International Perspectives On Guaranteed Annual Income Programs
International Perspectives On Guaranteed Annual Income Programs
International Perspectives On Guaranteed Annual Income Programs
1 (Winter 2011)
International Perspectives on
Guaranteed Annual Income Programs
Melissa Martin
Queens University
Osgoode Hall Law School/Schulich School of Business
ABSRACT
Addressing the issue of poverty in Canada is an important challenge to
policymakers. Establishing an income floor below which no citizen falls is a
critical public policy goal for the Canadian welfare state. In responding to this
policy issue, recent debate has revolved around a guaranteed annual income
(GAI), defined as a basic income paid by the government to all citizens on an
individual basis, without means test or work requirement. The purpose of this
paper is to analyze past and present GAI programs to inform the public policy
debate on the implementation of a GAI in Canada. Among the factors under
consideration are the programs efficiency in targeting payments, as well as its
effect on family structure and labour force participation. On an implementation
level, the paper also explores the potential for introducing a GAI through a
negative income tax. It is also important to note, however, that relatively few
GAI programs exist currently, and those that do, often are not sufficient alone in
providing income maintenance to citizens.
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developed due, in large part, to the policy analysis that showed that the
GAI represented the most bang for a billion bucks.22 At this point, the
main opposition was the potential effects of a GAI on labour supply of
working aged individuals. Economists entered the debate concerning the
wage price and income elasticity pertinent to labour-leisure choice. They
agreed, however, that the existing data could not provide a clear answer to
the work incentive question.23 As a result, it became necessary to design
experiments to test these assumptions.
The New Jersey experiment was the first to test the idea of a
guaranteed annual income. Haveman and Watts observed that the
tension between the motivations of those who supported the experiment
for general-political-demonstration reasons and those who desired it for
technical-economic-experimental reasons persisted through the [New
Jersey] experiment.24 It affected all of its primary characteristics from
technical design to duration, to selection of sites, and finally to the
interpretation of results.25 The New Jersey experiment served to set the
precedent for controlled social experiments surrounding GAI in the United
States and Canada. Following the New Jersey experiment, others
experiments followed including one performed by the Institute for
Research on Poverty to study a GAI in rural areas. Additionally the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) funded an
experiment in Gary, Indiana and others in Seattle, Washington, and
Denver.26
Each of these income-maintenance experiments served the purpose
of illuminating the policy debate on the effects of implementing a GAI.
Specifically, work incentives were determined by measuring labour-supply
responses, more simply calculated by looking at the change in hours
worked during the duration of the experiment.27 In addition, each of the
experiments was framed on a common study design and assignment model,
which was first developed in the New Jersey experiment.28 Each
experiment focused on low income household units; however, the selection
of income cutoffs varied from 150% of the official poverty line in the New
Jersey, Rural and Seattle-Denver experiments to 240% in the Gary
experiment.29 Further, the duration of the experiments was three years,
the exception being the Seattle-Denver experiment where some households
were enrolled in 5- and 20- year plans to determine the effect of
experimental duration on study results. Most importantly, each of the
experiments focused on different areas in the United States and targeted
different populations an important feature to consider if the lessons
learned are to be generalized to other jurisdictions. While New Jersey
focused on inner-city households, the Rural experiment focused on rural
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poverty in North Carolina and rural poverty amidst wealth in Iowa. The
Seattle-Denver experiment focused on a Western city with employment
instability and Gary examined black households in the ghetto.30 Given the
diverse regionalism that exists in Canada, this may give a better picture of
how the effects of a GAI might differ throughout the country.
In the view of Hum and Simpson, the experiments were designed to
provide reliable and credible analysis of the response to a guaranteed
annual income program to inform policy development.31 The results of
the experiment indicate that as expected, hours worked will decline with
the introduction of a GAI. The reduction in hours worked was smallest for
husbands, ranging from 1% to 8% and larger for wives, ranging from 3%
to 33%.32 For single female-headed households the reduction was between
7% and 30%.33 As noted above, these reductions in hours worked were
significantly higher than what was observed in the Mincome experiment.
Hum and Simpson also analyze the elasticity of labour-supply response and
conclude that, in contrast to non-experimental literature, there is a fairly
uniform and low elasticity of labour-supply response.34 Particularly, this
low elasticity was seen across all categories of individuals, husbands, wives
and single female-headed families. One important factor that was found in
labour supply response of married men and women was the presence of
preschool children in the home. Preschool children increased the labour
supply of husbands, while reducing the labour supply of wives by
approximately the same amount. Thus, changes in family composition
may have a greater impact on labour supply than a GAI program itself. If
the GAI were to be applied in a Canadian context, it is important to
consider the effect on labour-supply the GAI might have, as well as the
potential positive impacts resulting from the ability of individuals to stay
home to care for children and elderly relatives.
The non-labour supply response that is the most problematic is the
impact of a GAI on marital disruption. Research indicated that GAI
payments might influence some degree of family breakup. However, these
conclusions have been challenged and no clear consensus has arisen. What
is uncertain is whether or not some of these marital breakups may actually
be positive if, for instance, a woman becomes financially able to separate
from an abusive husband. In such a case, it could be argued that the GAI
actually has a positive effect for these individuals and any children the
couple may have. The potential impact on family composition is an
important area to consider in the implementation of such a program in
Canada.
Hum and Simpson conclude that [f]ew adverse effects have been
found to date. Those adverse effects found, such as work response, are
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NOTES
1
Canadian Policy Research Networks. Backgrounder: Thinking about marginalization:
What, who and why? Ottawa, Canada (2000): 1.
2
Hugh Segal, The Last Public Policy Frontier, Eliminating Poverty. Proceedings from
the Annual Gow Lecture, Queens University, Kingston: Canada, April 24, 2009.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
8
Philippe Van Parijs, Basic income: a simple and powerful idea for the twenty-first
century. Politics & Society, 32.1 (2004).
9
Ibid.
10
James P. Mulvale, Basic income and the Canadian welfare state: Exploring the realms
of possibility. Basic Income Studies: An International Journal of Basic Income Research,
3, no. 1 (2008): Accessed September 20, 2010
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1084&context=bis.
11
Derek Hum and Wayne Simpson, Economic response to a guaranteed annual income:
experience from Canada and the United States. Journal of Labour Economics, 11, no.1
(1993); Derek Hum and Wayne Simpson, A guaranteed annual income? From Mincome
to the millennium. Policy Options, January-February, (2001); Mulvale.
12
Hum and Simpson (2001).
13
Hum and Simpson (1993); Hum and Simpson (2001): 80.
14
Hum and Simpson (2001).
15
Ibid.
16
Segal.
17
Hum and Simpson (2001): 80-81.
18
Ibid.
19
Mulvale.
20
Hum and Simpson (1993).
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid, 5.
23
Ibid.
24
Robert H. Haveman and Harold W. Watts, Social experimentation as policy research:
A review of negative income tax experiments. Evaluation Studies, 1 (1976): 427.
25
Ibid.
26
Hum and Simpson (1993).
27
Ibid.
28
Ibid.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid.
31
Ibid, 276.
32
Gary M. Anderson and Walter Block, Comment on Hum and Simpson. Journal of
Labour Economics, 11, no. 1 (1993).
58
33
Ibid.
34
Hum and Simpson (1993).
35
Ibid, 287.
36
Anderson and Block.
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid, 352-353.
40
Eduardo Matarazzo Suplicy, Basic income and employment in Brazil. An
International Journal of Basic Income Research, 2, no. 1 (2007): Accessed September 20,
2010 http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1067&context=bis
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid.
43
Ibid.
44
Ibid.
45
Corina Rodriguez Enriquez, Basic income and labour market conditions: Insights from
Argentina. Basic Income Studies: An International Journal of Basic Income Research, 3,
no. 1 (2007). Accessed September 20, 2010.
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1063&context=bis.
46
Claudia Haarmann and Dirk Haarmann, From survival to decent employment: Basic
income
security in Namibia. An International Journal of Basic Income Research, 3, no. 1 (2007).
Retrieved from http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1066&context=bis.
47
Jeremy Seekings, The inconsequentiality of employment disincentives: Basic income in
South
Africa. Basic Income Studies: An International Journal of Basic Income Research, 2, no.
1 (2007): Accessed September 20, 2010
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1064&context=bis
48
Enriquez; Haarmann and Haarmann; Seekings, The inconsequentiality of employment
disincentives: Basic income in South Africa. Basic Income Studies: An International
Journal of Basic Income Research, 2, no. 1 (2007): Accessed September 20, 2010
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1064&context=bis; Seekings, The
inconsequentiality of employment disincentives: Basic income in South Africa. Basic
Income Studies: An International Journal of Basic Income Research, 2, no. 1 (2007):
Accessed September 20, 2010
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1064&context=bis; Suplicy.
49
Haarmann and Haarmann, From survival to decent employment: Basic income
security in Namibia. Basic Income Studies: An International Journal of Basic Income
Research, 3, no. 1 (2007). Retrieved from
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1066&context=bis.
59
REFERENCES
Anderson, Gary M., and Walter Block. Comment on Hum and Simpson.
Journal of Labour Economics, 11, no. 1 (1993): 348-363.
60
Van Parijs, Philippe. Basic income: a simple and powerful idea for the
twenty-first century. Politics & Society, 32, no. 1 (2004): 7-39.
61