). There are of course many
possible kinds of government. Aquinas identifies three good types (law-abiding democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy), and three
bad ones ('demagogic' democracy, oligarchy, and tyranny). He says monarchy is the most 'natural' in that it involves the rule of
one over many (as God rules over his creation). But a wise monarch is not readily found; and Aquinas thinks that in practice a
'mixed' constitution (similar to Aristotle's 'polity') combining the best features of democracy and aristocracy is preferable [c].

AESTHETICS
[11] Beauty for Aquinas exists objectively in things in so far as they reflect or participate in the absolute beauty (pulchritudo) of
God [a] [Commentary on the Divine Names IV, 5-6]. Like Truth it is a transcendental attribute of Being [a]. We have a
'disinterested apprehension' of the beauty in things through our cognitive perception; and we see it as an object of pleasure
[ST 1a.q.5.a.4] (just as good is seen as the object of desire). But he argues that the 'delight' we experience in the beautiful is
different from that evinced by truth or goodness in that it is a characteristic of the whole person. Beauty, as formal cause (as
contrasted with the good as final cause), is characterized by (a) 'proper proportion', that is, harmony, (b) 'integrity' or perfection,
and (c) 'clarity' or brilliance [1a.q.39.a.8] [b]. As for art, Aquinas says this is a 'habit' an application of the intellect to practical
action, and involves "right reason in making things" (just as in ethics it is a matter of exercising one's right reason in doing
things). The function of art is to imitate nature, because nature is the reflection of God's intellect [c].

CRITICAL SUMMARY
Generally regarded as the greatest medieval thinker, Aquinas covered a vast range of philosophical issues, and his thought is
notable for its depth, acuity, judicious balance and consistency. He drew on Neoplatonic elements, but his philosophy is
thoroughly Aristotelian the power of the Greek philosopher's writings being appropriated in support of Christian theology.
Three significant features may be singled out.
(1) The separation of faith and reason. While Aquinas regarded philosophy developed through reason alone as incomplete without
revelation, with him reason achieved autonomy not only in philosophy but also in natural theology.
(2) The emphasis on sense experience and the natural world rather than on an 'inner light' and the supernatural world, and on
individuality rather than the universal, as the starting-point for knowledge. This is reflected in particular in (a) Aquinas's
recognition of the parallelism between essence and existence, potency and act, and matter and form in individuals. The individual
is no longer a reflection of the universal but is regarded as a composite entity in its own right. Aquinas thus claims to have solved
what were perceived to be a number of problems in Plato's metaphysics. Being and becoming are understood in terms of act and
potentiality. Form actualizes matter; matter is the individuating principle. Universals are real but exist only in individual things;
and the individual does not contain a plurality of forms. Moreover, the soul is now the form of the body, although it remains
dependent on matter. The centrality of individuality is seen also in (b) Aquinas's ethics. The will is subordinated to the intellect.
Emphasis is therefore placed on the individual's deliberation and choice rather than on a will 'primed' by divine grace.
(3) His notions of metaphysical 'participation' and analogical predication of being, which is neither equivocal nor univocal, and
his attempt to blend Platonic and Aristotelian traditions in his approach to the divine ideas should also be noted as making an
important contribution to the debate concerning the relationship of created beings to God.
Aquinas's assumptions and approach do of course lay his system open to objections. Augustinians criticized him for breaking the
direct connection between God and his creatures. Knowledge is now to be acquired not through divine illumination but through
abstraction by the active intellect. God is no longer to be known directly; knowledge through analogy is imperfect. Moreover, in
his rejection of the ontological argument Aquinas will not allow a transition from the 'idea' to the 'real'. His own 'Five Ways' for
proving God's existence, all of which are a posteriori and start from sense experience, can themselves be criticized for at best
only establishing the existence of a first cause prime mover, not of a personal God. These arguments are in any case questionable.
Given that contingent beings are those which can cease to be, is there a necessary being at all? While he allows that an infinite
series of dependent causes may be possible (though not philosophically provable), it remains an open question whether such a
putative series itself requires a prime mover or first cause. And would such a first cause have to possess the divine qualities
demanded by Aquinas? His accounts of the relation between faith and reason and of the scope of metaphysics were also to be
challenged later by Duns Scotus and Ockham. Nevertheless, once the ecclesiastical authorities had overcome their reservations
and were satisfied that Aquinas's use of the new Aristotelian scholarship did not lead to 'false' teaching, 'Thomism' became the
'official' philosophy of the Catholic Church despite a rearguard action by the Augustinians. And in recent years there has been
a renewed interest in his metaphysics, theory of knowledge, and philosophy of mind among many philosophers who owe no
allegiance to the Church and indeed are in some case non-theists. As for his ethics, this exhibits the strengths and weaknesses of
Aristotle's moral philosophy. But whether Aquinas's relocation of Aristotle's ethics in an explicitly Christian framework results in
an improvement on the Greek master, or whether the numerous philosophical problems that arise (concerning, say the existence of
God, or the possibility of a 'natural' law) make it less easy to defend Aquinas's ethical system, remain open questions.

HENRY OF GHENT(c. 1230 (?) 1293)

MODIFIED AUGUSTINIANISM
Henry, known as the 'Exalted Teacher' (Doctor Solemnis) was born at Ghent, and probably studied at Paris. He was appointed
Canon of Tournai and in 1276 Archdeacon of Bruges, which post he combined with teaching in the faculties of arts and theology
at Paris. Although not a member of the Order, he was chosen by the Servites as their official theologian.

METAPHYSICS/ RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY

[1] [See Argument, III, 9; VII; IX.] According to Henry, metaphysics involves a search for 'intelligible essences' implicit in the
concept of being, which he regards as the starting point. He distinguishes between imaginary being and extramental being. Ideas
composing the former can never exist outside the mind because they are intrinsically incoherent or impossible (for example,
round square, golden mountain) [ibid. IV, 7, I]. Extramental being, however, is real being (esse essentiae), and this is either
possible or actual existence; the latter therefore also possesses esse existentiae [a]. Henry emphasizes the primacy of essence over
existence. Nevertheless he denies that the supposed distinction between essence and individual existence is a real or logical
distinction but says it relates to what he calls different 'intentions' (intentiones) [b] and ultimately to the way they relate to
God. Existence is not to be understood in terms of some actualization of potential matter through form. Matter itself is created by
and has its idea in God [c]. All actual existing essences are exemplata of the ideal exemplars or Divine Ideas which exist in and
are known by Him [d]. God is infinite, transcends all limitations, and is totally free in what He might do: His free will has
primacy over the intellect [e]. The existence of created beings is therefore not necessary. Actually existing things, although effects
of God's causative or creative power and 'outside' God are still dependent on Him [ibid., X, 7; Compendium, XXI, 4, x] [f].
Being for Henry is neither an equivocal nor a univocal concept though he does distinguish between God as necessary being
and 'negatively indeterminate' and his creatures as contingent being and 'privately indeterminate'. However, he thinks of the
relation of God's Being to the being of His creatures in analogical terms [see Compendium XXI, 2, vi and viii; XXIV, 8,
vi] [g]. Similarly creatures are by analogy divided into substances and accidents. Substances exist in themselves and are not
dependent on any other thing. Of these only man may be said to possess form as well as matter: but although Henry admitted a
plurality of forms in man, his view varied as to whether there is in man not only a single substantial form (humanity) but also a
corporeal form (his later position) [h]. What gives a thing its individuality is neither its matter nor its form alone (both of which
are essences at different stages of perfection and which join to make the unitary individual) but its actual extramental existence.
This lacks any internal division and makes the thing distinct from other things in relation to God, to whom they are known
as numerically distinguishable only through their essence. Henry calls the individual understood in this way a 'double
negation' [i] in the sense that it removes all differences and plurality from within and all identity from without. [See, for
example, Argument II, 1; V, 8.]
Henry's main argument for the existence of God is a priori and starts from the idea of uncreated being as greatest perfection
which he identified with necessary Being whose existence and essence are necessarily identical [for
example, Compendium XXIV, 6, vii] [j]. But he also used lesser arguments from experience of the physical world [j], though
he said that they can tell us nothing about God's nature (such as His unicity and indivisibility) and do not demonstrate His
necessity; to demonstrate these metaphysical proofs are required.

KNOWLEDGE
[2] For Henry there is a difference between knowing that something is true and knowing its truth. In the case of the former we can
have knowledge of particulars through sense-perception and knowledge of universals (intelligible species) through the intellect by
means of abstraction [a]. But knowledge of the truth as such, that is, the relation of a thing to God as eternal and unchanging
Truth, requires divine illumination, which enables us to see the divine Ideas [Compendium I, 11]. (In this respect God is thus
understood as Active Intellect.) [b]. The ideas of necessity and being (of God and his creatures) are innate, not imposed from
outside. Henry means by this that they are formed by the mind from itself on the occasion of experience, and thus are implicit in
it [c] not that they are in the mind prior to experience, or are derived from it. He also considers that the human intellect, like
God's, is subordinate to the self-determining will [Argument III, 17] [d].

CRITICAL SUMMARY
Henry was an independently minded thinker who, while appreciating the difficulties with Augustinianism, was unwilling to take
on board uncritically the Aristotelianism of the Thomist synthesis. He is perhaps best seen as creating a comprehensive
metaphysical response to meet the challenges posed to the Augustinian tradition (and supposedly to theological orthodoxy) by the
new thinking. How he should be viewed philosophically depends on one's standpoint. Thomists of the day might have regarded
his thinking as reactionary or retrogressive. A more positive approach would be to view his philosophy as radical and subtle
perhaps as a precursor of Duns Scotus (who was a constructive critic of many of his ideas). Of particular interest, and deserving
of close examination, are his 'intentional' distinction between esse essentiae and esse existentiae both real but the later being
additionally 'actualized'; his notion of individuation as 'double negation'; and his acceptance of a double source of knowledge
through abstraction and divine illumination. However, it has been suggested that the many diverse elements in his thought have
not been sufficiently worked into a coherent unity.

DUNS SCOTUS(c. 1266 1308)

'SCOTISM'
Born at Maxton, Roxburghshire (Scotland), John Duns Scotus was ordained in the Franciscan Order in 1291 and then studied at
Oxford and Paris (1293-96). After lecturing at Oxford he returned to Paris in 1302 only to be banished a year later for favouring
the Pope against the King. But he was soon back and received his doctorate in theology in 1305. He later taught at Cologne,
where he died. He was given the title 'Doctor Subtilis' (Subtle Doctor) because of his dialectical skill.

METAPHYSICS/ RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY

[1] For Scotus metaphysics and theology are distinct and have their own particular concerns the former with being (ens) and its
attributes, the latter with God [see, for example, Free Questions, 3 and 7, and Opus oxon. I and II]. He thinks of being as an
essentially indefinable concept of that in whose existence there is no contradiction; and this applies to being in all its modes
including God, individual created things, and concepts. Metaphysics, however, cannot attain to an understanding of the true nature
of being as such, as reason is limited and deals with the natural order and sense experience. Theology on the other hand is not
understood as a 'science'; it is grounded in revelation which is the concern of faith, and the 'knowledge' it provides us with can
only be 'practical' [ibid., Prologue 4, 31]. It follows that while we can apprehend Godthrough this central notion of being, beyond
this we can know nothing about Him [a].
For Scotus all features of the world that pass beyond the physical (and which are not included in Aristotle's categories)
are transcendentals. He distinguishes between finite beings (creatures) and infinite being (God); being is common to both. He
distinguishes further between 'convertible' attributes (passiones convertibiles) and 'disjunctive' attributes (passiones
disiunctae) [see, for example, ibid. I, 3, qq.ii and iii, and 8, q.iii]. The first includes notions such as true, good, one, which are
interchangeable with being in that there is no real distinction between them, only a formal one [see sec. 2]. The 'pure' perfections
of God, such as omnipotence, wisdom, and free-will, in whose definitions there are no limitations when applied to him, are also
convertible attributes. The second, however, covers such concepts as necessity and contingency, and potentiality and actuality,
which are not interchangeable with being if they are considered separately. Thus some beings are necessary and some contingent.
All beings must of course be one or the other. Scotus says we can move from finite disjunctive attributes to infinite being, but not
the other way round; a necessary existence does not entail a contingent one [b]. The deduction from potentiality to actuality or
from contingency to actuality, according to Scotus, presupposes that 'being' is a univocal concept (he rejects the analogical
account). By this he means that the concept, although applicable to different types of being, always has the same sense
referring to a universal nature. Thus it would be contradictory to say that God is being but that His creatures are not. God is of
course being in a different way, but He and His creatures must have something sufficiently in common to allow a valid deduction
from the existence of an attribute possessed by finite being to its predication of the infinite being God in a perfect sense.
Univocity is thus clearly essential to underpin Scotus's metaphysics [ibid.]. The univocal concept of being as such, abstracted
from individual beings (it is the ultimate abstraction), is a logical concept. Considered as signifying other signs and not things
(called intentio secunda in medieval logic), it has only a formal mental existence as ens rationis). And although grounded in
reality, having objective reference (when it is considered as intentio prima, as signifying things), there is no actual extramentally
existent thing which, while corresponding to the universal concept, is separate from it [see, for example, ibid. II, 3, q.i] [c]. Scotus
therefore (arguably) tends to the view that our 'subjective' mental and linguistic structures, while referring to the 'objective' realm,
condition the way we experience the being of nature (ens naturae) [d]. Perhaps we can say then that beings are 'subjectively
objective'. Underlying this position is the important idea of intentionality ('intentional inexistence'): all things are to be understood
as the referred objects of mental acts of understanding [e].
[2] Another important idea in his metaphysics is that of an 'objective formal distinction' which is more objective than a virtual or
mental distinction but is yet in some sense less than the real distinction [a]. He calls this distinctio formalis a parte rei ('formal
distinction on the side of/ in respect of the thing') [ibid. I, 35 and 36; also IV, 13]. Thus, while he regards essence and existence as
distinguishable, they are nevertheless inseparable, in that 'existence' applies strictly to essences of individual things, which have
been actualized from the Ideas in God (and which exist qua known) [b]. In the same way he distinguishes between the physical
nature of an object and its 'thisness'. (haecceitas) [II, 3]. What he means by these terms can be explained as follows. [See ibid. II,
3; Metaphysics V, 1 and 2.] An individual or 'composite' thing is made up of matter and its determining form or essence
(its haecceitas) [c], as well as other forms he thus accepted the plurality of forms, matter too having its own form of
corporeity [d] albeit imperfect by comparison with the soul, as well as the capacity of matter to receive other forms when
substantial change occurs [see, for example, Comms IV, 11, iii]. And while he accepted the doctrine of hylomorphism, it is
doubtful that he should be understood as intending to extend this beyond corporeal beings [Opus oxon. II, 12, q.i] [e]. Matter,
however, is not a mere potentiality; if God so willed, it could exist on its own, separate from forms [ibid. II, 12, qq.i and ii] [f].
Indeed matter must exist to receive forms, and it must underlie substantial change. Scotus says that although not a form it is 'in
act'. But he argues that matter is not the principle of individuation. If it were, then in a change of substance that which is produced
and that from which it originates would be identical, despite a difference in form [ibid. II, 3, qq.v and vi]. What makes, say,
Socrates that individual thing is his 'thisness', whereas his 'humanity' is attributed to his nature. Yet his haecceitas and his nature
are not really separable, though they are distinguishable in so far as we can abstract the nature as a universal . But Scotus denies
that the nature of, for example, 'humanity', common to Socrates and other human beings, is numerically identical in them
all. Universals actually exist in the intellect, but are common only in the sense that they refer to 'natures' which are, however,
unique to each individual. The distinction between an individual's nature and its 'thisness' is an 'objective formal' one [g]. He also
rejected the theory of 'seminal reasons' [h] on the grounds that change can be accounted for by the causal activity of created
efficient agents themselves [Reports II, 18, 1].
[3] As for his treatment of God, while He is strictly the proper object of theology, Scotus allows that His existence can be
proved [see especially Op. ox., II, 2]; and he offers a number of arguments. He accepts the ontological argument, although he first
'colours' it to show there is no contradiction in the idea that God is the most perfect being and is thus possible [see, for
example, Comms Prologue 4; Reports, Prologue]. In general he appeals to a posteriori proofs from God's effects in the world. But
although the 'natural philosopher' can argue for a first mover to account for the fact of motion, for proof of the existence of God as
first and efficient cause the arguments must be metaphysical. His main argument is based on the facts of contingency, finitude,
and relative perfection in the world. While we can admit an infinite regress of successive contingent causes (he calls this an
'accidental' chain), for example of parent to child, the total chain itself must be assimilated to a set of 'essential' causes which
includes all relevant causal factors and rests ultimately in the most 'eminent' or perfect being, the first efficient (and thereby
exemplary), intelligent cause. This first cause must be necessary (it cannot not exist) [a] and renders accidental chains necessary
and therefore transcendent; for if it were not, it would itself belong to the chain and thereby be contingent.
There can be only one ultimate or first cause. If there were two beings possessing a common nature of necessary being, their
separate individualities would not be necessary being. A first cause must also be essentially simple, lacking matter, form and
accidental qualities, and must be absolutely infinite Being or divine essence in which are grounded all perfections (goodness,
truth, justice, and so on) to an infinite degree. And God must be infinite if He is to know and produce an infinity of objects.
Furthermore, only an infinite being can satisfy our finite will's desire for an infinite object. As there is no incompatibility between
being and infinity, the most superior being must be infinite. It follows from Scotus's arguments that all God's attributes are really
identical with themselves and the divine essence, though they are formally distinct. Nevertheless, he maintains that while
God's infinity, necessity, uniqueness, freedom, and creative power are demonstrable philosophically, other attributes (such as
omnipotence, justice, goodness, providence) are a matter of revelation and faith and cannot be confirmed by reason [b].
Scotus distinguishes between the divine essence, intellect, and will. His essence is logically, but not temporarily prior to
his intellect, that is, the divine Idea, and is thus not identical with it. It contains implicitly the intelligible 'natures' as actual or
possible 'imitations' of the essence the exemplars of the things He wills to create. The exemplars thus depend on His
knowledge of His essence [c]; and He knows His created things through their possibility in his essence and not through the
exemplary Ideas themselves. And they are infinite in number but God chooses to create only some of the possible corresponding
sensible objects. [See ibid. I, 35-36.] His intellect is thus subordinate to his will [IV, 49,q.ii]. His creativity is necessary in that His
love for himself is part of His essential nature and has to be manifested. At the same time His willing, if it is to be perfect, must be
free [d]. God thus 'assents' to the necessity of His love. But while Scotus accepts that God, as first efficient cause, can create
immediately out of nothing (otherwise there would be no mediate creation, that is, the existing world), he does not believe
creation in time can be proved [e]. Further, in so far as God is creator by will and not by essence (in which case creation would be
necessary), His relation to creatures is 'mental' and not 'real'. The relation of creatures to God, however, is real, though it is only
through His will that contingent creatures can 'meet' Him as necessary being [Ibid. I, 3 and 17; 35 and 36; Repub. I, 45]. As for
the problem of evil, God providentially allows for its existence in the world to a limited degree in so far as He wishes men to
learn from error much of the evil resulting from their misuse of freedom [f].

PSYCHOLOGY
[4] [Op. ox., IV, 43, q.ii] The rational soul is the substantial form of man, says Scotus; it is what makes us alive and human. It is
not itself a substance (a composite of body and soul) [a]. He argues as follows. Each of our senses has its own proper object
colour, sound, and so on. The intellect, however, 'cognises' being. It does not depend on a sense organ and can pass beyond the
senses to apprehend, for example, relations. We also know ourselves to be free beings. Now, neither intellectual understanding nor
voluntary acts can be brought about by a material form. Our intellect and will therefore transcend the organic and must be
functions of spiritual form. This is the rational soul. Its 'activity' and 'passivity' are not regarded by Scotus as distinct powers [On
the Soul 13 though this may not be a wholly genuine work of Scotus's (see Wolter)]. As for the 'faculties' intellectual,
sensitive, and vegetative these are distinct only in the 'objective formal' sense. The soul thus brings about the perfection of the
whole man [b]. At death, although the composite being undergoes corruption, both the soul in its higher form and the body
survive (the latter by virtue of its imperfect corporeal form), albeit temporarily [see Op. ox., IV, 43, q.ii passim.]. However, for
Scotus neither the immortality of the soul nor the resurrection of the body can be demonstrated with certainty; they are only
probable, and are to be accepted on faith [c]. A priori arguments, based on the nature of the rational soul in its intellectual aspect
considered as a form transcending the composite being, do not show, moreover, that such a form is either necessarily
independent of the composite or self-subsistent. As for a posteriori moral arguments, for example, ones grounded in man's desire
for beatitude or in his need for sanctions after death, these are, for Scotus, even less satisfactory. Likewise, a natural desire to
avoid death (found also in non-human animals) does not prove immortality. We would first have to show that immortality is
possible before arguing to it from the recognition of any conscious desire. Finally, we cannot appeal to the hope of rewards in the
next life for good behaviour in this one, because we do not know that God will reward us.
As in the case of God, Scotus stresses the primacy of the human will over intellect [see Op. ox. IV, 49, qq.ii and iii; I, 8]. The
intellect must therefore necessarily assent to any truths it may apprehend. Likewise, the will, in so far as it is a natural inclination
to self-perfection, necessarily desires happiness. But the intrinsic nature of the will lies in its freedom [ibid. I, 17, q.iii] [d]: it can
choose to act or not to act to realize some end. And although knowledge is needed to apprehend such an end, the will can, through
its freedom, direct the intellect to attend to a particular object.

KNOWLEDGE
[5] It is in the very nature of the soul to know. So what does Scotus understand by 'knowledge', and how does the soul attain it?
[See especially ibid. I, 2, q.vii; 3, qq.iv, ix; 9, q.ii.]. Knowledge in the primary sense consists in the intellect's apprehension of
being as being. But Scotus says that in this life being can be known only as it is manifested in material things. The starting-point
for this 'secondary' knowledge is sense experience; and there are no innate ideas [Metaphys. 1, ii] [a]. Scotus also rejects any
involvement of 'illumination' divine or intellectual [Op. Ox. I, 3, iv] [b]. He distinguishes
between intuitive and abstractivesecondary knowledge [for example, ibid. I, 3, iii; 2, vii] [c]. The former is 'perfect' when
knowledge is immediate of a present object but 'imperfect' when of an existent or real object considered in the memory or
as existing in the future. Abstractive knowledge, on the other hand, is of the essence of a thing without regard to whether it
actually exists or not. Knowledge is firstly of individuals, singular things (their 'thisness'), of essences or forms, and of first
principles implicit in complexes (for example that the whole is greater than the part) the intellect being moved by sensations or
imagination (comprising phantasms) [cf. On the Soul, 22, 3]. Knowledge is effected when, through the cooperation of its active
and passive functions, the intellect interacts with the 'intelligible likenesses' of objects (sensory or intelligible species), which
convey to it 'their common natures'. The intellect can also transcend the sense to achieve knowledge of universals and
relations [d]. However, our intuition of singular things is confused. Scotus attributes this to a human limitation resulting from
original sin, or it may reflect the need for a harmonization of our powers [ Op. ox. II, 3, vi and ix; Free Questions 13, viii-x]. This
limitation also accounts for our inability to have any immediate intuition of the soul. (As for God, there can be no knowledge of
the divine essence in this life or after it [e]. ) Scotus says there is a role for inductive procedures. Thus we can come to
a knowledge of natural causes of effects by generalizing from our experience of number of instances. But for the most part he
uses demonstrative (deductive) proofs and tries to show that an effect follows logically or 'self-evidently' from its cause; such
knowledge is more certain [f].

ETHICS
[6] [See especially Opus oxon., II, 5, 7, 18, 40 and 41; III, 19, 37; IV, 1, 5, 14 and 15.] 'Goodness' for Scotus is to be understood in
several ways. A thing is transcendentally good in so far as it is a being, that is a positive entity, which can be desired. This is a
property of all beings. A thing is naturally (or secondarily) good when it possesses harmoniously all those qualities which are
'proper' to that thing or 'becoming' to it, just as something is made beautiful by virtue of its colour, shape, and so on. Such
goodness is an 'accident' of being [a]. Likewise an action or activity is naturally good when it is in harmony with its efficient
cause, its end, and its form. To be morally good, however, an action must be freely willed, and the 'circumstances' of the act must
all be present. These include objectivity (through the conformity of the willed action to what is morally right [Op. ox., II, 40, qq.ii,
iii] this is primary moral goodness, and is intuitable by the reason without divine illumination); and also the requirement that it
be done for the right end and with the right intention [b]. If the act is performed by the will having regard to all these
circumstances, especially the intention, then it is said to possess secondary moral goodness [II, 7, q.i]. The absence or even
deficiency of any one of these circumstances will affect the goodness of the action. Thus a good end sought by a bad means will
make the action evil; while doing something positive (for example, giving alms) as a result of mere inclination or impulse rather
than with an explicitly good intention (that is, not referred to the infinite good actually or virtually) will render the act morally
'indifferent', that is, neither good nor bad [ibid.]. Loving God is an exception; it can never be morally evil, requiring only
conformity to right reason. What, then, makes reason as the objective standard 'right'? Scotus seems to hold the view that an
objectively moral natural law is intrinsic to God's creation and cannot be altered. However, he distinguishes between the objective
content of the moral law and the obligation on us as finite beings to perform right actions [Op. ox. IV, 14]. This obligation
originates from God; and sin is disobedience to God's will. God himself can of course will only what is objectively good which
He perceives by His intellect. But Scotus also says that God can give us dispensation from some secondary laws which are in
accordance with primary self-evident moral principles (but not from the primary laws themselves or from those deducible from
them [see, for example, Op. ox., III, 37] [c].

CRITICAL SUMMARY
Scotus's philosophy is sui generis. Critical of both Augustinianism (with respect to the role of divine illumination) and Thomas's
use of Aristotelian terminology to describe God, Scotus marks the beginning of a radical change in medieval thought. In effect he
set out to reinterpret the relationship of faith to reason: reason is now limited to a metaphysics of Being, while faith is concerned
with divine revelation. Thus we find a greater place being accorded to reason and in consequence a delimiting of the sphere of
natural theology. It is only through Being as a univocal abstraction common to all existents, finite and infinite that a link
with God is retained and His existence provable. Scotus also stresses God's complete freedom (His intellect being subordinated to
His will, as is the case also with human creatures) and His necessary existence (created individuals being contingent). Scotus's
originality is shown particularly in his concept of 'thisness' (the immediate manifestation of essence or form) as the individuating
principle; and in his use of the Franciscan doctrine of 'objective formal distinction' a distinction which delineates neither the
subjective (mental) nor the objective (real), and which is applied to essences in things and the human soul. His account of
individuation and his emphasis on immediate knowledge of the individual thing its 'thisness' by the intellect working with
the senses are of particular interest for the role they played in informing the concept of 'inscape' introduced by the 19 th century
Jesuit poet Gerard Manley Hopkins to refer to the essential individuality and oneness of natural things.
From the standpoint of earlier philosophers in either of the two main traditions Scotus's weakening of the link between reason and
faith was a dangerous move. Not only (it was argued) does God become virtually unknowable, and the continuity between God
and his creation broken, but reason is now set free to undermine faith and authority although this was not the intention of
Scotus himself. On the other hand, from the point of view of thinkers who had no religious axe to grind, the confining of
philosophy to the sensible natural order was to be regarded as a positive and liberating feature of Scotist thought.

WILLIAM of OCKHAM (c. 1285 1349)

NOMINALISM/ EMPIRICISM
William (of) Ockham was born in the village of that name in Surrey, England. He entered the Franciscan order before studying
theology at Oxford, c. 1310-18. He was accused of heresy (his writings were condemned in 1326 and he was excommunicated);
and he came into conflict with the Holy See at Avignon (1324-8) over the issue of evangelical poverty. Later, in Munich, where he
was supported by the Emperor, he was again embroiled in controversy, this time concerning the issue of the relation of Church
power to the state. Because of the interruption of his career he never attained professorial rank, and he therefore became known
as Venerabilis Inceptor ('inceptor' being the term used to describe those awaiting the award of their teaching licence). He is said to
have died of the plague.

PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE/ LOGIC

[1] [See especially Commentaries on the Sentences, I, 2 passim.] Ockham contributed greatly to the development of the 'logic of
terms' which had been introduced in the twelfth century and developed in the thirteeenth. Propositions consist of terms. These are
of two kinds: (1) categorematic terms, which have meaning because of their reference to real things; (2) syncategorematic terms,
which have only a logical function to link categorematic terms. Thus, in 'All men are mortal' 'men' and 'mortal (thing)' are
categorematic, while 'all' is syncategorematic. Categorematic terms or words, whether spoken or written, are calledconventional
signs in so far as it is a linguistic convention that a given thing is referred to by a particular name ( the species 'man' in English,
'homo' in Latin, for example). But these different signs express the same state of mind (intentio) and thus have something in
common. This common feature is called a natural sign and is the concept or meaning (terminus conceptus) of the conventional
sign [Comms I, 2, vii] [a]. Ockham adopted also the distinction between 'first intention' and 'second intention' [see
also Quodlibetal Questions IV, 19]. Terms of first intention refer to things which are not signs of a language, for example, dog,
tree. But terms of second intention refer to signs of other signs in the language (for example the word 'dog') or to natural signs
(concepts). In other words, terms of second intention stand for terms of first intention. The referring characteristic of terms is
brought into play when the terms are used in propositions. Ockham says they then have a 'suppositio': they can 'stand for' things in
a variety of ways. And he adopted the classification which had been current in the thirteenth century [ibid. 2, iv]. (1) A term can
be said to be 'material' (suppositio materialis). This is the word itself considered as a sound the sound made when we utter
'man'. (2) A term can signify a particular individual, whether outside or within the mind (Socrates, this man, for example). Words
functioning in this way are called 'personal' (suppositio personalis). (3) A term can be the actual concept in the mind [b] (man as
that which is common to all individual men the species man). Such terms are called 'simple' ( suppositio simplex). It is only in
its second function that a word actually relates to something other than itself. Building on Aristotelian foundations, Ockham also
examined formally and extensively the logic of modalities, modal terms such as as contingency, possibility, and necessity being
regarded by him as properly applicable only to propositions. Contingent propositions state facts about things actually existing (as
determinable by the user of the proposition). But if such propositions can be translated into negative or hypothetical propositions
involving possibility, then they are said to be necessary [c], for example, 'All the tables in this room are brown' is contingent,
while 'All men are mortal' is necessary (because it means 'If there is a man he is mortal'). As for the truth-values of propositions,
Ockham says all propositions must be determinately true or false [d]: there can be no propositions which do not have a truth-
value.
.Ockham's views on logic and language, underpin his conceptualism (or 'nominalism') and his attack on what he sees as redundant
or superfluous abstract entities. This is important for an understanding of his metaphysics [sec. 3] and theory of knowledge [sec.
2]. His criterion is implicit in 'Ockham's Razor' "entities are not to be multiplied more than is necessary". (There is no evidence
that he actually used these words, though he did write "plurality is never to be assumed unless required" [ Comms., I, 27, 2] ). He
says that misunderstanding of the way language works often leads us to postulate the existence of such, abstract entities. Consider,
for example, the proposition 'Socrates is wise'. 'Socrates' always 'supposits' the same entity the term is absolute. But 'wise' is a
connotative term; and although it primarily qualifies Socrates we may also take it to refer secondarily to something else, namely
wisdom. It is this tendency that Ockham criticizes, for it shows that we have failed to appreciate the nature of logical predication.
However, he does allow the use of abstract names of sensible qualities of things such as whiteness and sweetness. Otherwise he
wants to eliminate references to abstract entities by rephrasing or 'reducing' the language in which they occur or are implied. Thus
general names are turned into connotative predicates and proper names become descriptions [e].

KNOWLEDGE
[2] [See especially Comms I, Prologue.] Knowledge as a 'science' (a body of propositions based on universal principles) is divided
by Ockham into real science and rational science [Comms I, 2, iv]. It is said to be realwhen its propositions are about actual
things, but rational when the propositions are just about other terms, as in logic [a]. The first principles are demonstrable or non-
demonstrable. They are the latter if their truth is evident to the mind, either as soon as we understand the meaning of their terms
(as in necessary truths such as 'The whole is greater than the part'), or through experience alone (as in the contingent propositions
such as 'All heat gives warmth'). Demonstrable knowledge, however, involves syllogistic argument grounded in non-demonstrable
knowledge. Non-demonstrable knowledge is thus foundational for Ockham. At the heart of his account is the notion
of intuitive knowledge [see, for example, Comms Prologue, 1, ii]. Intuitive knowledge of an individual thing is that knowledge by
virtue of which it can be known whether a thing exists or not. It involves a direct awareness, an act of immediate apprehension, of
a mental or real object. It may arise from sensation or it may be an intellectual intuition which can also include reflexive
intuitions of ourselves as acting or willing and of our own awareness of our mental acts. Truths known intuitively are contingent
in that they provide demonstrable evidence of contingent but not of necessary things. Perfect intuitive knowledge, Ockham says,
is experiential and is the basis of universal propositions and is thus the 'principle of art and science'. We can also have knowledge
which is concerned with understanding and not with demonstration. This is abstractive knowledge: this deals not with facts but
with universals and propositions or judgements about objects without regard to the question of their actual existence .
Abstractive knowledge of an object, however, must derive from some intuitive knowledge of it. All knowledge is thus grounded
in verifiable sensible or intellectual experience, with no appeal to any kind of external 'illumination'. And experience defines the
limits of our knowledge [b]. There can be no inference from causes to effects except through experience [Comms I, Prologue
9] [c]. But Ockham does allow that God has the power to cause in us an intuition of an object even though it is not actually
present to us, or, in other words, without any mediation of secondary causes [Quod. VI, 6]. By definition such knowledge could
not of course be 'evident'.
It is clear that given Ockham's views on logic and language and his emphasis on the individual concrete particular we can have
knowledge of universals only in so far as they have mental existence alone being but signs predicable commonly of several
things signified; they do not have real existence [d]. Likewise, while we can have intuitive knowledge of our mental acts and may
suppose they are acts of an 'extended and corporeal form', we can have no knowledge of an immaterial soul; nor can we prove its
existence philosophically. Instead we must rely on revealed truth and faith [e]. As for God, we can have neither intuitive nor
abstractive knowledge of His nature, though Ockham says we can have conceptual knowledge of Him [Comms. I, 2, ix].
However, any such concepts are not what he calls 'quidditative' concepts, that is, concepts which denote a single reality 'directly',
but are either connotative (for example, God is non-finite) or are extrapolations from concepts applying univocally to our
experience (as when we attribute infinite wisdom to Him on the basis of our experience of wisdom). Nevertheless such conceptual
knowledge is still confined to nominal representation in propositions [f].

METAPHYSICS/ RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY

[3] Metaphysics is the 'science of being', but according to Ockham being is to be understood as a concept or natural sign for what
all existing things have in common, namely that they exist [a]. For him, 'essence' or 'being' has the same meaning as 'existence';
existence and essence are distinguishable only mentally [a]. In a narrower sense metaphysics may be said to have different
branches, each concerned with different kinds of things substances, qualities, God. The term 'being' is thus both univocal and
equivocal. It is univocal when it is used as a predicate with the same meaning for all things, that is, they 'have' being, they exist.
But it is equivocal when applied to different kinds of things; it has a different meaning in each case [Comms I, Prologue, 9; I, 2
and 3; III, 9] [b].
Because of his 'nominalism' and 'empiricist' theory of knowledge, metaphysics for Ockham tends to be negative a critique of
previous views. Of special significance is the consequent separating of faith from reason and the extreme limitations imposed on
the scope of reason itself [c]. The content of Ockham's own positive position is in general confined to the notion of the individual
thing. Thus a substance is regarded as individual; it is neither an 'essence' nor a category in itself. We can know nothing of
substances in themselves other than what is given to us in sensible experience. We then understand it only by means of
connotative and negative predicates (respectively, 'self-subsistent being' and 'being which is not in something else'). But Ockham
also supposes that the sensible qualities are distinct from substances (and can be separated from them by God), while predicates
denoting qualities ('large', 'heavy', etc.) are in fact just ways of referring to substances the way substances exist [d]. Likewise,
in his account of 'common natures' he rejects all kinds of realism. The 'common nature' is neither really distinct from that which
'individuates', nor is it formally distinct; nor can the 'common nature' be both singular and universal (depending on the way we
think about it). The universal (first and second 'intention') for Ockham [see, for example, Comms I, 2, vi - viii; Quodlibet. IV, 9] is
an signifying 'act of the understanding' and has no real existence. It is simply a concept of a collection of signified individuals and
known in a confused manner. He talks of nature as being known in the universal 'occultly'. There can be no extramental existent
universals. Everything general in the created world species, forms, judgements, relations, and so on, exist only in the intellect.
This constitutes a separate order of being from real things in the world [e]. Relations, for example, 'being the father of', have no
real existence; they are names or concepts which stand for 'absolutes' in the natural world. The relationship of creatures to God or
vice versa is likewise neither real nor 'mental'; it is but the way we talk about how created beings depend on a relative Being. A
similar 'nominalist' rejection of essentialism is to be found in Ockham's account of motion, space, and time [f]. No thing is
denoted by these terms. Rather it is individual things which move, that is, change their place, time being inseparable from motion
and signifying the soul's knowledge of before and after. Ockham thinks of individual things or 'absolutes' (substances, sensible
qualities) as distinct and independent of each other. Their existence is contingent dependent on God's will, and there is no
necessary connection between them [g].
Ockham's approach to the doctrine of four causes is consistently empirical and anti-metaphysical. [See, for example, Comms I, I,
iii; II, 2 and 3.] Matter, he says, is not pure potentiality but is physical body its extension being corporeal form; while form is
simply the way the material body is shaped or structured. Matter and form are thus not strictly causes in Aristotle's sense. Ockham
admits efficient causality but interprets it empirically: to say that A is the efficient cause of B is to say that B regularly follows
when A occurs but otherwise does not. Moreover, knowledge that A is the cause of B presupposes intuitive cognition of both the
cause and effect, and that we have repeated experience of their conjunction. As for the notion of final cause, Ockham dismisses
this as metaphorical. We have no evidence that natural bodies act to bring about some end , only that they behave as if, they were.
In reality they act in a particular way (depending on circumstances) because it is of their nature to do so. Causal relationships in
general are contingent in that they have to be verified empirically [h].
[4] As might be expected, Ockham criticizes traditional proofs for the existence of God in the sense of the absolutely perfect,
infinite being. [See Comms I, 2 and 3 passim.] Because he has rejected final causation in natural things, he says we cannot argue
to the existence of an end towards which individual actions are directed. Still less could we show that there is but one end,
namely, God. As for the argument from efficient causality, we cannot prove that there is not an infinite regress . And even if we
can show there is a first efficient cause we can know nothing of its nature; it is therefore not God [a]. It follows from his criticisms
of such arguments that, for Ockham, the philosopher can say nothing about God's nature except imperfectly and inaccurately by
the use of 'connotative' or negative terms [Ibid. I, 35, v] [b]. Thus if God is a being, then we can affirm that he must be good, as
this is a property common to himself and his creatures. In general Ockham said that God's attributes can be demonstrated
provided the middle term of the relevant syllogism is a concept which is common in this sense, that is, a connotative term.
Otherwise the middle term forms the definition of what we seek to establish, and the argument is then circular (as, for example,
with the concept of creativity). To claim that God can produce something out of nothing, that He is omniscient, omnipotent,
eternal, and so on is a matter for theology not philosophy; and therefore no proof is possible [c]. This position also informs
Ockham's discussion of the treatment by earlier philosophers of divine ideas, divine knowledge, and will. He rejects the view that
there is any real plurality or distinction in God's intellect. Divine ideas exist only in the sense that they are identifiable with His
creatures individual things, substances and qualities, matter and form, which of course He knows [d]. Given Ockham's
nominalism and emphasis on individuality, there can be no such ideas if equated with the universal, species, negations, and so on.
The number of 'individuals', however, is infinite. If God knows His creatures, He must also have perfect intuitive knowledge of
past and future contingent events directly through His essence: but Ockham says we cannot say how precisely God accomplishes
this. All we can affirm is that either A is true or not-A is true and that God knows which is the case [Ibid I, 35, v; 38, i]. However,
Ockham rejects fatalism [e]. He says further that there is no distinction between God's intellect and His will both of which are
identical with the divine essence and therefore have the same meaning [f]. However, we may talk of will with reference to God's
omnipotence and his ability to cause directly anything to occur without intermediate or secondary causes, provided it is logically
possible [Ibid., I, 42 and 45]. Moreover, it is because God's power is absolute (potentia absoluta) even to the extent of
dispensing with the natural order, if that be His will that matters of faith lie beyond the purview of philosophy [see ibid. I,
17] [g].

PSYCHOLOGY
[5] [See, for example, Quod. I, 10, 12, and 16; II, 10 and 11; Comms I, 3 and 4; II 22 and 26.] According to Ockham, there are
three distinct 'forms' or souls. At the lowest level we have a corporeal soul (as do animals in general). Then there is a corruptible
sensitive soul to which we tend to attribute our acts of understanding and willing. Lastly there is the intellectual soul [a]. This
is regarded as incorruptible and therefore cannot inform corruptible matter directly. However, the soul's nature and its immortality
cannot be demonstrated philosophically [b]. Ockham says also that each soul is integral. Thus the intellectual soul cannot be
divided into parts or faculties, though it can bring about different kinds of act. Similarly the sensitive soul can 'perfect' different
parts of a body the organs of sight, hearing, and so on without itself possessing distinct powers . He also maintains that the
sensitive and rational souls are not only distinct but also separable from each other. At the same time he continues to regard man
as a unity. And he says there is no proof of a universal active intellect; this is a matter of faith [c]. He also places emphasis on the
ensouled man's freedom to accept or reject the dictates of both the sensitive appetites and the judgements of the intellect.

ETHICS
[6] [For example, Comms II, 19; III, 12 and 13.] The created world, according to Ockham, is contingent not only with respect to
the individuals it consists of and their causal relationships but also in its moral foundations. By virtue of his 'appointed power'
(potentia ordinata) God has laid down a particular moral code for His creatures to follow. But this is a consequence of His will
not his essence; and Ockham says God, by virtue of His absolute power, can demand obedience to acts quite opposite to those He
has established, though we are obliged to obey whatever ordinances He has in fact determined. Ockham thus rejects the idea of an
immutable natural law grounded in God's Reason [a]. Nevertheless, our wills remain free to obey or disobey both revealed truths
and judgements of our rational intellects [b]. Our acts are virtuous only when they both conform to our conscience, that is, what
we believe to be right reason, and are done because they accord with it [Ordinatio, I, d. 41] [c]. They are not virtuous when done
for other motives. Even if one's conscience is erroneous one is obliged to follow it, for the Divine Will wills that creatures should
follow the dictates of non-blameworthy reason. Indeed not to do so would be a sin [Reportatio, III q. 13]. As for the proper end of
virtuous action, this is perfect happiness ultimately achieved in our enjoyment of the Divine Essence (though Ockham does not
think this is philosophically provable) [d].

CRITICAL SUMMARY
While he shared some points in common with Scotus, Ockham was generally a vigorous critic not only of the Subtle Doctor's
metaphysical realism but also of certain aspects of Aristotelianism. There has been some dispute as to whether Ockham should be
regarded as a conceptualist or as a nominalist. However, given his emphasis on the primacy of natural signs (as states of mind but
not as entities existing ante rem) rather than on words, 'conceptualist' would seem to be the more appropriate description. As a
corollary of this conceptualist philosophy (which also exhibits both empiricist and rationalist features) Ockham regarded
individual things as the only reality. He thus goes further than Scotus in rejecting not only natural theology but also metaphysics.
Metaphysical concepts, such as substance, species, relations, are now only mental constructs. Essence is the same as existence;
knowledge is confined to intuitions (of objects or facts) or abstractions (of propositions). Causality is understood solely in terms
of regular sequences. Physical concepts (motion, space, time) are to be dealt with quantitatively not qualitatively. There can be no
certain proofs of God's existence (though it is probable that He does exist) or that the soul is spiritual and immortal. Ockham's
sceptical theology even led him to suppose that God is will, that He has absolute power to do anything that is not logically
impossible. God's grace becomes redundant so far as human behaviour is concerned. This leads to a tension between Ockham's
acceptance of the Aristotelian/ Thomistic idea of an immutable natural law knowable by the reason and his view that what is
morally good can be arbitrarily decided by God. How could human reason discover this except through revelation and faith?
To the extent that Ockham was an empiricist and a realist (but not of the Scotist kind), he cannot be criticized for any form of
phenomenalism or positivism. And arguably of all mediaeval thinkers he holds the greatest appeal for the majority of Anglo-
American 'linguistic' and empiricist philosophers today, though it might fairly be said that, while he was critical of the
metaphysics he had inherited, his commitment to individuality carries with it an implicit metaphysics of its own. From the
standpoint of Thomism, of course, serious objections can be made against his positions, not least his sundering of faith from
reason, his theory of knowledge, and his suggestion of Divine indeterminacy. But his impact on fourteenth century philosophy
and theology was profound. To all intents and purposes it ended scholasticism. Reason led to empiricism, agnosticism, or
scepticism, and a concentration on natural science. Faith was left to itself as irrational commitment, and often became assimilated
to mysticism. Metaphysics in the full sense was not to be completely restored until the emergence of the modified Thomism of
Suarez or the rationalism of Descartes. Ockham's terminist logic too was to be influential for some two hundred years.