Civ Digests PDF

Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013
RULE 1, Sections 1 to 6 On appeal, the Court of Appeals: reversed and set aside the
lower courts decision.
G.R. No. 133000 October 2, 2001 o It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to
PATRICIA NATCHER make a just and legal distribution of the estate. The lower
vs. court went beyond its jurisdiction when it performed the
HON. COURT OF APPEALS acts that is proper only in a special proceeding for the
settlement of estate of a deceased person.
FACTS: o What the lower court should have done was to rule on the
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, validity of the sale and leave the issue on advancement to
assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals. be resolved in a separate proceeding instituted for that
Respondents, Sps. Graciano Del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra purpose.
(Graciano and Graciana, LOL), were registered owners of a parcel Aggrieved, petitioner filed this petition under Rule 45 in the
of land located in Manila. Supreme Court, assailing the CAs decision for being contrary to
o When Graciana died, her husband Graciano and their 6 law and the facts of the case.
children entered into an extrajudicial settlement, dividing
among themselves the land owned by Graciano and RULING:
Graciana.
o Heirs executed and forged an Agreement of The Supreme Court agrees with the Court of Appeals. The petition
Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver of bears no merit.
Rights where they subdivided among themselves the
properties already given.
o Graciano married petitioner Patrician Natcher. Then Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action
Graciano sold his part of the property to Patricia Natcher. and special proceedings, in this wise:
o Later, Graciano died. His heirs being Patricia Natcher and
the 6 children. "XXX a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the
Civil Case was filed in the RTC of Manila. Wherein the private enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of
respondents (6 children) alleged that upon the death of Graciano, a wrong.
Patricia Natcher through fraud, misrepresentation and forgery
acquired the property by making it appear that Graciano executed a "A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are
Deed of Sale in favor of her. government by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to specific
o Natcher averred she was legally married to Graciano rules prescribed for a special civil action.
making her a compulsory heir. She further alleged that
during Gracianos lifetime, he already distributed, in
"XXX
advance, properties to his children, hence, respondents
may not anymore claim against the estate of Graciano.
o RTC said: The Deed of Sale in favor of Natcher is null and "c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
void. establish a status, a right or a particular fact."
Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon 1

There lies a marked distinction between an action and a special proceeding. court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by
An action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner
manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of Natcher.
applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. The
term "special proceeding" may be defined as an application or The trial court failed to observe established rules of procedure governing the
proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario. Hence, the decision of
fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required the CA is affirmed.
unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the
remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion." Hernandez vs Rural Bank 81 SCRA 75
According to American Jurisprudence: Facts:

"It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those
proceedings which are instituted and prosecuted according to the Spouses Hernandez obtained a loan secured by real estate from
ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at law or suits in equity, Rural Bank (1961) a sum of 6ooo payable on 1962
and that special proceedings include those proceedings which are not - 3 months after they loan the bank became distresses
ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and prosecuted according to and later was suspended to operate by Monetary Boars in
some special mode as in the case of proceedings commenced without its resolution No. 928
summons and prosecuted without regular pleadings, which are
characteristics of ordinary actions. XXX A special proceeding must therefore The bank filed with CFI Manila a complaint for seeking to restraint
be in the nature of a distinct and independent proceeding for particular relief, the implementation of the Resolution
such as may be instituted independently of a pending action, by petition or Hernandez before the expiration of the term of loan went to bank
motion upon notice." and offered payment by means of check drawn against the bank by
depositor San Pablo Colleges payable to Hernandez
Applying these principles, matters relating to settlement of the estate of a -payment was not consummated and check was
deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, dishonored because the banks operations was suspended
partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires - Hernandez after several requests to offer payment finally
the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court. mailed the same check he presented to the bank and
request to cancel the loan
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to Monetary Board decided to liquidate the bank.
advancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased to any Meanwhile, CFI Manila rendered decision restraining the
heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the enforcement of MB Resolution 928 and required the bank to
estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be undertake reorganization and curtail its operation
binding. - Central Bank (CB) appealed the decision before SC
- Sc reversed the decision of CFI manila and dismissed
The Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, the complaint for injunction
is devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of CB filed a petition before CFI MANILA for liquidation of bank
advancement of the real property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher. The and it was granted
RTC of Manila Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a probate

- Among the receivables of bank was the account of liquidation is intended to prevent multiplicity of actions against the insolvent.
Hernandez In this case Hernandez files a separate action in CFI LIPA and not in the
- Hernadez went to bank requested to cancel the liquidation bank which is CFI MANILA.
mortgage and claimed that he already paid it
- CB claimed that no payment was made because the THEREFORE, Venue is improper and the separate action filed therein is not
check cannot be honored because the bank was allowed and the REMEDY available for Hernandez was to intervene in the
already closed when it received the check and Liquidation Proceedings in CFI MANILA.
advised to settle it in cash
Hernandez disregarded it and filed separate action in CFI Lipa to * Sorry cant really see the connection of this case with Rule 1. This
compel the bank to accept the check and cancel the mortgage case is about jurisdiction.
and ask for damages.
CB filed motion to dismiss contending: G.R. No. L-49475 September 28, 1993
- that the venue is improper because the
encumbered property was situated in QC thus JORGE C. PADERANGA, petitioner,
the case should be filed in QC vs.
- since bank is under liquidation his assets are Hon. DIMALANES B. BUISSAN, Presiding Judge, Court of First
under custodial egis and may be reached only Instance of Zamboanga del Norte, Branch III and ELUMBA INDUSTRIES
by motion or petition in CFI MANILA (the COMPANY, represented by its General Manager, JOSE J.
liquidation Court) ELUMBA,respondents.
MD was denied
CFI LIPA ordered the bank to accept the check and pay the
damages
Rural Bank went to SC to appeal the decision arguing that: Facts:
- Venue is improper
- CFI MANILA has Jurisdiction over the claim Petitioner PADERANGA and private respondent ELUMBA entered into an
oral contract of lease for an indefinite period (P150.00 per month) of a
RULING: VENUE ISSUE: the complaint of cancellation of real estate
commercial space in Ozamiz City.
mortgage is a personal action because the mortgagee has not foreclosed
the mortgage. (Rule 4 of ROC Sec2 (a)). When the action is personal
plaintiff may file the action in his residence or defendants residents at the P subdivided the leased premises into two (2) by constructing a partition wall
election of plaintiff. (Rule 4 of ROC Sec2 (b)). HOWEVER in this case in between. He then took possession of the other half, allegedly with Jose
Elumbras consent.
BATANGAS was the domicile of Hernandez and their actual residence is in
QC. The term resides in Rule mentioned refers to place of actual residence
not domicile. CFI of Zamboanga del Norte based in Dipolog City
R instituted an action for damages and prayed for the fixing of the
SEPARATE ACTION FILED ISSUE: It is not maintainable because it is period of lease at five (5) years.
provided that if there is judicial liquidation of an insolvent bank all claims P moved for its dismissal
against the bank should be filed in the liquidation proceedings. Judicial

action was a real action, jurisdiction is with the Court of Petition for Prohibition is GRANTED.
First Instance of Misamis Occidental stationed in Ozamiz
City where the property in question was situated. Erminita Munoz v. Victoriano Yabut
Motion to Dismiss DENIED (case merely involved the enforcement
of the contract of lease, and while affecting a portion of real Petition for review on certiorari of the decisions and resolutions of the CA.
property, there was no question of ownership raised hence, venue The subject is a house and lot sold Munoz which she sold to her sister
was properly laid Emilia Ching, who in turn sold it to the Go spouses. When the Go spouses
P filed MOR but was also Denied defaulted on their loan to BPI the property was foreclosed. BPI won as the
highest bidder at the auction and the property was sold to the Chan
spouses.
Munoz registered her adverse claim and filed a complaint with the RTC for
SC - P filed petition for prohibition
annulment of a deed of absolute sale, cancellation of TCT in the spouses
Gos names and for revival of the TCT under her name. She also caused the
PADERANGA - inasmuch as ELUMBA seeks to recover possession of the annotation of a lis pendens.
portion surrendered to P, being a real action, venue is laid in the court
having jurisdiction over the territory in which the property lies. The RTC granted Gos motion for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
and Munoz was driven out of the property. Munoz, meanwhile, filed a
ELUMBA - present action is chiefly for damages arising from an alleged petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA assailing the writ of
breach in the lease contract; hence, the issue of recovery of possession is preliminary mandatory injunction granted by the RTC, but it was dismissed.
merely incidental.
The RTC rendered its judgment against Emilia Ching and the Go spouses. It
found that Munozs signature and the absolute deed of sale was forged.
ISSUE: WON CFI of Zamboanga del Norte based in Dipolog City has
Munoz never sold the subject property to her sister and that the Go spouses
jurisdiction over the case
were not innocent purchasers for value. The sale was null and void.
HELD: NO. Emilia Ching appealed the decision, but the appellate court not only affirmed
the decision of the RTC, it ordered the spouses Go and their successors in
While it may be that the instant complaint does not explicitly pray for interest to vacate the premises.
recovery of possession, such is the necessary consequence thereof. The
instant action therefore does not operate to efface the fundamental and After the RTC filed a writ of execution implementing its judgment, the
prime objective of the nature of the case which is to recover the one-half spouses Chan came forward and filed an urgent motion to stop the
portion repossessed by the lessor, herein petitioner. Indeed, where the execution against them. They asserted ownership and possession on the
ultimate purpose of an action involves title to or seeks recovery of basis of a clean title registered in their names, also contending that the final
possession, partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real judgment cannot be executed against them as they were not parties to the
property, such an action must be deemed a real action and must perforce case and that they purchased the property from BPI without any defects to
be commenced and tried in the province where the property or any part the title.
thereof lies (Ozamiz City)

Munoz discovered the cancellation of her adverse claim and notice of lis Munoz appealed to the CA, but the CA sustained the RTC orders holding
pendens, plus the subsequent events that led to transfer and registration that the Chans right to due process was vitiated by impleading them only at
from Go, to BPI then to the Chans. the execution stage of the civil case. The order of the RTC in the civil case
was null and void, and considering they are strangers to the case and they
It was denied by the RTC. The photocopy of BPIs TCT could hardly be are innocent purchasers for value.
regarded as proof that Munozs adverse claim and notice of lis pendens
were missing from the original, also pointing out that the registration in the Thereafter Munoz filed a motion for contempt with the RTC against the Chan
day book is what serves as sufficient notice to the world. There was no more spouses and Atty. Yabut. Munoz also filed a Motion for an alias writ of
need to annotate the title. They were deemed to have taken the property execution and application for surrender of the owners duplicate TCT, in
subject to the final outcome of the present dispute. which she prayed to direct the RD not only to cancel the TCT of Go, but all
documents declared null and void, and to restore her TCT free from all liens
The RTC then issued an alias writ of execution and the subject property was and encumbrances.
taken from the spouses and returned to Munoz. Their motion for
reconsideration was denied. In its order the RTC denied Munozs motion for contempt, but ordering an
alias writ of execution to deliver the property to Munoz, ordering Go to
Munoz then instituted a complaint for forcible entry with a prayer for vacate. It also ordered the RD to cancel from the records all documents
preliminary mandatory injunction alleging that with the aid of armed men, determined void and to restore Munozs TCT.
Chan and Atty. Yabut forcibly ousted Munoz of possession.
Unrelenting Munoz filed a motion for clarificatory order, pointing out that the
They claim Chan to be the true owner that his possession was never spouses Chan are the present occupants and that the property could not be
interrupted, and the men were there to attend services at the Buddhist delivered unless the spouses Chan are evicted. The motion was denied
Temple on the fourth floor of the building on the property. Munozs claim of reiterating the rule that once a judgment has become final only clerical errors
forcible entry should be dismissed for lack of merit and legal basis. may be corrected.
The MeTC granted Munozs petition and restored possession to her. Munoz elevated the complaint to the SC, but it was remanded to the CA in
observance of the hierarchy. The CA dismissed Munozs petition agreeing
Yabut and Chan questioned the MeTCs decision through a petition for with the RTC that the Chan spouses could not be covered by the writ of
certiorari with a prayer for a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction before the execution considering they were not impleaded in the civil case.
RTC. They asserted that they were not bound by the final judgment between
Go and Munoz. Munoz on the other hand argued that the MeTC order was Munoz claims that the decision in the civil case binds not only Ching, the Go
an interlocutory order, and is thus a prohibited pleading under the rules of spouses and BPI, but their successors in interest, assigns or persons acting
summary procedure. The RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction to on their behalf, hence they cannot be considered as innocent purchasers for
enjoin the implementation of the MeTC order. value.
The RTC found that the MeTC had committed grave abuse of discretion for Ruling
not dismissing the complaint for forcible entry on the ground of lis pendens
as the issue to who had a better right to possession between Chan and The SC denies Munozs petition for contempt and motion for clarificatory
Munoz was the subject of a pending proceeding. The RTC dismissed the order seeking that the Chans be executed against because the prior civil
ejectment suit. case against Go is an action for reconveyance which is an action in

personam. Since the Chans and BPI were not impleaded as parties, the o That La Paz Road was restored by the residents to make
effect of the judgment cannot bind or be extended to them by simply issuing it passable but Fil-estate excavated the road again.
alias writs of execution. No man shall be affected by any proceeding to o The act of Fil-estate in excavating La Paz Road caused
which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any damage, prejudice, inconvenience, annoyance, and loss
judgment rendered to the court. of precious hours to them, to the commuters and motorists
because traffic was re-routed to narrow streets that
Although the titles of Ching and Go were deemed void, there was no similar caused terrible traffic congestion and hazard
determination as to the titles that BPI and Chan had. Munoz cannot o And that its permanent closure would not only prejudice
collateraly attack the title that the Chans have; they must be given their day their right to free and unhampered use of the property but
in court in a proceeding designated for that purpose. would also cause great damage and irreparable injury.
JCHA prayed for the issuance of a TRO or a writ of preliminary
G.R. No. 152272 March 5, 2012
injunction (WPI) to enjoin Fil-Estate, from stopping and intimidating
JUANA COMPLEX I HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioners,
them in their use of La Paz Road.
vs.
RTC issued a TRO for a period of 20 days and a WPI, to stop
FIL-ESTATE LAND, INC., Respondents
preventing, coercing, intimidating or harassing the commuters and
motorists from using the La Paz Road.
Facts:
Fil-Estate, et al. filed a motion to dismiss.
o Arguing that the complaint failed to state a cause of action
On January 20, 1999, Petitioner (JCHA), together with individual and that it was improperly filed as a class suit.
residents of Juana Complex I and other neighboring subdivisions Fil-Estate, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration.
(collectively referred as JCHA, et. al.), instituted a complaint for RTC issued an Omnibus Order denying the motion to dismiss
damages in the RTC of Binan, Laguna, in its own behalf and as a and motion for reconsideration.
class suit representing the regular commuters and motorists of
Fil-Estate filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA.
Juana Complex I and neighboring subdivisions who were deprived
o They contended that the complaint failed to state a cause
of the use of La Paz Road, against Fil-Estate Land, Inc. (Fil-
of action and that it was improperly filed as a class suit.
Estate).
CA affirmed the denial of the RTC of the motion to dismiss.
o The complaint alleged that JCHA, et al. were regular
o CA ruled that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of
commuters and motorists who constantly travelled towards
action when JCHA, et al. alleged in their complaint that
the direction of Manila and Calamba, used the entry and
they had been using La Paz Road for more than ten (10)
exit toll gates of South Luzon Expressway (SLEX) by
years and that their right was violated when Fil-Estate
passing through right-of-way public road known as La Paz
closed and excavated the road.
Road.
o It sustained the RTC ruling that the complaint was properly
o They had been using La Paz Road for more than 10
filed as a class suit as it was shown that the case was of
years.
common interest and that the individuals sought to be
o That in August 1998, Fil-estate excavated, broke and
represented were so numerous that it was impractical to
deliberately ruined La Paz Road that led to SLEX so
include all of them as parties.
JCHA, et al. would not be able to pass through the said
Hence, this petitions for review.
road;

Fil-Estate explains that La Paz Road is included in the parcels of The question of whether the complaint states a cause of action is
land covered by TCTs all registered in the name of La Paz. determined by its averments regarding the acts committed by the
The purpose of constructing La Paz Road was to provide a defendant.
passageway for La Paz to its intended projects to the south, one of Thus, it must contain a concise statement of the ultimate or
which was the Juana Complex I. essential facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action.
When Juana Complex I was completed, La Paz donated the open To be taken into account are only the material allegations in the
spaces, drainage, canal, and lighting facilities inside the Juana complaint; extraneous facts and circumstances or other matters
Complex I to the Municipality of Bian. aliunde are not considered.
The streets within the subdivisions were then converted to public The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as
roads and were opened for use of the general public. constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts
The La Paz Road, not being part of the Juana Complex I, was alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with
excluded from the donation. Subsequently, La Paz became a the prayer of said complaint.
shareholder of FEEC, a consortium formed to develop several real Stated differently, if the allegations in the complaint furnish
properties in Bian, Laguna, known as Ecocentrum Project. sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the
In exchange for shares of stock, La Paz contributed some of its real same should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may
properties to the Municipality of Bian, including the properties be asserted by the defendant.
constituting La Paz Road, to form part of the Ecocentrum Project. In the present case, the Court finds the allegations in the
Fil-Estate insists that the complaint did not sufficiently contain complaint sufficient to establish a cause of action.
the ultimate facts to show a cause of action. First, JCHA, et al.s averments in the complaint show a
They aver the bare allegation that one is entitled to something is an demandable right over La Paz Road.
allegation of a conclusion which adds nothing to the pleading. These are:
o (1) their right to use the road on the basis of their
Issue: Whether the complaint states a cause of action. allegation that they had been using the road for more than
10 years; and
Held: Yes. o (2) an easement of a right of way has been constituted
over the said roads.
o There is no other road as wide as La Paz Road existing in
Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of action as
the vicinity and it is the shortest, convenient and safe route
an act or omission by which a party violates the right of another.
towards SLEX Halang that the commuters and motorists
A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three (3) may use.
essential elements of a cause of action, namely:
Second, there is an alleged violation of such right committed by Fil-
Estate, when they excavated the road and prevented the
1. the legal right of the plaintiff, commuters and motorists from using the same.
Third, JCHA, consequently suffered injury and that a valid judgment
2. the correlative obligation of the defendant, and could have been rendered in accordance with the relief sought
3. the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal therein.
right.

Sub-Issue: Whether the complaint was properly filed as a Class Suit. have filed manifestations with the lower court, conveying
their intention to join private respondents in the suit and
Held: Yes. claiming that they are similarly situated with private
respondents for they were also prejudiced by the acts of
petitioners in closing and excavating the La Paz Road.
With respect to the issue that the case was improperly instituted as
Moreover, the individuals sought to be represented by
a class suit, the Court finds the opposition without merit.
private respondents in the suit are so numerous that it is
impracticable to join them all as parties and be named
Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a class suit, as
individually as plaintiffs in the complaint. These individuals
follows:
claim to be residents of various barangays in Bian,
Laguna and other barangays in San Pedro, Laguna.
Sec. 12. Class suit. When the subject matter of
the controversy is one of common or general interest to
many persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join PNB vs Court of Appeals
all as parties, a number of them which the court finds to
be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully PETITION TO REVIEW ON CERTIORARI OF THE DECISION OF THE CA
protect the interests of all concerned may sue or defend WHICH IS AN ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE AND DAMAGES
for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the
right to intervene to protect his individual interest. FACTS:
Donata MONTEMAYOR through her son SALVADOR VITUG

The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are:
mortgaged several parcels of land situated in Pampanga, the
property served as a guarantee for the loan granted by PNB
1) the subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to
o LOAN TO Salvador Jaramilla and Pedro Bacani
many persons;
In 1963, MONTEMAYOR also mortgaged 2 parcels of land to
guarantee the loan of her son VITUG
2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them The TCTs mortgaged were all in the name of Donata
all to court; and MONTEMAYOR
VITUG failed to pay, and the properties were foreclosed and sold at
3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or public auction
representative of the class and can fully protect the interests of all o Jaramilla and Bacani also failed to settle the loan
concerned. o Cert of Sale was issued to PNB
o PNB later on sold the properties
In this case, the suit is clearly one that benefits all commuters and HISTORY
motorists who use La Paz Road. As succinctly stated by the CA: o Clodualdo Vitug was married twice, his second wife is
The subject matter of the instant case, i.e., the MONTEMAYOR
closure and excavation of the La Paz Road, is initially o He died intestate (with no will) and his estate was settled
shown to be of common or general interest to many and distributed
persons. The records reveal that numerous individuals

MONTEMAYOR was the administratix (meaning, o PNB was only included because the subject properties
the court made her the administer the estate of were sold.
Clodualdo) A mortgaged property should be in the name of
MONTEMAYOR entered a contract of the mortgagee, because the assumption is the
lease with two of her children mortgagee will be in default (eventually). The
o But then the other children filed an action for partition and property is a security for the payment of the loan.
reconveyance and damages against the administrator of PNB relied on the Torrens title, why would they
MONTEMAYORS estate (by this time Montemayor even question the validity of the titles? The titles
already passed away) were in the name of MONTEMAYOR. Therefore,
o They also included PNB in the action, because PNB they dont have to look beyond the title.
sold the mortgaged properties Actions for the recovery of real property and for partition ARE
THE SUBJECT of the action is 30 parcels of REAL ACTIONS, but they are also actions in personam that
land, which they claim to be CLODUALDOs and bind particular individuals who are parties thereto.
MONTEMAYORS o PNB not being a party in said cases is not bound by said
They argue that decisions
o The mortgage to PNB as well PNB was also not aware of the case and the said
as decision, because of they knew the conjugal
o The PUBLIC AUCTION are null nature of the property, they would have required
and void. the consent of all the heirs (co-owners).
They invoke a previous court decision WHEREFORE, the subject decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is
wherein the properties were decided to hereby REVERSED and set aside and another decision is hereby rendered
be of conjugal nature. DISMISSING the complaint and ordering private respondents to pay
1975, the lower court dismissed the complaint attomey's fees and expenses of litigation to petitioner PNB in the amount of
Plaintiffs interposed an appeal to the CA P20,000.00 and the costs of the suit.
Reversed lower court decision stating
that the public auction of the properties
are valid, but only HALF. MANILA HOTEL V CA (384 SCRA 515) a petition for review on certiorari
SO NOW, PNB filed a petition for
FACTS:
certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not PNB is a party to action for reconveyance and
Alcordo was hired by petitioner Manila Hotel on March 23, 1998 as
damages? Food and Beverage Director however, his services were terminated
on the ground of loss of confidence
HELD: NO.
Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for
Remember that there was a previous decision stating that the illegal dismissal on the ground that Alcordo, was hired not only to
parcels of land are of conjugal nature oversee the operations of the restaurants but precisely to improve
o PNB cannot be a proper party thereto. their profitability. Hence, the failure of private respondent to meet
this condition despite regular monthly evaluation by petitioner,

showing the substantial drop in the profitability of the department the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment
under his control, justified his dismissal for loss of confidence. is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein;
- Petitioner was ordered to pay private respondents one
month salary of P80,000.00 in lieu of the 30-day advance (2) where the interest of substantial justice will be served;
notice of dismissal, plus an indemnity of P5,000.00 for its
(3) where the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the
failure to comply with procedural due process
sound and judicious discretion of the court; and (4) where the
Petitioner appealed to (NLRC) which reversed the decision of the
injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the degree
Labor Arbiter
of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
-It ruled that petitioner failed to prove that Alcordo was
prescribed
hired subject to the condition that he would improve the profitability
of the restaurants, and that the unsatisfactory performance of said
Oversight have become an all too familiar and ready excuse on the
restaurants was due to the fault or negligence of Alcordo
part of lawyers remiss in their bounden duty to comply with established
A motion for reconsideration was filed but it was denied. rules. Rules of procedure are tools designed to promote efficiency and
A petition for certiorari was filed by petitioner with the Court of orderliness as well as to facilitate attainment of justice, such that strict
Appeals adherence thereto is required. The application of the Rules may be
- CA dismissed the petition on the following grounds: 1) the relaxed only when rigidity would result in a defeat of equity and
petition was not accompanied with copies of the decision substantial justice.
of the Labor Arbiter and the position paper of the parties;
2) the certificate of non-forum shopping was signed by THEREFORE, In the case at bar, petitioner has not shown any cogent
Atty. Martin B. Isidro, petitioners counsel and Assistant reason for the Court to be liberal in the application of the rules.
Vice-President, Personnel Department; and 3) the petition
was not accompanied with a board resolution authorizing G.R. No. 146611 February 6, 2007
Atty. Martin B. Isidro to act for and in behalf of petitioner.
MR was filed with documents that was not attached in petition and TANCREDO REDEA, Petitioner,
claimed that failure to attached those documents was due to vs.
oversight. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LEOCADIO REDEA, Respondents.
- CA denied MR stressing that under Rule 46, Section 3, in
relation to Rule 65, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Facts:
Procedure, failure to append copies of relevant documents
is sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
CFI San Pablo City, Laguna
Hence, petition for review on certiorari praying for a liberal
petitioner Tancredo filed an action for partition of their common
interpretation of the rules of procedure
fathers several pieces of realty, to wit: a residential lot at M. Calim
Street, Famy, Laguna; a riceland at Poroza, Famy, Laguna; and
RULING: Liberal construction of the rule has been allowed by
another parcel of land at Maate, also in Famy, Laguna, against his
SUPREME Court in the following cases:
older half-brother, herein private respondent Leocadio
(1) where a rigid application will result in manifest failure or Court ordered Leocadio to partition only the property located at
miscarriage of justice, especially if a party successfully shows that Maate, Famy, Laguna

P filed with the trial court a Notice of Appeal - The court gave due It is equally settled, however, that this Courts power to liberally construe and
course to the notice and directed the elevation of the records of the even to suspend the rules, presupposes the existence of substantial rights in
case to the CA whereat petitioners appeal was docketed as CA- favor of which, the strict application of technical rules must concede. The
G.R.CV No. 59641. facts are borne out by the records pertaining to petitioners purported
undivided share in the property at M. Calim Street, Famy, Laguna, and the
CA property in Poroza clearly showed that these two properties had been
no appellants brief filed within the extended period, CA considered subject of an agreement (Exh. "1") whereby petitioner recognized
the appeal abandoned and accordingly dismissing the same. respondents rights to said properties. This fact binds this Court, there being
After 8 months, P filed a motion for reconsideration thereof - CA nothing on record with the trial court as to the herein alleged fraud against
denied the motion the petitioner. Upon thorough deliberation of the supposed substantial rights
P filed a Petition for Relief praying CA to set aside its dismissal, claimed by the petitioner with the court below, the Court finds no cogent
reinstate his appeal and grant him a fresh period of forty-five (45) basis to favorably rule on the merits of the appeal even if it may be given
days from notice within which to file his appellants brief. Denied due course which is indispensable to justify this Court in considering this
P filed special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 case as an exception to the rules.
Rules of Civil Procedure to SC
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED and the assailed
Issue: WON CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the Petition resolutions of the CA are AFFIRMED.
for Relief
Tesorero v. Mathay
Held : NO
Facts
In Hagonoy Market Vendor Association v. Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan,
This is a petition for review on certiorari, with a prayer for a restraining order,
G.R. No. 137621, February 6, 2002, then Associate Justice, now Chief
seeking the annulment of the decision of the Board of Energy (BOE).
Justice Reynato S. Puno, reminded us that
Davao Light and Power (DALIGHT) filed an application with the BOE for the
The Rules itself expressly states in Section 2 of Rule 1 that the approval of the sound value appraisal of its properties and equipment in
rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object service. The first appraisal for 339M was made by Technical and
and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive Management Service Philippines (TAMSPHIL), and was rejected by the
determination of every action and proceeding. Courts, therefore, BOE after hearings and an ocular inspection because the TAMSPHIL
not only have the power but the duty to construe and apply President was a technical consultant of DALIGHT and there were
technical rules liberally in favor of substantive law and substantial discrepancies of serious proportion in the appraisal.
justice. Furthermore, this Court, unlike courts below, has the power
not only to liberally construe the rules, but also to suspend them, in DALIGHT again filed an application for approval and appraisal, this time
favor of substantive law or substantial rights. Such power inherently conducted by Asian Appraisal Co. in the amount of 309M, but it was
belongs to this Court, which is expressly vested with rule-making opposed by petitioners.
power by no less than the Constitution.

The BOE constituted a team to conduct and ocular of DALIGHTs properties, CRISOSTOMO REBOLLIDO, FERNANDO VALENCIA and EDWIN
equipment, books and papers related to the appraisal made by Asian, but REBOLLIDO, petitioners
only approved 282M as a fair and reasonable value. vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEPSICO, INC., respondents.
Seventeen (17) days after receipt of the decision, petitioners filed a motion
for reconsideration, but were denied, hence the instant petition with Davao Facts:
city as intervenors.
Issue - Is ceritiorari the proper remedy? Note: Pepsi Cola is the defendant while Pepsico is the Private
respondent.
Ruling
On August 7, 1984, (take note of the date) the petitioners filed
There is no question that certiorari is not the proper remedy in this case. The Civil Case for damages against Pepsi Cola Bottling Company of the
BOE charter provides for an appeal to the Office of the president within Philippines, Inc. (Pepsi Cola) and Alberto Alva before the Regional
seven (7) days from the receipt of a decision or orders. After, final decisions, Trial Court of Makati.
orders, awards or resolutions of all quasi-judicial bodies other than those o The case arose out of a vehicular accident on March 1,
specifically excepted are reviewable by the IAC. 1984, (take note of the date) involving a school bus
owned and driven by petitioners, and a truck trailer owned
In the broader interest of justice this Court has given due course to this
at that time by Pepsi Cola and driven by Alberto Alva.
petition, although the proper remedy is appeal and since litigations should,
The sheriff of the lower court served the summons addressed to the
as much as possible be decided on their merits not on technicalities. The
defendants.
records also indicate that this case will not only affect herein petitioners, but
It was received by one Nanette Sison who represented herself to
also the consumers of Davao.
be the authorized person receiving court processes as she was the
It is well settled that this Court cannot substitute its judgment or discretion for secretary of the legal department of Pepsi Cola.
that of the BOE whose decisions and determinations particularly on matter of Pepsi Cola failed to file an answer and was later declared in
fact carry great weight. But, it is equally accepted that exhaustion of default.
remedies before resort to judicial bodies is not an absolute rule. It admits of The lower court heard the case ex-parte and adjudged the
exception, as when the question litigated upon is a purely legal one the rule defendants jointly and severally liable for damages.
may be relaxed when its application may cause great and irreparable When the default judgment became final and executory, the
damage. petitioners filed a motion for execution, a copy of which was
received no longer by the defendant Pepsi Cola but by private
respondent PEPSICO, Inc.
At that time, the private respondent was already occupying the
RULE Rule 2, Secs. 1 to 6 place of business of Pepsi Cola.
Private respondent, a foreign corporation organized under the
G.R. No. 81123 February 28, 1989 laws of the State of Delaware, USA, held offices here for the
purpose, among others, of settling Pepsi Cola's debts, liabilities and
obligations which it assumed in a written undertaking executed on

June 11, 1983, preparatory to the expected dissolution of Pepsi Held: Yes.
Cola.
The dissolution of Pepsi Cola as approved by the Securities and The petitioner posits:
Exchange Commission materialized on March 2, 1984, (take note o It is Pepsi Cola which is the real party in the case before
of the date) one day after the accident occurred. the trial court because when the accident happened on
Respondent PEPSICO opposed the motion for execution and March 1, 1984 or one day before the date of legal
moved to vacate the judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. dissolution, Pepsi Cola was still the registered owner of
The private respondent questioned the validity of the service of the truck involved.
summons to a mere clerk. o Being solidarily liable with its driver for damages under
Lower court denied the motion of the private respondent holding Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, there appears to
that despite the dissolution and the assumption of liabilities by the be no question that the complaint and summons were
private respondent, there was proper service of summons upon correctly filed and served on Pepsi Cola.
defendant Pepsi Cola. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that:
Private respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition with CA to annul and set aside the judgment of the Parties in interest - Every action must be prosecuted and
lower court and its order denying the motion to vacate the defended in the name of the real party in interest. ... .
judgment, for having been issued without jurisdiction.
CA granted the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
S.C. states that a real party in interest-plaintiff is one who has a
ruling that there was no valid service of summons.
legal right while a real party in interest-defendant is one who has a
o The appellate court stated that any judgment rendered
correlative legal obligation whose act or omission violates the legal
against Pepsi Cola after its dissolution is a "liability" of the
rights of the former.
private respondent within the contemplation of the
For purposes of valid summons, the dissolved Pepsi Cola was the
undertaking, but service of summons should be made
real party in interest-defendant in the civil case filed by the
upon the private respondent itself in accordance with
petitioners not only because it is the registered owner of the truck
Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
involved but also because, when the cause of action accrued,
o It remanded the case to the lower court and ordered that
Pepsi Cola still existed as a corporation and was the party
the private respondent be summoned and be given its day
involved in the acts violative of the legal right of another.
in court.
The petitioners had a valid cause of action for damages against
Pepsi Cola.
A motion for reconsideration was denied. o A cause of action is defined as "an act or omission of one
party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other;
Hence, this petition for review. and its essential elements are a legal right of the plaintiff,
correlative obligation of the defendants and an act or
Issue: Whether Pepsi Cola, the dissolved corporation, is the real party in omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right."
interest to whom summons should be served in the civil case for
damages.

The law provides that a corporation whose corporate term has Baliwag filed a complaint for damages against the Philippine National
ceased can still be made a party to a suit. Under paragraph 1, Railways, which was held liable for its negligence in a decision rendered on
Section 122 of the Corporation Code, a dissolved corporation: April 6, 1977, by Judge Benigno Puno. Hughes was absolved of any
contributory negligence.
...shall nevertheless be continued as a body corporate for
Hughes claims that soon after the decision against the PNR, he had his
three (3) years after the time when it would have been so
driver's license renewed and then sought reinstatement with Baliwag Transit.
dissolved, for the purpose of prosecuting and defending
He repeated his request several times even after the dismissal of the
suits by or against it and enabling it to settle and close its
criminal case. He then decided to seek the assistance of Minister Ople, who
affairs, to dispose of and convey its property and to
wrote the petitioner on April 24, 1980, and "implored" the private
distribute its assets, but not for the purpose of continuing
the business for which it was established. respondent's re- employment. As this request was also ignored, Hughes
finally demanded his reinstatement on May 2, 1980. On May 10, 1980, the
petitioner replied to say he could not be reinstated because his driver's
In the case at bar, the right of action of the petitioners against
license had already been revoked and his driving was extremely dangerous
Pepsi Cola and its driver arose not at the time when the complaint
to the riding public."
was filed but when the acts or omission constituting the cause of
action accrued, on March 1, 1984 which is the date of the accident CIV PRO FACTS
and when Pepsi Cola allegedly committed the wrong.
The private respondent's reaction to this rejection was to file on July 29,
G.R. No. L-57642 March 16, 1989 1980, a formal complaint with the Ministry of Labor and Employment for
BALIWAG TRANSIT, INC., petitioner, illegal dismissal against the petitioner, with a prayer for his reinstatement
vs. with back wages from May 10, 1980.
HON. BLAS F. OPLE, Minister of Labor and Employment, and ROMEO
HUGHES, respondents. On January 22, 1981, the complaint was dismissed by Director Francisco L.
Estrella, National Capital Region, on the ground of prescription, "it appearing
The petitioner is a duly organized corporation with a valid authorization from that although the private respondent was separated from the service on 10
the Board of Transportation to operate a bus line. The private respondent August 1974 (date of the accident), it was not until 29 July 1980, or a little
was hired by it in 1966 and continued serving therein as a bus driver until the less than 6 years thereafter, when he filed the complaint."
incident in question, when he was relieved of his duties.
The regional director was, however, reversed by Minister Ople in his order
The incident occurred on August 10, 1974. Romeo Hughes was driving dated May 21, 1981.
Baliwag Transit Bus No. 1066 when it was stalled at the railroad crossing in
The question that has to be settled is the date when the cause of action
Calumpit, Bulacan, because the vehicle ahead of it had stopped owing to a
accrued and from which the period shall commence to run.The contention of
jeep that was making its way into a garage. As thus positioned, the bus was
Baliwag is that it should be August 10, 1974, when the collision occurred.
hit at its rear end by an onrushing train of the Philippine National Railways
Hughes insists it is May 10, 1980, when his demand for reinstatement was
that dragged it several meters.
rejected by the petitioner.
Eighteen passengers died and fifty six others suffered serious physical
SC said Hughes is correct its May 10, 1980.
injuries.

It is settled jurisprudence that a cause of action has three elements, (1) a Corazon and his brother Gonzalo co-owned a property
right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it - They obtained a loan from petitioner Development Bank of
arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to the Philippines (DBP) and as collateral, they executed a
respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of real estate mortgage over the subject property in favor of
such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of DBP.
the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff. - They failed to pay their amortizations.
- DBP foreclosed the real estate mortgage on September
We hold that the private respondent's right of action could not have accrued 15, 1983. Purportedly, no redemption was made within
from the mere fact of the occurrence of the mishap on August 10, 1974, as one year, and thus, DBP consolidated ownership over the
he was not considered automatically dismissed on that date. At best, he was subject property.
deemed suspended from his work.
Corazon died her sole heir was her daughter respondent
Cristina who asserted ownership over the subject property to
There was no apparent disagreement then between Hughes and his
the extent of one-half thereof
employer. As the private respondent was the petitioner's principal witness in
- However she discovered that the property was
its complaint for damages against the Philippine National Railways, we may
already registered as early as June 13, 1989 in the
assume that Baliwag Transit and Hughes were on the best of terms when
name of DBP
the case was being tried.
Cristina filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
We agree with the private respondent that May 10, 1980, is the date when of Dagupan City a complaint for reconveyance, quieting of title
his cause of action accrued, for it was then that the petitioner denied his and damages with prayer for a temporary restraining order
demand for reinstatement. (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction to prevent DBP from
conducting any auction sale on the subject property during the
Since a cause of action requires, as essential elements, not only a legal right pendency of the case
of the plaintiff and a correlative obligation of the defendant but also an act or - RTC granted the TRO
omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right the cause of action - DBP moved to lift the TRO arguing that it violates
does not accrue until the party obligated refuses, expressly or impliedly, to Section 2of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 385which
comply with its duty. prohibits the issuance of a restraining order,
temporary or permanent, against government
Hughes's complaint was filed not later than three months only after such financing institutions like DBP to enjoin any action
rejection, there is no question that his action has not prescribed. taken pursuant to the mandatory foreclosure clause of
the decree.
- Motion was denied and granted respondents plea for
an injunctive writ.
- DBP moved to reconsider the Order and at the same
DEVELOPMENT BANK v CASTILLO GR 163827 a petition for review on time sought the dismissal of respondents complaint
certiorari under Rule 45 on the sole ground that the same states no cause of
action
FACTS: - December 23, 1998, the writ of preliminary injunction
was issued

- RTC denied DBPs motion for reconsideration of the Hence an appeal was filed before SC. DBP claimed that it is
denial of its motion for the lifting of the TRO and evident from the face of the complaint that respondent failed to
DBPs motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered state a cause of action.
DBP to file an answer.
- DBP moved to reconsider the denial of its motion to RULLING: A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates
dismiss. But even before the RTC could resolve said a right of another. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains
motion, DBP filed its Answer three essential elements:
- A manifestation was later filed by DBP indicating that
the answer it filed was a mere cautionary measure or (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and whatever law it
what is known as an answer ad cautelam and thus arises;
without prejudice to any right of action it may take and
without any waiver of any of the grounds for the (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant to respect such right; and
dismissal of the complaint and any favorable
resolution or order that a superior court may issue (3) the act or omission of the defendant violates the right of the plaintiff. If
hereinafter any of these elements is absent, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a
- the RTC issued an order denying DBPs motion for motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.
reconsideration of its denial and in the same time
emphasized that DBP already filed an answer thereby
All the above elements of a cause of action are alleged in the
rendering the motion to dismiss moot and academic.
complaint: (1) the legal right of the respondent over the subject property
DBP filed a petition for certiorari before the CA assailing the foreclosed premised on the fact that she is the sole heir of one of the owners
following issuances of the RTC: who is entitled to the right of redemption; (2) the correlative obligation of
- TRO against DBP enjoining it from proceeding with defendant DBP, as the foreclosing entity, to respect such right of
the scheduled auction sale of the disputed property; redemption; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of the
- Order denying its motion to lift the TRO and legal right, i.e., the act of DBP and its co-defendant Zarate to cause the
granting the respondents prayer for a writ of ostensible foreclosure of the subject property and the subsequent execution
preliminary injunction; of a deed of conditional sale between the defendants even prior to the lapse
- Order denying DBPs motion to dismiss and motion of redemption period to deprive respondents mother of her right over the
for reconsideration of the December 14, 1998 Order; property.
and
- Order denying DBPs motion for reconsideration of
the March 8, 1999 order. THEREFORE, Petition is denied.
CA dismissed the petition on procedural grounds.
- It held that the petition questioning the first three orders
was filed late as the petition should have been filed within G.R. No. L-45350 May 29, 1939
60 days from receipt of the assailed orders and stated
that DBPs subsequent filing of its Answer to the
BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant,
complaint rendered its motion to dismiss moot and
vs.
academic.

ESTEBAN ICARAGAL and ORIENTAL COMMERCIAL CO., YES.
INC., defendants-appellees.
On June 11 , 1930, defendant, with one Jacinto Figueroa executed a REM in SC

favor of the plaintiff, Bachrach Motor Co., Inc a parcel of land in Pagil, Section 708 of our Code of Civil Procedure which provides that a
Laguna. They also executed a promissory note for one thousand six creditor holding a claim against the deceased, secured by a
hundred fourteen pesos (P1,614) as a security for the REMs payment. mortgage or other collateral security, has to elect between
Promissors defaulted in the payment. enforcing such security or abandoning it by presenting his claim
before the committee and share it in the general assets of the
CFI estate. Under this provision, It has been uniformly held by this court
Plaintiff filed an action for the collection of the amount due on the that, if the plaintiff elects one of the two remedies thus provided, he
note. waives the other, and if he fails, he fails utterly.
Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff.
A writ of execution was issued and the provincial sheriff of Laguna The same rule applies under the Insolvency Law.
levied on the properties of the defendants, including that which has
been mortgaged by Esteban Icaragal in favor of the plaintiff. But, even if we have no such section 708 of our Code of Civil
Procedure, or section 59 of the Insolvency Law, we have still the
The other defendant herein, Oriental Commercial Co., Inc., rule against splitting a single cause of action. This rule, though
interposed a third-party claim, alleging that by virtue of a writ of not contained in any statutory provision, has been applied by this
execution issued in civil case No. 88253 of the municipal court court in all appropriate cases.
of the City of Manila, the property which was the subject of the
mortgage and which has been levied upon by the sheriff, had
already been acquired by it at the public auction on May 12, The rule against splitting a single cause of action is intended "to prevent
1933. repeated litigation between the same parties in regard to the same subject of
controversy; to protect defendant from unnecessary vexation; and to avoid
In consequence thereof, the judgment rendered in favor of the the costs and expenses incident to numerous suits." It comes from that old
plaintiff remained unsatisfied. maxim nemo bedet bis vexare pro una et eadem cause (no man shall be
twice vexed for one and the same cause). And it developed, certainly not as
Plaintiff instituted ANOTHER action to foreclose the mortgage an original legal right of the defendant, but as an interposition of courts upon
Dismissed principles of public policy to prevent inconvenience and hardship incident to
repeated and unnecessary litigations
Hence, this appeal at SC
In the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may
institute against the mortgage debtor either a personal action for debt or real
ISSUE: WON plaintiff-appellant is barred from foreclosing the real estate action to foreclose the mortgage. In other words, he may pursue either of the
mortgage after it has elected to sue and obtain a personal judgment against two remedies, but not both. By such election, his cause of action can by no
the defendant-appellee on the promissory note for the payment of which the means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is complete in itself. Thus,
mortgage was constituted as a security. an election to bring personal action will leave open to him all the properties

of the debtor for attachment and execution, even including the mortgaged buying the lots. Their motion was denied by the RTC, so they assailed the
property itself. And, if he waives such personal action and pursues his denial on certiorari in the CA, which annulled the RTCs decision for being
remedy against the mortgaged property, an unsatisfied judgment thereon tainted with grave abuse and dismissing the civil case against Benelda.
would still give him the right to sue for a deficiency judgment, in which case,
all the properties of the defendant, other than the mortgaged property, are The Chus, Cunanans and Cool Town Realty entered into a compromise
again open to him for the satisfaction of the deficiency. In either case, his agreement. The RTC approved it.
remedy is complete, his cause of action undiminished, and any advantages
attendant to the pursuit of one or the other remedy are purely accidental and After, the Chus brought another suit against the Carloses and benelda,
are all under his right of election. seeking cancellation of the TCTs plus damages. They amended this
complaint to included the Cunanans.
Chu v. Cunanan The Cunananas and Benelda moved to dismiss mainly on the reason that
the action was barred by res judicata. The RTC denied the motions, holding
Facts
that the amended complaint stated a cause of action against all defendants;
The Chus executed a deed of sale with assumption of mortgage involving that the action was not barred by res judicata because there was no identity
five (5) parcels of land in favor of the Cunanans stipulating that ownership of parties and subject matter with the prior case.
would remain with the Chus until complete payment and total compliance
On appeal the CA granted the petition for certiorari nullifying the RTCs
with the terms of the deed of sale with mortgage. Thereafter, the Chus
orders, ruling that the compromise agreement had ended the controversy
executed and SPA authorizing the Cunanans to borrow money from any
and that the filing of the case violated the rule against splitting of a cause of
banking institution and to mortgage the five (5) lots as security, then to
action, rendering the case subject to a motion to dismiss on bar by res
deliver the proceeds to the Chus net of the balance of the mortgage and
judicata. Hence, this appeal
downpayment.
Issue Was the case barred by res judicata, although Benelda was not
The Cunanans were able to transfer the title of the five lots in her name
a party to the compromise agreement?
without the knowledge of the Chus and to borrow money with the lots as
security without paying the balance of the price to the Chus. She later Ruling
transferred two of the lots to the Carloses and three to Cool Town Realty,
despite the annotation of a vendors lien on the last three lots. Petition denied. The compromise agreement was not limited merely to th
three lots sold to Cool Town, it included the two sold to Benelda as it would
The Chus commenced a civil case in the RTC to recover the unpaid balance contravene the object of the civil case to enforce or rescind the deed of sale.
from the Cunanans. Five (5) years later they amended the complaint seeking
annulment of the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage and the TCTs It was apparent that petitioners were guilty of splitting their single cause of
issued pursuant to the deed with damages. They impleaded Cool Town action to enforce or rescind the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage.
Realty and the RD of Pampanga. Their splitting violated the policy against multiplicity of suit, the purpose of
which is to avoid unduly burdening the courts. Their contravention of the
The Carloses had meanwhile sold the two lots to Benelda Estate policy merited the dismissal of the case on the ground of bar by res judicata.
Development, so the Chus amended the complaint impleading Benelda.
Benelda filed its answer with a motion to dismiss, claiming that the amended In order that res judicata may be invoked, the following requisites must
complaint stated no cause of action because they had acted in good faith in concur:

a. The former judgment must be final; in their favor were approved in October 2000 by the Secretary of
b. It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the Agriculture for a period of twenty-five (25) years.
subject matter or the parties; On November 18, 2000, respondent allegedly forcibly and
c. It must be a judgment on the merits; unlawfully entered the leased properties and once inside barricaded
d. There must be between the first and second actions: the entrance to the fishponds, set up a barbed wire fence along the
a. Identity of parties road going to petitioners fishponds, and harvested several tons of
b. Identity of subject matter milkfish, fry and fingerlings owned by petitioners.
c. Identity of cause of action On November 22, 2000, petitioners promptly filed MTC in Sagay
Although Benelda was not made a party to the compromise agreement is City separate complaints for Forcible Entry With Temporary
inconsequential as they were deemed successors in interest of the Restraining Order And/Or Preliminary Injunction And Damages,
Cunanans. It has been held that absolute identity of parties is not a condition against Ernesto M. Treyes, Sr. and respondent.
sine qua non for res judicata to apply because a shared identity of interest In a separate move, petitioners filed in March 2004 with the
sufficed. As both actions involved the same properties the requisite of same Bacolod RTC a complaint for damages against respondent
subject matter was met, and it is obvious that there has been a final alleging:
judgment on the compromise agreement. Hence, the Chus are guilty of o That defendant Ernesto L. Treyes, Jr. and his armed men
splitting their cause of action. They should not be allowed to make a single forcibly and unlawfully entered the fishponds of the
cause of action the basis of several suits. plaintiffs and once inside barricaded the entrance of the
fishpond and set up barb wire fence along the road going
to plaintiffs fishpond and harvested the milkfish and carted
away several tons of milkfish owned by the plaintiffs;
G.R. No. 170916 April 27, 2007 o That on succeeding days, defendants men continued their
forage on the fishponds of the plaintiffs by carting and
CGR CORPORATION herein represented by its President ALBERTO taking away the remaining full grown milkfish, fry and
RAMOS, III, HERMAN M. BENEDICTO and ALBERTO R. BENEDICTO, fingerlings and other marine products in the fishponds.
Petitioners, NOT ONLY THAT, even the chapel built by plaintiff CGR
vs. Corporation was ransacked and destroyed and the
ERNESTO L. TREYES, JR., Respondent materials taken away by defendants men. Religious icons
were also stolen and as an extreme act of sacrilege, even
In issue is one of law whether a complainant in a forcible entry case can decapitated the heads of some of these icons;
file an independent action for damages arising after the act of dispossession o That the unlawful, forcible and illegal intrusion/destruction
had occurred. of defendant Ernesto Treyes, Jr. and his men on the
fishpond leased and possessed by the plaintiffs is without
Facts: any authority of law and in violation of Article 539 of the
New Civil Code.
CGR Corporation, claimed to have occupied 37.3033 hectares of

1) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff CGR Corporation the
public land in Barangay Bulanon, Sagay City, Negros Occidental
sum of at least P900,000.00 and to plaintiffs Herman and
even before the notarized separate 3 Fishpond Lease Agreements
Alberto Benedicto, the sum of at least P300,000.00 each by

way of actual damages and such other amounts as proved use and occupation of the premises,
during the trial; attorneys fees and costs. If it finds that said
allegations are not true, it shall render
2) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of judgment for the defendant to recover his
P100,000.00 each as moral damages; costs. If a counterclaim is established, the
court shall render judgment for the sum found
3) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of in arrears from either party and award costs
P100,000.00 each as exemplary damages; as justice requires. (Emphasis supplied)
4) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of The recoverable damages in forcible entry and detainer cases thus
P200,000.00 as attorneys fees, and to reimburse plaintiffs refer to "rents" or "the reasonable compensation for the use
with all such sums paid to their counsel by way of and occupation of the premises" or "fair rental value of the
appearance fees. property" and attorneys fees and costs.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss petitioners complaint for It bears noting that as reflected in the earlier-quoted allegations in
damages on three grounds litis pendentia, res judicata and forum the complaint for damages of herein petitioners, their claim for
shopping. damages have no direct relation to their loss of possession of
RTC dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground of prematurity. the premises.
o Holding that a complaint for damages may only be It had to do with respondents alleged harvesting and carting away
maintained "after a final determination on the forcible entry several tons of milkfish and other marine products in their
cases has been made." fishponds, ransacking and destroying of a chapel built by petitioner
CGR Corporation, and stealing religious icons and even
decapitating the heads of some of them, after the act of
Hence, the present petition for review.
dispossession had occurred.
Surely, one of the elements of litis pendentia - that the identity
Issue: Whether Petitioners filing of an independent action for damages is between the pending actions, with respect to the parties, rights
considered as splitting of a cause of action. asserted and reliefs prayed for, is such that any judgment rendered
on one action will, regardless of which is successful, amount to res
Held: No. judicata in the action under consideration - is not present, hence, it
may not be invoked to dismiss petitioners complaint for
Section 17, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides: damages.
Res judicata may not apply because the court in a forcible entry
SEC. 17. Judgment. If after trial the case has no jurisdiction over claims for damages other than the
court finds that the allegations of the use and occupation of the premises and attorneys fees.
complaint are true, it shall render judgment in Neither may forum-shopping justify a dismissal of the complaint for
favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of the damages, the elements of litis pendentia not being present, or
premises, the sum justly due as arrears of where a final judgment in the forcible entry case will not amount to
rent or as reasonable compensation for the res judicata in the former.

Petitioners filing of an independent action for damages other than The defendant filed an appeal with Branch Ill of the Court of First Instance of
those sustained as a result of their dispossession or those caused Cebu.
by the loss of their use and occupation of their properties could not
thus be considered as splitting of a cause of action. The Court of First Instance rendered a decision. Judgment is hereby
G.R. No. L-46000 March 18, 1985 required in favor of the defendant.
1. Ordering the plaintiff to pay

GLICERIO AGUSTIN (Deceased) as Administrator of the Intestate
a) P10,000.00 as moral damages;
Estate of Susana Agustinvs.
b) P5,000.00 as exemplary damages;
LAUREANO BACALAN and the PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF CEBU
c) P1,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
Bacalan is a lessee of a one-door ground floor space in a building owned by

the late Susana Agustin. Due to nonpayment of rentals despite repeated 2. With costs against plaintiff
demands an action to eject him was filed.
The decision lapsed into finality and became executory. A writ of execution
A complaint for ejectment with damages filed by plaintiff-appellant Agustin, was issued by virtue of which a notice to sell at public auction real properties
as adiministrator of the Intestate Estate of Susana Agustin, against belonging to the estate of Susana Agustin was issued by the Deputy Sheriff
defendant-appellee Bacalan, before the City Court of Cebu. to satisfy judgment.
Plaintiff-appellant prayed that Bacalan be ordered to immediately vacate the Plaintiff's counsel filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied.
place in question, to pay plaintiff-appellant the sum of P2,300.00
representing arrearages in rentals plus the corresponding rentals until he With the aid of new counsel, the Agustin filed a complaint with Branch V,
actually vacates the place, attorney's fees, expenses, and costs. Court of First Instance of Cebu, against the defendant and the Deputy
Sheriff of Cebu for the declaration of the nullity of the above-cited decision of
Bacalans answer included a counter-claim alleging that the present action Branch III, Court of First Instance of Cebu in the ejectment case on the
was "clearly unfounded and devoid of merits, as it is tainted with malice and ground that the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction was null and void from
bad faith. "That by virtue malicious filing of this action by the plaintiff against the beginning for the following reasons:
the defendant, the latter suffered, and will continue to suffer, actual and
moral damages in the amount of no less than P50,000.00; P10,000.00 in
(a) It grants relief in the total sum of P16,000.00 (exclusive of costs)
concept of exemplary damages. In addition, defendant has been compelled
distributed thus:
to retain the services of undersigned counsel to resist plaintiffs' reckless,
P10,000.00 as moral damages
malicious and frivolous claim and to protect and enforce his rights for which
P5,000.00 as exemplary damages
he obligated himself to pay the further sum of P3,500.00 as attorney's fees."
P1,000.00 as attorney's fees
which is clearly beyond the jurisdiction of the City Court of Cebu.
City Court of Cebu rendered judgment dismissing the counterclaim and
ordering the defendant to vacate the premises in question and to pay the
plaintiff the sum of P3,887.10 as unpaid back rentals and the sum of A motion to dismiss was filed by the defendant on the grounds that the
P150.00 as attorney's fees. plaintiff has no cause of action. The court sustained the defendant and ruled:

This Court believes that the present complaint fails to allege a valid cause of on credit from petitioner on various occasions from August to
action. October, 1981;
- second cause of action was against respondent Fernando Calion
Agustin's motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting him to file an for allegedly refusing to pay the amount of P10,212.00
appeal before the Court of Appeals. representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit
from petitioner on several occasions from March, 1981 to
Plaintiff-appellant assails the money judgment handed down by the court January, 1982.
which granted damages to the defendant-appellee. By reason thereof, he Private respondents opposed the action and filed motion to
seeks the declaration of the nullity of the entire judgment. dismiss for lack of jurisdiction citing Sec 19 of BP 129, the
regional trial court had exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount of
the demand is more than P20,000 and although, the other
Whether or not the Court of First Instance may, in an appeal, award the
respondent was indebted in the amount of P10, 212.00, his
defendant-appellee's counterclaim in an amount exceeding or beyond the
obligation was separate and distinct from that of the other
jurisdiction of the court of origin?
respondent.
The trial court by Judge Mallare (one of the respondents)
SC = No. The Court of First Instance, in the case at bar, having awarded
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
judgment in favor of the defendant-appellee in excess of its appellate
jurisdiction to the extent of P6,000.00 over the maximum allowable award of Flores appealed by certiorari in Supreme Court and maintains
P10,000.00, the excess is null and void and of no effect. Such being the that lower court has jurisdiction over the case following the "novel"
case, an action to declare the nullity of the award as brought by the plaintiff- totality rule introduced in Section 33(l) of BP129 and Section 11 of
appellant before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch V is a proper the Interim Rules.
remedy.
- The pertinent portion of Section 33(l) of BP129 reads as follows:
The amount of judgment obtained by the defendant-appellee on appeal,
cannot exceed the jurisdiction of the court in which the action began. Since ... Provided, That where there are several claims or
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the defendant's counterclaim in causes of action between the same or different parties,
excess of the jurisdictional amount, the appellate court, likewise, acquired no embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the
jurisdiction over the same. demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes
of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action
Flores v Mallare-Phillips 144 SCRA 144 SCRA 377 an appeal by certiorari arose out of the same or different transactions. ...
Facts:
Section 11 of the Interim Rules provides thus:
Flores sued the respondents Binongcol and Callion for refusing to
pay him certain amount of money as alleged in the complaint: Application of the totality rule.-In actions where the
- first cause of action alleged in the complaint was against jurisdiction of the court is dependent on the amount
respondent Ignacio Binongcal for refusing to pay the amount of involved, the test of jurisdiction shall be the aggregate sum
P11,643.00 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased of all the money demands, exclusive only of interest and
costs, irrespective of whether or not the separate claims

are owned by or due to different parties. If any demand is In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that
for damages in a civil action, the amount thereof must be the jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinder of parties
specifically alleged. pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court and that, after a careful scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there
- He argued that the totality rule was reduced to clarity and brevity is a misjoinder of parties for the reason that the claims against
and the jurisdictional test is the totality of the claims in all, not in respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct and neither of
each, of the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of which falls within its jurisdiction.
action arose out of the same or different transactions. THEREFORE, dismissal of complaint is legal.
Issue: WON the trial court correctly ruled on the application of the
[G.R. No. 140746. March 16, 2005]
permissive joinder of parties under the Rules of Court.
Ruling: YES PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC., and ALEXANDER
BUNCAN, petitioners, vs. STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.,
The Court rules that the application of the totality rule under Section and MARTINA GICALE, respondents.
33(l) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules is
Facts:
subject to the requirements for the permissive joinder of parties under
Section 6 of Rule 3 which provides as follows: A bus of Pantranco North Express, Inc., petitioner, driven by Alexander
Buncan, also a petitioner, hit the left rear side of the jeepney driven by
Permissive joinder of parties.-All persons in whom or Crispin Gicale owned by his mother Martina Gicale, respondent
against whom any right to relief in respect to or arising out herein. After hitting the jeep, Buncan sped away.
of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged
Crispin reported the incident to the Talavera Police Station and respondent
to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative,
Standard Insurance Co., Inc. (Standard), insurer of the jeepney. The total
may, except as otherwise provided in these rules, join as
cost of the repair was P21,415.00, but respondent Standard paid
plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one complaint,
only P8,000.00. Martina Gicale shouldered the balance ofP13,415.00.
where any question of law or fact common to all such
plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action; Thereafter, Standard and Martina, respondents, demanded reimbursement
but the court may make such orders as may be just to from petitioners Pantranco and its driver Alexander Buncan, but they
prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed refused.
or put to expense in connection with any proceedings in
which he may have no interest. RTC
R to filed a complaint for sum of money
P specifically denied the allegations in the complaint and averred
In cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as
defendants, under Section 6 of Rule 3, the total of all the claims shall now that it is the Metropolitan Trial Court, not the RTC, which has
furnish the jurisdictional test and instead of joining or being joined in one jurisdiction over the case
complaint separate actions are filed by or against the parties, the amount judgment is rendered in favor of the R
demanded in each complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test.
CA
P filed an appeal but was dismissed

Ps MOR was also denied In this case, there is a single transaction common to all, that is,
P filed petition for review on certiorari to SC Pantrancos bus hitting the rear side of the jeepney. There is also a
common question of fact, that is, whether petitioners are negligent. There
being a single transaction common to both respondents, consequently, they
ISSUE: WON RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter have the same cause of action against petitioners.
YES, RTC has jurisdiction To determine identity of cause of action, it must be ascertained
whether the same evidence which is necessary to sustain the second cause
of action would have been sufficient to authorize a recovery in the
SC Petition DENIED first. Here, had respondents filed separate suits against petitioners, the
same evidence would have been presented to sustain the same cause of
Petitioners insist that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case since
action. Thus, the filing by both respondents of the complaint with the
the cause of action of each respondent did not arise from the same
court below is in order. Such joinder of parties avoids multiplicity of suit
transaction and that there are no common questions of law and fact common
and ensures the convenient, speedy and orderly administration of justice.
to both parties. Section 6, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides:
Corollarily, Section 5(d), Rule 2 of the same Rules provides:
Sec. 6. Permissive joinder of parties. All persons in whom or against
whom any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. A party may in one pleading assert, in
transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have
severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions:
these Rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one
complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such xxx
plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court
may make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of
defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in connection
money the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.
with any proceedings in which he may have no interest.
The above provision presupposes that the different causes of action

Permissive joinder of parties requires that:
which are joined accrue in favor of the same plaintiff/s and against the same
[8]
(a) the right to relief arises out of the same transaction or series of defendant/s and that no misjoinder of parties is involved. The issue of
transactions; whether respondents claims shall be lumped together is determined by
paragraph (d) of the above provision. This paragraph embodies the totality
(b) there is a question of law or fact common to all the plaintiffs or rule as exemplified by Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129 which states, among
defendants; and others, that where there are several claims or causes of action between the
(c) such joinder is not otherwise proscribed by the provisions of the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of
Rules on jurisdiction and venue. the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action,
irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or
different transactions.

As previously stated, respondents cause of action against petitioners The petitioners claim the action for rescission and damages is a personal
arose out of the same transaction. Thus, the amount of the demand shall be one and may be filed in the RTC of their residence, and that their second
the totality of the claims. cause for the recovery of possession, although a real action, may be joined
with the rest of their causes under Sec. 5(c), Rule 2 of the ROC.
Respondent Standards claim is P8,000.00, while that of respondent
Martina Gicale is P13,415.00, or a total of P21,415.00. Section 19 of B.P. The trial court denied the motion for lack of merit and found merit in the
Blg. 129 provides that the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over all petitioners contention that Section 5(c), Rule 2 is applicable.
other cases, in which the demand, exclusive of interest and cost or the value
of the property in controversy, amounts to more than twenty thousand pesos Meanwhile the case was re-raffled to Branch 10 of the Malolos RTC. In a
(P20,000.00). Clearly, it is the RTC that has jurisdiction over the instant motion the respondents prayed for the reconsideration of the trial courts
case. It bears emphasis that when the complaint was filed, R.A. 7691 order. The motion was granted and the complaint was dismissed. It ruled
expanding the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan, Municipal and Municipal that the principal action was a real one and should have been filed at the
Circuit Trial Courts had not yet taken effect. It became effective on April 15, RTC of Paranque, where the subject matter was located.
1994.
Hence, the present recourse.
Sps. Decena v. Sps. Piquero
Issue Whether the venue was properly laid.
Facts
Ruling
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the RTC.
After due consideration, we find and rule that Sec 5(c), Rule 2 of the ROC
The Decenas are owners of a parcel of land with a house located in does not apply. This is because the petitioners had only one cause of action
Paranque. They executed a MOA wherein they sold the property to the against respondents, namely, the breach of MOA upon the refusal to pay,
Piqueros through installments in pst dated checks. They stipulated to oblige and in turn over the property, as well as the house constructed upon it. The
themselves to transfer the property to the respondents upon the execution of action for the rescission an reconveyance of property is a real action and
the MOA with the condition that if two (2) postdated checks bounce, the must therefore have been filed in the proper court where the property was
Piqueros would be obliged to return the property. located, in Paranque. Having filed the complaint at the RTC of Bulacan
venue was improperly laid; the trial court acted conformably with Sec 1(c),
Petitioners filed a complaint with the RTC of Bulacan for the annulment of
Rule 16 of the ROC when it ordered the dismissal of the complaint.
the sale and recovery of possession with damages. They allege that they did
not transfer ownership because the first two checks issued to them were not
G.R. No. 153829 August 17, 2011
honored by the drawee bank, and were not replaced by cash.
The respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue, ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA
and lack of jurisdiction over the subject property. Respondents aver that the represented herein by the incumbent Archbishop, Petitioner,
principal action for rescission of the MOA, and recovery of possession is a vs.
real action, not a personal one; hence, it should be brought to the EDUARDO SORIANO, JR., EDNA YALUN, EVANGELINA ABLAZA,
Paranaque RTC. The court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, being FELICIDAD Y. URBINA, FELIX SALENGA, REYNALDO I. MALLARI,
located in Paranque. MARCIANA B. BARCOMA, BIENVENIDO PANGANIBAN, BRIGIDA
NAVARRO, EUFRANCIA T. FLORES, VICTORIA B. SUDSOD,

EUFRONIO CAPARAS, CRISANTO MANANSALA, LILY MASANGCAY, o The appeal was dismissed because of their failure to file
BENJAMIN GUINTO, JR., MARTHA G. CASTRO and LINO TOLENTINO, the appeal memorandum.
Respondents.
When defendants elevated the case to the CA, their petition for
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x certiorari was not given due course for failure to file the same within
the extended period.
G.R. No. 160909
Hence, the decision ejecting the defendants from the premises
BENJAMIN GUINTO, JR., Petitioner, became final.
vs. The RCA filed an Urgent Motion for Immediate Issuance of a Writ of
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA Execution, which the MCTC granted.
represented herein by the incumbent Archbishop, Respondent. Seeking to enjoin the implementation of the writ of execution and
the notice to vacate, Guinto filed the instant Petition for Injunction
Facts: with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO),
Meanwhile, during the pendency of the ejectment case at the
The RCA of San Fernando, Pampanga,claimed that it is the owner MCTC, some of the defendants therein, filed Civil Case against the
of a vast tract of land located near the Catholic Church at RCA for Quieting of Title and Declaration of Nullity of Title
Poblacion, Macabebe, Pampanga and covered by an OCT issued before the RTC of Macabebe, Pampanga.
by the Registry of Deeds of San Fernando on February 21, 1929. o They claimed that they are in actual possession of the
The RCA alleged that several individuals unlawfully occupied the land in the concept of owners and alleged that the OCT in
the name of RCA is spurious and fake.
subject land and refused to vacate despite repeated demands.
Having no other recourse, the RCA filed an ejectment case, before
the MCTC of Macabebe-Masantol, Pampanga against the alleged The RCA moved to dismiss the case on grounds of noncompliance
intruders, the defendants. with a condition precedent, laches, and for being a collateral attack
Defendants countered that the RCA has no cause of action against on its title.
them because its title is spurious. RTC denied the motion to dismiss.
o They contended that the subject land belonged to the o Found that plaintiffs have a cause of action.
State, but they have already acquired the same by
acquisitive prescription as they and their predecessors-in- The RCA filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court
interest have been in continuous possession of the land denied.
for more than thirty (30) years. The RCA filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for
preliminary injunction.
MCTC ruled in favor of the RCA. CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
o The trial court held that the OCT in the name of the RCA Filed an M.R. but was denied.
remains valid and binding against the whole world until it is Hence, this petition for review.
declared void by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Defendants appealed to the RTC.

Issue: Whether the action for quieting of title and declaration of nullity of title an entity wholly owned by the National Government, embarked on
filed by the defendants should be dismissed for violation of the rule an expansion program embracing, among other things, the
on joinder of actions. construction of an integrated steel mill in Iligan City. Pursuant to the
expansion program of the NSC, Proc. No. 2239 was issued by the
Held: No. President withdrawing from sale or settlement a large tract of public
land and reserving that land for the use and immediate occupancy
of NSC.
The RCA submits that an action for quieting of title is a special civil
action covered by Rule 63, while an action for declaration of nullity Since certain portions of the subject public land were occupied by
of title is governed by ordinary rules. private respondent Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation, MCFC, LOI
o It contends that these cases should have been dismissed No 1277 was issued directing the NSC to negotiate with MCFC for
for violation of the rule on joinder of actions under Section the compensation of MCFCs present occupancy rights on the
5, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as subject land.
amended, which requires that the joinder shall not include When negotiations failed, petitioner ISA commenced eminent
special civil actions governed by special rules. domain proceedings against private respondent MCFC in the RTC
Such contention, however, is utterly bereft of merit. of Iligan City.
Section 6 of Rule 2 explicitly provides that misjoinder of On 17 September 1983, a writ of possession was issued by the trial
causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action. court in favor of ISA. ISA in turn placed NSC in possession and
control of the land occupied by MCFC's fertilizer plant installation.
The case proceeded to trial. While the trial was ongoing, however,
the statutory existence of petitioner ISA expired on 11 August 1988.
Rule 3, Secs. 1 to 3 MCFC then filed a motion to dismiss, contending that no valid
judgment could be rendered against ISA which had ceased to be a
G.R. No. 102976 October 25, 1995 juridical person.
IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY The trial court granted MCFC's motion to dismiss. The dismissal
vs. was anchored on the provision of the Rules of Court stating that
THE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER "only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may
CORPORATION be parties in a civil case."
Facts: Petitioner ISA moved for reconsideration of the trial court's Order,
contending that despite the expiration of its term, its juridical
Petitioner, ISA, was created by PD 272 dated 9 August 1973 in existence continued until the winding up of its affairs could be
order, generally, to develop and promote the iron and steel industry completed. In the alternative, petitioner ISA urged that the Republic
in the Philippines. of the Philippines, being the real party-in-interest, should be
P.D. No. 272 initially created petitioner ISA for a term of 5 years allowed to be substituted for petitioner ISA.
counting from 9 August 1973. When ISA's original term expired on The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration stating, among
10 October 1978, its term was extended for another ten years by other things, that the expropriation is not for public use but for
EO 555 dated 31 August 1979. private benefit.
The National Steel Corporation, NSC, then a wholly owned Petitioner went on appeal to the Court of Appeals who affirmed the
subsidiary of the National Development Corporation which is itself order of dismissal of the trial court.

The CA ruled that the action for expropriation could not prosper alleging that Travel Wide Associated Sales (TWA) and
because the basis for the proceedings, the ISA's exercise of its Trans World Airlines, Inc. had failed to comply with their
delegated authority to expropriate, had become ineffective as a obligations under Travel Pass '73 U.S.A., a package deal
result of the delegate's dissolution, and could not be continued in consisting of a TWA ticket to Los Angeles, New York and
the name of Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Boston, in the United States, and hotel accommodations,
Solicitor General. for which the plaintiffs had made the corresponding
payment in Manila.
Issue: TWA moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
W/N the Republic is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of the the complaint did not state a cause of action,
expiration of ISA's term RTC ordered the plaintiffs to amend their complaint and
particularize their averments. The Plaintiffs complied.
Held: TWA and Trans world move to dismiss on the ground that
Yes, the Republic is entitled to be substituted for ISA in the the amended complaint still did not state a cause of
expropriation proceedings. action- denied by RTC holding that the allegations were
now "sufficiently particular
Ratio: TWA and Trans wold filed a joint answer in which they
We consider that the ISA is properly regarded as an agent or alleged the special defense that they were not the real
delegate of the Republic of the Philippines. The Republic itself is a parties-in-interest because they had acted only as
body corporate and juridical person vested with the full panoply of agents of a disclosed principal
powers and attributes which are compendiously described as "legal Subsequently, they filed a Joint Motion for Preliminary
personality." Hearing of Special Defense, which was opposed by the
In the instant case, ISA instituted the expropriation proceedings in Plaintiffs on the ground that the special defense was
its capacity as an agent or delegate or representative of the barred, not having been raised in the two motions to
Republic of the Philippines pursuant to its authority under P.D. No. dismiss the amended complaint- motion was nevertheless
272. The present expropriation suit was brought on behalf of and granted.
for the benefit of the Republic as the principal of ISA. After the preliminary hearing, Judge. Fernandez issued his
From the foregoing premises, it follows that the Republic of the order dismissing the complaint
Philippines is entitled to be substituted in the expropriation MR was denied
proceedings as party-plaintiff in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of Case was elevated to the CA- reversed the trial court and ruled that
ISA having expired. petitioner should have pleaded the special defense that they were
not real parties-in-interest in their motion to dismiss, conformably to
the omnibus motion rule. Not having done so, they are deemed to
Travel Wide Associated Sales vs. CA, 199 SCRA 205 have waived that ground, which therefore could not be used as the
basis of the motion to dismiss.
FACTS: Sc- Petinvoke Rule 16, Section 1, of the Rules of Court and argue that
"the defense of not being a real party-in-interest" is not one of the
Decision Systems Corporation and its President, Manuel A. Alcuaz, grounds enumerated therein for a motion to dismiss. Consequently, they
Jr., filed a complaint in the RTC-Mla

could not have pleaded it in their motion to dismiss but only in their MARINELA all surnamed RALLA, and COURT OF
answer as a special defense. APPEALS, respondents.
ISSUE: WON petitioners are real parties-in-interest? Facts:

RULLING: YES.
Rosendo Ralla had two sons, Pablo and Pedro. The father apparently loved
A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the former but not the latter.
the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Rule 3,
Section 2, of the Rules of Court provides explicitly that "every action must be Probate Court
prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in- interest." The Rosendo executed a will disinheriting Pedro and leaving everything
party-in-interest is one who prosecutes or defends and is benefited or he owned to Pablo, to whom he said he had earlier sold a part of
injured. The term applies not only to the plaintiff but to the defendant, and his property for P10,000.00. Rosendo himself filed for the probate
the suit may be dismissed if neither of them is a real party-in-interest. If the of the will but pendente lite died on October 1, 1960.
suit is not brought in the name of or against the real party-in-interest, a On November 3, 1966, the probate judge converted SP 564 into an
motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the complaint states no intestate proceeding.
cause of action. The last will and testament of Rosendo Ralla was allowed on June
7, 1982
The Court believes that the evidence, particularly the terms and conditions of On October 20, 1982, the disinheritance of Pedro was
the brochure distributed by the petitioners and the significance of the disapproved.
Miscellaneous Charges Order which was issued by TWApoves that CA
petitioners were not mere agents of a disclosed principal and so could be Pablo elevated the October 20, 1982 order to the Court of Appeals
held liable on the complaintand even the trial court observed the active In a decision dated July 25, 1986, CA Reversed the trial court and
participation of TWA in the promotion of the travel pass plan as an additional reinstated the disinheritance clause after finding that the requisites
source of revenue for its airline business. And even if the petitioners were of a valid disinheritance had been complied with in the will. The
indeed acting as agents of the passengers, as the brochure stipulates, they appellate court noted that Pedro had threatened to kill his father,
could still be held liable under Article 1909 of the Civil Code. who was afraid of him and had earlier sued him for slander and
grave oral defamation.
Therefore, the petitioners are real parties-in-interest as defendants in the suit
below, the motion to dismiss for lack of a cause of action should not have
SC
been granted.
Pedro assailed the July 25, 1986 order of CA - dismissed
MOR was denied with finality
G.R. No. 78646 July 23, 1991
RTC
PABLO RALLA, substituted by his wife and co-defendant CARMEN Pedro had filed on May 19, 1972, a complaint to annul the
MUOZ-RALLA, and his legal heirs, HILDA RALLA-ALMINE, BELISTA, transaction the deed of sale executed by Rosendo Ralla in favor of
RENE RALLA-BELISTA and GERARDO M. RALLA, petitioners, Pablo over 149 parcels of land on the ground that it was simulated.
vs. declared the sale null and void
PEDRO RALLA, substituted by his legal heirs, LEONI, PETER, and

upon Pablos MOR, judge held the deed of sale to be valid. RTC:
CA
Upon Pedros appeal, reinstated the original decision invalidating Tanpingco filed a complaint for payment of disturbance compensation with
the deed of sale. damages against Horca.
SC
Pablo elevated CAs decision Tanpingco was Horca's leasehold tenant over an agricultural
riceland.
Tanpingco was asked to desist from working on the land because it
ISSUE: WON sale executed by Rosendo Ralla in favor of Pablo over 149
had been donated to the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports
parcels of land is valid
as a school site.
Petitioner claims he was being openly ordered to leave and ousted
NO.
in violation of law.
Petitioner is willing to accept disturbance compensation, but prays
The decision of the CA (previos case) approved the disinheritance to remain as a tenant.
of Pedro Ralla and the decision has long since become final. Since
then, Pedro Ralla no longer had the legal standing to question the
validity of the sale executed by Rosendo in favor of his other son The case was called in for pre-trial and Horca filed a motion to dismiss. He
Pablo. alleges that the complaint states no cause of action because he is no longer
The real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or a party-in-interest having already donated the property. The motion was
injured by the judgment or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. granted, while petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied.
"Interest" within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an
interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished IAC:
from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental
interest. As a general rule, one having no right or interest to protect Finding no merit in the appeal the case was dismissed.
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party-plaintiff in an
action. Hence, the current controversy.
Legally speaking, Pedro Ralla was a stranger to the transaction as
Ruling:
he did not stand to benefit from its annulment. His disinheritance
had rendered him hors de combat.
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires that every action must be
Reversed CA, complaint dismissed.
prosecuted in the name of the real party-in-interest. A corollary proposition to
this rule is that an action must be brought against the real party-in-interest,
G.R. No. 76225. March 31, 1992. or against a party which may be bound by the judgment to be rendered
therein.
ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, and The real party-in-interest is one who stands to be benefited or be injured by
the judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
BENEDICTO HORCA, SR., respondents.
Facts:

If the suit is not brought against the real party-in-interest, a motion to dismiss Petitioner House International Building Tenants Association, Inc.
may be filed on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action (ASSOCIATION) is a domestic non-stock, non-profit civic
(Section 1 (g), Rule 16, Rules of Court). corporation, whose incorporators, directors and members
constitute the great majority of more than a hundred heads of
Hence, the resolution of the dispute hinges upon the determination of families who are tenants of long and good standing of the 14-
whether or not the private respondent is the real party-in-interest against storey House International Building located at Binondo, Manila.
whom the suit should be brought. The land and the improvements thereon were formerly owned by
Atty. Felipe Ang who mortgaged the same to the GSIS to secure
We agree with the contentions of the private respondent. The petitioner
payment of an obligation.
should have impleaded the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports as the
After foreclosure of the mortgage and for failure of Ang to exercise
party-defendant for as stated in Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v.
his right of redemption over the foreclosed property, the ownership
Court of Appeals, a donation, as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in
thereof was consolidated with the GSIS which subsequently sold it
an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee
to CENTERTOWN in a deed of conditional sale, without notice
and once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of
to the tenants of the building and without securing the prior
the property donated.
clearance of the then Ministry of Human Settlements.
Under Article 428 of the New Civil Code, the owner has the right to dispose As CENTERTOWN was not authorized by its Articles of
of a thing without other limitations than those established by law. As an Incorporation to engage in the real estate business, it organized a
incident of ownership therefore, there is nothing to prevent a landowner from sister corporation, TOWERS, for the primary purpose of engaging
donating his naked title to the land. However, the new owner must respect in the real estate business.
the rights of the tenant. Subsequently, CENTERTOWN assigned to its sister corporation
TOWERS all its rights and obligations under the Deed of
Conditional Sale, with the consent and approval of the GSIS.
G.R. No. 75287 June 30, 1987
RTC: ANNULMENT OF THE DEED OF CONDITIONAL SALE.
ALLEGATION: DEED OF CONDITIONAL SALE IS VOID FOR
HOUSE INTERNATIONAL BUILDING TENANTS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
BEING ULTRA VIRES.
petitioner-plaintiff,
o Petitioner filed a complaint against CENTERTOWN,
vs.
TOWERS and GSIS for THE ANNULMENT OF THE
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, CENTERTOWN MARKETING
DEED OF CONDITIONAL SALE and the subsequent
CORP., MANILA TOWERS DEVELOPMENT CORP., AND THE
assignment thereof by CENTERTOWN to TOWERS.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondents-
o Alleged that the Deed of Conditional Sale is null and void
defendants.
ab initio for being ultra vires, since defendant
CENTERTOWN is not qualified to acquire real estate
RULING: THE REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST ARE THE TENANTS NOT property or to engage in real estate transactions.
THE ASSOCIATION. o DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT.
o DENIED M.R.
Facts:
CA:
o AFFIRMED RTCS DECISION.

o DENIED M.R. ALLAN C. GO, doing business under the name and style "ACG Express
Liner," Petitioner, vs. MORTIMER F. CORDERO, Respondent.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner (the Association) has the personality to sue, x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
on its own, as a corporation representing its members who are G.R. No. 164747
tenants of the House International Building. MORTIMER F. CORDERO, Petitioner, vs. ALLAN C. GO, doing business
under the name and style "ACG Express Liner," FELIPE M. LANDICHO
HELD: NONE. and VINCENT D. TECSON, Respondents
For review is the decision of the CA which affirmed the ruling of the
In the present case, the real parties in interest are the tenants of RTC of QC.
the House International Building and not the petitioner
ASSOCIATION, which has a personality separate and distinct from FACTS:
that of its members and therefore it has the capacity to sue and be
sued although it is composed of the tenants. Cordero is the vice president of Pamana Marketing Corp. He
Petitioner has not shown any real, actual, material, or ventured into the business of inter-island passenger vessels with
substantial interest in the subject matter of the action. (Subject Robinson, an Australian based in Brisbane, Australia and is the
matter: Deed of Conditional Sale) managing director of Aluminum Fast Ferries Australia (AFFA).
In this connection, the Court of Appeals properly observed: o Robinson appointed Cordero as exclusive distributor of
AFFA fast ferry vessels in the Philippines. With every sale,
Appellant has sued in its name, but has not alleged any he will get a commission. Cordero offered for sale
right belonging to it that was violated or any wrong SEACAT 25.
that was committed. The reason is obvious, the benefits o Landicho and Tecson are lawyers of Go. Go is the owner
are not really meant for appellant but for the unnamed of ACG Express Liner in Cebu. Landicho, Tecson and Go
great majority" of its members who have allegedly been made negotiations with Cordero to purchase 2 SEACAT
tenants of long standing of the building in question. 25s. (Dont get confused with many names, basta si
CORDERO ang biktima dito, sila LANDICHO, TECSON at
GO ay mga kalaban)
And, quoting from the Brief for the respondent-defendant GSIS, the
o Cordero made trips to AFFA with Go and Landicho to
Court of Appeals further said:
monitor the building of the SEACAT 25. Cordero
shouldered all the expenses.
Assuming arguendo, that the tenants have the alleged o Cordero later discovered that Go was dealing directly with
right, such rights of the tenants are personal and Robinson. Cordero tried to contact all of the respondents
individual rights which can only be claimed by the to clear the issue, but they were not answering.
tenants who must necessarily be the indispensable o Cordero flew to AFFA to clarify matters with Robinson but
and real parties in interest and certainly not the Go and Landicho were already there to negotiate sale of
plaintiff-appellant organization. the second SEACAT 25.
o Cordero wrote a letter to Go and informed him that dealing
G.R. No. 164703 May 4, 2010 directly with Robinson violated his exclusive
distributorship. ACG Express Liner thru Go, executed

fraudulent actuations and misrepresentations that Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration
amounted to a breach of Corderos Exclusive and to transmit the records to the CA.
Distributorship. Petition for certiorari was filed with the CA.
o Robinson, in his defense, claimed that the appointment of o CA issued a TRO in the execution orders of the trial court.
Cordero was for one transaction only and that Cordero o CA granted the petition for certiorari.
was offered the exclusive distributorship but failed to o The trial court set aside their orders.
submit it within reasonable time. o Cordero appealed in a petition for review. DENIED.
o Landicho, Tecson and Go, in response to the letter, said o CA sustained the trial court in ruling that Cordero is
that they are willing to amicably settle. However, it never entitled to damages for the breach.
materialized. o Motion for reconsiderations were DENIED.
o Cordero filed a complaint with the Bureau of Customs to Supreme Court: Petition for review under Rule 45 were filed by both
prohibit entry of SEACAT 25 from Australia based on parties.
misdeclaration and undervaluation. o According to Go (the relevant issue for CivPro):
Civil Case was instituted by Cordero to hold the 4 respondents for Cordero is not a real party in interest
conniving and conspiring to violate his exclusive distributorship,
thus depriving him of his commissions. ISSUE: Whether Cordero has the legal personality to sue the respondents
o AFFA cancelled the exclusive distributorship agreement. for breach?
o Robinson filed a motion to dismiss grounded on lack of
jurisdiction over his person and failure to state a cause of RULING:
action. Denied.
According to Sec. 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, a real party-in-interest is
o Robinson was declared in default for failure to file his
such party as the one to be benefited or injured by the judgment.
answer with the period prescribed.
o Go and Tecson filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state
The purposes of this provision are:
a cause of action. Denied.
o Subsequently, they filed their answer, denying that they 1) to prevent the prosecution of actions by persons without any
had anything to do with the termination of Corderos right, title or interest in the case;
authority to distribute exclusively. They averred it was
Cordero who was mishandling them in the perfection of 2) to require that the actual party entitled to legal relief be the one
the sale. to prosecute the action;
o Pre-trial was reset twice to give opportunity to reach a
settlement. 3) to avoid a multiplicity of suits; and
o The trial court rendered a decision in favor of Cordero.
Respondents filed a motion for new trial, claiming 4) to discourage litigation and keep it within certain bounds,
that they were unduly prejudiced due to their pursuant to sound public policy.
counsels negligence. DENIED.
A case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the
Respondents moved to reconsider and filed a
plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, hence grounded on failure to state a
notice of appeal. Both were DENIED. Notice of
cause of action.
appeal was denied for failure to pay docket fee.

The Supreme Court agrees with the CA that Cordero is the exclusive FACTS:
distributor. Robinson and AFFA dealt only with Cordero who alone made
decisions in the performance of the exclusive distributorship. Golangco,(1995) as a complainant initiated a prosecution for libel
against the respondent Fung in RTC
Go, Landicho and Tecson never raised Corderos lack of personality to sue, Allegedly, the respondent had issued an office memorandum
they did so only before the CA when they contended that it is Pamana dated May 10, 1995 maliciously imputing against the petitioner
(Corderos Company) and not Cordero, who was appointed and acted as the commission of bribery and had sent copies of the
exclusive distributor for AFFA. We find no error committed by the trial court memorandum to the petitioners superiors in the POEA and to
in overruling Robinsons objection over the improper resort to summons by other public officers and personalities not connected with the
publication upon a foreign national like him and in an action in personam, POEA, causing damage and prejudice to the petitioner.
notwithstanding that he raised it in a special appearance specifically raising After 6 years, the Prosecution presented only two witnesses
the issue of lack of jurisdiction over his person. Courts acquire jurisdiction (2001) the Prosecution requested that a subpoena ad
over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint, while jurisdiction over the testificandum be issued to and served on Atty. Oscar Ramos,
defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the service of summons Resident Ombudsman of the POEA, to compel him to testify in
upon them in the manner required by law or through their voluntary the libel case
appearance in court and their submission to its authority. A party who makes The hearing of February 20, 2001 was, however, reset to May
a special appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of said court based 23, 2001 due to the unavailability of Atty. Ramos.
on the ground of invalid service of summons is not deemed to have On Hearing day the Prosecution still failed to present Atty.
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Ramos as its witness because no subpoena had been issued
to and served on him for the purpose.
In this case, however, although the Motion to Dismiss filed by Robinson RTC judge issued an order terminating the Prosecutions
specifically stated as one (1) of the grounds the lack of "personal presentation of evidence
jurisdiction," it must be noted that he had earlier filed a Motion for Time to file Pet. went to CA on certiorari to assail the order and claimed that
an appropriate responsive pleading even beyond the time provided in the the RTC judge committed grave abuse of discretion for not issuing
summons by publication. Such motion did not state that it was a conditional the subpoena to require Atty. Ramos to appear and testify in the
appearance entered to question the regularity of the service of summons, May 23, 2001 hearing. He contended that his prior request for the
but an appearance submitting to the jurisdiction of the court by subpoena for the February 20, 2001 hearing should have been
acknowledging the summons by publication issued by the court and praying treated as a continuing request for the subpoena considering that
for additional time to file a responsive pleading. Consequently, Robinson the Rules of Court did not require a party to apply for a subpoena
having acknowledged the summons by publication and also having invoked again should it not be served in the first time.
the jurisdiction of the trial court to secure affirmative relief in his motion for Court of Appeals rejected the petitioner and dismissed the
additional time, he effectively submitted voluntarily to the trial courts petition for certiorari
jurisdiction. He is now estopped from asserting otherwise, even before this Hence , a Petition for review on certiorari was filed in SC
Court.
ISSUE: whether the Court of Appeals correctly ruled on the petition for
certiorari of the petitioner?YES
Golangco vs. Fung, G.R. No. 157952, SEpt. 8, 2009 Petition for review RULLING:
on certiorari

The gross procedural misstep committed by the petitioner in the Court of in favour of one Gabriel Ching. Before the words "With my Marital Consent"
Appeals appearing in the REM is a signature attributed to Antonios wife Matilde.
The petitioner did not join the People of the Philippines as a party in On October 5, 1998, Antonio executed an Amendment to the Real Esate
his action for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. He ignored that the Mortgage (AREM) increasing the amount secured by the mortgage to P26
People of the Philippines were indispensable parties due to his Million, also bearing a signature attributed to his wife Matilde above the
objective being to set aside the trial courts order dated May 23, words "With my Marital Consent."
2001 that concerned the public aspect of Criminal Case The
omission was fatal and already enough cause for the summary
Antonio died on December 26, 1999.
rejection of his petition for certiorari.
The petitioner did not also obtain the consent of the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) to his petition for certiorari. At the very RTC
least, he should have furnished a copy of the petition for certiorari petitioner filed in a "Petition for Sale" for the extrajudicial
to the OSG prior to the filing. Pet. violated Administrative Code foreclosure of the AREM and the sale at public auction of the lot
which mandates the OSG to represent the Government in the covered thereby.
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal RTC Clerk of Court and Ex-Oficio Sheriff scheduled the public
proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the auction on December 17, 2003.
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or On December 16, 2003, R filed a Complaint/Petition against
tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which petitioner and the Clerk of Court-Ex Oficio Sheriff, for
the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is annulment of the AREM, injunction with prayer for issuance of
a party. writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order
and damages
Therefore, the trial judge did not act capriciously, arbitrarily or whimsically in AREM is without force and effect, the same having been
issuing the assailed order. Thus, the Court of Appeals properly dismissed executed without the valid consent of the wife of
the petition for certiorari. mortgagor Antonio C. Tiu who at the time of the execution
of the said instrument was already suffering from
G.R. No. 178529 September 4, 2009 advance[d] Alzheimers Disease and, henceforth,
incapable of giving consent, more so writing and signing
her name
EQUITABLE PCI BANK, INC. (now known as BANCO DE ORO - EPCI,
The RTC issued a temporary restraining order and a writ of
INC.) Petitioner,
preliminary injunction.
vs.
P filed a Motion to Dismiss DENIED
HEIRS OF ANTONIO C. TIU, namely: ARLENE T. FU, MICHAEL U. TIU,
Ps MOR DENIED
ANDREW U. TIU, EDGAR U. TIU and ERWIN U. TIU, Respondents.
CA
Facts:
P filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus with
prayer for preliminary injunction- DENIED.
Antonio C. Tiu (Antonio), executed on July 6, 1994 a REM in favor of
petitioner covering a lot located in Tacloban City to secure a P7 Million loan

ISSUE: WON the complaint filed by respondents-children of Antonio, without The AREM was executed by Antonio, with the marital consent of Matilde.
impleading Matilde who must also be Antonios heir and who, along with Since the mortgaged property is presumed conjugal, she is obliged
Antonio, was principally obliged under the AREM sought to be annulled, is principally under the AREM. It is thus she, following Art. 1397 of the Civil
dismissible for lack of cause of action. Code vis a vis Sec. 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, who is the real party in
interest, hence, the action must be prosecuted in her name as she stands to
YES be benefited or injured in the action.
SC Assuming that Matilde is indeed incapacitated, it is her legal guardian who

the petition is GRANTED. should file the action on her behalf. Not only is there no allegation in the
complaint, however, that respondents have been legally designated as
The pertinent provision of the Civil Code on annulment of contracts reads: guardians to file the action on her behalf. The name of Matilde, who is
deemed the real party in interest, has not been included in the title of the
case, in violation of Sec. 3 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
Art. 1397. The action for the annulment of contracts may be instituted by
all who are thereby obliged principally or subsidiarily. However, persons who
are capable cannot allege the incapacity of those with whom they G.R. No. 157830. November 17, 2005.*
contracted; nor can those who exerted intimidation, violence, or undue
DANTE M. PASCUAL, represented by REYMEL R. SAGARIO, petitioner,
influence, or employed fraud, or caused mistake base their action upon
vs. MARILOU M.
these flaws of the contract. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
PASCUAL, respondent.
Upon the other hand, the pertinent provisions of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
(Parties to Civil Actions) read: Facts:
SEC. 2 Parties in interest. A real party in interest is the party who stands RTC:
to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to
Dante filed a civil case against his sister Marilou, for the annulment of a
the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these
TCT, Deed of Absolute Sale, and for the reconveyance of property with
Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
damages.
party in interest. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Dante is a permanent resident of the U.S., who appointed Sagario
SEC. 3. Representatives as parties. Where the action is allowed to be as his attorney-in-fact through an SPA.
prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary
capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the caseand shall
be deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee Marilou filed a motion to dismiss.
of an express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party
authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for There was non-compliance with requirement of the LGC that there
the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining must have been a confrontation before the Lupon Chairman or
the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the Pangkat, before filing a claim in court.
principal. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) There is no showing that the dispute was referred to barangay court

before the case was filed. except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto
RTC granted the respondent's motion to dismiss. agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate
lupon;....
Where real property or interest therein is involved, the dispute shall
be filed before the barangay where the property is located, In the 1982 case of Tavora v. Veloso, this Court held that where the parties
regardless of the residence of the parties. are not actual residents in the same city or municipality or adjoining
Ordinarily non-compliance with the condition precedent could affect barangays, there is no requirement for them to submit their dispute to the
the sufficiency of the cause of action and allow the complaint to be lupon as provided for in Section 6 vis-a-vis Sections 2 and 3 of P.D. 1508
vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of
action or prematurity. [B]y express statutory inclusion and exclusion, the Lupon shall have no
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. jurisdiction over disputes where the parties are not actual residents of the
same city or municipality, except where the barangays in which they actually
The court was of the opinion that the attorney-in-fact shall be reside adjoin each other. (Italics supplied)
deemed the real party in interest, he was therefore obliged to bring
the case before the barangay. To construe the express statutory requirement of actual residency as
SC: applicable to the attorney-in-fact of the party-plaintiff, as contended by
respondent, would abrogate the meaning of a real party in interest as
Dante elevated the case straight to the SC, questioning the "palpable legal defined in Section 2 of Rule 314 of the 1997 Rules of Court vis-a-vis Section
errors' of the RTC. 3 of the same Rule which was earlier quoted but misread and misunderstood
by respondent.
Petitioner argues that, he, not his attorney in fact is the real party in
interest, since he resides abroad, the lupon would have no In fine, since the plaintiff-herein petitioner, the real party in interest, is not an
jurisdiction. actual resident of the barangay where the defendant-herein respondent
Ruling: resides, the local lupon has no jurisdiction over their dispute, hence, prior
referral to it for conciliation is not a pre-condition to its filing in court.
The pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code read:
The RTC thus erred in dismissing petitioners complaint.
SEC. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto.The
lupon of each barangay G.R. No. 178552 October 5, 2010
shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the
SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC., Petitioners,
same city or municipality for
vs.
ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, Respondents.
amicable settlement of all disputes except:
. RULING: PETITIONERS HAVE NO LOCUS STANDI.
(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different 1. Have not presented any personal stake in the outcome of the
cities or municipalities, controversy.

2. Failed to particularize how the implementation of specific Manansan, OSB, Dean Consuelo Paz, Atty. Josefina Lichauco,
provisions of RA 9372 would result in direct injury to their Retired Col. Gerry Cunanan, Carlitos Siguion-Reyna, Dr. Carolina
organization and members. Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes, Danilo Ramos, Emerenciana de
3. There are other parties not before the Court with direct and Jesus, Rita Baua and Rey Claro Casambre filed a petition for
specific interests in the questions being raised. certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178581.
4. Did not show an actual or immediate danger of sustaining Karapatan and its alliance member organizations Hustisya,
direct injury as a result of the laws enforcement. Desaparecidos, Samahan ng mga Ex-Detainees Laban sa
5. None of the individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any Detensyon at para sa Amnestiya (SELDA), Ecumenical
direct and personal interest in the implementation of the law. Movement for Justice and Peace (EMJP), and Promotion of
Church Peoples Response (PCPR), which were represented by
Facts: their respective officers who are also bringing action on their own
behalf, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R.
Petitioners RESPECTIVELY filed a PETITION FOR No. 178890.
CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION BEFORE THE S.C. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Counsels for the
Defense of Liberty (CODAL), Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S.
Madrigal, Sergio Osmea III, and Wigberto E. Taada filed a
Before the Court are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of RA
petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 179157.
9372, the Human Security Act of 2007, signed into law on March 6, 2007.
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog (BAYAN-ST),
other regional chapters and organizations mostly based in the
Following the effectivity of RA 9372 on July 15, 2007, petitioner Southern Tagalog Region, and individuals followed suit by filing a
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., a non- petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 179461
government organization, and Atty. Soliman Santos, Jr., a that replicates the allegations raised in the BAYAN petition in G.R.
concerned citizen, taxpayer and lawyer, filed a petition for certiorari No. 178581.
and prohibition on July 16, 2007 docketed as G.R. No. 178552.
Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-
On even date, petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), National Terrorism Council composed of, at the time of the filing of the
Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU), petitions, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson,
and Center for Trade Union and Human Rights (CTUHR), Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign
represented by their respective officers who are also bringing the Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and
action in their capacity as citizens, filed a petition for certiorari and National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local
prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178554. Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary
BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, Margarito Teves as members. All the petitions, except that of the
Solidarity of Cavite Workers (SCW), League of Filipino IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of
Students, Anakbayan, Pambansang Lakas ng Kilusang Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine National Police
Mamamalakaya (PAMALAKAYA), Alliance of Concerned (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon.
Teachers, Migrante, Health Alliance for Democracy (HEAD), The Karapatan, BAYAN and BAYAN-ST petitions likewise
and Agham, represented by their respective officers, and joined by impleaded President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the support
concerned citizens and taxpayers Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Dr. agencies for the Anti-Terrorism Council like the National
Bienvenido Lumbera, Renato Constantino, Jr., Sister Mary John Intelligence Coordinating Agency, National Bureau of Investigation,

Bureau of Immigration, Office of Civil Defense, Intelligence Service Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being
of the AFP, Anti-Money Laundering Center, Philippine Center on suspected "communist fronts" by the government, especially
Transnational Crime, and the PNP intelligence and investigative the military; whereas individual petitioners invariably invoke the
elements. "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as
citizens and taxpayers.
ISSUE: Whether the various petitioners in this case has locus standi.
1. Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the
HELD: NONE. (ALL OF THEM) outcome of the controversy.
o None of them faces any charge under RA 9372.
Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP and PCR,
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so allege that they have been subjected to "close security
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. surveillance by state security forces," their members followed by
Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and "suspicious persons" and "vehicles with dark windshields," and their
substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or offices monitored by "men with military build."
will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is They likewise claim that they have been branded as "enemies of
being challenged. the [S]tate."
A party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a
direct and personal interest. o Even conceding such gratuitous allegations, the Office of the
It must show not only that the law or any governmental act is Solicitor General (OSG) correctly points out that petitioners
invalid, but also that it sustained or is in immediate danger of have yet to show any connection between the purported
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not "surveillance" and the implementation of RA 9372.
merely that it suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must show
that it has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY,
which it is lawfully entitled or that it is about to be subjected to some SCW, LFS, Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante, HEAD and
burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. Agham, would like the Court to take judicial notice of respondents
For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional alleged action of tagging them as militant organizations fronting for
question, it must show that: the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing,
the National Peoples Army (NPA).
1. it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a The tagging, according to petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of
result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; proscription without following the procedure under the law. The
petition of BAYAN-ST, pleads the same allegations.
2. the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
o The Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged "tagging" of
3. the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. petitioners.
o No ground was properly established by petitioners for the
taking of judicial notice.
IN THE CASE AT BAR:

o Petitioners apprehension is insufficient to substantiate their imminently disposed to ask for the judicial proscription of the CPP-
plea. That no specific charge or proscription under RA 9372 NPA consortium and its allied organizations.
has been filed against them, three years after its effectivity,
belies any claim of imminence of their perceived threat 3. There are other parties not before the Court with direct and
emanating from the so-called tagging. specific interests in the questions being raised.
o The same is true with petitioners KMU, NAFLU and CTUHR, o Of recent development is the filing of the first case for
who merely harp as well on their supposed "link" to the CPP proscription under Section 17 of RA 9372 by the
and NPA. Department of Justice before the Basilan Regional Trial
Court against the Abu Sayyaf Group.
2. They fail to particularize how the implementation of specific
provisions of RA 9372 would result in direct injury to their o Petitioner-organizations do not in the least allege any link
organization and members. to the Abu Sayyaf Group.
While in our jurisdiction there is still no judicially declared terrorist 4. Some petitioners attempt, in vain though, to show the
organization, the United States of America (US) and the European imminence of a prosecution under RA 9372 by alluding to past
Union (EU) have both classified the CPP, NPA and Abu Sayyaf rebellion charges against them.
Group as foreign terrorist organizations.
The Court takes note of the joint statement of Executive Secretary o The dismissed rebellion charges, however, do not save
Eduardo Ermita and Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales that the the day for petitioners.
Arroyo Administration would adopt the US and EU classification of o Those charges were filed in 2006, prior to the enactment
the CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations. of RA 9372, and dismissed by this Court. For another,
Such statement notwithstanding, there is yet to be filed before the rebellion is defined and punished under the Revised Penal
courts an application to declare the CPP and NPA organizations as Code.
domestic terrorist or outlawed organizations under RA 9372. o Prosecution for rebellion is not made more imminent by
Again, RA 9372 has been in effect for three years now. the enactment of RA 9372, nor does the enactment
From July 2007 up to the present, petitioner-organizations have thereof make it easier to charge a person with rebellion, its
conducted their activities fully and freely without any threat of, much elements not having been altered.
less an actual, prosecution or proscription under RA 9372. o Conversely, previously filed but dismissed rebellion
Parenthetically, the Fourteenth Congress, in a resolution initiated charges bear no relation to prospective charges under RA
by Party-list Representatives Saturnino Ocampo, Teodoro Casio, 9372.
Rafael Mariano and Luzviminda Ilagan, urged the government to o It cannot be overemphasized that three years after the
resume peace negotiations with the NDF by removing the enactment of RA 9372, none of petitioners has been
impediments thereto, one of which is the adoption of designation of charged.
the CPP and NPA by the US and EU as foreign terrorist
organizations. Petitioners IBP and CODAL base their claim of locus standi on their
Considering the policy statement of the Aquino Administration of sworn duty to uphold the Constitution.
resuming peace talks with the NDF, the government is not

The IBP zeroes in on Section 21 of RA 9372 directing it to render o To rule otherwise would be to corrupt the settled doctrine
assistance to those arrested or detained under the law. of locus standi, as every worthy cause is an interest
shared by the general public.
o The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law 6. Neither can locus standi be conferred upon individual
does not, however, suffice to clothe the IBP or any of its petitioners as taxpayers and citizens.
members with standing. o A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an exercise of
o The IBP failed to sufficiently demonstrate how its mandate the spending or taxing power of Congress, whereas
under the assailed statute revolts against its constitutional citizen standing must rest on direct and personal
rights and duties. interest in the proceeding.
o Moreover, both the IBP and CODAL have not pointed to o RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for
even a single arrest or detention effected under RA any appropriation from Congress for its implementation,
9372. while none of the individual petitioner-citizens has alleged
any direct and personal interest in the implementation of
Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal, who claims to have the law.
been the subject of "political surveillance," also lacks locus standi. o It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit
accompanied by the assertion of a public right, do not
establish locus standi.
o Court finds that she has not shown even the slightest
o Evidence of a direct and personal interest is key.
threat of being charged under RA 9372.
o Similarly lacking in locus standi are former Senator
Wigberto Taada and Senator Sergio Osmea III, who cite Rule 3, Sec 4 to 6 (Parties to a Civil Action)
their being respectively a human rights advocate and an
SPOUSES RICKY WONG and ANITA CHAN, LEONARDO JOSON,
oppositor to the passage of RA 9372.
JUANITO SANTOS, EMERITO SICAT and CONRADO LAGMAN,
o Outside these gratuitous statements, no concrete
petitioners,
injury to them has been pinpointed.
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ROMARICO HENSON,
5. Petitioners Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network and Atty. respondents.
Soliman Santos Jr. in also conveniently state that the issues they
raise are of transcendental importance, "which must be settled Facts:
early" and are of "far-reaching implications," without mention of any
specific provision of RA 9372 under which they have been charged, Submitted for adjudication in the instant petition for review on
or may be charged. certiorari
o Mere invocation of human rights advocacy has Private respondent Romarico Henson married Katrina Pineda
nowhere been held sufficient to clothe litigants with o They have three children but had been most of the time
locus standi. living separately
o Petitioners must show an actual, or immediate danger o Romarico bought a parcel of land in Angeles City from his
of sustaining, direct injury as a result of the laws father, Dr. Celestino L. Henson
enforcement.

o Meanwhile, in Hongkong, Katrina entered into an o alleged that he was "not given his day in court" because
agreement with Anita Chan whereby the latter consigned he was not represented by counsel as Attys. Albino and
to Katrina pieces of jewelry for sale Yumul appeared solely for Katrina
Katrina failed to return the pieces of jewelry within the 20-day The lower court issued an order restraining the Register of Deeds
period agreed upon, Anita Chan demanded payment of their value of Angeles City from issuing the final bill of sale of Transfer
Katrina issued in favor of Anita Chan a check which, however, was Certificates of Title in favor of the winning bidders (Santos and
dishonored for lack of funds Joson)
o Hence, Katrina was charged with estafa before the then Upon motion of Romarico, the court issued a writ of preliminary
Court of First Instance of Pampanga and Angeles City injunction enjoining the sheriff from approving the final bill of sale of
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the case the land
o Katrina's liability was not criminal but civil in nature as no After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered a decision holding
estafa was committed by the issuance of the check in that Romarico was indeed not given his day in court
payment of a pre-existing obligation o Pursuant to a doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court to
Anita Chan and her husband Ricky Wong filed against Katrina and the effect that the Court of First Instance or a branch
her husband Romarico Henson, an action for collection of a sum of thereof, has authority and jurisdiction to try and decide an
money also in the same branch of the aforesaid court action for annulment of a final and executory judgment or
Atty. Gregorio Albino, Jr. filed an answer with counterclaim but only order rendered by another court of first instance or of a
in behalf of Katrina branch thereof (Gianan vs. Imperial)
o Atty. Expedite Yumul, who collaborated with Atty. Albino, The defendants appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court
appeared for the defendants, it is not shown on record that o said court affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court
said counsel also represented Romarico judgment had not attained finality as the decision
After trial, the court promulgated a decisions in favor of the Wongs, therein was not served on him and that he was
which ordered Katrina and Romarico Henson to pay the former not represented by counsel
A writ of execution was thereafter issued estoppel may not be applied against him as, not
o Levied upon were four lots in Angeles City covered by having been served with the decision
TCTs in the name of Romarico married to Katrina The appellants filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of
The public auction sale was first set for October 30 but since said the appellate court but the same was denied for lack of merit
date was declared a public holiday, the sherrif reset the sale to Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari
November 11
The property covered by said title was extrajudicially foreclosed by
the Rural Bank of Porac, Pampanga on account of the mortgage Issue: W/N Romarico Henson was guilty of laches and may not now
loan which they obtained form the bank belatedly assert his rights over the properties because he and Katrina were
o Santos and Joson were the highest bidders in the sale represented by counsel
Romarico filed an action for the annulment of the decision in as well
Ruling: No
as the writ of execution, levy on execution and the auction sale
therein in the same Court of First Instance. Romarico and Katrina had in fact been separated when Katrina entered into
a business deal with Anita Wong. Thus, when that business transaction
eventually resulted in the filing of the case, Romarico acted, or, as charged

by petitioners, failed to act, in the belief that he was not involved in the in the amount of P 11,000.00, and resulted in the seizure of
personal dealings of his estranged wife. That belief was buttressed by the Lourdes Mariano's property worth P 15,000.00.
fact that the complaint itself did not mention or implicate him other than as Motion for the discharge of the attachment was filed by
the husband of Katrina. Lourdes- denied
she went up to CA on certiorari- ordered Trial Court to receive
Laches may not be charged against Romarico because, aside from the fact evidence on whether or not the attachment had been
that he had no knowledge of the transactions of his estranged wife, he was improvidently or irregularly issued
also not afforded an opportunity to defend himself The Trial Court did so, came to the conclusion that the
attachment had indeed been improperly issued, and
There is no laches or even finality of decision to speak of with respect to consequently dissolved it.
Romarico since the decision in the case is null and void for having been RTC ruled in favor of defendant Lourdes.
rendered without jurisdiction for failure to observe the notice requirements Sanchez filed a notice of appeal, an appeal bond and a record on
prescribed by law appeal.
Pending approval of the record on appeal, Lourdes Mariano
Failure to notify Romarico may not be attributed to the fact that the plaintiffs
filed a motion for the immediate execution of the judgment
in the case acted on the presumption that the Hensons were still happily
which the CFI granted.
married because the complaint itself shows that they did not consider
The sheriff garnished the sum of P 11,000.00 from Veritas
Romarico as a party to the transaction which Katrina undertook with Anita
Insurance Company, and levied on real and personal property
Wong. In all likelihood, the plaintiffs merely impleaded Romarico as a
belonging to the conjugal partnership of Esther and her
nominal party in the case pursuant to the provisions of Rule 3, Section 4 of
husband, Daniel
the Rules of Court
Esther then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Consequently, the writ of execution cannot be issued against Romarico as Appeals, praying for the annulment of the execution pending
he has not yet had his day in court and, necessarily, the public auction sale appeal authorized by the Trial Court- dismissed.
is null and void. Moreover, the power of the court in the execution of Husband filed a complaint for annulment of the execution in the
judgments extends only over properties unquestionably belonging to the CFI-QC in his capacity as administrator of the conjugal partnership
judgment debtor He alleged that the conjugal assets could not validly be made
to answer for obligations exclusively contracted by his wife,
Mariano vs. CA, G.R. No. 151283, June 7, 1989 an appeal to decision of and that, moreover, some of the personal property levied on,
CA such as household appliances and utensils necessarily used in
the conjugal dwelling, were exempt from execution.
FACTS: He also applied for a preliminary injunction pending
adjudication of the case on the merits.
Esther Sanchez file a case against Lourdes Mariano in CFI- Lourdes moved to dismiss the complaint- denied
caloocan for recovery of the value of ladies' ready made dresses She instituted a special civil action of certiorari in the CA to
allegedly purchased by and delivered to the latter. th th
enjoin CFI QC-7 div. granted but the 8 div. dismissed
A writ of preliminary attachment was issued at Esther Sanchez' th th
Lourdes motion.(8 div decided the case cause Justice in 7
instance, upon a bond posted by Veritas Insurance Company th
was transferred to 8 he brought the case)

CA ruled that QC Court had not interfered with the execution THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Division, and
process of the Caloocan Court because Daniel Sanchez's ROMULO NICOL, Respondents.
action in the former court raised an issue-the validity of the
sheriffs levy on the conjugal partnership assets of the Sanchez Facts:
spouses different from those adjudicated in the Caloocan
Court, and Sanchez was not a party to the case tried by the 1
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari assailing the Decision of the
latter. Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 47029 and its Resolution denying the
Hence Lourdes filed the present petition in SC. motion for reconsideration thereof.
Lourdes contention: Her action against Esther Sanchez was justified, the
litigation being "incidental to the ... business in which she is engaged and The case stemmed from the following factual backdrop:
consequently, the conjugal partnership of Daniel and Esther Sanchez was
liable for the debts and obligations contracted by Esther in her business RTC Branch 19 Bacoor, Cavite
since the income derived therefrom, having been used to defray some of the Petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Erlinda Nicol
expenses for the maintenance of the family and the education of the (Erlinda)
children, had redounded to the benefit of the partnership. It was therefore Said action originated from Erlinda Nicols civil liability arising
error for the CA to have rule that Husband is not bound by the decision of from the criminal offense of slander filed against her by
CFI Caloocan. petitioners.
Ordered Erlinda to pay damages.
RULLING:The husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a Said decision was affirmed, successively, by the Court of
"stranger" to the case prosecuted and adjudged against his wife. Whether by Appeals and this Court. It became final and executory on 5
intervention in the court issuing the writ, or by separate action, it is March 1992.
unavailing for either Esther Sanchez or her husband, Daniel, to seek TC issued a writ of execution
preclusion of the enforcement of the writ of possession against their conjugal Finding Erlinda Nicols personal properties insufficient to satisfy
assets. For it being established, that Esther had engaged in business with the judgment, the Deputy Sheriff issued a notice of levy on real
her husband's consent, and the income derived therefrom had been property on execution addressed to the Register of Deeds of
expended, in part at least, for the support of her family, the liability of the Cavite
conjugal assets to respond for the wife's obligations in the premises cannot Two (2) days before the public auction sale on 28 January
be disputed. 1993, an affidavit of third-party claim from one Arnulfo F. Fulo
was received by the deputy sheriff prompting petitioners to put
Therefore, CA decision is reversed and CFI-QC is ordered to dismiss the up a sheriffs indemnity bond.
case. The auction sale proceeded with petitioners as the highest
bidder.
G.R. No. 145222 April 24, 2009
RTC Branch 21 of the RTC of Imus, Cavite.
SPOUSES ROBERTO BUADO and VENUS BUADO, Petitioners, Romulo Nicol (respondent), the husband of Erlinda Nicol, filed a
vs. complaint for annulment of certificate of sale and damages with
preliminary injunction against petitioners and the deputy sheriff.

Respondent, alleged that the petitioners, connived and directly If the property levied on is claimed by any person other than the
levied upon and execute his real property without exhausting judgment obligor or his agent, and such person makes an affidavit
the personal properties of Erlinda Nicol. of his title thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the
Respondent averred that there was no proper publication and grounds of such right or title, and serves the same upon the officer
posting of the notice of sale. Furthermore, respondent claimed making the levy and a copy thereof upon the judgment obligee, the
that his property which was valued at P500,000.00 was only officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless such
sold at a "very low price" of P51,685.00, whereas the judgment judgment obligee, on demand of the officer, files a bond approved
obligation of Erlinda Nicol was only P40,000.00. by the court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not less
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of than the value of the property levied on. In case of disagreement as
jurisdiction and that they had acted on the basis of a valid writ of to such value, the same shall be determined by the court issuing
execution. the writ of execution. No claim for damages for the taking or
respondent should have filed the case with Branch 19 where keeping of the property may be enforced against the bond unless
the judgment originated and which issued the order of the action therefor is filed within one hundred twenty (120) days
execution, writ of execution, notice of levy and notice of from the date of the filing of the bond.
sheriffs sale.
dismissed respondents complaint and ruled that Branch 19 has The officer shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping
jurisdiction over the case. of the property, to any third-party claimant if such bond is filed.
MOR denied. Nothing herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any
third person from vindicating his claim to the property in a
separate action, or prevent the judgment obligee from claiming
CA damages in the same or a separate action against a third-party
Reversed the TC and held that Branch 21 has jurisdiction to act on claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly spurious claim.
the complaint filed by appellant.
Petitioners MOR - denied on 23 August 2000. When the writ of execution is issued in favor of the Republic of the
Philippines, or any officer duly representing it, the filing of such
bond shall not be required, and in case the sheriff or levying officer
SC rule 65 is sued for damages as a result of the levy, he shall be represented
Petitioner filed the instant petition attributing grave abuse of by the Solicitor General and if held liable therefor, the actual
discretion on the part of CA damages adjudged by the court shall be paid by the National
SC remedy should be appeal but SC decided on the case Treasurer out of such funds as may be appropriated for the
anyway. purpose. (Emphasis Supplied)
Issue: WON the husband of the judgment debtor may file an independent A third-party claimant may also resort to an independent separate action,
action to protect the conjugal property subject to execution? the object of which is the recovery of ownership or possession of the
property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages arising from wrongful
YES and Branch 21 has jurisdiction over the case seizure and detention of the property. If a separate action is the recourse,
the third-party claimant must institute in a forum of competent
Sec. 16. Proceedings where property claimed by third person. jurisdiction an action, distinct and separate from the action in which

the judgment is being enforced, even before or without need of filing a partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the liability
claim in the court that issued the writ.+ of the debtor-spouse.
This leads us to the question: Is the husband, who was not a party to the suit The civil obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by
but whose conjugal property is being executed on account of the other Erlinda coun NOT have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
spouse being the judgment obligor, considered a "stranger?" partnership.
In Mariano v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the husband of To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal
the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a "stranger" to the case obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is
prosecuted and adjudged against his wife for an obligation that has shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership.
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Hence, the filing of a separate action by respondent is proper and jurisdiction
On the other hand, in Naguit v. Court of Appeals and Sy v. is thus vested on Branch 21. Petitioners failed to show that the Court of
Discaya, the Court stated that a spouse is deemed a stranger to the Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in remanding the case to
action wherein the writ of execution was issued and is Branch 21 for further proceedings.
therefore justified in bringing an independent action to
vindicate her right of ownership over his exclusive or WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of
paraphernal property.lawphil.net Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
Pursuant to Mariano however, it must further be settled whether the No. L-25916. April 30, 1970.
obligation of the judgment debtor redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership or not. GAUDENCIO A. BEGOSA, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CHAIRMAN,
PHILIPPINE VETERANS
ADMINISTRATION;and MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF

ADMINISTRATORS,PHILIPPINE
There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article 122
16
of the Family Code explicitly provides that payment of personal debts VETERANS ADMINISTRATION, defendants-appellants.
contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not
be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to Facts:
the benefit of the family.
Plaintiff sought the aid of the judiciary to obtain benefits to which he believed
Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by he was entitled to under the Veteran's Bill of Rights.
either spouse by reason of a crime orquasi-delict is chargeable to the
absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the He filed a claim for disability, but it was erroneously disapproved
exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not due to his dishonorable discharge from the military.
accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal The PVA finally approved his claim entitling him to Php 30/month,
to begin on Oct 5, 1964.

CFI in the funds retained and in the credit for the work done. As a matter of fact,
in an earlier case where we sustained the power of a private citizen claiming
Believing that his pension should have taken effect in 1955, and that he is title to and right of possession of a certain property to sue an officer or agent
entitled to a higher pension as an incapacitated person, he filed a case of the government alleged to be illegally withholding the same, we likewise
against the PVA. expressed this caveat: However, and this is important, where the judgment
in such a case would result not only in the recovery of possession of the
The PVA claims that the Court does not have jurisdiction to hear property in favor of said citizen but also in a charge against or financial
the case, because, in reality, this is a suit against the government liability to the Government, then the suit should be regarded as one against
and they invoke the non-suability of the state without its consent. the government itself, and, consequently, it cannot prosper or be validly
The CFI ruled in Begosas's favor approving the back payments and entertained by the courts except with the consent of said Government.
adjusted amounts.
The PVA elevated the matter to the SC on appeal. G.R. No. L-23139 December 17, 1966
Ruling:
MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION, INC., plaintiff-appellant,
The fourth assignment of error assails what it considers to be the failing of vs.
the lower court in not holding that the complaint in this case is in effect a suit CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE and BUREAU of CUSTOMS,
against the State which has not given its consent thereto. We have recently defendants-appellees.
had occasion to reaffirm the force and primacy of the doctrine of non-
suability. It does not admit of doubt, then, that if the suit were in fact against RULING: BUREAU OF CUSTOMS CANNOT BE SUED, PROPRIETARY
the State, the lower court should have dismissed the coinplaint. Nor is it to FUNCTION (ARRASTRE SERVICE) IS ONLY AN INCIDENT TO
be doubted that while ostensibly an action may be against a public official, ITS PRINCIPAL GOVERNMENT FUNCTION.
the defendant may in reality be the government. As a result, it is equally
well-settled that where a litigation may have adverse consequences on the Facts:
public treasury, whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of property,
the public official proceeded against not being liable in his personal capacity,
4 cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad on S.S.
then the doctrine of non-suability may appropriately be invoked. It has no
"Leoville", consigned to Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc.,
application, however, where the suit against such a functionary had to be
(Petitioner).
instituted because of his failure to comply with the duty imposed by statute
The shipment arrived at the Port of Manila and was discharged to
appropriating public funds for the benefit of plaintiff or petitioner. Such is the
the custody of the Customs Arrastre Service, the unit of the
present case.
Bureau of Customs then handling arrastre operations therein.
The doctrine announced by us in Ruiz v. Cabahug finds relevance: We hold The Customs Arrastre Service later delivered to the broker of the
that under the facts and circumstances alleged in the amended complaint, consignee 3 cases only of the shipment.
which should be taken on its face value the suit is not one against the CFI OF MANILA: RECOVER THE VALUE OF THE
Government, or a claim against it, but one against the officials to compel UNDELIVERED CASE PLUS DAMAGES.
them to act in accordance with the rights to be established by the contending o Petitioner filed a suit against the Customs Arrastre
architects, or to prevent them from making payment and recognition until the Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value
contending architects have established their respective rights and interests

of the undelivered case in the amount of P18,493.37 plus a unit of the Bureau of Custom, set up under Customs
other damages. Administrative Order No. 8-62 of November 9, 1962.
o DEFENDANTS: MOTION TO DISMISS THE o It follows that the defendants herein cannot he sued under
COMPLAINT. the first two abovementioned categories of natural or
o ALLEGATION: not being persons under the law, juridical persons.
defendants cannot be sued.
o DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT. The fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a
o DEFENDANTS ARE NOT SUABLE. function proprietary in nature does not necessarily result in its
being suable.
PETITION FOR REVIEW IN THE SC. o If said non-governmental function is undertaken as an
CONTENTION: BUREAU OF CUSTOMS IS DISCHARGING incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver
PROPRIETARY FUNCTIONS AND AS SUCH, CAN BE SUED. thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to
such government entity.
ISSUE: Whether the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs
can be sued. IN THE CASE AT BAR, The Bureau of Customs is part of the
Department of Finance, with no personality of its own apart from
HELD: No. that of the national government.
Cannot be sued, such proprietary function is but an incident to 2. Its primary function is governmental, that of assessing and
its principal government function, thus, Bureau of Customs is collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff
immune from suit. and customs duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties.
The Rules of Court, in Section 1, Rule 3, provide: To this function, arrastre service is a necessary incident.
For practical reasons said revenues and customs duties can not be
SECTION 1. Who may be parties.Only natural or juridical assessed and collected by simply receiving the importer's or ship
persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil agent's or consignee's declaration of merchandise being imported
action. and imposing the duty provided in the Tariff law.
Customs authorities and officers must see to it that the declaration
tallies with the merchandise actually landed.
Accordingly, a defendant in a civil suit must be (1) a natural person;
And this checking up requires that the landed merchandise be
(2) a juridical person or (3) an entity authorized by law to be sued.
hauled from the ship's side to a suitable place in the customs
premises to enable said customs officers to make it, that is, it
1. Neither the Bureau of Customs nor (a fortiori) its function requires arrastre operations.
unit, the Customs Arrastre Service, is a person.
Clearly, therefore, although said arrastre function may be
deemed proprietary, it is a necessary incident of the primary
o They are merely parts of the machinery of Government. and governmental function of the Bureau of Customs, so that
o The Bureau of Customs is a bureau under the Department
of Finance; and as stated, the Customs Arrastre Service is

engaging in the same does not necessarily render said Bureau o plaintiff has adopted a credit system known as the
liable to suit. American Express Credit Card
For otherwise, it could not perform its governmental function o defendant applied for one such card to the plaintiff at the
without necessarily exposing itself to suit. latter's office in New York City
Sovereign immunity, granted as to the end, should not be denied as Thereafter and before the card expired was cancelled as of June
to the necessary means to that end. 20, 1961 the defendant used it in making purchases and obtaining
Regardless of the merits of the claim against it, the State, for services on credit in various foreign countries
obvious reasons of public policy, cannot be sued without its plaintiff made demands for payment upon the defendant, and after
consent. the latter refused to pay filed the presented suit for collection
Plaintiff should have filed its present claim to the General
Auditing Office, it being for money under the provisions of
Commonwealth Act 327, which state the conditions under which Issue: W/N plaintiff has no cause of action against him, not being a real
money claims against the Government may be filed. party in interest. (He alleged that American Express merely introduced him
It must be remembered that statutory provisions waiving State to different establishment, who shouldve brought the suit upon his non-
immunity from suit are strictly construed and that waiver of payment)
immunity, being in derogation of sovereignty, will not be lightly
Held: No
inferred.
From the provision authorizing the Bureau of Customs to lease Ratio:
arrastre operations to private parties, Court sees no authority to sue
the said Bureau in the instances where it undertakes to conduct With regard to the proper party filing the suit
said operation itself.
The Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the machinery of the This corporation pays for the purchase and the defendant has to reimburse
national government in the operation of the arrastre service, such payment to the owner of the credit card; in this case to the plaintiff
pursuant to express legislative mandate and as a necessary
incident of its prime governmental function, is immune from suit, On the same point the witness also stated that the charge orders of the
there being no statute to the contrary. appellant were in due course of business submitted by the establishments
concerned to the appellee for payment and paid by the latter. There can be
AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY, INC. v CIRIO H. SANTIAGO no doubt, therefore, that the appellee is the creditor of the appellant and as
such is the proper party to file this suit for collection
Facts:
This case is on appeal directly to this Court by the defendant from

With regard to Sec.20 Rule 24
the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, sentencing him
to pay the plaintiff
The appellant also objected to the admission of the aforesaid deposition as a
The plaintiff is a foreign corporation with main office in New York whole on the ground that the procedure prescribed in Section 20 of Rule 24
City and a branch office in the Philippines which is duly registered was not followed, particularly that portion which states that the officer who
and licensed to transact business as a travel agent took the deposition shall "promptly file it with the court in which the action is
pending or send it by registered mail to the Clerk of Court thereof for filing."

The non-compliance with this rule, according to the appellant, consists in the o Trial Court ruled in favor of Bulawan. Register of Deeds of
fact that it was the appellee's counsel who picked up the deposition from the Legazpi City is ordered to cancel the title.
Department of Foreign Affairs and delivered it to the Clerk of Court instead CA: Yan appealed to the CA. Dismissed. Affirmed Trial Court.
of its being filed directly with the latter o The Trial Courts decision became final and executory.
Register of Deeds informed Aquende of the trail courts writ of
We do not believe that the manner, in which the deposition was delivered to execution.
the Clerk of Court, as above related, so affected its integrity as to render it Aquende questioned the trial courts writ of execution. He alleged
inadmissible. After all there is no pretense here that the appellant did not that he was unaware of any litigation involving his property. He
contract the indebtedness for the collection of which he is being sued or that received no Summons or notice, nor was he aware of any adverse
the same has been paid, the only important issue posed in this appeal being claim as no notice lis pendens was inscribed in his title.
whether or not the appellee is the real party in interest. On this score the Respondent filed a third party claim against the writ because it
finding of the lower court, supported as it is by the evidence before it, is affected his property and he is not bound by the trial courts orders
conclusive. because he is not a party to the suit. Clerk of Court said it was the
wrong remedy because his property was not in sheriffs possession
nor was it up for auction.
Rule 3, Secs 7 to 12 (Parties to a Civil Action) Respondent filed a notice of appearance with third party motion.
Aquende also filed a Supplemental Motion where he reiterated that
G.R. No. 182819 June 22, 2011 he was not a party in the Civil Case and that since the action was in
MAXIMINA A. BULAWAN, Petitioner, personam or quasi in rem, only the parties in the case are bound by
vs. the decision.
EMERSON B. AQUENDE, Respondent. Trial Court denied Respondents motions. According to Trial Court
their jurisdiction was lost when CA affirmed.
Facts: Aquende filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court
Bulawan filed a complaint for annulment of title, reconveyance and of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
damages against Yap and the Register of Deeds. Aquende alleged that he was deprived of his property without due
o Bulawan is the owner of a lot bought from Yaptengco process of law. Bulawan conveniently failed to implead him despite
Brothers, who claims they inherited the property from Yap her knowledge of the existing title in his name and prevented him
Chin Cun. from participating in the proceedings and protecting his title.
o Petitioner alleged that Yap claimed ownership of the Aquende added that he is an indispensable party and the trial court
property and caused the issuance of a TCT in Yaps did not acquire jurisdiction over his person because he was not
name. impleaded as a party in the case. Trial court went beyond the
o Yap clarified that she asserts ownership of the lot, and that jurisdiction conferred by the allegations on the complaint because
according to an earlier civil case, the trial court declared Bulawan did not pray for the cancellation of the TCT.
that the lot of Bulawan was simulated by the Yaptengco CA ruled in favor of Respondent.
Brothers. The trial court ruled that Yap Chin Cun was the o MR was denied.
rightful owner. o The Court of Appeals ruled that it may still entertain the
o Yap Chin Cun sold the property to the Aquendes petition despite the fact that another division of the Court
(respondent) of Appeals already affirmed the trial courts Decision. The

other division of the Court of Appeals was not given the the joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all conditions, their
opportunity to rule on the issue of Aquende being an presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power. It is
indispensable party because that issue was not raised precisely "when an indispensable party is not before the court (that) the
during the proceedings before the trial court and on action should be dismissed." The absence of an indispensable party renders
appeal. all subsequent actions of the court null and void
o The CA declared that Aquende was an indispensable
party affected by the trial court. Trial court should have The trial court should have taken the initiative to implead Aquende as
impleaded Aquende under Section 11, Rule 3. Jurisdiction defendant or to order Bulawan to do so as mandated under Section 11, Rule
was not properly acquired over Aquende, the CA ruling 3 of the Rules of Court. The burden to implead or to order the impleading of
affirming the trial court is void. The Court of Appeals indispensable parties is placed on Bulawan and on the trial court,
added that the trial courts decision was void because the respectively.
trial court failed to note that the Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate and Partition, from where the Yaptengco brothers Even if Aquende were not an indispensable party, he could still file a petition
derived their ownership, as heirs of Yap Chin Cun and for annulment of judgment. We have consistently held that a person need
now being claimed by Bulawan, had already been not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled. What is essential is
declared void in an earlier Civil Case. The Court of that he can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use
Appeals also said that a reading of Bulawans complaint of fraud and collusion and that he would be adversely affected thereby.
showed that the trial court had no jurisdiction to order the
nullification of TCT because this was not one of the reliefs We agree with the Court of Appeals that Bulawan obtained a favorable
that Bulawan prayed for. judgment from the trial court by the use of fraud. Bulawan prevented
Hence this petition in the SC assailing the decision of the CA. Aquende from presenting his case before the trial court and from protecting
his title over his property. We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the
Issue: Whether Aquende is the proper party to sue for the annulment of 26 November 1996 Decision adversely affected Aquende as he was
judgment? deprived of his property without due process. Moreover, a person who was
not impleaded in the complaint cannot be bound by the decision rendered
Ruling: therein, for no man shall be affected by a proceeding in which he is a
stranger.
Petition has no merit.
The Petition for Annulment of Judgment is the Propert Remedy as Aquende
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines indispensable parties as was affected by the Trail Courts decision even if he was not a party to the
parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an case.
action. An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the
courts action in the litigation. As such, they must be joined either as plaintiffs
or as defendants. Dael vs. Teves, 136 SCRA 199 (1985) Petition for Review on certiorari R
65
In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals,
FACTS:
The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action
requires, of course, the joinder of all necessary parties where possible, and

Dael spouses filed in CFI-Misamis Oriental a complaint for: Section 2.Parties in interest. Every action must be
"Ownership, Recovery of Possession & Damages" against the prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in
private respondentsEdorot interest. All persons having an interest in the subject of the
EDOROT filed Answer with Counterclaim action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined
The case was set for pre-trial on various occasions to give the as plaintiffs. All persons who claim an interest in the
parties more chance to arrive at an amicable settlement (the controversy or the subject thereof adverse to the plaintiff,
original Judge was Malvar but he was transferred and TEVES- or who are necessary to complete determination or
one of respondents was appointed to take Malvars place) settlement of the question involved therein shall be joined
the case was set for pre-trial before Judge Teves who ordered as defendants.
amendment of complaint to include the heirs or representatives
of 2 deceased defendantsHerminigildo and Petra Section 7.Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties.
EDOROT filed an Ex- Parte Manifestation, praying that the Parties in interest without whom no final determination can
case be dismissed pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or
of Court for failure of petitioners to file an amended complaint- defendants.
granted
MR- denied In the case of Garchitorena, et al. vs. de los Santos, et al. No.L-
Hence direct appeal to SC. 17045, June 30, 1962, 115 Phil. 490, citing Bautista vs. Teodoro, 54 O.G.
619; Dizon vs. Garcia, et al., G.R. No. L-14690, November 29, 1960 the SC
Daels contention: Respondent Judge abused its discretion in ordering them
held that: Where the Court orders the plaintiff to amend its complaint
to file amended complaint to include the heirs of deceased defendants. NO
within a certain period of time in order to implead as party defendants
one who is not a party to the case but who is an indispensable party,
RULLING:
plaintiff's refusal to comply with such order is a ground for the
dismissal of the complaint.
Petitioners here claim that they are owners of the parcel of land in
question while respondents also claim to be the owners and possessors,
Therefore, Heirs of deceased defendants are indispensable parties
pro-indiviso by inheritance from their deceased parents, of the subject
who should be compulsory joined as defendants in the case and since the
litigated parcel. Then, deceased defendants have an undivided interest, right
petitioners failed to comply with this Order, respondent Judge acted within
and participation adverse to that of the petitioners' in the property in
his prerogative in dismissing the complaint.
litigation. Since both of them are already even prior to the filing of the
complaint against them in the court below and their interest in the property in
question having inured by intestacy to their heirs, the latter thereby G.R. No. L-44339 December 2, 1987
became the real parties in interest who should be impleaded as
defendants without whom no final determination of Civil Case can be CRISANTA F. SENO, CAROLA SENO SANTOS, MANUEL SENO, JR.,
had. DIANA SENO CONDER, EMILY SENO and WALTER SENO, plaintiffs,
vs.
Sections 2 and 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides- MARCOS MANGUBAT and Spouses FRANCISCO LUZAME and
VERGITA PENAFLOR, ANDRES EVANGELISTA and BIENVENIDO
MANGUBAT, defendants.

Facts: 2) the annulment of a subsequent sale to defendant spouses
Francisco Luzame and Vergita Penaflor of a parcel of land in
This is an appeal that was certified to this Court by the Court of Barrio Dongalo, Paranaque, Rizal.
Appeals 1 from the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 1,
dated September 29,1972 in Civil Case No. 12205 dismissing the action for On motion of defendant spouses Luzame and Penaflor, TC the
2 inclusion as defendants of Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido
reformation of instrument and annulment of subsequent sale.
Mangubat on the ground that they are indispensable parties,
Plaintiff Crisanta Seno, a widow and herein defendant Marcos Mangubat plaintiffs filed their amended complaint impleading Andres
agreed on a mortgage for the sum of P15,000.00 with a stipulation that as Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat as defendants.
long as the 2% per month interest is being paid, the mortgage over the The newly impleaded defendants moved for the dismissal of the
property will not be foreclosed. On the assurance of defendant Marcos case against them on the ground of prescription - granted
Mangubat, a practicing lawyer, Seno agreed to the execution of a Deed of Defendants Luzame, Penaflor and Mangubat in their motion for
Absolute Sale over the subject property for a consideration of P5,000.00 in reconsideration asked the court a quo to dismiss the case against
favor of defendant Mangubat and certain Andres Evangelista and all the defendants- GRANTED
Bienvenido Mangubat on July 17, 1961 court is no longer in a position to grant plaintiffs' demands,
principally the reformation of subject Deed of Absolute Sale.
On January 8, 1962 Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat executed

Plaintiffs MOR - denied
a Deed of Absolute Sale transferring their share in the subject property to
CA
defendant Marcos Mangubat;
Plaintiffs filed an appeal praying for the reversal of the orders of the
TC dismissing the complaint
Someyim in 1963, when plaintiff Crisanta F. Seno failed to pay the monthly
interest of 2%, she was sued for ejectment by defendant Marcos Mangubat
alleging non-payment of rentals; SC
CA certified the instant case to this Court holding that the
Seno also learned that defendant Marcos Mangubat sold the subject assignment of errors made by plaintiffs in their appeal raised purely
property in favor of spouses Francisco Luzame and Vergita Penaflor and legal questions
Sena claimed that the spouses Luzame and Penaflor bought the property in
bad faith since they had knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the ISSUE: WON defendants Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat
transaction between plaintiff and defendant Marcos Mangubat. indispensable parties in the case without whom no action can be properly
taken thereon?
Defendant spouses Luzame filed an ejectment case against plaintiff Crisanta
Seno for alleged non-payment of rentals. NO.
RTC For the determination of this issue, We find it necessary to consider the
Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking: distinction between indispensable and proper parties as clearly stated in
1) the reformation of a Deed of Sale executed in favor of Sections 7 and 8, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court which provide:
defendant Marcos Mangubat and,

Sec. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. have been amply protected. Defendants-spouses Luzame in any event may
Parties in interest without whom no final determination can enforce their rights against defendant Marcos Mangubat.
be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or
defendants. In fact the plaintiffs were not after defendants Andres Evangelista and
Bienvenido Mangubat as shown by their non-inclusion in the complaint and
Sec. 8. Joinder of proper parties. When persons who their opposition to the motion to include said defendants in the complaint as
are not indispensable but who ought to be parties if indispensable parties. It was only because they were ordered by the court a
complete relief is to be accorded as between those quo that they included the said defendants in the complaint. The lower court
already parties, have not been made parties and are erroneously held that the said defendants are indispensable parties.
subject to the jurisdiction of the court as to both service of
process and venue, the court shall order them summoned Notwithstanding, defendants Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido
to appear in the action. But the court may, in its discretion, Mangubat not being indispensable parties but only proper parties, their
proceed in the action without making such persons joinder as parties defendants was correctly ordered being in
parties, and the judgment rendered therein shall be accordance with Sec. 8 of Rule 3.
without prejudice to the rights of such persons.
By the dismissal of the case against defendants Andres Evangelista and
Under Section 7, indispensable parties must always be joined either as Bienvenido Mangubat, the court a quohad lost jurisdiction over them. We
plaintiffs or defendants, for the court cannot proceed without them. have already pointed out that the joinder of proper parties is necessary in
Necessary parties must be joined, under Section 8, in order to adjudicate the order to determine all the possible issues of the controversy; but if for some
whole controversy and avoid multiplicity of suits. reason or another it is not possible to join them, as when they are out of the
jurisdiction of the Court, the court may proceed without them, and the
Indispensable parties are those with such an interest in the controversy that judgment that may be rendered shall be without prejudice to their
a final decree would necessarily affect their rights, so that the courts cannot rights. Hence, notwithstanding the absence of said defendants, the court
proceed without their presence. Necessary parties are those whose could still proceed with the trial of the case as against the remaining
presence is necessary to adjudicate the whole controversy, but whose defendants in accordance with Sec. 8 of Rule 3.
interests are so far separable that a final decree can be made in their
absence without affecting them. Nevertheless, the court is constrained to affirm the dismissal of the
complaint against all the defendants as there is merit in the argument raised
In the present case, there are no rights of defendants Andres Evangelista by defendants-appellees that plaintiffs are barred by laches to bring suit
and Bienvenido Mangubat to be safeguarded if the sale should be held to be against them.
in fact an absolute sale not if the sale is held to be an equitable mortgage.
Defendant Marcos Mangubat became the absolute owner of the subject A perusal of the records shows that from the time of the execution of the
property by virtue of the sale to him of the shares of the aforementioned deed of sale on July 17, 1961 to the time of the filing of the present
defendants in the property. Said defendants no longer have any interest in complaint on August 29, 1969 or a period of 8 years, I month and 12 days,
the subject property. However, being parties to the instrument sought to be plaintiffs never took any step to enforce their rights which they claim to have
reformed, their presence is necessary in order to settle all the possible despite the several opportunities available to them.
issues of tile controversy. Whether the disputed sale be declared an
absolute sale or an equitable mortgage, the rights of all the defendants will

Defendant Marcos Mangubat filed an ejectment suit against plaintiff Crisanta DOMARAIS, MARILYN ANTALAN, CHRISTOPHER RAMIREZ, ARNOLD
Seno in 1963 and this fact was admitted by the plaintiffs in their complaint. SAN PEDRO, MARISSA SAN PEDRO, LORELI JIMENEZ, JEFFREY
For failure of plaintiff to appear in the case, a decision was rendered by the BUENO, CHRISTOPHER CAGAYAT, GERARD CABILES, JOAN
25
trial court ordering plaintiffs to vacate the subject property which decision ENRIQUEZ, JOSEPH DE LA CRUZ, NELLY CLERIGO, DULCE
26
was duly executed. NAVARETTE, ROWENA BELLO, DANIEL RAMIREZ, AILEEN BAUTISTA
and BALTAZAR FERRERA, Respondents.
It further appears from the complaint that plaintiffs were well aware of the
transfer of the title from the name of plaintiff Crisanta Seno to the names of Facts
defendants Marcos Mangubat, Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido This petition for review on certiorari assails the decision of the Court of
Mangubat and subsequently to the name of defendant Marcos Mangubat Appeals and its resolution denying reconsideration thereof.
alone as early as 1963 when the ejectment case was filed against plaintiffs,
and also they did not do anything about it. Private respondent (petitioner herein) Lotte Phils., Inc. (Lotte) and 7J
Maintenance and Janitorial Services ("7J") entered into a contract with
In January 1969, plaintiffs learned of the sale of the subject property to private respondent to provide manpower for needed maintenance, utility,
defendants-spouses Luzame. but it was only on August 29, 1969 when janitorial and other services to the latter. However, private respondent
plaintiffs brought this action and only after an ejectment case was filed by dispensed with their services allegedly due to the expiration/termination of
said defendant spouses against plaintiff Crisanta Seno before the Municipal the service contract by respondent with 7J.
Court of Paranaque, Rizal on August 4, 1969.
Labor Arbiter
Aggrieved, petitioners lodged a labor complaint against both private
As defendants-appellees contend, before the nine-year period lapsed,
respondent Lotte and 7J, for illegal dismissal, regularization, payment of
plaintiffs never raised a voice to protest against all these proceedings. They
corresponding backwages and related employment benefits, 13th month
chose to sleep on their rights and to rely on defendants' alleged word that
pay, service incentive leave, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys
their true agreement would be respected rather than bring their grievances
fees based on total judgment award.
to a court of law. However, when an ejectment case was filed against them
just when the 10-year prescriptive period for bringing of their suit was nearly
Labor Arbiter rendered judgment declaring 7J as employer of respondents.
over, they finally decided to stake their claim against the defendants.
The arbiter also found 7J guilty of illegal dismissal Respondents appealed to
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) praying that Lotte be
By the negligence of plaintiffs in asserting their rights for an unreasonable declared as their direct employer because 7J is merely a labor-only
length of time, they are now forever precluded from enforcing whatever right contractor. In its decision, the NLRC found no cogent reason to disturb the
they may have against defendants. Indeed, it is an indicia of the infirmity of findings of the labor arbiter and affirmed its ruling that 7J is the employer of
their claim. respondents and solely liable for their claims.
G.R. No. 166302. July 28, 2005 Respondents motion for reconsideration was denied by the NLRC in a
LOTTE PHIL. CO., INC., Petitioners, resolution dated June 18, 2002.
vs.
ERLINDA DELA CRUZ, LEONOR MAMAUAG, LOURDES CAUBA, CA
JOSEPHINE DOMANAIS, ARLENE CAGAYAT, AMELITA YAM, VIVIAN

Undaunted, they filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals against court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
the NLRC and Lotte, insisting that their employer is Lotte and not 7J. parties but even as to those present.
Lotte, however, denied that respondents were its employees. It prayed that In the case at bar, 7J is an indispensable party. It is a party in interest
the petition be dismissed for failure to implead 7J who is a party interested in because it will be affected by the outcome of the case. The Labor Arbiter
sustaining the proceedings in court, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 46 of the and the NLRC found 7J to be solely liable as the employer of respondents.
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals however rendered Lotte jointly and severally liable with
7J who was not impleaded by holding that the former is the real employer of
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the rulings of the Labor Arbiter respondents. Plainly, its decision directly affected 7J.
and the NLRC. In its decision, the Court of Appeals declared Lotte as the
real employer of respondents and that 7J who engaged in labor-only In Domingo v. Scheer, we held that the non-joinder of indispensable parties
contracting was merely the agent of Lotte. is not a ground for the dismissal of an action and the remedy is to implead
the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of
Lottes motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the
action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner refuses to implead an
Lotte asserts that 7J is an indispensable party and should have been indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the
impleaded in respondents petition in the Court of Appeals. It claims that the complaint/petition for the petitioner/plaintiffs failure to comply therefore.
petition before the Court of Appeals was dismissible for failure to comply
with Section 3, Rule 46 in relation to Section 5 of Rule 65 of the Revised Although 7J was a co-party in the case before the Labor Arbiter and the
Rules of Civil Procedure. NLRC, respondents failed to include it in their petition for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not acquire jurisdiction
Issue over 7J. No final ruling on this matter can be had without impleading 7J,
Whether or not the Petition is dismissible for failure to comply with Section 3, whose inclusion is necessary for the effective and complete resolution of the
Rule 46 in relation to Section 5, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil case and in order to accord all parties with due process and fair play.
Procedure.
Ruling G.R. NO. 93010 August 30, 1990.

Petitioners contention is tenable.
NICENCIO TAN QUIOMBING, petitioner,
An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final
vs.
determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as
plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. COURT OF APPEALS, and SPS. FRANCISCO AND MANUELITA A.
The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with SALIGO, respondents.
jurisdiction, which is "the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right
to act in a case". Thus, without the presence of indispensable parties to a RULING: INCLUSION OF BISCOCHO AS CO-PLAINTIFF WOULD BE
suit or proceeding, judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The USELESS FORMALITY, BEING SOLIDARY CREDITORS, EITHER ONE
absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the OF THEM MAY SUE FOR THE RECOVERY OF DEBT.

Facts: ISSUE: Whether Biscocho should be joined as co-plaintiff in this case.
This case stemmed stemmed from a Construction and Service HELD: NO.
Agreement whereby Nicencio Quiombing and Dante Biscocho
jointly and severally bound themselves to construct a house for It did not matter who as between Quiombing and Biscocho filed the
private respondents Saligo for P137, 940.00 which the latter complaint because private respondents were liable to either of
agreed to pay. the two as a solidary creditor for the full amount of the debt.
Subsequently, Quiombing and Manuelita Saligo entered into a Full satisfaction of a judgement obtained against respondents by
second written agreement whereby the latter acknowledged the Quiombing would discharge their obligation to Biscocho and vice
completion of the house and undertook to pay the balance of the versa.
contract price. Hence, it was NOT necessary for both Quiombing and Biscocho
Manuelita signed a promissory note for P125, 363.50 to file the complaint.
representing the amount still due from her and her husband Inclusion of Biscocho as a co-plaintiff, when Quiombing was
payable on or before December 31, 1984 to Quiombing. competent to sue by himself alone, would be useless formality.
RTC: PETITIONER: RECOVERY OF MONEY. Where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either one of the
RESPONDENTS: MOVED TO DISMISS. parties is indispensable, and the other is not even necessary
ALLEGATION: BISCOCHO WAS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY, because complete relief may be obtained from either.
SHOULD HAVE BEEN INCLUDED AS CO-PLAINTIFF. The participation of Biscocho is not at all necessary, much
o On October 9, 1986, Quiombing filed a complaint for less indispendable.
recovery of the said amount.
o Instead of filing an answer, defendants moved to dismiss G.R. No. 187714 March 8, 2011
the complaint, contending that Biscocho was an
indispensable party and therefore should have been AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., MANUEL B. VILLAR, JOKER P. ARROYO,
included as co-plaintiff. FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, PIA S. CAYETANO, and ALAN PETER S.
RTC: MOTION GRANTED, COMPLAINT DISMISSED. CAYETANO, Petitioners,
o Motion was denied but subsequently reconsidered and vs.
granted by the trial court. SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE represented by SENATE
o Complaint was dismissed but without prejudice to the filing PRESIDENT JUAN PONCE ENRILE,Respondents.
of an amended complaint to include the other solidary
creditor as co-plaintiff.
- Senator Panfilo Lacson (Senator Lacson) delivered a privilege
PETITIONER: APPEALED THE DISMISSAL.
speech entitled "Kaban ng Bayan, Bantayan!" In his privilege
ALLEGATION: SOLIDARY CREDITOR, COULD ACT ALONE. speech, Senator Lacson called attention to the congressional
o Quiombing appealed the order of dismissal to the CA. insertion in the 2008 General Appropriations Act particularly
o He argued that as a solidary creditor, he could act by the P200 million appropriated for the construction of the President
himself alone in the enforcement of his claim against the Carlos P. Garcia Avenue Extension
respondents.
- Senator Madrigal introduced P.S. Resolution 706 and was referred
CA: AFFIRMED THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT.
to the Committee on Ethics and Privileges (Ethics Committee)
Hence, this appeal.

- Senator Lacson inquired whether the Minority was ready to name - Respondent declared that there was substantial evidence to
their representatives to the Ethics Committee. After consultation proceed with the adjudicatory hearing. The preliminary conference
with the members of the Minority, Senator Pimentel informed the was set
body that there would be no member from the Minority in the Ethics - Petitioners came to this Court for relief
Committee. - In its Comment, respondent argues among others that the instant
- Senator Lacson reiterated his appeal to the Minority to nominate petition should be dismissed for failure to join or implead an
their representatives to the Ethics Committee.Senator Pimentel indispensable party. In the alternative, the instant petition should be
stated that it is the stand of the Minority not to nominate any of their archived until such time that the said indispensable party has been
members to the Ethics Committee, but he promised to convene a joined or impleaded and afforded the opportunity to be heard
caucus to determine if the Minoritys decision on the matter is final.
- Senate adopted the Rules of the Senate Committee on Ethics and
Privileges (Committee Rules) which was published in the Official ISSUE: W/N Senator Madrigal, who filed the complaint against Senator
Gazette Villar, is an indispensable party in this petition
- Senator Villar delivered a privilege speech where he stated that he
HELD: Indispensable Party
would answer the accusations against him on the floor and not
Section 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
before the Ethics Committee.
- Due to the accusation that the Ethics Committee could not act with
SEC. 7 Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. - Parties in interest
fairness on Senator Villars case, Senator Lacson moved that the
without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined
responsibility of the Ethics Committee be undertaken by the
as plaintiffs or defendants.
Senate, acting as a Committee of the Whole. The motion was
approved with ten members voting in favor, none against, and five
The test to determine if a party is an indispensable party is as follows:
abstentions.
An indispensable party is a party who has an interest in the controversy or
- Respondent Senate Committee of the Whole conducted its subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence,
hearings. Petitioners objected to the application of the Rules of the without injuring or affecting that interest, a party who has not only an interest
Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole, in the subject matter of the controversy, but also has an interest of such
questioned the determination of the quorum. nature that a final decree cannot be made without affecting his interest or
- petitioners proposed 11 amendments to the Rules of the Ethics leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final determination may
Committee that would constitute the Rules of the Senate be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. It has also been
Committee of the Whole, out of which three amendments were considered that an indispensable party is a person in whose absence there
adopted. cannot be a determination between the parties already before the court
- Senator Pimentel raised as an issue the need to publish the which is effective, complete or equitable. Further, an indispensable party is
proposed amended Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole one who must be included in an action before it may properly go forward.
- Respondent proceeded with the Preliminary Inquiry on P.S.
Resolution 706. A person who is not an indispensable party, however, if his interest in the
- The Chairman submitted a report on the Preliminary Inquiry with a controversy or subject matter is separable from the interest of the other
directive to all Senators to come up with a decision on the parties, so that it will not necessarily be directly or injuriously affected by a
preliminary report decree which does complete justice between them. Also, a person is not an

indispensable party if his presence would merely permit a complete relief the Board of Commissioners (BOC) issued a Summary Deportation
between him and those already parties to the action, or if he has no interest Order against respondent Scheer
in the subject matter of the action. It is not a sufficient reason to declare a
person to be an indispensable party that his presence will avoid multiple respondent, filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the
litigation. Summary Deportation Order
o complaint was dismissed
In this case, Senator Madrigal is not an indispensable party to the petition
before the Court. While it may be true that she has an interest in the BOC did not resolve the respondents motion. The respondent was
outcome of this case as the author of P.S. Resolution 706, the issues in this neither arrested nor deported
case are matters of jurisdiction and procedure on the part of the Senate
Committee of the Whole which can be resolved without affecting Senator District Court of Straubing dismissed the criminal case against the
Madrigals interest. The nature of Senator Madrigals interest in this case is respondent for physical injuries.
not of the nature that this case could not be resolved without her o He was later on issued a regular passport to the
participation. respondent
Petition partly granted.1awphi BOC still failed to resolve the respondents Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration
COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO, BUREAU OF

petitioner Immigration Commissioner Andrea T. Domingo assumed
IMMIGRATION, Petitioner, vs. HERBERT MARKUS EMIL
office and upon her orders, Marine operatives and BID agents
SCHEER, Respondent.
apprehended the respondent in his residence and held him in
custody while awaiting his deportation
Petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Decision of o Despite entreaties from the respondents
wife[21]and his employees, the petitioner
the Court of Appeals
refused to release the respondent
Respondent Herbert Markus Emil Scheer, a native of Ochsenfurt,
respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
Germany, applied for avpermanent resident status and the same
prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for temporary restraining
was granted
order and writ of preliminary injunction, to enjoin the petitioner from
o An Alien Certificate of Registration was issued in his favor
proceeding with the respondents deportation
The Vice Consul informed the Philippine Ambassador to Bonn,
the Court of Appeals issued a status quo order restraining the
Germany, that respondent had police records and financial
liabilities in Germany petitioner from deporting the respondent on a bond
BOC issued an Omnibus Resolution pendente lite denying the

respondent was wanted by the German Federal Police; that a
warrant of arrest had been issued against him respondents Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, Motion for
Bail/Recognizance

petitioner alleged that BOC was an indispensable party to the
petition as it was a real party in interest and that petitioners failure However, the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for
to implead the BOC warranted the denial of the petition the dismissal of an action
o petitioner claimed that the fact that Immigration o Parties may be added by order of the court on
Commissioner Andrea T. Domingo was impleaded as the motion of the party or on its own initiative at any
sole respondent was not enough, as she is only one of the stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If
four Commissioners the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an
indispensable party despite the order of the court,
Court of Appeals ruled: the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for
o There are quite a number of cases in relevant the petitioner/plaintiffs failure to comply therefor.
jurisprudence wherein only the Immigration Commissioner o The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to
was impleaded to decide whether an alien may stay or be be indispensable..
deported o Supreme Court has full powers, apart from that
o the nonjoinder of an indispensable party or the real party power and authority which is inherent, to amend
interest is not by itself a ground for the dismissal of the the processes, pleadings, proceedings and
petition. The court before which the petition is filed must decisions by substituting as party-plaintiff the real
first require the joinder of such party. It is the party-in-interest.
noncompliance with said order that would be a ground for
the dismissal of the petition In this case, the CA did not require the respondent to implead the
BOC as respondent, but merely relied on the rulings of the Court in
ISSUE: whether the members of the BOC were indispensable parties some cases
HELD: Yes o The CAs reliance on the said rulings is, however,
misplaced. The acts subject of the petition in the two cases
BOC was an indispensable party to the respondents petition were those of the Immigration Commissioner and not those
forcertiorari, prohibition and mandamus in the Court of Appeals of the BOC; hence, the BOC was not a necessary nor even
an indispensable party in the aforecited cases
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires indispensable
parties to be joined as plaintiffs or defendants.
o The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. Chua vs. Torres, G.R. No. 151900, Aug. 30, 2005 Petition for
Without the presence of indispensable parties to the ReviewR.45
suit, the judgment of the court cannot attain real
finality. Facts:
The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent

Chua filed a complaint for damges in RTC-caloocanimpleading her
actions of the court null and void.
brother Jonathan Chua as a necessary co-plaintiff against
defendants Jorge Torres(owner of Caltex) and Antonio
The responsibility of impleading all the indispensable parties rests on Beltran(employee)
the petitioner/plaintiff

The complaint alleged that Jonathan issued in favor of the petitioner. There is no allegation in the complaint alleging any violation or
Caltex Service Center his personal RCBC Check (P9,849.20) omission of any right of Jonathan, either arising from contract or from law.
in payment for purchases of diesel oil. However, the check was
dishonored by the drawee bank when presented for payment MISJOINDER OF JONATHAN, EFFECT: A misjoined party plaintiff has no
on the ground that the account was closed. Beltran sent business participating in the case as a plaintiff in the first place, and it would
petitioner a demand letter informing her of the dishonor of the make little sense to require the misjoined party in complying with all the
check and demanding the payment thereof. Petitioner ignored requirements expected of plaintiffs.
the demand letter on the ground that she was not the one who
issued the said check.Beltran instituted against petitioner a Section 11, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
criminal action for violation (B.P. 22) filed in MTC-caloocan-
issued a warrant of arrest against petitioner. The police officers
Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for
tasked with serving the warrant looked for her in her residence,
dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the
in the auto repair shop of her brother, and even at the Manila
court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action
Central University were she was enrolled as a medical student,
and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be
all to the alleged embarrassment and social humiliation of
severed and proceeded with separately.
petitioner.
Respondents move to dismiss the damage suit on the ground
that Jonathan did not signed the verification and cerftification Misjoinder of parties is not fatal to the complaint. The rule prohibits
against non-forum shopping- granted dismissal of a suit on the ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties, and
Chua moved for MR-denied the dropping of misjoined parties from the complaint may be done
motuproprio by the court,at any stage, without need for a motion to
such effect from the adverse party.
Hence she went to SC via R.45
Section 11, Rule 3 indicates that the misjoinder of parties, while erroneous,
RULING:
may be corrected with ease through amendment, without further hindrance
to the prosecution of the suit. It should then follow that any act or omission
JONATHAN AS NECESSARY PARTY: Section 8, Rule 7 of the Rules of committed by a misjoined party plaintiff should not be cause for impediment
Civil Procedure defines a necessary party as one who is not indispensable to the prosecution of the case, much less for the dismissal of the suit. After
but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as all, such party should not have been included in the first place, and no
to those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the efficacy should be accorded to whatever act or omission of the party. Since
claim subject of the action. Necessary parties are those whose presence is the misjoined party plaintiff receives no recognition from the court as either
necessary to adjudicate the whole controversy, but whose interests are so an indispensable or necessary party-plaintiff, it then follows that whatever
far separable that a final decree can be made in their absence without action or inaction the misjoined party may take on the verification or
affecting them. certification against forum-shopping is inconsequential.
In this case Jonathan does not stand to be affected if RTC rule Therefore, Jonathans failure to sign the certification against forum-
either favorably or unfavorably of the complaint. This is due to the nature of shopping was not a ground for dismissal of complaint.
the cause of action of the complaint, which alleges an injury personal to
petitioner, and the relief prayed for, which is to be adjudicated solely to

G.R. No. 84895 May 4, 1989 necessarily extends to defendant Jose D. Campos, Jr. who is the
son of said Mr. Jose Y. Campos.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, JOSE D. CAMPOS, private respondents opposed petitioner's motion
JR., petitioner-intervenor, Sandiganbayan DENIED petitioner's and Jose D. Campos, Jr.'s
vs. motions to drop him from the complaint. MOR was also DENIED
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, TEODORO Q. 1) The PCGG did not then and does not now have the
PEA, GORGONIO MACARIOLA, ORLANDO PACIENCIA, JESUS power to grant civil immunity;
TUPALAR SEVERINO DELA CRUZ, and FE CORTEZO, respondents. 2) Even if it did, the grant of immunity itself rendered in the
PCGG's resolution dated May 28, 1986 has not been
Facts: shown to cover the transactions involving the corporations
and or properties for which Jose D. Campos, Jr., is now
sought to be held accountable, i.e., Metroport Services,
Sandiganbayan
Inc.;
petitioner filed with respondent Court a complaint for reconveyance,
3) The fact is that nowhere, either in the original motions
reversion, accounting, restitution and damages against Alfredo
(Bejo) T. Romualdez, Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, or in the Motion for Reconsideration before this Court has
Jose D. Campos, Jr. and forty five (45) other defendants including it been shown that, save for the alleged unqualified
the above-named private respondents, seeking to 'recover from immunity, there no longer exists any demandable claim
against Jose D. Campos, Jr., arising from the transactions
them ill-gotten wealth at the expense and to the grave and
resulting in his being impleaded thereon. In other words,
irreparable damage of Plaintiff and the Filipino people.
defendant Jose D, Campos, Jr., filed a 'Manifestation and Motion were it not for the supposed grant of immunity, Jose D.
to Dismiss Complaint with Respect to Jose D. Campos' praying that Campos, Jr., would remain liable in the matter of
he be removed as party defendant from the complaint on the Metroport Services, Inc., and for the 60% which Alfredo
grounds that he had: (Bejo) Romualdez acquired therein according to
paragraph 14 (c) of the Complaint (supra) which does not
voluntarily surrendered or turned over [any share in his name
appear to have been restored or compensated for. (p. 54,
on any of the corporations referred to, aside from claiming any
interest, ownership or right thereon] to the Government of the Rollo)
Republic of the Philippines' and that The petitioner contends otherwise. The Solicitor General asserts
he was 'entitled to the immunity granted by the Presidential that the name of Jose D. Campos, Jr. was included as defendant in
the complaint through mistake or oversight and that pursuant
Commission on Good Government pursuant to Executive
to Section 11, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court it has a
Order No. 14, under the Commission's Resolution dated May
right to drop him as defendant without prior consent of any
28, 1986 ... to Mr. Jose Y. Campos (and) his family he 'being a
party. The Solicitor General also maintains that although the
member of the immediate family of Jose Y. Campos.'
petitioner (RP) filed with the respondent Court a 'Motion' seeking to defendants in the case were charged solidarily, Campos, Jr. was
drop defendant Jose D. Campos, Jr. from the Complaint on the not an indispensable party since Article 1216 of the Civil Code
allows the petitioner as solidary creditor to choose among the
ground that the Presidential Commission on Good Government
solidary debtors against whom it win enforce collection.
(PCGG for short) had, in a Resolution dated May 28, 1986, granted
immunity to Mr. Jose Y. Campos and his family, which immunity Jose Campos, Jr. adds that the petitioner's motion to drop him as
defendant should be considered as one filed under section 1, Rule

17 of the Revised Rules of Court thus giving it the absolute right to the dropping be 'on such terms as are just-just to all the
dismiss the action by mere notice of dismissal. other parties.
SC
The petitioner (RP) charges the Sandiganbayan with grave abuse There is nothing whimsical or capricious in dropping the petitioner-intervenor
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying from the complaint. Quite the contrary, it is based on sound and salutary
its motion to drop Jose D. Campos, Jr. as defendant in its complaint reasons.
for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages
filed against Jose D. Campos, Jr. and the other defendants The PCGG's motion to drop Campos, Jr. as defendant in Civil Case No.
Petition in intervention of Jose D. Campos, Jr. Was allowed. 0010 has legal basis under Executive Order No. 14. The fact that
Campos, Jr. and all the other defendants were charged solidarily in the
ISSUE: WON the petitioner (RP) can validly drop Jose D. Campos, Jr. as complaint does not make him an indispensable party. We have ruled in the
party defendant by virtue of the PCGG's grant of immunity in favor of his case of Operators Incorporated v. American Biscuit Co., Inc., [154 SCRA
father Jose Y. Campos and the latter's family. 738 (1987)] that "Solidarity does not make a solidary obligor an
indispensable party in a suit filed by the creditor. Article 1216 of the Civil
The PCGG was right when it filed a motion to drop Jose Campos, Jr. as Code says that the creditor 'may proceed against anyone of the solidary
defendant in the civil case. Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court states: debtors or some or all of them simultaneously."
SECTION 11, RULE 3. Misjoinder and non-joinder of There is no showing that the dropping of Jose Campos, Jr. as in defendant
parties Misjoinder of parties.-is not ground for dismissal of would be unjust to the other defendants in the civil case because, the other
an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of defendants can still pursue the case and put up their defenses.
the court on motion of any patty or of its own initiative at
any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. ... WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned
(Emphasis supplied) resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Sandiganbayan is ordered to drop Jose Campos, Jr. as defendant in Civil
We interpreted this rule in the case of Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete 66 SCRA 425 Case No. 0010.
(l975):
G.R. No. 166519 March 31, 2009
... the latter rule does not comprehend whimsical and NIEVES PLASABAS and MARCOS MALAZARTE, Petitioners,
irrational dropping or adding of parties in a complaint. that vs.
it really contemplates is erroneous or mistaken non-joinder COURT OF APPEALS (Special Former Ninth Division), DOMINADOR
and misjoinder of parties. No one is free to join anybody in LUMEN, and AURORA AUNZO, Respondents.
a complaint in court only to drop him unceremoniously
later at the pleasure of the plaintiff. The rule presupposes Facts
that the original inclusion had been made in the honest Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
conviction that it was proper and the subsequent dropping Court are the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) and the resolution
is requested because it turned out that such inclusion was denying reconsideration of the challenged decision.
a mistake. And this is the reason why the rule ordains that

RTC Ruling
Petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of title to property with damages The Court grants the petition and remands the case to the trial court for
before the Court of First Instance. In their complaint, petitioners prayed that disposition on the merits.
judgment be rendered confirming their rights and legal title to the subject
property and ordering the defendants to vacate the occupied portion and to Article 487 of the Civil Code provides that any one of the co-owners may
pay damages. bring an action for ejectment. A co-owner may file suit without necessarily
joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to
Respondents, for their part, denied petitioners allegation of ownership and be instituted for the benefit of all. Any judgment of the court in favor of the
possession of the premises, and interposed, as their main defense, that the plaintiff will benefit the other co-owners, but if the judgment is adverse, the
subject land was inherited by all the parties from their common ancestor, same cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-owners.
Francisco Plasabas.
Thus, petitioners, in their complaint, do not have to implead their co-owners
Revealed in the course of the trial was that petitioner Nieves, contrary to her as parties. The only exception to this rule is when the action is for the benefit
allegations in the complaint, was not the sole and absolute owner of the of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and is, thus, entitled to
land. the possession thereof. In such a case, the action will not prosper unless the
plaintiff impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable parties.
After resting their case, respondents raised in their memorandum the
argument that the case should have been terminated at inception for The rule is settled that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a
petitioners failure to implead indispensable parties. ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the non-
party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the
The trial court, without ruling on the merits, dismissed the case without court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action
prejudice. and/or at such times as are just. If petitioner refuses to implead an
indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the
CA complaint/petition for the plaintiffs/petitioner's failure to comply therewith.
Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the case to the CA. The appellate court
affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The CA, further, declared that the non-
joinder of the indispensable parties would violate the principle of due G.R. No. 182585 November 27, 2009
process, and that Article 487 of the Civil Code could not be applied
considering that the complaint was not for ejectment, but for recovery of title JOSEPHINE MARMO, NESTOR ESGUERRA, DANILO DEL PILAR and
or a reivindicatory action. MARISA DEL PILAR, Petitioners,
vs.
With their motion for reconsideration denied in the further assailed MOISES O. ANACAY Respondent.
December 1, 2004 Resolution, petitioners filed the instant petition.
RULING: ANY ONE OF THE CO-OWNERS MAY BRING AN ACTION IN

Issue:
EJECTMENT. RESPONDENTS CHILDREN ARE NOT
Whether petitioners failure to implead indispensable parties gave rise to a
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES.
ground for dismissal.
Facts:

RTC: RESPONDENT: ANNULMENT OF SALE, RECOVERY OF M.R. DENIED.
TITLE WITH DAMAGES. CA: PETITIONERS: RULE 65.
o On September 16, 2003, respondent Moises O. Anacay GROUND: DID NOT DISMISS CASE AFTER RESPONDENT
filed a case for Annulment of Sale, Recovery of Title with FAILED TO INCLUDE INDISPENSABLE PARTIES.
Damages against the petitioners and the Register of CA: DISMISSED PETITION.
Deeds of the Province of Cavite. GROUND: RESPONDENTS CHILDREN NOT INDISPENSABLE
o The complaint states, among others, that the respondent PARTIES.
is the bona-fide co-owner, together with his wife, Gloria M.R. DENIED.
P. Anacay (now deceased), of a 50-square meter parcel of HENCE, THIS PETITION.
land and the house built thereon, covered by TCT No. The petitioners submit that the respondents children, who
815595 of the Register of Deeds of Cavite. succeeded their deceased mother as co-owners of the property,
o They authorized petitioner Josephine to sell the are indispensable parties because a full determination of the case
subject property; petitioner Josephine sold the property
cannot be made without their presence.
to petitioner Danilo for P520,000.00, payable in monthly
They argue that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is a fatal
installments of P8,667.00 from May 2001 to June 2006;
jurisdictional defect.
o Petitioner Danilo defaulted in his installment payments
The respondent, on the other hand, counters that the respondents
from December 2002 onwards.
children are not indispensable parties because the issue involved in
o Respondent subsequently discovered that TCT No.
the RTC whether the signatures of the respondent and his wife in
815595 had been cancelled and TCT No. T-972424 was
the Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 20, 2001 were falsified
issued in petitioner Josephines name by virtue of a
- can be resolved without the participation of the respondents
falsified Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 20,
children.
2001;
o Petitioner Josephine subsequently transferred her title to
ISSUE: Whether respondents children are indispensable parties in this
petitioner Danilo; TCT No. T-972424 was cancelled and
TCT No. T-991035 was issued in petitioner Danilos name. case.
o The respondent sought the annulment of the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated September 20, 2001 and the HELD: NO.
cancellation of TCT No. T-991035; in the alternative, he
demanded petitioner Danilos payment of the balance When the controversy involves a property held in common, Article
of P347,000.00 with interest from December 2002, and 487 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that "any one of the co-
the payment of moral damages, attorneys fees, and owners may bring an action in ejectment."
cost of suit. We have explained that the term "action in ejectment" includes a
PETITIONER: MOTION TO DISMISS. suit for forcible entry or unlawful detainer.
GROUND: RESPONDENTS CHILDREN AS CO-OWNERS That the term "action in ejectment" includes "also, an accion
SHOULD HAVE BEEN INCLUDED AS PLAINTIFFS. publiciana (recovery of possession) or accion reinvidicatoria
RESPONDENT: CHILDREN NOT INDISPENSABLE PARTIES, (recovery of ownership)."
CAN BE RESOVLED WITHOUT THEIR PARTICIPATION.
DENIED MOTION TO DISMISS.

We upheld in several cases the right of a co-owner to file a suit him. Thus [de Guzman] sent a demand letter to [the spouses
without impleading other co-owners, pursuant to Article 487 of Carandang] for the payment of said total amount. [The spouses
the Civil Code. Carandang] refused to pay the amount, contending that a pre-
In the present case, the respondent, as the plaintiff in the court incorporation agreement was executed between [Arcadio Carandang]
below, never disputed the existence of a co-ownership nor claimed and [de Guzman], for [Arcadio Carandangs] technical expertise, his
to be the sole or exclusive owner of the litigated lot. newly purchased equipment, and his skill in repairing and upgrading
In fact, he recognized that he is a "bona-fide co-owner" of the radio/communication equipment. [de Guzman] filed his complaint,
questioned property, along with his deceased wife. seeking to recover the sum of money together with damages. The TC
Moreover and more importantly, the respondents claim in his rendered in favour of de Guzman. The spouses Carandang appealed
complaint is personal to him and his wife, i.e., that his and his the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the courts
wifes signatures in the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioner decision.
Josephine were falsified.
The issue therefore is falsification, an issue which does not require Issue: W/N the RTC Decision is void for failing to comply with Section
the participation of the respondents co-owners at the trial; it can be 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court?
determined without their presence because they are not parties to
the document; their signatures do not appear therein. Held: No.
Their rights and interests as co-owners are adequately protected by
their co-owner and father, respondent Moises O. Anacay, since the Ratio: The spouses Carandang claims that the Decision of the RTC,
complaint was made precisely to recover ownership and having been rendered after the death of Quirino de Guzman, is void for
possession of the properties owned in common, and, as such, will failing to comply with Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. In the
redound to the benefit of all the co-owners. present case, there had been no court order for the legal representative
In sum, respondents children, as co-owners of the subject of the deceased to appear, nor had any such legal representative
property, are not indispensable parties to the resolution of the appeared in court to be substituted for the deceased; neither had the
case. complainant ever procured the appointment of such legal representative
of the deceased, including appellant, ever asked to be substituted for
the deceased. As a result, no valid substitution was effected,
Carandang v Feirs of Quinrino de Guzman, GR 160347, November
consequently, the court never acquired jurisdiction over appellant for the
2006
purpose of making her a party to the case and making the decision
binding upon her, either personally or as a representative of the estate
Nature of Action: Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of
of her deceased mother. In the case at bar, not only do the heirs of de
Appeals Decision.
Guzman interpose no objection to the jurisdiction of the court over their
persons; they are actually claiming and embracing such jurisdiction. In
Facts: [Quirino de Guzman] and [the Spouses Carandang] are
doing so, their waiver is not even merely implied (by their participation in
stockholders as well as corporate officers of Mabuhay Broadcasting
the appeal of said Decision), but express (by their explicit espousal of
System. The capital stock of MBS was increased, from P500,000 to
such view in both the Court of Appeals and in this Court). The heirs of
P1.5 million and P345,000 of this increase was subscribed by [the
de Guzman had no objection to being bound by the Decision of the
spouses Carandang]. MBS again increased its capital stock [the
RTC. In sum, the RTC Decision is valid despite the failure to comply
spouses Carandang] yet again subscribed to the increase. [De Guzman]
with Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, because of the express
claims that, part of the payment for these subscriptions were paid by

waiver of the heirs to the jurisdiction over their persons, and because o Petitioners pleaded affirmative defenses, which also
there had been, before the promulgation of the RTC Decision, no further constitute grounds for dismissal of the complaint. These
proceedings requiring the appearance of de Guzmans counsel. grounds were: (1) failure to state a cause of action
inasmuch as the basis of respondents alleged title is void,
since the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale was
not published and it contained formal defects, the vendors
are not the legal heirs of Donata Lardizabal, and
respondents are not the real parties-in-interest to question
the title of petitioners, because no transaction ever
G.R. No. 186979 August 11, 2010
occurred between them; (2) non-joinder of the other heirs
SOCORRO LIMOS, ROSA DELOS REYES and SPOUSES ROLANDO
of Donata Lardizabal as indispensable parties; and (3)
DELOS REYES and EUGENE DELOS REYES Petitioners, vs. SPOUSES
respondents claim is barred by laches.
FRANCISCO P. ODONES and ARWENIA R. ODONES, Respondents.
o Respondents denied the foregoing affirmative defenses,
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. and insisted that the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate
and Sale was valid. They maintained their standing as
FACTS: owners of the subject parcel of land and the nullity of the
1972 Absolute Deed of Sale.
Spouses Odones (respondent) filed a complaint for Annulment of o Petitioners served upon respondents a Request for
Deed, Title and Damages against petitioners Limos, Delos Reyes Admission of matters pertaining to the family history of
and Sps. Delos Reyes before the RTC of Camiling, Tarlac. Donata, her heirs, and the validity of the Extrajudicial
o Sps. Odones are owners of a parcel of land. Obtained Succession of Estate and Sale.
from an Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale by o Respondents failed to respond to the Request for
Donata Lardizabal (She had the original title coz shes Admission, prompting petitioners to file a Motion to Set for
awesome) Preliminary Hearing on the Special and Affirmative
o It took a while before the Odones decided to register their Defenses, arguing that respondents failure to respond or
property. However, they found out that their Original Cert. object to the Request for Admission amounted to an
of Title (OCT) was cancelled and replaced by a TCT in the implied admission pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 26. A
name of the petitioners. (say whut?) hearing on the affirmative defenses had become
o Petitioners subdivide the property among themselves. imperative because petitioners were no longer required to
o Respondents sought to cancel the TCT of petitioners. present evidence on the admitted facts.
They claim that Donatas signature was forged in the 1972
Deed of Absolute Sale, because Donata died in 1923. (Im o Respondents filed a comment on the Motion, contending
talking about dead people at 1:33am, scary.) that the facts sought to be admitted by petitioners were not
o Petitioners filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars claiming material and relevant to the issue of the case as required
ambiguity in respondents claim that their vendors are the by Rule 26.
only heirs of Donata. RTC denied this motion and ordered o RTC denied the motion, because the information that is
petitioners to file their answers. contained in the Request for Admission had either been
pleaded and/or denied.
o Petitioners moved for reconsideration. Denied.

CA: Petitioners elevated the case to the CA by Special civil action latter cannot be compelled to admit or deny them anew. In turn, the
for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the requesting party cannot reasonably expect a response to the request and
RTC. thereafter, assume or even demand the application of the implied admission
o CA dismissed the petition. Affirmative defenses by rule in Section 2, Rule 26. In this case, the redundant and unnecessarily
petitioners were not indubitable and could be best proven vexatious nature of petitioners Request for Admission rendered it
in full blown trial. ineffectual, futile, and irrelevant so as to proscribe the operation of the
o Motion for Reconsideration was Denied. implied admission rule in Section 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court.
Supreme Court:Petitioners contend that the affirmative defenses
raised in their Motion are indubitable, as they were impliedly A perusal of respondents complaint shows that it was sufficiently clothed
admitted by respondents when they failed to respond to the with a cause of action and they were suited to file the same.
Request for Admission. As such, a preliminary hearing on the said
affirmative defenses must be conducted pursuant to our ruling in Rule 3, Sec. 13 to 19
Gochan v. Gochan.
Chiang Kai Shek School vs. CA, G.R. No. 58028. April 18, 1989petition
RULING: for review on certiorari
Pertinent to the issue are the rules on modes of discovery set forth in FACTS:
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. Under these rules, a party
who fails to respond to a Request for Admission shall be deemed to have
Faustina Oh was employed by petitioner for 33 years as teacher
impliedly admitted all the matters contained therein. It must be emphasized,
but was dismissed.
however, that the application of the rules on modes of discovery rests upon
Oh filed illegal dismissal case against the petitioner
the sound discretion of the court.
school.
Petitioner file MD on the ground that the it could not be
The matters set forth in petitioners Request for Admission were the same
sued
affirmative defenses pleaded in their Answer which respondents already
the complaint was amended.
traversed in their Reply. Petitioners sought to compel respondents to deny
Certain officials of the school were also impleaded to
once again the very matters they had already denied. It will serve no
make them solidarily liable with the school.
purpose but to delay the proceedings and thus defeat the purpose of the rule
CFI- Sorsogon dismissed the complaint
on admission as a mode of discovery.
On appeal CA- set aside the decision of CFI and ruled that the
school is suable and liable while absolving the other defendants.
A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the
The motion for reconsideration denied
allegations of the requesting partys pleading but should set forth relevant
The school then came to SCvia petition for review on certiorari
evidentiary matters of fact described in the request, whose purpose is to
establish said partys cause of action or defense. Unless it serves that
purpose, it is pointless, useless, and a mere redundancy. ISSUE raised by petitioner: WON a school that has not been incorporated
may be sued by reason alone of its long continued existence and recognition
If the trial court finds that the matters in a Request for Admission were by the government?
already admitted or denied in previous pleadings by the requested party, the

WON a complaint filed against persons associated under a Therefore, SC ruled that respondent was illegally dismissed and
common name will justify a judgment against the association itself and not entitled for damages.
its individual members?
G.R. No. 78295 & 79917 April 10, 1989
RULLING:SUABILITY OF SCHOOL: the school itself may be sued in its own
name ATTORNEY CELSO D. LAVIA, REMEDIOS M. MUYOT, SPOUSES
VIRGILIO D. CEBRERO and SEGUNDINA MAGNO-
Rule 3, Section 1, of the Rules of Court clearly provides that "only natural or CEBRERO, petitioners,
juridical persons may be parties in a civil action." It is also not denied that the vs.
school has not been incorporated. However, this omission should not HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and JOSEFINA C.
prejudice the private respondent in the assertion of her claims against the GABRIEL, respondents.
school.
Facts:
As a school, the petitioner was governed by Act No. 2706 as amended by
C.A. No. 180, which provided as follows: On April 6, 1983, Maria Carmen Gabriel y Paterno (CARMEN), executed a
donation mortis causa of the SAMPALOC PROPERTY (3,081 sqm) in
Unless exempted for special reasons by the Secretary of favor of her widowed sister-in-law Josefina C. Gabriel (JOSEFINA)..
Public Instruction, any private school or college
recognized by the government shall be incorporated under On August 11, 1983, Carmen, who was already gravely ill with breast
the provisions of Act No. 1459 known as the Corporation cancer, executed a Last Will And Testament in which she leaves the same
Law, within 90 days after the date of recognition, and shall Sampaloc property to her cousin and companion, Remedios C. Muyot
file with the Secretary of Public Instruction a copy of its (REMEDIOS), and willed a small lot (240 sqm) in Antipolo, Rizal to Josefina.
incorporation papers and by-laws. She named a friend, Concepcion M. De Garcia, as executrix of her will.
Having been recognized by the government, it was under obligation to On August 15, 1983, Carmen executed a General Power of Attorney
incorporate under the Corporation Law within 90 days from such recognition. appointing Remedios, as her attomey-in-fact
It appears that it had not done so at the time the complaint was filed
notwithstanding that it had been in existence even earlier than 1932. The On November 3, 1983, Josefina registered an adverse claim on the title of
petitioner cannot now invoke its own non-compliance with the law to the Sampaloc property based on the donation made by Carmen in her favor
immunize it from the private respondent's complaint.
November 4, 1983, Remedios, as Carmen's attorney- in-fact, hired Atty.

There is no need to apply Rule 3, Section 15, under which the persons Celso D. Lavia, as Carmen's counsel.
joined in an association without any juridical personality may be sued with
such association because the school itself may be sued in its own name.
On November 19, 1983, Carmen thumb-marked an "AFFIDAVIT OF
Besides, it has been shown that the individual members of the board of
DENIAL" repudiating the donation of the Sampaloc property to Josefina
trustees are not liable, having been appointed only after the private
because it was allegedly procured through fraud and trickery. She alleged
respondent's dismissal.
that in April 1983, she still could sign her name, and that she had no

intention of donating the property to Josefina who had not done her any death. She also assailed the service of summons to the decedent's
favor and in fact abandoned her during her illness. Carmen also thumb- Estate through Muyot and reiterated her motion for the appointment
marked a "REVOCATION OF DONATION" of a special administrator for the Estate. Atty. Lavia opposed the
motions
November 21, 1983, Remedios, as Carmen's attorney-in-fact, sold the Josefina's motion to disqualify - denied
Sampaloc property to Virgilio D. Cebrero. motion to appoint a special administrator for the Estate denied
the deceased left a Will naming an administratrix (executrix)
On November 29, 1983, Carmen passed away. and the latter has accepted the trust
Cebrero filed a motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens on the
Sampaloc property
On December 1, 1983, the "REVOCATION OF DONATION" was registered
CA
on the back of Carmen's TCT of the Sampaloc property
Josefina filed a petition for certiorari assailing TCs order Josefina's
motion to disqualify Atty. Lavia and praying for a writ of preliminary
RTC Manila injunction to stop TC from further proceeding in the case
Josefina filed a complaint against Carmen's estate and the Register GRANTED restraining order, ordering the lower court to "desist
of Deeds of Manila to annul the Deed of Revocation of Donation from proceeding with the Case until further orders."
She alleged that the deed of revocation, made only ten (10)
days before Carmen's death, was false and fictitious. She
However, on March 16, 1987, in spite of the restraining order, TC Judge
asked the court to appoint an administrator ad litem for the
Vicencio issued an order cancelling the notice of lis pendens because he
estate of Carmen
believed the Appellate Court's restraining order of February 10, 1987 expired
Josefina caused to be recorded a Notice of Lis Pendens on the title
on March 3, 1987, i.e., after 20 days.
of the property
Without appointing a special administrator for Carmen's estate, the
court caused summons to be served on the estate which was May 4, 1987 - On motions of Josefina, CA set aside Judge
received by Remedios Vicencio's order and required him, as well as his branch clerk of
court and Attorney Lavia to show cause why they should not be
punished for contempt of court. The Court of Appeals held that the
On January 24, 1984, the Cebreros registered the sale of the Sampaloc
20-day limitation on the life of a restraining order did not apply to it
property to them and obtained TCT No. 158305 in their names
but only to lower court "judges.
Sept 15, 1987 - CA rendered the following decision:
Josefina's complaint was amended to implead Muyot and the (2) declaring that the lower court did not acquire
Cebrero spouses as additional defendants. In addition to the jurisdiction over the person of the estate of Maria Carmen
original causes of action, the amended complaint sought the P. Gabriel;
nullification of Muyot's General Power of Attorney and the sale respondent Remedios Muyot was not capacitated
of the Sampaloc property to the Cebrero spouses to receive summons for the estate because the
Atty. Lavia filed an Answer (later an "Amended Answer with general power of attorney constituting her as
Compulsory Counter-claim") for the Estate and Muyot agent of the deceased became inoperative upon
Josefina filed a motion to disqualify Atty. Lavia on the ground that the death of the principal hence the service of
his authority as counsel for Carmen was extinguished upon her summons upon her was void.

(3) ordering respondent Atty. Celso Lavia to refrain from Carmen's death likewise divested Attorney Lavia of authority to represent
representing the estate of the deceased Maria Carmen P. her as counsel. A dead client has no personality and cannot be represented
Gabriel by an attorney.
Attorney Lavia may not appear "as counsel for
the estate of Carmen P. Gabriel because his Petitions for review are dismissed.
authority as her counsel was extinguished upon
Carmen's death" (Art. 1919, Civil Code). G.R. No. L-45809 December 12, 1986
(4) declaring that all pleadings, motions and papers filed SOCORRO SEPULVEDA LAWAS, petitioner,
by Atty. Lavia are sham and ordered expunged from the vs.
records of said case. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BERNARDO LL. SALAS, [as Judge, CFI,
SC Cebu, Branch VIII], and PACIFICO PELAEZ, respondents.
Lavia, Muyot, and Cebrero filed in this Court a petition for
certiorari and prohibition assailing the CAs May 4, 1987 decision Facts
Lavia, Remedios Muyot, and the Cebrero spouses appealed by This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
certiorari to this Court assailing the Sept 15, 1987 CAs decision from the decision of the Court of Appeals which dismissed the petition for
(petitions were consolidated) certiorari under, Rule 65 of said Rules against respondent Judge Bernardo
L. Salas
ISSUE: WON TC had acquired jurisdiction over the estate of Carmen P.
Gabriel Trial Court
Private respondent Pacifico Pelaez filed a Complaint against petitioner's
NO. father, Pedro Sepulveda, for ownership and partition of certain parcels of
land. Defendant Pedro Sepulveda filed his Answer resisting the claim and
The estate of a dead person may only be summoned through the executor raising the special defenses of laches, prescription and failure to ventilate in
or administrator of his estate for it is the executor or administrator who may a previous special proceeding. During the presentation of evidence for the
sue or be sued (Sec. 3, Rule 3, Rules of Court) and who may bring or plaintiff, the defendant died, counsels for the deceased defendant filed a
defend actions for the recovery or protection of the property or rights of the notice of death wherein were enumerated the thirteen children and surviving
deceased (Sec. 2, Rule 87, Rules of Court). The general power of attorney spouse of the deceased.
appointing Remedios as Carmen's agent or attorney-in- fact was
extinguished upon Carmen's demise. Thereafter, Remedios was bereft of Petitioner filed a petition for letters of administration and she was appointed
authority to represent Carmen. judicial administratrix of the estate of her late father.
During trial the respondent trial judge issued orders. The orders substituted
The petitioner's contention that the agency was "constituted in the common
the heirs of the deceased defendant, namely, his thirteen children and
interest of the principal and the agent" and that hence it was not
surviving spouse, as defendants; treated the case submitted for decision,
extinguished by the death of the principal (Art. 1930, Civil Code) is refuted
after the plaintiff had presented his evidence and rested his case, and
by the instrument itself which explicitly provided that the powers conferred
directed that said counsels and the fourteen heirs of the deceased defendant
on the agent were to be exercised for the "sole benefit" of the principal,
be furnished copies thereof.
Carmen P. Gabriel

The respondent trial judge rendered a decision against the heirs of the
deceased defendant. Duty of attorney upon death, incapacity, or incompetency of party.
Whenever a party to a pending case dies, becomes
Ten of the children of the deceased defendant, who apparently did not know incapacitated or incompetent, it shall be the duty of his attorney to
that a decision had already been rendered, filed an Answer in-substitution of inform the court promptly of such death, incapacity or
the deceased defendant through their counsel. This was denied admission incompetency, and to give the name and residence of his
by the respondent trial judge for being already moot and academic because executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representative.
of the earlier decision. The former counsels for the deceased defendant, Pedro
Sepulveda, complied with this rule by filing a notice of death on
The widow and two other children of the deceased defendant, through their May 21, 1975. They also correctly manifested in open court at the
counsel, filed a motion for substitution and for reconsideration of the hearing of the case on November 27, 1975, that with the death of
decision, the respondent trial judge issued an order setting aside his their client their contract with him was also terminated and none
decision and setting the case in the calendar for cross-examination of the of the heirs of the deceased had renewed the contract, and the
plaintiff, with a proviso that said order was applicable only to the three heirs heirs had instead engaged the services of other lawyers in the
who had filed the motion. The respondent trial judge lifted the order setting intestate proceedings.
aside his decision, despite the verbal petition for postponement of the
hearing made by one of the three heirs on the ground of the absence of their Both the respondent trial judge and the Court of Appeals erred in
counsel. considering the former counsels of the deceased defendant as counsels for
the heirs of the deceased. It was only after that the respondent trial judge
Petitioner, who had been appointed judicial administratrix of the estate of the issued an order substituting the deceased defendant with his fourteen heirs.
deceased defendant and who was one of the heirs who had filed an Answer This was followed with an order authorizing counsel for the plaintiff to
filed a motion to intervene and/or substitute the deceased defendant. The present his evidence in the absence of the deceaseds counsel, and an
respondent trial judge denied the motion for the reason that the decision had order treating the case as submitted for decision.
already become final.
Section 17 of Rule 3 provides as follows:
CA Death of party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby
Petitioner then filed a special civil action of certiorari with the Court of extinguished, the court shag order, upon proper notice, the legal
Appeals to annul the proceedings in the respondent trial court. However, the representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari. Hence, the present for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such
appeal. time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear
within said time, the court may order the opposing party to
Issue procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased
Whether within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative
shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the
Ruling deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such
The appeal is meritorious. appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered
as costs. The heirs of the de ceased may be allowed to be
Section 16 of Rule 3 provides as follows: substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of

an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian RULING: GENERAL RULE: FORMAL SUBSTITUTION OF HEIRS MUST
ad litem for the minor heirs. BE EFFECTUATED FOR THEM TO BE
BOUND BY A SUBSEQUENT JUDGMENT.
As this Court has held:
... Under the Rule, it is the court that is called upon, after notice of a party's EXCEPTION: FORMAL SUBSTITUTION OF HEIRS IS NOT
death and the claim is not thereby extinguished, to order upon proper notice NECESSARY WHEN THE HEIRS
the legal representative of the deceased to appear within a period of 30 days THEMSELVES VOLUNTARILY APPEARED,
or such time as it may grant. Since no administrator of the estate of the PARTICIAPTED IN THE CASE AND
deceased appellant had yet been appointed as the same was still pending PRESENTED EVIDENCE IN DEFENSE OF
determination in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, the motion of the THE DECEASED DEFENDANT.
deceased's counsel for the suspension of the running of the period within
which to file appellant's brief was well-taken. More, under the Rule, it should Facts:
have set a period for the substitution of the deceased party with her legal
representative or heirs, failing which, the court is called upon to order the
COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS: RESPONDENTS:
opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the
EJECTMENT.
deceased at the cost of the deceased's estate, and such representative shall
GROUND: PERSONAL CULTIVATION AND CONVERSION OF
then 'immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased.
LAND AGAINST PETITIONERS DECEASED HUSBAND.
Respondent court gravely erred in not following the Rule and requiring the o On July 23, 1970, both private respondents Primitive
appearance of the legal representative of the deceased and instead Nepomuceno and Emerenciana Nepomuceno filed
dismissing the appeal of the deceased who yet had to be substituted in the separate complaints with the then Court of Agrarian
pending appeal. Relations of Malolos, Bulacan, for ejectment on the ground
Under the said Rule, priority is given to the legal representative of the of personal cultivation and conversion of land for useful
deceased, that is, the executor or administrator of his estate. It is only in non-agricultural purposes against petitioner's deceased
cases of unreasonable delay in the appointment of an executor or husband, Benjamin Salazar.
administrator, or in cases where the heirs resort to an extrajudicial
settlement of the estate, that the court may adopt the alternative of allowing RTC: RULED IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS. (AFTER
the heirs of the deceased to be substituted for the deceased. PROTRACTED PROCEEDINGS)
o After protracted proceedings in the agrarian court and then

G.R. No. 121510 November 23, 1995 the Regional Trial Court spanning from 1970 to 1993, the
trial court rendered its joint decision in favor of private
FABIANA C. VDA. DE SALAZAR, petitioner, respondents.
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PRIMITIVO NEPOMUCENO and EMERENCIANA An appeal therefrom was interposed in the name of petitioner's
NEPOMUCENO, respondents. deceased husband on the ground that private respondents herein
failed to satisfy the requirements pertaining to personal cultivation
and conversion of the landholdings into non-agricultural uses.

CA: AFFIRMED RTCS RULING. The exception would be that formal substitution of heirs is not
o The Court of Appeals rejected such contention upon necessary when the heirs themselves voluntarily appeared,
finding that the record was replete with evidence justifying participated in the case and presented evidence in defense of
private respondents' assertion of their right of cultivation deceased defendant.
and conversion of their landholdings. Although the jurisprudential rule is that failure to make the
substitution is a jurisdictional defect, it should be noted that the
Almost a year after the termination of that appeal, the same trial purpose of this procedural rule is to comply with due process
court decision subject thereof was once again assailed before the requirements.
Court of Appeals through a petition for annulment of judgment. o The original party having died, he could not continue to
CA: PETITIONER: ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT OF RTC. defend himself in court despite the fact that the action
GROUND: NO SUBSTITUTION OF HEIRS DESPITE survived him.
DEFENDANTS DEATH. o For the case to continue, the real party in interest must be
o Herein petitioner assailed the same trial court decision as substituted for the deceased. The real party in interest is
having been rendered by a court that did not have the one who would be affected by the judgment.
jurisdiction over her and the other heirs of her deceased o It could be the administrator or executor or the heirs.
husband because notwithstanding the fact that her o In the instant case, the heirs are the proper substitutes.
husband had already died on October 3, 1991, the trial o Substitution gives them the opportunity to continue the
court still proceeded to render its decision on August 23, defense for the deceased.
1993 without effecting the substitution of heirs in o Substitution is important because such opportunity to
accordance with Section 17, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court defend is a requirement to comply with due process.
thereby depriving her of her day in court. o Such substitution consists of making the proper changes
CA: AFFIRMED RTCS DECISION. in the caption of the case which may be called the formal
GROUND: DID NOT ASSERT FRAUD OR COLLUSION IN THE aspect of it.
PETITION. o Such substitution also includes the process of letting the
substitutes know that they shall be bound by any judgment
M.R. DENIED.
in the case and that they should therefore actively
Hence this petition.
participate in the defense of the deceased.
o This part may be called the substantive aspect. This is the
ISSUE: Whether the RTCs decision in the ejectment case is null and void heart of the procedural rule because this substantive
due to failure to effect the substitution of heirs in lieu of the aspect is the one that truly embodies and gives effect to
defendant who died during the pendency of the case. the purpose of the rule.
o It is this court's view that compliance with the substantive
HELD: NO. aspect of the rule despite failure to comply with the formal
aspect may be considered substantial compliance.
The petition is bereft of merit. o Such is the situation in the case at bench because the
The general rule is that formal substitution of heirs must be only inference that could be deduced from the following
effectuated for them to be bound by a subsequent judgment. facts was that there was active participation of the heirs in
the defense of the deceased after his death:

1. The original lawyer did not stop representing the While it is true that a decision in an action for ejectment is
deceased. It would be absurd to think that the lawyer enforceable not only against the defendant himself but also against
would continue to represent somebody if nobody is paying members of his family, his relatives, and his privies who derived
him his fees. The lawyer continued to represent him in the their right of possession from the defendant and his successors-in-
litigation before the trial court which lasted for about two interest, it had been established that petitioner had, by her own
more years. A dead party cannot pay him any fee. With or acts, submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court.
without payment of fees, the fact remains that the said She is now estopped to deny that she had been heard in
counsel was allowed by the petitioner who was well aware defense of her deceased husband in the proceedings therein.
of the instant litigation to continue appearing as counsel As such, this petition evidently has no leg to stand on.
until August 23, 1993 when the challenged decision was
rendered; Bonifacio v. Dizon (1989)
2. After the death of the defendant, his wife, who is the

petitioner in the instant case, even testified in the court
and declared that her husband is already deceased. She INSTANT PETITION FOR CERTIORARI INVOLVING PURE QUESTION OF
knew therefore that there was a litigation against her LAW
husband and that somehow her interest and those of her
FACTS:
children were involved;
- 1968, OLIMPIO BONIFACIO (decedent) filed before the Court of
3. This petition for annulment of judgment was filed only Agrarian Relations a case for ejectment against private respondent
after the appeal was decided against the defendant on Pastora SAN MIGUEL
April 3, 1995, more than one and a half year (sic) after the o It was Bonifacios two hectare agricultural land in Marilao,
decision was rendered (even if we were to give credence Bulacan.
to petitioner's manifestation that she was not aware that o The ground was personal cultivation under the Agricultural
an appeal had been made); Land Reform Code
- 1970, Judge Serapio granted OLIMPIO to eject SAN MIGUEL
4. The Supreme Court has already established that o SAN MIGUEL was asked to vacate the property and
there is such a thing as jurisdiction by estoppel. This deliver possession to OLIMPIO
principle was established even in cases where jurisdiction - SAN MIGUEL appealed, and the CA affirmed the lower courts
over the subject matter was being questioned. In the decision
instant case, only jurisdiction over the person of the heirs o SAN MIGUEL counterclaimed OLIMPIO to pay her P1,376
is in issue. Jurisdiction over the person may be acquired - SAN MIGUEL then sought relief before the SC
by the court more easily than jurisdiction over the subject o During her petition on Aug 7, 1983, Olimpio Bonifacio
matter. Jurisdiction over the person may be acquired by passed away
the simple appearance of the person in court as did herein No notice of death was given to the Court
petitioner appear; No order for substitution of his heir was made
- July 31, 1985 the SC denied SAN MIGUELs petition for lack of
merit, and affirmed the CA decision

- ROSALINA BONIFACIO and the children (other heirs) moved for b. The problem is the term personal cultivation of RA 3844:
the execution of the decision of CAR Agricultural Land Reform Code. It gave the impression
o This was filed before the RTC of Bulacan. that the ejectment of an agricultural lessee was allowed
o A write of execution was issued on Feb 1986, and on Mar only when the landowner-lessor opted to cultivate the
1986, the Deputy Sheriff reported that SAN MIGUEL landholding
refused to vacate the portion she occupied (her house) i. That the right of cultivation pertained
But he was able to delivered the subject matter to EXCLUSIVELY to the landowner-lessor and
ROSALINA therefore, his personal right *THIS IS SOOOO
o SAN MIGUEL moved to quash the writ of execusion WRONG sabi ng Court, it is a misconception
o The BONIFACIOs countered with a writ of demolition and 1. Sec 36 of the RA states, Sec. 36.
an order declaring SAN MIGUEL in contempt of court for Possession of Landholding; Exceptions.
re-entering the subject land Notwithstanding any agreement as to
- Judge Dizon ordered that the implementation of the writ of the period or future surrender of the
execution based on the CAR decision was null and void land, an agricultural lessee shall
o The motion for Demolition was also denied, as well as the continue in the enjoyment and
petition for contempt. possession of his landholding except
- BONIFACIOs contend that Judge Dizon GADLJ in ruling that the when his dispossession has been
CAR case cannot be executed because it was a purely personal authorized by the Court in a judgment
action, therefore, the BONIFACIO heirs could not have inherited the that is final and executory if after due
favorable ruling. hearing it is shown that:
- ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES (1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a
o DIZON it is not an ordinary ejectment case, but an member of the immediate family will
ejectment of an agricultural lessee personally cultivate the landholding or
The action is personal to OLIMPIO, as thus, it will convert the landholding, if suitably
died with him located, into residential, factory,
The non-substitution of OLIMPIOs heirs hospital or school site or other useful
rendered the proceedings after OLIMPIOs death non-agricultural purposes . . . .
NULL AND VOID
ISSUE: Whether or not the favorable judgment obtained by the decedent is c. Under the provision, ejectment of an agricultural lessee is
inherited by the compulsory heirs? not only the right of the landowner-lessor BUT ALSO
WHEN HIS IMMEDIATE FAMILY desires so
HELD: YES i. THEREFORE, how can it be personal when the
law allows an immediate family member to eject
1. Judge Dizon is correct in saying that the case is not an ordinary an agricultural lessee
ejectment case, it is an agrarian case. ii. Clearly then, the right of cultivation as a ground
a. HOWEVER, even if public policy is involved, the for ejectment was not a right exclusive and
GENERAL RULE that an ejectment case survives the personal to the landowner-lessor.
death of a party 2. The right of cultivation was extended to the landowner's
immediate family members evidently to place the landowner-

lessor in parity with the agricultural lessee who was (and still is) till the land, so why cant the immediate family members of the lessor eject
allowed to cultivate the land with the aid of his farm household. In them? PARITY lang.
this regard, it must be observed that an agricultural lessee who
cultivates the landholding with the aid of his immediate farm The Heirs of Vda. De Haberer vs. CA (1981)
household is within the contemplation of the law engaged in
"personal cultivation." PETITION FOR REVIEW BY WAY OF APPEAL FROM RESOLUTIONS OF
3. Petitioners are not only the heirs and successors-in-interest, but THE CA, DISMISSING THE APPEAL OF THE LATE FLORENTINA VDA DE
the immediate family members of the deceased landowner-lessor HABERER (Hehe! Haberber!)
as well.
a. The right to cultivate the landholding asserted in CAR
FACTS:
Case No. 2160-B'68 not being a purely personal right of
the deceased landowner-lessor, the same was
transmitted to petitioners as heirs and successors-in- FLORENTINA VDA DE HABERER filed complaints (ergo, 2 cases)
interest. Petitioners are entitled to the enforcement of the for recovery of possession of the parcel of land situated in
judgment in CAR Case Mandaluyong, she was the duly registered owner. She filed the
4. ON THE DUTY OF THE ATTORNEY to inform the court of his case before the CFI Rizal
clients death o She alleged that the private respondents entered and built
a. In case of a partys death, the court, if the action survives houses
shall then order upon proper notice the legal May 26, 1971 The CFI dismissed all complaints
representatives of the deceased to appear and to be On the motion of FLORENTINA the cases were reopened and
substituted within a period of 30 days or the time granted retied due to newly discovered evidence
by court. o September 15, 1972 The CFI still issued an order reviving
b. The case was compared to the case of FLORENDO vs. its previous decision (dismissing all complaints)
COLOMA (almost the same facts) The 1972 decision was appealed to the CA
i. But the line of reasoning in the FLORENDO CASE is o The cases were erroneously dismissed in the lower court,
1. Petitioners challenged the CA decision after the death for being allegedly filed out of time.
of the plaintiff Since no legal representative Jan 1975, the SC rendered its judgment setting aside the CAs
substituted CA lost jurisdiction therefore, dismissal on appeal and ordered the reinstatement of the case for
proceedings null the proper disposition on the merits.
2. But then? The Lawyer failed to inform the court of the o Because the appeal was perfected in time
plaintiffs death THEREFORE, the supervening The cases were remanded to the CA
death of the plaintiff DID NOT EXTINGUISH her civil o FLORENTINA was required to file a printed brief within 45
personality decision valid days from her receipt of notice
REMEMBER in this case, the Court said, even if there was no notice of o 3 days before the period was to expire, June 18, 1975,
death, the action is NOT PERSONAL because the substantive law FLORENTINAs counsel requested for an extension of
allows immediate family members of the Landowner-lessor to eject an time to file
agricultural lessee. The lessees immediate family members are allowed to The request was granted, they were given a 90
day extension

June 1975, the private respondent appellants brief and/or a resolution suspending the
opposed the extension by filing a running of the period.
Motion to Set Aside Order Granting Nov 24, 1975 the CA DENIED the request for extension and
Extension of Time to File Brief dismissed the appeal
THEN, FLORENTINA DIES on MAY 26, 1975 o The appellant had 195 days to file the brief
o Her counsel gave the CA notice of her death on June 28, Dec 8, 1975, FLORENTINAs counsel filed a MR explaining why
1975. they made requests for extension/suspension
Her counsel also asked to suspending the o Due to the uncertainty that their services may no longer be
running of the period to file appellants brief retained by the heirs or legal representatives of their
pending the appointment of an executor of her deceased client BUT felt that they had the right to
Estate in the CFI QC preserve the right of such heirs pursuant to R 3, S 17 of
There was already a petition for the probate of the Rules of Court, pending the settlement of
her will (meaning, the will was submitted in court, FLORENTINAs estate
and the court has to determine if it is a valid will.) o The printed brief for the appellant, wasnt printed for
Guys, when a person dies, her Estate professional ethical considerations pending the courts
(has a personality), an executor is resolution
someone that is named in her will to o They also submitted 2 separate orders issued by
execute what is stipulated in her will. If The Court of Agrarian Relations
the person assigned to execute is a girl CFI Guimba, Nueva Ecija
shes called an EXECUTRIX THESE orders granted the deceaseds counsels
o If you get to read prayer to hold in abeyance further proceedings
ADMINISTRATOR/ADMINIST therein pending the appointment of an
RATIX, court appointed yun, administrator
not named in the will. CA denied the reconsideration stating that, litigants have no right
Respondents then contend that the lawyers of the deceased NO to assume that such extensions will be granted as a matter of
LONGER HAD ANY LEGAL STANDING and could no longer act in course
her behalf because the client-attorney relationship has been o BUT the COURT (SC) says that the CA erred in applying
severed (because FLORENTINAs dead) the principle and summarily denying reconsideration
The motion FLORENTINAs counsel gave on June 28, 1975 o NOTE: The attorney would thereafter have no further
remained UNACTED and the original extension granted was about power or authority to appear or take any further action in
to expire. the case, save to inform the court of the client's death and
o Sept 18 1975, her counsel filed a motion asking to an take the necessary steps to safeguard the deceased's
extension of 60 days and/or resolution suspending the rights in the case.
running of the period.
o CA had remained silent ISSUE: Whether or not the client-attorney relationship was terminated by the
o Nov 14, 1975, not certain whether the heirs would retain death of FLORENTINA (deceased-client)?
the counsel, they filed another extension of time to file
HELD: NO.

1. The deceaseds counsel properly informed the court of the case, her estate and/or heirs) should be given every
death of FLORENTINA opportunity to be heard but also because no substantial
a. The sought suspension of the proceedings and period for injury or prejudice can well be caused to the adverse
filing appellants brief PENDING THE APPOINTMENT of parties principally, since they are in actual possession of
the executor of the deceaseds estate before CFI QC the disputed land.
2. S 17, Rule 3 sets the rule on substitution of parties in case of death b. The better and certainly the more prudent course of action
of the parties in every judicial proceeding is to hear both sides and
a. After the notice of a partys death and the claim is not decide on the merits rather than dispose of a case on
extinguished, to order upon proper notice the legal technicalities, especially where no substantial prejudice is
representative of the deceased to appear within 30 days caused to the adverse party.
or the time granted. 7. The dismissal of an appeal based on the appellant's failure to file
3. Since there was no administrator of the estate, the suspension of brief is based on a power granted to respondent Court of Appeals
the running of the period within which to file appellants brief was and not on a specific and mandatory duty imposed upon it by the
well-taken. Rules.
a. THE CA should have set a period for the substitution of a. Since it is not MANDATORY
the deceased party with her legal representative or heirs i. failure of an appellant to file his brief within the
i. IF the CA ruled this way, then the representative time prescribed does not have the effect of
shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the dismissing the appeal automatically
interest of the deceased ii. the Court of Appeals has the discretion to dismiss
1. BUT THEY DIDNT, the CA gravely or not to dismiss appellant's appeal, which
erred in not following the rule! discretion must be a sound one to be exercised
4. When a party dies in an action that survives, and no order is issued in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair
by the court for the appearance of the legal representative or the play having in mind the circumstances obtaining
heirs of the deceased in each case
a. SINCE NO SUBSTITUTION TOOK PLACE, the trial by the b. prima facie meritorious case which should be properly
court are NULL and VOID determined on the merits and "the element of rigidity
i. Because the court did not properly acquire should not be affixed to procedural concepts and made to
jurisdiction over the persons of the legal cover the matter"
representatives or heirs. 8. On March 19, 1976, counsels submitted with their Manifestation the
5. The Original 45-day period should have been automatically written authority dated January 20, 1976 individually signed by
suspended until the proper substitution of the deceased appellant instituted heirs and/or legal representatives of the testate
by her executor or administrator or her heirs. estate of the deceased Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer
6. What should guide judicial action is the principle that a party litigant granting said counsels full authority to file and prosecute the
is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his case and any other incidental cases for and in their behalf,
complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor a. Such manifestation and authority may be deemed the
or property on technicalities formal substitution of the deceased by her heirs, as in fact
a. A liberal, rather than a strict and inflexible adherence to they appear as petitioners in the title of the case at bar.
the Rules, is justified not only because appellant (in this

9. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted and respondent court's Alice died in 1955, leaving the 50 shares to her husband,
resolutions of November 24, 1975 and January 15, 1976 are set John Young, Sr
aside. RTC of Cebu adjudicated 6/14 of these shares to her
a. The cases are remanded to the CA for further proceedings children, herein [respondents]
and proper determination of the appeal on merits Five days later (25 September) children reached the age
10. SIDE NOTE: counsel for respondents Felipe C. Navarro be of majority, their father John Sr., requested Gochan Realty
disbarred for "gross misconduct and/or malpractice" to partition the shares of his late wife by cancelling the
stock certificates in his name and issuing in lieu thereof,
Super complicatedpero I think the last issue yong related sa new stock certificates in the names of [herein
discussion natin respondents].
Respondent Gochan Realty refused, citing as reason, the
RGINIA O. GOCHAN, FELIX Y. GOCHAN III, MAE GOCHAN-EFANN, right of first refusal granted to the remaining stockholders
LOUISE Y. GOCHAN, ESTEBAN Y. GOCHAN JR., DOMINIC Y. GOCHAN, by the Articles of Incorporation.
FELIX O. GOCHAN III, MERCEDES R. GOCHAN, ALFREDO R. GOCHAN, John, Sr. died, leaving the shares to the [respondents]
ANGELINA R. GOCHAN-HERNAEZ, MARIA MERCED R. GOCHAN, [respondents] Cecilia GochanUy and Miguel Uyfiled a
CRISPO R. GOCHAN JR., MARION R. GOCHAN, MACTAN REALTY complaintwith the SEC forissuance of shares of stock to the
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and FELIX GOCHAN & SONS REALTY rightful owners, nullification of shares of stock, reconveyance
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. RICHARD G. YOUNG, DAVID G. of property impressed with trust, accounting, removal of
YOUNG, JANE G. YOUNG-LLABAN, JOHN D. YOUNG JR., MARY G. officers and directors and damages against respondents the
YOUNG-HSU and ALEXANDER THOMAS G. YOUNG as heirs of Alice heirs of Alice. A Notice of LisPendens was annotated on real
Gochan; the INTESTATE ESTATE OF JOHN D. YOUNG SR.; and properties of the corporation
CECILIA GOCHAN-UY and MIGUEL C. UY, for themselves and on Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint alleging that:
behalf and for the benefit of FELIX GOCHAN & SONS REALTY (1) the SEC ha[d] no jurisdiction over the nature of the
CORPORATION, respondents. action; (2) the [respondents] [were] not the real parties-in-
interest and ha[d] no capacity to sue; and (3)
[respondents] causes of action [were] barred by the
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
Statute of Limitations-granted
Petitioners filed a Motion for cancellation of Notice of
FACTS: LisPendens-granted
Respondents filed MR-denied
Gochan Realty, for brevity was registered with the SEC with Felix Res appealed to the SEC en banc denied saying that it
Gochan, Sr., Maria Pan Nuy Go Tiong, Pedro Gochan, was filed 97 days late, beyond the 30-day period for
TomasaGochan, Esteban Gochan and CrispoGochan as its appealsand that motion for reconsideration did not
incorporators. interrupt the 30-day period for appeal because said motion
Felix Gochan Sr.s daughter, Alice, mother of [herein was pro-forma.
respondents], inherited 50 shares of stock in Gochan Respondnet went to CA-ruled that the SEC had no jurisdiction over
Realty from the former. the case as far as the heirs of Alice Gochan were concerned,
because they were not yet stockholders of the corporation. On the

other hand, it upheld the capacity of Respondents Cecilia action dealing with the registration of the shares in the names of the heirs of
GochanUy and her spouse Miguel Uy. It also held that the intestate Alice.
Estate of John Young Sr. was an indispensable party.
Hence petitioner filed petition was filed in SC Petitioners further claim that the Estate of John Young Sr. was not
properly represented. They claim that when the estate is under
RULING: administration, suits for the recovery or protection of the property or
rights of the deceased may be brought only by the administrator or
Personality of the Spouses Uy to File a Suit Before the executor as approved by the court
SECIssue:
SC: Section 3 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which is cited by petitioner in
The jurisdiction of a court or tribunal over the subject matter is determined by support of their position, reads:
the allegations in the complaint. For purposes of resolving a motion to
dismiss, Cecilia Uys averment in the Complaint -- that the purchase of her Sec. 3.Representatives as parties. - Where the action is allowed to be
stocks by the corporation was null and void ab initio is deemed admitted. prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary
It is elementary that a void contract produces no effect either against or in capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be
favor of anyone; it cannot create, modify or extinguish the juridical relation to deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of
which it refers.Thus, Cecilia remains a stockholder of the corporation in view an express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party
of the nullity of the Contract of Sale. Although she was no longer registered authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for
as a stockholder in the corporate records as of the filing of the case before the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining
the SEC, the admitted allegations in the Complaint made her still a bona fide the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the
stockholder of Felix Gochan& Sons Realty Corporation (FGSRC), as principal.
between said parties.
Section 2 of Rule 87 of the same Rules, which also deals with
Capacity of the Intestate Estate of John D. Young Sr. Issue: administrators, states:
(CIV.PRO related take note of this for discussion)
Sec. 2. Executor or administrator may bring or defend actions which
Petitioners contend that the Intestate Estate of John D. Young Sr. is survive. - For the recovery or protection of the property or rights of the
not an indispensable party, as there is no showing that it stands to deceased, an executor or administrator may bring or defend, in the right of
be benefited or injured by any court judgment. the deceased, actions for causes which survive.
SC: One of the causes of action stated in the Complaint filed with the SEC The Rules, while permitting an executor or administrator to
refers to the registration, in the name of the other heirs of Alice Gochan represent or to bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the
Young, of 6/14th of the shares still registered under the name of John D. heirs from representing the deceased. These rules are easily applicable
Young Sr. Since all the shares that belonged to Alice are still in his name, to cases in which an administrator has already been appointed. But no rule
no final determination can be had without his estate being impleaded in the categorically addresses the situation in which special proceedings for the
suit. His estate is thus an indispensable party with respect to the cause of settlement of an estate have already been instituted, yet no administrator
has been appointed. In such instances, the heirs cannot be expected to wait

for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the The facts, as culled from the records, follow.
administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights
and the interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the In a case entitled Patricio Sereno v. Teodoro Gasing/Truck Operator Gasing
rights and the properties of the decedent are violated or dissipated. was ordered to pay Sereno P43,606.47 for illegally dismissing the latter. LA
issued an Alias Writ of Execution directing Lavarez, Sheriff II of the NLRC to
The Rules are to be interpreted liberally in order to promote their satisfy the judgment award. On July 23, 1996, Lavarez, accompanied by
objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every Sereno and his counsel, petitioner Atty. Rogelio E. Sarsaba levied a
action and proceeding. They cannot be interpreted in such a way as to Fuso Truck in the possession of Gasing. On July 30, 1996, the truck was
unnecessarily put undue hardships on litigants. For the protection of the sold at public auction, with Sereno appearing as the highest bidder.
interests of the decedent, this Court recognized the heirs as proper
representatives of the decedent, even when there is already an RTC Davao del Sur
administrator appointed by the court. When no administrator has been respondent Fe Vda. de Te, represented by her attorney-in-fact,
appointed, as in this case, there is all the more reason to recognize the Faustino Castaeda, filed a Complaint for recovery of motor
heirs as the proper representatives of the deceased. Since the Rules do vehicle, damages with prayer for the delivery of the truck pendente
not specifically prohibit them from representing the deceased, and since no lite against petitioner, Sereno, the Lavarez and the NLRC of Davao
administrator had as yet been appointed at the time of the institution of the City
Complaint with the SEC, we see nothing wrong with the fact that it was the Respondent alleged that:
heirs of John D. Young Sr. who represented his estate in the case filed (1) she is the wife of the late Pedro Te, the registered
before the SEC. owner of the truck
(2) Gasing merely rented the truck from her;
Therefore, in view of the effectivity of RA 8799the case should be (3) Lavarez erroneously assumed that Gasing owned the
remanded to the proper regional trial court, not to the Securities and truck because he was, at the time of the "taking," in
Exchange Commission. possession of the same; and
(4) since neither she nor her husband were parties to the
G.R. No. 175910 July 30, 2009 labor case between Sereno and Gasing, she should not
be made to answer for the judgment award, much less be
ATTY. ROGELIO E. SARSABA, Petitioner, deprived of the truck as a consequence of the levy in
vs. execution.
FE VDA. DE TE, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, FAUSTINO
CASTAEDA, Respondents. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss contending that:
(1) respondent has no legal personality to sue, having no real
Facts: interests over the property subject of the instant complaint;
(2) the allegations in the complaint do not sufficiently state that
1 the respondent has cause of action;
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary
2 (3) the allegations in the complaint do not contain sufficient
injunction assailing the Order dated March 22, 2006 of the Regional Trial
cause of action as against him; and
Court (RTC), Branch 19, Digos City, Davao del Sur, in Civil Case No. 3488.

(4) the complaint is not accompanied by an Affidavit of Merit Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration DENIED
and Bond that would entitle the respondent to the delivery of SC rule 45
the tuck pendente lite. Petitioner directly sought recourse from the Court via the present
petition involving pure questions of law, which he claimed were
NLRC also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of resolved by the RTC contrary to law, rules and existing
jurisdiction and lack of cause of action. jurisprudence.
Lavarez filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim and Third- SUB ISSUE: WON petitioner correctly availed of the mode of appeal under
Party Complaint. Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
RTC does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter and
that the complaint does not state a cause of action. NO.
Motion to dismiss DENIED

The subject of the present petition is an Order of the RTC, which denied
petitioner's Omnibus Motion to Dismiss, for lack of merit.
petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss the Case on the
following grounds:
(1) lack of jurisdiction over one of the principal defendants (the An Order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory. Under Section 1(c),
Sheriff could not serve a copy of the summons to Sereno, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an interlocutory order is not appealable.
together with a copy of the complaint, because he was
already dead.); and BUT, the SC deemed it best to rule on the issues, not only for the benefit of
(2) to discharge respondent's attorney-in-fact for lack of the bench and bar, but in order to prevent further delay in the trial of the
legal personality to sue. case. Resultantly, SCs relaxation of the policy of strict observance of the
judicial hierarchy of courts is warranted.
Respondent, Fe Vda. de Te, died on April 12, 2005.
SUB ISSUE : WON RTC should have dismissed the complaint against all
RTC (continuation) the defendants and that the same should be filed against his estate since
Respondent filed an Opposition (to the Omnibus Motion to Sereno (principal defendant) died before summons was served on him
Dismiss), contending that the failure to serve summons upon
Sereno is not a ground for dismissing the complaint, because the NO.
other defendants have already submitted their respective
responsive pleadings. Moreover, respondent's death did not Jurisdiction over a party is acquired by service of summons by the sheriff,
render functus officio her right to sue since her attorney-in- his deputy or other proper court officer, either personally by handing a copy
fact, Faustino Castaeda, had long testified on the complaint thereof to the defendant or by substituted service. On the other hand,
on March 13, 1998 for and on her behalf and, accordingly, summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought
submitted documentary exhibits in support of the complaint. against him. Service of such writ is the means by which the court may
acquire jurisdiction over his person.
Petitioner's Omnibus Motion to Dismiss DENIED

The court's failure to acquire jurisdiction over one's person is a (1) actions to recover real or personal property or an interest
defense which is personal to the person claiming it. Obviously, it is now thereon,
impossible for Sereno to invoke the same in view of his death. Neither can
petitioner invoke such ground, on behalf of Sereno, so as to reap the benefit (2) actions to enforce liens thereon, and
of having the case dismissed against all of the defendants. Failure to serve
summons on Sereno's person will not be a cause for the dismissal of (3) actions to recover damages for an injury to a person or a
the complaint against the other defendants, considering that they have property.
been served with copies of the summons and complaints and have
long submitted their respective responsive pleadings. In fact, the other
In such cases, a counsel is obliged to inform the court of the death of his
defendants in the complaint were given the chance to raise all possible
client and give the name and address of the latter's legal representative.
defenses and objections personal to them in their respective motions to
dismiss and their subsequent answers.
The rule on substitution of parties is governed by Section 16, Rule 3 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
Failure to effect service of summons unto Patricio Sereno, one of the
defendants herein does not render the action DISMISSIBLE, considering
that the three (3) other defendants, namely, Atty. Rogelio E. Sarsaba, Strictly speaking, the rule on substitution by heirs is not a matter of
Fulgencio Lavares and the NLRC, were validly served with summons and jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process. The rule on substitution
the case with respect to the answering defendants may still proceed was crafted to protect every party's right to due process. It was designed to
independently. Be it recalled that the three (3) answering defendants have ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly represented in
previously filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint which was denied by the the suit through his heirs or the duly appointed legal representative of his
Court. estate. Moreover, non-compliance with the Rules results in the denial of the
right to due process for the heirs who, though not duly notified of the
proceedings, would be substantially affected by the decision rendered
Hence, only the case against Patricio Sereno will be DISMISSED and the
therein. Thus, it is only when there is a denial of due process, as when
same may be filed as a claim against the estate of Patricio Sereno, but the
the deceased is not represented by any legal representative or heir,
case with respect to the three (3) other accused will proceed.
that the court nullifies the trial proceedings and the resulting judgment
therein.
CIVPRO ISSUE: WON case should be dismissed since respondent's
attorney-in-fact, Faustino Castaeda, has no more legal personality to sue
In the case before Us, it appears that respondent's counsel did not make
on behalf of Fe Vda. de Te, who passed away on April 12, 2005, during the
any manifestation before the RTC as to her death. In fact, he had
pendency of the case before the RTC.
actively participated in the proceedings. Neither had he shown any
proof that he had been retained by respondent's legal representative or
NO. any one who succeeded her.
When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished, the The proper remedy here is the Substitution of Heirs and not the
Rules of Court require a substitution of the deceased. Section 1, Rule 87 dismissal of this case which would work injustice to the plaintiff. The
of the Rules of Court enumerates the actions that survived and may be filed Court has repeatedly declared that failure of the counsel to comply with his
against the decedent's representatives as follows: duty to inform the court of the death of his client, such that no substitution is

effected, will not invalidate the proceedings and the judgment rendered After investigation, the Committee found respondents liable for
thereon if the action survives the death of such party. The trial court's insubordination, non-performance of duties and absences without official
jurisdiction over the case subsists despite the death of the party. leaves (AWOL).
SEC. 16, RULE 3 provides for the substitution of the plaintiff who dies Petitioner issued an order suspending respondents from their respective
pending hearing of the case by his/her legal heirs. As to whether or not the positions for two months.
heirs will still continue to engage the services of the Attorney-in-fact is
another matter, which lies within the sole discretion of the heirs. The CSC
Petition is DENIED. Respondents then appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
contending that their right to due process has been violated. During the
G.R. Nos. 161166-67 February 03, 2005 pendency of respondents appeal, petitioner issued an order dropping them
MAYOR RHUSTOM L. DAGADAG, petitioner, from the roll of employees by reason of their unauthorized absences. Again,
vs. they appealed to the CSC.
MICHAEL C. TONGNAWA and ANTONIO GAMMOD, respondents.
DECISION CSC issued a Resolution affirming petitioners order suspending
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: respondents from the service for two months. They moved for
reconsideration but were denied by the CSC, prompting them to file with the
Facts Court of Appeals a petition for review.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the joint Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals Meanwhile, the CSC issued another Resolution affirming petitioners order
dropping respondents from the roll. When their motion for reconsideration
Petitioner was formerly the mayor of the municipality of Tanudan, Province was denied by the CSC, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a
of Kalinga. Michael Tongnawa and Antonio Gammod, respondents, are the petition for review.
municipal engineer and municipal planning and development coordinator,
respectively, of the said municipality. CA
The Court of Appeals, in its joint Decision, granted respondents petitions for
Petitioner, while then the mayor of Tanudan, sent respondents a review, reversing the CSC challenged Resolutions and reinstating them to
memorandum ordering them to explain within 72 hours why they should not their respective positions and ordering the payment of their corresponding
be administratively sanctioned for acts unbecoming of public servants and back wages.
failure to perform their duties. Respondents submitted to petitioner their
respective explanations. Petitioner filed a joint motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Court
of Appeals.
Petitioner issued an Executive order creating a Municipal Grievance
Committee to investigate the charges against respondents. Guilbert Hence, the instant petition.
Dangpason, then the vice-mayor of Tanudan, was designated Chairman.
In their joint comment, respondents aver that petitioner has no legal
personality to file the instant petition because he had ceased to be the

municipal mayor of Tanudan, Kalinga; and that the CSC, being the adversely affect its integrity. Significantly, it has not challenged the assailed
aggrieved party, is the proper party to file this petition. Decision.
Issue Admittedly, however, petitioner, at the time he filed with this Court the instant
Who may appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals? petition assailing the Appellate Court Decision, was no longer the mayor of
Tanudan.
Ruling Section 17, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is
In resolving the issue, the concept of "real party in interest" becomes relevant, thus:
relevant.
"Sec. 17. Death or separation of a party who is a public officer.
Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, When a public officer is a party in an action in his official capacity
provides: and during its pendency dies, resigns or otherwise ceases to hold
office, the action may be continued and maintained by or against
"SEC. 2. Parties in interest. A real party in interest is the party his successor if, within thirty (30) days after the successor takes
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, office or such time as may be granted by the court, it is
or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise satisfactorily shown to the court by any party that there is a
authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be substantial need for continuing or maintaining it and that the
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest." successor adopts or continues or threatens to adopt or continue
the action of his predecessor. Before a substitution is made, the
The established rule is that a real party in interest is one who would be party or officer to be affected, unless expressly assenting thereto,
benefited or injured by the judgment, or one entitled to the avails of the suit. shall be given reasonable notice of the application therefor and
The word "interest," as contemplated by the Rules, means material interest accorded an opportunity to be heard." (underscoring ours)
or an interest in issue and to be affected by the judgment, as distinguished
from mere interest in the question involved or a mere incidental interest.
Stated differently, the rule refers to a real or present substantial interest as
distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate, Interpreting the above rule, in Miranda vs. Carreon, Heirs of Mayor
or consequential interest. As a general rule, one who has no right or interest Nemencio Galvez vs. Court of Appeals, and Roque, et al. vs. Delgado, et al.,
to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an we held that where the petitioner (a public officer) ceases to be mayor, the
action. appeal and/or action he initiated may be continued and maintained by his
successor if there is substantial need to do so. If the successor failed to
We hold that the CSC and the mayor of Tanudan are real parties in interest pursue the appeal and/or action, the same should be dismissed.
in this case and, therefore, can contest the assailed joint Decision of the
Court of Appeals before us. Records show that upon petitioners cessation from public office, his
The CSC is the party adversely affected by the questioned Decision of the successor did not file any manifestation to the effect that he is continuing
Court of Appeals because it has been mandated by the Constitution to and maintaining this appeal.
preserve and safeguard the integrity of our civil service system. Thus, any We thus agree with the respondents that petitioner has lost his legal
transgression by herein respondents of the CSC rules and regulations will personality to interpose the instant petition.

G.R. No. 160347 November 29, 2006 De Guzman claims that, part of the payment for these subscriptions
were paid by him, P293,250 for the November 26, 1983 capital
ARCADIO and MARIA LUISA CARANDANG, Petitioners, stock increase and P43,125 for the March 3, 1989 Capital Stock
vs. increase or a total of P336,375. Thus, on March 31, 1992, de
HEIRS OF QUIRINO A. DE GUZMAN, namely: MILAGROS DE GUZMAN, Guzman sent a demand letter to the spouses Carandang] for the
VICTOR DE GUZMAN, REYNALDO DE GUZMAN, CYNTHIA G. RAGASA payment of said total amount.
and QUIRINO DE GUZMAN, JR., Respondents. The spouses Carandang refused to pay the amount, contending
that a pre-incorporation agreement was executed between Arcadio
RULING: THE RTC DECISION IS VALID DESPITE THE FAILURE TO Carandang and de Guzman, whereby the latter promised to pay for
COMPLY WITH SECTION 16, RULE 3 OF THE ROC, the stock subscriptions of the former without cost, in consideration
BECAUSE OF THE EXPRESS WAIVER OF THE HEIRS OF for Arcadio Carandangs technical expertise, his newly
PLAINTIFF OVER THEIR PERSONS AND THE CASE WAS purchased equipment, and his skill in repairing and upgrading
SUBMITTED FOR DECISION 7 MONTHS BEFORE radio/communication equipment therefore, there is no indebtedness
PLAINTIFFS DEATH. on their part.
RTC: DE GUZMAN: RECOVERY OF SUM OF MONEY WITH
Facts: DAMAGES.
RULED IN FAVOR OF DE GUZMAN.
o On June 5, 1992, de Guzman filed his complaint, seeking
to recover the P336,375 together with damages.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals

CA: AFFIRMED THE RTC DECISION.
Decision and Resolution affirming the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision
o Spouses Carandang appealed to the CA.
rendering herein petitioners Arcadio and Luisa Carandang [hereinafter
M.R. DENIED.
referred to as spouses Carandang] jointly and severally liable for their loan
to Quirino A. de Guzman. SC: PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.
MAIN ISSUE: Whether the decision of the RTC is void for failing to comply
Quirino de Guzman and the Spouses Carandang are stockholders
with section 6, Rule 3 of the ROC.
as well as corporate officers of Mabuhay Broadcasting System
(MBS for brevity), with equities at fifty four percent (54%) and forty
six percent (46%) respectively. HELD: NO.
On November 26, 1983, the capital stock of MBS was increased,
from P500,000 to P1.5 million and P345,000 of this increase was The spouses Carandang claims that the Decision of the RTC,
subscribed by the spouses Carandang. having been rendered after the death of Quirino de Guzman, is void
Thereafter, on March 3, 1989, MBS again increased its capital for failing to comply with Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
stock, from P1.5 million to P3 million, the spouses Carandang yet which provides:
again subscribed to the increase.
They subscribed to P93,750 worth of newly issued capital stock. SEC. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. Whenever a party to a pending
action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of

his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the o Implied waiver comes in the form of either voluntary
fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or appearance or a failure to object.
representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground IN THE CASE AT BAR, not only do the heirs of de Guzman
for disciplinary action. interpose no objection to the jurisdiction of the court over their
persons; they are actually claiming and embracing such
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the jurisdiction.
deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or o In doing so, their waiver is not even merely implied (by
administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the their participation in the appeal of said Decision), but
minor heirs. express (by their explicit espousal of such view in both
The court shall forthwith order the legal representative or the Court of Appeals and in this Court).
representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of o The heirs of de Guzman had no objection to being
thirty (30) days from notice. bound by the Decision of the RTC.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased o Thus, lack of jurisdiction over the person, being subject to
party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified waiver, is a personal defense which can only be asserted
period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified by the party who can thereby waive it by silence.
time, to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for
the estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear In People v. Florendo, where we likewise held that the
for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring proceedings that took place after the death of the party are void, we
such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be gave another reason for such nullity: "the attorneys for the offended
recovered as costs. party ceased to be the attorneys for the deceased upon the death
In the present case, there had been no court order for the legal of the latter, the principal x x x."
representative of the deceased to appear, nor had any such legal Nevertheless, IN THE CASE AT BAR, the case had already been
representative appeared in court to be substituted for the submitted for decision before the RTC on 4 June 1998, several
deceased; neither had the complainant ever procured the months before the passing away of de Guzman on 19 February
appointment of such legal representative of the deceased, including 1999.
appellant, ever asked to be substituted for the deceased. Hence, no further proceedings requiring the appearance of de
o As a result, no valid substitution was effected, Guzmans counsel were conducted before the promulgation of the
consequently, the court never acquired jurisdiction over RTC Decision.
appellant for the purpose of making her a party to the case Consequently, de Guzmans counsel cannot be said to have no
and making the decision binding upon her, either authority to appear in trial, as trial had already ceased upon the
personally or as a representative of the estate of her death of de Guzman.
deceased mother. In sum, the RTC Decision is valid despite the failure to comply
with Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, because of the
HOWEVER, unlike jurisdiction over the subject matter which is express waiver of the heirs to the jurisdiction over their
conferred by law and is not subject to the discretion of the parties, persons, and because there had been, before the promulgation of
jurisdiction over the person of the parties to the case may be the RTC Decision, no further proceedings requiring the appearance
waived either expressly or impliedly. of de Guzmans counsel.

Quirino and Milagros de Guzman were married before the
effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August 1988.
SUB-ISSUE: Whether the RTC should have dismissed the case for failure to As they did not execute any marriage settlement, the regime of
state a cause of action, considering that Milagros de Guzman, conjugal partnership of gains govern their property relations.
allegedly an indispensable party, was not included as a party- Credits are personal properties, acquired during the time the loan
plaintiff. or other credit transaction was executed. Therefore, credits loaned
during the time of the marriage are presumed to be conjugal
HELD: NO. property.
Being co-owners of the alleged credit, Quirino and Milagros de
SPS. CARANDANGS CONTENTION: Guzman may separately bring an action for the recovery thereof.
o Since three of the four checks used to pay their stock In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties
subscriptions were issued in the name of Milagros de in interest.
Guzman, the latter should be considered an indispensable However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and relevant
party. jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of
o Being such, the spouses Carandang claim, the failure to action, for the recovery of co-owned properties.
join Mrs. de Guzman as a party-plaintiff should cause the Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner
dismissal of the action because "(i)f a suit is not brought in who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is
the name of or against the real party in interest, a motion an indispensable party thereto.
to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the complaint The other co-owners are not indispensable parties.
states no cause of action." They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be
SC disagrees with the contention of the sps. Carandangs. accorded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit is
The joint account of spouses Quirino A de Guzman and Milagros presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.
de Guzman from which the four (4) checks were drawn is part of Milagros de Guzman is not an indispensable party in the action
their conjugal property and under both the Civil Code and the for the recovery of the allegedly loaned money to the spouses
Family Code the husband alone may institute an action for the Carandang.
recovery or protection of the spouses conjugal property. As such, she need not have been impleaded in said suit, and
Petitioners erroneously interchange the terms "real party in interest" dismissal of the suit is not warranted by her not being a party
and "indispensable party." thereto.
o A real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit, or the Rule 3, Sec 18 to 22
party entitled to the avails of the suit.
o On the other hand, an indispensable party is a party in Romualdez v Tiglao GR 51151, July 1981
interest without whom no final determination can be had of
an action, in contrast to a necessary party, which is one Facts: Paz G. Romualdez and others sued Antonio Tiglao for the payment of
who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a unpaid rentals for the lease of a hacienda and its sugar quota. Included in
party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those the suit were Felisa Tiglao and others who had guaranteed the payment of
already parties, or for a complete determination or the rents jointly and severally with Antonio Tiglao. The TC rendered a
settlement of the claim subject of the action.

decision in favour of the plaintiffs. The judgment was not satisfied o General manager and board chairman was Maximo M.
notwithstanding a writ of execution to enforce it. Paz G. Romualdez, et al. Kalaw; defendants Juan Bocar and Casimiro Garcia were
filed Civil Case members of the Board; defendant Leonor Moll.
14424 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against Antonio Tiglao and his NACOCO, after the passage of Republic Act 5, embarked on copra
sureties in order to revive the judgment above quoted. It should be stated trading activities. An unhappy chain of events conspired to deter
that when the suit to revive judgment was filed, Felisa F. Tiglao had died and NACOCO from fulfilling these contracts. Nature supervened. Four
her estate was being settled. The administratrix of Tiglaos estate questioned devastating typhoons visited the Philippines. Coconut trees
the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit to revive judgment. CA ruled throughout the country suffered extensive damage. Copra
for the revival of judgment. production decreased. Prices spiralled. Warehouses were
destroyed. Cash requirements doubled. When it became clear that
Issue: W/N he Estate of Tiglao can be liable? the contracts would be unprofitable, Kalaw submitted them to the
board for approval
Held: Yes. This argument is simply answered thus: the original judgment has Kalaw made a full disclosure of the situation apprised the board of
become stale because of its non-execution after the lapse of five years. the impending heavy losses. No action was taken on the contracts.
(Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.) Accordingly, it cannot be presented Then, President Roxas made a statement that the NACOCO head
against the Estate of Felisa Tiglao unless it is first revived by action. This is did his best to avert the losses, emphasized that government
precisely why the appellees have instituted the second suit whose object is concerns faced the same risks that confronted private companies,
not to make the Estate of Felisa Tiglao pay the sums of money adjudged in that NACOCO was recouping its losses, and that Kalaw was to
the first judgment but merely to keep alive said judgment so that the sums remain in his post. The buyers threatened damage suits. Some of
therein awarded can be presented as claims against the estate. the claims were settled, but one buyer, Louis Dreyfus & Go.
(Overseas) Ltd., did in fact sue before the Court of First Instance of
20 SCRA 1967 Manila, upon claims as follows: For the undelivered copra. All
The Board of Liquidators settlements sum up to P1,343,274.52. NACOCO seeks to recover
vs the above sum of P1,343,274.52 from general manager and board
Heirs of Maximo Kalaw chairman Maximo M. Kalaw, and directors Juan Bocar, Casimiro
Garcia and Leonor Moll. It charges Kalaw with negligence under
FACTS: Article 1902 of the old Civil Code and defendant board members,
including Kalaw, with bad faith and/or breach of trust for having
The National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO, for short) was approved the contracts. During the pendency of the case, Kalaw
chartered as a non-profit governmental organization avowedly for died.
the protection, preservation and development of the coconut
industry in the Philippines. ISSUE: Whether the action is enforceable against the heirs of Kalaw?
NACOCO's charter was amended by RA 5 (yes, ganito na katanda
ang kasong ito) to grant that corporation the express power "to buy, RULING:
sell, barter, export, and in any other manner deal in, coconut,
copra, and desiccated coconut, as well as their by-products, and to Yes. The suit here revolves around the alleged negligent acts of Kalaw for
act as agent, broker or commission merchant of the producers, having entered into the questioned contracts without prior approval of the
dealers or merchants" thereof. board of directors, to the damage and prejudice of plaintiff; and is against

Kalaw and the other directors for having subsequently approved the said heirs filed MD- granted on the ground that the legal
contracts in bad faith and/or breach of trust." Clearly then, the present case representative, and not the heirs, should have been made
is not a mere action for the recovery of money nor a claim for money arising the party defendant; and that anyway the action being for
from contract. The suit involves alleged tortious acts. And the action is recovery of money, testate or intestate proceedings
embraced in suits filed "to recover damages for an injury to person or should be initiated and the claim filed therein
property, real or personal", which survive. Action against the Kalaw heirs MR-denied, Hence to SC.
and, for the matter, against the Estate of Casimiro Garcia survives.
G.R. No. L-18107 August 30, 1962 RULING: Rule 88, section 1, enumerates actions that survive against a
decedent's executors or administrators:(1) actions to recover real and
MARIA G. AGUAS, FELIX GUARDINO and FRANCISCO SALINAS, personal property from the estate; (2) actions to enforce a lien thereon; and
plaintiffs-appellants, (3) actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property. The
vs. present suit is one for damages under the last class, it having been held that
HERMOGENES LLEMOS, deceased defendant substituted by his "injury to property" is not limited to injuries to specific property, but extends
representatives, to other wrongs by which personal estate is injured or diminished (Baker vs.
PERPETUA YERRO-LLEMOS, HERMENEGILDO LLEMOS, FELINO Crandall, 47 Am. Rep. 126; also 171 A.L.R., 1395). To maliciously cause a
LLEMOS and AMADO LLEMOS, defendants-appellees. party to incur unnecessary expenses, as charged in this case, is certainly
injurious to that party's property (Javier vs. Araneta, L-4369, Aug. 31, 1953).
FACTS:
However, parties have arrived at an amicable settlement of their differences,
Francisco Salinas and the spouses Felix Guardino and Maria and that they have agreed to dismiss this appeal. CFI-granted. Appeal was
Aguas jointly filed an action in the CFI-Samar to recover damages dismissed.
from Hermogenes Llemos
Alledging that Llemos had served them by registered mail Rule 4 Venue
with a copy of a petition for a writ of possession, with
notice that the same would be submitted to the said court G.R. No. 156187 November 11, 2004
of Samar
that in view of the copy and notice served, plaintiffs
JIMMY T. GO, petitioner,
proceeded to the court from their residence in Manila
vs.
accompanied by their lawyers, only to discover that no
UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, ANGELO V. MANAHAN,
such petition had been filed; and that defendant Llemos
FRANCISCO C. ZARATE, PERLITA A. URBANO and ATTY. EDWARD
maliciously failed to appear in court, so that plaintiffs'
MARTIN, respondents.
expenditure and trouble turned out to be in vain, causing
Facts:
them mental anguish and undue embarrassment
Llemo died before he filed his answer so plaintiffs
amended their complaint to include the heirs of the Petitioner Jimmy T. Go and Alberto T. Looyuko are co-owners of several
deceased-granted businesses under the name of Noahs Ark.

Petitioners applied for a P900,000,000 Omnibus Line accommodation ISSUE: WON petitioners complaint for cancellation of real estate mortgage
(secured by Real Estate Mortgages over parcels of land) with respondent is a personal or real action for the purpose of determining venue.
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB)) Pesos and was favorably acted
upon by the latter. SC via petitiones petition for review on certiorari.
The approved Omnibus Line accommodation granted to petitioner was In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or as
subsequently cancelled by UCPB. provided for in Section 1, Rule 4, a real action is an action affecting title to or
possession of real property, or interest therein. These include partition or
Go demanded from UCPB the return of the two (2) TCTs covered by Real condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property. The venue for
Estate Mortgages earlier executed. UCPB refused to return the same. real actions is the same for regional trial courts and municipal trial courts --
the court which has territorial jurisdiction over the area where the real
RTC Mandaluyong City property or any part thereof lies.
Respondent UCPB filed an extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgage for nonpayment of the obligation secured by said Personal action is one brought for the recovery of personal property, for the
mortgage. enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for
the public auction sale of the mortgaged property was set on the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or
11 April 2000 and 03 May 2000. property. The venue for personal actions is likewise the same for the
regional and municipal trial courts -- the court of the place where the plaintiff
RTC Pasig City or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the
Go filed a complaint for Cancellation of Real Estate Mortgage and principal defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff, as indicated in
damages, with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of Section 2 of Rule 4.
preliminary injunction, against respondent bank and its officers
Respondent bank filed a motion to dismiss based on different The cancellation of the real estate mortgage, subject of the instant petition,
grounds including: is a real action, considering that a real estate mortgage is a real right and a
2) that the complaint was filed in the wrong venue; real property by itself. An action for cancellation of real estate mortgage is
petitioners application for a writ of preliminary injunction - necessarily an action affecting the title to the property. It is, therefore, a real
GRANTED. action which should be commenced and tried in Mandaluyong City, the place
the auction sale, scheduled on 11 April 2000 and 03 May 2000, where the subject property lies.
was enjoined. (see last bullet RTC Mandaluyong)
UCPBs motion to dismiss- DENIED No. L-44351. May 18, 1978.
UCPBs MFR DENIED HOECHST PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. FRAN-CISCO TORRES and
the Honorable PROCORO J. DONATO, Judge of the Court of First
CA Instance of Isabela, respondents.
UCPB filed a petition for certiorari (Rule 65)
directed the trial court to dismiss on the ground of improper venue. Facts
Petitioners MFR DENIED
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and prohibition.

only after the action has been filed already that change or transfer of venue
Petition for certiorari and prohibition to declare respondent court without by agreement of the parties is understandably controllable in the discretion
authority to take cognizance of private respondents action for Breach of of the court.
Contract with Preliminary Injunction and to enjoin said court from further
taking any action in said case upon the ground of improper laying of the The agreement in this case was entered into long before the petitioners
venue. action was filed It is clear and unequivocal. The parties therein stipulated
that (I)n case of any litigation arising out of this agreement, the venue of any
CFI action shall be in the competent courts of the Province of Rizal.
Private respondent, Francisco Torres, filed with respondent Court of First Change or transfer of venue from that fixed in the rules may be effected
Instance of Isabela upon written agreement of the parties not only before the actual filing of the
A complaint alleging breach of a distributorship contract on the part action but even after the same has been filed.
of petitioner, Hoechst Philippines, Inc.
The settled rule of jurisprudence in this jurisdiction is that a written
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that: agreement of the parties as to venue, as authorized by Section 3, Rule 4, is
The contract provides that (I)n case of any litigation arising out of not only binding between the parties but also enforceable by the courts. It is
this agreement, the venue of any action shall be in the competent only after the action has been filed already that change or transfer of venue
courts of the Province of Rizal. by agreement of the parties is understandably controllable in the discretion
Venue has been improperly laid in respondent court. of the court.
Respondents Argue: The agreement in this case was entered into long before the petitioners
The word shall in the stipulation in question should be construed action was filed. It is clear and unequivocal. The parties therein stipulated
to be merely permissive and not mandatory. that (I)n case of any litigation arising out of this agreement, the venue of any
The stipulation as to venue was meant to apply only to suits to be action shall he in the competent courts of the Province of Rizal. No further
filed by petitioner. stipulations are necessary to elicit the thought that both parties agreed that
It is maintained that there are no words in the contract expressly any action by either of them would be filed only in the competent courts of
restricting the venue to the courts of Rizal. Rizal province exclusively.
It is urged that to give effect to the stipulation in controversy is to
serve the convenience and the purpose of the petitioner only. Indeed, there may be instances when an agreement as to venue may be so
oppressive as to effectively deny to the party concerned access to the courts
Its effect is to discourage, to deter, to render expensive and
by reason of poverty. In such an eventuality and depending on the peculiar
uneconomical the filing of suits by small-time company distributors
circumstances of the case, the Court may declare the agreement as to
against the petitioner.
venue to be in effect contrary to public policy,despite that in general,
changes and transfers of venue by written agreement of the parties is
Ruling
allowablewhenever it is shown that a stipulation as to venue works
injustice by practically denying to the party concerned a fair opportunity to
The settled rule of jurisprudence in this jurisdiction is that a written
file suit in the place designated by the rules.
agreement of the parties as to venue, as authorized by Section 3, Rule 4, is
not only binding between the parties but also enforceable by the courts. It is

Petition granted. I/We hereby expressly submit to the jurisdiction of the
courts of Valenzuela any legal action which may arise
G.R. No. 106920 December 10, 1993 out of this promissory note.
PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, o As security for the re-payment by respondent Circle of the
vs. sums loaned by petitioner Bank, eight (8) individuals, who
HON. SALVADOR S. TENSUAN, Judge of Regional Trial Court of were impleaded as defendants in the complaint executed
Makati, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 146; CIRCLE a Continuing Surety Agreement and undertook to pay
FINANCIAL CORPORATION, AVELINO E. DEATO, JR., MIGUEL F. jointly and severally respondent Circle's obligations.
VIOLAGO, BENJAMIN F. SANTIAGO, SOCORRO R. GOMEZ, NERISSA o Only five (5) out of eight (8) individual obligors are
T. GLORIA, FILEMON C. MARQUEZ, DOMINGO SANTIAGO AND respondents in present case.
HILARIO P. LOPEZ, respondents. o On their due dates, Circle failed to pay its obligations
under the promissory notes.
RULING: THE STIPULATION AS TO THE VENUE OF ACTION MUST o Petitioner Bank demanded payment from the eight (8)
CLEARLY INDICATE THROUGH QUALIFYING AND individual sureties conformably with their promises
RESTRICTIVE WORDS THAT THE PARTIES DELIBERATELY contained in the Continuing Surety Agreement; the
INTENDED TO EXCLUDE CAUSES OF ACTIONS FROM THE individual obligors, however, also failed to pay.
OPERATION OF THE ORDINARY PERMISSIVE RULES ON
VENUE TO THE EXCLUSION OF ANY OTHER COURT. PETITIONER: ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
ATTACHMENT.
Facts: ALLEGATION: CIRLCE BECAME INSOLVENT AND PLACED
UNDER RECEIVERSHIP BY CB.
o Petitioner moved for issuance of a writ of preliminary
Petitioner Philippine Banking Corporation (hereafter "Bank") is a
attachment, alleging that respondent Circle had become
commercial banking corporation with principal office at Makati,
insolvent and had been placed under receivership by the
Metro Manila.
Central Bank.
RTC MAKATI: PETITIONER: COLLECTION OF SUM OF MONEY
RTC: GRANTED THE MOTION.
o Petitioner Bank instituted a complaint for collection of a
o The trial judge granted the motion and issued a writ of
sum of money, with a prayer for preliminary attachment, at
preliminary attachment.
the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
o Bank alleges that respondent Circle Financial Co.
(hereafter "Circle"), sometime in 1983 and 1984, through The sheriff's return indicated, however, that no properties
its representatives, obtained several loans aggregating belonging to the respondent Circle and the individual obligors
P1,000,000.00 from petitioner. could be found.
o Respondent Circle, for value received, delivered to RESPONDENT: MOTION TO DISMISS.
petitioner Bank four (4) promissory notes, each of GROUND: VENUE OF ACTION IMPROPERLY LAID,
which contained the stipulation that: AGREEMENT WAS IN VALENZUELA ONLY.
o A motion to dismiss was filed by the respondents (Circle
and the five [5] individual sureties served with summons)

and averred that the venue of the action was improperly HELD: NO. THE AGREEMENT WAS PERMISSIVE.
laid since an agreement had fixed the venue of actions
arising from the promissory notes in Valenzuela, Metro It is settled in this jurisdiction that the parties, by written agreement,
Manila, only. may change or transfer the venue of an action from one province to
o Respondents called the trial court's attention to the another.
stipulation contained in the promissory note, quoted in The relevant task, in other words, is determining the intent of the
limine. parties as manifested in the words employed by them and, where
such words are less than clear, in other recognized indicators of the
RTC: GRANTED MOTION, CASE DISMISSED. will of the contracting parties.
M.R DENIED. A careful reading of the terms of the stipulation "I/We hereby
HENCE, THIS PETITION FOR REVIEW. expressly submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of Valenzuela any
PETITIONERS CONTENTION: legal action which may arise out of this promissory note" shows
o The stipulation contained in the promissory notes is that the stipulation does not require the laying of venue in
merely an agreement to add the courts of Valenzuela to Valenzuela exclusively or mandatorily.
the tribunals to which the parties may resort. The plain or ordinary import of the stipulation is the authorizing of,
o Petitioner thus insists that the venue stipulation set out in or permission to bring, suit in Valenzuela; there is not the slightest
the notes did not restrict or limit the permissible venue of indication of an intent to bar suit in other competent courts.
actions arising out of those notes to the courts of Permissive stipulations like the one here considered have invariably
Valenzuela, to the exclusion of all the other courts received judicial approval and the Court have declared that either of
recourse to any one of which is authorized or permitted the parties is authorized to lay venue of an action in the court
under the Rules of Court. named in the stipulation.
o Thus, venue was properly laid by petitioner Bank in the o The stipulation here does not purport to deprive either
place where its principal offices are located: i.e., Makati, party of it right to elect, or option to have resort to, another
Metropolitan Manila. competent court as expressly permitted by Section 2(b) of
Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, should such party choose to
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: initiate a suit.
The stipulation here merely operated to confer or confirm a right
o Aver that the words used in the stipulation here involved upon a party to elect recourse to the courts of Valenzuela or,
are clear and unambiguous. alternatively, to go before any of the tribunals envisaged by
o A promise to submit to the jurisdiction of a specific court, the rules on venue, i.e., the courts of Makati, Quezon City and
without an express reservation of the right to resort to one Bulacan.
or more of the tribunals otherwise accessible under the In principle, the stipulation on venue here involved must be
Rules of Court, is an agreement definitely fixing the distinguished from stipulations which purport to require or compel
permissible venue in only one place, i.e., Valenzuela, to the parties to lay venue of an action in a specified place, and in that
the exclusion of other competent courts. particular place only.
o The latter type of venue stipulation must clearly indicate,
through QUALIFYING and RESTRICTIVE words, that
ISSUE: Whether the agreement as to the venue of action was EXCLUSIVE.
the parties deliberately intended to exclude causes or

actions from the operation of the ordinary permissive rules Petitioners filed a complaint for damages against respondents because the
on venue, and that they intended contractually to respondents action was unwarranted, unjustified, malicious, abusive and
designate a specific venue to the exclusion of any other capricious.
court also competent and accessible to the parties under Respondents moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the venue of the
the ordinary rules on the venue of actions. Stipulations of action had been improperly laid in the RTC of Makati.
this exclusionary nature may, under certain
circumstances, be characterized as unreasonable or as Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss by alleging that their cause of
contrary to public policy and, accordingly, not judicially action is not based on the lease contract and, therefore, the case is not
enforceable. covered by the stipulation as to venue. Instead it is governed by the general
3
rule as to venue stated in Rule 4, sec. 2(b). They also alleged that even
In the case at bar, neither qualifying nor restrictive words (e.g., assuming that the stipulation is applicable, it does not operate to limit the
"must," "only" or "exclusively") were employed which could yield an venue to Pasay City but merely provides for an additional forum.
intent on the part of the parties mandatorily to restrict the venue of
actions arising out of the promissory notes to the courts of The trial court dismissed petitioners' action on the ground of improper venue.
Valenzuela only. MR was likewise denied.
The case is remanded to the RTC.
Hence this petition
GESMUNDO vs.JRB REALTY CORPORATION
Issue: Whether venue was properly laid in the RTC of Makati.
1
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the order of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati (Branch 148), dismissing on the ground of improper venue a Held: No. It was improperly laid.
complaint which the spouses Virgilio B. Gesmundo and Edna C. Gesmundo
2
filed against the JRB Realty Corporation and Jaime R. Blanco. We have in the past held stipulations limiting venue as valid and binding on
4
the contracting parties, based on Rule 4, sec. 3 which provides:
Facts:
Petitioner Virgilio B. Gesmundo, as lessee, and respondent JRB Realty Venue by agreement. By written agreement of the parties, the venue of
Corporation, represented by its president, respondent Jaime R. Blanco, as an action may be changed or transferred from one province to another.
lessor, entered into a lease contract covering Room 116, Blanco Suites, at
246 Villaruel St., Pasay City, the parties stipulating that the venue for all In the case at bar, it is clear from the parties' contract that the venue of any
suits will be the courts of appropriate jurisdiction in Pasay City.Petitioner action which they might bring are the courts of competent jurisdiction in
received a letter terminating their lease. Respondent Blanco told petitioner Pasay City.The language used leaves no room for interpretation. This
Gesmundo that the Corporation where Gesmundo works did not pay him his means a waiver of their right to institute action in the courts provided for in
retainer fees and that he did not want petitioner in any of his apartment units. Rule 4, sec. 2(b).
Petitioner asked for reconsideration but was ignored, and instead was forced
to vacate the leased premises. Petitioner leased another apartment. This case is different from Polytrade Corporation v. Blanco, where in
Polytrade there was an absence of any qualifying or restrictive words, while
Procedural Facts: in this case the word all suits plainly restricted the venue.

The stipulation in this case is similar to that involved in Hoechst Philippines, Thus, venue was properly laid in Manila. A motion for
Inc. v. Torres. reconsideration of said order was likewise denied.
[G.R. No. 158138. April 12, 2005]
On appeal, the CA ruled that respondents' alleged debt was based
PHILIPPINE BANK OF, COMMUNICATIONS, Petitioner,
on the Promissory Note. The parties' Surety Agreement, though
vs.
ELENA LIM, RAMON CALDERON, and TRI-ORO INTERNATIONAL silent as to venue, was an accessory contract.
TRADING & MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Respondents. ISSUE:
Whether the action against the sureties is covered by the restriction on

venue stipulated in the PN?
Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Philippine Bank of Communications filed a complaint against

Respondents Elena Lim, Ramon Calderon and Tri-Oro International RULING:
Trading & Manufacturing Corporation (Tri-Oro) with the Regional Yes. The cases pertaining to both causes of action are restricted to Makati
Trial Court of for the collection of a deficiency amounting to City as the proper venue.
P4,014,297.23 exclusive of interest.
In enforcing a surety contract, the 'complementary-contracts-construed-
Petitioner alleged therein that [respondents] obtained a loan from it together doctrine finds application. According to this principle, an accessory
and executed a continuing surety agreement dated November 16, contract must be read in its entirety and together with the principal
1995 in favor of [petitioner]. agreement.
Petitioner granted a renewal of said loan upon respondent's The aforementioned doctrine is applicable to the present case. Incapable of
request, the most recent being evidenced by a Promissory Note standing by itself, the SA can be enforced only in conjunction with the PN.
Renewal in the amount of P3,000,000.00. It was expressly
stipulated that the venue for any legal action that may arise out of Petitioner approved the loan covered by the PN, partly because of the SA
said promissory note shall be Makati City, 'to the exclusion of all that assured the payment of the principal obligation. It makes no sense to
other courts' argue that the parties to the SA were not bound by the stipulations in the PN.
Respondents allegedly failed to pay said obligation upon maturity.
Thus, petitioner foreclosed the real estate mortgage executed by By inserting the provision that Makati City would be 'the venue for any legal
respondents valued at P1,081,600.00 leaving a deficiency balance action that may arise out of the Promissory Note, petitioner also restricted
of P4,014,297.23 as of August 31, 1999. the venue of actions against the sureties. The legal action against the
sureties arose not only from the SA, but also from the PN.
Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
improper venue.
Young Auto Supply vs. CA, 223 SCRA 670
The trial court denied said motion asseverating that petitioner had
separate causes of action arising from the promissory note and the
continuing surety agreement. FACTS:

Young Auto Supply Co. Inc. (YASCO) represented by Nemesio But without waiting for the resolution of the motion, he filed a
Garcia, its president, Nelson Garcia and Vicente Sy, sold all of petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals- order dismissal
their shares of stock in Consolidated Marketing & Development on the ground of improper venue
Corporation (CMDC) to Roxas.(8M price payable 4M-Dp,4M- MR-denied, Hence they went to SC
4postdated check)
After the execution of the agreement, Roxas took full control of the RULLING:
four markets of CMDC. However, the vendors held on to the stock CA erred in holding that the venue was improperly laid in Cebu
certificates of CMDC as security pending full payment of the City, they relied on the address of YASCO, as appearing in the Deed of
balance of the purchase price. Sale dated October 28, 1987, which is "No. 1708 Dominga Street, Pasay
down-payment, was honored by the drawee bank but the four other City." This was the same address written in YASCO's letters and several
checks representing the balance were dishonored commercial documents in the possession of Roxas. In the Regional
Roxas sold one of the markets to a third party. Out of the proceeds Trial Courts, all personal actions are commenced and tried in the
of the sale, YASCO received P600,000.00, leaving a balance of province or city where the defendant or any of the defendants
P3,400,000.00 resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the
Nelson Garcia and Vicente Sy assigned all their rights and title to plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff [Sec. 2(b) Rule 4,
the proceeds of the sale of the CMDC shares to Nemesio Garcia. Revised Rules of Court].
YASCO and GARCIA filed a complaint against Roxas in the
RTC- Cebu City, praying that Roxas be ordered to pay There are two plaintiffs in the case at bench: a natural person and a
petitioners the sum of P3,400,00.00 or that full control of the domestic corporation. Both plaintiffs aver in their complaint that they are
three markets be turned over to YASCO and Garcia and residents of Cebu City, thus:1.1. Plaintiff Young Auto Supply Co., Inc.,
prayed for the forfeiture of the partial payment . ("YASCO") is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under
ROXAS failed to file answer and he was declared in Philippine laws with principal place of business at M. J. Cuenco Avenue,
default but was later lifted by court Cebu City. It also has a branch office at 1708 Dominga Street, Pasay City,
Metro Manila.
ROXAS filed MD on the grounds that: The complaint
did not state a cause of action due to non-joinder of
Plaintiff Nemesio Garcia is of legal age, married, Filipino citizen and with
indispensable parties;The claim or demand set forth
business address at Young Auto Supply Co., Inc., M. J. Cuenco Avenue,
in the complaint had been waived, abandoned or
Cebu City. . .
otherwise extinguished; and The venue was
improperly laid- Denied
RoXas filed another motion for extension of time to The Article of Incorporation of YASCO (SEC Reg. No. 22083) states:THIRD
submit his answer and MR -denied for being pro- That the place where the principal office of the corporation is to be
forma and Roxas was again declared in default, on established or located is at Cebu City, Philippines (as amended on
the ground that his motion for reconsideration did not December 20, 1980 and further amended on December 20, 1984) (Rollo, p.
toll the running of the period to file his answer. 273).
Roxas filed an unverified Motion to Lift the Order of
Default which was not accompanied with the required A corporation has no residence in the same sense in which this term is
affidavit or merit. applied to a natural person. But for practical purposes, a corporation is in a
metaphysical sense a resident of the place where its principal office is

located as stated in the articles of incorporation. The Corporation Code 1st dishonor Saludo's daughter used her supplementary credit
precisely requires each corporation to specify in its articles of incorporation card to pay her purchases in the United States some time in
the "place where the principal office of the corporation is to be located which April 2000.
must be within the Philippines" (Sec. 14 [3]). The purpose of this requirement 2nd dishonor occurred when Saludo used his principal credit
is to fix the residence of a corporation in a definite place, instead of allowing card to pay his account at the Hotel Okawa in Tokyo, Japan
it to be ambulatory. while he was there with other delegates from the Philippines to
attend the Congressional Recognition in honor of Mr. Hiroshi
If it was Roxas who sued YASCO in Pasay City and the latter questioned the Tanaka
venue on the ground that its principal place of business was in Cebu City, The dishonor of these AMEX credit cards were allegedly unjustified
Roxas could argue that YASCO was in estoppel because it misled Roxas to as they resulted from respondents' unilateral act of suspending
believe that Pasay City was its principal place of business. But this is not the petitioner Saludo's account for his failure to pay its balance
case before us.With the finding that the residence of YASCO for purposes of covering the period of March 2000. Subsequently, his credit card
venue is in Cebu City, where its principal place of business is located, it and its supplementary cards were cancelled by respondents on
becomes unnecessary to decide whether Garcia is also a resident of Cebu July 20, 2000.
City and whether Roxas was in estoppel from questioning the choice of Respondent raised the affirmative defenses of lack of cause of
Cebu City as the venue. action and improper venue. On the latter, respondents averred
that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground that
G.R. No. 159507 April 19, 2006 venue was improperly laid because none of the parties was a
resident of Leyte. They alleged that respondents were not
residents of Southern Leyte and that Saludo was not a resident
ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR., Petitioner,
thereof as evidenced by the fact that his community tax certificate,
vs.
which was presented when he executed the complaint's verification
AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC., and/or IAN T. FISH and
and certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay City.
DOMINIC MASCRINAS, Respondents.
To buttress their contention, respondents pointed out that petitioner
Saludo's complaint was prepared in Pasay City and signed by a
Facts: lawyer of the said city. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint a quo.
RTC of Maasin City, Southern Leyte Respondents filed an Opposition to Ex-Parte Motion (to Set Case
Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against the for Pre-Trial) and Motion for Preliminary Hearing (on Affirmative
American Express International, Inc. (AMEX) and/or its officers. Defense of Improper Venue) to which petitioner Saludo filed his
The complaint alleged that Saludo "is a member of the House of Comments and/or Objections to the Affirmative Defense of
Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Improper Venue.
Leyte, Philippines." On the other hand, AMEX "is a engaged in He asserted that any allegation refuting his residency in
providing credit and other credit facilities and allied services with Southern Leyte was baseless and unfounded considering that
office at Makati City." he was the congressman of the lone district thereof at the time
The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful of the filing of his complaint. He urged the court a quo to take
dishonor of petitioner Saludo's AMEX credit card and the judicial notice of this particular fact. As a member of Congress,
supplementary card issued to his daughter. he possessed all the qualifications prescribed by the

Constitution including that of being a resident of his district. He SC
was also a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines- The petition is meritorious. Saludo was a resident of Southern
Southern Leyte Chapter, and has been such ever since his Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint, and consequently
admission to the Bar. His community tax certificate was issued holding the venue was properly laid
at Pasay City only because he has an office thereat and the Petitioner Saludo's complaint for damages against respondents
office messenger obtained the same in the said city. In any before the court a quo is a personal action. As such, it is governed
event, the community tax certificate is not determinative of by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Courts which reads:
one's residence.
TC denied respondents' affirmative defense that venue was SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be
improperly laid. commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal
Respondents MFR DENIED plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant
CA where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition alleging
grave abuse of discretion In Koh v. Court of Appeals, we explained that the term "resides" as
TRO was issued which enjoined the presiding judge of the court a employed in the rule on venue on personal actions filed with the courts
quo from conducting further proceedings of first instance means the place of abode, whether permanent or
CA ruled that venue was improperly laid temporary, of the plaintiff or the defendant, as distinguished from
action filed by petitioner Saludo against respondents is "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when
governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. The said absent, one has the intention of returning.
rule on venue of personal actions basically provides that
personal actions may be commenced and tried where plaintiff
This Court held in the case of Uytengsu v. Republic, 50 O.G. 4781, October,
or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where defendant or
1954 that -
any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of
plaintiff.
Venue was improperly laid in the court a quo, according to the 'There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to
appellate court, because not one of the parties was a resident indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile
of Southern Leyte. Specifically, it declared that petitioner denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the
Saludo was not a resident thereof. The appellate court intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a
pronounced that, for purposes of venue, the residence of a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence
person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or his coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have
actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may
be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein have numerous places of residence. His place of residence generally is his
with continuity and consistency place of domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so since no length of
Petitioners MFR DENIED residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.
ISSUE: WON CA erred in dismissing the complaint on the basis of improper

venue

"We note that the law on venue in Courts of First Instance (Section 2, of Luis (Felicisimo). During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages.
Rule 4, Rules of Court) in referring to the parties utilizes the words 'resides His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit out of which were born six
or may be found,' and not 'is domiciled,' thus: children,Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son.
'Sec. 2(b) Personal actions - All other actions may be commenced and tried However, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for
where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or Divorce in the United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a
where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody.
plaintiff.' Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, before the
Minister of the United Presbyterian in Los Angeles, California. He
"Applying the foregoing observation to the present case, We are fully had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from
convinced that private respondent Coloma's protestations of domicile in San the time of their marriage up to his death.
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, based on his manifested intention to return there after
the retirement of his wife from government service to justify his bringing of RTC
an action for damages against petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte, is
entirely of no moment since what is of paramount importance is where he Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
actually resided or where he may be found at the time he brought the action, assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. She filed a petition for
to comply substantially with the requirements of Sec. 2(b) of Rule 4, Rules of letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Court, on venue of personal actions." (Koh v. Court of Appeals, supra, pp.
304-305.) Respondent alleged that:
She is the widow of Felicisimo;
G.R. No. 133743. February 6, 2007.* That the decedents surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse,
EDGAR SAN LUIS, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, respondent. his six children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage;
That the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive,
G.R. No. 134029. February 6, 2007.* valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less.
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, respondent. Petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first
marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and
Facts failure to state a cause of action.
Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should
have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimos
PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals. place of residence prior to his death.
He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the Decision of the the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at
Court of Appeals, which reversed and set aside the Resolutions of the the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134; and its Resolution denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San the dismissal of the petition. The trial court issued an Order denying the two

motions to dismiss. Judge Tensuan issued an Order granting the motion for inhibition. The case
was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed her
opposition thereto. She submitted: The trial court required the parties to submit their respective position papers
Documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the
powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house petition. Edgar manifested that he is adopting the arguments and evidence
in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila set forth in his previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper.
She presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers.
Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of
Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. The trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that,
She claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a
virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid resident of the Province of Laguna.
down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in
Makati City.
Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed Respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters
motions for reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus,
They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code void ab initio.
cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondents bigamous It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimos
marriage with Felicisimo marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind
This would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 of the Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen.
Family Code. Paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively
applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimos legitimate
Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to children.
disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.
Respondent moved for reconsideration and for the disqualification of Judge
The trial court issued an Order denying the motions for reconsideration. It Arcangel but said motions were denied.
ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal
standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid. CA
The motion for disqualification was deemed moot and academic because Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside
then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. the orders of the trial court.
Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration which
Mila filed a motion for inhibition against Judge Tensuan. Edgar also filed a were denied by the Court of Appeals. Edgar appealed to this Court via the
motion for reconsideration from the Order denying their motion for instant petition for review on certiorari. Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and
reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it motion to adopt the said petition which was granted.
was based.
SC

Petitioner's Arguments: It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that residence, for purposes of fixing
Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject petition for letters of the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with
administration was improperly laid: domicile. The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the
Because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a
Cruz, Laguna. distinction between residence for purposes of election laws and residence
They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray and for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, residence
Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, residence is and domicile are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed
synonymous with domicile which denotes a fixed permanent permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of
residence to which when absent, one intends to return. returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court,
They claim that a person can only have one domicile at any given the residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or
time. actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal
Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition for letters of residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and
administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna. consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in
Respondents marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous one place and domicile in another.
because it was performed during the subsistence of the latters
marriage to Merry Lee. In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was
Paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a
would impair vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death.
Respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid
administration. property.
She also presented billing statements from the Philippine Heart
Issue Center and Chinese General Hospital indicating the address of Felicisimo at
Whether venue was properly laid. Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa.
Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased
Ruling in the Ayala Alabang Village Association and Ayala Country Club, Inc.
Letter-envelopes from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceaseds
The petition lacks merit. children to him at his Alabang address, and
The deceaseds calling cards stating that his home/city address is
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of at Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa while his office/provincial address is
administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial in Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Court of the province in which he resides at the time of his death. In the
case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, we laid down the doctrinal rule for From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang,
determining the residenceas contradistinguished from domicileof the Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate.
decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly
(Emphasis supplied) filed in the Regional

Trial Court which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The As petitioner Irene Marcos-Araneta would later allege, both
subject petition was filed in December. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a corporations were organized pursuant to a contract or arrangement
municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National whereby Benedicto, as trustor, placed in his name and in the name
Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were of his associates, as trustees, the shares of stocks of FEMII and
then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. UEC with the obligation to hold those shares and their fruits in trust
Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of and for the benefit of Irene to the extent of 65% of such shares.
Makati City. Several years after, Irene, through her trustee-husband, Gregorio
Ma. Araneta III, demanded the reconveyance of said 65%
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals stockholdings, but the Benedicto Group refused to oblige.
reinstating and affirming the Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied RTC BATAC, ILOCOS NORTE:
petitioners motion to dismiss and its Order which dismissed petitioners PETITIONER: 2 COMPLAINTS FOR CONVEYANCE OF SHARES
motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to OF STOCK, ACCOUNTING AND RECEIVERSHIP OF UEC
the trial court for further proceedings. SHARES AND RECOVERY OF 65% OF FEMII SHARES.
o In March 2000, Irene thereupon instituted before the RTC
SO ORDERED. two similar complaints for conveyance of shares of stock,
accounting and receivership against the Benedicto Group
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order (TRO).
G.R. No. 154096 August 22, 2008 o The first, covered the UEC shares and named Benedicto,
his daughter, and at least 20 other individuals as
IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA, DANIEL RUBIO, ORLANDO G. RESLIN, defendants.
and JOSE G. RESLIN, petitioners, o The second, sought the recovery to the extent of 65% of
vs. FEMII shares held by Benedicto and the other defendants
COURT OF APPEALS, JULITA C. BENEDICTO, and FRANCISCA named therein.
BENEDICTO-PAULINO, respondents.

ST
RESPONDENT FRANCISCA: MOTION TO DISMISS THE 1
RULING: CO-PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT PRINCIPAL PARTIES TO THE COMPLAINT.
CASE, VENUE OF ACTION MUST BE WHERE THE GROUND: IMPROPER VENUE.
PRINCIPAL PLAINTIFF RESIDES. o Respondent Francisca Benedicto-Paulino, Benedicto's
st
daughter, filed a Motion to Dismiss the 1 complaint,
followed later by an Amended Motion to Dismiss.
Facts:

ND
RESPONDENT BENEDICTO: MOTION TO DISMISS THE 2
COMPLAINT.
Sometime in 1968 and 1972, Ambassador Roberto S. Benedicto,
GROUND: IMPROPER VENUE.
now deceased, and his business associates (Benedicto Group) nd
o Benedicto, on the other hand, moved to dismiss 2
organized Far East Managers and Investors, Inc. (FEMII) and
complaint, adopting in toto the five (5) grounds raised by
Universal Equity Corporation (UEC), respectively.
Francisca in her amended motion to dismiss. Among
these were: (1) the cases involved an intra-corporate

dispute over which the Securities and Exchange PETITIONER: M.R. and MOTION TO ADMIT AMENDED
Commission, not the RTC, has jurisdiction; (2) venue was COMPLAINT.
improperly laid; and (3) the complaint failed to state a GROUND: ADDED ADDITIONAL PLAINTIFFS; PETITIONERS
cause of action, as there was no allegation therein that TRUSTEES, FROM ILOCOS NORTE.
plaintiff, as beneficiary of the purported trust, has accepted o Pending resolution of her motion for reconsideration, Irene
the trust created in her favor. filed on July 17, 2000 a Motion (to Admit Amended
To the motions to dismiss, Irene filed a Consolidated Opposition, Complaint), attaching therewith a copy of the Amended
which Benedicto and Francisca countered with a Joint Reply to Complaint dated July 14, 2000 in which the names of
Opposition. Daniel Rubio, Orlando G. Reslin, and Jose G. Reslin
Upon Benedicto's motion, both cases were consolidated. appeared as additional plaintiffs.
BENEDICTO AND FRANCISCA: PETITIONER DOES NOT o As stated in the amended complaint, the added plaintiffs,
RESIDE IN BATAC, ILOCOS NORTE. all from Ilocos Norte, were Irene's new trustees.
o During the preliminary proceedings on their motions to
dismiss, Benedicto and Francisca, by way of bolstering RTC: DENIED PETITIONERS M.R. BUT GRANTED MOTION TO
their contentions on improper venue, presented the Joint ADMIT AMENDED COMPLAINT.
Affidavit of household staff at the Marcos' Mansion in Brgy. GROUNDS: CURED THE DEFECT OF IMPROPER VENUE.
Lacub, Batac, Ilocos Norte and that Irene did not maintain o RTC dictated in open court an order denying Irene's
residence in said place as she in fact only visited the motion for reconsideration aforementioned, but deferred
mansion twice in 1999; that she did not vote in Batac in action on her motion to admit amended complaint and the
the 1998 national elections; and that she was staying at opposition thereto.
her husband's house in Makati City. o The RTC predicated its order on the following premises:
PETITIONER: COMMUNITY TAX CERTIFICATE ISSUED ON (1) Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court,
11/07/99 IN CURIMAO, ILOCOS NORTE. Irene may opt to file, as a matter of right, an amended
o Against the aforesaid unrebutted joint affidavit, Irene complaint.
presented her PhP 5 community tax certificate (CTC)
issued on "11/07/99" in Curimao, Ilocos Norte to support (2) The inclusion of additional plaintiffs, one of whom was
her claimed residency in Batac, Ilocos Norte. a Batac, an Ilocos Norte resident, in the amended
In the meantime, on May 15, 2000, Benedicto died and was complaint setting out the same cause of action cured the
substituted by his wife, Julita C. Benedicto, and Francisca. defect of improper venue.
RTC: DISMISSED BOTH COMPLAINTS.
GROUND: PETITIONER DID NOT ACTUALLY RESIDE IN
(3) Secs. 2 and 3 of Rule 3 in relation to Sec. 2 of Rule 4
ILOCOS NORTE, VENUE IMPROPERLY LAID.
allow the filing of the amended complaint in question in
o On June 29, 2000, the RTC dismissed both complaints, the place of residence of any of Irene's co-plaintiffs.
stating that these partly constituted "real action," and that
Irene did not actually reside in Ilocos Norte, and, therefore,
M.R. DENIED.
venue was improperly laid.

GROUND: PETITIONER HAS THE RIGHT TO AMEND HER Venue essentially concerns a rule of procedure which, in personal
COMPLAINTS BEFORE ANY RESPONSIVE PLEADING HAS actions, is fixed for the greatest convenience possible of the plaintiff
BEEN FILED. and his witnesses.
CA: RESPONDENTS: PETITION FOR CERTIORARI. The ground of improperly laid venue must be raised
CA: ISSUED TRO AND WPI ENJOINING RTC FROM seasonably, else it is deemed waived.
PROCEEDING WITH THE COMPLAINTS. o Where the defendant failed to either file a motion to
CA: SET ASIDE RTC ORDERS AND DISMISSING THE dismiss on the ground of improper venue or include the
COMPLAINTS. same as an affirmative defense, he is deemed to have
o Respondents went to the CA via a petition for certiorari, waived his right to object to improper venue.
seeking to nullify the RTC orders.
M.R. DENIED. In the case at bench, Benedicto and Francisca raised at the
o Irene and her new trustees' motion for reconsideration of earliest time possible, meaning "within the time for but before filing
the assailed decision was denied through the equally the answer to the complaint," the matter of improper venue.
assailed June 20, 2002 CA Resolution. o They would thereafter reiterate and pursue their objection
on venue, first, in their answer to the amended
Hence, this petition for review before the SC. complaints and then in their petition for certiorari
before the CA.
ISSUES: o Any suggestion, therefore, that Francisca and Benedicto
or his substitutes abandoned along the way improper
venue as ground to defeat Irene's claim before the RTC
1. Whether respondents waive improper venue.
has to be rejected.
HELD: NO.
2. Venue was improperly laid.
2. Whether the venue in this case was improperly laid.

a. Subject Civil Cases are Personal Actions.
HELD: YES.
It is the posture of respondents that the venue was in this case
improperly laid since the suit in question partakes of a real action
1. Private Respondents did not Waive Improper Venue.
involving real properties located outside the territorial jurisdiction of
the RTC in Batac.
Petitioners maintain that Julita and Francisca were effectively This contention is not well-taken.
precluded from raising the matter of improper venue by their In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal
subsequent acts of filing numerous pleadings. property, the enforcement of a contract, or the recovery of
o To petitioners, these pleadings, taken together, signify a damages.
waiver of private respondents' initial objection to improper Real actions, on the other hand, are those affecting title to or
venue. possession of real property, or interest therein. In accordance with
This contention is without basis and, at best, tenuous. the wordings of Sec. 1 of Rule 4, the venue of real actions shall be

the proper court which has territorial jurisdiction over the area SC points out at the outset that Irene, as categorically and
wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. peremptorily found by the RTC after a hearing, is not a resident of
The venue of personal actions is the court where the plaintiff or any Batac, Ilocos Norte, as she claimed.
of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of The Court perceives no compelling reason to disturb, in the
the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident confines of this case, the factual determination of the trial court and
defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff. the premises holding it together.
In the instant case, petitioners are basically asking Benedicto and Accordingly, Irene cannot, in a personal action, contextually opt
his Group, as defendants a quo, to acknowledge holding in trust for Batac as venue of her reconveyance complaint.
Irene's purported 65% stockownership of UEC and FEMII, inclusive As to her, Batac, Ilocos Norte is not what Sec. 2, Rule 4 of the
of the fruits of the trust, and to execute in Irene's favor the Rules of Court adverts to as the place "where the plaintiff or any of
necessary conveying deed over the said 65% shareholdings. the principal plaintiffs resides" at the time she filed her amended
In other words, Irene seeks to compel recognition of the trust complaint.
arrangement she has with the Benedicto Group. That Irene holds CTC No. 17019451 issued sometime in June 2000
o The fact that FEMII's assets include real properties in Batac, Ilocos Norte and in which she indicated her address as
does not materially change the nature of the action, Brgy. Lacub, Batac, Ilocos is really of no moment.
for the ownership interest of a stockholder over o Let alone the fact that one can easily secure a basic
corporate assets is only inchoate as the corporation, residence certificate practically anytime in any Bureau
as a juridical person, solely owns such assets. of Internal Revenue or treasurer's office and dictate
o It is only upon the liquidation of the corporation that the whatever relevant data one desires entered, Irene
stockholders, depending on the type and nature of their procured CTC No. 17019451 and appended the same to
stockownership, may have a real inchoate right over the her motion for reconsideration following the RTC's
corporate assets, but then only to the extent of their pronouncement against her being a resident of Batac.
stockownership.
c. Co-plaintiffs are not principal parties.
The amended complaint is an action in personam, it being a suit
against Francisca and the late Benedicto (now represented by Petitioners, in an attempt to establish that the RTC in Batac, Ilocos
Julita and Francisca), on the basis of their alleged personal liability Norte is the proper court venue, asseverate that Batac, Ilocos Norte
to Irene upon an alleged trust constituted in 1968 and/or 1972. is where the principal parties reside.
They are not actions in rem where the actions are against the real Pivotal to the resolution of the venue issue is a determination of the
properties instead of against persons. status of Irene's co-plaintiffs in the context of Secs. 2 and 3 of Rule
o SC particularly notes that possession or title to the real 3 in relation to Sec. 2 of Rule 4, which pertinently provide as
properties of FEMII and UEC is not being disputed, albeit follows:
part of the assets of the corporation happens to be real
properties.
Rule 3
PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS
b. Interpretation of Secs. 2 and 3 of Rule 3; and Sec. 2 of
Rule 4

SEC. 2. Parties in interest. -- A real party in interest is the party who Sec. 2 of Rule 4 indicates quite clearly that when there is more than
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the one plaintiff in a personal action case, the residences of the
party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized principal parties should be the basis for determining proper venue.
by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or o According to the late Justice Jose Y. Feria, "the word
defended in the name of the real party in interest. 'principal' has been added [in the uniform procedure rule]
in order to prevent the plaintiff from choosing the
SEC. 3. Representatives as parties. -- Where the action is allowed residence of a minor plaintiff or defendant as the venue."
to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone o Eliminate the qualifying term "principal" and the purpose of
acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the Rule would, to borrow from Justice Regalado, "be
the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in defeated where a nominal or formal party is impleaded in
interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a the action since the latter would not have the degree of
guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law interest in the subject of the action which would warrant
or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit and entail the desirably active participation expected of
of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the litigants in a case."
principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the
principal. Before the RTC in Batac, in the 2 Civil Cases, Irene stands
undisputedly as the principal plaintiff, the real party-in-interest.
Rule 4 Following Sec. 2 of Rule 4, the subject civil cases ought to be
VENUE OF ACTIONS commenced and prosecuted at the place where Irene resides.
SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. -- All other actions may be As earlier stated, no less than the RTC in Batac declared Irene
commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal as not a resident of Batac, Ilocos Norte.
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal Withal, that court was an improper venue for her conveyance
defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant action.
where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff. The Court can concede that Irene's three co-plaintiffs are all
residents of Batac, Ilocos Norte.
There can be no serious dispute that the real party-in-interest o But it ought to be stressed in this regard that not one
plaintiff is Irene. of the three can be considered as principal party-
As self-styled beneficiary of the disputed trust, she stands to be plaintiffs in the 2 Civil Cases, included as they were in
benefited or entitled to the avails of the present suit. the amended complaint as trustees of the principal
It is undisputed too that petitioners Daniel Rubio, Orlando G. plaintiff.
Reslin, and Jose G. Reslin, all from Ilocos Norte, were included as o As trustees, they may be accorded, by virtue of Sec. 3 of
co-plaintiffs in the amended complaint as Irene's new designated Rule 3, the right to prosecute a suit, but only on behalf of
trustees. the beneficiary who must be included in the title of the
As trustees, they can only serve as mere representatives of case and shall be deemed to be the real party-in-interest.
Irene. o In the final analysis, the residences of Irene's co-
plaintiffs cannot be made the basis in determining the
venue of the subject suit.

o This conclusion becomes all the more forceful considering The extrajudicial foreclosure sale of a real estate mortgage is governed
that Irene herself initiated and was actively by Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118. Section 1 and 2 thereof
prosecuting her claim against Benedicto, his heirs, clearly state:
assigns, or associates, virtually rendering the
impleading of the trustees unnecessary. Section 1. When a sale is made under a special power inserted in
or attached to any real-estate mortgage hereafter made as security for
d. Principal Plaintiff not a Resident in Venue of Action. the payment of money of the fulfillment of any other obligation, the
provisions of the following sections shall govern as to the manner in
which the sale and redemption shall be effected, whether or not
Irene was a resident during the period material of Forbes Park,
provision for the same is made in the power.
Makati City.
o She was not a resident of Brgy. Lacub, Batac, Ilocos
Section 2. Said sale cannot be made legally outside of the
Norte, although jurisprudence has it that one can have
province in which the property sold is situated; and in case the place
several residences, if such were the established fact.
within said province in which the sale is to be made is the subject of
stipulation, such sale shall be made in said place or in the municipal
building of the municipality in which the property or part thereof is
situated.
SPS. OCHOA v CHINA BANKING CORP

The case at bar involves petitioners mortgaged real property located in
Paranaque City over which respondent bank was granted a special
Facts: For resolution is petitioners motion for reconsideration of our
power to foreclose extra-judicially. Thus, by express provision of Section
resolution denying their petition for review on certiorari for failing to
2, the sale can only be made in Paranaque City.
sufficiently show any reversible error in the assailed judgment of the
Court of Appeals.
The exclusive venue of Makati City, as stipulated by the parties and
sanctioned by Section 4 of the Rules of Court, cannot be made to apply
Petitioners insist that it was error for the CA to rule that the stipulated
to the Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure filed by respondent bank
exclusive venue of Makati City is binding only on petitioners complaint
because the provision of Rule 4 pertain to venue of actions, which an
for Annulment of Foreclosure, Sale, and Damages filed before the
extrajudicial foreclosure is not.
Regional Trial Court of Paranaque City, but not on respondent banks
Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage, which was filed with
With respect to the venue of extrajudicial foreclosure sales, Act No.
the same court.
3135, as amended, applies, it being a special law dealing particularly
with extrajudicial foreclosure sales of real estate mortgages, and not the
Issue: Whether venue of Makati City is binding only on petitioners
general provisions of the Rules of Court on Venue of Actions.
complaint but not on respondent banks
Consequently, the stipulated exclusive venue of Makati City is relevant
Held: We disagree.
only to actions arising frm or related to the mortgage, such as
petitioners complaint for Annulment of Foreclosure, Sale, and
Damages.

(3) there was still a necessity for the MTC to issue an order
Motion for reconsideration DENIED. following the close of the pre-trial conference
Rule 5 Uniform Procedure in Trial Courts ISSUE: Whether CAs decision to remand the case to the MTC was proper
224 SCRA 557 (1993) RULING:

BAYUBAY
VS Yes, it was proper. The Court was merely enforcing the mandatory
CA provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure.
FACTS: The record shows that the Municipal Trial Court failed to take into
Proceeding at bar traces its origin to an action for ejectment filed account the pertinent provisions of the Rule on Summary
by petitioner Bayubay in the MTC of Los Baos, Laguna on the Procedure that require the immediate issuance by the Municipal
ground of expiration of lease. Trial Court of an order which clearly and distinctly sets forth
In his answer, private respondent argued that it had the option to the issues of the case and the other matters taken up during
renew the term of the lease contract under such conditions as may the preliminary conference.
be agreed upon by the parties and set up the defense of estoppel. The order is an important part of the summary procedure because it
MTC rendered a decision holding that the contract of lease had is its receipt by the parties that begins the ten-day period to submit
expired because no extension had been agreed upon by the parties the affidavits and other evidence mentioned in Sec. 7, which reads
as required by the agreement. as follows:
Private respondent appealed to the RTC of Calamba, Laguna on Sec. 7. Submission of affidavits. Within ten (10) days
the ground that "the MTC violated Secs. 6 and 7 of the Rules on from receipt of the order mentioned in the next preceding
Summary Procedure by rendering judgment without ordering section, the parties shall submit the affidavits of witnesses
the parties to submit their respective position papers and and other evidences on the factual issues defined therein,
affidavits of their respective witnesses, as a consequence of together with a brief statement of their petitions setting
which, defendant's right to due process was violated." forth the law and the facts relied upon by them.
RTC affirmed the appealed decision. However, it was reversed by There was no order issued to that effect nor was there any
the CA, which ordered the remand of the case to the MTC for indication of when the position papers were to be submitted for the
further proceedings. purpose of discussing the factual questioning raised.
Petitioner contends that the CA erred in ruling that: Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly
(1) the failure of the MTC to give the private respondent the administration of justice and the protection of substantive rights in
opportunity to submit its position paper and/or affidavit of witnesses judicial and extra-judicial proceedings. It is a mistake to suppose
constituted a denial of due process; that substantive law and adjective law are contradictory to each
(2) the questions raised were not only questions of law because other. Observance of both substantive and procedural rights is
the answer contained a counterclaim for reimbursement of equally guaranteed by due process, whatever the source of such
improvements allegedly made by the lessee on the premises, and rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.
damages; and

Lucas vs. Fabros, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1226, Jan. 31, 2000 "SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following pleadings,
motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule.
FACTS: (c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening
of trial.
Gloria Lucas charged respondent, Judge Amelia A. Fabros of
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 9, Manila, with Gross This rule, however, applies only where the judgment sought to
Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Discretion relative to be reconsidered is one rendered on the merits. As held by the Court in
Civil Case No. 151248 entitled "Editha F. Gacad, represented an earlier case involving Sec. 15 (c) of the Rules on Summary Procedure,
by Elenita F. Castelo vs. Gloria Lucas, for Ejectment". J later Sec. 19 (c) of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure effective
November 15, 1991: "The motion prohibited by this Section is that
which seeks reconsideration of the judgment rendered by the court
Lucas was the defendant in Ejectment case, alleged
after trial on the merits of the case. Here, the order of dismissal issued by
that Judge Amelia A. Fabros issued an Order granting
respondent judge due to failure of a party to appear during the preliminary
the plaintiffs motion for reconsideration of the her
conference is obviously not a judgment on the merits after trial of the case.
previous order which dismissed the case for failure of
Hence, a motion for the reconsideration of such order is not the prohibited
plaintiff and her counsel to appear at the Preliminary
pleading contemplated under Section 19 (c) of the present Rule on
Conference.
Summary Procedure. Thus, respondent judge committed no grave abuse of
Lucas averred that it is elementary, under Section 19
discretion, nor is she guilty of ignorance of the law, in giving due course to
(c) of the Rules of Summary Procedure, that MR is
the motion for reconsideration subject of the present complaint. Esmsc
prohibited, but respondent judge, in violation of the
rule, granted. She added that, notwithstanding the
fact that the respondent herself had pointed out in [G.R. No. 141614. August 14, 2002]
open court that the case is governed by the Rules on TERESITA BONGATO, petitioner, vs. Spouses SEVERO A. MALVAR
Summary Procedure,the judge ordered the revival of and TRINIDAD MALVAR, respondents.
the case out of malice, partiality and with intent to
cause an injury to complainant.
JUDGE FABROS admitted that she granted the
FACTS:
motion for reconsideration even if the same is a
prohibited motion in an ejectment case in the interest
of justice. MTCC
The Office of the Court Administrator recommended The spouses Severo and Trinidad Malvar filed a complaint for
that respondent judge be fined in the amount of forcible entry against petitioner Teresita Bongato, alleging that
P2,000.00 for grave abuse of discretion. petitioner Bongato unlawfully entered a parcel of land belonging to
the said spouses and erected thereon a house of light materials.
Petitioner filed a motion for extension of time to file an answer
RULLING: As a rule, a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading
which the MTCC denied - being proscribed under the Rule on
under Section 19 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Thus,
Summary Procedure, and likewise containing no notice of
hearing.

Petitioner filed an answer -disregarded having been filed beyond CA
the ten-day reglementary period. Lot referred to in the present controversy was different from that
Petitoners motion to dismiss - denied as being contrary to the involved in the anti-squatting case.
Rule on Summary Procedure. It ruled that MTCC had jurisdiction, and that it did not err in
Ordered petitioner to vacate the land in question, and to pay rejecting petitioners Motion to Dismiss. The appellate court
rentals, attorneys fees, and the costs of the suit. reasoned that the MTCC had passed upon the issue of ownership
of the property merely to determine possession -- an action that did
not oust the latter of its jurisdiction.
RTC
The decision was affirmed by respondent RTC judge.
Petitioners MFR - GRANTED only insofar as to determine the ISSUE: WON CA gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the Motion to
location of the houses involved in this civil case so that the Court Dismiss was a prohibited pleading
will know whether they are located on one and the same lot or a lot
different from that involved in the criminal case for Anti-
Squatting. In the same order, respondent Judge disallowed any SC - Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
extension and warned that if the survey is not made, the court The Petition is meritorious.
might consider the same abandoned and the writ of execution
would be issued.
Forcible entry is a quieting process, and that the restrictive time bar
is prescribed to complement the summary nature of such
process. Indeed, the one-year period within which to bring an action for
The criminal case for anti-squatting (Crim. Case No. 4659) was filed by forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the
private respondents Malvar against petitioner Bongato. The case is still land. However, when entry is made through stealth, then the one-year
pending with the Regional Trial Court, Branch I, Butuan City. period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned about it. After the lapse
of the one-year period, the party dispossessed of a parcel of land may file
Petitioner filed a motion for extension of the March 29, 1994 either an accion publiciana, which is a plenary action to recover the right of
deadline for the submission of the relocation survey and to possession; or an accion reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover
move the deadline to April 15, 1994, as the engineer concerned ownership as well as possession.
could not conduct his survey during the Holy Week (*take
note) On the basis of the foregoing facts, it is clear that the cause of action
Respondent Judge noted that no survey report was submitted and for forcible entry filed by respondents had already prescribed when they filed
ordered the record of the case returned to the court of origin for the Complaint for ejectment on July 10, 1992. Hence, even if Severo Malvar
disposal. may be the owner of the land, possession thereof cannot be wrested through
a summary action for ejectment of petitioner, who had been occupying it for
more than one (1) year. Respondents should have presented their suit
before the RTC in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not
before the MTCC in summary proceedings for forcible entry. Their
cause of action for forcible entry had prescribed already, and the
MTCC had no more jurisdiction to hear and decide it.

A courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived by the
parties or cured by their silence, acquiescence or even express consent. A
A motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject
party may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of
matter is NOT a prohibited pleading, but is allowed under Sec. 19(a) of
the proceedings and even on appeal. That the MTCC can take cognizance
the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
of a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, even if an answer
has been belatedly filed we likewise held in Bayog v. Natino:
The Rule on Summary Procedure was promulgated specifically to achieve The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, as well as its predecessor, do
an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases. The speedy
not provide that an answer filed after the reglementary period should be
resolution of unlawful detainer cases is a matter of public policy, and
expunged from the records. As a matter of fact, there is no provision for an
the Rule should equally apply with full force to forcible entry cases, in entry of default if a defendant fails to answer. It must likewise be pointed
which possession of the premises is already illegal from the start. For out that MAGDATOs defense of lack of jurisdiction may have even
this reason, the Rule frowns upon delays and prohibits altogether the filing of been raised in a motion to dismiss as an exception to the rule on
motions for extension of time. Consistently, Section 6 was added to give the prohibited pleadings in the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Such
trial court the power to render judgment, even motu proprio, upon the a motion is allowed under paragraph (a) thereof, x x x.
failure of a defendant to file an answer within the reglementary
period. However, as forcible entry and detainer cases are summary in
In the case at bar, the MTCC should have squarely ruled on the issue
nature and involve disturbances of the social order, procedural
of jurisdiction, instead of erroneously holding that it was a prohibited
technicalities should be carefully avoided and should not be allowed to
pleading under the Rule on Summary Procedure Because the Complaint for
override substantial justice.
forcible entry was filed on July 10, 1992, the 1991 Revised Rule on
Pursuant to Section 36 of BP 129, the Court on June 16, 1983, promulgated Summary Procedure was applicable.
the Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases. Under this Rule, a
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1429. October 4, 2002.*
motion to dismiss or quash is a prohibited pleading. Under the 1991
FRANCISCA P. PASCUAL, complainant, vs. Judge EDUARDO U.
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, however, a motion to dismiss on
JOVELLANOS, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Alcala, Pangasinan,
the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is an
respondent.
exception to the rule on prohibited pleadings:
Facts
SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following pleadings,
motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule: ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross Ignorance of the
Law, Bias and Partiality, Abuse of Discretion and Neglect of Duty.
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the
complaint or information except on the ground Complainant filed a complaint for forcible entry against a certain Lorenzo L.
of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, Manaois. The complaint was dismissed without prejudice for being
or failure to comply with the preceding section; insufficient in some material allegations, so she filed a corrected complaint.
xxx xxx x x x Instead of filing an answer, defendant filed a Motion to Strike Out arguing
that the new allegations in the complaint are false. After the period to answer

lapsed and no answer was submitted, complainant filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment. Defendant opposed the motion. Instead of obeying the TRO, defendant continued with the construction of
the building and even started with a new one.
Defendants motion to strike out was granted by respondent Judge. Hence, a contempt charge was filed by herein complainant.
Complainant filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order. Defendant moved to dismiss the contempt charge
on the ground that it was filed in the same proceedings and the
Based on the foregoing, complainant accused respondent Judge of Neglect filing fee was not paid.
of Duty anchored on the following grounds: The court motu proprio docketed the complaint for contempt as
Civil Case No. 744
Defendant should have filed an answer instead of a Motion to Strike the required docket and other fees were paid by defendant.
Out. Inspite thereof, respondent Judge granted the motion 120 days after its On same date, the court issued an Order furnishing anew the
filing, thus defeating the summary nature of the case; defendants/respondents with a copy of the contempt charge.
The Order granting the motion to strike out is bereft of any findings These, complainant claims, cured the defect cited by
of fact because no hearing was conducted relative thereon; defendants/respondents in their motion to dismiss.
Respondent Judge exhibited his bias and partiality in favor of the Respondent Judge still has not resolved the aforesaid motion to the
defendant in his Order granting the motion to strike out when he pointed out prejudice of herein complainant.
x x x that the complaint in this case is virtually a rehash of the complaint in
Civil Case No. 730 x x x. Complainant asserts that the same is to be In his Comment, respondent denied the allegations in the Complaint he said:
expected because the defects or insufficiency in the first complaint were just Atty. Alejandro V. Peregrino, complainants counsel in the forcible
being rectified in the later one; entry case, of having a penchant for filing administrative cases
Her Motion for Summary Judgment remains, until the present, against him instead of appealing decisions before the proper court.
unacted upon. None of the charges had any factual or legal bases.
His Decision in Civil Case No. 730 had been rendered with utmost
Defendant, taking advantage of the lull in the proceedings, started the good faith, honesty and sound discretion.
construction of a one-storey building on the subject land.
The OCAs Recommendation
To protect her interest, complainant filed an Application for Preliminary
Injunction. Acting thereon, respondent Judge issued a Temporary After investigation of this case, the OCA found that:
Restraining Order and set the hearing on the Injunction. On said date, Respondent failed to apply the Rule on Summary Procedure, which
complainant was able to present evidence in support of her application while he ought to have been very conversant with, because it was a
defendant chose not to present controverting evidence and to just submit a common procedure in municipal courts.
memorandum. Accordingly, it recommended that respondent be FINED in the
amount of P10,000.00 and warned that the commission of a similar
On the last day of the effectivity of the TRO, complainant filed an Extremely infraction will be dealt with more severely.
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to grant her application for injunction. Defendant
filed his memorandum. However, until the present, respondent Judge has Ruling
not ruled on her application on preliminary injunction.
We agree with the findings of the OCA, but increase the penalty, taking note

that this is respondents second infraction. Judges, when burdened by heavy caseloads that prevent them
from deciding cases within the reglementary period, may ask for additional
The Rules on Summary Procedure was promulgated precisely to achieve an time from this Court.
expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases. Failure to observe the Respondent has failed to do so. He ought to know that the speedy
period within which to render a judgment subjects the defaulting judge to resolution of forcible entry cases is a matter of public policy.
administrative sanctions. For this reason, the Rule frowns upon delays and His inaction for almost three years on complainants Motion for
expressly prohibits, altogether, the filing of motions for extension. Summary Judgment practically rendered nugatory the whole purpose of
summary proceedingsto promote a more expeditious and inexpensive
In this case, it is very clear that respondent lacks awareness of the relevant determination of cases.
provisions on ejectment. He has evidently been remiss in resolving the By tarrying too long in deciding this forcible entry case, he failed to
forcible entry case, pursuant to the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. live up to the mandate of the Code of Judicial Conduct to maintain
judgment should have been rendered based on the allegations of professional competence.
the Complaint and the evidence presented therein, inasmuch as the
defendant failed to file his answer after the lapse of ten (10) days from the WHEREFORE, Judge Eduardo Jovellanos is hereby found GUILTY of gross
service of the summons. ignorance of the law and is FINED in the amount of fifteen thousand pesos
Section 6 of the Rule allows the trial court to render judgment, (P15,000). He is further warned that a repetition of this or similar offenses
even motu proprio, upon failure of the defendant to file an answer within the will be dealt with even more severely.
reglementary period. SO ORDERED.
under Section 10 of the Rule, respondent was duty-bound to render
his decision within thirty (30) days from receipt of the last affidavits and A. M. No. MTJ-05-1610 September 26, 2005
position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing them.
This notwithstanding, he has not yet ruled on the Motion for DR. JOSE S. LUNA, Complainants,
Summary Judgment, filed in accordance with Section 6 of the Rules on vs.
Summary Procedure. JUDGE EDUARDO H. MIRAFUENTE, Municipal Trial Court, Buenavista,
Marinduque, Respondent.
Lack of knowledge of the Rules on Summary Procedure reflects a serious
degree of incompetence. When the law is so elementary, as in this case, not
RULING: RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN ADMITTING THE BELATED
to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. A member of the
ANSWER OF THE DEFENDANTS, SHOULD HAVE BEEN
bench must be constantly abreast of legal and jurisprudential developments,
FILED WITHIN 10 DAYS FROM THE SERVICE OF
bearing in mind that this learning process never ceases. It is indispensable
SUMMONS.
to the correct dispensation of justice.
Respondent claimed that if there was any delay on his part in resolving the FACTS:
incidents, it was not intentional but merely brought about by pressure from
work. ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT AGAINST RESPONDENT
JUDGE FOR VIOLATION OF RRSP.
In the present case, the heavy caseload in respondents sala, though MTC BUENAVISTA MARINDUQUE: PETITIONER: UNLAWFUL
unfortunate, cannot excuse him from due observance of the rules. DETAINER.

o In May 2003, Dr. Luna filed a complaint for unlawful ISSUE: WHETHER RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN ADMITTING THE
detainer, against Florencio Sadiwa and Alex Sadiwa (the BELATED ANSWER OF DEFENDANTS.
defendants) with the Municipal Trial Court of Buenavista,
Marinduque presided by respondent. HELD: YES.
o The defendants filed an unverified answer to the
complaint, seven (7) days beyond the reglementary period
Delay in the disposition of cases undermines the peoples faith and
of ten (10) days from the service of the summons on them.
confidence in the judiciary.
PETITIONER: MOTION FOR JUDGMENT.
Hence, judges are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch.
GROUND: SECTION 6 OF RRSP.
Such a requirement is especially demanded in forcible entry and
DENIED. unlawful detainer cases.
M.R. ALSO DENIED. For forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases involve perturbation
o Dr. Lunas counsel filed a Motion for Judgment, invoking of social order, which must be restored as promptly as possible,
Section 6 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, to such that technicalities or details of procedure which may cause
which motion the defendants did not file any opposition. unnecessary delays should carefully be avoided.
o By Order of August 28, 2003 respondent denied the
That explains why the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure which
motion.
governs ejectment, among other cases, lays down procedural
safeguards to guarantee expediency and speedy resolution.
Hence, arose the present administrative complaint against
respondent, Dr. Luna asserting that as the defendants answer was Sections 5 and 6 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure provide:
unverified and belatedly filed, respondent should have motu
proprio or on motion of the plaintiffs rendered judgment as
Sec. 5. Answer. Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the
warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint, following
defendant shall file his answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on
Section 6 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
the plaintiff. xxx
In his Comment respondent explains that his admission of the
defendants unverified, belatedly filed answer was premised on "the
spirit of justice and fair play, which underlie[s] every court litigation Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. Should the defendant fail to answer
and serves as the bedrock to preserve the trust and faith of parties the complaint within the period above provided, the court, motu
litigants in the judicial system;" proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be
warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is
That the admission was proper because the delay was negligible, it
prayed for therein: Provided, however, That the court may in its discretion
involving only four (4) days as June 13 to 15, 2003 were non-
reduce the amount of damages and attorneys fees claimed for being
working holidays (per presidential proclamation in connection with
excessive or otherwise unconscionable. This is without prejudice to the
the Independence Day celebration);
applicability of Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, if there are two or
That the defendants might have believed that the period to file
more defendants.
answer was 15 days, which is the usual or common period to file an
answer; and that the delay was also excusable as defendants acted
pro se, without the benefit of legal assistance, and not dilatory. The word "shall" in the above-quoted sections of the 1991 Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure underscores their mandatory
character.

Giving the provisions a directory application would subvert the After summons and a copy of the complaint were served,
nature of the Rule and defeat its objective of expediting the Macalinao failed to file her answer. BPI moved for a judgment
adjudication of the suits covered thereby. pursuant to Sec6 of the Rules of Summary Procedures.
To admit a late answer is to put a premium on dilatory MTC ruled in favor of BPI ordering Macalinao to pay P141,518.34
maneuvers the very mischief that the Rule seeks to redress. plus 2% per month penalty from Jan. 5, 2004.
In the present case, respondent gave a liberal interpretation of the Macalinao appealed before the RTC. RTC affirmed the decision in
above-said Rule. toto.
Liberal interpretation or construction of the law or rules, however, is She then filed a petition for review with the CA. CA affirmed but
not a free commodity that may be availed of in all instances under with modification, reducing the amount to P126,706.70 plus 3%
the cloak of rendering justice. penalty charge from Jan. 5,2004. She filed a MR, but was denied.
Liberality in the interpretation and application of Rules applies only Macalinao filed the instant case, arguing that the CA erred in using
in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. the P94,843.70 as basis of the recomputation and should have
While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is dismissed the case for failure of BPI to prove the exact amount of
equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with her obligation.
the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy Issues:
administration of justice. W/N the interest and penalty charges of 3% per month were unconscionable
and iniquitous.
W/N the complaint should be dismissed or remand it to the lower court for
failure of respondent to prove the exact amount of the obligation.
Held:
Macalinao v BPI
Petitioners contend that neither they nor the private respondent Jaime
Facts: Blanco reside in Pasay City. This fact is, however, irrelevant to the resolution
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the of the issue in this case since parties do stipulate concerning the venue of
decision of CA denying Macalinaos MR an action without regard to their residence.
Macalinao was an approved cardholder of BPI Mastercard, and as
such made some purchases through the use of the said card. Petitioners claim that their cause of action is not based on the lease contract
because it seeks neither its implementation nor its the cancellation.
She subsequently received a letter from BPI demanding payment of
P141,518.34 including the 3% interest per month and an additional Petitioners' action is for alleged breach of the lease contract which, it is
11
penalty of 3% per month for a delay in payment under the terms contended, was terminated to spite them. Petitioners view this act of
respondents as an abuse of right under arts. 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil
governing its issuance.
Code, warranting an award of damages. Their cause of action is ultimately
The BPI filed a complaint for sum of money with MTC Makati for
anchored on their right under the lease contract and, therefore, they cannot
failure to settle its obligation and prayed for payment of
avoid the limitation as to the venue in that contract.
P154,608.78 inclusive of 3.25% finance charges and 6% late
payment charges plus 25% attorneys fees.
The contention of the petitioner that the dismissal of their case based on
improper venue is a mere technicality and should not be sustained was

without merit, where the court said that procedural rules are required to be o Petitioners filed with the RTC a motion to dismiss the
followed except only for the most persuasive reasons. Therefore, Petitioners appeal of respondents, on the ground that the order was
must abide by their agreement. not yet final and that it is not appealable. DENIED. MR
was also denied.
PETITION DENIED Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari, alleging that the RTC
acted with grave abuse of discretion on denying their motion to
Azucena Go and Regena Gloria Siong dismiss the appeal. (Kasi yung respondents nag file ng motion to
vs. appeal dun sa pag suspend ng ejectment case.)
Court of Appeals and Star Group Resources and Development Inc. Respondent filed with the RTC a motion to resume proceedings in
the ejectment case.
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside and reverse the o RTC granted this motion and directed the remand of the
consolidated decision of the CA, which disallowed the suspension of the records of the case to the MTCC.
ejectment proceedings. o Petitioners filed MR and Clarification. DENIED.
Petitioners filed a petition for review in the CA. Alleged therein was
(An appeal was entertained by the RTC and CA despite the fact that it is not the issue that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
allowed by the Rules of Court and Summary Procedure. In the defense of granted the motion to resume proceedings in the MTCC. (Badtrip
the RTC and CA, there was a procedural void wherein walang magiging yung petitioners kasi natuloy yung ejectment case, diba nga sila
remedy si respondent at baka tumagal ng tumagal ang kaso niya. Sabi ni yung nagpatawag ng suspension nun?)
SC, sige okay lang, because if strict compliance with rules will result in o CA issued a TRO, enjoining RTC from further proceeding
injustice then the rules may be relaxed. Kawawa naman kasi si respondent with the case. After the TRO lapsed, the RTC remanded
kapag suspended yung case niya tapos di niya alam kung kalian matutuloy the records to the MTCC.
ito.) Petitioners filed a motion to hold in abeyance further proceedings,
with the MTCC. DENIED. MR also DENIED.
FACTS: (Malabo itong kaso na ito, Im trying my best to deliver the best Petitioners filed a motion for an injunction and ordered respondents
digest possible) to refrain from continuing the ejectment case in the MTCC until the
Respondent filed with the MTCC of Iloilo an ejectment case against specific performance case has been disposed of. (MTCC =
the petitioners. Ejectment Case; RTC = Specific Performance)
o Upon motion of the petitioners, Court issued an order Court of Appeals: Recognizing that there is a procedural void in
holding in abeyance the preliminary conference of the the Rules on Summary Procedure, CA sustained the
ejectment case until after the case for specific correctness of an appeal as a remedy to challenge the
performance, involving the same parties shall be suspension of the Ejectment Suit by the MTCC.
decided upon by the RTC of Iloilo. In short, the case for o Purpose of the Rules on Summary Procedure is to
Ejectment will be indefinitely be suspended. (Before achieve expeditious and inexpensive determination of
the ejectment case kasi, there was a specific performance cases with regard to technical rules.
case filed by the same parties, ito naman sa RTC, yung o The prohibition against petitions for certiorari involving
ejectment sa MTCC.) interlocutory orders was included to forestall useless
o An appeal was filed by respondents questioning the petitions and to avoid delays.
order of the court. The appeal was assigned to the RTC.

o The inaction on the MTCCs order of suspension due to Under an extraordinary circumstance of having to suffer a procedural void,
the procedural void will defeat rather than promote the the court is forced to provide a remedy consistent with the objective of
speedy disposition of cases. speedy resolution of cases.
While technicalities have their uses, resort to
them should not be encouraged when they serve As held by the CA, the purpose of the Rules on Summary Procedure is to
only to impere the speedy and just resolution of achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases without
the case. regard to technical rules. In this case, however respondent challenged the
Petitioners elevated the case to the SC. MTCC order delaying the ejectment suit to avoid mischief that may emanate
therefrom.
ISSUE:
SC hold that in situation where summary proceeding is indefinitely
Whether the CA erred in allowing the appeal of an interlocutory suspended, a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion may be
order? allowed. Respondents, herein, filed an appeal questioning the interlocutory
order. This move of the respondents was upheld by the CA and RTC to fill a
RULING: procedural void. SC affirms this ruling. The said appeal should be treated
as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
The petition is devoid of merit.
The court said that whenever a procedural void exists, no remedy is
In affirming the ruling of the RTC, the CA noted that there was a sanctioned by law. The court is empowered to promulgate rules according to
procedural void in the summary proceedings in the MTCC. Section 5, Article 8 of the 1987 Constitution, categorically rules of procedure.
(Respondent will not have a remedy based from the procedural rules.) The courts are even onligated to suspend the operation of the rules when a
rule deserts its proper office as an aid to justice that it frustrates rather than
(Summary ng facts na napakalabo) MTCC suspended the preliminary
promote substantial justice. The power of the court to suspend its own rules
conference of the Ejectment suit, upon motion of the petitioners, until the
or to except a particular case from their operations whenever the purposes
termination of the pending Specific Performance suit involving the same
of justice require it, cannot be questioned.
parties. Respondents appealed to the RTC. Petitioners filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal, on the ground that it was an interlocutory order and not
subject to an appeal.
Court said, the order that was subjected to the appeal was interlocutory,
Rule 6 Kinds of Pleadings
because it does not dispose of the case but leaves something else to be
done by the trial court on the merits of the case. It is obvious that an
Buncayao vs. Fort Ilocandia Property, G.R. No. 170483, Apr. 19, 2010
interlocutory order cannot be challenged by an appeal. The proper remedy is
an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment on the merits, incorporating
FACTS:
the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order.
Manuel C. Bungcayao, Sr. (petitioner) claimed to be one of the
Clearly private respondent cannot appeal the order. But neither can it file a two entrepreneurs who introduced improvements on the
petition for certiorari, because the ejectment suit falls under the Revised foreshore area of Calayab Beach in 1978 when Fort Ilocandia
Rules on Summary Procedure, Section 19 (g), which considers petitions for Hotel started its construction in the area and later formed
certiorari as a prohibited pleading.

themselves into the DSierto Beach Resort Owners Deed of Assignment, Release, Waiver and Quitclaim1 in favor
Association, Inc. (DSierto) of respondent.
6 parcels of land in Barrio Balacad (now Calayad) where the resort
situated were transferred to the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) Petitioner then filed an action for declaration of nullity of contract
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1704 before the RTC- Laoag against respondent alleging that his son
Petitioner and other DSierto members applied for a foreshore lease with had no authority to represent him and that the deed was void and
the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) not binding upon him. The issue raised by petitioner was his claim
and was granted a provisional permit. for damages while respondents issue was only his claim for
Fort Ilocandia Property Holdings and Development Corporation possession of the property occupied by petitioner and damages.
(respondent) filed a foreshore application over a 14-hectare area abutting
the Fort Ilocandia Property, including the 5-hectare portion applied for by
RTC Dismissed the claim of plaintiff for and granted the
DSierto members.
counterclaim of the defendant for recovery of possession
DENR Regional Executive Director denied the foreshore lease of the lot occupied by the plaintiff.
applications of the DSierto members, including petitioner, on
Pet went on appeal to CA-affirmed RTC, Hence, petition
the ground that the subject area applied for fell either within the
was filed in SC.
titled property or within the foreshore areas applied for by
respondent.
ISSUE: Whether respondents counterclaim is compulsory?
The DSierto members appealed the denial of their applications-
DENR Secretary denied the appeal on the ground that the area
applied for encroached on the titled property of respondent based on RULLING:
the final verification plan.
Respondent, through its Public Relations Manager invited the A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or any
DSierto to discuss common details beneficial to all parties relief, which a defending party may have against an opposing party,
concerned. Atty. Liza Marcos (Atty. Marcos), wife of Governor which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily connected,
Bongbong Marcos, was asked by Fort Ilocandia hotel officials with, the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
to mediate over the conflict among the parties. Atty. Marcos the plaintiffs complaint. It is compulsory in the sense that it is within
offered P300,000 as financial settlement per claimant in the jurisdiction of the court, does not require for its adjudication the
consideration of the improvements introduced, on the condition presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire
that they would vacate the area identified as respondents jurisdiction, and will be barred in the future if not set up in the answer
property. A DSierto member made a counter-offer of to the complaint in the same case. Any other counterclaim is
P400,000, to which the other DSierto members agreed. permissive.
Petitioner alleged that his son, Manuel Bungcayao, Jr., who

attended the meeting, manifested that he still had to consult his
parents about the offer but upon the undue pressure exerted
by Atty. Marcos, he accepted the payment and signed the

The Court has ruled that the compelling test of compulsoriness The rule in permissive counterclaim is that for the trial court to
characterizes a counterclaim as compulsory if there should exist a logical acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the
relationship between the main claim and the counterclaim. The Court further prescribed docket fees. Any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a
ruled that there exists such a relationship when conducting separate trials of total nullity and may be struck down at any time, even on appeal before
the respective claims of the parties would entail substantial duplication of this Court. In this case, respondent did not dispute the non-payment of
time and effort by the parties and the court; when the multiple claims involve docket fees. Respondent only insisted that its claims were all compulsory
the same factual and legal issues; or when the claims are offshoots of the counterclaims. As such, the judgment by the trial court in relation to the
same basic controversy between the parties. second counterclaim is considered null and void without prejudice to a
separate action which respondent may file against petitioner.
The criteria to determine whether the counterclaim is compulsory or
permissive are as follows: Therefore, SC DISMISS respondents permissive counterclaim without
prejudice to filing a separate action against petitioner.
(a) Are issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by
the counterclaim largely the same? G.R. Nos. 158090 October 4, 2010
(b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on
defendants claim, absent the compulsory rule? GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), Petitioner,
(c) Will substantially the same evidence support or vs.
refute plaintiffs claim as well as defendants counterclaim? HEIRS OF FERNANDO F. CABALLERO, represented by his daughter,
(d) Is there any logical relations between the claim JOCELYN G. CABALLERO,Respondents.
and the counterclaim?
FACTS:
A positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the
counterclaim is compulsory. In this case, Respondent filed three On March 7, 1968, Respondent Fernando C. Caballero (Fernando) and his
counterclaims. The first was for recovery of the P400,000 given to Manuel, wife, Sylvia Caballero, secured a loan from petitioner GSIS in the amount
Jr.; the second was for recovery of possession of the subject property; and of P20,000.00. Fernando and his wife likewise executed a real estate
the third was for damages. The first counterclaim was rendered moot with mortgage on the same date, mortgaging a residential lot situated at Rizal
the issuance of the 6 November 2003 Order confirming the agreement of the Street, Mlang, Cotabato as security.
parties to cancel the Deed of Assignment, Release, Waiver and Quitclaim
and to return the P400,000 to respondent. Respondent waived and
Fernando defaulted on the payment of his loan with the GSIS. Hence, the
renounced the third counterclaim for damages. The only counterclaim that
subject property was foreclosed, and was sold at a public auction where the
remained was for the recovery of possession of the subject property.
petitioner was the only bidder.
While this counterclaim was an offshoot of the same basic controversy
between the parties, it is very clear that it will not be barred if not set up in
the answer to the complaint in the same case. Respondents second For failure of Fernando to redeem the said property within the designated
counterclaim, contrary to the findings of the trial court and the Court of period, petitioner executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a
Appeals, is only a permissive counterclaim. It is not a compulsory new TCT was issued in the name of petitioner.
counterclaim. It is capable of proceeding independently of the main
case.

On January 16, 1989, petitioner scheduled the subject property for public counterclaim which required the payment by gsis of docket fees before
bidding. On the scheduled date of bidding, Fernando's daughter, Jocelyn the trial court can acquire jurisdiction over said counterclaim.
Caballero, submitted a bid in the amount of P350,000.00 but since CMTC
was the highest bidder (P450,000) it was awarded the subject property. A An Ex Parte Motion for Substitution of Party was filed by the
new TCT was issued in the name of CMTC. surviving heirs of Fernando, who died on February 12, 2002.
RTC of Kabacan, Cotabato SC - petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45

Fernando, represented by his daughter and attorney-in-fact,
Jocelyn Caballero filed a case against CMTC, the GSIS and its The petition of the GSIS seeks the review of the CA's Decision insofar as it
responsible officers. deleted the trial court's award of P249,800.00 in its favor representing
Fernando alleged that there were irregularities in the conduct rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC.
of the bidding.
Petitioner and its officers filed their Answer with Affirmative Going now to the first assigned error, petitioner submits that its counterclaim
Defenses and Counterclaim. The GSIS alleged that Fernando lost for the rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC is in the nature of a
his right of redemption. He was given the chance to repurchase the compulsory counterclaim in the original action of Fernando against
property; however, he did not avail of such option compelling the petitioner for annulment of bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT No.
GSIS to dispose of the property by public bidding as mandated by 76183. Respondents, on the other hand, alleged that petitioner's
law. counterclaim is permissive and its failure to pay the prescribed docket
In its counterclaim, petitioner alleged that Fernando owed petitioner fees results into the dismissal of its claim.
the sum of P130,365.81, representing back rentals, including
additional interests from January 1973 to February 1987, and the
To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, the Court has
additional amount of P249,800.00, excluding applicable interests,
devised the following tests:
representing rentals Fernando unlawfully collected from Carmelita
Ang Hao from January 1973 to February 1988.
TC dismissed the complaint and granted petitioner's counterclaim; (a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the
MFR denied counterclaim largely the same?
(b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claims,
CA absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
respondent filed a Notice of Appeal (c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs
affirmed RTC with the modification that the portion of the judgment claim as well as the defendants counterclaim? and
ordering Fernando to pay rentals in the amount of P249,800.00, in (d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the
favor of petitioner, be deleted. counterclaim? A positive answer to all four questions would indicate
Petitioner filed MFR - denied that the counterclaim is compulsory
Petitioner's counterclaim for the recovery of the amount representing rentals

ISSUE: WON CA committed an error of law in holding that GSIS' collected by Fernando from the CMTC is permissive. The evidence needed
counterclaim, among others, of p249,800.00 representing rentals collected by Fernando to cause the annulment of the bid award, deed of absolute sale
by private respondent from CMRC is in the nature of a permissive

and TCT is different from that required to establish petitioner's claim for the In said case, the Court ruled that:
recovery of rentals.
The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our
The issue in the main action, i.e., the nullity or validity of the bid award, deed government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to
of absolute sale and TCT in favor of CMTC, is entirely different from the promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole
issue in the counterclaim, i.e., whether petitioner is entitled to receive the province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this
CMTC's rent payments over the subject property when petitioner became prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal,
the owner of the subject property by virtue of the consolidation of ownership alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by this Court.
of the property in its favor. Viewed from this perspective, the claim of a legislative grant of
exemption from the payment of legal fees under Section 39 of RA 8291
The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court to acquire necessarily fails.
jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket
fees. This, petitioner did not do, because it asserted that its claim for Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the
the collection of rental payments was a compulsory counterclaim. payment of legal fees without transgressing another equally important
Since petitioner failed to pay the docket fees, the RTC did not acquire institutional safeguard of the Court's independence fiscal autonomy. Fiscal
jurisdiction over its permissive counterclaim. The judgment rendered autonomy recognizes the power and authority of the Court to levy, assess
by the RTC, insofar as it ordered Fernando to pay petitioner the rentals and collect fees, including legal fees. Moreover, legal fees under Rule 141
which he collected from CMTC, is considered null and void. Any have two basic components, the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the
decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF). The laws which
struck down at any time, even on appeal before this Court. established the JDF and the SAJF expressly declare the identical purpose of
these funds to "guarantee the independence of the Judiciary as mandated
Petitioner further argues that assuming that its counterclaim is permissive, by the Constitution and public policy." Legal fees therefore do not only
the trial court has jurisdiction to try and decide the same, considering constitute a vital source of the Court's financial resources but also comprise
petitioner's exemption from all kinds of fees. an essential element of the Court's fiscal independence.
In In Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government No. L-28466. March 27, 1971.
Service Insurance System from Payment of Legal Fees, the Court ruled that
the provision in the Charter of the GSIS, i.e., Section 39 of Republic Act No. ALBERTO T. REYES, SATURNINO LIWANAG AND LORENZO
8291, which exempts it from "all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties HERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND
of all kinds," CANNOT operate to exempt it from the payment of legal TEODORO KALAW, JR. respondents.
fees. This was because, unlike the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, which
Facts
empowered Congress to repeal, alter or supplement the rules of the
Supreme Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, the 1987 Appeal by petitioners-plaintiffs from the decision of the Court of Appeals
Constitution removed this power from Congress. Hence, the Supreme affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Court now has the sole authority to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts. Plaintiffs-appellants are lessees of defendants premises located in Manila,
where they also conduct their respective businesses. The lease was oral

and on a month-to-month basis. Plaintiffs have been occupying the premises modification that plaintiffs should also pay to defendant Kalaw the sum of
for a period of from 10 to 15 years as of the filing of the complaint. P50,000.00 as temperate damages.
Defendant started sending out to each of said plaintiffs notices to Ruling

vacate the premises to give way for the demolition of the old
building occupied by them and the eventual construction of a new We must call attention to the fact that the rules, which have the force of law,
one. provide the manner and occasion when issues are to be raised for
Each of the said notices gave plaintiffs a period of time within which adjudication. If the rules were to be ignored and We permit litigants to raise
to move out. issues without order and regulation, confusion would arise. This would
The last notice gave said plaintiffs 24 hours within which to vacate certainly happen were we to allow the issues the defendant raised in his
the premises. answer in the Court of First Instance. The defendant-appellant is not
precluded from raising his counterclaim in a separate action if he decides to
do so. But in view of the fact that the trial in the Court of First Instance in an
Defendant started the demolition of the roofing and upper sidings of the appeal is merely a trial de novo, We are constrained to dismiss the
building and also the fencing thereof, although the demolition of the back counterclaims in pursuance of the dictates and mandate of the rules.
portion actually started earlier. (Emphasis supplied)
City Court While said damages arose out of, or are necessarily connected with, the
same transaction or occurrence which was the wrongful withholding of
Plaintiffs filed a complaint for forcible entry with the City Court against possession, they are not a compulsory counterclaim because they exceed
defendant, praying, among others, for a writ of preliminary injunction (which the jurisdiction of the inferior court.
was granted) and damages.
Decision affirmed with modification
The defendant counterclaimed for ejectment and damages for alleged loss
of the use and occupation of his premises. INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
The City Court rendered its decision in favor of plaintiffs THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL,
Presiding Judge of Branch IX, Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Defendants counterclaim for want of merit is hereby dismissed. Judicial Region, C.F. SHARP, INC. and FIRST INTEGRATED BONDING
& INSURANCE CO., INC., respondents
CFI
RULING: PETITIONERS COUNTERCLAIM WAS COMPULSORY,
Defendant appealed the aforesaid decision to the Court of First Instance. In
THEREFORE THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT WITHOUT
a decision, later amended, the said Court dismissed the complaint and all
ITS OBJECTION ALSO DISMISSES THE COUNTERCLAIM,
claims and counterclaims, among others.
BEING AN ANCILLIARY ACTION.
CA
FACTS:
Both, parties appealed to the Court of Appeals which, in turn, rendered its RTC MANILA: SHARP: PROHIBITION WITH WPI.
decision, affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance, with the sole

o On February 10, 1988, Sharp, Inc., the herein private o Judge dismissed the complaint as well as the
respondent filed a complaint for prohibition with prayer for counterclaim.
preliminary injunction against the Secretary of ICTSI: M.R. INSOFAR AS IT DISMISSED ITS COUNTERCLAIM.
Transportation and Communications, the Philippine Ports o CCTSI filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
Authority (PPA), E. Razon, Inc., and the International insofar as it dismissed its counterclaim.
Container Terminal Services Inc., the herein petitioner. o Meanwhile, it gave notice to the First Integrated Bonding
o The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 88-43616 and Insurance Co., Inc. that it was claiming damages
in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9. against Sharp for the revoked injunction.
RTC: GRANTED WPI. M.R. DENIED.
o On March 7, 1988, the trial court issued a writ of o The trial court declared in part:
preliminary injunction upon the posting by Sharp of a bond
issued by the Integrated Bonding and Insurance Co. in the x x x indeed a compulsory counterclaim
sum of P10,000,000.00. by the nature of its nomenclature arises
PETITIONER: ANSWER WITH A COMPULSORY out of or is so intertwined with the
COUNTERCLAIM. transaction or occurrence that is the
o On that same day, the petitioner filed an answer with a subject matter of the complaint so that by
compulsory counterclaim against Sharp (PLS. TAKE the dismissal of the latter, the same has
NOTE) for its unfounded and frivolous action. to be discarded, specially since the
o The petitioner claimed that as a consequence of the complaint was dismissed without any
complaint and the writ of preliminary injunction, it had trial.
suffered injuries which if monetized (would) amount to CA: AFFIRMED RTCS DECISION IN DISMISSING THE
more than P100,000,000.00. COUNTERCLAIM.
SC: NULLIFIED WPI. o The dismissal of the counterclaim was appealed to the
o On March 17, 1988, the writ of preliminary injunction was respondent court, which upheld the lower court on the
nullified by this Court in G.R. No. 82218. following justifications:
o We held that Sharp was not a proper party to stop the 1. Compulsory counterclaims for actual damages are not
negotiation and awarding of the contract for the the claims recoverable against the bond.
development, management and operation of the 2. Petitioners manifestation adopting Philippine Ports
Container Terminal at the Port of Manila. Authoritys motion to dismiss did not contain any
PPA: MOTION TO DISMISS SHARPS COMPLAINT. reservation. Hence, Sec. 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of
o On March 25, 1988, the PPA, taking its cue from this Court will not apply. The counterclaim for damages
decision, filed a motion to dismiss Sharps complaint on being compulsory in nature, for which no filing fee has
the above-stated grounds. been paid, was correctly dismissed.
This motion was adopted by petitioner CCTSI in a 3. Sec. 20 of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court specifically
manifestation. provides that such damages (recoverable against the
RTC: DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT AS WELL AS bond) may be awarded only upon application and after
COUNTERCLAIM. proper hearing, and shall be included in the final
judgment. The application must be filed before the trial x

x x, with due notice to the attaching creditor and his HELD: YES.
surety or sureties, setting forth the facts showing his The counterclaim for damages alleged that the delay in the award
right to damages and the amount thereof. The of the MICT contract caused by Sharps complaint and writ of
application contemplated in Sec. 20 is distinct and preliminary injunction jeopardized the petitioners timetable to attain
separate from the compulsory counterclaim asserted in the projected volumes in its winning bid and, as well, caused it to
the answer. incur litigation expenses, including attorneys fees.
4. The filing in court of a claim against the injunction bond, We have consistently held that a counterclaim is compulsory
with copy thereof being furnished the surety, was not where:
sufficient notice to the latter of an application against it 1. it arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the
under this bond. transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
SC: ICTSI: PETITION FOR REVIEW. opposing partys claim;
o The petitioner contends that the respondent court erred 2. it does not require for its adjudication the presence of third
in sustaining the said order because: parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and
1. Dismissal of the complaint upon 3. the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim.
defendants motion did not Tested by these requirements, the petitioners counterclaim
necessarily entail dismissal of was clearly compulsory.
defendants compulsory The petitioner itself so denominated it.
counterclaim. There is no doubt that the same evidence needed to sustain it
2. A claim for damages arising from a would also refute the cause of action alleged in the private
wrongfully obtained injunction may be respondents complaint; in other words, the counterclaim would
made in a counterclaim. succeed only if the complaint did not.
3. There is no rule requiring a particular o It is obvious from the very nature of the counterclaim that it
form of notice to the surety of could not remain pending for independent adjudication,
petitioners claim against the injunction that is, without adjudication by the court of the complaint
bond. itself on which the counterclaim was based.
For its part, the private respondent argues that the dismissal of Rule 17, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court provides:
the compulsory counterclaim should be sustained because:
1. The dismissal of the complaint upon petitioners motion Sec. 2. Dismissal by order of the court.
necessarily entailed the dismissal of the compulsory
counterclaim. Except as provided in the preceding section, an action shall not be
2. The compulsory counterclaim raised by petitioner in its dismissed at the plaintiffs instance save upon order of the court and upon
answer did not partake of the nature of a claim for damages such terms and conditions as the court may deem proper. If a counterclaim
against the injunction bond. has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the
3. The notice given by the petitioner to the surety was fatally plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the
defective and did not comply with the requirements of the defendants objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for
Rules of Court. independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the
ISSUE: WHETHER THE COUNTERCLAIM WAS CORRECTLY order, a dismissal under this paragraph shall be without prejudice.
DISMISSED BY THE LOWER COURT.

The Court notes that, to begin with, the petitioner itself joined the assuming this would still be possible. It did neither of these. The petitioner
PPA in moving for the dismissal of the complaint; or put now claims that there is no law requiring that reservation, but there is no law
passively, it did not object to the dismissal of the private presuming it either.
respondents complaint.
Secondly, the compulsory counterclaim was so intertwined
with the complaint that it could not remain pending The petitioner cannot simply say now that it intended all the time to
for independent adjudication by the court after the dismissal of preserve its counterclaim when it knew that under Rule 17, Sec. 2 if
the complaint which had provoked the counter-claim in the first a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the
place. service upon him of a motion to dismiss, the action shall not be
o As a consequence, the dismissal of the complaint (on dismissed against the defendants objection unless the
the petitioners own motion) operated to also dismiss counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by
the counterclaim questioning that complaint. the Court.
The counterclaim was not permissive.
SUB-ISSUE: WHETHER THE CLAIM FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE o A counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out of
WRONGFUL ISSUANCE OF A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION nor is it necessarily connected with the subject matter
CAN BE MADE IN THE FORM OF A COUNTERCLAIM. of the opposing partys claim.
HELD: YES. o It is not barred even if not set up in the action.
As held in Raymundo vs. Carpio: The petitioners counterclaim was within the jurisdiction of the trial
court.
It would seem that the proper practice to be followed in cases Most importantly, it had no independent existence, being merely
where it is desired to obtain damages by reason of the wrongful issuance of ancillary to the main action.
an attachment in favor of plaintiff that an issue would be tendered on the The petitioner knew all this and did not object to the dismissal of the
subject by the defendant in his answer in the main case. Such a tender complaint. On the contrary, it actually moved to dismiss that main
would present the question squarely in that court, and the parties having action, and in so doing also moved, in effect, for the dismissal of its
offered their evidence on the subject, the trial court could dispose of it along counterclaim.
with the principal action. It is not necessary that the defendant wait until it is
determined by a final decision in the main action that the plaintiff is not Metals Engineering v.CA
entitled to recover in order to present the question of his right to damages.
All questions which are material to the main action or which are incidental Petition for review on certiorari on the decision of the CA dismissing the
thereto but depending thereon should be presented and litigated at the same special civil action for certiorari and prohibition against the petitioner
time with the main action, so as to avoid the necessity of subsequent corporation.
litigation and consequent loss of time and money. However, there is no
glossing away the fact that it was the petitioner itself that caused the Facts:
dismissal of its counterclaim when it not only did not object to, but actually An action for the annulment of Agreement to Sell was filed by petitioner
moved for, the dismissal of the complaint. The petitioner cannot undo that corporation Metals Engineering against Jose Plaridel before the RTC. It
act. If it wanted the counterclaim to subsist, it should have objected to the was the petitioners contention that said contract was defective for having
dismissal of the complaint or at least reserved its right to prosecute it,

no meeting of the minds between the parties as to its terms and payment Held: Yes.
thus said contract is unenforceable.
Despite the fact that the said contract is not perfected, defendant Plaridel A compulsory counterclaim cannot be made the subject of a separate action
prematurely executed the contract which caused the lots subject of the but should be asserted in the same suit involving the same transaction or
agreement to be sold to the public through an advertisement published in occurrence giving rise to it.
Manila Bulletin.
A compulsory counterclaim is auxiliary to the proceeding in the original suit
Subsequently, the Plaintiff tendered a check representing the full refund of and derives its jurisdictional support therefrom, inasmuch as it arises out of
the earnest money previously delivered by the defendant infavor of the or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the
plaintiff inorder to rescind the imperfect contract. Defendant refused to subject matter of the complaint.
accept the same thus continued with his transaction which caused damages
to the petitioner corporation. It follows that if the court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the main
Defendant/Repondent in his Answer with Counterclaim alleging a action of the case and dismisses the same, then the compulsory
compulsory counter claim that due to the non fulfillment of the petitioner, counterclaim, being ancillary to the principal controversy, must likewise be
defendant had to incur losses and tarnished reputation. dismissed since no jurisdiction remained for any grant of relief under the
counterclaim.
TC upon the defendants motion dismissed the case due to lack of
jurisdiction for non payment of docket fee.
Defendant then filed a Motion to set the case for the presentation of 184 SCRA 374 (1990)
evidence in support of his counter claim. Petitioner on the other hand COJUANGCO
moved that the same be dismissed on the ground that the principal action vs.
has been dismissed. VILLEGAS
TC denied the petitioners MR. Petition for certiorari and prohibition against the order of a co-equal court
(yep, shit happens.)
Petitioner went to the CA to file a special civil action, certiorari and
prohibition. FACTS:
CA dismissed the said special civil action, stating that since the order is Cojuangco filed an ejectment case against Villegas before the
merely interlocutory in nature and that at most it is merely an error of MTC. TC dismissed the case on the ground that Villegas and her
judgment, it cannot be corrected by certiorari. predecessors had been in actual possession of the disputed lot for
more than 60 years. Thus Villegas asserted an adverse claim of
Thus this case. ownership and transformed the suit into an accion publiciana which
is within the jurisdiction of RTC.
Issue: On appeal with the CFI(RTC) it reversed the decision of the MTC
W/N the compulsory counter claim filed by the defendant Plaridel will be and ordered Villegas to surrender the lot to Cojuangco.
dismissed upon the dismissal of the principal action filed by the Petitioner? On appeal to CA and SC both upheld Cojuangcos right of
possession.

A writ of execution was filed by Cojuangco before the RTC. Villegas FACTS:
did not oppose but asked for a grace period to remove her personal
properties and improvements. Before the lapse of the grace period, RTC -BULACAN
Villegas filed a separate civil action against Cojuangco and the
provincial sheriff for specific performance with TRO and preliminary ESTHERLITA CRUZ-AGANA filed a Complaint for annulment of
injunction from enforcing the demolition order the case was raffled title with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction against B.
before the RTC which enjoined Conjuangco and the sheriff from SERRANO ENTERPRISES, INC.LAGMAN(judge ng RTC)
enforcing the demolition order.
ISSUE: Whether Villegas separate civil action case for recovery of She claims that as the sole heir of one Teodorico Cruz,
improvements in RTC Branch XVII is proper despite the ejectment case she is the sole owner of a lot covered by TCT.
previously filed by Cojuangco against the former. This lot was fraudulently sold to Eugenio Lopez, Jr. who
later on transferred the lot to respondent.
RULING: Respondent filed its Answer with compulsory
counterclaim.
No. Villegas' claim to recover compensation for improvements made on the AGANA moved to dismiss respondents counterclaim for
land is essentially in the nature of a counterclaim since it is inter-woven with lack of a certificate of non-forum shopping- DENIED trial
the fact of possession. Said claim for compensation should have been court reasoned that respondents counterclaim is
presented as a counterclaim in the ejectment suit. It is deemed barred if not compulsory and therefore excluded from the coverage of
raised on time and the party in error is precluded from setting it up in a Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
subsequent litigation. The rule on compulsory counter-claim is designed to Petitioner filedMRinvoking the mandatory nature of a
enable the disposition of the entire conflict at one time and in one action. certificate of non-forum shopping under Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 04-94- granted and dismiss the
Rule 9, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court on compulsory counterclaim counterclaim
provides the answer. It states: Respondent filed MR arguing that Administrative Circular
No. 04-94 does not apply to compulsory counterclaims
Thus, Villegas should have set forth, simultaneously with the assertion that following the ruling in Santo Tomas University Hospital
she was entitled to the parcel of land by right of inheritance, the alternative v. Surla- granted and reversed itself and recalled its
claim that assuming she was not legally entitled to the disputed lot, at least Order dismissing respondents counterclaim.
as a builder in good faith, she has the right to the value of the buildings and
improvements which she and her parents had introduced on the land. Petitioner went to SUPREME Court through Rule 65 . His
contention was the Courts rulings in Santo Tomas and Ponciano
The adjudication of the issue joined by the parties in the earlier case are contrary to the mandate of Administrative Circular No. 04-94
constitutes res judicata, the theory being that what is barred by prior and other procedural laws.
judgment are not only the matters actually raised and litigated upon, but also
such other matters as could have been raised but were not. ISSUE: Whether respondents counterclaim is compulsory or permissive. If
it is a permissive counterclaim, the lack of a certificate of non-forum
Agana vs. Lagman, G.R. No. 139018, April 11, 2005

shopping is fatal. If it is a compulsory counterclaim, the lack of a certificate over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and will be barred in the
of non-forum shopping is immaterial. future if not set up in the answer to the complaint in the same case. Any
other counterclaim is permissive.
SC RULLING: Petitioner is mistaken.!!!!!!!(galitlngsc?!!)The Constitution
expressly bestows on this Court the power to promulgate rules concerning Respondents counterclaim as set up in its answer states:3. That because
the pleading, practice and procedure in all courts.Procedural matters are of the unwarranted, baseless, and unjustified acts of the plaintiff, herein
within the sole jurisdiction of this Court to prescribe. Administrative Circular defendant has suffered and continue to suffer actual damages in the sum of
No. 04-94 is an issuance of this Court. It covers a matter of procedure. at least P400,000,000.00 which the law, equity, and justice require that to be
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 is not an enactment of the paid by the plaintiff and further to reimburse the attorneys fees of
Legislature. This Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to interpret, amend or P2,000,000.00;
revise the rules it promulgates, as long as the rules do not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. This is precisely the purpose of It is clear that the counterclaim set up by respondent arises from
Santo Tomas as far as Administrative Circular No. 04-94 is concerned. the filing of plaintiffs complaint. The counterclaim is so intertwined with the
main case that it is incapable of proceeding independently. The
In Santo TomasSC clarified the scope of Administrative Circular No. 04-94 counterclaim will require a re-litigation of the same evidence if the
with respect to counterclaims. The Court pointed out that this circular is counterclaim is allowed to proceed in a separate action. Even petitioner
intended primarily to cover an initiatory pleading or an incipient recognizes that respondents counterclaim is compulsory. A compulsory
application of a party asserting a claim for relief. counterclaim does not require a certificate of non-forum shopping because a
compulsory counterclaim is not an initiatory pleading.
In Ponciano v. Judge Parentela, Jr. Administrative Circular No. 04-94 does
not apply to compulsory counterclaims. The circular applies to initiatory and
similar pleadings. A compulsory counterclaim set up in the answer is not an
initiatory or similar pleading. The initiatory pleading is the plaintiffs
complaint. A respondent has no choice but to raise a compulsory G.R. No. 107356 March 31, 1995
counterclaim the moment the plaintiff files the complaint. Otherwise,
respondent waives the compulsory counterclaim. In short, the compulsory SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED, petitioner,
counterclaim is a reaction or response, mandatory upon pain of waiver, to an vs.
initiatory pleading which is the complaint. THE COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, respondents.
In this casePetitioners counsel fails or simply refuses to accept Facts:

the distinction between a permissive counterclaim and a compulsory
counterclaim. This distinction was the basis for the ruling in Santo Tomas
Sancho Rayos was an overseas contract worker who had a renewed
and Ponciano. .A compulsory counterclaim isany claim for money or
contract with the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) for the period
other relief, which a defending party may have against an opposing party,
covering April 16, 1980, to April 15, 1981. As part of Aramco's policy, its
which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the
employees returning to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia from Manila are allowed to
same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of plaintiffs
claim reimbursement for amounts paid for excess baggage of up to 50
complaintIt is compulsory in the sense that it is within the jurisdiction of
kilograms, as long as it is properly supported by receipt. On April 1980,
the court, does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties

Rayos took a Singapore Airlines (SIA) flight to report for his new assignment, CA-all parties appealed
with a 50-kilogram excess baggage for which he paid P4,147.50. Aramco SIA's appeal was dismissed for non-payment of docket fees, which
reimbursed said amount. dismissal was eventually sustained by this Court.
The Rayos spouses withdrew their appeal when SIA satisfied the
In December 1980, Rayos learned that he was one of several employees judgment totaling P802,435.34.
being investigated by Aramco for fraudulent claims. He immediately asked PAL claimed that the spouses Rayos had no valid claim against
his wife Beatriz in Manila to seek a written confirmation from SIA that he SIA because it was the inefficiency of Rayos which led to the
indeed paid for an excess baggage of 50 kilograms. On December 10, 1980, non-renewal of his contract with Aramco, and not the alleged
SIA's manager notified Beatriz of their inability to issue the certification tampering of his excess bagged ticket
requested because their records showed that only three kilograms were SIA argued that the only issue in the said appeal is WON it
entered as excess and accordingly charged. After 4 months, SIA issued the was entitled to reimbursement from PAL
certification requested by the spouses Rayos only on April 8, 1981, after its granted PAL's appeal and absolved it from any liability to SIA.
investigation of the anomaly and after Beatriz, assisted by a lawyer,
threatened it with a lawsuit. On April 14, 1981, Aramco gave Rayos his
travel documents without a return visa. His employment contract was SC - petition for review
not renewed. SIA argues that PAL cannot validly assail for the first time on
appeal the trial court's decision sustaining the validity of plaintiff's
On August 5, 1981, the spouses Rayos, convinced that SIA was responsible complaint against SIA if PAL did not raise this issue in the lower
for the non-renewal of Rayos' employment contract with Aramco, sued it for court. It added that the appellate court should have restricted its
damages. SIA claimed that it was not liable to the Rayoses because the ruling on the right of SIA to seek reimbursement from PAL, as this
tampering was committed by its handling agent, Philippine Airlines was the only issue raised by SIA in its third-party complaint against
(PAL). It then filed a third-party complaint against PAL. PAL, in turn, PAL.
countered that its personnel did not collect any charges for excess baggage;
that it had no participation in the tampering of any excess baggage ticket; ISSUE: WON SIA is it was entitled to reimbursement from PAL
and that if any tampering was made, it was done by SIA's personnel.
YES.
RTC
Ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant Singapore The petitioner correctly pointed out that the case of Firestone squarely
Airlines Limited, sentencing the latter to pay the former judgment applies to the case at bench. the Court stated:
totaling P802,435.34.
The defendant's counterclaim is hereby dismissed. The third-party complaint is, therefore, a procedural device whereby
ON THE THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT, the third-party a "third party" who is neither a party nor privy to the act or
defendant PAL is ordered to pay defendant and third-party deed complained of by the plaintiff, may be brought into the
plaintiff SIA whatever the latter has paid the plaintiffs. case with leave of court, by the defendant, who acts as third-
party plaintiff to enforce against such third-party defendant a
TC concluded that the excess baggage ticket of Rayos was tampered with right for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other
by the employees of PAL and that the fraud was the direct and proximate relief, in respect of the plaintiff's claim.
cause of the non-renewal of Rayos' contract with Aramco.

It must be noted that in the proceedings below, PAL disclaimed any liability PAL is NOT solely liable for the satisfaction of the judgment. While the trial
to the Rayoses and imputed the alleged tampering to SIA's personnel. On court found, and this has not been adequately rebutted by PAL, that the
appeal, however, PAL changed its theory and averred that the spouses proximate cause of the non-renewal of Rayos' employment contract with
Rayos had no valid claim against SIA on the around that the non-renewal of Aramco was the tampering of his excess baggage ticket by PAL's personnel,
Sancho's contract with Aramco was his unsatisfactory performance rather it failed to consider that the immediate cause of such non-renewal was SIA's
than the alleged tampering of his excess baggage ticket. In response to delayed (4 months after request) transmittal of the certification needed
PAL's appeal, SIA argued that it was improper for PAL to question SIA's by Rayos to prove his innocence to his employer.
liability to the plaintiff, since this was no longer an issue on account of the
finality and, in fact, satisfaction of the judgment. Rule 7 Parts of a Pleading
There is no question that a third-party defendant is allowed to set up in No. L-31822. July 31, 1972.
his answer the defenses which the third-party plaintiff (original
defendant) has or may have to the plaintiff's claim. There are, however, JOSE SALCEDO QUIMPO, petitioner, vs. CATALINO DELA VIC-TORIA
special circumstances present in this case which preclude third-party and FRANCISCA O. DELA VICTORIA, respondents.
defendant PAL from benefiting from the said principle.
Facts
One of the defenses available to SIA was that the plaintiffs had no cause of PETITION TO REVIEW the orders of the Court of First Instance of Davao.
action, that is, it had no valid claim against SIA. SIA investigated the
matter and discovered that tampering was, indeed, committed, not by Petition to review the following orders of the Court of First Instance of
its personnel but by PAL's. This became its defense as well as its main Davao, denying defendant-petitioners motion to dismiss.
cause of action in the third-party complaint it filed against PAL. For its part,
PAL could have used the defense that the plaintiffs had no valid claim CFI
against it or against SIA. (SEE RULE 6 sec 13 I BELIEVE it is the rule
involved but it was NOT exactly mentioned in the case) This could be Plaintiffs-respondents filed a complaint against defendant-petitioner with the
done indirectly by adopting such a defense in its answer to the third-party Court of First Instance of Davao, for quieting of title and recovery of
complaint if only SIA had raised the same in its answer to the main possession with damages.
complaint, or directly by so stating in unequivocal terms in its answer to
SIA's complaint that SIA and PAL were both blameless. Yet, PAL opted to City Court
deny any liability which it imputed to SIA's personnel. It was only on appeal
Plaintiffs-respondents filed another case against defendant-petitioner with
in a complete turn around of theory that PAL raised the issue of no
the City Court of Davao City for forcible entry over the same parcel of land.
valid claim by the plaintiff against SIA. This simply cannot be allowed.
Plaintiffs-respondents prayed in the later case for the court to order
defendant-petitioner
While the third-party defendant; would benefit from a victory by the
third-party plaintiff against the plaintiff, this is true only when the third- to vacate the premises and deliver the possession thereof to the
party plaintiff and third-party defendant have non-contradictory former, and
defenses. Here, the defendant and third-party defendant had no common ordering defendant to pay the plaintiffs the amount of f 500.00 a
defense against the plaintiffs' complaint, and they were even blaming each month as rental and the same to begin from the later part of March,
other for the fiasco. 1968 until possession thereof shall be delivered to the plaintiffs,

and It is pointed out in the first assigned error that since the verification in the
the amount of P500.00 as attorneys fees. ... * complaint for forcible entry does not comply with Section 6, Rule 7, of the
Revised Rules of Court, the complaint is void; hence, the City Court, and
subsequently the court a quo, did not acquire jurisdiction over the said case.
In a motion to dismiss defendant-petitioner sought the dismissal of the
complaint for forcible entry alleging the pendency of Civil Case No. 6005; but Section 6, Rule 7, Revised Rules of Court provides: xxxxx.
the City Court, in its order for the reason that there is no identity of rights Verification.A pleading is verified only by an affidavit stating that the
asserted and relief prayed for and for the further reason that it does not person verifying has read the pleading and that the allegations thereof
appear that any judgment which would be rendered on the other action will are true of his own knowledge.
amount to res judicata in the herein case. The same court order set the case
for hearing. Verification based on information and belief, or upon knowledge,
information and belief shall be deemed insufficient.
Defendant-petitioner was declared in default for failure to file his answer to
the forcible entry case and the City Court set the reception of plaintiffs- Catalino dela Victoria, one of the plaintiffs (now respondents) clearly referred
respondents evidence for the following day. to the allegations in the complaint as having been read by him. However,
while he stated that they are true and correct, he omitted to state that said
The same court rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiff. conclusion was reached of his own knowledge. The latter detail, however, is
logically inferable since affiant was a party and it does not appear that he
Defendant-petitioner then moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid was verifying upon information and belief. If petitioner entertained doubt
order denying his motion to dismiss the complaint for forcible entry, and also about the true character of the verification, he should have asked that it be
the decision. However, his motion was denied in the City Court order. made more definite.
CFI
Defendant-petitioner appealed to the Court of First Instance. In a motion, Moreover, even if We should find the verification insufficient, that
defendant-petitioner reiterated his arguments for the dismissal of the insufficiency would not render the complaint for forcible entry, or the whole
complaint for forcible entry as stated in his earlier motion in the City Court. In proceedings in the court below, void. This Court already held in several
the meantime, plaintiffs-respondents moved for the issuance of an order for decisions that the requirement regarding verification is not jurisdictional, but
the immediate execution of the City Court decision. The court a quo denied merely formal.
the motion to dismiss for lack of merit, and at the same time granted the
immediate execution of the City Court judgment. Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause
and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the
SC loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, and his appeal WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the orders appealed from, the
dismissed, defendant filed the herein petition, claiming that the lower court same are hereby affirmed, with costs against defendant-petitioner.
Did not acquire jurisdiction over the action for forcible entry, the G.R. No. 186045 February 2, 2011
verification of the corresponding complaint being void;

MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, Petitioner, were acquired by the NAC through a negotiated sale were
vs. Lot Nos. 986 and 991-A.
Heirs of ESTANISLAO MIOZA, namely: The Heirs of FILOMENO T. Leila claimed that their predecessors-in-interest, specifically,
MIOZA, represented by LAUREANO M. MIOZA; The Heirs of PEDRO Adriana, Patricio, and Santiago executed a Deed of Sale on
T. MIOZA; and The HEIRS of FLORENCIA T. MIOZA, represented by February 15, 1950 conveying the subject lots to the NAC on the
ANTONIO M. URBIZTONDO, Respondents. assurance made by the latter that they (Leilas predecessors-in-
interest) can buy the properties back if the lots are no longer
RULING: INTERVENORS IN THEIR M.R., APPENDED A COMPLAINT-IN- needed.
INTERVENTION WITH THE REQUIRED VERIFICATION AND o Consequently, they sold the subject lots to the NAC.
CERT. OF NON-FORUM-SHOPPING, THE REQUIREMENT OF o However, the expansion project did not push through.
THE RULE WAS SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH. o More than forty years after the sale, plaintiffs informed the
NACs successor-in-interest, the Mactan-Cebu
IN GENERAL, AN INDEPENDENT CONTROVERSY CANNOT BE International Airport Authority (MCIAA), that they were
INJECTED INTO A SUIT BY INTERVENTION, SUCH exercising the buy-back option of the agreement, but the
INTERVENTION WILL NOT BE ALLOWED WHERE IT WOULD MCIAA refused to allow the repurchase on the ground that
ENLARGE THE ISSUES IN THE ACTION AND EXPAND THE the sale was in fact unconditional.
SCOPE OF THE REMEDIES.
The MCIAA, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed
FACTS: an Answer with Counterclaim.
RTC: INTERVENORS: COMPLAINT-IN-INTERVENTION.
o On November 16, 1999, before the MCIAA could present
RTC: LEILA: RECONVEYANCE, CANCELLATION OF TITLE,
evidence in support of its case, a Motion for Intervention,
ISSUANCE OF NEW TITLE AND DAMAGES.
with an attached Complainant-in-Intervention, was filed
On July 6, 1998, a Complaint for Reconveyance, Cancellation of
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, by the
Defendants Title, Issuance of New Title to Plaintiffs and Damages
heirs of Filomeno T. Mioza, represented by Laureano M.
was filed by Leila M. Hermosisima (Leila) for herself and on behalf
Mioza; the heirs of Pedro T, Mioza, represented by
of the other heirs of the late Estanislao Mioza.
Leoncio J. Mioza; and the Heirs of Florencia T. Mioza,
o The complaint alleged that Leilas late great grandfather,
represented by Antonio M. Urbiztondo (Intervenors), who
Estanislao Mioza, was the registered owner of Cadastral
claimed to be the true, legal, and legitimate heirs of the
Lot Nos. 986 and 991-A, located at Banilad Estate, Cebu
late Estanislao Mioza.
City.
o The intervenors alleged in their complaint:
o That the late Estanislao Mioza had three children,
namely, Adriana, Patricio, and Santiago, all surnamed
Mioza. (1) that the plaintiffs in the main case are not related to
o In the late 1940s, the National Airports Corporation (NAC) the late spouses Estanislao Mioza and
embarked in an expansion project of the Lahug Airport. Inocencia Togono whose true and legitimate
o For said purpose, the NAC acquired several properties children were: Filomeno, Pedro, and Florencia,
which surrounded the airport either through negotiated all surnamed Mioza;
sale or through expropriation. Among the properties that

(2) that, on January 21, 1958, Adriana, Patricio, and Title Nos. RT-6101 (T-10534) and RT-6102 (T-10026) to
Santiago, executed, in fraud of the intervenors, be the true and valid torrens titles to Lots 986 and 991-[A].
an Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the
late spouses Estanislao Mioza and Inocencia f. Condemning plaintiffs Leila M. Hermosisima and Constancio
Togono and adjudicated unto themselves the Mioza to pay intervenors, moral and exemplary damages.
estate of the deceased spouses; and
RTC: DENIED MOTION FOR INTERVENTION.
(3) that, on February 15, 1958, the same Adriana, o On February 18, 2000, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22,
Patricio, and Santiago, fraudulently, deceitfully, issued an Order denying the Motion for Intervention.
and in bad faith, sold Lot Nos. 986 and 991-A to GROUNDS: 1. OWNERSHIP OF THE LOTS WAS MERELY
the NAC. COLLATERAL.
o The intervenors thus prayed for the following reliefs: 2. SHOULD BE ASSERTED IN A SEPARATE
PROCEEDING.
a. Declaring herein intervenors as the true, legal and legitimate
heirs of the late spouses Estanislao Mioza and Inocencia 3. IF GRANTED, WOULD UNDULY DELAY THE
Togono; PROCEEDINGS.
b. Declaring herein intervenors as the true, rightful and registered 4. COMPLAINT-IN-INTERVENTION NOT VERIFIED
owners of Lots 986 and 991-A of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate; DOES NOT CONTAIN CERTIFICATION OF NON-
FORUM SHOPPING.
c. Declaring the Extrajudicial Settlement executed on January 21,
1958 by the late Adriana Mioza and the late Patricio Mioza o In denying the motion, the trial court opined that the
and the late Santiago Mioza that they are the only heirs of the ownership of the subject lots was merely a collateral issue
late spouses Estanislao Mioza and Inocencia Togono, who in the action.
died intestate and without any debts or obligations and o The principal issue to be resolved was whether or not the
adjudicating among themselves the estate of the deceased x x x heirs of the late Estanislao Mioza whoever they may be
as void ab initio; have a right to repurchase the said lots from the MCIAA.
o Consequently, the rights being claimed by the intervenors
d. Declaring the sale of Lots 986 and 991-A of the Banilad Friar should be asserted in and would be fully protected by a
Lands Estate executed by the late Adriana Mioza, the late separate proceeding.
Patricio Mioza and the late Santiago Mioza in favor of the o Moreover, if the motion was granted, it would unduly delay
National Airport Corporation on February 15, 1958 as void ab the proceedings in the instant case.
initio; o Finally, the complaint-in-intervention was flawed,
considering that it was not verified and does not
e. Ordering the cancellation of TCTs for Lots 986 and 991-A in the contain the requisite certification of non-forum
name of the MIAA and restoring Transfer Certificate of shopping.

INTERVENORS: M.R., ATTACHED A COMPLAINT-IN- would make the proceedings unnecessarily complicated
INTERVENTION WITH THE REQUIRED VERIFICATION AND and change the nature of the proceedings.
CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING. o Furthermore, contrary to the requirements for the
o The intervenors filed a Motion for Reconsideration, to allowance of a motion for intervention, their legal interest
which was attached a Complaint-in-Intervention with the in the subject properties appear to be merely contingent or
required Verification and Certificate of Non-Forum expectant and not of direct or immediate character.
Shopping. o Petitioner also posits that the intervenors rights can be
better protected in another proceeding.
M.R. DENIED. o The complaint-in-intervention was not verified by all
Aggrieved, the intervenors sought recourse before the CA. the interested parties or all the heirs of Filomeno
Mioza, which still warrants its dismissal.
CA: REVERSED AND SET ASIDE RTCS ORDERS.
GROUND: M.R. APPENDED WITH A COMPLAINT-IN-
INTERVENTION CONTAINING THE REQUIRED VERIFICATION ISSUE: WHETHER THE RULES ON VERIFICATION AND
AND CERT. OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING AMOUNTED TO CERTIFICATION OF NON FORUM-SHOPPING WERE COMPLIED WITH.
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE.
o In ruling for the intervenors, the CA ratiocinated that the HELD: YES. THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE.
determination of the true heirs of the late Estanislao
Mioza is not only a collateral, but the focal issue of the At the outset, on the procedural aspect, contrary to petitioners
case, for if the intervenors can prove that they are indeed contention, the initial lack of the complaint-in-intervention of the
the true heirs of Estanislao Mioza, there would be no requisite verification and certification on non-forum shopping was
more need to determine whether the right to buy back the cured when the intervenors, in their motion for reconsideration of
subject lots exists or not as the MCIAA would not have the order denying the motion to intervene, appended a complaint-
acquired rights to the subject lots in the first place. in-intervention containing the required verification and
o In addition, to grant the motion for intervention would avoid certificate of non-forum shopping.
multiplicity of suits. In the case of Altres v. Empleo, the Court clarified, among other
o As to the lack of verification and certification on non-forum things, that as to verification, non-compliance therewith or a
shopping, the CA opined that the filing of the motion for defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally
reconsideration with an appended complaint-in- defective.
intervention containing the required verification and The court may order its submission or correction, or act on the
certificate of non-forum shopping amounted to pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict
substantial compliance of the Rules. compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the
ends of justice may be served thereby.
M.R. DENIED. Further, a verification is deemed substantially complied with when
Hence, this PETITION FOR REVIEW. one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the
o Petitioner argues that to allow the intervenors to intervene allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and
in the proceedings before the trial court would not only when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith
unduly prolong and delay the resolution of the case, it or are true and correct.

Moreover, as to the certification against forum shopping, non- Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court states:
compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification,
is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or SECTION 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest in the
correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rules on the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest
ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of "special against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
circumstances or compelling reasons." other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer
Also, the certification against forum shopping must be signed thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The
by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or
did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or
Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when not the intervenors rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a
common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of Under this Rule, intervention shall be allowed when a person has:
them in the certification against forum shopping substantially
complies with the Rule.
1. a legal interest in the matter in litigation;
Thus, considering that the intervenors in their motion for
reconsideration, appended a complaint-in-intervention with the
2. or in the success of any of the parties;
required verification and certificate of non-forum shopping, the
requirement of the Rule was substantially complied with.
3. or an interest against the parties;
SUB-ISSUE: WHETHER THE COMPLAINT-IN-INTERVENTION SHOULD
BE ADMITTED. 4. or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or disposition of property in the custody of the court or
an officer thereof.
HELD: NO.
Moreover, the court must take into consideration whether or not the
Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable
rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenors
him, her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest which may be
right or interest can be adequately pursued and protected in a
affected by such proceedings.
separate proceeding.
It is a proceeding in a suit or action by which a third person is
In the case at bar, the intervenors are claiming that they are the
permitted by the court to make himself a party, either joining plaintiff
legitimate heirs of Estanislao Mioza and Inocencia Togono and
in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or uniting with
not the original plaintiffs represented by Leila Hermosisima.
defendant in resisting the claims of plaintiff, or demanding
o True, if their allegations were later proven to be valid
something adversely to both of them; the act or proceeding by
claims, the intervenors would surely have a legal interest
which a third person becomes a party in a suit pending between
in the matter in litigation.
others; the admission, by leave of court, of a person not an original
o Nonetheless, this Court has ruled that the interest
party to pending legal proceedings, by which such person becomes
contemplated by law must be actual, substantial, material,
a party thereto for the protection of some right of interest alleged by
him to be affected by such proceedings.

direct and immediate, and not simply contingent or that of the original parties; the proper course is for the would-be
expectant. intervenor to litigate his claim in a separate suit.
o It must be of such direct and immediate character that the Intervention is not intended to change the nature and character of
intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal the action itself, or to stop or delay the placid operation of the
operation and effect of the judgment. machinery of the trial.
o Otherwise, if persons not parties to the action were The remedy of intervention is not proper where it will have the
allowed to intervene, proceedings would become effect of retarding the principal suit or delaying the trial of the
unnecessarily complicated, expensive and interminable. action.
To be sure, not only will the intervenors rights be fully protected in
Moreover, the intervenors contentions that Leilas predecessors-in- a separate proceeding, it would best determine the rights of the
interest executed, in fraud of the intervenors, an extra judicial parties in relation to the subject properties and the issue of who the
settlement of the estate of the late spouses Estanislao Mioza and legitimate heirs of Estanislao Mioza and Inocencia Togono, would
Inocencia Togono and adjudicated unto themselves the estate of be laid to rest.
the deceased spouses, and that subsequently, her predecessors- Furthermore, the allowance or disallowance of a motion for
in-interest fraudulently and deceitfully sold the subject lots to the intervention rests on the sound discretion of the court after
NAC, would unnecessarily complicate and change the nature consideration of the appropriate circumstances.
of the proceedings. It is not an absolute right.
In addition to resolving who the true and legitimate heirs of The statutory rules or conditions for the right of intervention must be
Estanislao Mioza and Inocencia Togono are, the parties would shown.
also present additional evidence in support of this new allegation of The procedure to secure the right to intervene is to a great extent
fraud, deceit, and bad faith and resolve issues of conflicting claims fixed by the statute or rule, and intervention can, as a rule, be
of ownership, authenticity of certificates of titles, and regularity in secured only in accordance with the terms of the applicable
their acquisition. provision.
o Verily, this would definitely cause unjust delay in the
adjudication of the rights claimed by the original Sameer Overseas Placement Agency v Santos, et al.
parties, which primarily hinges only on the issue of Respondents were hired by the petitioner as aluminum products
whether or not the heirs represented by Leila have a right manufacturer operators for Ensure Company Ltd. Of Taiwan under
to repurchase the subject properties from the MCIAA. a 1 year employment with a monthly salary of $14,800
Verily, the allegation of fraud and deceit is an independent The respondents were deployed and able to work for Ensure but
controversy between the original parties and the intervenors. were repatriated before the expiration of their contracts.
In general, an independent controversy cannot be injected into a Respondents filed a complaint before the NLRC against Sameer
suit by intervention, hence, such intervention will not be allowed (petitioner)
where it would enlarge the issues in the action and expand the

rd
scope of the remedies. Sameer filed a 3 party complaint against ASBT International
It is not proper where there are certain facts giving the intervenors Management Service, Inc (ASBT). Sameer claimed that ASBT
case an aspect peculiar to himself and differentiating it clearly from should be liable because Sameers accreditation was transferred to
them

W/N the pleadings were validly signed
Dec 29 1999 Labor Arbiter rendered the decision against Sameer W/N ASBT violated the prohibition against forum shopping
Sameer appealed to the NLRC alleging that the LA committed GAD HELD:
in failing to decide the third-party complaint and insisted that it SEC. 3. Signature and address.Every pleading must be signed
should have been absolved of any and all liabilities agains by the party or counsel representing him, stating in either case his
st
respondent workers. address which should not be a post office box. (1 paragraph. Di ko
na sinama yung other 2)
July 24, 2001 NLRC: absolved Sameer from liabilities in view of
the transfer of accreditation to ASBT and ordered the latter to pay Obviously, the rule allows the pleadings to be signed by either the
the respondent workers. party to the case or the counsel representing that party. In this
case, ASBT, as petitioner, opted to sign its petition and its motion
ASBT moved for reconsideration. NLRC denied it for lack of merit for reconsideration in its own behalf, through its corporate
president, Mildred R. Santos, who was duly authorized by ASBTs
ASBT elevated the case to the CA via PfC under rule 65. Board of Directors to represent the company in prosecuting this
case. Therefore, the said pleadings
CA denied due course and dismissed ASBTs petition because the
attached verification and certification of non-forum shopping was Sameer also submits that ASBT violated the prohibition against
signed by Mildred Santos as president of ASBT without proof of forum shopping.
authority to sign for and bind ASBT in the proceedings
ASBT filed an MR and submitted the necessary board resolution It claims that the transfer of CA-G.R. SP No. 65068 from the Seventh
authorizing Mildred Santos to represent ASBT. Motion was granted Division of the Court of Appealswhich initially denied due course and
and the petition was reinstated. dismissed the petition then reinstated the same (upon proof that Mildred R.
Santos as duly authorized) in the Former Fourth Division, which gave due
CA ruled in favor of ASBT and ordered Sameer to pay the course to and granted the petitionwas actually an act of forum shopping.
respondent workers Sameer posits that the grant
o of ASBTs July 5, 2001 motion for reconsideration by the
Sameer moved to reconsider but was denied. Hence, here we Seventh Division, which reinstated the dismissed petition,
goooooo! in effect gave rise to a new petition.
Sameer contends that since the petition and the motion for Forum shopping is defined as an act of a party, against whom an
reconsideration was signed by Mildred Santos as corporate adverse judgment or order has been rendered in one forum, of
president, and since shes not a member of the bar, the petition and seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another
the MR should be considered as unsigned pleadings pursuant to forum, other than by appeal or special civil action for
Rule 7, Sec 3. certiorari. It may also be the institution of two or more actions or
proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that
ISSUES: one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.

o There is forum shopping where the elements of litis cancelling ... their licenses or permits (as hawkers or street
pendentia are present, namely: vendors) and threatening the physical demolition of their respective
(a) there is identity of parties, or at least such business stalls in the places specified in such licenses or permits.
parties as represent the same interest in both Petitioners claim to be five of about 130 "licensed and duly
actions; authorized vendors of ... religious articles, medicine herbs and
(b) there is identity of rights asserted and relief plants around the Quiapo Church, ... Manila," bringing suit 'for
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same themselves and all others similarly situated as themselves."
set of facts; and They allege that their licenses "were revoked or cancelled (by
(c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is respondent Mayor) for reasons unknown to them which is
such that any judgment rendered in the pending tantamount to deprivation of property without due process of laws,"
case, regardless of which party is successful, written notice of such cancellation having been served on them on
would amount to res judicata in the other. or about May 30 (actually May 3), 1986; respondent Mayor "had
o It expressly prohibited by this Court because it trifles with given (them) an ultimatum of 7:00 up to 12:00 o'clock in the
and abuses court processes, degrades the administration afternoon" (of August 5, 1986) to vacate the premises where their
of justice, and congests court dockets. A willful and respective stalls are situated or suffer physical demolition thereof.
deliberate violation of the rule against forum shopping is a The petition must be given short shrift
ground for summary dismissal of the case, and may also Petition should be abated for the ground of lis pendens
constitute direct contempt It appears that on July 7, 1986 there was filed in the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 8636563, a special
There was no forum shopping. The MR filed praying for civil action of "prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Acting
reconsideration of the resolution of the CA dismissing the petition Manila City Mayor Gemiliano Lopez, Jr. It was filed by Samahang
on the technical ground of lack of proof of authority by Santos to Kapatiran Sa Hanapbuhay Ng Bagong Lipunan, Inc." (hereafter,
bind the corporation was just a motion for reconsideration. Sameer simply "Samahan") composed, according to the petition, of "some
cannot insist that it be treated as a new petition to make it fit the 300 individual owners and operators of separate business stalls ...
definition of forum shopping to evade liability. mostly at the periphery immediately 0beyond the fence of the
Quiapo Church."
G.R. No. 75349. October 13, 1986. The president of the Samahan is Rosalina Buan and its Press
Buan vs. Lopez Relations Officer, Liza Ocampo. Rosalina Buan and Liza Ocampo
are two of the five petitioners in the case at bar, described in the
FACTS: petition before this Court as suing "for themselves and all others
similarly situated as themselves": i.e., vendors "around the Quiapo
(Im sorry guys kung magulo, ang labo talaga ng facts, Ilan beses ko na siya Church." The three other petitioners also appear to be Samahan
nabasa. Sobrang frustrated ako ditto. Sana maintindihan niyo pa rin.) members.
The petition in Case No. 86-36563 is grounded on the same facts
On August 5, 1986 petitioners instituted in this Court a special civil as those in the case at bar. That they were vendors who had been
action for prohibition to the end that respondent Gemiliano C. religiously paying the license and permit fees but have been given
Lopez, Jr., acting as Mayor of the City of Manila, be "perpetually a written notice advising them of the cancellation of their permits
prohibited from arbitrarily, whimsically and capriciously revoking or and their possible relocation to another site.

There thus exists between the action before this Court and RTC and relief sought, as well as basis thereof, to a degree sufficient to
Case No. 86-36563 Identity of parties, or at least such parties as give rise to the ground for dismissal known as auter action pendant
represent the same interests in both actions, as well as Identity of or lis pendens. That same Identity puts into operation the
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the sanction of twin dismissals just mentioned. The application of
same facts, and the Identity on the two preceding particulars is this sanction will prevent any further delay in the settlement of the
such that any judgment rendered in the other action, will regardless controversy which might ensue from attempts to seek
of which party is successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action reconsideration of or to appeal from the Order of the Regional Trial
under consideration: all the requisites, in fine, of auter action Court in Civil Case No. 86-36563 promulgated on July 15, 1986,
pendant. which dismissed the petition upon grounds which appear
The two cases (One with the RTC and the other with the SC) were persuasive.
dismissed for forum shopping The case was also dismissed because of the permits and licenses
o Forum Shopping: The acts of petitioners constitute a of the vendors all eventually expired thus making the case moot
clear case of forum shopping, an act of malpractice that is and academic.
proscribed and condemned as trifling with the courts and
abusing their processes. It is improper conduct that tends Sto. Tomas University vs. Surla, 294 SCRA 382 (1998)
to degrade the administration of justice. The rule has been
formalized in Section 17 of the Interim Rules and FACTS:
Guidelines issued by this Court on January 11, 1983 in
connection with the implementation of the Judiciary RTC-QC
Reorganization Act, specifically with the grant in Section 9 SPOUSES SURLA filed a complaint for damages
of B.P. Blg. 129 of equal original jurisdiction to the against petitioner Santo Tomas University Hospital
Intermediate Appellate Court to issue writs of mandamus, predicated on an allegation by the spouses that their son,
prohibition, etc., and auxiliary writs or processes, whether Emmanuel Cesar Surla, while confined at the said hospital
or not in aid Of its appellate jurisdiction. Thus, the cited for having been born prematurely, had accidentally fallen
Rule provides that no such petition may be filed in the from his incubator possibly causing serious harm on the
Intermediate Appellate Court 'if another similar petition child
has been filed or is still pending in the Supreme Court' Petitioner hospital filed its Answer with "Compulsory
and vice-versa. The Rule orders that "A violation of the Counterclaim" asserting that respondents still owed to it
rule shall constitute contempt of court and shall be a the amount of P82,632.10 representing hospital bills for
cause for the summary dismissal of both petitions, without Emmanuel's confinement at the hospital and making a
prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the claim for moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney's
counsel or party concerned." The rule applies with equal fees, by reason of the supposed unfounded and malicious
force where the party having filed an action in the suit filed against it.
Supreme Court shops for the same remedy of prohibition Petitioner received respondents' Reply to Counterclaim
and a restraining order or injunction in the regional trial which sought, inter alia, the dismissal of petitioner's
court (or vice-versa). counterclaim for its non-compliance with Supreme Court
there is between the action at bar and RTC Case No. 86-36563, an Administrative Circular No. 04-94 requiring that a
Identity as regards parties, or interests represented, rights asserted complaint and other initiatory pleadings, such as a
counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.) party

complaint, be accompanied with a certificate of non-forum to the court or agency wherein the original pleading and
shopping. sworn certification contemplated here have been filed.
RTC dismissed petitioner's counterclaim.
Pet. MR-denied The complaint and other initiatory pleadings referred to
CA via a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 and subject of this Circular are the original civil complaint,
Dismissed the petition and held: dismissal of the counterclaim, cross-claim third (fourth, etc.) party
counterclaim, being a final order, petitioner's remedy was complaint or complaint-in-intervention, petition, or
to appeal therefrom and, such appeal being then application wherein a party asserts his claim for relief.
available, the special civil action of certiorari had been
improperly filed. Administrative Circular No. 04-94, made effective on 01 April 1994, is to
Hence Pet went to SC curb the malpractice commonly referred to also as forum-shopping. It is
an act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered
ISSUE: Can a compulsory counterclaim pleaded in an Answer be
in one forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in
dismissed on the ground of a failure to accompany it with a certificate of
another forum, other than by appeal or the special civil action of
non-forum shopping
certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other
RULLLING:
court would make a favorable disposition.The language of the circular
distinctly suggests that it is primarily intended to cover an initiatory
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 provide:
pleading or an incipient application of a party asserting a claim for relief.
1. The plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or principal party The rationale of the circular is to sustain the view that the circular in question
seeking relief in the complaint, petition, application or has not, in fact, been contemplated to include a kind of claim which, by its
other initiatory pleading shall certify under oath in such very nature as being auxiliary to the proceedings in the suit and as deriving
original pleading, or in a sworn certification annexed its substantive and jurisdictional support therefrom, can only be appropriately
thereto and simultaneously filed therewith, to the truth of pleaded in the answer and not remain outstanding for independent
the following facts and undertakings: (a) he has not resolution except by the court where the main case pends. The proviso in
theretofore commenced any other action or proceeding the second paragraph of Section 5, Rule 8, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court Procedure, i.e., that the violation of the anti-forum shopping rule "shall
of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (b) to the best not be curable by mere amendment . . . but shall be cause for the
of his knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending dismissal of the case without prejudice," being predicated on the
in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other applicability of the need for a certification against forum shopping,
tribunal or agency; (c) if there is any such action or obviously does not include a claim which cannot be independently set
proceeding which is either pending or may have been up.
terminated, he must state the status thereof; and (d) if he
should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding Petitioner, nevertheless, is entitled to a mere partial relief. The so-
has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, called "counterclaim" of petitioner really consists of two segregative parts:
the Court of Appeals or any other tribunal or agency, he (1) for unpaid hospital bills of respondents' son, Emmanuel Surla, in
undertakes to report that fact within five (5) days therefrom the total amount of P82,032.10; and (2) for damages, moral and

exemplary, plus attorney's fees by reason of the alleged malicious and and that accordingly, the appropriate Information be filed with the
unfounded suit filed against it. It is the second, not the first, claim that the Sandiganbayan.
Court here refers to as not being initiatory in character and thereby not Petitioners filed a Motion for Reinvestigation with prayer to defer
covered by the provisions of Administrative Circular No. 04-94. arraignment and pre-trial
alleging that they recognize the salary increases of the health
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby modified in that the claim for personnel as a mandatory statutory obligation but the salary
moral, exemplary damages and attorney's fees in Civil Case No. Q-95- increases could not be implemented because of lack of funds
25977 of petitioner is ordered reinstated. and the municipality had incurred overdrafts and not due to any
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
G.R. No. 139396 August 15, 2000 negligence on their part.
Special Prosecution Officer I Ongpauco-Cortel recommended the
EFREN O. LOQUIAS, ANTONIO V. DIN, JR., ANGELITO L. MARTINEZ II, dismissal of the case
LOVELYN J. BIADOR, GREGORIO FACIOL, JR., petitioners, Petitioners filed MFR of the Resolution of the Office of the
vs. Ombudsman-Mindanao dated June 29, 1998 alleging that there is
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, and DR. JOSE PEPITO H. DALOGDOG, no probable cause in holding that they violated Section 3 (e) of the
DR. AURORA BEATRIZ A. ROMANO, MA. TERESITA C. ABASTAR, Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
JESSICA S. ALLAN, MA. TERESA ANIVERSARIO, respondents. Special Prosecution Officer I Ongpauco-Cortel recommended the
dismissal of the case was disapproved by Ombudsman Desierto
Petitioners allege that the order disapproving the dismissal of
Facts:
the case constitutes a denial of their motion for reconsideration.
Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao

SC petitioners filed petition for certiorari under Rule 65
private respondents (officers of the Association of Municipal Health
Office Personnel of Zamboanga del Sur who instituted the said
complaint in behalf of the 490 members of the said Association)
charged herein petitioners (members of the Sangguniang Bayan of
the said municipality) with violation of Republic Act No. 3019 for ISSUE: WON petition for certiorari filed by the petitioners at SC under rule
their alleged failure to give the salary increases and benefits 65 complies with Section 5, Rule 7
provided in Section 20 of the Magna Carta of Public Health
Workers (R.A. 7305) and Local Budget Circulars Nos. 54, 54-A, 56, NO
60 and 64 for the health personnel of the local government of San
Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur. In its Comment the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Solicitor General,
On the Resolution dated June 29, 1998 (Take note) Investigation alleges that the petition does not comply with Section 5, Rule 7 as the
Officer II Jovito A. Coresis, Jr. of the Office of the Ombudsman- Verification and the Certification on Non-Forum Shopping were signed
Mindanao found "probable cause to conclude that the crime of only by petitioner Antonio Din and not by all the petitioners and there
violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 has been committed by is no showing that petitioner Din was authorized by his co-petitioners
respondents Mayor, Vice-Mayor, members of the Sangguniang to represent them in this case; that the petition raise factual issues; and
Bayan and Budget Officer of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur" that the municipality had sufficient funds to grant the statutory salary
increases and benefits.

In their Reply, petitioners contend that there was substantial compliance the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition2 under Rule 65 and denied the
with Section 5, Rule 7 notwithstanding the fact that only one of the corresponding motion for reconsideration, respectively.
petitioners signed the verification and certification on forum shopping;
and that the petition does not call for an examination of the probative value Private respondent Casiano Hombria filed a Complaint for the recovery of a
of the evidence presented. parcel of land against his lessees, petitioner-spouses Antonio and Alfreda
Docena.
At the outset, it is noted that the Verification and Certification was signed by
The petitioners claimed ownership of the land based on occupation
Antonio Din, Jr., one of the petitioners in the instant case. We agree with
since time immemorial.
the Solicitor General that the petition is defective. Section 5, Rule 7
expressly provides that it is the plaintiff or principal party who shall A certain Guillermo Abuda intervened in the case.
certify under oath that he has not commenced any action involving the In a Decision, the trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners and the
same issues in any court, etc. Only petitioner Din, the Vice-Mayor of San intervenor Abuda.
Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, signed the certification.1wphi1 There is no On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial
showing that he was authorized by his co-petitioners to represent the latter court and ordered the petitioners:
and to sign the certification. It cannot likewise be presumed that petitioner to vacate the land they have leased from the plaintiff-appellant
Din knew, to the best of his knowledge, whether his co-petitioners had the [private respondent Casiano Hombria], excluding the portion
same or similar actions or claims filed or pending. We find that substantial which the petitioners reclaimed from the sea and forms part of
compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance by the the shore, as shown in the Commissioners Report, and
rules. The attestation contained in the certification on non-forum shopping to pay the plaintiff-appellant the agreed rental of P1.00 per
requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same. year from the date of the filing of the Complaint until they shall
Petitioners must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the have actually vacated the premises.
certification. Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by
The Complaint in Intervention of Abuda was dismissed.
harking on the policy of liberal construction.
Private respondent Hombria filed a Motion for Execution of the above
decision which has already become final and executory.
The petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The motion was granted by the public respondent judge, and a Writ
G.R. No. 140153. March 28, 2001.* of Execution was issued therefor.
public respondent sheriff subsequently filed a Manifestation
ANTONIO DOCENA and ALFREDA DOCENA, petitioners, vs. HON.
requesting that he be clarified in the determination of that particular
RICARDO P. LAPESURA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the
portion which is sought to be excluded prior to the delivery of the
RTC, Branch III, Guian, Eastern Samar; RUFINO M. GARADO, Sheriff IV;
land adjudged in favor of plaintiff Casiano Hombria in view of the
and CASIANO HOMBRIA, respondents.
defects in the Commissioners Report and the Sketches attached
Facts thereto.
After requiring the parties to file their Comment on the sheriffs
PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals. Manifestation, the public respondent judge, held
that x x x no attempt should be made to alter or modify the
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court decision of the Court of Appeals.
seeking the nullification of the Court of Appeals Resolutions which dismissed

What should be delivered therefore to the plaintiff x x x is that 1999.17
portion leased by the defendant-appellees from the plaintiff- Hence this petition.
appellant excluding the portion that the defendant-appellee
Issue
have reclaimed from the sea and forms part of the shore as
shown in the commissioners report x x x.
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
Pursuant to the Resolution, the public respondent sheriff issued an alias Writ
dismissing the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
of Demolition.
Ruling
The petitioners filed a Motion to Set Aside or Defer the Implementation of
Writ of Demolition. The petition is meritorious.
This motion was denied by the public respondent judge in an Order The Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for Certiorari upon the following
a copy of which was received by the petitioners on December 29, grounds, viz.:
1998.
Public respondent judge, in open court, granted the petitioners until the petition was filed beyond the 60-day period provided under Sec.
January 13, 1999 to file a Motion for Reconsideration. 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
petitioners moved for an extension of the period to file a motion for the certification of non-forum shopping was signed by only
reconsideration one of the petitioners.
The motion was finally filed by the petitioners, but was denied by It has been our previous ruling that the certificate of non-forum shopping
the trial court in an Order should be signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case, and that the
A copy of the Order was received by the petitioners signing by only one of them is insufficient. In the case of Efren Loquias, et al.
CA vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al. we held that the signing of the
Verification and the Certification on Non-Forum Shopping by only one of the
A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed by the petitioners with the petitioners constitutes a defect in the petition. The attestation contained in
Court of Appeals: the certification on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the
party executing the same, and the lone signing petitioner cannot be
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge presumed to have personal knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his co-
in issuing the Orders, and petitioners of any action or claim the same as or similar to the current
of the sheriff in issuing the alias Writ of Demolition. petition. To merit the Courts consideration, petitioners must show
reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification.
In a Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the
grounds that the petition was filed beyond the 60-day period In the case at bar, however, we hold that the subject Certificate of Non-
provided under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Forum Shopping signed by the petitioner Antonio Docena alone should be
Civil Procedure as amended by Bar Matter No. 803 effective deemed to constitute substantial compliance with the rules. There are only
September 1, 1998, and two petitioners in this case and they are husband and wife. Their residence
that the certification of non-forum shopping attached thereto was is the subject property alleged to be conjugal in the instant verified petition.
signed by only one of the petitioners The Verification/Certification on Non-Forum Shopping attached to the
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was signed only by the husband who
by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated September 9,

certified, inter alia, that he and his wife have not commenced any other interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and
action or proceeding involving the same issues raised in the petition in any legitimate objective.
court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency; that to the best of their knowledge no
such action is pending therein; and that he and his wife undertake to inform WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
the Court within five (5) days from notice of any similar action or proceeding Court of Appeals Resolutions are hereby SET ASIDE and the case is
which may have been filed. REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
The property subject of the original action for recovery is conjugal. Whether SO ORDERED.
it is conjugal under the New Civil Code or the Family Code, a fact that
cannot be determined from the records before us, it is believed that the G.R. No. 150865 June 30, 2006
certificate on non-forum shopping filed in the Court of Appeals constitutes
sufficient compliance with the rules on forum-shopping. ART FUENTEBELLA, Park-in-Charge, and ROLLING HILLS MEMORIAL
PARK, INC., Petitioners,
Under the New Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal vs.
partnership. In fact, he is the sole administrator, and the wife is not entitled DARLICA CASTRO, Respondent.
as a matter of right to join him in this endeavor. The husband may defend
the conjugal partnership in a suit or action without being joined by the wife.
RULING: A CERTIFICATION WHICH HAD BEEN SIGNED WITHOUT THE
Corollarily, the husband alone may execute the necessary certificate of non-
PROPER AUTHORIZATION IS DEFECTIVE AND CONSTITUTES
forum shopping to accompany the pleading. The husband as the statutory
A VALID CAUSE FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION.
administrator of the conjugal property could have filed the petition for
certiorari and prohibition alone, without the concurrence of the wife. If suits
to defend an interest in the conjugal properties may be filed by the husband EXCEPTION TO THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE FOR FAILURE OF ONE
alone, with more reason, he may sign the certificate of non-forum shopping OF THE PETITIONERS TO SIGN THE CERITIFICATION:
to be attached to the petition.
o Petitioners must comply with two conditions:
It is believed that even under the provisions of the Family Code, the husband
alone could have filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition to contest the 1. petitioners must show justifiable cause for their failure to
writs of demolition issued against the conjugal property with the Court of personally sign the certification; and,
Appeals without being joined by his wife. The signing of the attached
certificate of non-forum shopping only by the husband is not a fatal defect. 2. they must also be able to prove that the outright
dismissal of the petition would seriously impair the orderly
More important, the signing petitioner here made the certification in his
administration of justice. In the present case, we find that
behalf and that of his wife. The husband may reasonably be presumed to
petitioners failed to prove the presence of these
have personal knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his wife of any action
conditions.
or claim similar to the petition for certiorari and prohibition given the notices
and legal processes involved in a legal proceeding involving real property.
FACTS:
It bears stressing that the rules on forum shopping, which were designed to
promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should not be

The controversy primarily involves the application of Rule 7, because the amount of damages claimed is more than
Section 5 of the Rules of Court relating to the signature appearing P200,000.
on the certificate of non-forum shopping, and the submission of a o Respondent subsequently filed a motion to withdraw the
false certification. complaint, which was granted by the MTCC.
Respondent Darlica Castro is the widow of the late Freddie Castro
who died in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental. RTC NEGROS OCCIDENTAL: RESPONDENT: DAMAGES.
o Respondent engaged the funeral services of petitioner o Afterwards, respondent filed a similar complaint with the
Rolling Hills Memorial Park, Inc. in Bacolod City for the RTC of Negros Occidental.
interment of the remains of her husband. o Attached in the complaint was the Verification and
o During the burial, when the casket of her deceased Certification against Forum Shopping required under
husband was about to be lowered into the vault, it was Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, stating:
discovered that the dimensions of the vault did not
correspond to the measurements of the casket. That I further certify that I have not commenced any other action or
o As a result, the casket was lifted and placed under the proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, Court of
heat of the sun for about one hour in front of all the Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; that to the best of my knowledge,
mourners while the vault was being prepared. no such action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, Court of
o To make matters worse, the employees of petitioner Appeals, or other tribunal or agency, and that if I should thereafter learn that
corporation measured the casket by using a spade. a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, I shall
Insulted by the events that transpired at the funeral, respondent, undertake to report that fact within five (5) days to this Honorable Court.
through counsel, wrote to the management of petitioner corporation
demanding an explanation for its negligence, but the latter did not PETITIONER: MOTION TO DISMISS.
respond nor attempt to apologize to the former. GROUND: CERT. IS FALSE, RESPONDENT FILED AN
MTCC: RESPONDENT: DAMAGES. IDENTICAL COMPLAINT WITH THE MTCC.
PETITIONER: MOTION TO DISMISS. o Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
GROUND: NO JURISDICTION, AMOUNT OF DAMAGES certification is false because respondent had previously
CLAIMED IS MORE THAN P200K. filed an identical complaint with the MTCC.
RESPONDENT: MOTION TO WITHDRAW COMPLAINT.
GRANTED. DENIED MOTION TO DISMISS.
o Consequently, respondent filed a complaint for damages GROUND: REQUIRMENT NOT TO BE INTERPRETED TOO
against the corporation and its Park-in-Charge Art LITERALLY.
Fuentebella, jointly and solidarily, before the Municipal o The trial court issued the questioned order denying the
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City asking for motion to dismiss for lack of merit, to wit:
moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and
litigation costs.
x x x, while the requirement as to the certificate of non-forum shopping is
o Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
mandatory, nonetheless, the requirement is not to be interpreted too literally
MTCC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case

and thus defeat the objective of preventing the undesirable practice of forum Monico A. Puentevella, Jr., Corporate Secretary of
shopping. petitioner corporation, affirming therein the authority of
Lourdes A. Pomperada to file the aforementioned petition.
PETITIONER: M.R. (ALSO TAKE NOTE OF THIS.)
DENIED. HENCE, THIS PETITION FOR REVIEW.
o A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners
arguing that the motion to dismiss was not based on the ISSUE: WHETHER PETITIONER HAS COMPLIED WITH THE RULES ON
ground that respondent had filed two similar actions at the VERIFICATION AND CERITIFICATE AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING.
same time but rather on the submission by the latter of a
false certification. The trial court denied said motion in its HELD: NO.
order, dated July 9, 2001, stating:
It is obligatory that the one signing the verification and certification
As can be readily seen from the said provision, the sanction against forum shopping on behalf of the principal party or the other
provided by the said rule on the submission of a false certification is not petitioners has the authority to do the same.
dismissal of the case but [the same] will be considered as an indirect
contempt of Court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure provides:
criminal action that may be filed against the party concerned.
Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party

CA: PETITIONER: CERTIORARI WITH WPI AND/OR TRO. shall specify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting
DISMISSED. a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
o Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced
certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or restraining any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal
order. The petition, however, was dismissed by the Court or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other
of Appeals in its resolution issued on September 27, 2001, action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or
thus: claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and, (c) if he
should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed
A perusal of the records discloses that the verification and the or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the
certification against forum shopping was signed by a certain Lourdes court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Pomperada without any showing or indication that she is duly
authorized by the petitioners to sign for and in their behalf. (NOTE: Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be
THIS CONCERNS THE PETITIONERS VERIFICATION AND CERT. OF curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other
NON-FORUM SHOPPING NOT OF RESPONDENT ANYMORE.) initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the
case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion
M.R. DENIED. and after hearing.
o A motion for reconsideration of the above resolution was The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with
filed by petitioner Rolling Hills Memorial Park, Inc. any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect
attaching thereto a Secretarys Certificate signed by

contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding IN THE CASE AT BAR, the Court of Appeals accordingly
administrative and criminal actions. dismissed the petition for lack of proper authorization of the one
If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and signing it on behalf of petitioners.
deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for o Lourdes Pomperada, the Administrative Manager of
summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct petitioner corporation, who signed the verification and
contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions. certificate on non-forum shopping, initially failed to submit
The above provision mandates that the petitioner or the principal a secretarys certificate or a board resolution confirming
party must execute the certification against forum shopping. her authority to sign for the corporation, and a special
The reason for this is that the principal party has actual power of attorney to sign on behalf of co-petitioner Art
knowledge whether a petition has previously been filed Fuentebella, who was sued jointly and solidarily with
involving the same case or substantially the same issues. the corporation in his capacity as officer of the latter.
o If, for any reason, the principal party cannot sign the
petition, the one signing on his behalf must have been Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court requires that the petitioner
duly authorized. shall sign the certificate of non-forum shopping.
o In the case of corporations, the physical act of signing
This requirement is intended to apply to both natural and juridical may be performed in behalf of the corporate entity by
persons as Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 and Section 5, Rule specifically authorized individuals for the simple reason
7 of the Rules of Court do not make a distinction between natural that corporations, as artificial persons, cannot do the task
and juridical persons. themselves.
o Where the petitioner is a corporation, the certification o However, in the case of natural persons, the Rule
against forum shopping should be signed by its duly requires the parties themselves to sign the certificate of
authorized director or representative. non-forum shopping.
o This was enunciated in Eslaban, Jr. v. Vda. de Onorio, o The reason for such a requirement is that the petitioner
where the Court held that if the real party-in-interest is a himself, or in [the] case of a corporation, its duly
corporate body, an officer of the corporation can sign the authorized representative, knows better than anyone else
certification against forum shopping so long as he has whether a separate case has been filed or pending which
been duly authorized by a resolution of its board of involves substantially the same issues.
directors. EXCEPTION TO THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE FOR FAILURE
Likewise, where there are several petitioners, it is insufficient that OF ONE OF THE PETITIONERS TO SIGN THE
only one of them executes the certification, absent a showing that CERITIFICATION:
he was so authorized by the others. o Petitioners must comply with two conditions:
That certification requires personal knowledge and it cannot be
presumed that the signatory knew that his co-petitioners had the first, petitioners must show justifiable cause for their
same or similar actions filed or pending. failure to personally sign the certification; and,
Hence, a certification which had been signed without the
proper authorization is defective and constitutes a valid cause second, they must also be able to prove that the outright
for the dismissal of the petition. dismissal of the petition would seriously impair the orderly
administration of justice. In the present case, we find that

petitioners failed to prove the presence of these On December 27, 1996, petitioner filed with the (BIR) a claim for tax
conditions. refund/tax credit of the full amount of the 20% sales discount it granted
to senior citizens for the year 1995, allegedly totaling to PhP 123,083 in
SUB-ISSUE: WHETHER RSPONDENTS FAILURE TO DISCLOSE THAT accordance with Sec. 4 of RA 7432.
A SIMILAR CASE WAS EARLIER FILED BUT WAS LATER
WITHDRAWN FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION CONSTITUTED Ruling of the Court of Tax Appeals
FALSE CERTIFICATION. On April 26, 2000, the CTA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for
review for lack of merit.
HELD : NO. pursuant to Sec. 4 of RA 7432, the 20% sales discounts petitioner extended
to qualified senior citizens in 1995 should be treated as tax credit and not as
deductions from the gross sales as erroneously interpreted in RR 2-94.
An omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about any
event that would not constitute res judicata and litis pendentia, as in
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
the present case, is not fatal as to merit the dismissal and
On August 31, 2000, the CA issued the assailed Resolution dismissing the
nullification of the entire proceedings considering that the evils
petition on procedural grounds.
sought to be prevented by the said certificate are not present.
The CA held that the person who signed the verification and certification of
Hence, in any event, the trial court correctly held that the absence of forum shopping, a certain Jacinto J. Concepcion, President of
submission of a false certification shall constitute indirect contempt petitioner, failed to adduce proof that he was duly authorized by the board of
of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and directors to do so.
criminal sanctions.
This is in accordance with Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. ISSUES:
Whether the President of a corporation is authorized to sign the verification
Cagayan Valley Drug Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal and certification against forum shopping, without need of a board
Revenue resolution.(In sufficient compliance with Secs. 4 and 5, Rule 7 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.)
Facts:
Whether the CTA committed reversible error in denying and dismissing
Petitioner, a corporation, is a duly licensed retailer of medicine and petitioners action for refund or tax credit.
other pharmaceutical products. It operates two drugstores, one in
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and the other in Roxas, Isabela, under the name HELD: that the following officials or employees of the company can sign the
and style of Mercury Drug. verification and certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the
Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3)
In compliance with Revenue Regulation No. (RR) 2-94, petitioner the General Manager or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and
treated the 20% sales discounts granted to qualified senior citizens in (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case.
1995 as deductions from the gross sales in order to arrive at the net
sales, instead of treating them as tax credit as provided by Section 4 of GR: 154704 June 1, 2011
RA 7432.

NELLIE VDA. DE FORMOSO and her children, namely, MA. THERESA act for the rest. In the case at bar, there was no showing
FORMOSO-PESCADOR, ROGER FORMOSO, MARY JANE FORMOSO, that he was authorized. Certification of non-forum
BERNARD FORMOSO, and PRIMITIVO MALCABA, Petitioners, shopping requires personal knowledge of the party who
executed it. Petitioners must show reasonable cause for
vs. failure to personally sign the certification.
o MR = DENIED
PNB, FRANCISCO ARCE, ATTY. BENJAMIN BARBERO (NAKU!
Supreme Court: Petitioners argued that they have substantially
MAHIRAP MAGING LAWYER ITO!),AND ROBERTO NAVARRO,
complied with the requirements on verification and certification of
Respondents. non-forum shopping. Petitioners are of the view that the rule on the
verification and certification should be liberally construed, since
This is a petition assailing the decision of the CA which dismissed
only questions of law are raised in a petition for certiorari and no
the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners on the ground that the verification
factual issues that require personal knowledge of the petitioners.
and certification of non-forum shopping was signed by only one of the
o PNB countered that the mandatory rule on certification
petitioners.
against forum shopping requires that all of the 6
FACTS: petitioners must sign.
Malcaba was not a party or signatory to the
Petitioner Nellie and her 5 children executed a SPA in favor of contract of loan between PNB and Nellie. Neither
Malcaba, authorizing him to secure all papers and documents and was there evidence that Malcaba was a co-
owners copies of the titles of real properties pertaining to a loan owner.
with REM from PNB.
RULING:
Nellie and her family sold the property to Malcaba. So Malcaba
went to PNB to fully pay the obligation. PNB refused. (insert evil
Petition lack merit! Hmp!
music)
Petitioners filed a complaint for Specific Performance in the RTC of Certiorari is an extraordinary, prerogative remedy and is never issued as
Vigan, praying PNB be ordered to accept the payment. matter of right. The party who seeks to avail of it must strictly observe the
o RTC favored the petitioners, however their prayer for rules laid down by law. A PfC is availed of when any tribunal has acted with
damages was denied. grave abuse of discretion. A petition shall be accompanied by, among
o PNB = MR = DENIED. others, a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. It shall contain names
o Petitioners filed a petition for Relief from Judgment and addresses of all the parties. The petitioner shall also submit a sworn
questioning the RTC decision their evidence does not certification that he has not commenced any other action involving the same
warrant an award for damages. DENIED. issues in the SC or CA.
o Petitioners = MR = DENIED.
Court of Appeals: Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari. Failure of the petitioner to comply with the requirements shall be sufficient
DISMISSED. ground for dismissal of the petition.
o Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was
signed by only one of the many petitioners. All petitioners Acceptance of a PfC is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
must be signatories to the certification of non-forum Although the court has absolute discretion to reject and dismiss a PfC, it
shopping, unless the one who signed was empowered to does so only when the petition fails to demonstrate grave abuse of discretion

and when there are procedural errors, like violations of the Rules of Courts alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and
or SC Circulars. correct.
In the case at bench the petitioners claim they have complied with the 4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance
requirements on verification and certification of non-forum shopping. The therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not
court disagrees! curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless
there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or compelling
mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be reasons."
cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false 5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all
certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not
constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or
administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or
clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause
ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the
contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions. certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the
Rule.
For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form
the jurisprudential pronouncements already reflected above respecting non- 6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be
compliance with the requirements on, or submission of defective, verification executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for
and certification against forum shopping: reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to
sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the counsel of record to sign on his behalf.
requirement on or submission of defective verification, and non-
compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective In the PfC in the CA there were 7 petitioners but only Malacaba signed.
certification against forum shopping. There was no proof that Malcaba was authorized by his co-petitioners to
sign for them. There was no special power of attorney shown by the
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein Formosos authorizing Malcaba as their attorney-in-fact in filing a petition for
does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The review on certiorari.
Court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading
if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with The certificate of non-forum shopping should be signed by all the
the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice petitioners or plaintiffs in a case, and that the signing by only one of
may be served thereby. them is insufficient. The attestation on non-forum shopping requires
personal knowledge by the party executing the same, and the lone
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who signing petitioner cannot be presumed to have personal knowledge of
has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the
complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters

the filing or non-filing by his co-petitioners of any action or claim the between petitioner, on one hand, and the respondents as heirs of Joselito
same as similar to the current petition. Daffon, on the other hand.
Petitioner filed a MD on the grounds of (1) lack of jurisdiction over the

The certification against forum shopping in CA-G.R. SP No. 72284 is
subject matter of the case; (2) failure of the complaint to state a cause of
fatally defective, not having been duly signed by both petitioners and
action; and (3) waiver, abandonment and extinguishment of the obligation.
thus warrants the dismissal of the petition for certiorari.
She argued that the trial court cannot take cognizance of the action for
Rule 8 Manner of making allegations in Pleadings partition considering her claim of absolute ownership over the properties;
and that respondents themselves admitted that petitioner has repudiated the
CONCEPCION V. VDA. DE DAFFON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE co-ownership. Anent the third ground, petitioner alleged that Joselito Daffon
COURT OF APPEALS, LOURDES OSMEA VDA. DE DAFFON, filed a complaint against Milagros Marin, who was likewise married to
.
AILEEN DAFFON, JOSELITO DAFFON, JR., ANA VANESA Amado Daffon, for recovery of a parcel of land in Mandaluyong In said
DAFFON, LEILA DAFFON and SUZETTE complaint, respondent Lourdes Osmea Vda. de Daffon allegedly admitted
DAFFON, respondents. that the land sought was the only property of the late Amado Daffon.
FACTS: RTC denied MD. MR was filed by Petitioner-denied
Petitioner went to CA via certiorari-dismissed, MR-denied, hence he went to

Petitioner Concepcion Villamor was married to the late Amado Daffon, with
SC
whom she begot one son, Joselito Daffon. Joselito married Lourdes
Osmea, and they bore six children, namely, Aileen, Joselito Jr., Ana ISSUE: WON a complaint fails to state a cause of action?NO
Vanesa, Leila, Julius and Suzette.
RULLING: It should be stressed that in the determination of whether a
Amado passed away followed by His son, Joselito, complaint fails to state a cause of action, only the statements in the
complaint may be properly considered. Moreover, a defendant who moves to
RTC- Davao
dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action hypothetically
Respondents Lourdes Osmea Vda. De Daffon, together with her six minor admits all the averments thereof. The test of sufficiency of the facts found in
children, instituted an action for partition against petitioner Concepcion a complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the
Villamor Vda. de Daffon facts alleged the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in
accordance with the prayer thereof. The hypothetical admission extends to
Respondents alleged that Amado left several real and personal properties the relevant and material facts well pleaded in the complaint and inferences
which formed part of his conjugal partnership with petitioner. Joselito being fairly deducible therefrom. Hence, if the allegations in the complaint furnish
a forced heir of Amado was entitled to at least one half of Amados estate, sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should
consisting of his share in the said conjugal properties. However, the said not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be assessed by the
properties were never partitioned between petitioner and Joselito. After defendants.
Joselitos death, petitioners behavior towards respondents, her daughter-in-
law and grandchildren, changed. She claimed absolute ownership over all IN THE CASE AT BAR: the complaint sufficiently alleged that
the properties and deprived them of the fruits thereof. Thus, respondents defendant (i.e., petitioner herein) was married to Amado Quiros Daffon and
[11]
prayed that the conjugal properties of Amado Daffon and petitioner be that they begot an only son in Joselito Daffon. The complaint further
partitioned and that the one-half share of Amado be further partitioned alleged that Joselito Daffon later got married to herein plaintiff Lourdes

Osmea and before the former died on October 25, 1990 he sired the six (6) REYES, petitioners,
children who are now plaintiffs with their mother. vs.
THE HON. JUDGE ABDULWAHID A. BIDIN, in his capacity as Presiding
SC: Such allegation was sufficient that Joselito Daffon was a legitimate
Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance, City of Zamboanga,
son of the spouses Amado and Concepcion Daffon; and that plaintiffs DALMACIO RAMOS, and JUANITO CAMACHO, respondents.
(i.e.,respondents herein) were likewise legitimate heirs of Joselito
Daffon. Admitting the truth of these averments, there was, therefore, no
Facts:
need to inquire whether respondent minor children were duly acknowledged
by the deceased Amado Daffon. To be sure, the illegitimacy of the said
children and the lack of acknowledgment are matters which petitioner may RTC
raise as a defense in her answer and threshed out by the court during a full-
blown trial. The petitioners filed a case for recovery of hereditary rights against
the respondents alleging that their shares in the inheritance left by
In the same vein, there is no need for the complaint to specifically their mother were NEVER sold, transferred or disposed to others
allege respondents claim of co-ownership of the properties. The complaint persons nor to their brother Dionisio Toribio.
needs only to allege the ultimate facts on which the plaintiffs rely for their
claim. In their answer, the defendants-respondents alleged that the shares
of plaintiffs-petitioners had likewise been sold to Dionisio Toribio,
The rules of procedure require that the complaint must make a concise
their brother, who, in turn, sold the same to Juanito Camacho and
statement of the ultimate facts or the essential facts constituting the
Dalmacio Ramos. The alleged sale from petitioners to Dionisio and
plaintiffs cause of action. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out
the sale from Dionisio to the respondents were evidenced by
without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate. A
deeds of sale, xerox copies of which were appended to and
complaint states a cause of action only when it has its three indispensable
made an integral part of the respondents' partition agreement
elements, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and
between the respondents and also a xerox copy of the
under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of
respondents' transfer certificates of title.
the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act
or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of plaintiff or
Petitioners - filed a constancia with a motion for reconsideration -
constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which
[14] DENIED
the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.
Petitioners contend that the documents submitted by the
THUS, The allegations contained therein are sufficient to establish respondents were merely evidentiary in nature, not a cause of
respondents right to the estate of Amado Daffon. By stating their action or defense, the due execution and genuineness of
relationship to the deceased, they established their line of succession as the which they had to prove. They alleged that the subject of
basis for their claim. Their rights to succeed as heirs were transmitted from litigation was the hereditary shares of plaintiffs-petitioners, not
the moment of death of the decedent. any document. They stated that the defense consisting mainly
of transfer certificates of titles in the respondents' names
G.R. No. L-57821 January 17, 1985 originating from the sale from petitioners to Dionisio and from
the latter to the respondents were merely evidentiary in nature.
They argued that a simple specific denial without oath is
SEGUNDINO TORIBIO, EUSEBIA TORIBIO, and the HEIRS OF
sufficient.
OLEGARIO TORIBIO, represented by his widow, ADELA DE LOS

MOR denied between the co-heirs is also elemental to the defense of the
documents attached to the respondents' answer and made respondents. The first deeds of sale (from petitioners to their brother), to
an integral part thereof were declared to be the very which the respondents were not parties but which they seek to enforce
foundation or basis of the respondents' defense and not against the parties are also actionable documents.
merely evidentiary in nature.
CIVPRO ISSUE: WON Section 7 and 8, Rule 8 applies in the case
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
HELD: YES.
SUBISSUE: WON the deeds of sale allegedly executed by the petitioners in
favor of their brother Dionisio Toribio and appended to the respondents' The petitioners further alleged that this case falls under the exception to
answer are merely evidentiary in nature or the very foundation of their Section 8, Rule 8 which provides:
defense which must be denied under oath by the petitioner?
SEC. 7. Action or defense based on document.
HELD: The deeds of sale are actionable documents hence, the very Whenever an action or defense is based upon a written
foundation of their defense. instrument or document, the substance of such instrument
or document shall be set forth in the pleading, and the
Jurisprudence has centered mainly on a discussion of actionable documents original or a copy thereof shall be attached to the pleading
as basis of a plaintiff's cause of action. Little has been said of actionable as an exhibit, which shall be deemed to be a part of the
documents being the foundation of a defense. The Rule, however, covers pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set forth in
both an action or a defense based on documents. the pleading.
The respondents anchor their defense on the deeds of sale by virtue of SECTION 8. How to contest genuineness of such
which the hereditary rights of all the petitioners over the disputed lot were documents. When an action or defense is founded
sold, transferred, and conveyed in favor of their brother, Dionisio Toribio, upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the
who in turn sold the same to herein respondents. The deed of sale executed corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding
by the petitioners in favor of their brother Dionisio is an essential and section, the genuineness and due execution of the
indispensable part of their defense to the allegation that the petitioners instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse
had never disposed of their property. party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth
what he claims to be the facts; but this provision does
The deed of sale executed by Dionisio Toribio in favor of the respondents, not apply when the adverse party does not appear to
by itself, would be insufficient to establish a defense against the petitioners' be a party to the instrument.
claims. If the petitioners deny that they ever sold their shares in the inherited
lot to their brother Dionisio, a failure to prove the sale would be decisive. For The petitioners are themselves parties to the deeds of sale which are sought
if it can be shown that no conveyance of the property was executed by the to be enforced against them. The complaint was filed by the petitioners.
petitioners, then Dionisio Toribio had no right to convey what did not belong They filed suit to recover their hereditary properties. The new owners
to him. The respondents could acquire only the rights that Dionisio had over introduced deeds of sale as their main defense. In other words, the
the disputed property. The genuineness and due execution of the deed

petitioners brought the issue upon themselves. They should meet it WHEREFORE, the order of the respondent court dated July 20, 1981 is
properly according to the Rules of Court. hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court which took
over the cases of the respondent court is ordered to receive the petitioners'
Sections 7 and 8 of Rule 8, therefore, apply. The proper procedure was for evidence regarding the genuineness and due execution of the disputed
the petitioners to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and deeds of sale.
due execution of the questioned deeds of sale and to set forth what
they claim to be the facts. However, the oversight or negligence of G.R. No. 13300 September 29, 1919
petitioners' counsel in not properly drafting a reply to the answer and an
answer to the counter claim is not necessarily fatal to their cause. BASILIA BOUGH and GUSTAVUS BOUGH, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
The facts of the case and equitable considerations constrain us to MATILDE CANTIVEROS and PRESBITERA HANOPOL, defendants-
grant the petition and to set aside the questioned order of the appellees.
respondent court.
Facts
As stated earlier, the reason for the rule is to enable the adverse party to CFI
know beforehand whether he will have to meet the issue of genuineness or
due execution of the document during trial. While mandatory, the rule is a This action was begun in the Court of First Instance of Leyte, pursuant to a
discovery procedure and must be reasonably construed to attain its purpose, complaint by means of which the plaintiffs Basilia Bough and Gustavus
and in a way as not to effect a denial of substantial justice. The interpretation Bough sought to have themselves put in possession of the property covered
should be one which assist the parties in obtaining a speedy, inexpensive, by the deed of sale quoted in the complaint, and to require the defendant
and most important, a just determination of the disputed issues. Matilde Cantiveros to pay the plaintiffs the sum of five hundreds pesos by
way of damages, and to pay the costs.
The petitioners' counsel was obviously lulled into complacency by two
factors. First, the plaintiffs, now petitioners, had already stated under oath Matilde Cantiveros answered with a general denial and a special defense,
that they never sold, transferred, or disposed of their shares in the not sworn to, in which she asked that judgment be rendered declaring the
inheritance to others. Second, the usual procedure is for a defendant (NOT contract of sale theretofore made between herself and Basilia Bough null.
the plaintiff) to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due
The plaintiffs, thereupon, denied under oath the genuineness and due
execution of documents set forth in and annexed to the complaint.
execution of the so-called donation intervivos set forth in the answer.
Somehow, it skipped counsel's attention that the rule refers to either
Presbitera Hanopol was permitted to intervene as a defendant.
an action or a defense based upon a written instrument or document. It
applies to both plaintiffs and defendants.
After trial, judgment was rendered by the Honorable W. E. McMahon, judge
of first instance, in favor of the defendants, declaring the deed of sale,
An interpretation of a rule of procedure which would not deny to the Exhibit A, fictitious, null, and without effect, and absolving the defendants
petitioners their rights to their inheritance is warranted by the circumstances from the complaint, with costs against the plaintiffs.
of this case.
It is from this judgment through the ordinary means of perfection of a bill of
exceptions that the case is brought to this court for decision.

Ruling in issue, by denial under oath, the due execution of the instrument, as
required in section 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure, operates as an
The first assignment of error reads: "The lower Court erred in permitting the admission of the authority of the officer to execute the contract, since the
defendants to present evidence, over the objections of the plaintiff, tending authority of the officer to bind the company is essential to the due execution
to impugn the genuineness and due execution of the document, Exhibit A, of its contract. (Ramirez vs. Orientalist Co. and Fernandez [1918], 38 Phil.,
and in admitting them to show the circumstances under which it was 634.) But the failure of the party to file an affidavit denying the genuineness
executed. and due execution of the document does not estop him from controverting it
by evidence of fraud, mistake, compromise, payment, statute of limitations,
It is undeniable that this was an action brought upon a written instrument, estoppel, and want of consideration. As section 285 of our Code of Civil
and that the complaint contained a copy of the instrument, but that its Procedure permits a writing to be impeached because of its illegality or
genuineness and due execution were not specifically denied under oath in fraud, such a defense would not be barred by the provisions of section 103.
the answer. Is this fatal to the defense? (Moore vs. Copp [1897], 119 Cal., 429 Brooks vs. Johnson [1898], 122 Cal.,
569; Hibberd vs. Rohde and McMillian [1915], 32 Phil., 476.)
Section 103 of the Philippine Code of Civil Procedure provides:
We hold that although the defendants did not deny the genuineness and due
When an action is brought upon a written instrument and the
execution of the contract of sale of December 9, 1913, under oath, yet the
complaint contains or has annexed a copy of such
defendants could properly set up the defenses of fraud and want of
instrument, the genuineness and due execution of the
consideration.
instrument shall be deemed admitted, unless specifically
denied under oath in the answer; and when the defense to Hibberd vs. Rohde
an action, or a counterclaim stated in an answer, is founded
upon a written instrument and the copy thereof is contained G.R. No. L-8418, December 09, 1915
in or annexed to the answer, the genuineness and due
execution of such instrument shall be deemed admitted, RULING: FAILURE TO FILE A VERIFIED SPECIFIC DENIAL OF THE
unless specifically denied under oath by the plaintiff in his GENUINESS AND DUE EXECUTION OF A PROMISSORY NOTE
pleadings. GIVES THE PLAINTIFF A PRIMA FACIE CASE WHICH
DISPENSES WITH THE NECESSITY OF EVIDENCE OF ITS DUE
This section is derived from sections 448 and 449 of the Code of Civil EXECUTION
Procedure of California, and is to be found in varying form in the statutes of
practically all the states of the American Union. The meaning of this portion HOWEVER IT CANNOT PRECLUDE A DEFENDANT FROM
of the Code, and the intention of the Legislature in enacting it, are easily INTRODUCING ANY DEFENSE ON THE MERITS WHICH DOES
found. The law says that the genuineness and due execution of a written NOT CONTRADICT THE EXECUTION OF THE INSTRUMENT
instrument properly pleaded shall be deemed admitted unless the plaintiff or INTRODUCED IN EVIDENCE.
defendant, as the case may be, shall specifically deny the same under oath.
When the law makes use of the phrase "genuineness and due execution of Facts:
the instrument" it means nothing more than that the instrument is not
spurious, counterfeit, or of different import on its face from the one executed. D.J. McMillian was in the retail liquor business and secured a stock
As an example, where the name of a corporation is signed to the document of merchandise valued at P1,200 from Brand & Hibberd.
which is the basis of an action, the failure of the defendant corporation to put Later Brand & Hibberd filed a complaint of estafa against McMillian.

The defendant Rohde was a practicing attorney and the documents was delivered; and that any formal requisites
undertook McMillian's defense in the estafa case. required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue
Rohde testified that he was well acquainted with the nature of the stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him.
transaction between the firm of Brand & Hibberd and McMillian. Hence, such defense as that the signature is a forgery; or that it
Later on Rohde agreed to sign the following note if Brand & was unauthorized, as in the case of an agent signing for his
Hibberd would withdraw the estafa complaint: principal, or one signing in behalf of a partnership, or of a
corporation; or that, in the case of the latter, that the corporation
Baguio, Benget, April 27th, 1911 was not authorized under its charter to sign the instrument; or that
the party charged signed the instrument in some other capacity
For value received, we the undersigned parties, jointly and than that alleged in the pleading setting it out; or that it was never
severally agree to pay to thefirm of Brand & Hibberd, of the city of delivered are cut off by the admission of its genuineness and
Baguio, P.J., twelve hundred pesos Philippine currency in monthly due execution.
installments of one hundred pesos per month, beginning with the The effect of the admission is such that in the case of a promissory
first day of June 1911. note a prima facie case is made for the plaintiff which
dispenses with the necessity of evidence on his part and entitles
W.M.J. Rohde him to a judgment on the pleadings unless a special defense of
D.J. McMillian new matter, such as payment, is interposed by the defendant.
The only object of the rule was to enable a plaintiff to make out a
Rohde did this because he did not want his client to remain in prima facie, not a conclusive case, and it cannot preclude a
confinement pending his trial in the Courts of First Instance. defendant from introducing any defense on the merits which
However the CFI found as a fact that the consideration of the note does not contradict the execution of the instrument introduced
was the compromise of a public offense. in evidence.
Now because Rohde has not entered a verified specific denial To so interpret section 103 as to prohibit such a defense as
of the genuiness and due execution of the note, the plaintiff illegality of consideration, which is clearly a defense of new matter,
claims that his special defense of illegality of consideration is cut would pro tanto repeal the second paragraph of section 94, which
off. permits a defendant to answer by A statement of any new matter
constituting a defense or counterclaim.
Issue: Whether Rohde was barred from questioning the legality of the note Likewise, section 285 provides that the terms of a writing may be
due to not having verified specific denial of the genuiness and due impeached by reason of its illegality or fraud. SC does not
execution of the note. understand that such defenses are barred by the provisions of
section 103.
Held: No. SC accordingly holds that the special defense interposed by the
defendant of illegality of consideration is not barred by his failure
By the admission of the genuineness and due execution of an to enter a verified denial of the genuineness and due execution of
instrument is meant that the party whose signature it bears admits the note set out in the complaint.
that he signed it or that it was signed by another for him with his
authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures PERFECTO JABALDE, plaintiff-appellant,
exactly as set out in the pleadings of the party relying upon it; that

vs. G.R. No. 169548 March 15, 2010
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, defendant-appellee.
TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, Petitioner,
Facts: vs.
MANUEL A. DAVID, SR. and MARTHA S. DAVID, Respondents.
- Plaintiff-appellant deposited a sum of money with defendant-
appellee Philippine National Bank (PNB)
FACTS:
- Plaintiff filed this complaint, seeking the recovery of said amount
(P10,000. First P5,000 Phil currency; Second 5000 Phil - Manuel and Martha David were spouses who owned lots registered
currency and Japanese military notes) in the latter's name. The spouses separated de facto
o Basis: a passbook - Manuel discovered that Martha had sold the property to petitioner
Titan Construction Corp. for P1.5M through a Deed of Sale
- Defendant filed an answer which was not under oath and admitting
the making of the foregoing deposits, but denying the dates - Manuel filed a complaint for annulment of contract and
indicated in the passbook, reconveyance against petitioner Titan Construction before the RTC-
QC
o PNB alleged that there were discrepancies in said
passbook, likely due to tampering on the part of plaintiff o The ground was, the sale executed by Martha in favor of
titan was made without his knowledge/consent
Issue: W/N defendant PNB's failure to deny under oath the entries in the
passbook as 'copied' in the complaint constitutes an admission of the - Titans counterclaim stated that it was a buyer in good faith and for
genuineness and due execution of the document value because it relied on a Special Power of Attorney (SPA)
signed by Manuel which authorized Maria to dispose of the property
Held: NO on behalf of the spouses
- General rule: such failure is tantamount to such an admission o Titan prayed for the dismissal of the complaint
- But this rule is inapplicable in the case at bar because the plaintiff - RTC: declared the deed of sale void ab initio
submitted evidence indicating what was allegedly the dates of
deposit, but did not raise an objection when witnesses testified o The SPA authorizing Maria to dispose of the property was
on different dates of deposit void ab initio
- By this omission, the plaintiff waived the defendant's failure to deny - CA: affirmed the lower court's decision
under oath the genuineness and execution of the passbook entries
o MfR denied
- Hence, PNB may interpose a defense assailing the genuineness
- Hence the instant PfRC R45
and due execution of the passbook entries

o Titan contended that the lower court erred in declaring the FACTS:
SPA (and in turn, the deed of sale) void ab initio
lots Nos. 1226 and 1182 of the Cadastral Survey had
Ground: Rule 8, which states that when an been sold by C. N. Hodges to Vicente M. Layson.In order that he could use
action/defense is based on a written instrument said lots as security for a loan he intended to apply from a bank, Layson
or document, the genuineness and due execution persuaded Hodges to execute in his (Layson's) favor a deed of absolute sale
thereof is deemed admitted unless the adverse over the properties, with the understanding that he would put up a surety
party specifically denies them under oath bond to guarantee the payment of said balance. Layson executed, in favor of
Hodges, a promissory and indicated there in the principal and interest and
Manuel filed a reply alleging that the SPA was a and the sum of P1,551.60, for attorney's fees and costs in case of default in
forgery, but the same was not made under oath the payment of the principal or interest of said note. To guarantee the same
the Central Surety and Insurance Company (petitioner) through the
Therefore, Manuel cannot assail the genuineness manager ( MRS.MESA)of its executed in favor of Hodges the surety bond .
and due execution of the SPA
Layson defaulted in the discharge of his obligation,
ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in declaring the deed of sale as void Hodges demanded payment from the petitioner but Layon failed to settle it.
ab initio
CFI-ILOIOLO
RULING: Hodges file recovery jointly and severally the sum against Layson
and petitioner
In his answer to the complaint, Layson admitted the formal

NO!!! allegations and denied the other allegations. While petitioner was
declared in default.
It is true that the reply filed by Manuel alleging that the special power of
attorney is a forgery was not made under oath. However, the complaint, CFI-ruled in favor of HODGE
which was verified by Manuel under oath, alleged that the sale of the subject
Petitioner filled a MR and a motion for relief under Rule 38-CFI set
property executed by his wife, Martha, in favor of Titan was without his
aside decision against the petitioner and admitted its answer.
knowledge, consent, and approval, express or implied; and that there is
nothing on the face of the deed of sale that would show that he gave his ANSWER OF PETITIONER :petitioner disclaimed liability under
consent thereto. the surety bond in question, upon the ground (a) that the same is
null and void, it having been issued by Mrs. Rosita Mesa after her
While Section 8, Rule 8 is mandatory, it is a discovery procedure and must
authority therefor had been withdrawn (b) that even under her
be reasonably construed to attain its purpose, and in a way as not to effect a
original authority Mrs. Mesa could not issue surety bonds in
denial of substantial justice. The interpretation should be one which assists excess of P8,000.00 without the approval of petitioner's main
the parties in obtaining a speedy, inexpensive, and most important, a just office which was not given to the surety bond in favor of Hodges;
determination of the disputed issues.
and (c) that the present action is barred by the provision in the
surety bond to the effect that all claims and actions thereon should
CENTRAL SURETY and INSURANCE COMPANY, petitioner, vs.
C. N. HODGES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

be filed within three (3) months from the date of its expiration on G.R. No. 143338 July 29, 2005
January 23, 1955.
THE CONSOLIDATED BANK AND TRUST CORPORATION
CFI-ruled for Pet. HODGES went to CA-ruled for HODGES hence
(SOLIDBANK), Petitioners,
petitioner went to SC
vs.
PET contention: they assails the finding of the Court of Appeals to DEL MONTE MOTOR WORKS, INC., NARCISO G. MORALES, AND
the effect that the petitioner is liable for the full amount of surety SPOUSE, Respondents.
bond 17,826.08 despite the fact that it exceeded the sum of
P8,000.00 and hence, required, for its validity and binding effect Facts:
as against petitioner herein, the express approval and
confirmation of its Manila office, which were not secured in view 2
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of
of petitioner's failure to deny under oath the genuineness and due Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 16886 entitled, "The Consolidated Bank & Trust
execution of said bond, copy of which was attached to the Corporation (SOLIDBANK) v. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc., Narciso O.
complaint Morales and Spouse" promulgated on 25 November 1999 and of the
Resolution of the appellate court dated 11 May 2000 denying petitioners
RULLING: motion for reconsideration. Said decision and resolution affirmed the order
dated 28 December 1987 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27,
Section 8 of Rule 8 of the Rules of Court: When an action or defense is Manila.
founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the
corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the In a promissory note, respondent Del Monte Motor Works, Inc. (respondent
genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed corporation) and Morales bound themselves jointly and severally to pay
admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies petitioner for the P1M granted to them by the latter. Respondent defaulted
them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but this provision and failed to pay.
does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the
instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original RTC
instrument is refused. Petitioner filed before the RTC of Manila a complaint for recovery of
sum of money against respondents, impleading the spouse of
IN THIS CASE: The parties acted in complete disregard of or wholly respondent Narciso O. Morales (respondent Morales) in order to
overlooked the rule above-quoted. Hodges had neither objected to the bind their conjugal partnership of gains.
evidence introduced by petitioner herein in order to prove that Mrs. Mesa Petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Declare the Defendants in
had no authority to issue a surety bond, much less one in excess of Default
P8,000.00, and took no exception to the admission of said evidence. opposed by the defendants upon the ground that they were
never served with copies of the summons and of petitioners
Hence, Hodges must be deemed to have waived the benefits of said rule complaint.
and petitioner was held liable only for the sum of P8,000.00 and not the Respondent corporation filed a manifestation attaching `its answer
entire amount. to petitioners complaint which states the following:

TC - denied petitioners motion to declare respondents in default longer possessed any proof of respondents alleged
and admitted their respective answers indebtedness.
Respondents filed their respective defenses independently TC dismissed the case
During the trial on the merits of this case, petitioner presented as its CA affirmed TC MFR denied
sole witness, Liberato A. Lavarino (Lavarino), then the manager of
its Collection Department.
Petitioner made its formal offer of evidence. However, as the ISSUE: WON CA gravely erred when it upheld the exclusion of exhibit E,
original copy of Exhibit "A" (the promissory note) could no the second original copy of the promissory note, despite the fact that the
longer be found, petitioner instead sought the admission of original of exhibit A (xerox copy of the duplicate original of the promissory
the duplicate original of the promissory note which was note) was actually in the possession of private respondents, thus warranting
identified and marked as Exhibit "E." the admission of secondary evidence.
TC initially admitted into evidence Exhibit "E" and granted
respondents motion that they be allowed to amend their respective HELD: YES.
answers to conform with this new evidence.
Respondent corporation filed a manifestation and motion for
Respondents were able to generally and specifically deny under oath the
reconsideration of the trial courts order admitting into evidence
genuineness and due execution of the promissory note, thus:
petitioners Exhibit "E." Respondent corporation claims that Exhibit
"E" should not have been admitted as it was immaterial,
irrelevant, was not properly identified and hearsay evidence. There can be no dispute to the fact that the allegations in the
Respondent corporation insists that Exhibit "E" was not properly answer (Record, p. 20, 26-27), of both defendants, they denied
identified by Lavarino who testified that he had nothing to do in the generally and specifically under oath the genuineness and due
preparation and execution of petitioners exhibits, one of which was execution of the promissory note and by way of special and
Exhibit "E." Further, as there were markings in Exhibit "A" which affirmative defenses herein states that he (MORALES) never
were not contained in Exhibit "E," the latter could not possibly be signed the promissory note attached to the complaint (Exh. A) in his
considered an original copy of Exhibit "A." Lastly, respondent personal and/or individual capacity. Moreover, what appears in the
corporation claims that the exhibit in question had no bearing on record (Record, p. 20) was an admission of paragraphs 1 & 2 but
the complaint as Lavarino admitted that Exhibit "E" was not the they deny generally and specifically the rest of the allegations. It
original of Exhibit "A" which was the foundation of the complaint would be considered that there is a sufficient compliance of the
and upon which respondent corporation based its own answer. requirement of the law for specific denial.
Respondent Morales similarly filed a manifestation with motion to
reconsider order admitting as evidence Exhibit "E insisting that the The pertinent portion of the Rules of Court on the matter provides:
due execution and genuineness of the promissory note were
NOT established as far as he was concerned. SEC. 8. How to contest such documents. When an action or defense is
TC - granted respondents motions for reconsideration with regard founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the
to the admission of Exhibit "E. corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the
Petitioners MFR denied genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed
Respondents separately filed their motions to dismiss on the similar admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them
ground that with the exclusion of Exhibits "A" and "E," petitioner no and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but the requirement of an

oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to RICARDO MASONGSONG, Respondent.
the instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the
original instrument is refused. Facts
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and of the

Respondents denials do not constitute an effective specific denial as
26 Resolution promulgated by the Court of Appeals. The Decision dismissed
contemplated by law. In the early case ofSongco vs. Sellner, the Court
Nestorio Memitas (Memita) appeal and affirmed the Decision of Branch 50
expounded on how to deny the genuineness and due execution of an
of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental (trial court), while the
actionable document, viz.:
Resolution denied Memitas motion for reconsideration.
. . . This means that the defendant must declare under oath that he Masongsong, under the business name of RM Integrated Services, was the
did not sign the document or that it is otherwise false or fabricated. distributor of San Miguel Foods, Inc.s Magnolia chicken products.
Neither does the statement of the answer to the effect that the Masongsong supplied Magnolia chicken products on a 25-day payment
instrument was procured by fraudulent representation raise any credit to Memitas Vicor Store in Burgos Public Market, Bacolod City.
issue as to its genuineness or due execution. On the contrary such
a plea is an admission both of the genuineness and due execution Masongsong filed a complaint before the trial court and alleged that from
thereof, since it seeks to avoid the instrument upon a ground not Memitas credit on goods purchased already reached the amount of
27
affecting either. P603,520.50. Masongsong made several demands upon Memita to pay
before Masongsong filed the complaint. Masongsong even sent a demand
TC and CA erred in ruling that respondents were able to specifically deny letter to Memita, but did not receive any reply.
the allegations in petitioners complaint in the manner specifically required by
the rules. In effect, respondents had, to all intents and purposes, Aside from payment, Masongsong also prayed for the issuance of a writ of
admitted the genuineness and due execution of the subject promissory attachment against Memita.
note and recognized their obligation to petitioner. (sec 11 Rule 8)
The trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of attachment against Memita,
taking into account the following:
Significantly, and as discussed earlier, respondents failed to deny
specifically the execution of the promissory note. This being the case, The allegations of the verified complaint;
there was no need for petitioner to present the original of the The testimonies of Masongsong and Joel Go, his sales person; and
promissory note in question. Their judicial admission with respect to Masongsongs bond.
the genuineness and execution of the promissory note sufficiently
established their liability to petitioner regardless of the fact that
petitioner failed to present the original of said note. According to the sheriffs return of service, the Provincial Sheriff issued a
notice of levy on attachment to the Registrar of the Land Transportation
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents are ordered to pay One Million Office and a notice of embargo to the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City.
Pesos to petitioner.
NESTORIO MEMITA, Petitioner, - versus -

In his answer, Memita did not deny that he purchased goods on credit from
Masongsong. Memita further stated that his refusal to pay was based on the
following grounds: It is quite obvious that the best evidence of the transaction between
[Masongsong] and [Memita] is the Sales Invoice for this document reflects
Questionable deliveries; the particulars of the transaction between the parties for a specific day. In
Short deliveries and discrepancies; and this document, [Memita] acknowledges receipt of the deliveries made by
Possible manipulation of delivery receipts. [Masongong].
Atty. Sabornay manifested that Memitas settlement offer was not

Trial Court acceptable to Masongsong. The trial court thus denied the motion
for postponement and deemed the case submitted for decision.
Trial proceeded soon thereafter. The trial court found that: The evidence Atty. Zamora filed a motion for reconsideration of the 22 January
ineluctably show that the transaction between [Masongsong] and [Memita] is 1998 order.
documented by the Sales Invoices annexed as Annexes A to TTT of the The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration. Portions of the
Complaint. trial courts order read:
In his Motion for [R]econsideration, [Memitas] counsel failed to
The Sales Invoices were attached as annexes to the Complaint and justify his failure to appear in the hearing.
their genuineness and due execution are deemed admitted for The trial court ruled that Masongsong was entitled to the reliefs
failure of [Memita] to deny them under oath. prayed for in his Complaint.
Defendant failed to point out any particular Sales Invoice which
substantiates his claim of short deliveries or questionable
deliveries. Appellate Court
As [Masongsong] declared, [Memita] belatedly raised the issue of
short deliveries and discrepancies after he failed to pay and The appellate court did not agree with Memita. It upheld the trial courts
demands were made on him to pay. decision intoto.
The appellate court identified two issues for its resolution:

To bolster his claim of short deliveries and discrepancies, [Memita]
attempted to show to the Court that there were other documents, namely: Whether Memita was deprived of his right to due process when the
trial court denied his motion for postponement; and
the Load Order Manifest and the Issue Form wherein the actual Whether the trial court erred in admitting the sales invoices
deliveries to the defendant are reflected. submitted by Masongsong.
In so far as the Issue Form is concerned, this document reflects the
quantity of goods obtained by [Masongsong] from San Miguel
Foods for delivery to [Masongsongs] customers. In resolving the first issue, the appellate court reiterated Masongsongs
argument that the trial court committed no error in denying Memitas motion
The Issue Form does not at all show the quantity of goods
to postpone the hearing. The appellate court emphasized that due process
delivered to each particular customer of [Masongsong].
demands proper obedience to procedural rules. As to the second issue, the
The Load Order Manifest is [Masongsongs] own document which
appellate court pointed out that Memita failed to explicitly deny or contest the
reflects the quantity of goods to be delivered to the customer.

genuineness and due execution of the receipts or any of the signatures on due execution of any of the receipts nor any of his signatures or that of his
the receipts. The appellate court also stated that Memita failed to discharge authorized representative appearing therein.
the burden of proving his allegations of short or questionable deliveries.
Section 8 of Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reads as follows:
Issue
Sec. 8. How to contest such documents. When an action or
Rule 8, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, relied defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached
upon by the Honorable Court of Appeals[,] does not apply because to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section,
the Answer with Counterclaim of [Memita] was verified and under the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be
oath. deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically
Also, Rule 8, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, is denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but the
inapplicable as petitioner does not appear to be a party to all of the requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does
seventy-two (72) sales invoices admitted in evidence by the lower not appear to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with
court. an order for inspection of the original instrument is refused.
The seventy-two (72) sales invoices should have been excluded (Emphasis added)
and denied admission for failure of [Masongsong] to prove in the
course of the trial their authenticity and due execution. Memita, in alleging questionable and short deliveries, in effect alleges
that Masongsong committed fraud. As the party invoking fraud, Memita has
the burden of proof. Whoever alleges fraud or mistake affecting a transaction
Ruling must substantiate his allegation, since it is presumed that a person takes
ordinary care of his concerns and private concerns have been fair and
The petition has no merit. regular.
In his Answer, Memita admitted that he purchased goods from Masongsong. Memita chose to present evidence which did not set forth the facts nor the
However, without specifying the date of purchase or the receipt number, substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial.
Memita denied the quantities and value of the purchases. Memita alleged Memita chose to present the concepts of the load order manifest and the
that there were questionable deliveries and questionable number of kilos per issue form. He also presented witnesses who are current and former
crate. Memita further alleged that he discovered short deliveries and employees of San Miguel Foods, Inc. However, per the explanation of Mr.
discrepancies. Through these unsubstantiated allegations, Memita Alberto Valenzuela, a former issuer/receiver and route salesman of San
concluded that Masongsong might have manipulated the delivery receipts. Miguel Foods, Inc., the load order manifest shows the goods ordered by
Masongsong from San Miguel Foods, Inc. But the load order manifest
Memita insists that the trial court should not have admitted the sales invoices cannot be considered as the only basis of a customers order as the
attached to Masongsongs complaint. In its decision, the trial court stated customer is not precluded from calling up the San Miguel Foods, Inc. office
that [Memita] failed to point out any particular Sales Invoice which and make additional orders. Mr. Reynaldo Geaga, an employee in charge of
substantiates his claim of short deliveries or questionable deliveries. the warehouse of San Miguel Foods, Inc., explained that the issue form
reflects the quantity of goods actually obtained by Masongsong from San
The appellate court reiterated the trial courts position and stated that Miguel Foods, Inc. San Miguel Foods, Inc. then uses the issue form as basis
[Memitas] Answer failed to explicitly deny or contest the genuineness and for billing Masongsong.

The best evidence of the transaction between Memita and Masongsong are power plant site in Sta. Rita, Batangas City to Calaca,
the sales invoices. The sales invoices show that Memita or his Batangas.
representative acknowledged receipt of Masongsongs deliveries without o Respondents obligation under the SIA entailed the
protest. Memita aired his doubts about the amounts only after Masongsong acquisition of easements of right-of-way over affected
asked him to pay his credit. Moreover, although Memita confronted lands located along the designated route of the
Masongsong with a check dated 1 July 1996 in the amount of P127,238.40 transmission line.
payable to RM Integrated Services, Masongsong stated that the said amount
did not include any transaction in the present case. Respondent entered into a Contract of Easement of Right-of-
Way (Contract) with Antero Luistro (petitioner), owner of a parcel of
Memitas evidence reveal that Memita failed to prove fraud on
land.
Masongsongs part. Therefore, the trial court is correct in stating that Memita
o Under the Contract, petitioner granted respondent
is liable to Masongsong in the amount of P603,520.50 plus interest of 12%
perpetual easement over a 100-sq. m. portion of his
per annum as agreed upon by the parties and as stated in the sales
property for the erection of the transmission line tower and
invoices. Memita is further liable for attorneys fees in the amount of 10% of
a 25-year easement over 2,453.60 sq. m. portion of the
the principal claim and costs of litigation.
property for the right to pass overhead line cables. The
Contract covered a total area of 2,553.60 sq. m. for a
G.R. No. 158819 April 16, 2009 consideration of P88,608 to cover the easement fee, tower
pole, guy occupancy fees and improvements.
ANTERO LUISTRO, Petitioner, Respondent then commenced the construction of the transmission
vs. line tower and the stringing of overhead transmission line cables
COURT OF APPEALS and FIRST GAS POWER CORPORATION, above petitioners property covered by the Contract.
Respondents. After a several months, petitioners counsel wrote a letter to
respondents president asking for a temporary stoppage of all kinds
RULING: PETITIONER FAILED TO STATE WITH PARTICULARITY THE of work within the vicinity of petitioners residential house pending
CIRCUMSTANCES CONSTITUTING THE ALLEGED FRAUD. settlement of petitioners grievance that the house and other
improvements lay underneath the transmission wire/line being
Facts: constructed and would endanger the life and health of the persons
in the vicinity.
Petitioner also referred the concerns to the NPC in a letter dated 19
First Gas Power Corporation (respondent) operates a gas-fired
April 1999. However, the NPC set aside petitioners concerns
power generating facility by virtue of a Power Purchase Agreement
and considered the matter closed.
(PPA) with the Manila Electric Company (Meralco). Respondent
sells the electric power generated by its facility to Meralco. RTC: PETITIONER: RESCISSION/AMENDMENT OF CONTRACT
WITH DAMAGES.
Respondent entered into a Substation Interconnection Agreement
(SIA) with Meralco and the National Power Corporation (NPC). ALLEGATION: BY MEANS OF FRAUD, WAS ABLE TO
o The SIA required respondent to design, finance, construct, CONVINCE HIM TO INTO THE CONTRACT.
commission, and energize a 230-kilovolt electric power o Subsequently, petitioner filed a complaint for
transmission line, approximately 25 km. in length from its "Rescission/Amendment And Or Modification of Contract

Of Easement With Damages," against respondent and Section 5, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
First Balfour Beatty Realty, Inc. (defendants).
o Petitioner alleged that respondent, by means of fraud and Section 5. Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. - In all averments of fraud
machinations of words, was able to convince him to enter or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated
into the Contract. with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge or other condition of the mind of
o Petitioner alleged that while his house was supposed to be a person may be averred generally.
20 to 25 meters away from the transmission wire/line, it
turned out after the installation of Posts 97 and 98 that his
Again, the complaint falls short of the requirement that fraud must
house was only 7.23 meters directly underneath the
be stated with particularity. The complaint merely states:
transmission wire/line.
o Petitioner alleged that the powerful 230 kilovolts passing
the transmission wire/line continuously endanger the lives, 4. That sometime in the year of 1997, the consolidator-facilitator of
limbs, and properties of petitioner and his family. the Defendants FGPC and Balfour by means of fraud and
machinations of words were able to convince[] the plaintiff to
enter into CONTRACT OF EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY
RESPONDENT: MOTION TO DISMISS.
wherein the latter granted in favor of the defendant FGPC the right
GROUND: FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION. to erect [its] Tower No. 98 on the land of the plaintiff situated at
o Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Barangay Maigsing Dahilig, Lemery 4209 Batangas including the
petitioner failed to state a cause of action in his complaint. right to Install Transmission Lines over a portion of the same
property for a consideration therein stated, a xerox copy of said
RTC: DENIED MOTION TO DISMISS. contract is hereto attached as [] ANNEXES "A" up to "A-4" of the
M.R. DENIED. complaint;
CA: RESPONDENT: CERTITIORARI.
o Respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. 5. That the said contract, (Annexes "A" up to "A-4") was entered
into by the plaintiff under the "MISREPRESENTATION,
CA: SET ASIDE RTCS ORDERS. PROMISES, FALSE AND FRAUDULENT ASSURANCES AND
GROUND: PETITIONER FAILED TO STATE WITH TRICKS" of the defendants[.]
PARTICULARITY THE CIRCUMSTACES CONSTITUTING THE
ALLEGED FRAUD. Not only did petitioner fail to allege with particularity the fraud
M.R. DENIED. allegedly committed by respondent. A review of the Contract shows
HENCE, THIS PETITION FOR REVIEW. that its contents were explained to petitioner. The Contract states:
ISSUES: Whether the complaint alleges fraud with particularity as required Bago ko/namin nilagdaan ang kasulatang ito ay ipinaliwanag muna sa
under Section 5, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. akin/amin sa wikang Tagalog/ o sa wikang aking/aming naiintindihan. Ang
nilalaman nitoy lubusan ko/naming nauunawaan kayat lumagda kami rito
HELD: NO. ng kusang loob, walang sinumang pumilit o tumakot sa akin/amin.
Allegation of Fraud

There is clearly no basis for the allegation that petitioner only signed the - 1966, Capitol Motors filed a complaint against Yabut
Contract because of fraud perpetrated by respondent. o Yabut executed a promissory note for the sum of P30,
134. 25
Sufficiency of Cause of Action Payable in 18 equal monthly installments with
12% interest per annum
The note states that if Yabut fails to pay 2
In a motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action, the
successive installments, the principal would
question posed to the court for determination is the sufficiency of
become due and demandable with additional
the allegation of facts made in the complaint to constitute a cause
25% of the principal and interest due (for
of action.
attorneys fees and costs of collection).
To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, it must be
o Several demands were made, but Yabut still refused to
shown that the claim for relief does not exist, rather than that a
pay
claim has been defectively stated, or is ambiguous, indefinite or
- On April 27, 1966, and within the reglementary period, Yabut,
uncertain.
through his counsel, filed an answer which reads:
In this case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the complaint
DEFENDANT through counsel alleges:
lacked sufficient cause of action.
The complaint was based on the alleged breach of the Contract
1. Paragraph 1 of the complaint is admitted.
and violation of the undertaking that petitioners house was
supposed to be 20 to 25 meters away from the transmission
wire/line. 2. Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the complaint are
Petitioner alleged in the complaint that contrary to what had specifically denied for lack of knowledge sufficient to
been "assured and promised," his house turned out to be only form a belief as to the truth thereof.
7.23 meters directly underneath the transmission wire/line.
As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, there was no such WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the
undertaking in the Contract. Complaint be dismissed with costs against the
o The Contract only granted respondent a perpetual plaintiff.
easement over 100 sq. m. portion of petitioners property,
as well as 25 years easement of right-of-way over the - On June 16, 1966, the plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the
property or portions thereof, as indicated in the sketch pleadings, on the ground that the defendant, not having set forth
plan, for the installation and maintenance of wooden in his answer the substance of the matters relied upon by him
poles, steel towers, tower footings, and electric and guy to support his denial, had failed to deny specifically the
wires. material allegations of the complaint, hence, must be deemed
to have admitted them.
Therefore, the alleged right of petitioner, which respondent o The defendant did not file an opposition to the motion.
supposed to have violated, did not exist in the Contract. o On September 13, 1966, after hearing on the motion, the
court issued an order granting the said motion and
Capitol Motors, plaintiff-appellee vs. Yabut, defendant-appellant (1970) considering the case submitted for decision on the basis of
the pleadings; and on January 9, 1967, the court rendered

judgment granting in toto the plaintiff's prayer in its defendant's knowledge that his averment of ignorance must be
complaint. palpably untrue.
- Yabut argues that the court erred in considering him as having - In National Marketing Corporation vs. De Castro, 106 Phil. 803
failed to deny specifically the material allegations of the complaint (1959)
o He argues that there are only 3 modes of specific denials o in his answer to the appellee's complaint, he merely
(1) by specifying each material allegation of fact alleged that 'he has no knowledge or information sufficient
in the complaint the truth of which the defendant to form a belief as to the truth of the matters contained in
does not admit, and, whenever practicable, paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 so much so that he denies
setting forth the substance of the matters which specifically said allegations.' A denial is not specific
he will rely upon to support his denial or simply because it is so qualified.
(2) by specifying so much of an averment in the o Material averments in a complaint, other than those as to
complaint as is true and material and denying the amount of damage, are deemed admitted when not
only the remainder or specifically denied.
(3) by stating that the defendant is without o The court may render judgment upon the pleadings if
knowledge or information sufficient to form a material averments in the complaint are admitted.
belief as to the truth of a material averment in the - It becomes evident from all the above doctrines that a mere
complaint, which has the effect of a denial, and allegation of ignorance of the facts alleged in the complaint, is
he has adopted the third mode of specific denial, insufficient to raise an issue; the defendant must aver positively
his answer tendered an issue, and, consequently or state how it is that he is ignorant of the facts so alleged.
the court a quo could not render a valid judgment - There are two other reasons why the present appeal must fail.
on the pleadings. o First. The present action is founded upon a written
instrument attached to the complaint, but defendant-
ISSUE: Whether or not Yabuts answer constitutes a specific denial under appellant failed to deny under oath the genuineness
the Rules of Court? and due execution of the instrument; hence, the same
are deemed admitted. (Section 8, Rule 8 of the Revised
HELD: NO, BUT it was denied because Yabut did not oppose the motion Rules of Court
for judgment on the pleadings filed by plaintiff appellee; o Second. Defendant-appellant did not oppose the motion
for judgment on the pleadings filed by plaintiff
appellee; neither has he filed a motion for reconsideration
- We agree with defendant-appellant that one of the modes of
of the order of September 13, 1966, which deemed the
specific denial contemplated in Section 10, Rule 8, is a denial by
case submitted for decision on the pleadings, or of the
stating that the defendant is without knowledge or information
decision rendered on January 9, 1967.
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment in
In Santiago vs. Basilan Lumber Company, G.R.
the complaint.
No. L-15532, October 31, 1963 (9 SCRA 349),
- The rule authorizing an answer to the effect that the defendant has
this Court said:
no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
It appears that when the plaintiff moved
truth of an averment and giving such answer the effect of a denial,
to have the case decided on the
does not apply where the fact as to which want of knowledge
pleadings, the defendant interposed no
is asserted, is so plainly and necessarily within the

objection and has practically assented After repeated demands from Comphil to pay the said amount, it
thereto. The defendant, therefore, is still refuses to pay the same.
deemed to have admitted the Respondent Stokely further prayed that a writ of attachment be
allegations of the complaint, so that issued against any and all the properties of the petitioners in an
there was no necessity for the amount sufficient to satisfy any lien of judgment that the respondent
plaintiff to submit evidence of his may obtain in its action.
claim. The trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of attachment in favor
of the respondent upon the latter's deposit of a bond.
G.R. No. L-61523 July 31, 1986 The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration to reduce the
attachment bond. Attached to this motion is an affidavit by the
ANTAM CONSOLIDATED, INC., TAMBUNTING TRADING assistant attorney of the respondent's counsel stating that he has
CORPORATION and AURORA CONSOLIDATED SECURITIES and verified with the records of Comphil and the SEC the facts he
INVESTMENT CORPORATION, petitioners, alleged in the prayer for the attachment order.
vs. The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE MAXIMIANO C. ground that the respondent, being a foreign corporation not
ASUNCION (Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch II [Sta. Cruz]) licensed to do business in the Philippines, has no personality to
and STOKELY VAN CAMP, INC., respondents. maintain the instant suit.
The Trial Court ruled to reduce the attachment bond and denied the
This is a Petition for certiorari and prohibition. motion to dismiss by the petitioners.
CA upheld the decision of TC.
FACTS: o The appellate court dismissed the petition stating that the
respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of
Respondent Stokely Van Camp. Inc. (Stokely) filed a complaint discretion in deferring the petitioners' motion to dismiss
against Banahaw Milling Corporation (Banahaw), Antam because the said judge is not yet satisfied that he has the
Consolidated, Inc., Tambunting Trading Corporation (Tambunting), necessary facts which would permit him to make a
Aurora Consolidated Securities and Investment Corporation, and judicious resolution.
United Coconut Oil Mills, Inc. (Unicom) for collection of sum of
money. ISSUE: Whether the trial court should not have issued the order of
o In its complaint, Stokely alleged that Comphil undertook to attachment and the appellate court should not have affirmed the same
sell and deliver and Capital City agreed to buy 500 long because the verification in support of the prayer for attachment is
tons of crude coconut oil to be delivered in insufficient?
October/November 1978 at the c.i.f. price of US$0.30/1b.
but Comphil failed to deliver the coconut oil so that Capital RULING:
City covered its coconut oil needs in the open market at a No.
price substantially in excess of the contract and sustained
a loss. We rule that the defect in the original verification was cured when Renato
o On that transaction, Capital city sustained damages. Calma, the counsel for respondents, subsequently executed an affidavit to
the effect that the allegations he made in support of the prayer for

attachment were verified by him from the records of Comphil and the 4) that in line with the above mentioned agreement and through
Securities and Exchange Commission. Moreover, petitioner had the said Merrill Lynch Philippines, Inc., the Lara Spouses actively
opportunity to oppose the issuance of the writ. traded in futures contracts, including "stock index futures" for four
3
years or so, i.e., from 1983 to October, 1987, there being more or
As to the merit of the attachment order itself, we find that the allegations in less regular accounting and corresponding remittances of money
the respondent's complaint satisfactorily justify the issuance of said order. (or crediting or debiting) made between the spouses and ML
FUTURES;
MERRILL LYNCH FUTURES, INC., petitioner, vs.HON. COURT OF 5) that because of a loss amounting to US$160,749.69 incurred in
APPEALS, and the SPOUSES PEDRO M. LARA and ELISA G. respect of three (3) transactions involving "index futures," and after
LARA, respondents. setting this off against an amount of US$75,913.42 then owing by
ML FUTURES to the Lara Spouses, said spouses became indebted
FACTS: to ML FUTURES for the ensuing balance of US$84,836.27, which
the latter asked them to pay;
RTC_QC 6) that the Lara Spouses however refused to pay this balance,
"alleging that the transactions were null and void because Merrill
Lynch Philippines, Inc., the Philippine company servicing accounts
Merrill Lynch Futures, Inc. (simply ML FUTURES) filed a complaint
of plaintiff, . . had no license to operate as a 'commodity and/or
against the Spouses Pedro M. Lara and Elisa G. Lara for the
financial futures broker.'"
recovery of a debt and interest thereon, damages, and attorney's
ML FUTURES prayed (1) for a preliminary attachment- issued ex
fees
parte and the defendant spouses were duly served with summons.
ML FUTURES alleged the following:
SPOUSE LARA filed MD (2) grounds: (a) that the plaintiff has no
legal capacity to sue, and (b) that the complaint states no cause of
1) that on September 28, 1983 it entered into a Futures Customer action -sustained by RTC, MR_denied
Agreement with the defendant spouses (Account No. 138-12161), in virtue of
which it agreed to act as the latter's broker for the purchase and sale of futures
CA-affirmed RTC,MR-denied
contracts in the U.S.;
ML FUTURES has appealed to this Court on certiorari.

2) that pursuant to the contract, orders to buy and sell futures
contracts were transmitted to ML FUTURES by the Lara Spouses
ISSUE: The capacity of a foreign corporation to maintain an action in the
"through the facilities of Merrill Lynch Philippines, Inc., a Philippine
2 Philippines against residents?
corporation and a company servicing plaintiffs customers;
3) that from the outset, the Lara Spouses "knew and were duly RULLING:YES
advised that Merrill Lynch Philippines, Inc. was not a broker in
futures contracts," and that it "did not have a license from the
The settled doctrine of course is that said ground must appear on the face of
Securities and Exchange Commission to operate as a commodity
the complaint, and its existence may be determined only by the allegations
trading advisor (i.e., 'an entity which, not being a broker, furnishes
of the complaint, consideration of other facts being proscribed, and any
advice on commodity futures to persons who trade in futures 11
attempt to prove extraneous circumstances not being allowed. The test of
contracts');
the sufficiency of the facts alleged in a complaint as constituting a cause of

action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court might render a US$75,913.42 which it (ML FUTURES) then admittedly owed the
valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the spouses and thereafter sought to collect the balance, US$84,836.27, but
12
complaint. Indeed, it is error for a judge to conduct a preliminary hearing the Laras had refused to pay (for the reasons already above stated), the
and receive evidence on the affirmative defense of failure of the complaint to crucial question is whether or not ML FUTURES may sue in Philippine
state a cause of action. Courts to establish and enforce its rights against said spouses, in light of the
undeniable fact that it had transacted business in this country without being
The other ground for dismissal relied upon, i.e., that the plaintiff has no legal licensed to do so. In other words, if it be true that during all the time that they
capacity to sue may be understood in two senses: one, that the plaintiff is were transacting with ML FUTURES, the Laras were fully aware of its lack of
prohibited or otherwise incapacitated by law to institute suit in Philippine license to do business in the Philippines, and in relation to those
14 transactions had made payments to, and received money from it for several
Courts, or two, although not otherwise incapacitated in the sense just
15 years, the question is whether or not the Lara Spouses are now estopped to
stated, that it is not a real party in interest. Now, the Lara Spouses contend
that ML Futures has no capacity to sue them because the transactions impugn ML FUTURES' capacity to sue them in the courts of the forum.
subject of the complaint were had by them, not with the plaintiff ML
FUTURES, but with Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner& Smith, Inc. Evidence is The rule is that a party is estopped to challenge the personality of a
quite obviously needed in this situation, for it is not to be expected that said corporation after having acknowledged the same by entering into a
ground, or any facts from which its existence may be inferred, will be found contract with it. And the "doctrine of estoppel to deny corporate
in the averments of the complaint. When such a ground is asserted in a existence applies to foreign as well as to domestic corporations;" "one
motion to dismiss, the general rule governing evidence on motions applies. who has dealt with a corporation of foreign origin as a corporate entity
The rule is embodied in Section 7, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. is estopped to deny its corporate existence and capacity." The
principle "will be applied to prevent a person contracting with a foreign
corporation from later taking advantage of its noncompliance with the
Sec. 7.Evidence on motion. When a motion is based on
statutes, chiefly in cases where such person has received the benefits
facts not appearing of record the court may hear the
of the contract (Sherwood v. Alvis, 83 Ala 115, 3 So 307, limited and
matter on affidavits or depositions presented by the
distinguished in Dudley v. Collier, 87 Ala 431, 6 So 304; Spinney v.
respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter
Miller, 114 Iowa 210, 86 NW 317), where such person has acted as
be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions.
agent for the corporation and has violated his fiduciary obligations as
such, and where the statute does not provide that the contract shall be
SC held: that the Laras did transact business with ML FUTURES through its void, but merely fixes a special penalty for violation of the statute. . . .
agent corporation organized in the Philippines, it being unnecessary to
determine whether this domestic firm was MLPI (Merrill Lynch Philippines, DOCTRINE: The general rule that in the absence of fraud of person who has
Inc.) or Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner& Smith (MLPI's alleged predecessor). contracted or otherwise dealt with an association in such a way as to
The fact is that ML FUTURES did deal with futures contracts in exchanges in recognize and in effect admit its legal existence as a corporate body is
the United States in behalf and for the account of the Lara Spouses, and that thereby estopped to deny its corporate existence in any action leading out of
on several occasions the latter received account documents and money in or involving such contract or dealing, unless its existence is attacked for
connection with those transactions. causes which have arisen since making the contract or other dealing relied
on as an estoppel and this applies to foreign as well as domestic
CASE AT BAR: the last transaction executed by ML FUTURES in the corporations.
Laras's behalf had resulted in a loss amounting to US $160,749.69; that in
relation to this loss, ML FUTURES had credited the Laras with the amount of CA decision is reversed by SC.

G.R. No. 165744 August 11, 2008
RTC
OSCAR C. REYES, petitioner, Oscar filed a Motion to Declare Complaint as Nuisance or
vs. Harassment Suit.
HON. RTC OF MAKATI, Branch 142, ZENITH INSURANCE complaint is a mere nuisance or harassment suit and should,
CORPORATION, and RODRIGO C. REYES, respondents. according to the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate
Controversies, be dismissed;
Facts: and that it is not a bona fide derivative suit as it partakes of the
nature of a petition for the settlement of estate of the
deceased Anastacia that is outside the jurisdiction of a
Siblings Pedro, Anastacia, Petitioner Oscar, and Respondent Rodrigo each
special commercial court.
owned shares of stock of Respondent Zenith Insurance Corporation (Zenith).
Motion Denied
Pedro died in 1964, while Anastacia died in 1993. Although Pedros estate
was judicially partitioned among his heirs sometime in the 1970s, no similar
CA
settlement and partition appear to have been made with Anastacias estate,
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
which included her shareholdings in Zenith.
Affirmed RTC and denied petitioners MFR
SEC
ISSUE: WON fraud has been alleged with particularity in Rodrigos
Zenith and Rodrigo filed a complaint against Oscar stating that it is
complaint as required by Sec. 5 Rule 8 for the special commercial court to
"a derivative suit initiated and filed by the complainant Rodrigo C.
have jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Reyes to obtain an accounting of the funds and assets of
ZENITH INSURANCE CORPORATION which are now or formerly
in the control, custody, and/or possession of Oscar and to HELD: NO.
determine the shares of stock of deceased spouses Pedro and
Anastacia Reyes that were arbitrarily and fraudulently P.D. No. 902-A enumerates the cases over which the SEC (now the RTC
appropriated [by Oscar] for himself. acting as a special commercial court) exercises exclusive jurisdiction:
In his Answer with Counterclaim, Oscar denied the charge that he
illegally acquired the shares of Anastacia Reyes. He asserted, as a SECTION 5. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative functions
defense, that he purchased the subject shares with his own funds of the Securities and Exchange Commission over corporations,
from the unissued stocks of Zenith, and that the suit is not a bona partnership, and other forms of associations registered with it as
fide derivative suit because the requisites therefor have not been expressly granted under existing laws and decrees, it shall have
complied with. He thus questioned the SECs jurisdiction to original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
entertain the complaint because it pertains to the settlement of the involving:
estate of Anastacia Reyes.
RA 8799 took effect - SECs exclusive and original jurisdiction over a) Devices or schemes employed by or any acts of the
cases enumerated in Section 5 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. board of directors, business associates, its officers or
902-A was transferred to the RTC designated as a special partners, amounting to fraud and misrepresentation
commercial court. Records of the case then were thus turned over which may be detrimental to the interest of the public
to the RTC.

and/or of the stockholders, partners, members of 5. The complainant Rodrigo C. Reyes discovered that by some
associations or organizations registered with the manipulative scheme, the shareholdings of their deceased
Commission. mother, Doa Anastacia C. Reyes, shares of stocks and [sic]
valued in the corporate books at P7,699,934.28, more or less,
The rule is that a complaint must contain a plain, concise, and direct excluding interest and/or dividends, had been transferred solely
statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action and in the name of respondent. By such fraudulent manipulations
must specify the relief sought. Section 5, Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of and misrepresentation, the shareholdings of said respondent
Court provides that in all averments of fraud or mistake, the Oscar C. Reyes abruptly increased and becomes the majority
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with stockholder of Zenith Insurance Corporation, which portion of said
particularity. These rules find specific application to Section 5(a) of P.D. shares must be distributed equally amongst the brothers and
No. 902-A which speaks of corporate devices or schemes that amount to sisters of the respondent Oscar C. Reyes including the complainant
fraud or misrepresentation detrimental to the public and/or to the herein.
stockholders.
xxxx
In an attempt to hold Oscar responsible for corporate fraud, Rodrigo alleged
in the complaint the following: 9.1 The shareholdings of deceased Spouses Pedro Reyes
and Anastacia C. Reyes valued at P7,099,934.28 were illegally
3. This is a complaintto determine the shares of stock of the and fraudulently transferred solely to the respondents [herein
deceased spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes that were petitioner Oscar] name and installed himself as a majority
arbitrarily and fraudulently appropriated for himself [herein stockholder of Zenith Insurance Corporation [and] thereby
petitioner Oscar] ...xxx deprived his brothers and sisters of their respective equal shares
thereof including complainant hereto.
3.1. Respondent Oscar C. Reyes, through other schemes of
fraud including misrepresentation, unilaterally, and for his own xxxx
benefit, capriciously transferred and took possession and
control of the management of Zenith Insurance 10.1 By refusal of the respondent to account of his [sic]
Corporation...xxx shareholdings in the company, he illegally and fraudulently
transferred solely in his name wherein [sic] the shares of stock
xxxx of the deceased Anastacia C. Reyes [which] must be properly
collated and/or distributed equally amongst the children,
4.1. During the increase of capitalization of Zenith Insurance including the complainant Rodrigo C. Reyes herein, to their
damage and prejudice.
Corporation, sometime in 1968, the property covered by TCT No.
225324 was illegally and fraudulently used by respondent as a
collateral. The charges of fraud against Oscar were NOT properly supported by
the required factual allegations. While the complaint contained allegations
xxxx of fraud purportedly committed by him, these allegations are NOT particular
enough to bring the controversy within the special commercial courts

jurisdiction; they are not statements of ultimate facts, but are mere Petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the default proceedings, the
conclusions of law: how and why the alleged appropriation of shares can be judgments and the writs of execution of respondent judge of the Court of
characterized as "illegal and fraudulent" were not explained nor elaborated First Instance of Quezon City, and for prohibition to enjoin the execution of
on. said judgments. Upon the filing of the petition, the Court issued the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for. Respondents were required to answer and
Rodrigo had twice been given the opportunity to study the propriety of after issues were joined, the parties filed their respective memoranda in lieu
amending or withdrawing the complaint, but he consistently refused. The of oral argument.
courts function in resolving issues of jurisdiction is limited to the review of
the allegations of the complaint and, on the basis of these allegations, to the CFI
determination of whether they are of such nature and subject that they fall
A fire broke out in the premises of private respondents (Tapia, for short) at
within the terms of the law defining the courts jurisdiction. Regretfully, we
No. 245 Roosevelt Avenue, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. Being
cannot read into the complaint any specifically alleged corporate fraud that
holders of fire insurance policies from different companies, among them the
will call for the exercise of the courts special commercial jurisdiction. Thus,
petitioners, and having failed to secure extrajudicial settlement of their
we cannot affirm the RTCs assumption of jurisdiction over Rodrigos
claims, they filed corresponding civil actions in the Court of First Instance of
complaint on the basis of Section 5(a) of P.D. No. 902-A.
Quezon City. All of said cases, dealing as they did with the same facts and
issues, were assigned to respondent judge, to whom by raffle the first of
Case is ordered DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. them had fallen. Petitioner British (for short) was served summons, hence
their answers were due on April 13 and 17, respectively.
On April 13, 1971, counsel for British filed by mail a motion asking for fifteen
(15) days extension of its time to answer, claiming that due to the intervening
Holy Week and pressure of other works, he would be unable to prepare his
Rule 9 Effect of Failure to Plead answer within the reglementary period. He was granted only five (5) days.
Cibeles in turn filed its own motion for extension on, two days after due date.
THE PHILIPPINE BRITISH CO. INC. and THE CIBELES INSURANCE Obviously, the period could not be extended anymore. Just the same, it filed
CORPORATION, petitioners, its answer, which was joint with that of British.
vs.
In the meanwhile, Tapia filed separate motions in the two cases praying that
THE HON. WALFRIDO DE LOS ANGELES in his capacity as Presiding
petitioners be declared in default. Not having received by then any answer of
Judge, Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, THE
petitioners, (Petitioners did file a joint answer, but as will be seen later, the
HON. VICENTE S. OCOL in his capacity as Clerk of Court of First
same was actually received by respondent court late.) an order of default
Instance of Quezon City and Ex-Oficio Sheriff of Quezon City and
was issued, directing at the same time that plaintiffs' evidence be received
MULTIFIELD ENTERPRISES and MOISES M. TAPIA respondents.
by the clerk of court. This reception of evidence was done, the judgments
Facts complained of herein were rendered. After being duly docketed, these
judgments were released for service by registered mail, addressed to
petitioners' counsel, Atty. Alfonso Felix, Jr. at his given address.

According to the postman assigned in that area, Alfredo E. Sugatan, the first Pursuant to the writs issued under this order, the Hongkong & Shanghai
registry notice of said mail matter, Registered Mail No. 13648, was delivered Banking Corporation paid to respondent Sheriff P294,750.00 for the account
by him actually to counsel's secretary who was known to him personally, a of British and the First National City Bank of New York the sum of P75,000
certain Miss Tuliao, in the morning, as he similarly delivered to her for the account of Cibeles (Pars. 30 and 31, Petition), but all the amounts
subsequently the second and third notices. thus paid were returned to the respective banks by virtue of the writ of
preliminary injunction of this Court.
According to Atty. Felix, Jr., on May 24, 1971, the day he received the order
of default in Q-13577 (Par. 12 and Annex C-1 of Petition) he found himself in
the respondent court and to his great surprise, in the corresponding
expedientes, he found neither (1) his motion for extension of time to file Petitioners filed a joint "Petition for Relief from Judgment." But before said
answer in Q-13577 nor (2) the aforementioned joint answer he had filed on petition could be acted upon by the court, the instant petition was filed with
behalf of petitioners and that instead he saw therein that orders of default this Court and summons, together with the writ of preliminary injunction was
had been issued in both cases and, further, that evidence of the plaintiffs served on public respondents. In the meantime, on the same day that the
had been received ex-parte. He claims also that on said occasion, when he petition for relief was set for hearing, respondent judge found it to be
examined the expedientes of the cases, he did not find therein any copy of "sufficient in form and substance" and ordered the respondents "to answer
any decision. To be noted, however, he does not pretend that he made any the same within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof." Nothing
inquiry from any of the officials and employees of the court as to what was else developed in the trial court later because the injunction of this Court
the exact status of his cases as of that date. which was served on respondent judge enjoined him from "taking further
action" in the two subject cases.
Two days later, he filed a joint motion, to lift the order of default, unverified
and unaccompanied by any affidavit of merit, which he set for hearing. At this juncture, it becomes necessary to discuss and resolve a point of
According to him, "the motion to set aside the Order of Default could not be procedure before going any further. As may be noted, We could have
heard on the day which it was set for hearing for the reason that the day had refused to give due course to the present petition when it was filed,
been declared a public been declared a public holiday, undersigned counsel considering that it already avers that a petition for relief from judgment had
went to respondent court the next day, consulted the expedients and seeing been filed by petitioners with the trial court, which, pursuant to the usual
respondent Judge de los Angeles showed him a copy of the Joint Motion practice, We could have deemed as an adequate remedy in the ordinary
Annex 'D' to lift the Order of Default. Respondent Judge de los Angeles after course of law that constitutes a bar to a certiorari review or any other kind of
reading in the presence of undersigned counsel that Joint Motion Annex 'D' special civil action. But the petition, on its face, presented the situation that
asked him to set it for hearing anew and told him that it was always his obtained in the trial court in such an alarming manner, to the point of strongly
practice to give parties a chance to present evidence." (Par. 17 of Petition). hinting possible irregularities in the actuations of the respondent judge and
And so, counsel did as told. the employees in his sala, which could involve their honesty and good faith
as well as the integrity of judicial records and proceedings that the Court felt
Thus, a notice was received by Atty. Felix, Jr. Advising him that the motion it was in the best interest of justice for the Court itself to inquire without
had been set for hearing, but respondent judge issued an order cancelling further loss of time into what actually happened. Indeed, even after the
this notice for the reason that "for failure of defendants in the above-entitled parties had filed their respective memoranda and the Court had by resolution
cases to comply with the requirement imposed by Section 3 of Rule 18, of October 21, 1971 declared these cases submitted for decision, when the
Rules of Court and pursuant to the decisions of the Supreme Court on the respondents filed their motion to dismiss of September 5, 1972, based
matter, this Court can no longer set aside its order dated, so respondent precisely on the ground that on July 7, 1971 the trial court had given due
judge issued the order.

course to petitioners' petition for relief, We resolved to defer determination of
the dismissal motion until this decision on the merits.
The general rule is that once a matter in issue has been decided by the
Ruling court, it may no longer be brought again in the form of another objection, and
in the guise of a motion under another provision of the rules" (at p. 387).
The contention of petitioners that they were erroneously declared in default True it is that as a matter of form, under Section 3 of Rule 18 it is not
has no merit. From the incontrovertible facts in the record, We cannot see essential that the affidavit of merit be separate from the motion and may
how it can be justly said that respondent judge committed a grave abuse of instead be incorporated therein, but in the instant case of petitioners' motion,
discretion in making such declaration. even if it makes general allegations of merit, these allegations are not
supported by oath of anyone who has knowledge of the fact. As already
Counsel suggests that he was not given enough time, considering that there stated, not even Atty. Felix Jr. swore to the truth thereof. Accordingly, We
was the Holy Week to take into account, but His Honor ruled that precisely, find no error in the subsequent action of respondent judge of cancelling the
counsel would have more time because of the holidays. Again, We perceive notice of hearing of the joint motion to lift the order of default.
no grave abuse of discretion in such a pragmatic ratiocination.
Besides, the same section expressly provides that motions to lift orders of
Anent the motion to lift the orders of default, counsel invites attention to the default may be filed only before judgment, and petitioners' joint motion was
alleged directive of respondent judge to him to have the hearing of his said filed only on May 26, 1971, whereas the judgments in question were
motion reset because it is the judge's "practice to give parties a chance to rendered on April 28, 1971.
present evidence." We take it, however, that seemingly what happened then
must, have been that His Honor was just trying to figure out how counsel But counsel would attach importance to another aspect of his motion to lift
could be helped out of his self-imposed predicament, but, evidently, upon the default orders, regardless of its legal untenability. He contends that
further reflection, he must have realized the legal obstacles on the way and having filed such a motion, he became entitled under Section 9 of Rule 13 to
consequently found no alternative than to rule that the motion to lift did not notice "of all further proceedings" and, therefore, the failure of respondents
have to be reset for hearing anymore. Upon perusing the motion when it was to notify him of the motions for immediate execution of the default judgments
filed, he must have noted that it did not comply, as he so stated in his order, fatally vitiated the order granting the same and the writs and levies pursuant
with the requirements of Section 3 of Rule 18. thereto.
As may be seen, petitioners' joint motion to lift the order of default, Annex D It is quite obvious that counsel's reliance on the provision cited by him is
of the Petition, the same is neither under oath nor accompanied by any misplaced. Textually, the said section reads thus:
affidavit of merit.
SEC. 9. Service upon party in default. No service of
In fact, in view of the omission of petitioners to accompany their motion with papers other than substantially amended or supplemental
any affidavit of merit, the trial court had no authority to consider the same. It pleadings and final orders or judgments shall be necessary
is to be noted that the requirements of Section 3 of Rule 18 are practically on a party in default unless he files a motion to set aside
identical to those of Section 3 of Rule 38 regarding the need to show the the order of default, in which event he shall be entitled to
existence of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence that caused notice of all further proceedings regardless of whether the
the default and to accompany the motion to set aside with affidavits of merit. order of default is set aside or not.
Consequently, it is but proper to apply to such a motion the same ruling
applicable to petitions for relief under Rule 38.

We are not prepared to agree with counsel that the right of a party in default requisite showing that they have good and valid defenses, We likewise hold
to notice of further proceedings which this rule revives as a result of the filing that they have failed to do so. It would be idle ceremony to still require
of a motion to set aside the default order is intended by the rule to be so respondent court to take further action on the petition for relief, Annex N.
easily reacquired that just by the mere filing of any motion with a prayer to The order of respondent judge of July 7, 1971, giving due course to said
set aside the default, the provision may be deemed as already complied petition has in effect become functus officio. We are persuaded that the
with. Logic and principle dictate that the effects of default may not be treated respective situations of the parties can no longer be possibly altered, should
as lightly as if it were of no juridical essence. While the Court has generally We prolong this judicial battle in any way.
been liberal in giving a party in default a chance to participate in the trial, We
cannot sanction any proposition that would so reduce the effect of an order IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered
of default that to have it set aside all that has to be done is for the party dismissing the petition in these cases and setting aside the writ of
concerned to file any perfunctory motion therefor. A party who by inaction or preliminary injunction issued on July 8, 1971, with the consequence that the
negligence allows himself to be declared in default offends the rule requiring executions enjoined thereby may now proceed in accordance with law and
him to answer the summons without unnecessary delay to the end that the the rules, with costs against petitioner.
issues may be duly joined and the litigation be expeditiously terminated. To
purge himself of the effects of such offense, it should not be enough for him REBECCA T. ARQUERO, Petitioner
to just tell the court he has, after all, decided to wake up and take part in the
proceedings. It is but proper that he must justify his failure to comply with the vs.
rule before he is relieved from the adverse consequences of his emission.
Thus, Section 9 of Rule 13 must be read in conjunction with Section 3 of COURT OF APPEALS (Former Thirteenth Division); EDILBERTO C. DE
Rule 18. In other words, the motion to set aside default referred to in Section JESUS, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education;
9 of Rule 13 must be one the contents of which are precisely those provided DR. PARALUMAN GIRON, Director, Regional Office IV-MIMAROPA,
for in Section 3 of Rule 18. Thus, the filing of such a motion to set aside Department of Education; DR. EDUARDO LOPEZ, Schools Division
short of the requirements of this latter provision may not as it cannot produce Superintendent, Puerto Princesa City; and NORMA BRILLANTES,
the revival of the right to notice contemplated in Section 9 of Rule 13. Any Respondents
other construction in line with the position of petitioners would render the
intent and purpose of the pertinent provisions nugatory and ineffective.
RULING: A DEFENDANT DECLARED IN DEFAULT RETAINS THE RIGHT
Considering, therefore, that counsel's joint motion to lift the order of default
TO APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT ON THE
in the subject cases did not comply with Section 3 of Rule 18, there is no
GROUND THAT THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE THE
justification at all for his gripe that he was not notified of further proceedings.
MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS O FTHE COMPLAINT, OR THAT THE
DECISION IS CONTRARY TO LAW, EVEN WITHOUT NEED OF
THE PRIOR FILING OF A MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER
We reiterate that these circumstances make it unnecessary for Us to adhere OF DEFAULT.
to the technical procedure of returning these cases to the trial court for
further proceedings and final determination of the issue of whether or not EXCEPT THAT HE DOES NOT REGAIN HIS RIGHT TO ADDUCE
petitioners' petition for relief from judgment should be granted. We find all EVIDENCE.
the proceedings leading to the rendition of the impugned judgments and to
the issuance of all the writs of execution thereunder to have been regular FACTS:
and legal. And as to whether or not petitioners have been able to make the

On October 13, 1989, Congress approved Republic Act (RA) No. Restraining Order and/or Injunctive Writ before the RTC of
6765, or An Act Integrating Certain High Schools in the City of Palawan against public and private respondents.
Puerto Princesa and in the Province of Palawan with the Palawan o Petitioner argued that the designation of private
National School and Appropriating Funds Therefor. respondent deprived her of her right to exercise her
Under the law, a number of schools all around the Province of function and perform her duties in violation of her right to
Palawan were converted into national schools and integrated with security of tenure.
the Palawan National School (PNS) in the City of Puerto Princesa,
Province of Palawan. RTC: ISSUED TRO AND WPI.
The law provides that the Palawan Integrated National Schools Respondents failed to file their Answer. (PLS. TAKE NOTE)
(PINS) shall be headed by a Vocational School Superintendent Hence, on motion of petitioner, the Court declared respondents in
(VSS) who shall be chosen by the Sec. of DECS and the PNS and default in an Order dated December 15, 2003. In the same order,
each of its units or branches shall be headed either by a Principal petitioner was allowed to present her evidence ex parte.
or Secondary School Head Teacher to be chosen in accordance RTC: RENDERED JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT IN FAVOR OF
with the DepEd Rules and Regulations. PETITIONER.
However, no VSS was appointed. Petitioner took over as CA: RESPONDENT: APPEAL: REVERSED AND SET ASIDE
Secondary School Principal of the PNS. RTCS DECISION.
On March 18, 1993, then DECS-Region IV Director IV Desideria o Respondents filed an appeal to the CA despite being
Rex (Director Rex) designated petitioner as OIC of the PINS. declared in default. (PLS. TAKE NOTE.)
After 9 years, OIC of DepEd. Region Office 4 (OIC) withdrew the
designation of petitioner as OIC of the PINS, enjoining her from HENCE, THIS PETITION FOR REVIEW.
submitting to the Regional Office all appointments and personnel
Petitioner insists that respondents could not have appealed the
movement involving the PNS and the satellite schools.
RTC decision having been declared in default.
On March 28, 2003, then DepEd Secretary Edilberto C. De Jesus o She explains that the only issue that could have been
designated Assistant Schools Division Superintendent Norma B. raised is a purely legal question, therefore, the appeal
Brillantes (private respondent) in concurrent capacity as OIC of the should have been filed with the Supreme Court and not
PINS entitled to representation and transportation allowance, with the CA.
except the salary of the position.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Clarification
ISSUE: Whether a party in default retains the right to appeal from the
before the Office of the DepEd Secretary as to the designation of
judgment by default.
private respondent.
On September 18, 2003, the OIC filed a formal charge against
HELD: Yes, except that he does not regain his right to adduce
petitioner who continued to defy the orders issued by the Regional
evidence.
Office relative to the exercise of her functions as OIC of the PINS
despite the designation of private respondent as such.
RTC PALAWAN: PETITIONER: PETITION FOR QUO WARANTO Citing Lina v. Court of Appeals the Court enumerated the above-
WITH TRO AND WPI. mentioned remedies, to wit:
o On October 2, 2003, petitioner filed the Petition for Quo
Warranto with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary

a) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and Such party declared in default is proscribed from seeking a modification or
before judgment, file a motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default reversal of the assailed decision on the basis of the evidence submitted by
on the ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake him in the Court of Appeals, for if it were otherwise, he would thereby be
or excusable neglect, and that he has meritorious defenses; (Sec. 3, Rule allowed to regain his right to adduce evidence, a right which he lost in the
18) trial court when he was declared in default, and which he failed to have
vacated.
b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant
discovered the default, but before the same has become final and executory, In this case, the petitioner sought the modification of the decision
he may file a motion for new trial under Section 1 (a) of Rule 37; of the trial court based on the evidence submitted by it only in the
Court of Appeals.
c) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become Undoubtedly, a defendant declared in default retains the right to
final and executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule appeal from the judgment by default on the ground that the plaintiff
38; and failed to prove the material allegations of the complaint, or that the
decision is contrary to law, even without need of the prior filing of a
d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as motion to set aside the order of default except that he does not
contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside regain his right to adduce evidence.
the order of default has been presented by him. (Sec. 2, Rule 41) The appellate court, in turn, can review the assailed decision and is
not precluded from reversing the same based solely on the
evidence submitted by the plaintiff.
The Court explained that the fourth remedy, that of appeal, is
anchored on Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1964 Rules.
Even after the deletion of that provision under the 1997 Rules, the JUAN A. GOCHANGCO, HON. FELINO GARCIA, as Presiding Judge of
Court did not hesitate to expressly rely on the Lina doctrine, the City Court of Bacolod, Branch I, and DEPUTY PROVINCIAL
including the pronouncement that a defaulted defendant may SHERIFF JOSUE DE JOSE vs THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
appeal from the judgment rendered against him. NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH IV, SY HO and MILAGROS MINORIA
Moreover, in Rural Bank of Sta. Catalina v. Land Bank of the
Philippines, the Court provided a comprehensive restatement of the FACTS:
remedies of the defending party declared in default:
- Appeal by certiorari governing the modes of acquisition of
It bears stressing that a defending party declared in default loses his jurisdiction by a court over the person of a defendant, default,
standing in court and his right to adduce evidence and to present his substitution of parties plaintiff, judgment on the pleadings, and
defense. execution pending appeal in ejectment cases. An unlawful detainer
was filed by C.N. Hodges in the City Court of Bacolod, Branch I,
He, however, has the right to appeal from the judgment by default and assail docketed as Civil Case No. 2838. Hodges sought the ejectment
said judgment on the ground, inter alia, that the amount of the judgment is from certain parcels of land in Bacolod City titled in his name, of
excessive or is different in kind from that prayed for, or that the plaintiff failed several persons, namely: Basilicio Macanan, Gertrude Nolan,
to prove the material allegations of his complaint, or that the decision is Alejandro Santiago, Jr., Sy Ho, and Milagros Minoria. The cases
contrary to law. against Macanan, Nolan and Santiago were all dismissed for some

reasons. Cases against Sy Ho and Minora, however continued. been prosecuted for an unreasonably long span of time; and the
Summons was duly served to Minora, though she didnt cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations under PD
sign/acknowledge it. Sy Ho, on the other hand was contending that No. 20. City Court rendered judgment in favour of Gochangco. Sy
it was not properly served alleging that he that he had never Ho filed for MR and second MR which were both denied.
received summons; apparently the summons had been served at Gochangco moved for the execution pending appeal contending
the place where he maintained his scrap iron business, which was that this was proper since the judgment was against a defendant,
not his residence and at which he had no representative authorized declared by Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court to be
to receive court processes and notices. immediately executory. Sy Ho and Minoria thereupon filed a joint
- During the pendency of the case, Hodges died and was substituted petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for preliminary
by PCIB (Phil. Commercial Industrial Bank) as court-appointed injunction discretion with the Court of First Instance of Negros
administrator of Hodgess estate. PCIB filed motion declare Sy Ho Occidental. CFI of Negros rendered judgment in favour of Sy Ho
in default for failure to answer complaint which court granted. Sy Ho and Minoria.
then filed Opposition to the Motion for Default stating the improper
service of summons, which the City Court overruled. City Court also
ordered Sy Ho to pay monthly rentals corresponding to the ISSUE: WON Sy Ho was properly served with summons as a basis
premises occupied by him directly to it, instead of to his co- declaring him in default; WON the order authorizing execution of the
defendant, Minoria, who apparently had therefore been acting as ejectment judgment against the defendants proper.
caretaker of the property.
- Later, all the proceedings of this ejectment case were all suspended until
16 or 17 years later by reason of controversies as regards to the
RULING: YES! Whatever defect might have existed in the return of the
administration and hereditary rights over Hodgess estate. The property
service of summons on Sy Ho was rendered inconsequential by subsequent
involve in this case was later on sold to Juan Gochangco, who obtained
events, duly entered in the record, demonstrating that service of summons
title therein in due course. Gochangco lost no time in advising Minoria and
had indeed been effected and Sy Ho had voluntarily submitted himself to
Sy Ho of his acquisition of the property and demanding their vacation
the jurisdiction of the City Court. There was a valid service which is a
thereof. He also filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Substitution of Plaintiff and
substituted service, allowed when the defendant cannot be served
Reception of Evidence" dated March 26, 1976, which the City Court
personally within a reasonable time, in which event, service may be effected
granted by Order dated March 26, 1976. Accordingly, Gochangco
by leaving copies of the summons at defendants dwelling house or
presented evidence ex-parte on March 30, 1976; this, as regards Sy Ho,
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
who had been declared in default.
therein, or at his office or regular place of business with some competent
- In his turn, Sy Ho filed a motion to set aside the order of default
person in charge thereof. Sy Hos submission to the Court's jurisdiction is
attaching an affidavit of Merits in which he claimed that his failure
necessarily inferred from his act of request for leave to present his answer to
to file answer to the complaint was due to the fault of his counsel
the complaint, of voluntarily complying with the City Court's Order for the
who, according to him, failed to make the "proper follow-up" of the
payment of rentals, and filing various other motions and pleadings. There is,
case; and he asked to be excused for his mistake or negligence for
too, his counsel's admission already adverted to, that Sy Ho had really
'depending too much on his lawyer who formerly handled his case."
submitted himself to the City Court's jurisdiction. There can thus be no
Both Minoria and Sy Ho was given a day in court but 1 day before
debate about the proposition that jurisdiction of his person had been
the scheduled appearance, Sy Ho filed MTD stating that the
acquired by the City court by his voluntary appearance and acquiescence.
complaint has no cause of action and the case against him had not

The propriety of the order authorizing execution of the ejectment judgment In reaction to the order of the respondent, the chairman of the
against the defendants also cannot be gainsaid. The order is squarely within petitioner wrote a letter appealing for reconsideration of the order.
the provisions of Section 8, Rule 70 which declares that "(i)f judgment is
rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately, unless Respondent rejected the appeal.
an appeal has been perfected and the defendant, to stay execution, files a Petitioner filed a complaint for damages with prayer for writ of
sufficient bond approved by the justice of the peace or municipal court and preliminary and mandatory injunction and TRO against respondent
executed to the plaintiff to enter the action in the Court of First Instance and
to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the Respondent filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss
judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he
deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time Petitioner filed its opposition to the MTD. Respondents filed a reply
under the contract, if any, as found by the judgment of the justice of the on April 21, 1998.
peace or municipal court to exist. ..."
Petitioners formally offered evidence
G.R. No. 139371 April 4, 2001
Respondents offered evidence
INDIANA AEROSPACE UNIVERSITY, petitioner,
vs. RTC denied MTD and issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction in
COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION (CHED), respondent. favor of the petitioner. Respondent was directed to file its answer
15 days from receipt of the order (Aug 15)
Petition for Review on Certiorari under rule 45 o Writ of Preliminary Injunction
Not to publish or circulate any announcement in
Indiana Aerospace University, formerly Indiana School of the newspaper, radio or television regarding its
Aeronautics was directed by the respondent to desist from using Cease and Desist Order against petitioner
the term University as there was a violation committed by the Not to enforce the Cease and Desist Order
institution unless the school had complied with the basic issued against petitioner;
requirements of being a university. To maintain the status quo by not withholding the
issuance of yearly school permits and special
Respondent was able to verify from the SEC that the petitioner had order to all graduates.
filed a proposal to change its name (from school to university)
which was supposedly favored by the DECS. Petitioner filed a Motion To Declare Respondent in default pursuant
to Section 3, Rule 9 in relation to Section 4, Rule 16 of the Rules of
SEC chairman wrote a letter to the chairman of the respondent Court, as amended, and at the same time praying for the Motion to
saying that their records show that the petitioner has not filed any Set for Hearing on October 30, 1998 at 8:30 a.m.
amended articles of incorporation that changed its corporate name Respondent filed a Motion For Extension of Time to File its Answer
to university. In case the corporate submits an application for until November 18, 1998. On November 17, 1998, respondent filed
change of name, the cease and desist order shall be considered its Answer.
accordingly
December 9, 1998 Judge declared respondents in default

ERLINDA GAJUDO, FERNANDO GAJUDO, JR., ESTELITA GAJUDO,
February 23, 1999 Respondents filed a PFC with the CA BALTAZAR GAJUDO and DANILO ARAHAN
1
o CAs Ruling CHUA, Petitioners, vs.TRADERS ROYAL BANK, Respondent.
Respondent should not have been declared in
default, because its Answer had been filed long FACTS: RTC_QC
before the RTC ruled upon petitioner's Motion to
declare respondent in default. Thus, respondent [Petitioners] filed a against [respondent] Traders Royal Bank, the City Sheriff
had not obstinately refused to file an Answer; on of Quezon City and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City for the annulment
the contrary, its failure to do so on time was due of the extra-judicial foreclosure and auction sale made by [the] city sheriff of
to excusable negligence. Declaring it in default Quezon City of a parcel of land covered by TCT the conventional redemption
did not serve the ends of justice, but only thereof, and prayed for damages and the issuance of a writ of preliminary
prevented it from pursuing the merits of its case. injunction.
ANSWER was filed
ISSUE: Whether there was Grave Abuse of Discretion when the
Case was set for trial however, a big conflagration hit the City Hall of
respondents were declared in default.
Quezon City, which destroyed, amongst other things, the records of the
case.
RULING:
After the records were reconstituted, [petitioners] discovered that the
foreclosed property was sold by [respondent] bank to the Ceroferr Realty
YES
Corporation, and that the notice of lis pendens annotated on the certificate of
title of the foreclosed property, had already been cancelled.
[petitioners], with leave of court, amended their complaint- TC dismiss the
Petitioner was chillax in calling the attention of the Court to the fifteen-day
case without prejudice due to [petitioners] failure to pay additional filing
period for filing an Answer. It moved to declare respondent in default only on
fees.
September 20, 1998, when the filing period had expired on August 30, 1998.
[petitioners] re-filed the complaint with the same Court
The only conclusion in this case is that petitioner has not been prejudiced by
the delay. The same leniency can also be accorded to the RTC, which the amended complaint substantially reproduced the allegations of the
declared respondent in default only on December 9, 1998, or twenty-two original complaint. But [petitioners] this time impleaded as additional
days after the latter had filed its Answer on November 17, 1998. Defendant's defendants the Ceroferr Realty Corporation and/or Cesar Roque, and Lorna
Answer should be admitted, because it had been filed before it was declared Roque, and included an additional cause of action, to wit: that said new
in default, and no prejudice was caused to plaintiff. defendants conspired with [respondent] bank in [canceling] the notice of lis
pendens by falsifying a letter sent to and filed with the office of the Register
While there are instances when a party may be properly declared in default, of Deeds of Quezon City, purportedly for the cancellation of said notice.
these cases should be deemed exceptions to the rule and should be a motion to declare [respondent] bank in default alleging that no answer has
resorted to only in clear cases of obstinate refusal or inordinate neglect in been filed despite the service of summons-granted
complying with the orders of the court.12 In the present case, however, no RTC ruled for Pet. Respondent MR-denied.
such refusal or neglect can be attributed to respondent.

CA- reversed decision of RTC and ruled for respondents. Hence a petition in Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete. "Unequivocal, in the literal sense, as these
was filed in SC via R.45 Petitioners challenge the CA Decision for applying provisions [referring to the subject of default then under Rule 18 of the old
Section 3 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court Rules of Civil Procedure] are, they do not readily convey the full import of
what they contemplate. To begin with, contrary to the immediate notion that
RULING: can be drawn from their language, these provisions are not to be understood
as meaning that default or the failure of the defendant to answer should be
Sec. 3. of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court:" Default; declaration of(read this interpreted as an admission by the said defendant that the plaintiffs cause of
section di ko na sinama yong actual rule) action find support in the law or that plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed
for.
Section 3 of Rule 9 governs the procedure which the trial court is directed to
take when a defendant fails to file an answer. According to this provision, the "Being declared in default does not constitute a waiver of rights except that
court "shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as of being heard and of presenting evidence in the trial court. x x x.
his pleading may warrant," subject to the courts discretion on whether to
require the presentation of evidence ex parte. The same provision also sets "In other words, a defaulted defendant is not actually thrown out of court.
down guidelines on the nature and extent of the relief that may be granted. While in a sense it may be said that by defaulting he leaves himself at the
In particular, the courts judgment "shall not exceed the amount or be mercy of the court, the rules see to it that any judgment against him must be
different in kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated damages." in accordance with law. The evidence to support the plaintiffs cause is, of
course, presented in his absence, but the court is not supposed to admit that
As in other civil cases, basic is the rule that the party making allegations has which is basically incompetent. Although the defendant would not be in a
the burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence. Moreover,
19 position to object, elementary justice requires that only legal evidence should
parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence, not upon the be considered against him. If the evidence presented should not be sufficient
20
weakness of the defense offered by their opponent. This principle holds to justify a judgment for the plaintiff, the complaint must be dismissed. And if
true, especially when the latter has had no opportunity to present evidence an unfavorable judgment should be justifiable, it cannot exceed in amount or
because of a default order. Needless to say, the extent of the relief that may be different in kind from what is prayed for in the complaint."
21
be granted can only be as much as has been alleged and proved with
preponderant evidence required under Section 1 of Rule 133. THUS, while petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex parte under
Section 3 of Rule 9, they were not excused from establishing their claims for
22
In Pascua v. Florendo that complainants are not automatically entitled to damages by the required quantum of proof under Section 1 of Rule 133.
the relief prayed for, once the defendants are declared in default. Favorable Stated differently, any advantage they may have gained from the ex parte
relief can be granted only after the court has ascertained that the relief is presentation of evidence does not lower the degree of proof required.
warranted by the evidence offered and the facts proven by the presenting Clearly then, there is no incompatibility between the two rules.
party. In Pascua, this Court ruled that "x x x it would be meaningless to
require presentation of evidence if every time the other party is declared in WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision
default, a decision would automatically be rendered in favor of the non- and Resolution AFFIRMED.
defaulting party and exactly according to the tenor of his prayer. This is not
23
contemplated by the Rules nor is it sanctioned by the due process clause." DOCTRINE: The mere fact that a defendant is declared in default does not
automatically result in the grant of the prayers of the plaintiff. To win, the

latter must still present the same quantum of evidence that would be Monzon was also indebted Coastal Lending Corporation which
required if the defendant were still present. A party that defaults is not extrajudicially foreclosed the entire property covered by Psu-
deprived of its rights, except the right to be heard and to present evidence to 232001, including the portions mortgaged and
the trial court. If the evidence presented does not support a judgment for the subsequently sold to respondents. The winning bidder in
plaintiff, the complaint should be dismissed, even if the defendant may not the extrajudicial foreclosure is Addio Properties Inc.
have been heard or allowed to present any countervailing evidence. Monzon, in her Answer, claimed that the Petition for Injunction
should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
TERESITA MONZON, Petitioner, RTC, citing the absence of petitioner and her counsel on said
- versus - hearing date despite due notice, granted an ex parte
SPS. JAMES & MARIA ROSA NIEVES RELOVA and SPS. BIENVENIDO presentation of evidence by respondents, BUT petitioner was
& EUFRACIA PEREZ, NOT declared in default (take note)
Respondents. RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents.
- versus - Petioner filed an appeal
ADDIO PROPERTIES, INC., Intervenor. Addio Properties, Inc. filed before the trial court a Motion for
Intervention - granted
September 17, 2008 Petitioners appeal dismissed.
G.R. No. 171827 CA

Affirmed RTC and denied petitioners MFR
Facts:
Monzon filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.
RTC of Tagaytay City
Respondents filed an initiatory pleading captioned as a Petition for
Injunction against Atty. Ana Liza Luna, Clerk of Court of Branch 18 Issue: WON RTC erred in rendering its decision immediately after the
of the RTC of Tagaytay City, and herein petitioner Teresita Monzon respondents presented their evidence ex parte without giving Monzon a
which stated the following: chance to present her evidence.
respondents alleged that on 28 December 1998, Monzon
executed a promissory note in favor of the spouses Perez for Held: YES.
the amount of P600,000.00 payable on or before 28 December
1999. This was secured by a 300-square meter lot in Tagaytay Monzon claims anew that it was a violation of her right to due process of law
City. Monzon later on executed a Deed of Absolute Sale for the RTC to render its Decision immediately after respondents
over lot 2A of Psu-232001 in favor of the spouses Perez. presented their evidence ex parte without giving her a chance to
Another claim is that Monzon executed another promissory present her evidence. Monzon stresses that she was never declared in
note, this time in favor of the spouses Relova, and that this default by the trial court. The trial court should have, thus, set the case for
loan was secured by a 200 square meter lot. Monzon later on hearing for the reception of the evidence of the defense. She claims that she
executed a Deed of Conditional Sale over lot 2B of Psu- never waived her right to present evidence.
232001 in favor of the spouses Relova.

It can be seen that despite the fact that Monzon was not declared in default Case is REMANDED to the trial court for reception of evidence for the
by the RTC, the RTC nevertheless applied the effects of a default order defense.
upon petitioner under Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court:
Rule 10 Amended and Supplemental Pleadings
SEC. 3. Default; declaration of.Ifthe defending party fails to
answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon G.R. No. 80001 February 27, 1989
motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and
proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default. CARLOS LEOBRERA, petitioner
Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the vs.
claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in THE COURT OF APPEALS and BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such respondents.
reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court.
Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala, Pescon & Bengson for petitioner.
(a) Effect of order of default.Aparty in default shall be entitled to
Leoner, Ramirez & Associates for respondent BPI.
notice of subsequent proceedings but not to take part in the trial.
In his book on remedial law, former Justice Florenz D. Regalado writes that
failure to appear in hearings is not a ground for the declaration of a Facts
defendant in default:
The crux of the present petition for review on certiorari is the propriety of the
Failure to file a responsive pleading within the reglementary admission by the trial court of a supplemental complaint filed by petitioner.
period, and NOT failure to appear at the hearing, is the sole
Sometime in 1980, petitioner Carlos Leobrera (Leobrera for short) was
ground for an order of default, except the failure to appear at a
granted an P 800,000.00 credit facility by private respondent Bank of the
pre-trial conference wherein the effects of a default on the part of
Philippine Islands (BPI for short) consisting of the following:
the defendant are followed, that is, the plaintiff shall be allowed to
present evidence ex parte and a judgment based thereon may be
P 200,000.00 revolving promissory note line at 10% interest p.a.;
rendered against the defendant (Section 5, Rule 18). Also, a default
P 100,000.00 export advance line at 12% interest p.a.; and,
judgment may be rendered, even if the defendant had filed his
P 500,000.00 Industrial Guarantee Loan Fund (IGLF) loan at 12%
answer, under the circumstance in Sec. 3(c), Rule 29.
interest p.a.
The facility was granted as part of an amicable settlement between BPI and
Hence, according to Justice Regalado, the effects of default are followed Leobrera wherein the latter agreed to drop his claims for damages against
only in three instances: the former for its alleged failure to deliver on time three export letters of
(1) when there is an actual default for failure to file a responsive credit opened in Leobrera's favor.
pleading;
(2) failure to appear in the pre-trial conference; and Aside from the abovementioned credit facility, Leobrera also obtained from
(3) refusal to comply with modes of discovery under the BPI a separate three-year term loan in the amount of P 500,000.00
circumstance in Sec. 3(c), Rule 29.

evidenced by Promissory Note No. 01785/0224-0 . This three-year term loan BPI then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for
was secured by a third real estate mortgage. preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals,
Upon maturity of the 90-day notes [Rollo pp. 67-681 BPI and Leobrera Seeking to annul the court order issued by the trial court and
negotiated, albeit unsuccessfully, on the terms of their renewal. No Asking that the latter be prohibited from hearing the petition for
agreement having been reached by them, BPI demanded the full payment of injunction prayed for in the supplemental complaint.
the loan. Leobrera failed to settle his loan account thus BPI prepared to
foreclose the real estate mortgages securing the same.
Before the Court of Appeals could act on BPI's petition however, the trial
RTC court granted the injunction prayed for.
Before BPI could institute foreclosure proceedings however, Leobrera filed a The Court of Appeals gave due course to BPI's petition and enjoined the trial
complaint for damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary judge from enforcing his order, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of
injunction seeking to enjoin BPI from foreclosing the mortgages at the RTC. preliminary injunction in favor of BPI.
The trial court issued an order The Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of BPI.
Restraining BPI from foreclosing the real estate mortgages SC

Securing the 90 day loans and, after hearing,
Issued a writ of preliminary injunction. Leobrera filed the instant petition for review with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction.
Leobrera failed to pay the amortization due on the loan, as a result of which, The Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining BPI "from
BPI opted to accelerate the maturity and called the entire loan due and foreclosing the three (3) properties of the petitioner.
demandable. Leobrera likewise failed to remit the amount due and BPI thus By this time, BPI had already foreclosed two of the properties.
threatened to foreclose the real estate mortgage securing the loan. The Court gave due course to the petition and the parties submitted
their respective memoranda.
Before BPI could foreclose the mortgage, petitioner filed with the trial court a Petitioner filed two motions asking for the extension of suspension
"Motion to File Supplemental Complaint," attaching thereto the supplemental of the period to redeem the properties but the Court in a resolution
complaint which prayed for the issuance of an injunction to restrain BPI from denied said motions as well as petitioner's motion for
foreclosing the third mortgage. reconsideration.
The Court merely noted a subsequent manifestation and motion
The next day, the trial court granted Leobrera's motion to file the praying that the foreclosure be declared null and void, as it was in
supplemental complaint and issued a restraining order enjoining BPI from effect a second motion for reconsideration.
proceeding with any "Legal, court or other action." BPI filed a motion to set it Issue
aside but the motion was denied by the trial court.
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court abused its
CA
discretion in admitting the supplemental complaint.

Ruling proof of its service as required by Section 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
Section 6 of Rule 10 of the Rules of Court governing the admission of
supplemental pleadings states: It is evident from the notice that no time and place of hearing of the motion is
indicated. Neither does the record reveal that there was proof of service
Section 6. Matters subject of supplemental pleadings. - Upon motion attached to the motion. The minimum requirements of procedural due
of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such process not having been satisfied by the notice, the motion to which it was
terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting attached is thus a mere scrap of paper not entitled to any cognizance by the
forth transactions, occurrences or events which happened since the trial court. The Court of Appeals thus committed no reversible error in
date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. If the court deems it annulling the order of the trial court tainted as it was with clear grave abuse
advisable that the adverse party should plead thereto, it shall so of discretion.
order, specifying the time therefor.
As to the supplemental complaint, what likewise militates against its
The above rule expressly provides that the Court may allow a party upon admission is the fact that the matters involved therein are entirely different
motion to serve a supplemental pleading after reasonable notice has been from the causes of action mentioned in the original complaint.
given the other party. The question here then is whether that requirement of
a "reasonable notice" has been complied with. A supplemental complaint should, as the name implies, supply only
deficiencies in aid of an original complaint. It should contain only causes of
The Court of Appeals found, undisputed by petitioner, that petitioner filed the action relevant and material to the plaintiff's right and which help or aid the
"Motion to File the Supplemental Complaint" attaching thereto a copy of the plaintiff's right or. The supplemental complaint must be based on matters
supplemental complaint. A copy of the motion was sent to BPI by registered arising subsequent to the original complaint related to the claim or
mail on the same day but was received by the latter only two days later. A defense presented therein, and founded on the same cause of action. It
day earlier however, the trial court had already issued an order granting the cannot be used to try a new matter or a new cause of action.
motion and admitted the supplemental complaint "in the interest of sound
administration of justice." The trial judge likewise issued a temporary While petitioner would persuade this Court that the causes of action are
restraining order to enjoin BPI from proceeding with "Any legal, court or interrelated, the record reveals otherwise. The record shows that petitioner's
other action against plaintiff (Leobrera) arising from Promissory Note." main cause of action in the original complaint filed in Civil Case No. 15644
concerned BPI's threat to foreclose two real estate mortgages securing the
The undue haste which characterized the trial courts admission of the two 90 day promissory notes executed by petitione. Petitioner alleges that
supplemental complaint is at once apparent as no notice had as yet been this threatened foreclosure violated the terms of the amicable settlement
received by BPI when the trial court issued the order granting the motion to between BPI and petitioner.
file the supplemental complaint and restraining BPI from foreclosing the
mortgage. BPI learned of the existence of the motion and the order granting The supplemental complaint on the other hand alleged acts of harassment
it too late for it to contest the motion. committed by BPI in unreasonably opting to declare petitioner in default and
in demanding full liquidation of the three-year term loan. This three-year term
The arbitrariness of the trial court's admission of the supplemental complaint loan, as previously mentioned, was entirely distinct and separate from the
is brought to the fore when it is considered that the motion to file the two promissory notes. It was independent of the amicable settlement
supplemental complaint contained an invalid notice of hearing and lacked between petitioner and BPI which gave rise to the credit facility subject of the
original complaint. Although there is Identity in the remedies asked for in the

original and supplemental complaints, i.e. injunction, petitioner's subsequent The contract entitled "Contract and Agreement" was for the
cause of action giving rise to the claim for damages in the supplemental construction of a new Pasay City Hall at F.B. Harrison St., Pasay
complaint is unrelated to the amicable settlement which brought about the City. Pertinent provision of the said contract is as follows:
grant of the credit facilities, the breach of which settlement is alleged to be
the basis of the original complaint. Petitioner himself in his supplemental xxx xxx xxx
complaint admits this.
Whereas one of the conditions set forth in the proposal is
The two causes of action being entirely different, the latter one could not be
that the Contractor shall start the construction of the
successfully pleaded by supplemental complaint.
Pasay City Hall Building as per plans and specifications by
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The stages advancing the necessary amount needed for each
temporary restraining order issued is hereby LIFTED. stage of work and the Party of the First Part (Pasay City)
to reimburse the amount spent on the work accomplished
by the Contractor before proceeding on the next stage ...
G.R. No. L-32162 September 28, 1984
...
THE PASAY CITY GOVERNMENT, THE CITY MAYOR OF DEFENDANT

xxx xxx xxx
PASAY CITY GOVERNMENT, THE MEMBERS OF THE MUNICIPAL
BOARD OF PASAY ClTY and THE CITY TREASURER OF PASAY CITY
GOVERNMENT, petitioners-appellants, 2. That the work shall be done in stages to be determined
vs. by the City Engineer considering structural and functional
THE HONORABLE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH criteria and consistent with funds immediately available for
X and VICENTE DAVID ISIP (doing business under the firm name V.D. the purpose;
ISIP SONS & ASSOCIATES), respondents-appellees.
3. That the Contractor shall advance the necessary
RULING: A SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH amount needed for each stage of work; Provided that the
AND IN AID OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION SET FORTH IN THE Contractor, shall before starting each stage of work, inform
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND A NEW AND INDEPENDENT the First Party in writing as to the amount necessary to be
CAUSE OF ACTION CANNOT BE SET UP BY SUCH advanced by the former; ... ...
COMPLAINT, EXPECIALLY WHERE JUDGMENT HAS ALREADY
BEEN OBTAINED BY HIM IN THE ORIGINAL ACTION. 4. That the Party of the First Part shall reimburse the
Contractor the cost of the work completed as estimated by
FACTS: the City Engineer for back stage of work before the
Contractor proceed to the next stage; ... ... (pp. 33-34,
rec.).
On August 12, 1964, respondent V.D. Isip, Sons & Associates
represented by Vicente David Isip entered into a contract with the
City of Pasay represented by the then Mayor Pablo Cuneta. The respondent accomplished under various stages of construction
the amount of work (including supplies and materials) equivalent to

an estimated value of P1,713,096.00 of the total contract price of On July 19, 1969, the respondent Court issued an order stating that
P4,914,500.80. inasmuch as the petitioner has not yet paid the respondent as
The petitioner paid only the total amount of P1,100,000.00 to the of this date then "the writ of execution and of garnishment are
respondent leaving an amount of P613,096.00 immediately due declared to be again in full force and effect ...".
from the petitioner to the respondent. On July 22, 1969, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
Notwithstanding demands for payment thereof, the petitioner failed on three grounds, to wit:
to remit the aforesaid amount of P613,096.00 to the respondent. On July 22, 1969, the respondent Court denied and rejected the
CFI MANILA: RESPONDENT: SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE petitioners motion for reconsideration.
AGAINST PETITIONER. The respondent Court ordered the enforcement of the garnishment
o On May 16, 1968, respondent filed an action for specific already issued to the City Sheriff for Pasay by taking possession of
performance with damages against herein petitioners the amount of P613,096.00 from the deposits of Pasay City
before the respondent Court. Government with the Philippine National Bank, Pasay City Branch
and delivering the same to the plaintiff.
The parties arrived at a draft of amicable agreement which was
submitted to the Municipal Board of Pasay City for its consideration. Petitioner filed an appeal from the orders of the respondent
Subsequently, the Municipal Board of Pasay enacted Ordinance Court.
No. 1012 which approved the Compromise Agreement and also The respondent, Vicente David Isip, in the original complaint for
authorized and empowered the incumbent City Mayor Jovito specific performance filed an urgent motion for permit to serve a
Claudio to represent the appellant Pasay City Government, subject supplemental complaint seeking rescission of the original
to the final approval of the respondent Court herein. contract titled Contract and Agreement and of the Compromise
CFI approved the said Compromise Agreement including a Agreement and claiming damages in the sum of P672,653.91
Manifestation and Addendum thereto. alleging the violations of the defendants specially the Pasay City
On April 10, 1969, the petitioner filed an urgent motion seeking a Government in complying with its obligations incumbent upon it in
declaration of legality of the original contract and agreement dated the compromise agreement.
August 4, 1964 from the respondent Court.
On May 10, 1969, the respondent Court issued an order declaring On June 29, 1970, the defendants filed their cautionary answer to
that the original contract is legal and valid. the supplemental complaint alleging that the Court has no
On June 21, 1969, at the instance of the respondent, the jurisdiction over the subject of the present supplemental complaint;
respondent Court granted an order of execution (PLS. TAKE that the cause of action is already barred by prior judgment; that the
NOTE) pursuant to which a writ of execution dated June 25, 1969 principle of res judicata applies; that plaintiff's supplemental
was issued. complaint states no cause of action and that the present claim of
On July 9, 1969, an application for and notice of garnishment were plaintiff has been paid, waived, abandoned and extinguished.
made and effected upon the funds of appellant Pasay City
Government with the Philippine National Bank. ISSUE: Whether the respondent court was in error when it still
On July 11, 1969, the petitioner filed an urgent motion to set aside entertained the supplemental complaint filed by respondent.
the respondent Court's order of execution and to quash the writ of
execution.

HELD: YES. RESPONDENT COURT HAS NO MORE JURISDICTION When a decision has become final and executory, the court no
OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER. longer has the power and jurisdiction to alter, amend or revoke, and
its only power thereof is to order its execution.
Art. 2041. If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, After the perfection of an appeal, the trial court loses jurisdiction
the other party may either enforce the compromise or regard it as over its judgment and cannot vacate the same.
rescinded and insist upon his original demand., Moreover, supplemental pleadings are meant to supply deficiencies
in aid of original pleading, not to entirely substitute the latter
It is obvious that the respondent did not only succeed in enforcing IN THE CASE AT BAR, the respondent originally asked for specific
the compromise but said respondent likewise wants to rescind the performance which was later settled through a compromise
said compromise. agreement.
It is clear from the language of the law, specifically Article 2041 of After this, the respondent asked for rescission of both the contract
the New Civil Code that one of the parties to a compromise has two and agreement and the compromise agreement using a
options: supplemental complaint.
It is clear that the supplemental complaint is not only to "supply
1) to enforce the compromise; or deficiencies in aid of original pleading but is also meant as an
entirely new "substitute" to the latter.
A supplemental complaint must be consistent with and in aid of, the
2) to rescind the same and insist upon his original demand.
cause of action set forth in the original complaint and a new and
independent cause of action cannot be set up by such complaint,
The respondent in the case herein before Us wants to avail of especially where judgment has already been obtained by him in the
both of these options. This can not be done. original action.
The respondent cannot ask for rescission of the compromise
agreement after it has already enjoyed the first option of
Torres, petitioner v. CA, respondent
enforcing the compromise by asking for a writ of execution
resulting thereby in the garnishment of the Pasay City funds - PFROC, treated as a special civil action, praying that the judgment
deposited with the Philippine National Bank which eventually rendered by the CA and the Resolution denying the MR and
was delivered to the respondent. Petition for New Trial be set aside
- Margarita Torres cohabited Leon Arbole w/o the benefit of marriage
ISSUE OF SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT: o Petitioner Macaria Torres was born on 20 June 1898
- Mother died on20 Dec 1931; Father died on 14 Sept 1933
Having established that the compromise agreement was final and - 13 Dec 1910 The Government issued to Margarita a Sale
immediately executory, and in fact was already enforced, the Certificate payable in 20 installments
respondent Court was in error when it still entertained the o Last installment was on 17 Dec 1936, 3 years after
supplemental complaint filed by the respondent-appellee for by Arboles death
then the respondent Court had no more jurisdiction over the subject - 25 Aug 1933 Arbole sold and transferred all his rights and
matter. interests to the portion of Lot 551 in favor of Petitioner

- 6 June 1953 Vicente Santillan, legitimate child of Margarita, allegedly found among the belongings of Vicente, alleging
executed an Affidavit claiming possession of Lot 551 and asking for that the latter may have tried to suppress
the issuance of title in his name o Respondents argued against new trial, arguing that it is
- 7 Nov 1957 The Bureau of Lands issued the patent in the name not newly discovered evidence which could not have been
of the legal heirs of Margarita produced during trial by the exercise of due diligence
- 3 June 1954 Respondents filed a complaint against Petitioner for - 24 Aug 1973 Denied both Motions
Forcible Entry with the Justice of the Peace Court of Tanza, Cavite, Issue: W/N the CA overlooked to include in its findings of facts the
alleging that Petitioner had entered a portion of Lot 551 without admission made by Vicente Santillan and the Respondents that
their consent, constructed a house and refused to vacate on Macaria and Vicente are siblings with their common mother,
demand Margarita
- The ejectment case was decided against Petitioner and then, the
latter appealed to the CFI of Cavite Held: No
- 8 June 1954 Petitioner instituted an Action for Partition of Lot 551
before the CFI of Cavite alleging that she is a legitimate child of - Without taking account of the notarial document, she cannot be
Margarita Torres; Respondents averred that they are the only heirs considered a legitimate child
and that the complaint for partition be dismissed o Continuous possession of the status of a natural child will
- 20 Nov 1958 The Ejectment Case and Partition Case were jointly not amount to automatic recognition but that an action for
tried compulsory recognition is necessary; Hence, Petitioner
o Lot 551 is the paraphernal property of Margarita refers to Par. 3 of Respondents original complaint in the
2/3 to Respondents Ejectment Case
1/3 to Petitioner The plaintiffs and the defendants Macaria Torres
- Petitioner moved for its Reconsideration are the legal heirs...
- 7 Aug 1963 CFI of Cavite granted the Reconsideration - Petitioner then avers that the statement is an admission of her
o Macaria Torres as a legitimate child legitimation and is controlling
o Lot 551 is a conjugal property - However, in the Amended Complaint filed by the Respondents, the
o 4/6 to Macaria said portion referred to by the Petitioner was deleted
o 2/6 to the other heirs - In virtue thereof, the Amended Complaint takes the place of the
- Respondents appealed original. The Original is regarded as abandoned and ceases to
- 2 April 1973 CA rendered a judgment perform any further function as a pleading. The Original complaint
o Macaria Torres is not a legitimate child no longer forms part of the record
o Lot 551 is a conjugal property - If Petitioner had desired to utilize the Original complaint, she should
o to Macaria have offered it in evidence
o to the other heirs - Having been amended, the Original Complaint lost its character as
- 16 April 1973 Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and for a judicial admission, which would have required no proof, and
New Trial became merely an extrajudicial admission, the admissibility of
o A notarial document, dated 5 March 1930, was presented which, as evidence, requires its formal offer
by Petitioner arguing that it was found only later as it was - Therefore, there can be no estoppels by extrajudicial admission
made in the Original Complaint, for failure to offer it in evidence

- It should also be noted that in the Partition Case, Respondents asked for time to respond to it. The Dionisios filed their amended
denied the legitimacy of the Petitioner complaint; Wilfredo maintained his original answer.
- However, it is the Courts view that the notarial document can MTC rendered judgment, ordering Wilfredo to vacate the land and
reasonably qualify as newly discovered evidence as per Petitioners remove his house from it.
allegation (that the document was allegedly suppressed) RTC: On appeal, the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, affirmed the MTC
- The case is hereby REMANDED to the Intermediate Appellate decision, holding that the case was one for forcible entry.
Court for new trial CA: On review the CA reversed the decisions of the courts below,
and ordering the dismissal of the Dionisios action. The CA held
that, by amending their complaint, the Dionisios effectively changed
their cause of action from unlawful detainer to recovery of
G.R. No. 178159 March 2, 2011 possession which fell outside the jurisdiction of the MTC. Further,
since the amendment introduced a new cause of action, its filing
marked the passage of the one year limit from demand required in
SPS. VICENTE DIONISIO AND ANITA DIONISIO, Petitioner,
ejectment suits. More, since jurisdiction over actions for possession
vs.
WILFREDO LINSANGAN, Respondent. depended on the assessed value of the property and since such
assessed value was not alleged, the CA cannot determine what
court has jurisdiction over the action.
The case is about amendments in the complaint that do not alter the
cause of action
ISSUE: Whether or not the Dionisios amendment of their complaint
effectively changed their cause of action from one of ejectment to one of
FACTS:
recovery of possession; and whether MTC has jurisdiction?
Cruz owned agricultural lands in San Rafael, Bulacan, that his RULING:
tenant, Romualdo cultivated. Upon Romualdos death, his widow,
Emiliana, got Cruzs permission to stay on the property provided
An amended complaint that changes the cause of action is a new complaint.
she would vacate it upon demand.
The action is deemed filed on the date of the filing of such amended
The Dionisios bought the property from Cruz. The Dionisios found
pleading, not on the date of the filing of its original version. Thus, the statute
out that Emiliana had left the property and that it was already
of limitation resumes its run until it is arrested by the filing of the amended
Wilfredo Linsangan who occupied it under the strength of a
pleading.
"Kasunduan ng Bilihan ng Karapatan".
The Dionisios wrote Wilfredo, demanding that he vacate the land
An amendment which does not alter the cause of action but merely
but the latter declined, prompting the Dionisios to file an eviction
supplements or amplifies the facts previously alleged, does not affect the
suit against him before the MTC of San Rafael, Bulacan. Wilfredo
reckoning date of filing based on the original complaint. The cause of action,
filed an answer in which he declared that he had been a tenant of
unchanged, is not barred by the statute of limitations that expired after the
the land as early as 1977.
filing of the original complaint.
Pre-trial, the Dionisios orally asked leave to amend their complaint.
Despite initial misgivings over the amended complaint, Wilfredo

The original complaint alleges that the Dionisios bought the land from Cruz The RTC characterized the nature of the action as an action for forcible
on 1989; that Romualdo used to be the lands tenant; that when he died, the entry, Wilfredo having entered the property and taken over from widow
Dionisios allowed his widow, Emiliana, to stay under a promise that she Emiliana on the sly. The problem with this characterization is that the
would leave the land upon demand; that in 2002 the Dionisios discovered on complaint contained no allegation that the Dionisios were in possession of
visit to the land that Emiliana had left it and that Wilfredo now occupied it the property before Wilfredo occupied it either by force, intimidation, threat,
under a claim that he bought the right to stay from Emiliana under a strategy, or stealth, an element of that kind of eviction suit. Nowhere in the
"Kasunduan ng Bilihan ng Karapatan;" that the Dionisios did not know of and recitation of the amended complaint did the Dionisios assert that they were
gave no consent to this sale which had not been annotated on their title; that in prior possession of the land and were ousted from such possession by
the Dionisios verbally told Wilfredo to leave the property by April 31, 2002; Wilfredos unlawful occupation of the property.
that their lawyer reiterated such demand in writing on April 22, 2002; that
Wilfredo did not heed the demand; that the Dionisios wanted to get The MTC and the RTC gave credence to the Dionisios version. The Court
possession so they could till the land and demolish Wilfredos house on it; will respect their judgment on a question of fact.
that Wilfredo did not give the Dionisios just share in the harvest; and that the
Dionisios were compelled to get the services of counsel for P100,000.00. WILFREDO P. VERZOSA and PILAR MARTINEZ, petitioners vs. COURT
OF APPEALS, HON. NICODEMO FERRER, and FE GIRON
The amended complaint has essentially identical allegations. The only new USON, respondents
ones are that the Dionisios allowed Emiliana, Romualdos widow to stay "out
of their kindness, tolerance, and generosity;" that they went to the land in FACTS:
2002, after deciding to occupy it, to tell Emiliana of their plan; that Wilfredo
cannot deny that Cruz was the previous registered owner and that he sold
Fe Uson is the owner of a parcel of land in Sual, Pangasinan. She
the land to the Dionisios; and that a person occupying anothers land by the
mortgaged the land to Wilfredo Versoza. For failing to pay her
latters tolerance or permission, without contract, is bound by an implied
obligation, Versoza foreclosed the property. The Provincial Sheriff
promise to leave upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment
set the foreclosure sale.
is the proper remedy.
To prevent from proceeding with the foreclosure sale, Uson filed for
annulment of mortgage with a prayer for issuance of a writ of
To determine if an amendment introduces a different cause of action, the
preliminary injunction. The complaint of Uson was dismissed on the
test is whether such amendment now requires the defendant to answer for a
ground that it was not personally verified by Uson. The court
liability or obligation which is completely different from that stated in the
granted Usons Motion for Reconsideration and filed an amended
original complaint.
complaint with the required verification.
In the meantime, Versoza asked the Sheriff to proceed with the
Here, both the original and the amended complaint required Wilfredo to foreclosure. Uson requested that the sale be deferred since there
defend his possession based on the allegation that he had stayed on the was a pending action (annulment of mortgage) in court. However,
land after Emiliana left out of the owners mere tolerance and that the latter the sale continued and the property was sold to Versoza.
had demanded that he leave. Indeed, Wilfredo did not find the need to file a
After the redemption period, Sheriff issued the Sheriffs Final Deed
new answer.
of Sale. The lot is now under Versozas name. Sometime after,
Versoza sold the lot to Pilar Martinez.
The jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is
determined by the allegations of the complaint.

Uson filed her an application for preliminary injunction in her such a substantive matter as prescription, on the date it is actually filed with
nd
2 amended complaint impleading Martinez and the Register of the court, regardless of when it is ultimately formally admitted by the
Deeds of Pangasinan as defendants to the case. court. After all, the only purpose of requiring leave of and formal admission
Trial Court granted the injunction and ordered Martinez to cease by the court of an amended pleading after issues have already been joined
and desist from performing acts of ownership over the lot. as to the original ones is to prevent the injection of other issues which ought
Versoza and Martinez now claims that the status quo to be either to be considered as barred already or made the subject of another
nd proceeding, if they are not anyway indispensable for the resolution of the
preserved refers to the point before the filing of the 2 complaint
and before Martinez acquired the property. They also contend that original ones and no unnecessary multiplicity of suits would result; so, when
consummated acts can no longer be restrained by injunction. the court ultimately admits the amendment, the legal effect, for substantive
The judge of the case clarified that the status quo being maintained purposes, of such admission retroacts as a rule to the date of its actual
in this case is the possession of Uson of the land and does not filing.
refer to Martinez being the registered owner of the lot.
In the instant case, the Amended Complaint did not introduce a new
Issue : What constitutes the status quo ante in the application of an injunctive
or different cause of action or demand. The original Complaint was
writ, in the event a complaint is subsequently amended?
amended only to rectify the lack of verification and thereafter to implead
Martinez, who had purchased the contested property from Verzosa. .
Held:Status quo maintained is from Usons possession of the land. As
defined, status quo is the last peaceful uncontested situation which precedes Hence, the CA was correct in upholding the trial court that the status
a controversy. Its preservation is the function of the injunctive suit. When quo was the situation of the parties at the time of the filing of the original
the amended complaint does not introduce new issues or causes of action, Complaint.
the suit is deemed to commence on the date when the original complaint
was filed. In short, for purposes of determining the commencement of a suit, G.R. No. L-34840 July 20, 1982
the original complaint is deemed abandoned and superseded by the
amended complaint only if the amended complaint introduces a new or
MARIO RODIS MAGASPI, JUSTINO R. MAGASPI, BALDOMERA M.
different cause of action or demand.
ALEJANDRO, and MANOLITA M. CORTEZ,petitioners,
Hence, it has been held that an amendment which merely vs.
supplements and amplifies the facts originally alleged relates back to the HONORABLE JOSE R. RAMOLETE, Judge of the Court of First
date of the commencement of the action and is not barred by the statute of Instance of Cebu, ESPERANZA V. GARCIA, Clerk of Court of First
limitations, the period of which expires after service of the original complaint Instance of Cebu, THE SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES
[18]
but before service of amendment. It is the actual filing in court that LIMITED and/or THE SHELL REFINING COMPANY (Phil.) INC.,
controls and not the date of the formal admission of the amended pleading. CENTRAL VISAYAN REALTY & INVESTMENTS CO., INC., CEBU CITY
SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION and the GOVERNMENT OF THE
[20]
The Court in Republic v. Marsman elucidated:While in the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
procedural sense, especially in relation to the possible necessity of and time
for the filing of responsive and other corresponding pleadings, an amended
complaint is deemed filed only as of the date of its admission, xxx , the self-
evident proposition [is] that for practical reasons and to avoid the
Facts:
complications that may arise from undue delays in the admission thereof,
such an amended complaint must be considered as filed, for the purpose of

CFI Cebu 8. To order the defendants jointly and solidarily except the
Petitioners filed a complaint for the recovery of ownership and Government of the Republic of the
possession of a parcel of land with damages against The Shell Co. Philippines moral damages in such amount as this
of the Philippines, Ltd. and/or The Shell Refining Co. (Phil.) Inc., Court may determine and attorney's fees in the
Central Visayan Realty & Investment Co., Inc. and Cebu City amount of P100,000.00 and the cost of this action;
Savings & Loan Association. Upon filing and the payment of
P60.00 as docketing fee and P10.00 for sheriff fees, the complaint 9. Exemplary damages be imposed on the defendants
was assigned Civil Case No. R11882. jointly and solidarily except the Government of the
Central Visayan Realty & Investment Co., Inc. and Cebu City Republic of the Philippines in the amount as this Court
Savings and Loan Assn filed a motion to compel the plaintiffs to may deem just and proper as an example and deterrent
pay the correct amount for docket fee. Respondents contend to any similar acts in the future.
that the following should be the computation for the payment of DF.
Docket fee (JUST TAKE NOTE OF THE FIGURES BECAUSE (Complaint was edited in such a way na wala na yung
IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT, MARAMING MAWAWALA exact figures requested for damages para bumaba
DITO.) yung DF. Ang taba ng utak nung lawyer.)
Land and Improvement at P87,280.00 assessed value
.................... P100.00
On November 12, 1970, the defendants (herein respondents filed
Recovery of Value of the Land and damages:
an opposition to the admission of the amended complaint. They
a) P1,250,000.00 Land value based their opposition on the following grounds:
b) 500,000.00 Moral Damages
c) 500,000.00 Exemplary Damages
1. That while the only reason given for the amendment of
d) 250,000.00 Attorney,s fees
the complaint is the inclusion of the Government of the
e) 890,633.24 Monthly rentals up to date of filing of Philippines as an indispensable party; the plaintiffs have
complaint 6,632.00 taken the improper liberty of amending portions of the
= P3,390,633.24 allegations in the complaint and even have eliminated
DF = 6,732.00 entire paragraph, thus:
On October 14, 1970, RTC judge ordered plaintiffs to pay a

a) By not mentioning the previously
filing fee of P6,730.00 on the ground that the total demand of the
alleged value of the land at
said plaintiffs (the value of the land, which is P17,280.00, plus the
P1,250,000.00 in paragraph 19;
damages amounting to P3,390,633.24 TAKE NOTE) should be
the basis for computing the filing fee and not the value of the land
b) By not mentioning the previously
alone.
On November 3, 1970, the plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to averred to monthly rentals due at
P3,500.00 from June 2, 1948, or
amend the complaint so as to include the Government of the
computed at P890,633.24;
Republic of the Philippines as a defendant. The amended
complaint still sought the return of the lot in question but the
pecuniary claim was limited to the following:

c) By eliminating completely the claim The above motion was opposed by the plaintiffs on the
for moral damages of P500.000.00 and ground that the amended complaint which had been
reducing attorney's fees from admitted by the court had replaced the original complaint.
P250,000.00 to P100,000.00 under par. RTC ruled that the correct docket fee must be paid before the Court
21; will act on the petition or complaint. The Court of Justice is not
called upon to act on a complaint or a petition in the absence of
d) By not mentioning the amount payment of a corresponding docket fee. Before the payment of the
previously claimed as exemplary docket fee, the case is not deemed registered and docketed.
damages in the sum of P500,000.00, as In the light of the above rulings on the matter, the original
alleged in par. 21: complaint, up to the present, is not deemed registered or
docketed. It follows, therefore, that there is likewise no
substituting thereto, the averment that, the amount of amended complaint deemed to have been filed and
these various claims for damages will be proven admitted.
during the trial of the case;
The petitioners assail the above order. They insist that they had correctly
2. That these amendments are obviously intended to paid the docketing fee in the amount of P60.00, or in the alternative, that if
circumvent, it not entirely subvert, the lawful Order of this they are to pay an additional docketing fee, it should be based on the
Honorable Court for the plaintiff to pay the amount of amended complaint.
P3,104.00 as docket fee, on the basis of the total amount
claimed for damages ISSUE: WON the amended complaint should be the basis for the
computation of the DF.
xxx
Held: YES.
4. That the payment of the correct and in this case, by an
Order of this Honorable Court of the docket fee, is a We hold that under the circusmtances, Civil Case No. R. 11882 was
condition precedent for the complaint, amended or docketed upon the payment of P60.00 although said amount is
otherwise, of the plaintiff to be given due course; insufficient. Accordingly, the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over the
case and the proceedings thereafter had were proper and regular.
RTC admitted the amended complaint although the plaintiffs
had not yet complied with his Order of October 14, 1970, that The next question is in respect of the correct amount to be paid as docket
they should pay an additional P3,104.00 docket fee. fee. RTC on October 14, 1970, ordered the payment of P3,104.00 as
Central Visayan Realty and Cebu City Savings filed a motion additional docket fee based on the original complaint. However, the
praying that the plaintiffs be ordered to pay the additional docket petitioners assert as an alternative view, that the docket fee be based on the
fee within seven (7) days, otherwise the complaint will be dismissed amended complaint which was admitted on November 14, 1970, also by
with prejudice under Sec. 3 Rule 17 of the ROC for failure to follow Judge Canonoy.
courts order.

The petitioners have a point. "When a pleading is amended, the original NAWASA interposed as one of its special defenses R.A. 1383
pleading is deemed abandoned. The original ceases to perform any which vested upon it the ownership, possession and control of all
further function as a pleading. The case stands for trial on the waterworks systems throughout the Philippines and
amended pleading only. " As one of its counterclaims the reimbursement of the expenses it
had incurred for necessary and useful improvements amounting.
On the basis of the foregoing, the additional docket fee to be paid by
the petitioners should be based on their amended complaint.
Judgment was rendered by the trial court in favor of the CITY on the basis of
a stipulation of facts. The trial court found NAWASA to be a possessor in
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted: the petitioners shall be
bad faith and hence not entitled to the reimbursement claimed by it.
assessed a docket fee on the basis of the amended complaint; and after all
of the lawful fees shall have been paid, the proceedings in Civil Case No. R-
11882 shall be resumed. No special pronouncement as to costs.
CA
METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM,
petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE CITY OF DAGUPAN, NAWASA appealed to the then Court of Appeals and argued in its lone
respondents. assignment of error that
Facts The CITY should have been held liable for the amortization of the
balance of the loan secured by NAWASA for the improvement of
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of the Dagupan Waterworks System.
Appeals which affirmed the decision of the then Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan.
The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial.
The lower court had declared respondent City of Dagupan the lawful owner
of the Dagupan Waterworks System and held that the National Waterworks SC
and Sewerage Authority, now petitioner Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System, was a possessor in bad faith and hence not entitled to Petitioner-Appellant MWSS, successor-in-interest of the NAWASA, appealed
indemnity for the useful improvements it had introduced. to this Court.
Trial Court In support of its claim for removal of said useful improvements, MWSS
argues that
The City of Dagupan (hereinafter referred to as the CITY) filed a complaint
against the former National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (hereinafter the pertinent laws on the subject, particularly Articles 546, 547 and
referred to as the NAWASA), now the Metropolitan Waterworks and 549 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, do not definitely settle the
Sewerage System (hereinafter referred to as MWSS), question of whether a possessor in bad faith has the right to
remove useful improvements
For recovery of the ownership and possession of the Dagupan The CITY in its brief
Waterworks System.

Questions the raising of the issue of the removal of useful on the issue of removability of the improvements and the case was decided
improvements for the first time in this Court, inasmuch as it was not on a stipulation of facts. Consequently, the pleadings could not be deemed
raised in the trial court, much less assigned as an error before the amended to conform to the evidence.
then Court of Appeals.
Issue However, We shall overlook this procedural defect and rule on the main
issue raised in this appeal, to wit:
Whether MWSS may raise the issue of removal of the useful improvement.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the appellate court is affirmed with costs
against petitioner.
Ruling SO ORDERED.
The procedural objection of the CITY is technically correct. NAWASA should G.R. No. L-68636 February 29,1988
have alleged its additional counterclaim in the alternativefor the
reimbursement of the expenses it had incurred for necessary and useful
NORTHERN CEMENT CORPORATION, petitioner-appellant,
improvements or for the removal of all the useful improvements it had
vs.
introduced.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and SHIPSIDE INCORPORATED,
respondents-appellees.
Petitioner, however, argues that although such issue of removal was never
pleaded as a counterclaim, nevertheless it was joined with the implied
consent of the CITY, because the latter never filed a counter-manifestation RULING: THE COURT SHOULD NOT BE PRECLUDED FROM
or objection to petitioners manifestation wherein it stated that the AWARDING AN AMOUNT HIGHER THAN THAT CLAIMED IN
improvements were separable from the system, and quotes the first part of THE PLEADINGS NOTWITHSTANDING THE ABSENCE OF THE
Sec. 5 of Rule 10 of the Rules of Court to support its contention. Said REQUIRED AMENDMENT.
provision reads as follows:
CONDITION: EVIDENCE OF SUCH HIGHER AMOUNT HAS BEEN
SEC. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of PRESENTED PROPERLY, WITH FULL OPPORTUNITY ON
evidence.When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by THE PART OF THE OPPOSING PARTIES TO SUPPORT
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all THEIR RESPECTIVE CONTENTIONS AND TO REFUTE
respects, as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such EACH OTHERS EVIDENCE.
amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to
conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made FACTS:
upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure
so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. xxx
In connection with its exportation of cement, NCC contracted the
This argument is untenable because the above-quoted provision is premised arrastre, stevedoring and other related services of Shipside
on the fact that evidence had been introduced on an issue not raised by the beginning September 14, 1973.
pleadings without any objection thereto being raised by the adverse party. In The understanding was that for the latter's "integrated services,"
the case at bar, no evidence whatsoever had been introduced by petitioner the former would pay it at the fixed rate of P0.41 per bag of

cement, which amount was, after Shipside had started rendering its opposing parties to support their respective contentions and to
services, later increased to P0.46 by agreement of the parties. refute each others evidence.
Subsequently, Shipside advised NCC of another increase in this
rate and billed it accordingly, as well as for "regular and overtime The applicable rule is Rule 10, Section 5, providing as follows:
stand-by, lighting, equipment rental, gears, empty bags, and other
charges." SEC. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize
NCC apparently acceded to the new arrangement but about two presentation of evidence When issues not raised by the
years later questioned this billing, contending that the agreed pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the
integrated rate of P0.46 covered all the services rendered by parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had
Shipside and that such rate could not be increased unilaterally. been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the
Shipside said that only arrastre and stevedoring services were pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform
included; all other services were subject to separate billings; and, to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made
moreover, NCC had not earlier objected to the billing. upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment;
CFI LA UNION: RESPONDENT: RECOVERY OF SUM OF but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the
MONEY. trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial
o In the end, as no agreement could be reached, Shipside on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the
filed its complaint for collection of the amount of pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be
P453,347.82 representing arrastre, stevedoring, and other amended and shall do so freely when the presentation of
service charges allegedly due from NCC in the Court of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the
First Instance of La Union. objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission
CFI: DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT and RULED IN FAVOR OF of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his
DEFENDANT ON ITS COUNTERCLAIM. action or defense upon the merits. The court may grant a
o The trial court had allowed the refund in the sum of continuance to enable the objecting party to meet such
P526,280.53 on the justification that this had been evidence.
established by the evidence adduced at the trial.
IAC: REVERSED THE DECISION OF CFI. There have been instances where the Court has held that even
o On appeal, however, the respondent court reversed, without the necessary amendment, the amount proved at the
holding that this refund should be limited to the sum of trial may be validly awarded, as in Tuazon v. Bolanos, where we
P31,652.62, which was the amount claimed in the said that if the facts shown entitled plaintiff to relief other than that
counterclaim. asked for, no amendment to the complaint was necessary,
HENCE, THIS PETITION FOR REVIEW. especially where defendant had himself raised the point on which
recovery was based.
ISSUE: Whether the court may award an amount higher than that The appellate court could treat the pleading as amended to
claimed in the pleadings notwithstanding the absence of the conform to the evidence although the pleadings were not actually
required amendment. amended.
Amendment is also unnecessary when only clerical errors or non-
HELD: YES. But with the condition that the evidence of such higher amount substantial matters are involved, as we held in Bank of the
has been present properly, with full opportunity on the part of the Philippine Islands v. Laguna. In Co Tiamco v. Diaz, we stressed

that the rule on amendment need not be applied rigidly, particularly BROKERAGE, INC., ATTY. ROMULO R. BOBADILA and WEB-HEGG
where no surprise or prejudice is caused the objecting party. And in CONSTRUCTION RESOURCES, INCORPORATED, petitioners,
the recent case of National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES MANUEL T. DE
we held that where there is a variance in the defendant's pleadings GUIA and LETICIA MARIANO DE GUIA and the REGISTER OF DEEDS
and the evidence adduced by it at the trial, the Court may treat the OF PARAAQUE CITY, METRO MANILA, respondents.
pleading as amended to conform with the evidence.
It is the view of the Court that pursuant to the abovementioned rule In resolving the propriety of the amendment of the complaint in the present
and in light of the decisions cited, the trial court should not be case, which motion to amend was filed after the lapse of fifteen years from
precluded from awarding an amount higher than that claimed the filing of the initiatory pleading sought to be amended, this Court
in the pleadings notwithstanding the absence of the required painstakingly considered not only the peculiar circumstances obtaining, but
amendment. also accorded premium to the legal truism that "adjective law is not the
But this is upon the condition that the evidence of such higher counterfoil of substantive law" and that the rules of procedure must not be
1
amount has been presented properly, with full opportunity on perverted into engines of injustice.
the part of the opposing parties to support their respective Sought to be reversed in the instant petition for review on certiorari is the
2
contentions and to refute each other's evidence. decision of the Court of, which nullified and set aside the orders of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 231. The subject orders of
In the case at bar, there was a failure of the above-stated condition. the RTC denied private respondents' motion to admit amended complaint.
Facts:
In the trial court, NCC was allowed to adduce evidence in support
Herein private respondents spouses Manuel and Leticia De Guia
of its claim for refund beyond the amount indicated in its
filed a complaint for specific performance and damages (Civil Case
counterclaim, however Shipsides rebuttal evidence was brushed
No. PQ-9412-P from now on Civil Case A) against herein
aside on the ground that it was not permitted by the stipulation
petitioners spouses Jovito and Norma Valenzuela before the then
of facts earlier entered into by the parties, besides being
CFI of Rizal in Pasay City. The complaint prayed that the Spouses
hearsay and self-serving.
Valenzuela be ordered to execute in favor of private respondents
On appeal, the respondent court admitted all the evidence adduced
the necessary deed of sale covering the two (2) parcels of land
by Shipside, however, it did not gave NCC the chance to refute
allegedly subject of a contract to sell between said parties.
them.
Private respondents spouses De Guia, upon discovering that the
To this end, the Court finds it necessary to remand this case to the
subject real properties were sold and transferred by the spouses
respondent court in accordance with Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129 for
Valenzuela to herein co-petitioners spouses Alfredo and Bella
the reception and a more careful evaluation of the evidence, from
Gonzales Quiazon, filed for annulment of sale, cancellation of title
both the petitioner and the private respondent, regarding the
and damages (Civil Case No. PQ 9432-P from now on Civil Case
claimed excess payments and, if necessary, for the corresponding
B), against spouses Valenzuela, spouses Quiazon, and the
amendment of the pleadings.
Register of Deeds of Pasay City.
In the complaint, private respondents spouses De Guia prayed
SPOUSES JOVITO VALENZUELA and NORMA VALENZUELA,
specifically for the annulment of the deed of sale executed by the
SPOUSES ALFREDO QUIAZON and BELLA GONZALES QUIAZON,
spouses Valenzuela in favor of the spouses Quiazon, cancellation
SPOUSES EDUARDO DE GUZMAN and JULIETA DE GUZMAN, DE
of TCT Nos. 39396 and 39397 in the name of spouses Quiazon,
GUZMAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, SKYFREIGHT

and the reinstatement of TCT No. 39142 in the name of the Pendens and the Adverse Claim on two TCTs in the name of
spouses Valenzuela, or in the alternative, the reconveyance of the spouses Quiazon.
subject properties by the spouses Quiazon to spouses Valenzuela. Private respondents sought to reconsider the trial court's order and
Private respondents spouses De Guia amended their complaint in filed a motion to admit another amended complaint in Civil Case A.
Civil Case B, impleading Webb-Hegg Construction Resources, Inc. Prior to the resolution of the two pending motions, private
as additional defendant. respondents filed a motion for the inhibition of the presiding judge
Spouses De Guia filed a Motion to Admit Second Amended of Branch 117, RTC-Pasay.
Complaint in Civil Case B, impleading as additional defendant The court granted the motion for inhibition resulting in the re-raffle
Gerardo Villacorta. Prior to the resolution of such pending motion, of Civil Case A to Branch 231, presided by Judge Cesar Z. Ylagan.
Civil Case B was transferred to the RTC of Makati, Branch 133 Judge Ylagan denied the motion to admit amended complaint
pursuant to B.P. Blg. 129. As a result, Civil Case No. B was prompting herein private respondents spouses De Guia to file a
redocketed as Civil Case No. 2723 (From now on still Civil Case B). motion for reconsideration which the lower court denied.
The RTC of Makati, Branch 133 issued an order admitting the Private respondents elevated the lower court's order denying the
second amended complaint. motion to admit amended complaint to the Court of Appeals.
Upon motion of the defendants therein, however, Civil Case B was The Court of Appeals granted the petition for certiorari and
returned to RTC-Pasay, where herein private respondents spouses mandamus, and ordered respondent to admit petitioners amended
De Guia filed a motion to admit third amended complaint seeking to complaint.

implead spouses De Guzman, De Guzman Development 8
The RTC-Pasay, Branch 231 issued an order admitting the
Corporation, Skyfreight Brokerage, Inc. and Lawyer Romeo amended complaint.
Bobadilla, as additional defendants. Herein petitioners filed with the lower court a manifestation with

7 9
The RTC-Pasay issued an omnibus order denying the motion to motion to reconsider to the effect that they would file a "petition for
admit the third amended complaint and declaring as automatically review on certiorari" before the Supreme Court, to which
vacated the order of RTC-Makati, Branch 133, which admitted the manifestation private respondents filed an opposition. Petitioners
second amended complaint. then filed a reply to the opposition.
Upon denial of their motion for reconsideration, private respondents The lower court decreed "that the admission of the amended
spouses De Guia then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition complaint and service of summons are hereby held in abeyance
before the appellate court which was also dismissed. until after the Supreme Court has resolved the case before it which
Private respondents spouses De Guia appealed the dismissal of has effectively placed this court on notice."
said case before the Court of Appeals. Herein petitioners filed the instant petition where this Court is
The CA affirmed the dismissal order of the lower court. tasked in the main to resolve the propriety of the amendment of the
Aggrieved, private respondents spouses De Guia filed a petition complaint in Civil Case A.
before the Supreme Court assailing the decision of the Court of
Appeals. The High Court dismissed the petition for having been Issue:
filed beyond the reglementary period. Private respondents moved (a) Whether or not the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure can be applied
to reconsider. The motion was denied. retroactively?
Upon motion of spouses Quiazon in Civil Case A and B, the lower (b) Whether or not the amendments can be introduced?
court issued an order directing the cancellation of the Notice of Lis
Held: Yes to both.

objective of the rules which is to secure a "just, speedy and inexpensive
Ratio: disposition of every action and proceeding. Rules of procedure, after all, are
(a) but tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when rigid
Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The fact that application of the rules tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial
15
procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not justice, the Supreme Court is empowered to suspend their operation. This
preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive Court will not hesitate to set aside technicalities in favor of what is fair and
application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who just.
may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive application of True enough, the delay that has so characterized the adjudication of the
procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a merits of this case which original complaint was filed practically two
general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from procedural laws. decades ago has not escaped the attention of this Court. Thus, in the
interest of substantial justice, this Court allows the introduction of
(b) amendments to the complaint so as to afford the party-litigants the full and
Section 1, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly provides: genuine opportunity to substantiate their respective claims and defenses and
"SECTION 1. Amendment in general. - Pleadings may be amended by for the trial court to finally resolve the matters relating to the merits of the
adding or striking out an allegation or the name of any party, or by correcting case.
a mistake in the name of a party or a mistaken or inadequate allegation or
description in any other respect, so that the actual merits of the controversy Besides, the defendants sought to be impleaded in Civil Case No. PQ-9412-
may speedily be determined, without regard to technicalities, and in the most P are not left without justifiable recourse. To this end, the law in no uncertain
expeditious and inexpensive manner." (emphasis ours) terms provide for the necessary legal implements and the adoption of
Equally important is Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules: effective means and defenses sanctioned by the Rules, wherein both parties
"SECTION 3. Amendments by leave of court. - Except as provided in the in the controversy may very well advance and protect their respective legal
next preceding section, substantial amendments may be made only upon interests. By sanctioning the introduction of amendments to the complaint,
leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the issues shall at last be viewed, so to speak, in the clear light of day and
the motion was made with intent to delay. Orders of the court upon the substantial matters therein shall not anymore be lost in the abyss of
matters provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and technicalities and procedural jargon. Petition is Granted
after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard." G.R. No. 169551 January 24, 2007
SPOUSES ORLANDO M. LAMBINO and CARMELITA C. LAMBINO,
The contention of the petitioners that the introduction of the amendments Petitioners,
would radically change the cause of action is untenable. Interestingly, vs.
11
Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the HON. PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 172,
12
former rule in such manner that the phrase "or that the cause of action or Valenzuela City, and BPI FAMILY BANK, Respondents.
defense is substantially altered" was stricken-off and not retained in the new Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. The
rules. The clear import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that CA affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City,
under the new rules, "the amendment may (now) substantially alter the which denied the motion of petitioners to admit the supplemental complaint.
13
cause of action or defense." This should only be true, however, when
despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or defense,
FACTS:
the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of
substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable

Petitioners Orlando M. Lambino, a lawyer, and his wife, Carmelita Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. The court issued an
C. Lambino, secured a housing loan of P600,000.00 from private Order denying the motion of petitioners.
respondent BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. (BPI). Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA seeking to nullify
o Petitioners executed a Mortgage Loan Agreement (MLA) the Orders of the RTC.
over their property as security for the loan. o Petitioners reiterated that they came to know of the
Petitioners failed to pay the monthly amortizations from January to escalating and arbitrary charges, liquidated damages, and
May. attorneys fees only when they received the statements of
Private respondent filed a petition for the extrajudicial foreclosure of account dated June 5, 1996, November 15, 1996, and
the MLA with the Ex-Officio Sheriff of the RTC of Valenzuela City. August 15, 1998, after the filing of their original complaint;
Petitioners filed a complaint for annulment of the MLA. They hence, they could not have been alleged as an integral
alleged therein that private respondent had released only part of their causes of action in their original complaint.
P555,047.19 on a staggered basis out of their P600,000.00 loan. CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition.
The court issued a TRO and the sale at public auction was reset.
On April 1996 petitioners offered to settle the balance of their loan. ISSUE: Whether the petitioners Motion to Admit their Supplemental
However, private respondent rejected the offer. Complaint can be granted?
In the meantime, the court suspended pretrial to enable the parties
to settle the matter amicably. RULING:
o The pretrial proceeding was terminated.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Admit their Supplemental Complaint NO!!!
wherein they alleged the following:
o The plaintiffs were forced to litigate due to the Petition for
The pertinent provision of the Rules of Court is Section 6 of Rule 10 which
Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage filed by defendant
reads:
bank and unlawful imposition of escalating and arbitrary
rate of interest without the consent of the plaintiffs and not
authorized under the Real Estate Mortgage Contract Sec. 6: Matters subject of supplemental pleadings. Upon motion
o The unauthorized deductions and advance interest of a party, the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as
charges were known by plaintiffs only for the first time at are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth
the Pre-Trial Brief of defendants. transactions, occurrences or events which have happened since the date of
the pleading sought to be supplemented.
o Aside from the unauthorized deductions and advance
interest payment made, defendant bank also imposed
escalating and arbitrary rate of interest. The rule is a useful device which enables the court to award complete relief
The trial court issued an Order denying the motion of petitioners in in one action and to avoid the cost delay and waste of separate action. A
its finding that the alleged escalating and arbitrary rate of interest supplemental pleading is meant to supply deficiencies in aid of the original
and other charges imposed by private respondent had accrued long pleading and not to dispense with or substitute the latter.
before the complaint was filed. It held that under Section 6, Rule 10
of the Revised Rules of Court, only transactions, occurrences, or The supplemental complaint must be based on matters arising subsequent
events which accrued after the date of the complaint may be set to the original complaint related to the claim or defense presented therein,
forth in the supplemental complaint. and founded on the same cause of action.

Before they filed their original complaint, petitioners were already aware of CONTENTION: HGCs failure to redeem the outstanding regular SMPPCs
the deductions made on the proceeds of the loan, for interest charges, MRI despite obtaining possession of the Asset Poolballooned the stipulated
premium, and fire insurance premium in the total amount of P44,952.88. interests and materially prejudiced its stake on the residual values of
They received notices on the following dates: July 25, 1994, September 5, the Asset Pool,
1994, October 24, 1994, and November 15, 1994. And because petitioners
had alleged all these charges in the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure sale, that the DAC should be rescinded since PDB exceeded its authority in
it behooved petitioners to have incorporated in their original complaint as a executing the same prior to HGCs redemption and payment of the
cause of action the alleged "illegal/unauthorized and unconscionable" guaranteed SMPPCs;
charges for MRI, escalating interest charges, liquidated damages, attorneys that while the estimated value of Asset Poolamounted to P5,919,716,618.62
fees, and foreclosure expenses. They should have sought to nullify such as of 30 June 2005, its total liabilities was estimated at P2,796,019,890.41;
charges in the original complaint, but they did not. They are thus proscribed and,
from incorporating the same via a supplemental complaint. that with the cessation of PDBs functions as a trustee and HGCs intention
to use the Asset Pool to settle its obligations to the Social Security System
HOME GUARANTY CORPORATION, Petitioner, (SSS), it was best qualified to be appointed as new trustee in the event of
vs. the resolution of the DAC.
R-II BUILDERS INC. and NATIONAL HOUSING the complaint sought the grant of the following reliefs: (a) a temporary
AUTHORITY, Respondents restraining order/preliminary and permanent injunction, enjoining
disposition/s of the properties in the Asset Pool; (b) the resolution or, in the
FACTS (mahaba talaga tong case!) alternative, the nullification of the DAC; (c) R-II Builders' appointment
as trustee pursuant to Rule 98 of the Rules of Court; (d) HGCs rendition of
A Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) was entered into between respondents an accounting of the assets and the conveyance thereof in favor of R-II
National Housing Authority (NHA) and R-II Builders, Inc. (R-II Builders) for Builders; and, (e) P500,000.00 in attorneys fees
the implementation of the Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation writ of preliminary injunction was issued
Project (SMDRP). JVA was aimed at implementing a two-phase conversion Petitioner filed its answer and move for the conduct of a preliminary hearing
of the Smokey Mountain Dumpsite into a habitable housing project inclusive on its affirmative defenses which included such grounds as lack of
of the reclamation of the area across Radial Road 10 (R-10). jurisdiction, improper venue and the then pendency before this Court of G.R.
NHA and R-II Builders, alongside petitioner Housing Guaranty Corporation No. 164537, entitled Francisco Chavez vs. National Housing Authority, et al.,
(HGC) as guarantor and the Philippine National Bank (PNB) astrustee, a case which challenged, among other matters, the validity of the JVA and
entered into an Asset Pool Formation Trust Agreement its subsequent amendments.
On the same date, the parties likewise executed a Contract of R-II Builders, in turn, filed a motion to admit its Amended and
Guaranty whereby HGC, upon the call made by PNB and conditions therein Supplemental Complaint which deleted the prayer for resolution of the
specified, undertook to redeem the regular SMPPCs upon maturity and to DAC initially prayed for in its original complaint and introduced causes of
pay the simple interest thereon to the extent of 8.5% per annum action for conveyance of title to and/or possession of the entire Asset Pool,
for NHA to pay the Asset Pool and additional works on the project and for
RTC MANILA- Special Commercial Court (SCC). an increased indemnity for attorneys fees.-ADMITTED by Court subject to
payment of docket fees
R-II Builders filed again motion to admit it Second Amended
R-II Builders filed the complaint against HGC and NHA which was
Complaint, on the ground that its previous Amended and Supplemental

Complaint had not yet been admitted in view of the non-payment of the Complaint and, in lieu thereof, filed its Second Amended
correct docket fees and it notably resurrected R-II Builders cause of action Complaint which deleted its cause of action for accounting and conveyance
for resolution of the DAC, deleted its causes of action for accounting and of title to and/or possession of the entire Asset Pool, reduced its claim for
conveyance of title to and/or possession of the entire Asset Pool, reduced attorneys fees, sought its appointment as Receiver and prayed for the
the claim for attorneys fees , sought its appointment as Receiver pursuant to liquidation and distribution of the Asset Pool. In upholding the admission of
Rule 59 of the Rules of Court and, after an inventory in said capacity, prayed said Second Amended Complaint in respondent RTCs assailed Order,
for approval of the liquidation and distribution of the Asset Pool in however, the CA clearly lost sight of the fact that a real action was
accordance with the parties agreements.--GRANTED ensconced in R-II Builders original complaint and that the proper docket
HGC filed MD R-II Builders Second Amended Complaint on the ground that fees had yet to be paid in the premises. Despite the latters withdrawal of
respondent RTC had no jurisdiction to act on the case until payment of the its Amended and Supplemental Complaint, it cannot, therefore, be gainsaid
correct docket fees and that said pleading was intended for delay and that respondent RTC had yet to acquire jurisdiction over the case for non-
introduced a new theory inconsistent with the original complaint and payment of the correct docket fees. While R-II Builders styled its original
theAmended and Supplemental Complaint. --DENIED complaint and Amended and Supplemental Complaint as one primarily for
R-II Builders also filed anUrgent Ex-Parte Motion for Annotation of Lis the resolution and/or declaration of the DAC, it simultaneously and
Pendens on the titles of the properties in the Asset Pool, on the ground that unmistakably prayed for the conveyance, possession and control of
HGC had sold and/or was intending to dispose of portions thereof, in the Asset Pool. Alongside the fact that HGC has consistently questioned the
violation of the writ of preliminary injunction issued in the premises-NOTED sufficiency of the docket fees paid by R-II Builders, estoppel cannot be said
MR by HGc_denied while respondents application for appointment of to have set in since, the lapse of more than five years from the
receiver was granted. commencement of the complaint notwithstanding, it appears that the case
has yet to be tried on the merits. Having admitted that its original complaint
CA- HGC filed petition via R.65 denied partook the nature of a real action and having been directed to pay the
correct docket fees for its Amended and Supplemental Complaint, R-II
Builders is, furthermore, clearly chargeable with knowledge of the
Ground: (one of grounds related sa rule 10) R-II Builders need
insufficiency of the docket fees it paid. Unmistakably manifesting its
not pay any deficiency in the docket fees considering its withdrawal
intent to evade payment of the correct docket fees, moreover, R-II
of its Amended and Supplemental Complaint;
Builders withdrew its Amended and Supplemental Complaint after its
admission and, in lieu thereof, filed its Second Amended Complaint on
MR- denied. Hence a petition in SC via R45 the ground that said earlier pleading cannot be considered admitted in
view of its non-payment of the docket and other fees it was directed to
RULLING: jurisdiction over the case had yet to properly attach. Applying the pay. In so doing, however, R-II Builders conveniently overlooked the fact
rule that "a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee that the very same argument could very well apply to its original complaint
regardless of the actual date of filing in court" in the landmark case for which given its admitted nature as a real action - the correct docket
of Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, Court fees have also yet to be paid.
ruled that jurisdiction over any case is acquired only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee which is both mandatory and jurisdictional. The importance of filing fees cannot be over-emphasized for they
are intended to take care of court expenses in the handling of cases in terms
IN CASE AT BAR: R-II Builders manifested its intent to evade payment of of costs of supplies, use of equipment, salaries and fringe benefits of
the correct docket fees by withdrawing its Amended and Supplemental personnel, and others, computed as to man-hours used in the handling of

each case. The payment of said fees, therefore, cannot be made dependent respective undertakings, DELBROS was to receive a share in the gross
on the result of the action taken without entailing tremendous losses to the operating profit [GOP] of the hotel, while HILTON was entitled to a
government and to the judiciary in particular. For non-payment of the correct management fee equivalent to five percent [5%] of the gross revenues and
docket fees which, for real actions, should be computed on the basis of the an incentive fee equivalent to ten percent [10%] of the GOP of the hotel.
assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value
thereof as alleged by the claimant, respondent RTC should have denied In violation of the terms of the agreement, HILTON a] refused, despite
admission of R-II Builders Second Amended Complaint and ordered repeated demands, to remit to DELBROS its share in the GOP; b]
the dismissal of the case. R-II Builders which not only failed to pay transferred, without DELBROS' prior approval, a portion of the reserve funds
the correct docket fees for its original complaint and Amended and to its operating funds; and, c] used said operating funds for capital
Supplemental Complaint but also clearly evaded payment of the same expenditures without the consent of DELBROS and in addition, HILTON
by filing its Second Amended Complaint. grossly mismanaged the hotel and breached the trust and confidence
Hence, with jurisdiction over the case yet to properly attach, HGC reposed upon it by DELBROS; thereby causing DELBROS to default in its
correctly fault the CA for upholding respondent RTCs admission of R-II amortizations to the GSIS
Builders Second Amended Complaint despite non-payment of the docket
fees for its original complaint and Amended and Supplemental Complaint as RTC Civil Case No. 85-29489
well as the clear intent to evade payment thereof. On February 27,1985, petitioner a complaint for termination of
agreement and damages, with prayer for the issuance of a
DOCTRINE: transfer of possession was sought by respondent R-II restraining order and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
Builders since the very start and the successive amendments betraying the against private respondents Hilton Hotels International and Richard
deft maneuverings to evade payment of the correct docket fees. Chapman, in his capacity as General Manager of Manila Hilton.
(TAKE NOTE OF THE DATES HERE)
Rule 11 When to file Responsive Pleadings In their Answer*** with Compulsory counterclaim, therein
defendants HILTON and Chapman specifically denied the
G.R. No. 72566 April 12, 1988 allegations of DELBROS and set forth affirmative defenses
On April 12,1985 DELBROS filed a motion to admit
DELBROS HOTEL CORPORATION, petitioner, Supplemental Complaint.
vs. Complaint impleaded as an additional defendant Flaviano
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT [FIRST SPECIAL CASES Mosquera, Jr., in his capacity as Comptroller of the Manila
DIVISION], HILTON INTERNATIONAL COMPANY, ACHIM IHLENFELD as Hilton and
successor to RICHARD CHAPMAN and FLAVIANO MOSQUERA JR., the sought the confirmation by the trial court of the termination of
latter two in their respective capacities as former General Manager and the Management Contract effected by DELBROS through the
Comptroller of the Manila Hilton International Hotel, respondents. service upon HILTON of the five-day notice of termination
provided thereunder, as well as the payment of DELBROS'
share in the GOP of the hotel for the months of January and
Facts:
February 1985 and other damages.
On June 14, 1985 -Supplemental Complaint ADMITTED
DELBROS financed, built, furnished and equipped "Manila Hilton," and the On July 6, 1986, an ex-parte motion for an extension of 12 days
operation and management of which was granted to HILTON; for their to answer the supplemental complaint was filed in behalf of all

the three defendants, HILTON, Chapman and Mosquera. Said
motion, sent by registered mail, was not reserved by the trial court
until July 16, 1985. (SC resolved the case on a different angle, NOT based on the
On July 9, 1985, DELBROS had filed a motion to declare Petitioners contention with the TRO. It went back to the RTCs order of
defendants HILTON and Chapman in default with respect to default.)
the supplemental complaint. - Granted and DELBROS was
allowed to present its evidence ex-parte in support of its Issue: WON Private respondents HILTON and Chapman should be
supplemental complaint. declared in default for failure to file an answer to the Supplemental
!!! - On July 15, 1986, the lower court rendered a judgment by Complaint (see July 15, 1986 Order)
default, confirming as legal and valid the termination as of
March 31, 1985 of the Management Agreement
Held: NO. This is a reversible error.
HILTON, et al. filed their Answer to the Supplemental Complaint,
and on July 24, 1985, filed a notice of appeal from the judgment by
default. Fundamentally, default orders are taken on the legal presumption that in
DELBROS moved for the execution of the judgment failing to file an answer, the defendant does not oppose the allegations
GRANTED on September 3, 1985 thru Special Order and relief demanded in the complaint. In the case at bar, however, no
such presumption can arise vis-a-vis the Answer filed by HILTON and
IAC (this part is not important in our topic but for the sake Chapman to the original complaint; their vigorous opposition to the
completing the story, I still added it) admission of the supplemental complaint under consideration, of which the
HILTON, et al. instituted a petition for certiorari with prayer for a trial judge had full knowledge and notice, should have cautioned him from
restraining order/preliminary injunction, docketed as AC-G.R. No. precipitately rendering the default order as well as the default judgment.
SP-07020, to assail the Special Order of September 3, 1985 for
allegedly having been issued with grave abuse of discretion "A supplemental pleading is not like an amended pleading substitute
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. for the original one. It does not supersede the original, but assumes
September 5, 1985 a TRO enjoining the implementation and/or that the original pleading is to stand, and the issues joined under the
enforcement of the Special Order of September 3, 1985 was issued original pleading remain as issues to be tried in the action." While it is
On September 11, 1985, the First Special Cases Division of the conceded that there is authority in support of a default judgment being
IAC issued a resolution reiterating 'the continuing efficacy of its predicated upon defendant's failure to answer a supplemental complaint, the
restraining order dated September 5, 1985, enjoining the parties to same cannot apply here.
conform to the restraint against the execution/implementation of the
Special Order dated September 3, 1985 ..." The reason is that although in the supplemental complaint, the relief prayed
DELBROS forthwith filed on September 25, 1985 an for was altered from termination of the management contract to judicial
urgent motion for reconsideration of the resolution dated confirmation of its termination, the basic and principal issue of whether or
September 24, 1985. When more than a month had not petitioner was entitled to terminate the management contract,
elapsed without the IAC acting on its motion for remained. As this basic issue had been previously traversed and joined by
reconsideration, petitioner filed the instant petition (to SC) the Answer filed by HILTON and Chapman, there was no necessity for
assailing as null and void the three orders issued in AC- requiring them to plead further to the Supplemental Complaint.
G.R. No. SP-07020. Consequently, the trial judge did not have a legal ground for declaring

them in default for such failure to plead. (because respondents already examination of the circumstances under which a default
answered the initial complaint which is just basically reiterated in the order was issued. And when no real injury would result to
supplemental complaint ***) the interests of the plaintiff by the reopening of the case,
the only objection to such action would, therefore, be
Another factor which the trial judge should have considered is that the solely on a technicality. On such an infirm foundation, it
supplemental complaint brought in an additional defendant, Flaviano would be a grevious error to sacrifice the substantial rights
Mosquera, Jr. On this score, it would have been more prudent under the of a litigant.
liberal construction rule provided in Section 2, Rule 1 of the Rules of
Court, for the trial court to have treated the supplemental complaint as Upon these considerations, the order of default dated July 9, 1985, the
an amended complaint, and the original answer thereto as sufficient; or default judgment of July 15, 1985 as well as the Special Order dated
otherwise to have waited for the answer of the newly-impleaded September 3, 1985, should be, as they are hereby set aside.
defendant before acting on the motion to declare the original
defendants in default and rendering the default judgment, considering WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The default order
that a common cause of action has been asserted against the three of July 9, 1985, the default judgment dated July 15, 1985 and the Special
defendants, so that the answer of Mosquera, Jr. could inure to the benefit of Order of September 3, 1985 issued in Civil Case No. 85-29489 of the
the original defendants. As it turned out, the Answer filed on July 18, 1985 Regional Trial Court of Manila are hereby annulled and set aside.
was for and in behalf of all the defendants. Hence, under Sec. 4 of Rule 18,
the court shall try the case against all upon the answer filed and render SPOUSES GEORGE BARRAZA and YOLANDA GATCHALIAN-
judgment upon the evidence presented. BARRAZA, petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., Presiding
Judge, Br. XXX, CFI-Rizal, Pasay City, 7th Judicial District, and
Indeed, no prejudice wouId result to petitioner had the trial judge taken a RENATO GATCHALIAN, respondents.
more prudent and judicious course of action as above suggested. Acting as
the trial judge did, grave, irreparable and serious damage caused to private
respondents. Such prejudice is compounded by the issuance of the Special
Order of September 3, 1985 decreeing the execution pending appeal of the Facts
default judgment at a time when defendant Mosquera was not yet declared
in default. Consequently, any defense set up by him for himself and for the PETITION for certiorari with preliminary injunction to review the order of the
benefit of his co-defendants was rendered practically inutile by the execution Court of First Instance of Rizal.
of the default judgment.
The petition at bar evolved from a dispute between brother and sister over
the use of the business name or style GATCHALIAN-THE HOUSE OF
Time and again, this Court has expressed disfavor toward default NATIVE LECHON.
judgments for the reason that:
CFI
A default judgment does not pretend to be based on the
merits of the controversy. Its existence is justified by Private respondent filed a Complaint for damages based on defendants
expediency. It may, however, amount to a positive and (petitioners herein) use of plaintiffs (now private respondent) trade name
considerable injustice to the defendant. The possibility of and style of GatchalianThe House of Native Lechon and Restaurant, with
such serious consequences necessarily requires a careful prayer for preliminary injunction in the Court of First Instance.

Petitioners were properly served with summons together with the Defendants were denied of their rights of procedural due process
corresponding complaint and annexes thereof. and
Defendants were also denied of their day in court.
Petitioners as defendants therein filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Plaintiffs opposed the motion for reconsideration. The Court denied
extension of time of 15 days within which to file an Answer which the Court defendants motion for reconsideration.
granted in its order.
Instead of filing the Answer within the extended period of fifteen (15) days,
defendants filed through their counsel, a Motion to Dismiss Complaint Upon an Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution, the Court in its
Together With Prayer for Preliminary Injunction. Said motion moved for the Order granted the motion and caused the issuance of a writ of execution.
dismissal of the complaint on the following grounds:
Defendants through a new counsel, filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion
That the complaint states no cause of action; praying that
That venue is improperly laid; and
That there is another action pending between the same parties for The Order of the Court declaring the defendants as in default,
the same cause of action, namely for Infringement of Trade Name the proceedings held on the strength thereof and the decision
before the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila. rendered in the case at bar be set aside and that
the defendants be given three (3) days from receipt of the
corresponding order within which to file their answer in the case at
The same motion was set for hearing, notice thereof served to counsel for bar.
the plaintiff and the Clerk of Court.
Private respondent filed an ExParte Motion to Declare Defendants in Opposition having been filed by the plaintiff, the Court denied defendants
Default on the ground that the defendants failed to file an answer within the Omnibus Motion in its Order.
reglementary period allowed by the Rules of Court.
SC
The Court finding the reasons stated in the Ex-Parte Motion to Declare
Defendants in Default filed by plaintiff, through counsel to be well-taken, Defendants now come before Us on a Petition for Certiorari with a prayer for
granted said motion and allowed the plaintiff to present evidence. The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order to restrain the
hearing before the commissioner was held whereat plaintiff presented his execution of the decision, particularly the sale of the petitioners properties.
evidence, testimonial and documentary, ex-parte. After hearing to render the preliminary injunction permanent with the
annulment of all the proceedings held and conducted by the respondent
Respondent judge rendered his decision in favor of the plaintiff; judgment is judge from the declaration of default, the rendition of the decision based
hereby rendered in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants. thereon, the levy, etc. and enjoining said respondent judge to rule and
decide the petitioners motion to dismiss or in the alternative, to allow the
petitioners to file their answer.
Defendants through counsel moved for the reconsideration of the courts Issue
order declaring defendants in default and of the decision on the ground that:

Whether the Order of respondent Judge declaring defendants, now the before the expiration of the period as extended by the court. This is clearly
herein petitioners, in default for failure to file their answer within the allowed under Section 1, Rule 16, Rules of Court.
reglementary period provided by law, was issued without or in excess of
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. Private respondents argument that although a motion to dismiss interrupts
the running of the period within which to file an answer, this refers to the
original period of fifteen (15) days within which to file the responsive
pleading and not to the extension of time within which to file the answer, is
Ruling without merit. There is nothing in the Rules which provide, directly or
indirectly, that the interruption of the running of the period within
The applicable provisions of the Revised Rules of Court state: which to file an answer when a motion to dismiss the complaint is filed
and pending before the court, refers only to the original period of
Rule 11, Section 1. Time to answer.Within fifteen (15) days after
fifteen (15) days and not to the extension of time to file the answer as
service of summons the defendant shall file his answer and serve a
granted by the court. It may be true that under Section 4 of Rule 16, if the
copy thereof upon the plaintiff, unless a different period is filed by the
motion to dismiss is denied or if the termination thereof is deferred, the
court.
movant shall file his answer within the time prescribed by Rule 11, computed
from the time he received notice of the denial or deferment, unless the court
provides a different period.
Section 7. Extension of time to plead.Upon motion and on such
terms as may be just, the court may extend the time to plead This Section 1 of Rule 11 in relation to Section 4 of Rule 16 allows the
provided in these rules. defendant to file his answer not only within the original fifteen (15) days
period but also within a different period (as) fixed by the court.
Without resolving petitioners Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, respondent

The court may also, upon like terms, allow an answer or other Judge declared defendant in default in his Order. This is clearly in
pleading to be filed after the time fixed by these rules. Rule 16, contravention of the Rules for under Section 3, Rule 16, and the court after
Section 1. Grounds.Within the time for pleading a motion to dismiss hearing may deny or grant the motion or allow amendment of pleading, or
the action may be made on any of the following grounds: x x x may defer the hearing and determination of the motion until the trial if the
ground alleged therein does not appear to be indubitable. And it is only from
the time that the movant receives notice of the denial or deferment of the
motion to dismiss that the period within which he shall file his answer is
Section 4. Time to plead.If the motion to dismiss is denied or if computed, which period is prescribed by Rule 11, unless the court provides
determination thereof is deferred, the movant shall file his answer a different period.
within the period prescribed by Rule 11, computed from the time he
received notice of the denial or deferment, unless the court provides
a different period.
Respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave
Under the facts of the case at bar, respondent judge had granted petitioners abuse of discretion. Petitioners were denied their day in court; there was
an extension of fifteen (15) days to file their answer. Instead of filing the lack of due process. Consequently, the decision rendered by respondent
answer, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, one (1) day Judge is null and void and must be set aside. The writ of execution issued by

respondent Judge and the levy made by the Sheriff on the properties of the his wife Marissa David, and the Register of Deeds of
petitioners and all orders and acts proceeding or emanating therefrom are Pampanga.
hereby declared of no legal force and effect. Private respondents alleged that petitioner fraudulently exceeded
his special power of attorney to cause the conversion of their
Petitioners Motion to Dismiss the Complaint must be resolved by the trial agricultural lands to those for residential, commercial and industrial
court and if the Motion to Dismiss is denied or if determination thereof is purposes by registering in his name some of the lands, mortgaging
deferred, petitioners shall file their answer pursuant to Section 4, Rule 16 of others, failing to remit and account any money received from any
the Rules of Court. transaction involving their lands, and absconding.
Service of summons failed as petitioner was abroad.
SO ORDERED.
RTC ordered service by publication.
Thereafter, private respondents moved that petitioner be
declared in default since he failed to answer within 60 days from
date of last publication on March 19, 2005.
G.R. No. 170427 January 30, 2009
On July 14, 2005, petitioner filed a motion for extension of 15
days within which to file Answer, with opposition to the motion to
ROBERTO R. DAVID, Petitioner,
declare him in default.
vs.
In its Order dated July 15, 2005, the RTC declared petitioner in
JUDGE CARMELITA S. GUTIERREZ-FRUELDA, Honorable Presiding
default.
Judge, Branch 43, Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga,
The RTC noted that the period to file petitioners Answer lapsed on
VICENTE L. PANLILIO, ROBERTO L. PANLILIO, REMEDIOS P. PAPA,
May 19, 2005, 60 days after the last publication on March 19,
ADELWISA P. FERNANDEZ, and LOURDES D. PANLILIO,
2005, and that petitioner failed to answer despite the "many
REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT AND ON BEHALF OF
opportunities" given to him.
HIMSELF, VICENTE L. PANLILIO, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
The RTC also denied petitioners motion for extension to file
PAMPANGA, Respondents.
Answer.
Petitioner moved to lift the order of default and sought another
RULING: DID NOT COMPLY WITH SEC. 3 RULE 9 OF THE ROC.
extension of 15 days within which to file Answer.
PETITIONERS MOTION WAS NOT UNDER OATH AND THERE
o Petitioner stated that declarations of default are frowned
WAS NO ALLEGATION THAT HIS FAILURE TO FILE AN
upon, that he should be given the opportunity to present
ANSWER OR ANY RESPONSIVE PLEADING WAS DUE TO
evidence in the interest of substantial justice, and that he
FRAUD, ACCIDENT, MISTAKE OR EXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE.
has meritorious defenses.
FACTS:
The RTC denied the motion in its September 21, 2005 Order.
o The RTC ruled that while judgments by default are
RTC SAN FERNANDO: RESPONDENTS: ACCOUNTING, generally looked upon with disfavor, petitioners motion to
RECONVEYANCE AND DAMAGES. lift the order of default was fatally flawed under Section
o On September 17, 2004, private respondents filed a 3(b), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
complaint for accounting, reconveyance and damages o The RTC noted that petitioners motion was not under
with prayer for preliminary attachment against petitioner, oath; unaccompanied by an affidavit of merit; and

without any allegation that his failure to file Answer b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant
was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable discovered the default, but before the same has become final and
negligence. executory, he may file a motion for new trial under Section 1(a) of
o The RTC also ruled that it was not sufficient for petitioner Rule 37;
to merely allege that he has a meritorious defense.
HENCE, THIS PETITION UNDER RULE 65. c) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has
become final and executory, he may file a petition for relief under
ISSUE: Whether the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion in denying Section 1 of Rule 38; and
petitioners motion to lift order of default.
d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as
HELD: NO. contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set
aside the order of default has been presented by him (Sec. 2, Rule
Petitioner belabors his complaint on the alleged defects in the 41).
service of summons by publication. He ignores his voluntary
appearance before the RTC when he filed two motions for Moreover, a petition for certiorari to declare the nullity of a judgment
extension to file Answer. by default is also available if the trial court improperly declared a
His voluntary appearance was equivalent to service of summons. party in default, or even if the trial court properly declared a party in
It has cured any alleged defect in the service of summons. default, if grave abuse of discretion attended such declaration.
We also note that petitioners motions were not motions to dismiss Petitioner used the first remedy. But the RTC denied his motion to
the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over his person. lift the order of default.
On the contrary, the motions invoked the RTCs jurisdiction while Indeed, default orders are not viewed with favor.
seeking the following affirmative reliefs: to grant extension, deny But in this case, petitioner failed to comply with the basic
the motion to declare petitioner in default and lift the order of requirements of Section 3(b), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
default. The motion was not under oath. There was no allegation that
Thus, petitioner waived any defect in the service of summons by petitioners failure to file an Answer or any responsive
publication or even want of process because for the RTC to validly pleading was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
act on his motions, it necessarily acquired jurisdiction over his negligence.
person. Petitioner merely stated that declarations of default are frowned
upon, that he should be given the opportunity to present evidence
One declared in default has the following remedies: in the interest of substantial justice, and that he has meritorious
defenses.
a) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof Unfortunately, his claim that he has meritorious defenses is
and before judgment, file a motion under oath to set aside the order unsubstantiated.
of default on the ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud, He did not even state what evidence he intends to present if
accident, mistake or excusable negligence, and that he has a his motion is granted.
meritorious defense (Sec. 3(b), Rule 9);
RULE 12 BILL OF PARTICULARS

JOSELITA SALITA, petitioner, Petitioner insists that the allegations in the Bill of Particulars
constitute a legal conclusion, not an averment of facts, and fails to
vs. point out the specific essential marital obligations she was not able
HON. DELILAH MAGTOLIS, in her capacity as Judge of the RTC, to perform, and thus render the Bill of Particulars insufficient if not
Quezon City, Br. 107, and ERWIN ESPINOSA, respondents. irrelevant to her husbands cause of action.
Private respondent on the other hand believes that his allegations
FACTS:
in the Bill of Particulars constitute the ultimate facts which the Rules
of Court requires.
Erwin Espinosa and Joselita Salita were married in church rites on
January 25, 1986.
A year later their union turned sour. ISSUE: Was the Bill of Particulars submitted by respondents of sufficient
They separated in fact in 1988. definiteness or particularity as to enable herein petitioner to properly prepare
Subsequently, Erwin sued for annulment on the ground of Joselitas her responsive pleading.
psychological incapacity.
The petition for annulment was filed in January 7, 1992 before the HELD:
RTC of Quezon City.
The petition alleged that sometime in 1987, petitioner came to The Bill of Particular filed by private respondent is sufficient to state a cause
realize that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply of action and to requirement more details from private respondent would be
with the essential marital obligations of their marriage, which to ask for information on evidentiary matters.
incapacity existed at the time of marriage although the same
became manifest only thereafter. A complaint only needs to state the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs
cause or causes of action. Ultimate facts has been defined as those facts
Dissatisfied with the allegation in the petition, Joselita moved for a
which the expected evidence will support.
bill of particulars which the trial court granted.
Joselita was not contented with the Bill of Particulars and argued The Bill of Particular specified that *** at the time of marriage, respondent
that the assertion in the bill of particulars is a statement of legal (Joselita Salita) was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
conclusion made by petitioners counsel and not an averment of
essential marital obligations of their marriage in that she was unable to
ultimate facts, as required by the Rules of Court, from which such understand and accept the demands made by his profession that of a
a conclusion may be properly be inferred. verily qualified Doctor of Medicine upon petitioners time and efforts sot
The trial court found the Bill of Particulars adequate and directed that she frequently complained of his lack of attention to her even to her
Joselita of file her responsive pleading. mother, whose intervention caused petitioner to loss his job.
Joselita was not convinced and she filed a petition for certiorari with
the Supreme Court. Consequently, the SC has no other recourse but to order the immediate
The SC referred the same to the Court of Appeals. resumption of the annulment proceedings which have already been delayed
The CA denied due course to her petition. for more than 2 years now, even before it could reach its trial stage. Whether
It was the view of the CA that the specification more than satisfies petitioner is psychologically incapacitated should be immediately
the Rules requirement that a complaint must allege the ultimate determined. There is no point in unreasonably delaying the resolution of the
facts constituting plaintiffs cause of action. petition and prolonging the agony of the wedded couple who after coming

out from a storm still have the right to a renewed blissful life either alone or denial of the motion to dismiss
in the company of each other. The defendants filed a record of appeal before the Supreme Court
But because they subsequently filed a petition for relief from
G.R. No. L-15808 April 23, 1963 the judgment of default, they asked that consideration and
approval of the record on appeal be held in abeyance until said
FAUSTA AGCANAS, JUAN MIGUEL, JUANITA MIGUEL, assisted by her petition had been resolved
husband ULPIANO PASION, The request was granted
assisted by her husband JUAN PASCUAL, plaintiffs-appellees,
The petition for relief was denied
vs.
BRUNO MERCADO and ANTONIO DASALLA, defendants-appellants. The motion for reconsideration on such denial was also
denied
Hence, this appeal
This is an appeal by defendants Mercado and Dasalla from the CFI-Isabela
on a question of law
ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in declaring the defendants in default
FACTS:
RULING:
Plaintiffs Agcanas, et al, filed an action to recover portions of
parcels of land in Isabela against defendants Mercado and Dasalla YES
Defendants filed a motion for a bill of particulars
Notice of hearing was made on 8 Dec. 1956 Both a motion to dismiss and a motion for a bill of particulars interrupt
The CFI received the motion only on 12 Dec. 1956 the time to file a responsive pleading
The CFI set it for hearing on 22 Dec. 1956 In a situation where:

17 Dec. 1956: defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and set the
hearing thereof on 22 Dec. 1956 motions to dismiss and for a bill of particulars are filed;
22 Dec. 1956: the court issued an order postponing 'consideration'
the resolution of the bill of particulars is held in abeyance; and
of both motions to 29 Dec. 1956
7 Mar. 1957: the court denied the motion to dismiss; ordered the the motion to dismiss is denied,
defendants to file an Answer the period to file an Answer remains suspended until the
Defendants failed to file an Answer; on motion of the plaintiffs, motion for a bill of particulars is denied (or if it is granted, until
the court issued an order declaring defendants in default the bill is served on the moving parties)
Upon learning of the order of default, the defendants filed a motion CAB:
asking that the court set aside the order of default and resolve the
motion for a bill of particulars The motion for a bill of particulars had yet to be resolved.
The court denied said motion; it explained that the defendants The defendants did not tacitly waive their right to the
had "tacitly waived their right to push through with the hearing resolution thereof by failing to set it for hearing since it
of the motion for a bill of particulars," because of their failure to was already set for hearing (22 Dec 1956, postponed to
set it for hearing or to ask the clerk of court to calendar it after 29 Dec 1956)

Therefore, the period to file an Answer was still suspended. The allegations must state the facts and circumstances from which the fraud,
deceit, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation, and threats may be
Since said period was still suspended, their failure to file an
inferred as a conclusions In his complaint, the appellant merely averred that
Answer could not result in a ground for default
all the documents sought to be annulled were all executed through the use
Hence, the lower court erred in declaring the defendants in of deceits, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentations, threats, and
default other fraudulent means without the particular-facts on which alleged fraud,
deceit, machination, or misrepresentations are predicated. Hence, it was
proper for the trial court to grant the defendant's motion for a bill of
JOSE SANTOS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. particulars, and when the plaintiff failed to comply with the order, the trial
LORENZO J. LIWAG, defendant-appellee. court correctly dismissed the complaint.
FACTS: RULE 13 FILING AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS
CFI- G.R. No. 143791 January 14, 2005
Jose Santos filed a complaint against Lorenzo J. Liwag seeking the PETER D. GARRUCHO, petitioner,
annulment of certain documents, attached to the complaint and marked as vs.
Annexes "A", "B", and "C", as having been executed by means of COURT OF APPEALS, HON. OSCAR B. PIMENTEL (in his capacity as
misrepresentations, machination, false pretenses, threats, and other Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 148, Makati City),
fraudulent means, as well as for damages and costs. SHERIFF RENATO C. FLORA (in his capacity as Branch Sheriff), and
LiWAG moved for bill of particulars for him to prepare an intelligent and RAMON BINAMIRA, respondents.
proper pleading necessary and appropriate in the premises GRANTED with
respect to the paragraphs specified in defendant's motion", and when the Facts:
plaintiff failed to comply with the order, the court, acting upon previous
motion of the defendant, dismissed the complaint with costs Secretary of the Department of Tourism and Chairman of the Board of
Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) petitioner Peter D.
Hence, the present appeal. Garrucho requested then Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation
Andrea Domingo to issue Hold Departure Orders against Ramon Binamira
RULLING: The allowance of a motion for a more definite statement or bill of and Faustino Roberto. Commissioner Domingo granted the request and
particulars rests within the sound judicial discretion of the court and, as issued Hold Departure Order Nos. 333 and 334 against Binamira and
usual in matters of a discretionary nature, unless there has been a Roberto.nt
palpable abuse of discretion or a clearly erroneous order.
RTC Makati
CASE AT BAR complaint is without doubt imperfectly drawn and suffers Roberto filed a complaint for prohibition and damages against
from vagueness and generalization to enable the defendant properly to petitioner Garrucho and Commissioner Domingo. Binamira, for his
prepare a responsive pleading and to clarify issues and aid the court In an part, filed a complaint-in-intervention in the case. Petitioner
orderly and expeditious disposition in the case. Garrucho was represented by private practitioners Remollo &

Associates, whose offices were located at Suite No. 23, Legaspi PTA as early as January 9, 1991 and was no longer holding
Suites, 178 Salcedo Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City. office thereat. Since then, he had gone back to the private
RTC held that the Hold Departure Order No. 333 is found to be sector and held office at 417 Benpress Building, Meralco
void ab initio, unconstitutional and illegal, the preliminary injunction Avenue corner Echague Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City.
is hereby declared permanent. His counsel failed to receive his copy of the CA resolution
because he transferred his office at Suite No. 23, Legaspi
CA Suites, 178 Salcedo Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City, and
The petitioner and Commissioner Domingo appealed to CA. his residence to Dumaguete City, Negros Occidental.
On March 9, 1999, the CA sent a notice by registered mail to the He further alleged that the CA and the RTC were obliged to
petitioners counsel directing the latter to file his brief as appellant. take judicial notice of his resignation as Tourism Secretary and
However, the notice was returned to the court. The envelope the appointment of his successor, his appointment as
containing the said notice was stamped, thus: "Return To Sender, Executive Secretary by President Fidel E. Ramos in July 1992,
Moved Out." and his resignation from the said position in August/September
CA resent the notice dated March 5, 1999 to the petitioner at his 1992.l
office at the Department of Tourism building, Agripino Circle, Petitioner points out that his present office was not difficult to
Manila. The notice was returned to the CA on May 5, 1999, again, locate, considering his stature in business and politics in the
having been "unclaimed." country. He avers that there was no reason why the copies of
On June 23, 1999, CA declared the service of notice on the the assailed resolutions and order could not be sent to him at
petitioner was complete as of May 5, 1999. A copy of the said the same office since the sheriff was able to locate his office on
resolution was sent by registered mail to the petitioner in the July 12 and 17, 2000.
Department of Tourism.
On November 26, 1999, CA dismissed the appeal of the petitioner
for his failure to file his brief.
A copy of the resolution was sent by registered mail to the ISSUE: WON petitioner was deprived of his right to due process when the
petitioners counsel, but the said resolution was returned to the CA dismissed his appeal because of his failure to file appellants brief
court with a notation stamped on the envelope "Return To
Sender, Moved Out." The CA then had a separate copy of the
Held: NO.
notice served by registered mail on the petitioner at his office
address, but the same was returned to the CA with the notation
"Unclaimed." The records show that the counsel of the petitioner in the trial court was the
law firm of Remollo & Associates with offices at Suite No. 23, Legaspi
SC Suites, 178 Salcedo Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City. Under Section 2,
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the counsel of the parties in
CA and RTC erred in issuing the assailed resolutions and the court of origin shall be considered as their counsel in the CA.
order because he never received copies of the assailed CA
resolutions which were sent to him at his former office at the Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if any
Department of Tourism. He averred that he had resigned as party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon
Secretary of the Department of Tourism and Chairman of the his counsel unless served upon the party himself is ordered by the trial

court. Notice or service made upon a party who is represented by negligible but want of inquiry or update on the status of his case for several
counsel is a nullity. Notice to the client and not to his counsel of record months (four, in this case) is inexcusable. It is the duty of a party-litigant to
is not notice in law. The rule admits of exceptions, as when the court or be in contact with his counsel from time to time in order to be informed of the
tribunal orders service upon a party or when the tribunal defendant is progress of his case. Petitioner simply claims that he was busy with his
waived. gravel and sand and trading businesses which involved frequent traveling
from Manila to outlying provinces. But this was not a justifiable excuse for
In the absence of a proper and adequate notice to the court of a change of him to fail to ask about the developments in his case or to ask somebody to
address, the service of the order or resolution of a court upon the parties make the query for him. Petitioner failed to act with prudence and diligence;
must be made at the last address of their counsel on record. It is the duty of hence, his plea that he was not accorded the right to due process cannot
the party and his counsel to device a system for the receipt of mail intended elicit this Courts approval or even sympathy.
for them, just as it is the duty of the counsel to inform the court officially of a
change in his address. It is also the responsibility of a party to inform the No. L-27211. July 6, 1977.*
court of the change of his address so that in the event the court orders that
an order or resolution be served on the said party to enable him to receive EUSEBIA BARRAMEDA, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
the said resolution or order.
ENGRACIO CASTILLO, defendant-appellee.
Petitioners counsel of record, moved out from their office at the Legaspi Facts
Suites to Dumaguete City without informing the court of such fact. Based on
its records, the CA believed that the law office of the petitioners counsel was APPEAL from an order of dismissal of the Court of First Instance of Quezon
still at the Legaspi Suites and sent copies of its resolutions to the counsel of ProVince.
the petitioner at the said address.
MTC
Neither did the petitioner inform the court of his home or office address after
his resignation as Secretary of the Department of Tourism where copies of Eusebia Barrameda sued Engracio Castillo in the municipal court of Lopez,
the said order or resolution could be sent. Notwithstanding his stature in the Quezon Province. A copy of the courts decision, which was adverse to
business community, the CA cannot take judicial notice of the petitioners Barrameda, was sent by registered mail to her lawyer at San Pablo City.
home address or his office address after his departure as Secretary of the That mail was received in the city post office on the following day. The city
Department of Tourism or as Executive Secretary of the President. postmasters office supposedly sent to Barramedas counsel three notices
regarding the registered mail.
Indeed, the petitioner has nobody but himself to blame. It was his Barramedas lawyer did not claim that mail. It was returned to the municipal
responsibility to check the status of his appeal in the CA from time to time, court and was received there as unclaimed mail.
from his counsel or from the CA.
Eusebia Barrameda must have been informed that the adverse decision
True enough, the party-litigant should not rely totally on his counsel to litigate could not be served upon her lawyer. She received personally a copy of the
his case even if the latter expressly assures that the formers presence in decision.
court will no longer be needed. No prudent party will leave the fate of his
case entirely to his lawyer. Absence in one or two hearings may be CFI

Through a lawyer, Barrameda filed a notice of appeal. Castillo did not upon actual receipt by the addressee; but if he fails to claim his mail
interpose in the municipal court any objection to her appeal. The court gave from the post office within five (5) days from the date of first notice of
it due course. the postmaster, service shall take effect at the expiration of such
time.
Castillo filed in the Court of First Instance a motion to dismiss the appeal on
the ground that it was filed out of time. His theory was that the fifteen-day In service by registered mail, the general rule is that service is complete
reglementary period within which Barrameda could appeal should be upon actual receipt by the addressee. The exception is that when the
counted from the expiration of five days from the date of the first notice sent addressee does not claim his mail within five days from the date of the first
by the postmaster to Barramedas lawyer. notice of the postmaster, then the service takes effect at the expiration of
such time.
In this case, the supposed first notice was sent, when the mail in question
was received in the San Pablo City post office. The five days counted from As illustrated by Justice Cesar Bengzon, if the first notice is received by the
that date expired when the second notice was allegedly sent to Barramedas addressee on December 1, and he gets his mail on December 3, the service
lawyer. is complete on December 3.
Eusebia Barrameda opposed Castillos motion to dismiss her appeal. She But if the addressee gets his mail only after 15 days, service is deemed
contended that Castillo failed to prove that her counsel actually received the complete 6 days after or five days from receipt, the date of the first notice
supposed three notices sent by the postmaster. She argued that because in (exception).
the municipal court Castillo did not object to her appeal, his motion could no
longer be entertained in the Court of First Instance. If the addressee never gets the mail, service is also deemed complete on
th
the 6 day, as provided in the exception to the general rule. If he receives
The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the appeal. It assumed that his mail two months after it is registered and there is no proof of the first
the fifteen-day period should be counted from the date of the third notice and notice, then service is complete on the date of actual receipt, following the
the period had already expired, according to the trial courts computation. general rule.
SC Bearing in mind that the exception in service by registered mail refers to

constructive service, not to actual receipt of the mail, it is evident that the fair
Eusebia Barrameda appealed to this Court. She Specified that she was and just application of that exception depends upon conclusive proof that a
going to question the legality of the order of dismissal. first notice was sent by the postmaster to the addressee. The presumption
that official duty has been regularly performed should not be applied to such
Ruling a situation.
Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides: Therefore, to obviate injustice, it is incumbent upon a party, who relies on
constructive service or who contends that his adversary was served with a
SEC. 7. Service of final orders or judgments.Final orders or
copy of a final order or judgment upon the expiration of five days from the
judgments shall be served either personally or by registered mail, x x
first notice of registered mail sent by the postmaster to prove that that first
x.
notice was sent and delivered to the addressee. A certification from the
SEC. 8. Completeness of service.Personal service is complete postmaster would be the best evidence of that fact. The mailmans testimony
upon actual delivery. x x x Service by registered mail is complete may also be adduced to prove that fact..

The postmasters certification as to the sending of the first notice should On March 1, 1954, private respondents entered into a contract of
include the data not only as to whether or not the corresponding notices lease with Philippine Blooming Mills, Co., Inc., (PBM for brevity)
were issued or sent but also as to how, when and to whom the delivery whereby the latter shall lease the aforementioned parcels of land as
thereof was made. factory site.
This leasehold right of PBM covering the parcels of land was duly
In the instant case, there is no evidence that the first notice was sent to annotated at the back of the above stated certificates of title.
Barramedas lawyer and that it was delivered to him or should have been PBM introduced on the land, buildings, machineries and other
received by him. The envelope containing the unclaimed mail was presented useful improvements.
in court. The face of the envelope contains the notation Returned to sender. These constructions and improvements were registered and
Reason: Unclaimed. Above the stamp, on the back of the envelope, with the annotated at the back of the respondents' certificates of title.
legend City of San Pablo, Philippines are written the dates. Written also on
On October 11, 1963, PBM executed in favor of PNB, a deed of
the back of the envelope are the following: R to S, notified 3/3/66.
assignment, conveying and transferring all its rights and interests
under the contract of lease which it executed with private
Relying on those notations on the envelope, the trial court literally and
respondents.
rigidly applied the presumption as to constructive service. It did not require
appellee Castillo to present the postmasters certification that a first notice The assignment was for and in consideration of the loans granted
was sent to Barramedas lawyer and that the notice was received by the by PNB to PBM. The deed of assignment was registered and
latter. annotated at the back of the private respondents' certificates of title.
On November 6, 1963 and December 23, 1963 respectively, PBM
Under those circumstances, the trial courts order dismissing Barramedas executed in favor of PNB a real estate mortgage for a loan of
appeal is fraught with injustice. P100,000.00 and an addendum to real estate mortgage for another
loan of P1,590,000.00, covering all the improvements constructed
G.R. No. 63201 May 27, 1992 by PBM on the leased premises. These mortgages were registered
and annotated at the back of respondents' certificates
PBM filed a petition for registration of improvements in the titles of
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,
real property owned by private respondents docketed as Case No.
vs.
6530.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, PASIG BRANCH XXI,
Private respondents filed a motion in the same proceedings which
PRESIDED BY JUDGE GREGORIO G. PINEDA, CHUNG SIONG PEK @
was given a different case number to wit, LRC Case No. R-2744,
BONIFACIO CHUNG SIONG PEK AND VICTORIA CHING GENG TY @
because of the payment of filing fees for the motion.
VICTORIA CHENG GENG TY, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
RIZAL, PASIG, METRO MANILA AND/OR HIS DEPUTIES AND AGENTS, The motion sought to cancel the annotations on respondents'
respondents. certificates of title pertaining to the assignment by PBM to PNB of
the former's leasehold rights, inclusion of improvements and the
real estate mortgages made by PBM in favor of PNB, on the ground
Facts:
that the contract of lease entered into between PBM and
respondents-movants had already expired by the failure of PBM
Private respondents are the registered owners of three parcels of and/or its assignee to exercise the option to renew the second 20-
land in Pasig, Metro Manila covered by certificates of title of the year lease commencing on March 1, 1974 and also by the failure of
Registry of Deeds of Rizal. PBM to extend its corporate existence in accordance with law.

The motion also states that since PBM failed to remove its PNB's counsel at the PNB Building at Escolta, Manila
improvements on the leased premises before the expiration of the which is his address of record in this case. Consequently
contract of lease, such improvements shall accrue to respondents the entry of judgment Order of September 14, 1982.
as owners of the land.
Respondent court issued an order directing the cancellation of the xxx xxx xxx
inscriptions on respondents' certificates of title.
Petitioner PNB filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. The respondent PNB's counsel at the hearing of said
Private respondents filed a motion for entry of final judgment and incidents admitted that the aforesaid registered notices
issuance of a writ of execution. could have been received by PNB's regular Receiving
Respondent court granted the aforesaid motion for entry of final Section at the PNB Building at the Escolta but could
judgment and ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the entries not have been forwarded by said Receiving Section to
on respondents' certificates of title stated in the order. said counsel's Litigation and Collection Division, Legal
Petitioner PNB filed an omnibus motion to set aside the entry of Department at an upper floor of the same building. Thus
judgment as ordered by the respondent court on the ground that it the presumption that official duty was regularly performed
has no prior notice or knowledge of the order of respondent court by the postmaster was not overcome, as most recently
which denied its motion for reconsideration and that while there reiterated by the Supreme Court in Feraren vs. Santos
was a certification from the Bureau of Posts that three registry promulgated on April 27, 1982, 113, SCRA 707 . . . (p.
notices were sent to petitioner's counsel, there was no allegation 195, Rollo)
or certification whatsoever that said notices were actually
received by the addressee. Section 8 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides
The respondent court deniedS the omnibus motion. that service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by
Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65. the addressee; but if he fails to claim his mail from the post office
within five (5) days from the date of first notice of the postmaster,
Issue: Whether there is a need to allege or certify that said notices were service shall take effect at the expiration of such time.
actually received by the addressee. The fair and just application of that exception depends upon the
conclusive proof that the first notice was sent by the postmaster to
Held: No. the addressee. The best evidence of that fact would be the
certification from the postmaster (Barrameda v. Castillo, L-
In resolving this matter, the respondent court stated in the 27211, July 6, 1977, 78 SCRA 1).
questioned order of January 12, 1983 as follows: In the instant case, the respondent court found that the
postmaster's certification stated that three (3) notices of the
registered mail which contained the order denying the motion for
The respondent PNB filed a motion to set aside the order
reconsideration were sent to petitioner PNB's counsel at Escolta,
of the court. This was denied by the court. Then the
Manila which is the address stated in the record of the case.
movants filed a motion of August 25, 1982 for entry of
The factual findings of the trial court bear great weight and are
judgment, based on the postmaster's certification that not
binding upon this Court.
only one but three notices of the registered mail
containing a copy of the order was sent to respondent Hence, as between the denial of the petitioners' counsel that he
received the notice of the registered mail and the postmaster's

certification that said notices were sent to him, the postmaster's on August 9, 1967, Petitioners' notice of appeal, appeal bond and
claim should prevail. record on appeal were filed and they filed a "Motion to Amend
The postmaster has the official duty to send notices of registered Record on Appeal" on August 18, 1967
mail and the presumption is that official duty was regularly
performed (Aportadera, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 41358, respondent judge refused to act upon this because, according to
March 16, 1988, 158 SCRA 695). him, his order of probate had already become final
he held that from May 3 to May 17, petitioners consumed
G.R. No. L-28296 November 24, 1972 14 days, and if the resumption of their period to appeal is
Hernandez vs. Navarro to be computed from July 24, 1967, when their counsel
actually received delivery of the order of denial of June 29,
Petition for mandamus to compel respondent judge to give 1967, August 9, 1967 would appear to be the thirtieth day
due course to the appeal of the petitioners of said period, there being 16 days from July 24 to August
9, 1967
on April 24, 1967, respondent Judge Navarro Pasig CFI issued an
order admitting to probate the will of the deceased Maximo C. respondents on the other hand contended that petitioners filed
Hernandez, Sr., father of petitioners mere scraps of paper entitled notice of appeal, record on appeal
and appeal bond and that the purported notice of appeal, record on
on May 3, 1967, notice thereof was served on petitioner appeal and appeal bond were filed much beyond the period within
which to perfect an appeal
they argue that:
on May 17, 1967, petitioners filed a motion to set aside said order (1) petitioners' motion of May 17, 1967 to set
aside the order of probate is pro-forma,
on June 29, 1967, respondent judge denied said motion pertinently and did not, therefore, suspend the period
holding that the motion to set aside order of probate filed by for appeal
petitioner did not amount to a Motion for New Trial under the Rules (2) assuming the contrary, the period for
of Court appeal of petitioners, after the order of
denial of June 29, 1967, should be
Notice of this denial order was served on petitioner' counsel by considered as having been resumed on
registered mail July 10, 1967, when the first notice, as
According to the certification: the registered mail aforestated, was "issued" by the Manila
containing said order and "addressed to Atty. Andres R. Post Office and not from July 24, 1967
Narvasa at 232 Madrigal Building, Escolta, Manila was when petitioners actually received delivery
delivered on July 24, 1967 to Cometa Villaflor for the of said order
addressee upon presentation of the third notice issued on
July 19, 1967" and that "the first notice was issued on July ISSUE: whether or not petitioners took their appeal on time by filing their
10, 1967." notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal on August 9,
1967

HELD: Yes equity and justice. It was incumbent upon the post
office to further certify that said notices were
Section 8 of Rule 13 reportedly received
Completeness of service. Personal service is When there are several related acts supposed to be
complete upon actual delivery. Service by ordinary mail is performed by a public officer or employee in regard
complete upon the expiration of five (5) days after to a particular matter, the presumption of regularity
mailing, unless the court otherwise provides. Service by in the performance of official functions would not
registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the arise and be considered as comprehending all the
addressee; but if he fails to claim his mail from the post required acts, if the certification issued by the
office within five (5) days from the date of first notice of proper office refers only to some of such acts,
the postmaster, service shall take effect at the expiration particularly in instances wherein proof of whether or
of such time. not all of them have been performed is available
under the law or office regulations to the officer
the period for appeal of petitioners should be deemed to have making the certification
resumed upon the expiration of five days from July 10, 1967, the
date the first notice was "issued", as certified by the post office, and the omission of some of the acts in the certification may justify the
not from July 24, 1967, when the registered mail containing the inference that from the proof available to the officer there is no
denial order was actually received by petitioners' counsel showing that they have also been performed
respondents do not point to any evidence proving
the date when the first notice from the Manila Post
Office was actually delivered to the address of Where the certification is worded in general terms that reasonably
petitioners' counsel. All that appears in the record comprehend performance of all the related acts, the presumption of
before Us is that the said notice was issued by the irregularity holds as to all of them
Post Office on July 10, 1967
G.R. No. 138500 September 16, 2005
proof should always be available to the post office not only of
whether or not the notices of registered mail have been reported ANDY QUELNAN, Petitioners,
delivered by the letter carrier but also of how or to whom and when vs.
such delivery has been made VHF PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
when the post office makes a certification regarding
delivery of registered mail, such certification should
include the data not only as to whether or not the Under consideration is this petition for review on certiorari to nullify and set
corresponding notices were issued or sent but also aside the decision dated September 17, 1997 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
as to how, when and to whom the delivery thereof in CA-G.R. No. SP-41942, and its resolution dated April 27, 1999, denying
was made. petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
the certification in the case at bar that the first and
second notices addressed to Atty. Narvasa had FACTS:
been "issued" can hardly suffice to requirements of

Respondent, VHF Phil. Inc. filed an ejectment suit against negligence as would justify the filing of the petition for relief from
petitioner, Andy Quelnan, involving a condominium unit at the judgment.
Legaspi Towers which respondent claimed to have been leased by Respondent sought reconsideration of the RTC decision but its'
petitioner. motion was denied by said court in its order of July 5, 1996.
MTC of Manila found that 'summons together with a copy of the Respondent directly went to this Court on a petition for review,
complaint was served on petitioner thru his wife on August 25, 1992 which petition was remanded by this Court to the Court of Appeals
by substituted service and that petitioner failed to file his answer (CA), whereat the same was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 41942.
within the reglementary period. September 17, 1997, CA reversed and set aside the decision of
November 23, 1992 it rendered judgment in favor of respondent, RTC under Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, and reinstated
ordering Quelnan to vacate the premises of the unit and pay for that of the MeTC.
back rentals, etc. Petitioner filed MR but CA denied in April 27, 1999.
Copy of the aforementioned decision was served on petitioner by
registered mail but the same was returned unclaimed on account of ISSUE/S:
petitioner's failure to claim the same despite the postmaster's three
(3) successive notices on November 25, 1992, December 7 and 11
If a party fails to claim his copy of the adverse decision which was
of year 1992.
sent through registered mail, when is he deemed to have
No appeal having been taken by the petitioner, the MeTC decision knowledge of said decision?
became final and executory.
Will the presumption of completeness of service of a registered mail
May 18, 1993, a writ of execution, a notice of levy and a notice to matter under Rule 13, Section 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
vacate were served on petitioner's wife who acknowledged receipt Procedure apply in relation to the 60-day period for filing a petition
thereof. for relief from judgment under Rule 38, Section 3 of the Rules?
May 24, 1993, petitioner Quelnan filed with the Manila RTC a
Petition for Relief from Judgment With Prayer for Preliminary RULING:
Injunction and/or temporary restraining order, alleging that:
o He was never served with summons' and was' completely Petition is denied and the CA decision is affirmed.
unaware of the proceedings in the ejectment suit,
o He learned of the judgment rendered thereon only on May 1. Petitioner: He contends that the 60-day period for filing a petition for relief
18, 1993 when a notice of levy on execution came to his from judgment must be reckoned from the time a party acquired knowledge
knowledge. of the judgment. Hence, prescinding from his premise that he became aware
o He thus prayed the RTC to annul and set aside the MeTC of the MeTC decision only on May 18, 1993 when a notice to pay and vacate
decision and the writs issued in connection therewith. was served on him by the sheriff, petitioner submits that his petition for relief
June 3, 1996, the RTC granted petitioner's petition for relief and set from judgment was timely filed on May 24, 1993.
aside the MeTC decision. The RTC explained that petitioner had SC: Section 3 of Rule 38 reads: Time for filing petition; contents and
been unduly deprived of a hearing and had been prevented from verification. ' A petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this
taking an appeal for the reason that petitioner's wife, in a fit of Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner
anger, tore the summons and complaint in the ejectment suit in the learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside,
heat of a marital squabble. To the RTC, this constituted excusable and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order
was entered, or such proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied

with affidavits, showing the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence receipt by the addressee, or after five (5) days from the date he
relied upon and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and substantial received the first notice of the postmaster, whichever date is
cause of action or defense, as the case may be. earlier. (Emphasis supplied)
A petition for relief from judgment must be filed within: (a) 60 days
from knowledge of judgment, order or other proceedings to be set Under the Rules, service by registered mail is complete upon actual
aside; and (b) six (6) months from entry of such judgment, order or receipt by the addressee.
other proceeding. However, if the addressee fails to claim his mail from the post office
o These two periods must concur. within five (5) days from the date of the first notice, service
o Both periods are also not extendible and never becomes effective upon the expiration of five (5) days
interrupted. therefrom.
o Strict compliance with these periods stems from the There arises a presumption that the service was complete at the
equitable character and nature of the petition for relief. end of the said five-day period.
Relief is allowed only in exceptional cases as when there is no
other available or adequate remedy.
A petition for relief is actually the 'last chance given by law to This means that the period to appeal or to file the necessary pleading begins
litigants to question a final judgment or order. And failure to avail of to run after five days from the first notice given by the postmaster. This is
such last chance within the grace period fixed by the Rules is fatal. because a party is deemed to have received and to have been notified of the
judgment at that point.
2. The records clearly reveal that a copy of the MeTC decision was sent to
[G.R. No. 143424. August 8, 2001]
petitioner through registered mail at his given address on November 25,
1992. AMEN-AMEN vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. (Petition for Review on
It should be noted that petitioner was not represented by counsel Certiorari under Rule 45)
during the proceedings before the MeTC.
The first notice to him by the postmaster to check his mail was on FACTS:
November 25, 1992.
Subsequent notices were sent by the postmaster on December 7, NLRC- illegal suspension and dismissal
1992 and December 11, 1992. Danilo Amen-Amen filed a complaint for illegal suspension and
th
A certification that the registered mail was unclaimed by the dismissal, separation pay, 13 month pay, performance
petitioner and thus returned to the sender after three successive incentive pay and sick leave pay against Toyota Davao City,
notices was issued by the postmaster. Inc./Duratrak Corp. and/or Jose A. Lim, III, President.
Service of said MeTC decision became effective five (5) days after LA- decided in favor of complainant
November 25, 1992, or on November 30, 1992, conformably with Respondent appealed to NLRC- reversed the appealed
Rule 13, Section 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which decision and ruled that petitioner's dismissal from employment
reads: Completeness of Service. Personal service is complete was for a just cause and with due process of law
upon actual delivery. Service by ordinary mail is complete upon the MR by petitioner-Denied
expiration of ten (10) days after mailing, unless the court otherwise CA- petitioner elevated the matter via a Petition for Certiorari under
provides. Service by registered mail is complete upon actual Rule 65

Dismissed the petition for non-compliance with Section 11, Petitioner Lynette G. Garvida seeks to annul and set aside the order dated
Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure May 2, 1996 of respondent COMELEC en banc suspending her
HENCE TO SC proclamation as the duly elected Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan
ISSUE: WON CA erred in dismissing the petition on the ground of On April 23, 1996, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position
lack of explanation of service by registered mail? NO of Chairman, Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality
of Bangui, Ilocos Norte.
RULLING: It is not disputed that petitioner's Petition for Certiorari filed in the
Court of Appeals did not contain an explanation why resort was made to Respondent Election Officer Dionisio F. Rios disapproved petitioner's
other modes of service of the petition to the parties concerned. certificate of candidacy on the ground that petitioner, who was then twenty-
one years and ten (10) months old, exceeded the age limit for membership
"Sec. 11.(RULE 13)Priorities in modes of service and filing. - in the Katipunan ng Kabataan as laid down in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC
Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other Resolution No. 2824.
papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers
emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be Petitioner appealed to COMELEC Regional Director Filemon A. Asperin who
accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was set aside the order of respondents and allowed petitioner to run.
not done personally. A violation of this rule may be cause to
consider the paper as not filed."
Earlier and without the knowledge of the COMELEC officials, private
respondent Florencio G. Sales, Jr., a rival candidate for Chairman of the
Pursuant to the above-quoted section, service and filing of pleadings and Sangguniang Kabataan, filed with the COMELEC en banc a "Petition of
other papers must, whenever practicable, be done personally. To Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy" against petitioner
underscore the mandatory nature of this rule requiring personal service Garvida for falsely representing her age qualification in her certificate of
whenever practicable, said section gives the court the discretion to candidacy. The petition was sent by facsimile and registered mail on
consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of service April 29, 1996 to the Commission on Elections National Office, Manila.
or filing were resorted to and no written explanation was made as to (TAKE NOTE)
why personal service was not done in the first place.
Acting on the petition sent by facsimile as mentioned above, on May 2,
G.R. No. 124893 April 18, 1997 1996, COMELEC en banc issued an order directing the Board of
Election Tellers and Board of Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo to
LYNETTE G. GARVIDA, petitioner, suspend the proclamation of petitioner in the event she won in the
vs. election. (TAKE NOTE)
FLORENCIO G. SALES, JR., THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, ELECTION OFFICER DIONISIO F. RIOS and PROVINCIAL On May 6, 1996, election day, petitioner garnered 78 votes as against
SUPERVISOR NOLI PIPO, respondents. private respondent's votes of 76. In accordance with the May 2, 1996 order
of the COMELEC en banc, the Board of Election Tellers did not proclaim
FACTS: petitioner as the winner.

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari was filed on May 27, 1996 (Because the proper Clerk of Court of the COMELEC personally, or, by
her proclamation was still suspended). registered mail.
ISSUE: WON COMELEC en banc erred when it issued the disputed order In the instant case, the subject petition was not in proper form. Only two (2)
based on a petition sent by facsimile copies of the petition were filed with the COMELEC. Also, the
COMELEC en banc issued its Resolution on the basis of the petition
HELD: YES. COMELEC failed to note that the petition itself did not comply transmitted by facsimile, not by registered mail.
with the formal requirements of pleadings under the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and
reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one
elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area
by a specified amount of electric current. The current is transmitted as a
Sec. 1. Filing of Pleadings. Every pleading, motion and signal over regular telephone lines or via microwave relay and is used by the
other papers must be filed in ten (10) legible copies. receiver to reproduce an image of the elemental area in the proper position
However, when there is more than one respondent or and the correct shade. The receiver is equipped with a stylus or other device
protestee, the petitioner or protestant must file additional that produces a printed record on paper referred to as a facsimile.
number of copies of the petition or protest as there are
additional respondents or protestees. Filing a pleading by facsimile transmission is not sanctioned by the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, much less by the Rules of Court. A
Sec. 2. How Filed. The documents referred to in the facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact
immediately preceding section must be filed directly with copy preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original, there
the proper Clerk of Court of the Commission personally, is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is
or, unless otherwise provided in these Rules, by registered genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his
mail. In the latter case, the date of mailing is the date of counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading. The uncertainty of the
filing and the requirement as to the number of copies must authenticity of a facsimile pleading should have restrained the COMELECen
be complied with. banc from acting on the petition and issuing the questioned order. The
COMELEC en banc should have waited until it received the petition
filed by registered mail.
Sec. 3. Form of Pleadings, etc. (a) All pleadings
allowed by these Rules shall be printed, mimeographed or
typewritten on legal size bond paper and shall be in STILL, the petition is dismissed because petitioner Lynette G. Garvida is
English or Filipino. declared ineligible for being over the age qualification for candidacy in the
May 6, 1996 elections of the Sangguniang Kabataan.
xxx xxx xxx

G.R. No. 175334. March 26, 2008.*
Every pleading before the COMELEC must be printed, SPS. DOMINGO M. BELEN and DOMINGA P. BELEN, herein
mimeographed or typewritten in legal size bond paper and filed in represented by their attorney-in-fact NERY B. AVECILLA, petitioners,
at least ten (10) legible copies. Pleadings must be filed directly with vs. HON. PABLO R. CHAVEZ, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 87,

Rosario, Batangas and all other persons acting under his orders and before the branch clerk of court. Before the scheduled ex parte presentation
SPS. SILVESTRE N. PACLEB and PATRICIA A. PACLEB, represented of evidence, Atty. Alcantara filed a motion to dismiss, citing the judgment of
herein by their attorney-in-fact JOSELITO RIOVEROS, respondents. dismissal issued by the Superior Court of the State of California, which
allegedly dismissed the case. The RTC held in abeyance the ex parte
Facts presentation of evidence of private respondents and the resolution of Atty.
Alcantaras motion pending the submission of a copy of the judgment of
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of dismissal.
Civil Procedure assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals. The appellate courts decision dismissed the petition for certiorari For failure to present a copy of the alleged judgment of dismissal, the RTC
which sought to nullify the orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of denied the motion to dismiss. Through a motion, Atty. Alcantara sought the
Rosario, Batangas, denying herein petitioners motion to quash writ of reinstatement of the motion to dismiss by attaching a copy of the said foreign
execution and their motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals judgment.
resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration of the decision.
For their part, private respondents filed a motion for the amendment of the
RTC complaint. The amended complaint attached to the motion averred that
private respondents were constrained to withdraw their complaint against
The instant petition originated from the action for the enforcement of a petitioners from the California court because of the prohibitive cost of
foreign judgment against herein petitioners, spouses Domingo and Dominga litigation.
Belen, filed by private respondent spouses Silvestre and Patricia Pacleb,
represented by their attorney-in-fact, Joselito Rioveros, before the RTC of The answer to the amended complaint raised the defenses of lack of cause
Rosario, Batangas. of action, res judicata and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and
over the persons of the defendants since the amended complaint had raised
The complaint alleged that private respondents secured a judgment by an entirely new cause of action which should have been ventilated in
default rendered by the Superior Court of the State of California. The another complaint.
summons was served on petitioners address in San Gregorio, Alaminos,
Laguna, as was alleged in the complaint, and received by a certain Marcelo Petitioners and Atty. Alcantara failed to appear at the rescheduled pre-trial
M. Belen. conference. Thus, the RTC declared petitioners in default and allowed
private respondents to present evidence ex parte. Atty. Alcantara passed
away without the RTC being informed of such fact until much later.
Atty. Reynaldo Alcantara entered his appearance as counsel for petitioners. The RTC rendered a Decision, ordering the defendants are hereby directed
Atty. Alcantara subsequently filed an answer, alleging that to pay the plaintiffs.
Contrary to private respondents averment, petitioners were actually A copy of the RTC decision intended for Atty. Alcantara was returned with
residents of California, USA. the notation Addressee Deceased. A copy of the RTC decision was then
The answer also claimed that petitioners liability had been sent to the purported address of petitioners in San Gregorio, Alaminos,
extinguished via a release of abstract judgment issued in the same Laguna and was received by a certain Leopoldo Avecilla. Meanwhile,
collection case. immediately after the promulgation of the RTC decision, private respondents
In view of petitioners failure to attend the scheduled pre-trial conference, the
RTC ordered the ex parte presentation of evidence for private respondents

filed an ex parte motion for preliminary attachment which the RTC granted in whether the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the persons of
its Order. petitioners through either the proper service of summons or the
appearance of the late Atty. Alcantara on behalf of petitioners and
Private respondents sought the execution of the RTC decision. In its Order, whether there was a valid service of the copy of the RTC decision
the RTC directed the issuance of a writ of execution. Upon the issuance of a on petitioners.
writ of execution, the real properties belonging to petitioners were levied
upon and the public auction.
Ruling
Atty. Carmelo B. Culvera entered his appearance as counsel for petitioners.
He then filed a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution (With Prayer to Defer As a general rule, when a party is represented by counsel of record, service
Further Actions). He also filed a Notice of Appeal from the RTC Decision of orders and notices must be made upon said attorney and notice to the
averring that he received a copy of the decision late. client and to any other lawyer, not the counsel of record, is not notice in law.
The exception to this rule is when service upon the party himself has been
The RTC denied the motion seeking the quashal of the writ of execution. ordered by the court. In cases where service was made on the counsel of
Subsequently, the RTC denied Atty. Culveras motion for reconsideration of record at his given address, notice sent to petitioner itself is not even
said order. necessary.
CA The following provisions under Rule 13 of the Rules of Court define the
proper modes of service of judgments:
Thus, petitioners filed a Rule 65 petition before the Court of Appeals,
imputing on the RTC grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess SEC. 2. Filing and service, defined.x x x
of jurisdiction
Service is the act of providing a party with a copy of the pleading or
in rendering its decision although it had not yet acquired jurisdiction paper concerned. x x x
over their persons in view of the improper service of summons;
On 31 July 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision SEC. 5. Modes of service.Service of pleadings, motions, notices,
dismissing the petition for certiorari., it issued the assailed Resolution orders, judgments and other papers shall be made either personally
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. or by mail.
SC SEC. 9. Service of judgments, final orders or resolutions.

Judgments, final orders or resolutions shall be served either
In a Resolution, the Court denied the petition because it is not accompanied personally or by registered mail. When a party summoned by
by a valid verification and certification of non-forum shopping. Petitioners publication has failed to appear in the action, judgments, final orders
sought reconsideration, which the Court granted in a Resolution dated. The or resolutions against him shall be served upon him also by
Court also ordered the reinstatement of the petition and the filing of a publication at the expense of the prevailing party.
comment.
SEC. 6. Personal service.Service of the papers may be made by
Issue delivering personally a copy to the party or his counsel, or by leaving
it in his office with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof. If
The instant petition raises two issues, thus: no person is found in his office, or his office is not known, or he has

no office, then by leaving the copy, between the hours of eight in the requirements of Section 7, Rule 13. Therefore, service by registered mail
morning and six in the evening, at the partys or counsels residence, presupposes that the present address of the party is known and if the person
if known, with a person of sufficient age and discretion then residing who receives the same is not the addressee, he must be duly authorized by
therein. the former to receive the paper on behalf of the party.
SEC. 7. Service by mail.Service by registered mail shall be made Since the filing of the complaint, petitioners could not be physically found in
by depositing the copy in the post office, in a sealed envelope, plainly the country because they had already become permanent residents of
addressed to the party or his counsel at his office, if known, otherwise California, U.S.A. It has been established during the trial that petitioners are
at his residence, if known, with postage fully pre-paid, and with former residents of Alaminos, Laguna, contrary to the averment in the
instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after complaint that they reside and may be served with court processes thereat.
ten (10) days if undelivered. If no registry service is available in the The service of the RTC decision at their former address in Alaminos, Laguna
locality of either the sender or the addressee, service may be done is defective and does not bind petitioners.
by ordinary mail
In view of the foregoing, the running of the fifteen-day period for appeal did
SEC. 8. Substituted service.If service of pleadings, motions, not commence upon the service of the RTC decision at the address on
notices, resolutions, orders and other papers cannot be made under record of Atty. Alcantara or at the Laguna address. It is deemed served on
the two preceding sections, the office and place of residence of the petitioners only upon its receipt by Atty. Culvera on 29. Therefore, the filing
party or his counsel being unknown, service may be made by of the Notice of Appeal is within the reglementary period and should be
delivering the copy to the clerk of court, with proof of failure of both given due course.
personal service and service by mail. The service is complete at the
time of such delivery. G.R. No. 166216 March 14, 2012
In the instant case, a copy of the RTC decision was sent first to Atty.
ROGELIO ABERCA, RODOLFO BENOSA, NESTOR BODINO, NOEL
Alcantara, petitioners counsel of record. However, the same was returned
ETABAG, DANILO DELA FUENTE, BELEN DIAZ-FLORES, MANUEL
unserved in view of the demise of Atty. Alcantara. Thus, a copy was
MARIO GUZMAN, ALAN JASMINEZ, EDWIN LOPEZ, ALFREDO
subsequently sent to petitioners last known address in San Gregorio,
MANSOS, ALEX MARCELINO, ELIZABETH PROTACIO-MARCELINO,
Alaminos, Laguna, which was received by a certain Leopoldo Avecilla.
JOSEPH OLAYER, CARLOS PALMA, MARCO PALO, ROLANDO
Undoubtedly, upon the death of Atty. Alcantara, the lawyer-client relationship SALUTIN BENJAMIN SEGUNDO, ARTURO TABARA, EDWIN TULALIAN,
between him and petitioners has ceased, thus, the service of the RTC and REBECCA TULALIAN, Petitioners,
decision on him is ineffective and did not bind petitioners. vs.
MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER, COL. FIDEL SINGSON, COL. GERARDO B.
The subsequent service on petitioners purported last known address by LANTORIA, COL. ROLANDO ABADILLA, COL. GALILEO KINTANAR,
registered mail is also defective because it does not comply with the LT. COL. PANFILO M. LACSON, MAJ. RODOLFO AGUINALDO, CAPT.
requisites under the aforequoted Section 7 of Rule 13 on service by DANILO PIZARRO, 1LT. PEDRO TANGO, 1LT. ROMEO RICARDO, 1LT.
registered mail. Section 7 of Rule 13 contemplates service at the present RAUL BACALSO, M/SGT. BIENVENIDO BALABA and "JOHN DOES,"
address of the party and not at any other address of the party. Service at the Respondents.
partys former address or his last known address or any address other than
his present address does not qualify as substantial compliance with the Facts:

On 25 January 1983, several suspected subversives who were Furthermore, respondents were also no longer occupying the
arrested and detained by the military filed a complaint for damages positions they held at the time the complaint was filed.
with the RTC of Quezon City against respondents. Thus, petitioners were directed to report to the trial court the
In their complaint, the petitioners alleged that they were arrested addresses and whereabouts of respondents so that they could
and detained by Task Force Makabansa, a composite group of be properly notified.
various intelligence units of the AFP, on the strength of defective Instead of complying, petitioners filed a motion to declare
search warrants; that while under detention and investigation, they respondents in default.
were subjected to physical and psychological harm, torture and The trial court denied petitioners motion to declare respondents in
other brutalities to extort from them confessions and other default, emphatically pointing out that respondents were not duly
information that would incriminate them; and that by reason thereof, notified of the decision of the Supreme Court.
they suffered actual and moral damages. In the same order, the trial court directed petitioners to comply with
The trial court granted respondents motion to dismiss and ordered the order within ten (10) days from notice, with a warning that the
the case dismissed. case [would] be archived and eventually dismissed if petitioners
Petitioners filed a motion to reconsider and set aside the order of failed to furnish to the court the addresses of respondents.
dismissal. However, the trial court declared the order final. Petitioners moved to reconsider but the trial court denied the
Petitioners again filed a motion for reconsideration, but the trial motion, stating that "without actual notice of the judgment of the
court denied the motion. Supreme Court xxx the defendants-appellants herein would not be
Petitioners went to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on aware that they should file a responsive pleading" and that,
certiorari, seeking to annul and set aside the orders of the trial therefore, "to consider the defendants-appellants in default would
court. be tantamount to lack of due process xxx."
While the case was pending in the Supreme Court, the so-called For failure of the petitioners to comply with the orders, the trial court
EDSA revolution took place. As a result, the respondents lost their dismissed the case without prejudice in its order dated March 7,
official positions and were no longer in their respective office 1991.
addresses as appearing in the record. Subsequently, however, in an order dated June 4, 1991, the trial
On April 15, 1988, the Supreme Court rendered a decision court set aside the order of dismissal and reinstated the case.
annulling and setting aside the assailed orders and remanded the It also approved petitioners request to serve the notice to file
case to the trial court for further proceedings. answer or responsive pleading by publication. (Pls. take note
However, trial could not proceed immediately because on June 11, of this)
1988, the record of the case was destroyed when fire razed the City Petitioners informed the trial court that the following notice was
Hall of Quezon City. published in the Tagalog newspaper BALITA in its issues of August
It was only on October 9, 1989 when petitioners sought a 29, 1991 and that no answer was filed by respondents within
reconstitution of the record of the case. the period stated in the notice.
On August 15, 1990, petitioners filed a motion praying that On motion of petitioners, the trial court declared respondents in
respondents be required to file their answer. default and directed petitioners to present their evidence ex-parte.
However, the record as reconstituted did not show who are the
lawyers of the respondents considering that Estelito Mendoza, who Ruling of the RTC
had represented them in his capacity as Solicitor General, was no
longer holding that position.

RTC handed down a decision in favor of the petitioners, whereby o The fourth error was committed when the respondents
respondents are ordered to pay the former almost P500k by way of were declared in default because they were not duly
damages. notified and, therefore, were denied due process.
Some of the respondents filed their Omnibus Motion praying that
the order of default be reversed and set aside, that the entire The petitioners come to this Court praying for the reversal and
proceedings be declared null and void and be given a chance to file setting aside of the CA decision.
their answer and present evidence.
One respondent filed a petition for relief from judgment averring Issue: Whether due process was properly observed.
that the decision rendered was without the benefit of notice in gross
violation of his right to due process.
Held: No.
However, these were all denied by the trial court.
Aggrieved, they elevated their case to the CA.
In the case at bench, the respondents were completely deprived of
due process when they were declared in default based on a
The Ruling of the CA
defective mode of service service of notice to file answer by
publication.
The CA rendered a decision reversing and setting aside the RTC The rules on service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders,
decision and ordering the case remanded to the RTC for further judgments, and other papers were not strictly followed in declaring
proceedings. the respondents in default.
The CA ruled, among others, that the RTC committed four (4) The Court agrees with the CA that the RTC committed procedural
errors in declaring the respondents in default and proceeding to lapses in declaring the respondents in default and in allowing the
hear the case. petitioners to present evidence ex-parte.
o The RTC committed its first error when it abandoned the As correctly observed by the CA, the RTCs order requiring
proper modes of service of notices, orders, resolutions or petitioners to report the addresses and whereabouts of the
judgments as the petitioners failed to comply with its order respondents was an attempt to serve a notice to file answer on the
directing them to report the addresses and whereabouts of respondents by personal service and/or by mail.
the respondents so that they could be properly notified. These proper and preferred modes of service, however, were
o The second error was the failure of the RTC to avail of never resorted to because the OSG abandoned them when the
substituted service after failing to effect personal service petitioners failed to comply with the RTC order requiring them to
or service by mail. report the addresses and whereabouts of the respondents.
o It perpetrated its third error when it authorized service by Nevertheless, there was still another less preferred but proper
publication after dismissing the case for failure of the mode of service available substituted service - which is service
petitioners to furnish the current addresses of the made by delivering the copy to the clerk of court, with proof of
respondents. The CA reasoned out that there was nothing failure of both personal service and service by mail.
in the rules which would authorize publication of a notice
Unfortunately, this substitute mode of service was not resorted
of hearing to file answer and for what was authorized to be
to by the RTC after it failed to effect personal service and
published were summons and final orders and judgments.
service by mail.

Instead, the RTC authorized an unrecognized mode of service
under the Rules, which was service of notice to file answer by
publication. SERVICE BY PUBLICATION ONLY APPLIES TO SERVICE OF
Considering the fact that the OSG could no longer represent the SUMMONS
respondents, the RTC should have been more patient in
notifying the respondents through personal service and/or The Court would like to point out that service by publication only
service by mail. It should not have simply abandoned the applies to service of summons stated under Rule 14 of the Rules
preferred modes of service when the petitioners failed to of Court where the methods of service of summons in civil cases
comply with its order with the correct addresses of the are: (1) personal service; (2) substituted service; and (3) service by
respondents. publication. Similarly, service by publication can apply to
More so, it should not have skipped the substituted service judgments, final orders and resolutions as provided under Section
prescribed under the Rules and authorized a service of notice on 9, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court
the respondents to file answer by publication. As correctly ruled by the CA, RTCs third error was when it
The RTC should have instead directed the petitioners to exert authorized service by publication after initially dismissing the case
diligent efforts to notify the respondents either personally or for failure of petitioners to furnish the current address of
by registered mail. defendants-appellants.
In case the preferred modes were impractical, the Court should o There is, however, nothing in the Rules that authorizes
have required the petitioners to at least report in writing why efforts publication of a notice of hearing to file answer.
exerted towards personal service or service by mail failed. o What is authorized to be published are: (1) summons, and
In other words, a convincing proof of an impossibility of (2) final orders and judgments.
personal service or service by mail to the respondents should
have been shown first.
The above-quoted provision cannot be used to justify the trial
The RTC, thus, erred when it ruled that the publication of a notice courts action in authorizing service by publication.
to file answer to the respondents substantially cured the procedural o Firstly, what was published was not a final order or
defect equivalent to lack of due process. judgment but a simple order or notice to file answer.
The RTC cannot just abandon the basic requirement of personal o Secondly, even granting that the notice to file answer can
service and/or service by mail. be served by publication, it is explicit in the Rule that
At any rate, the Court is of the view that personal service to the publication is allowed only if the respondents was
respondents was practicable under the circumstances considering summoned by publication. The record is clear that
that they were well-known persons who used to occupy high respondents were not summoned by publication.
government positions. The basic rules on modes of service of pleadings, motions, notices,
To stress, the only modes of service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments, and other papers are mandatory in nature and,
orders, judgments and other papers allowed by the rules are therefore, must be strictly observed.
personal service, service by mail and substituted service if either
personal service or service by mail cannot be made, as stated in
Sections 6, 7 and 8 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. Nowhere
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
under this rule is service of notice to file answer by publication is
mentioned, much less recognized.

SO ORDERED. be abated by the Municipal Mayor unless it is specially injurious to
a private person.
RED ALERT (GR 168973) **BIANCA MADE A DIGEST** Respondent appealed to the RTC and the decision of the MTC was
reversed. The RTC declared the house as a nuisance.
Notice of Lis Pendens: The RTC denied the petitioners MR.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Review with the CA, which was
G.R. No. 154018 April 3, 2007 dismissed OUTRIGHT for failure of the petitioners to include in their
petition the required explanation on why personal service upon the
respondent was not resorted to pursuant to Sec. 11, Rule 13 of the
MARTIN PEOSO and ELIZABETH PEOSO, Petitioners,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
vs.
Petitioners filed a MR attaching a Certification from the Postmaster
MACROSMAN DONA, Respondent.
that the pleading in question had been actually received by the
respondent as well as a letter to the CA Clerk of Court stating that if
the docket fee is insufficient, counsel for the petitioners shall remit
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the the balance immediately, if any.
1
Rules of Court assailing the Resolution dated March 22, 2002 promulgated MR was denied stating that petitioners subsequent compliance
by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 69472, which dismissed the with the Rules does not cleanse the petition of its infirmity.
appeal before it because Martin Peoso and his mother Elizabeth Peoso
Hence the instant Petition.
(petitioners) failed to submit a written explanation why service of pleading
was not done personally as required under Section 11 of Rule 13 of the
2 ISSUE:
Rules of Court and to pay the requisite docket fees; and, the CA Resolution
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for failure of the
dated June 3, 2002 which denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
petitioner to include in their petition the required explanation on why
personal service upon the respondent was not resorted to pursuant to Sec.
FACTS:
11, Rule 13, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and on the ground that
Macrosman Dona (Respondent) filed a complaint against docketing fees was short?
petitioners for Abatement of Nuisance with the MTC, San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro which was tried and decided under the Rule on
Summary Procedure.
Respondent claims that in front of their house is a barangay road RULING:
where the petitioners constructed their house against the objection
of the respondent. The CA erred.
o They claim that the house is a public nuisance. The
petitioners defend that the house was constructed by the
late Praxido Penoso, way ahead before the respondent Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides:
arrived and that they have no action to file the case.
MTC ruled in favor of petitioners on the ground that respondent has Sec. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. Whenever
no cause of action against petitioners and that the house may only practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers
shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating

from the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a
written explanation why the service or filing was not done WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the assailed
personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
paper as not filed. Court of Appeals is directed to REINSTATE the petition for review, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 69472, for further proceedings.
Jurisprudence holds that the rule that a pleading must be accompanied by a
written explanation why the service or filing was not done personally is Rule 13: Filing a pleading by fax is not sanctioned by the COMELEC Rules
mandatory of Procedure, much less by the Rules of Court.
9
However, in Ello v. Court of Appeals, the Court defined the circumstances
when the court may exercise its discretionary power under Section 11 of Top Management Programs Corp. vs. Fajardo, G.R. No. 150462, June
Rule 13, viz: 15, 2011 (certiorari R.45)
However, such discretionary power of the court must be exercised FACTS: (MAGULO MADAMING FACTS)
properly and reasonably, taking into account the following factors:
CFI RIZAL- 2 applications for registration of title
(1) "the practicability of personal service;" (2) "the importance of the
subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein;" and (3)
Gregorio filed an application for registration of title (case 1) over
"the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for
Lots 1 to 4 of Plan Psu-204785 and the court thereafter issued an
violation of Section 11. x x x"
order declaring as abandoned the reserved oppositions of Jose T.
Velasquez and Pablo Velasquez
Considering the prima facie merit of the pleading involving the issues
Velasquez filed an application for registration of title(Case 2)
whether the petitioners house is a public nuisance; whether the subject
over six lots denominated as Lots 7 and 9 of Psu-80886, Ap-5538,
house is constructed on an abandoned road; and whether the alleged
and Lots 1, 7, 9 and 11 of Psu-56007 Amd., Ap-11135before the
nuisance is specially injurious to respondent; and, considering further the
same court.
fact that the MTC and the RTC decisions are conflicting, the CA had valid
CFI (case 1)rendered a decisiondeclaring Gregorio to be the
grounds to refrain from dismissing the appeal solely on technical grounds.
absolute owner of Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 described in Plan Psu-204785,
the decree of registration was issued and become final.
Furthermore, considering the peculiar circumstances of the case, the
The same court (case 2) adjudicate Lots 1, 7, 9 and 11 of Psu-
shortage of the payment of the docketing fee cannot be used as a ground for
56007-Amd, plan Ap-11135, and Lots 7 and 9 of Psu-80886 (Ap-
dismissing petitioners appeal before the CA. It is undisputed that they and
5538) to Velasquez. The decree of registration was issuedand
their counsel are living in a remote town and are not aware of the exact
become final.
amount of the lawful fees for petitions for review. Hence, it is understandable
LRA informed the CFI that Lots 1 and 7 of Psu-56007-Amd (Ap-
why they place sheer reliance on the Rules of Court, notably, Section 1 of
11135) had been amended by the Bureau of Lands to exclude
Rule 42, which only specifies the amount of P500.00 for the appeal cost in
therefrom portions covered by Lot 2, Psu-64894, Psu-96904, and
question. Petitioners sent P500.00 with a request from the Clerk of Court for
Lots 1 to 4, Psu-204785 of Gregorio
notification of any insufficiency which will be sent immediately if there is any.
The deficiency in payment was not at all intentional. The petitioners acted in Velasquez petitioned the CFI to set aside the award earlier made
good faith and substantially complied with the Rules. in favor of Gregorio in case 1 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
and to give due course to his application over the said lots

CFI ruled that the application of Velasquez be given due course Pet. Top Management Programs Corporation sought the annulment of the
insofar as Lots 1 and 7 of Ap-11135 which are identical to Lots 1 to CFI RIZAL orderreinstating the order directing the issuance of new certificates
4, Plan Psu-204785, and the first decision in favor of Gregorio of title in the name of Trinidad and Fajardo, on the ground of extrinsic fraud.
respecting the same lots as null and void. Petitioner claimed that by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Saledated November
29, 1988 which was notarized on January 9, 1989, the heirs of Gregorio sold
CA- Gregorio appealed the decision of CFI- reversed to it Lot 1-A Psd-293076, being a portion of Lot 1, Psu-204785 covered by
TCT No. T-463.
It attains finality on February 1, 1972however, a petition for
review had been filed by Velasquez in SC-denied
CA rendered its decision dismissing the petition for annulment and held that
SC decision attained its finality on March 2, 1984 as per entry of
there existed no extrinsic fraud which would justify the annulment of the
judgment however, on October 31, 1972 decree over Lots 1, 3 and
questioned orders.
4 of Plan Psu-204785 were issued by the LRA in the name of
Gregorio in compliance with the order of CA
SC- Petitioner sought the reversal of the CA ruling via a petition for certiorari.
CFI-RIZAL By Decisiondated May 28, 1993-dismissed the petition and affirmed the CA
judgment.
Gregorio sought the annulment of the deed of sale over the said
lots in favor of Luciana Parami-dismissed RTC-MAKATIPetitioner filed for Quieting of Title With Damages dismissed;
Gregorio appealed to the CA -which reversed the CFI and ordered CA- Pet. appealed- denied; Hence to SC.
the cancellation of certificate of title in the name of the Paramis and
issuance of an OCT in favor of Gregorio covering Lots 1, 3 and 4,
ISSUE; WON CA erred in affirming the validity of private respondents TCT
Plan Pasu-204785.
despite the clear nullity of its mother title which was issued pending the
On November 20, 1979, the court in the same case issued an order appeal filed by Velasquez from the decision of the appellate court in CA- to
declaring the children (Ana, Paz, Carmen, Remedios and Rolando, SC. NOOO
all surnamed Gregorio) of the deceased Emilio Gregorio as his
compulsory heirs to substitute the said plaintiff. Pursuant to the said
decision, OCT No. 9587 in the name of Emilio Gregorio was Petitionerasserts that the entries in his TCT contain errors and
cancelled and a new certificate of title, TCT No. S-91911 in favor of insists that TCT actually emanated from the application for registration of
his heirs was issued Emilio Gregorio in LRC Case pursuant to the Order of the Regional Trial
covering lots also in the name of the Heirs of Emilio Gregorio by way of
RTC-PASIG (hndna CFI) implementing the final judgment of said court in the case between Gregorio
and Velasquez, as affirmed by the CA and this Court.
heirs of Emilio Gregorio filed an ex-parte motion for execution-
granted
this results to the duplication of titlesboth in the name of the same RULLING: (Lispendensyong topic ng case) The premature issuance of the
owners decree in favor of Emilio Gregorio and the corresponding original certificate
of title in his name did not affect his acquisition of title over the subject land
ETO NA YONG TOP MANAGEMENT considering that Velasquezs petition was eventually dismissed. Neither can

petitioner, by reason alone of defective issuance of OCT, claim a right over properties are in litigation, petitioner merely stepped into the shoes of its
the subject land superior to that acquired by the private respondent. vendors who lost in the case. Such vested right acquired by the private
respondent under the final judgment in his favor may not be defeated by the
subsequent issuance of another certificate of title to the heirs of Gregorio
A reading of the annotations of encumbrances at the back of TCT which respecting the same parcel of land. For it is well-settled that being an
were carried over from TCT in the name of the Heirs of Gregorio,would show involuntary transaction, entry of the notice of lispendens in the primary entry
that during the pendency of Civil Case filed before the CFI of Rizal by private book of the Register of Deeds is sufficient to constitute registration and such
respondent and Trinidad, the latter caused the annotation of a Notice of entry is notice to all persons of such claim.
LisPendensinvolving the same properties of the defendants therein, the heirs
of Emilio Gregorio. The notice of lispendens was registered as Entry No. It is to be noted that the notation of the lispendens on the back of
21398on TCT the owners duplicate is not mentioned for the purpose of constituting a
constructive notice because usually such owners duplicate certificate is
Lispendens, which literally means pending suit, refers to the presented for the purpose of the annotation later, and sometimes not at all
jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over property involved in until [it is] ordered by the court. Strictly speaking, the lispendens annotation
a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment. is not to be referred to as a part of the doctrine of notice; the purchaser
Founded upon public policy and necessity, lispendens is intended to keep pendente lite is affected, not by notice, but because the law does not allow
the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is litigating parties to give to others, pending the litigation, rights to the property
terminated, and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by in dispute so as to prejudice the opposite party. The doctrine rests upon
subsequent alienation. Its notice is an announcement to the whole world public policy, not notice.
that a particular property is in litigation and serves as a warning that one who
acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk or that he Thus we have held that one who buys land where there is a
gambles on the result of the litigation over said property. pending notice of lispendens cannot invoke the right of a purchaser in good
faith; neither can he have acquired better rights than those of his
The filing of a notice of lispendenshas a two-fold effect: (1) to keep predecessor in interest.
the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of
the final judgment to prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive G.R. No. 104769 September 10, 2001
alienations; and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land subject
of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate AFP MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,
subsequently. Once a notice of lispendens has been duly registered, any vs.
subsequent transaction affecting the land involved would have to be subject COURT OF APPEALS, SOLID HOMES, INC., INVESTCO, INC., and
to the outcome of the litigation. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MARIKINA,respondents.
CASE AT BAR:Petitioner being a mere transferee at the time the decision of x---------------------------------------------------------x
the RTC of Pasig in Civil Case had become final and executory on
December 6, 1988, it is bound by the said judgment which ordered the heirs
G.R. No. 135016 September 10, 2001
of Emilio Gregorio to convey Lots 1, 2, 3 & 4, Psu-204875 in favor of private
respondent and Trinidad. As such buyer of one of the lots to be conveyed to
private respondent pursuant to the courts decree with notice that said

SOLID HOMES, INC., petitioner, If we allow provisional annotations as a valid form of annotation of notice
vs. of lis pendens, we would be eroding the very value of the indefeasibility of
INVESTCO, INC., substituted by ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES the torrens system.
MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION, INC., respondent.
In the present case, there could be no valid annotation on the titles issued to
AFPMBAI because the case used as basis of the annotation pending with
the trial court was an action for collection of a sum of money and did not
Facts: involve the titles to, possession or ownership of the subject property or an
interest therein. This Court, in its final decision on the case categorized the
What is before the Court is Solid Homes, Inc.s MFR of the decision action initiated by Investco, Inc. against Solid Homes, Inc. (Civil Case No.
promulgated on March 3, 2000, reversing the decision of the Court of 40615 of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Metro Manila) as:
Appeals and ordering the Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis
pendens on the titles issued to petitioner AFP Mutual Benefit "An action for collection of sums of money, damages and attorneys
Association, Inc. (AFPMBAI), declaring it as buyer in good faith and for fees was filed with the Regional Trial Court (Civil Case No. 40615)
value. of Pasig by private respondents Investco, Angela Perez Staley and
Antonio Perez, Jr. against petitioner Solid Homes, Inc."
We find the motion without merit.
Unquestionably, such action did not directly involve titles to, ownership
1. Solid Homes, Inc.s position is anchored on the preposition that a notice or possession of the subject property, and, therefore, was not a proper
of lis pendens was duly annotated on the vendors title that must be deemed subject of a notice of lis pendens.
carried over to the titles issued to AFPMBAI, subjecting it to the final result of
the litigation as a transferee pendente lite. "The Torrens System was adopted in this country because it was believed to
be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to
The Revised Rules of Court allows the annotation of a notice of lis protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and
pendens in actions affecting the title or right of possession of real recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the
property, or an interest in such real property. We further declared that the sellers title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that
rule of lis pendens applied to suits brought "to establish an equitable estate, his acquisition was ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair to him.
interest, or right in specific real property or to enforce any lien, charge, or What is worse is that if this were permitted, public confidence in the system
encumbrance against it x x x."
7 would be eroded and land transactions would be attended by complicated
and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The
further consequence would be that land conflicts could be even more
Pencil markings, which Solid Homes admits to be provisional, are not
numerous and complex than they are now and possibly also more abrasive,
an accepted form of annotating a notice of lis pendens. The Court
if not even violent."
cannot accept the argument that such pencil annotation can be
considered as a valid annotation of notice of lis pendens, and thus an
effective notice to the whole world as to the status of the title to the Prevailing jurisprudence recognizes that "All persons dealing with property
land. The law requires proper annotation, not "provisional" annotation covered by the torrens certificate of title are not required to go beyond what
of a notice of lis pendens. appears on the face of the title." "The buyer is not even obligated to look

beyond the certificate to investigate the titles of the seller appearing on the the existence of two women helpers who allegedly refused to sign and
face of the certificate." Hence, we ruled that AFPMBAI is a buyer in good acknowledge receipt of the summons. In any event, they contended that
faith and for value. assuming that the allegation were true, the helpers had no authority to
receive the documents.
Consequently, we reject movant Solid Homes, Inc.s contention that
AFPMBAI is a transferee pendente lite of Investco, Inc. By Order, the trial court set aside the Order of Default and gave herein
respondents five days to file their Answer. Respondents just the same did
not file an Answer, drawing petitioner to again file a Motion to declare them
RULE 14 SUMMONS, SEC. 1 TO 14
in default, which the trial court again granted by Order.
Rapid City Realty and Development Corporation, Respondents filed an Omnibus Motion for reconsideration of the second
order declaring them in default and to vacate proceedings, this time claiming
Petitioner, that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons due to
invalid service of summons.
- versus -
The trial court denied respondents Omnibus Motion by Order and
ORLANDO VILLA and LOURDES PAEZ-VILLA,
proceeded to receive ex-parte evidence for petitioner.
Respondents.
Respondents, via certiorari, challenged the trial courts Orders before the
Facts: Court of Appeals.
Sometime in 2004, Rapid City Realty and Development Corporation In the meantime, the trial court, by Decision, rendered judgment in favor of
(petitioner) filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of subdivision plans . . . petitioner.
mandamus and damages against several defendants including Spouses
By Decision, the appellate court annulled the trial courts Orders declaring
Orlando and Lourdes Villa (respondents).
respondents in default for the second time stating: A party who makes a
After one failed attempt at personal service of summons, Gregorio Zapanta special appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of said court based
(Zapanta), court process server, resorted to substituted service by serving on the ground of invalid service of summons is not deemed to have
summons upon respondents househelp who did not acknowledge receipt submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
thereof and refused to divulge their names.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate
Despite substituted service, respondents failed to file their Answer, court by Resolution, it comes to the Court via petition for review on certiorari,
prompting petitioner to file a Motion to Declare Defendants[-herein arguing in the main that respondents, in filing the first Motion to Lift the Order
respondents] in Default which the trial court granted. of Default, voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court.
Ruling:
More than eight months thereafter, respondents filed a Motion to Lift Order
of Default, claiming that they officially received all pertinent papers such as
The petition is impressed with merit.
Complaint and Annexes. Motion to Dismiss of the Solicitor General and the
ORDER granting the Motion to Declare [them] in Default. And they denied

It is settled that if there is no valid service of summons, the court can still default or lose the same outright without
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by virtue of the latters the benefit of a trial on the merits;
voluntary appearance. Thus Section 20 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
provides: 5. It would be the height of injustice if
the respondents is [sic] denied the equal
Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. The protection of the laws[;]
defendants voluntary appearance in the
action shall be equivalent to service of 6. Respondents must be afforded Due
summons. The inclusion in a motion to process of Law as enshrined in the
dismiss of other grounds aside from lack New Constitution, which is a basic right
of jurisdiction over the person shall not of every Filipino, since they were not
be deemed a voluntary appearance. furnished copies of pleadings by the
plaintiff and the Order dated May 3,
Citing Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Wilson Dy Hong 2005;
Pi and Lolita Dy, et al. It is clear that:
x x x x[9]
(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on
voluntary appearance; Respondents did not, in said motion, allege that their filing thereof was a
special appearance for the purpose only to question the jurisdiction over
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of their persons. Clearly, they had acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the court.
the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal
manner; and WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Court of Appeals
Decision of April 29, 2008 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the
court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative G.R. No. L-68037 July 29, 1992
relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution.[7] (italics and
underscoring supplied) PARAMOUNT INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
In their first Motion to Lift the Order of Default dated January 30, 2006,
HON. MAXIMO M. JAPZON, Presiding Judge, Br. 36, RTC, Manila; City
respondents alleged
Sheriff and Deputy Sheriffs Nestor Macabilin & Teodoro Episcope,
xxxx public respondents, JOSE LARA and ARSENIO PAED, private
respondents.
4. In the case of respondents, there is
no reason why they should not receive ROMERO, J.:
the Orders of this Honorable Court since
the subject of the case is their multi- Assailed in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
million real estate property and naturally 1
injunction is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36
they would not want to be declared in dated August 30, 1983 in Civil Case No. 82-4416 entitled "Jose Lara and

Arsenio Paed v. Willy Garcia, Emilio Macasieb, Domingo Natividad, Willy In the interim period, a fire gutted the City Hall of Manila on
Manuel, and Paramount Insurance Co. Inc." ordering petitioner to pay November 19, 1981 and the records of the case were burned to
private respondents an aggregate sum of P175,000.00 as insurer of a motor ashes. Subsequently, on January 25, 1982, Lara and Paed filed a
vehicle owned by Domingo Natividad despite the absence of jurisdiction over petition for reconstitution of the judicial records of the case which
its persons. was approved without any opposition in the order of the court dated
November 4, 1982.
Facts: On February 17, 1983, the court reiterated its order before the
reconstitution of the judicial records declaring defendants
It appears that on May 27, 1978, Jose Lara contracted the services Natividad, Manuel and Paramount in default in view of their
of a passenger jeepney owned and operated by Garcia, to transport continued failure to appear during the trial of the case and allowed
his family, relatives and friends from Manila to Pangasinan. The the Lara and Paed to make a formal offer of exhibits and
said jeepney was then driven by Macasieb. considered the case submitted for decision.
On the very same date, within the vicinity of Barangay Parsolingan After protracted proceedings which lasted for almost five years, the
in Gerona, Tarlac, a Ford truck owned by Natividad, then driven by RTC rendered a decision in favor of Lara and Paed, ordering the
Manuel, while cruising the National Highway on its way to Manila, defendants to pay the former P175k by way of damages, attorneys
overtook an unidentified motor vehicle and in the process hit and fees and cost of the suit.
sideswept the said passenger jeepney then driven by Macasieb. A copy of the said decision was served on the petitioner's counsel,
As a consequence of such mishap, the two (2) passengers of the Atty. Segundo Gloria, on October 5, 1981.
jeepney, namely: Lara and Paed sustained physical injuries of o No appeal from the judgment having been filed within the
varying degrees. reglementary period or up to October 20, 1983, the same
The insurer of said truck is herein petitioner Paramount Surety and became final and executory.
Insurance Co. Inc.
On or about June 5, 1978, Lara and Paed filed a criminal case So, Lara and Paed, now private respondents, filed an ex-parte
against Manuel for Reckless Imprudence resulting in Damage to motion for execution of the said judgment and the trial court granted
Property. the same on July 10, 1984.
Accordingly, Lara and Paed filed on September 17, 1978 a civil It was only on March 3, 1984 that Paramount, now petitioner,
case for damages against Garcia, Macasieb, Manuel, Natividad, filed a motion to set aside the Decision raising the issue that
and impleaded Paramount, the latter as insurer of the Ford truck. the court has not validly acquired jurisdiction over its person.
A certain Atty. Segundo Gloria filed a notice of appearance dated
November 16, 1978 where he informed the court that he was Hence, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
appearing for and in behalf of the defendants Natividad, Manuel injunction.
and Paramount.
Subsequently, on December 14, 1978, he filed an answer with Petitioner now claims that the Decision of the trial court dated
crossclaim and counterclaim. August 30, 1983, should be set aside since the court has not validly
During the trial of the criminal case, accused Manuel pleaded guilty acquired jurisdiction over its person, not having been validly served
to the crime charged on, and was accordingly, sentenced to with summons and a copy of the complaint nor did it actively
imprisonment of six months. participate in the said proceedings.

It alleged that Atty. Segundo Gloria was not its retained counsel at v. Luna," this Court had the opportunity to rule that "the mere filling
that time nor was he authorized by petitioner to act for and in its of the answer with crossclaim raised a presumption of authority to
behalf; and that private respondents' claims for moral, exemplary appear for petitioner Paramount Insurance Corporation . . . in
and compensatory damages as well as attorney's fees are not accordance with Section 21, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Such
recoverable from petitioner. presumption is rebuttable, but only by clear and positive proof.
In the absence of such clear and positive proof, the presumption of
Issue: Whether the court validly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the authority . . . should prevail over the petitioner's self-serving denial
defendants. of such authority.
Held: Yes. SYJUCO, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. JOSE P. CASTRO
Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is
acquired either by his voluntary appearance in court and his
submission to its authority or by service of summons. Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
The service of summons is intended to give notice to the defendant
FACTS:
or respondent that an action has been commenced against it.
o The defendant or respondent is thus put on guard as to
After being served of Supreme Courts decision, Lims caused the
the demands of the plaintiff or the petitioner.
filing with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City of still another
action, the third, also designed, like the first two, to preclude
Consequently, petitioner's contentions that it was not properly enforcement of the mortgage held by Syjuco. This time the
served with summons and that Atty. Segundo Gloria was not complaint was presented, not in their individual names, but in the
authorized to appear for and in its behalf are untenable. name of a partnership of which they themselves were the only
In the case at bar, although petitioner questioned the propriety of partners: "Heirs of Hugo Lim."
the service of summons, it however failed to substantiate its QC Judge Castro issued restraining order and summons of which
allegation that it was not properly served with summons. Syjuco claims not to have received.Then, Sheriff Perfecto G.
Hence, the disputable presumption that official duty has been Dalangin submitted a return of summons to the effect that on
regularly performed prevails. December 6, 1982 he
The records of the case, however, showed that all the pleadings, .. served personally and left a copy of summons together with a
including the answer with crossclaim and counterclaim filed by Atty. copy of Complaint and its annexes x x upon defendant's office
Segundo Gloria stated that he represented the defendants formerly at 313 Quirino Ave., Paranaque, Metro-Manila and now at
Natividad, Manuel and Paramount. 407 Dona Felisa Syjuco Building, Remedios St., corner Taft
In fact, he even filed a notice of appearance informing the court that Avenue, Manila, through the Manager, a person of sufficient age
he is representing the said defendants. and discretion duly authorized to receive service of such nature,
It is worth noting that this is not the first time petitioner raised the but who refused to accept service and signed receipt thereof.
issue of warrant of jurisdiction over its person as well as warrant of
authority of a lawyer to appear for and in its behalf. In the case Lims through Atty. Canlas filed an ex-parte motion to declare
docketed as G.R. No. 68066 entitled "Paramount Insurance Corp. Syjuco in default which was granted and by virtue of which the trial

court held void the mortgage in question because it was executed strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer
by the Lims without authority from the partnership which was and jurisdiction of the court
had been since March 30,1959 the exclusive owner of the
mortgaged property, and making permanent an injunction against lacking such valid service, the Trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
the foreclosure sale that had issued on January 14,1983. petitioner Syjuco, rendering null and void all subsequent proceedings and
Syjuco filed this petition praying that the default judgment rendered issuances in the action from the order of default up to and including the
against it by Judge Castro in said Civil Case No. Q-36485 be judgment by default and the order for its execution
annulled on the ground of lack of service of summons, res judicata
and laches, and failure of the complaint to state a cause of action ELISEO BOTICANO, petitioner, vs. MANUEL CHU, JR., respondent.
FACTS:
ISSUE: Was there a valid service of summons?
Petitioner Eliseo Boticano is the registered owner of a Bedford truck
HELD: The sheriffs return creates grave doubts about the correctness of the with plate No. QC-870, T-Pilipinas '77 which he was using in
Judge's basic premise that summons had been validly served on Syjuco. hauling logs for a certain fee.
While loaded with logs, it was properly parked by its driver Maximo
RATIO: Dalangin at the shoulder of the national highway, it was hit and
bumped at the rear portion by a Bedford truck owned by private
the return is unspecific about where service was effected
respondent Manuel Chu, Jr. and driven by Jaime Sigua, the
No safe conclusion about the place of service can be made from its
former's co-defendant in this case.
reference to a former and a present office of Syjuco in widely
Manuel Chu, Jr. acknowledged ownership thereof and agreed with
separate locations, with nothing to indicate whether service was
petitioner to shoulder the expenses of the repair of the damaged
effected at one address or the other, or even at both
truck of the latter
failure to name the person served who is, with equal ambiguity,
When Manuel Chu, Jr. failed to comply with aforesaid agreement
identified only as "the Manager" of the defendant corporation
as well as to pay damages representing lost income despite
(petitioner herein)
petitioner's demands, the latter (plaintiff in the lower court), filed a
Since the sheriffs return constitutes primary evidence of the manner complaint on November 24, 1977 at the Court of First Instance of
and incidents of personal service of a summons, the Rules are Nueva Ecija, Branch VII at Cabanatuan City, against private
quite specific about what such a document should contain:SEC. 20. respondent Manuel Chu, Jr. (truck owner) and Jaime Sigua (his
Proof of service driver) both as defendants in Civil Case No. 6754 "Eliseo Boticano
The defective sheriffs return thus being insufficient and incompetent v. Manuel Chu, Jr. and Jaime Sigua" for damages.
to prove that summons was served in the manner prescribed for Summons was issued on December 12, 1977 but was returned
service upon corporations, there is no alternative to affirming the unserved for defendant Jaime Sigua because he was no longer
petitioner's claim that it had not been validly summoned in Civil connected with San Pedro Saw Mill, Guagua, Pampanga, while
Case No. Q-36485 another copy of the summons for Manuel Chu, Jr. was returned
duly served on him thru his wife Veronica Chu at his dwelling
house.
EFFECT OF INVALID SERVICE OF SUMMONS:

On February 15, 1978 petitioner moved to dismiss the case against respondent Court of Appeals issued an order denying
Jaime Sigua and to declare Manuel Chu, Jr. in default for failure to petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
file responsive pleadings within the reglementary period. The o There is no dispute as to the facts of this case, as shown by
motion was granted by the lower court in an Order dated the admission of private respondent to the extent of making an
September 4, 1978, allowing petitioner to adduce his evidence ex agreement with petitioner to shoulder the expenses of the
parte on October 17, 1978. repair of the damaged truck of the latter and the findings of the
Court of Appeals that petitioner's evidence fully supports the
Trial Court: From the evidence adduced by the petitioner the trial findings of facts of the trial court as well as its judgment under
court November 28, 1978 found that private respondent Manuel appeal.
Chu, Jr. is responsible for the petitioner. o Neither does private respondent deny receipt of the summons
in question. The bone of contention appears to be in the
On March 19, 1979 private respondent Manuel Chu, Jr. filed with manner of service of said summons on the wife of private
the trial court a "Notice of Appeal" and an Urgent Motion for respondent at their dwelling instead of on private respondent
Extension of Time to file Record on Appeal which was granted by himself personally.
the trial court on the same date o Petitioner contends in favor of validity of such service while
On March 26, 1979, Atty. Hermenegildo D. Ocampo, counsel of private respondent maintains the opposite view which was
record of private respondent, filed a "Motion to Withdraw as sustained by respondent Court of Appeals to the effect that the
Counsel" while the new counsel Atty. Wilfredo G. Laxamana Sheriff resorted to substituted service under Section 8, Rule 14
entered his appearance on April 18, 1979 and filed his record on of the Rules of Court, without first complying with the mode of
appeal on the same date personal service required under Section 7 of the same Rule.
On May 4, 1979 petitioner filed with the trial court a Motion to
Dismiss Appeal and for execution which was set for hearing on May
14, 1979 wherein private respondent's counsel personally appeared ISSUE: Whether the question of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
and opposed petitioner's motion while on the latter date petitioner can be raised for the first time on appeal.
filed his reply to opposition,
On May 16, 1979 the trial court issued an order denying aforesaid RULING: NO
motion, while on May 22, 1979, the trial court issued another order
The question has been answered in the negative by the Supreme Court in a
approving private respondent's Record on Appeal.
long line of decisions. In fact, one of the circumstances considered by the
CA the appealed judgment is hereby set aside, for being null and Court as indicative of waiver by the defendant-appellant of any alleged
void. This case is directed to be remanded to the court of origin; defect of jurisdiction over his person arising from defective or even want of
that appellant be properly served with summons and a copy of the process, is his failure to raise the question of jurisdiction in the Court of First
complaint; and that the necessary and appropriate proceedings or Instance and at the first opportunity. It has been held that upon general
action be taken thereafter, as the circumstances and the case win principles, defects in jurisdiction arising from irregularities in the
warrant.With costs against appellee. commencement of the proceedings, defective process or even absence of
process may be waived by a failure to make seasonable objections.
o On April 20, 1981, petitioner filed with the respondent Court of
Appeals a Motion for Reconsideration and on June 3, 1981 a Jurisdiction was properly acquired by the trial court over the person of
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. On August 28, 1981 respondent thru both service of summons and voluntary appearance in

court; he was therefore properly declared in default for not having filed any Case No. 6754 "Eliseo Boticano v. Manuel Chu, Jr. and Jaime Sigua" is
answer; despite respondent's failure to file a motion to set aside the hereby REINSTATED. No costs.
declaration of default, he has the right to appeal the default judgment but in
the appeal only the evidence of the petitioner may be considered, PAN-ASIATIC TRAVEL CORP., petitioner,
respondent not having adduced any defense evidence; We agree with the vs.
findings of fact by the trial court. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. AMANTE S. PURISIMA, as Presiding
Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VII, CITY SHERIFF OF
In fact, one of the circumstances considered by the Court as indicative of MANILA, and DESTINATIONS TRAVEL PHIL., INC., respondents.
waiver by the defendant-appellant of any alleged defect of jurisdiction over
his person arising from defective or even want of process, is his failure to Facts:
raise the question of jurisdiction in the Court of First Instance and at the first * DESTINATIONS) filed a complaint against PAN-ASIATIC) for the refund of
opportunity. It has been held that upon general principles, defects in the price of alleged unutilized airplane tickets issued by the latter for
jurisdiction arising from irregularities in the commencement of the passengers recruited by the former, which refund allegedly totalled
proceedings, defective process or even absence of process may be waived P48,742.33
by a failure to make seasonable objections. * DESTINATIONS filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default.
*After receipt of said Motion, PAN-ASIATIC, by way of special appearance,
It has been pointed out that during the stages of the proceedings in the court filed a Motion to Dismiss for the sole purpose of objecting to the trial court's
below, defendant-appellant could have questioned the jurisdiction of the jurisdiction over its person on the ground that it was not properly served with
lower court but he did not. summons.
*Two days after the filing of the Motion to Dismiss, DESTINATIONS filed on
Private respondent voluntarily appeared thru counsel in the trial court. He June 25, 1980 an amended complaint increasing its claim for reimbursement
filed a Notice of Appeal, Appeal Bond, Motion for Extension of Time to File of refunds to P103,866.35. At the hearing of said Motion to Dismiss, PAN-
Record on Appeal, Record on Appeal, Motion for Withdrawal of Appearance, ASIATIC was informed of the filing of the amended complaint; hence, it
Notice of Appearance and Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Appeal withdrew its Motion to Dismiss.
and for Issuance of a Writ of Execution. Not only did he submit pleadings *a copy of the amended complaint and summons were served on PAN-
and motions, but he likewise appeared in person, thru counsel in the hearing ASIATIC.However, instead of filing an Answer, it filed a Motion for Bill of
held on May 14, 1979 at 8:30 a.m. and orally argued in open court on the Particulars which was granted by the trial court.
pending incident. *DESTINATIONS did not file a Bill of Particulars. Instead, on May 9, 1981, it
served and filed a Motion to Admit attached "Second Amended Complaint"
In the case at bar, there is no question that summons was timely issued and
* Said Second Amended Complaint-admitted by the trial judge in an Order
received by private respondent. In fact, he never denied actual receipt of
dated May 28, 1981, which Order was served on petitioner on June 9, 1981.
such summons but confined himself to the argument that the Sheriff should
However, no new summons was served on petitioner.
prove that personal service was first made before resorting to substituted
*On July 15, 1981 DESTINATIONS filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in
service,
Default-granted
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals *TC ruled for DESTINATIONS ,PAN-ASIATIC, received a copy of decision
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the decision of the then Court of First *On February 24, 1982, petitioner filed its Omnibus Motion to Lift Order of
Instance (now Regional Trial Court)of Nueva Ecija, Cabanatuan City in Civil Default and to Vacate Judgment by Default, alleging that the trial court's
decision was rendered without jurisdiction because petitioner was never
served with summons on the Second Amended Complaint, and that it was

deprived of its day in court on account of fraud, accident, mistake and/or SEC. 3. Answer to amended complaint.If the complaint is amended, the
excusable negligence. DENIED time fixed for the filing and service of the answer shall, unless otherwise
*Motion for Reconsideration of the Order was filed and While the MR was ordered, run from notice of the order admitting the amended complaint. An
pending, petitioner filed its notice of appeal and at the same time withdrew answer filed before the amendment shall stand as an answer to the
its Motion for Reconsideration which withdrawal was granted by the trial amended complaint, unless a new answer is filed within ten (10) days from
court. notice of service as herein provided.
* DESTINATIONS filed a Motion for Execution-granted while the appeal of
PAN-ASIATIC, was Dismissed on the ground that the Decision had become THUS, PAN-ASIATIC was properly served with a copy of the Second
final and executory and that the appeal was filed beyond the reglementary Amended Complaint and that on June 9, 1981, it received a copy of the
period. Order admitting said Second Amended Complaint. Since it failed to serve
CA and file its Answer within fifteen (15) days from June 9, 1981, the trial court
* PAN-ASIATIC filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Court was correct in declaring the company in default, in holding trial ex parte, and
of Appeals -dismissed,hence pet. Went to SC. in eventually rendering judgment by default.
SC:
Petitioner contends that the Second Amended Complaint introduced new (Old rule pa yung gamit nila dito kaya IBA yung numbering ng sections
causes of action not alleged in the original nor in the first amended sa Rule 14 in this case.)
complaint. Hence, it is argued that new summons had to be served on
petitioner, for the court to acquire jurisdiction over its (petitioner's) person. G.R. No. 79374 October 2, 1992
RULING:
The Second Amended Complaint does introduce new causes of action. For
TOMAS G. MAPA, petitioner,
while in the first amended complaint, DESTINATIONS prayed for
vs.
reimbursement of refunds for unutilized airplane tickets only, in the Second
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO, JR.,
Amended Complaint, there were claims for commissions and incentives,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH LIII, and LAND BANK
although the total amount of the claims was the same as the amount claimed
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
in the first amended complaint.
Summons on the first amended complaint was properly served on PAN-
ASIATIC. After which, the company filed several motions for extension of G.R. No. 82986 October 2, 1992
time within which to file responsive pleading, and then a Motion for Bill of
Particulars, all of which motions were granted by the trial court. With the TOMAS G. MAPA, petitioner,
filing of these motions, PAN-ASIATIC had effectively appeared in the case vs.
and voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court. Hence, no new COURT OF APPEALS and LAND BANK OF THE
summons on the Second Amended Complaint was necessary, ordinary PHILIPPINES, respondents.
service being sufficient.
In cases where a complaint is amended, the Rules of Court provide for the
period within which the defendant must answer thus: FACTS:

The validity of a substituted service of summons upon the petitioner is fatally defective because it was not made in accordance with
raised as the common issue in these two (2) cases. law.
Defense: the sheriff's return did not show that the sheriff
High Peak Mining, through its duly authorized corporate officers exerted efforts to personally serve the summons; thus,
Encarnacion C. Tittel and Juergen Tittel, borrowed P11M (P5M, 3M and 3M) substituted service pursuant to Section 7 and 8, Rule 14 of the
from the private respondent Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) The loans Rules of Court was not warranted.
are evidenced by 3 Promissory Notes executed on different dates. High Even granting that the substituted service was proper, the
Peak failed to pay the said loans. actual service upon Susan O. dela Torre cannot be considered
valid because
The first note become the subject matter of a complaint for the recovery of a (a) it was left not at defendant Mapa's residence and dela
sum of money with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment filed Torre was not residing therein, and
against High Peak, Mapa, in his personal capacity and as Chairman of High (b) that he (Mapa) was not holding office or regular place
Peak's Board of Directors, and the abovenamed signatories to the of business at the second floor, First Midland
promissory notes. This is the case involved in G.R. No. 79374. Condominium Bldg., Gamboa St., Legaspi Village, Makati,
Metro Manila; he holds office in his residence.
Petition DENIED, MFR DENIED.
CA petition for certiorari

Civil Cases Nos. 142400 = G.R. No. 79374
Petition Denied
It ruled that the service of summons upon Susan O. dela Torre, an
RTC Branch 53 employee of the corporation, may be regarded as service upon an
Deputy Sheriff Flores certified that on the 10th day of November agent of a corporation within the meaning of Section 13 of Rule 14.
1982, he has served copies of summons with complaint and MFR DENIED
annexes upon the defendants High Peak Mining Exploration
Corporation, Tomas G. Mapa, Encarnacion C. Tittel and Juergen
Tittel, thru SUSAN O. DELA TORRE, a person of suitable age and
discretion working therein, who claims to be the person
The second and third Promissory Notes became the subject matter of a
authorized to received processess (sic) of this nature and who
complaint for the recovery of a sum of money in G.R. No. 82986.
acknowledged the receipt thereof at second (sic) floor, First
Midland Condominium Bldg., Gamboa Street, Legaspi Village,
Makati, Metro-Manila. Civil Case No. 82-13465 = G.R. No. 82986
No answer was filed by the defendants so they were declared in
default and ordering the LBP to present its evidence ex-parte. RTC
rendered a decision against the defendants; the latter's liability for Deputy Sheriff Flores (AGAIN) certified that on the 10th day of
the amount adjudged was made joint and several November 1982, he has served copies of summons with complaint
petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss and Set Aside Judgment on the and annexes upon the defendants High Peak Mining Exploration
ground that service of summons upon him and High Peak was Corporation, Tomas G. Mapa, Encarnacion C. Tittel and Juergen
Tittel, thru SUSAN O. DELA TORRE.
Mapa was again declared in default and was found liable.

He filed Motion to Dismiss and Set Aside Judgment (AGAIN) on the However, if personal service cannot be effected within a reasonable time,
ground that service of summons to him and the corporation was substituted service, as provided for in Section 8 of the abovementioned Rule
fatally defective reiterating the same arguments he raised in the 14, may suffice:
similar motion he filed on the abovementioned case.
4 May 1987- partly granted the said motion by setting aside the Sec. 8 Substituted service. If the defendant cannot be
decision because no jurisdiction was acquired over both the served within a reasonable time as provided in the
petitioner and High Peak. The court held that there is no showing preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving
that efforts were exerted by the sheriff to serve the summons copies of the summons at the defendant's dwelling house
personally upon the petitioner; the former immediately resorted to or residence with some person of suitable age and
substituted service upon Susan O. dela Torre who cannot be discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the
considered a competent person in charge of the office. With respect copies at defendant's office or regular place of business
to High Peak, Miss dela Torre, a mere employee thereof, is not one with some competent person in charge thereof.
of those explicitly authorized to receive summons in behalf of a
corporation under Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. This provision is a reproduction of Section 8, Rule 7 of the 1940
Rules of Court except that, inter alia, the work "promptly" in the
CA latter was changed to "within a reasonable time" in the former. Of
set aside (a) the 4 May 1987 Order of Branch 10 of the RTC of course, "within a reasonable time" contemplates a period of time
Manila in Civil Case No. 82-13465 reversing its earlier decision on longer than that demarcated by the word "prompt", and
the ground that the herein petitioner was not validly served presupposes that a prior attempt at personal service, within a
with summons and (b) the 16 October 1987 Order denying the justifiable time frame as would be necessary to bring the defendant
motion for reconsideration of the latter. within the jurisdiction of the court, had failed.
It is not shown when the summonses in Civil Cases Nos. 142400 and 82-
13465 were actually issued. What was shown is that in both cases,
ISSUE: WON there was a valid substituted service of summons to MAPA in summons were served on 10 November 1982, these returns do not show
both cases? that prior attempts at personal service were made by the Sheriff and
that such attempts had failed, prompting the latter to resort to
Held: NO substituted service.
24
Both are unquestionably actions in personam. Jurisdiction over the In Keister vs. Navarro, this Court described how the impossibility of
petitioner, as defendant therein, can therefore be acquired either by his personal service should be shown:
voluntary submission to such jurisdiction, as when he appears in
court, or by service of summons upon him. Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating
the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the
Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court explicitly requires personal service fact that such efforts failed. This statement should be
of summons which is accomplished "by handing a copy thereof to the made in the proof of service. This is necessary because
defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him." substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of

service. It has been held that this method of service is "in Petitioner never alleged that he did not in fact receive the summonses, such
derogation of the common law"; it is a method circumstance by itself cannot warrant the conclusion that he actually
extraordinary in character, and hence may be "used only received from Susan dela Torre the said summonses and copies of the
as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by complaints. In the absence of a categorical admission no such inference
statute." . . . (72 C.J.S. 1053). to the contrary could be drawn. It was thus incumbent upon the private
respondent to prove that Susan dela Torre delivered to the petitioner copies
The proof of service alluded to is the return required by Section 6 of Rule 14 of both the summonses and the complaints.
which reads:
There was a valid service of summons on High Peak. Section 13, Rule 14 of
Sec. 6. Return. When the service has been completed, the Rules of Court provides for the manner in which service of summons
the server shall give notice thereof, by registered mail, to upon a private domestic corporation shall be made. It reads:
the plaintiff or his counsel, and shall return the summons
to the clerk who issued it, accompanied with the proof of Sec. 13. Service upon private domestic corporation or
service. partnership. If the defendant is a corporation organized
under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly
The sheriff's returns in Civil Cases Nos. 142400 and 82-13465 are registered, services may be made on the president,
patently wanting it particulars that would justify the substituted manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors.
service. Accordingly, it is fatally flawed and defective; on that basis alone,
therefore, the trial court acquired no jurisdiction over the person of the The rationale for the above rule is to render it reasonably certain that the
petitioner. corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to
insure that the summons be served on a representative so integrated with
It must nevertheless be emphasized that the absence in the sheriff's return the corporation that such a person will know what to do with the legal papers
of a statement about the impossibility of personal service does not served on him. In other words, the rule is meant to bring home to the
conclusively prove that the service is invalid. Proof of prior attempts at corporation notice of the filing of the action.
personal service may be submitted by the plaintiff during the hearing of any
incident assailing the validity of the substituted service. The summonses for High Peak in Civil Cases Nos. 142400 and 82-13465
were received by Susan O. dela Torre. While petitioner categorically admits
Unfortunately in these instant cases, the private respondent failed to that this Susan O. dela Torre is an employee of the corporation, he does not
present evidence during the hearings of the petitioner's separate disclose her specific duties and responsibilities. Until rebutted by competent
motions to dismiss and set aside judgment to prove that substituted evidence, these returns would have to stand in the meantime for they enjoy
service of summons was indeed effected in strict compliance with the presumption of regularity. Susan O. dela Torre may thus be deemed
Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. During such hearings, the private an agent of High Peak for purposes of the aforesaid Section 13 of Rule 14. It
respondent could also have presented evidence to show that the petitioner is then logical to presume that she delivered the copies of the summonses
did in fact receive from Susan O. dela Torre the summonses, together with and complaints to the corporation, considering especially the fact that she
copies of the complaints, in both cases. If indeed the petitioner received the was working in the office of the said corporation as indicated in the
same, the requirement of due process would have been complied with. complaints.

G.R. No. 149380 July 3, 2002 Instead of filing a preliminary conference brief, petitioner moved for
reconsideration of Resolution No. 01-081 and prayed for the admission of
FEDERICO S. SANDOVAL II, Petitioner, his answer with counter-protest. He argued that the substituted service of
vs. summons upon him was improperly effected upon a maintenance man Gene
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET) and Maga who was "neither a regular employee nor responsible officer at
AURORA ROSARIO A. ORETA, Respondents. [petitioners] office." In Resolution No. 01-118, the HRET denied
reconsideration of the assailed resolution and admission of petitioners
Facts: answer with counter-protest.
Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Petitioner Sandoval filed the instant petition with prayer for temporary
Preliminary Injunction under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure restraining order and preliminary injunction questioning Resolutions Nos. 01-
assailing HRET Resolutions Nos. 01-081 and 01-118. 081 and 01-118 and assailing the HRETs jurisdiction over his person. In due
time, we denied the plea for injunctive writs. Petitioner was constrained to
Petitioner Sandoval and respondent Oreta were candidates for the lone
file his preliminary conference brief ad cautelam and to attend the
congressional district of Malabon-Navotas during the May 2001 national
preliminary conference, which had been postponed several times upon his
elections.
request.
Respondent Oreta filed with HRET an election protest against petitioner. The
Respondent Oreta filed her Comment to the instant petition. The Office of
protest assailed the alleged electoral frauds and anomalies in one thousand
the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion In Lieu of Comment.
three hundred eight (1,308) precincts of the Malabon-Navotas District. On 4
The Solicitor General found that the substituted service of summons upon
June 2001 HRET issued the corresponding summons for service upon
petitioner was faulty and thus recommended favorable action on the petition.
petitioner. On 7 June 2001 HRET Process Server Pacifico Lim served the
HRET also submitted a Manifestation and Motion In lieu of Comment
summons by substituted service upon a certain Gene Maga who signed the
manifesting that as a nominal party in the instant case it was not filing a
process servers copy of the summons and indicated thereon his position as
"separate comment" from the Solicitor Generals pleading.
"maintenance" along with the date and time of his receipt thereof as 7 June
2001 at 1:25 p.m. Issue:
On 12 July 2001 HRET issued Resolution No. 01-081 which took note of Was substituted service of summons validly effected on herein petitioner
petitioner Sandovals failure to file an answer to the election protest within Federico S. Sandoval II in the election protest filed by herein respondent
ten (10) days from date of service of the summons on 7 June 2001 and Aurora Rosario A. Oreta before the House of Representatives Electoral
entered in his behalf a general denial of the allegations set forth in the Tribunal (HRET)?
protest. The HRET also ordered the parties to proceed to preliminary
conference. On 18 July 2001 the HRET ordered both petitioner and Ruling:
respondent to file their respective preliminary conference briefs. Petitioner
received the order on 20 July 2001 as shown by the rubber stamp bearing It is well-established that summons upon a respondent or a defendant (i.e.,
his name and his district office in Navotas and indicating the time and date of petitioner herein) must be served by handing a copy thereof to him in person
receipt as well as the person with corresponding position, i.e., administrative or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. Personal service of
staff, who received the order. Initially, on 1 August 2001, it was only summons most effectively ensures that the notice desired under the
respondent Oreta who filed the required preliminary conference brief. constitutional requirement of due process is accomplished. If however efforts

to find him personally would make prompt service impossible, service may effect personal service upon him, all it would have taken the process server
be completed by substituted service, i.e., by leaving copies of the summons was a few hours more of a little extra work. Regrettably, the affidavit of
at his dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and service, indeed the entire record of this case, does not specify the efforts
discretion then residing therein or by leaving the copies at his office or exerted to serve the summons personally upon petitioner. Upon this ground
regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. alone, the assailed service of summons should already fail miserably.
In our jurisdiction, for service of summons to be valid, it is necessary first to Moreover, we do not find in the record, much less in the affidavit of service
establish the following circumstances, i.e., executed by the process server, that the summons and a copy of the
election protest were served on a competent person in charge of petitioner's
(a) impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time, office. It must be emphasized that Gene Maga, the recipient of the
summons, was merely a "maintenance" man who offered his services not
(b) efforts exerted to locate the petitioners and, only to petitioner but to anyone who was so minded to hire his assistance.
His occupation as a freelance service contractor, not as employee of
(c) service upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing therein or
petitioner Sandoval, is very clear not only from the assertion of petitioner in
some competent person in charge of his office or regular place of business.
his motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. 01-081 that Maga was
It is also essential that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be "neither a regular employee nor responsible officer at [petitioners] office" but
stated in the proof of service or officer's return itself and only under also from Maga's own adverse admission under oath.
exceptional terms may they be proved by evidence aliunde. Failure to
Clearly, the fact that Maga was not an employee of petitioner as
comply with this rule renders absolutely void the substituted service
Representative of the Malabon-Navotas Congressional District but an
along with the proceedings taken thereafter for lack of jurisdiction over
independent contractor for odd maintenance jobs deserves credence since it
the person of the defendant or the respondent.
is petitioner and Maga themselves who would be in the best position to verify
We find no merit in respondent Oreta's austere argument that personal the latter's professional status. It follows from this that Maga, not being an
service need not be exhausted before substituted service may be used since employee thereof, would be an incompetent person to receive the summons
time in election protest cases is of the essence. Precisely, time in election in petitioner's behalf.
protest cases is very critical so all efforts must be realized to serve the
The mere fact that Maga allegedly identified himself to the process server as
summons and a copy of the election protest by the means most likely to
"member of the staff of [petitioner] Rep. Federico S. Sandoval II," does not
reach the protestee. Hence, as regards the hierarchy in the service of
ipso facto render him competent to receive the summons. By this alleged
summons, there ought to be no rational basis for distinguishing between
statement, Maga did not communicate any assurance that he could take
regular court cases and election protest cases pending before the HRET.
delivery of the summons effectively to justify the process server to assume
It is truly unfortunate that the purported substituted service of summons such authority. Even in the affidavit of service, which should have proved
upon petitioner Sandoval was irregularly executed. Except for the time and first hand the pertinent facts justifying substituted service, Maga's
place of service and the signature of the "maintenance" man who received indisputable representation was only that of a "maintenance" man, an
the summons, there is absolutely nothing in the process server's affidavit of affirmation which should have immediately alerted the process server to the
service indicating the impossibility of personal service of summons upon fact that he had no authority to receive the summons for petitioner Sandoval.
petitioner within a reasonable time. We can take judicial notice of the fact
that petitioner is a very visible and active member of Congress such that to

In the absence of even the barest compliance with the procedure for Respondents forthwith filed the following:
substituted service of summons outlined in the Rules of Court, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of public functions does not a. Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam to Admit Motion
apply. This violates the rule granting absolute preference to personal service to Dismiss and Answer with Compulsory
of summons and, only secondarily, when the defendant cannot be promptly Counter-claim;
served in person and after compliance with stringent formal and substantive
requirements, permitting resort to substituted service. In light of the defective b. Urgent Motion to Dismiss;
and irregular substituted service of summons, the HRET did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner and consequently the period within
c. Answer with Compulsory Counter-Claim.
which to file his answer with counter-protest did not start to run.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED and The judge denied respondents' Motion to Dismiss, but admitted
MODIFIED, the Answer with Counter-Protest of petitioner Federico S. their Answer.
Sandoval II is admitted to form part of the record of the election protest filed RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner.
by respondent Aurora Rosario A. Oreta. Respondents filed with the CA a Petition for certiorari, prohibition
and injunction, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or
G.R. No. 152776 October 8, 2003 temporary restraining order (TRO).
In the main, they raised the issue of whether the trial court had
HENRY S. OAMINAL, petitioner, validly acquired jurisdiction over them.
vs. The CA ruled that the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction
PABLITO M. CASTILLO and GUIA S. CASTILLO, respondents. over respondents, because the summons had been improperly
served on them.
Facts: o It based its finding on the Sheriff's Return, which did not
contain any averment that effort had been exerted to
personally serve the summons on them before substituted
Petitioner Henry Oaminal filed a complaint for collection against
service was resorted to.
respondents Pablito and Guia Castillo with the RTC of Ozamis City.
The complaint prayed that respondents be ordered to pay
Hence, this Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
P1,500,000.00 by way of liquidated damages and P150,000.00 as
attorney's fees. Petitioner contends that the trial court validly acquired jurisdiction
over the persons of respondents, because the latter never denied
The summons together with the complaint was served upon Ester
that they had actually received the summons through their
Fraginal, secretary of respondent Mrs. Castillo.
secretary. Neither did they dispute her competence to receive it.
On 06 June 2000, respondents filed their 'Urgent Motion to Declare
Moreover, he argues that respondents automatically submitted
Service of Summons Improper and Legally Defective' alleging
themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court when they filed an
that the Sheriff's Return has failed to comply with Section (1), Rule
Omnibus Motion to Dismiss or Admit Answer, a Motion to Dismiss
14 of the Rules of Court or substituted service of summons.
on the grounds of improper venue and litis pendentia, and an
On 19 October 2000, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to Declare
Answer with Counterclaim.
Respondents in Default and to Render Judgment because no
answer was filed by the latter.

On the other hand, respondents insist that the substituted Cubao, Quezon City thru MS. ESTER FREGINAL, secretary, who
service of summons on them was improper. Thus, they allege is authorized to receive such kind of process. She signed in receipt
that the trial court did not have the authority to render its Decision. of the original as evidenced by her signature appearing on the
original summons.
Issue: Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over respondents.
"That this return is submitted to inform the Honorable x x x Court
Held: Yes. Trial court acquired jurisdiction over the respondents. that the same was duly served."
In civil cases, the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of Nonetheless, nothing in the records shows that respondents
the defendant either by the service of summons or by the latter's denied actual receipt of the summons through their secretary, Ester
voluntary appearance and submission to the authority of the former. Fraginal.
Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the o Their "Urgent Motion to Declare Service of Summons
Philippines, the service of summons may be made through Improper and Legally Defective" did not deny receipt
personal or substituted service in the manner provided for by thereof; it merely assailed the manner of its service.
Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. o In fact, they admitted in their Motion that the "summons,
Personal service of summons is preferred over substituted service. together with the complaint, was served by the Sheriff on
Ester Fraginal, secretary of the defendants at No. 7, 21st
Resort to the latter is permitted when the summons cannot be
Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City on 30 May 2000."
promptly served on the defendant in person and after stringent
formal and substantive requirements have been complied with. Moreover, respondents did not raise in their Motion to Dismiss the
For substituted service of summons to be valid, it is necessary to issue of jurisdiction over their persons; they raised only improper
establish the following circumstances: (a) personal service of venue and litis pendentia. Hence, whatever defect there was in the
manner of service should be deemed waived.
summons within a reasonable time was impossible; (b) efforts were
exerted to locate the party; and (c) the summons was served upon
a person of sufficient age and discretion residing at the party's Voluntary Appearance and Submission
residence or upon a competent person in charge of the party's
office or regular place of business. Assuming arguendo that the service of summons was defective,
It is likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these such flaw was cured and respondents are deemed to have
circumstances are stated in the proof of service or officer's return. submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court when they
In the present case, the Sheriff's Return failed to state that efforts filed an Omnibus Motion to Admit the Motion to Dismiss and
had been made to personally serve the summons on respondents. Answer with Counterclaim, an Answer with Counterclaim, a Motion
Neither did the Return indicate that it was impossible to do so within to Inhibit, and a Motion for Reconsideration and Plea to Reset Pre-
a reasonable time. It simply stated: trial.
The filing of Motions seeking affirmative relief -- to admit answer,
"THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on the 30th day of May 2000, copies of for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default
the summons together with the complaint and annexes attached judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration
thereto were served upon the defendants Pablito M. Castillo and -- are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the
Guia B. Castillo at their place of business at No. 7, 21st Avenue, court.

Having invoked the trial court's jurisdiction to secure April 22, 1999 RTC rendered its decision in favor of Sps. Mason
affirmative relief, respondents cannot -- after failing to obtain and rescinding, terminating and cancelling the contract of lease.
the relief prayed for -- repudiate the very same authority they Decision became final on May 12, 1999.
have invoked. The following day, private respondent filed a motion to lift order of
default, which was opposed by petitioners.
MASON vs. CA RTC ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
However, without waiting for the same, the trial court on May 26,
This petition for review assails the decision, dated May 12, 2000, of the 1999, denied the motion to lift order of default because the decision
Court of Appeals and its resolution dated August 25, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP rendered by RTC on April 27, 1999 has become final and executor
No. 54649 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. The decision set on May 12, 1999. The motion for execution was granted in favor of
aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 112, in Sps. Mason.
Civil Case No. 98-1567 and directed said court to conduct further Private respondent filed MR, which was denied.
proceedings on the complaint for rescission of lease contract. Private respondent filed a manifestation and motion to lift the writ of
execution. It was denied for being dilatory. The branch sheriff was
FACTS: directed to proceed with the enforcement of the decision.
Petitioners, Sps. Efren and Digna Mason owned two parcels of land CA ruled in favor of Columbus. It ordered the court a quo to require
located along Epifanio delos Santos Avenue in Pasay City. petitioner to file its answer and conduct further appropriate
March 30, 1993 petitioners and private respondent Columbus proceedings with reasonable dispatch.
Philippines Bus Corporation (Columbus) entered into a lease o CA held that the trial court erred when it denied private
contract, under which Columbus undertook to construct a building respondents motion to lift order of default.
worth ten million pesos (P10,000,000) at the end of the third year of o Since private respondent was not properly served with
the lease. summons, thus it cannot be faulted if it failed to file an
Columbus failed to comply with this stipulation. Answer.
November 13, 1998 petitioners filed a complaint for rescission of o Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
contract with damages against private respondent before Pasay requires that service of summons upon domestic
RTC. private juridical entity shall be made through its
Summons was served upon private respondent through a certain president, managing partner, general manager,
Ayreen Rejalde. While the receiving copy of the summons corporate secretary, treasurer or in-house counsel.
described Rejalde as a secretary of Columbus, the sheriffs return Since service upon private respondent was made through
described Rejalde as a secretary to the corporate president, duly a certain Ayreen Rejalde, a mere filing clerk in private
authorized to receive legal processes. respondents office, as evidenced by the latters
Private respondent failed to file its answer or other responsive employment record, such service cannot be considered
pleading, hence petitioners filed a motion to declare private valid.
respondent in default. o Consequently, the subsequent proceedings, including the
The motion was granted and petitioners were allowed to present order of default, judgment by default and its execution,
evidence ex-parte. were also invalid because the trial court did not acquire
The case was submitted for decision. jurisdiction over private respondent.

o Judgments by default are not favored, especially so when respondent did not question the validity of the service of
there is a prima facie showing that the defaulting party has summons but explained in paragraph three thereof that its
a meritorious defense, which in this case was grounded on failure to answer the complaint was due to its impression
the contract of lease sued upon, said the Court of that the case would not be pursued by petitioners because
Appeals. the corporation already made payments to them.
ISSUE/S:
Private respondent counters that:
a. Whether there was valid service of summons on private - Nowhere in the Millenium case did this Court expressly state or
respondent for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction. (main remotely imply that we have not abandoned the doctrine of substantial
issue) compliance. The Millenium case held that as a general rule, service
b. Whether private respondents motion to lift order of default was in upon one who is not enumerated in Section 13, Rule 14 of the then
order. Rules of Court is invalid, according to private respondent.
- An exception is when the summons is actually received by the
HELD: Petition denied. CA decision is affirmed. corporation, which means that there was substantial compliance with
RATIO: the rule.
1. Petitioners contend that while Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 The case law applicable in the instant case, contends private respondent, is
Rules of Civil Procedure clearly specifies the persons authorized to Villarosa which squarely provides for the proper interpretation of the new
receive summons on behalf of a private juridical entity, said rule on the service of summons upon domestic corporation, thus:
provision did not abandon or render inapplicable the substantial The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept
compliance rule. summons for a domestic corporation or partnership is now limited and more
a. Millenium Industrial Commercial Corporation v. Tan clearly specified in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
effectively ruled that said provision is the statement of the
general rule on service of summons upon corporation and The rule now states "general manager" instead of only "manager";
the substantial compliance rule is the exception. "corporate secretary" instead of "secretary"; and "treasurer" instead of
b. Also, SC has upheld the substantial compliance rule when "cashier." The phrase "agent, or any of its directors" is conspicuously deleted
it allowed the validity of the service of summons on the in the new rule.
corporations employee other than those mentioned in the
Rule where said summons and complaint were in fact According to private respondent, service through Ayreen Rejalde, a mere
seasonably received by the corporation from said filing clerk of private respondent and not one of those enumerated above, is
employee. invalid.
c. Petitioners insist that technicality must not defeat speedy
justice. *In short the supreme court sides with the respondents, Columbus. Ayreen
d. Petitioners stress that even though the summons was Rejalde is not one of those enumerated to validly accept summons.
received by a mere filing clerk in private respondents
corporation, there was substantial compliance with Section JOSE vs. BOYON (2003) (Ang haba ng hayop na kaso na ito, sorry if its too
11, Rule 14 because the summons actually reached long.)
private respondent. This can be gleaned from private
respondents motion to lift order of default where private

Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, attorneys fees of P20,000 including
assailing the February 26, 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals costs of this suit
Helen Boyon, who was then residing in the United States of
FACTS: America, was surprised to learn from her sister Elizabeth Boyon, of
the resolution issued by the respondent court.
Petitioners Patrick and Rafaela Jose lodged a complaint for specific o BOYONs filed an Ad Cautelam motion questioning, among
performance against respondents Helen and Romeo Boyon to others, the validity of the service of summons effected by
compel them to facilitate the transfer of ownership of a parcel of the court a quo.
land subject of a controverted sale. o The public respondent (le Judge) issued an Order denying
o This case was lodged to the Regional Trial Court of the said motion on the basis of the defaulted BOYONs
Muntinlupa supposed loss of standing in court.
MR, denied
Issued summons to the respondents
o Substituted service was resorted to by the process server JOSEs moved for the execution of the controverted judgment which
allegedly because efforts to serve the summons the respondent judge ultimately granted
personally to the BOYONs failed. BOYONs filed before the CA, petition for certiorari under Rule 65
o JOSEs filed before the trial court an Ex-parte Motion for o The CA held that the trial court had no authority to issue
Leave of Court to Effect Summons by Publication. the questioned Resolution and Orders.
o Public respondent issued an Order granting the Ex-parte the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over
Motion for Leave of Court to Effect Summons by respondents because of the invalid service of
Publication. summons upon them
o The respondent judge, sans a written motion, issued an First, the sheriff failed to comply with the
Order declaring herein BOYONs in default for failure to file requirements of substituted service of summons,
their respective answers. because he did not specify in the Return of
As a consequence of the declaration of default, Summons the prior efforts he had made to locate
petitioners were allowed to submit their evidence them and the impossibility of promptly serving the
ex-parte. summons upon them by personal service.
Spouses Helen and Romeo Boyon are Second, the subsequent summons by publication
directed to execute the necessary was equally infirm, because the Complaint was a
document with the effect of withdrawing suit for specific performance and therefore an
the Affidavit of Loss they filed and action in personam.
annotated with the Register of Deeds of Consequently, the Resolution and the Orders
Makati City so that title to the parcel of were null and void, since the RTC had never
land subject of the Deed of Absolute acquired jurisdiction over respondents.
Sale in favor of the Plaintiffs be
transferred in their names. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in holding that the proceedings in the lower
Also directed to pay Plaintiffs actual court are null and void due to invalid and defective service of summons and
expenses in the amount of P20,000 and the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondents?

RULING: Respondents conclude that even granting that the service of summons by
publication was permissible under the circumstances, it would still be
No. defective and invalid because of the failure of petitioners to observe the
requirements of law, like an Affidavit attesting that the latter deposited in the
Petitioners aver that the CA erred in ruling that the service of summons on post office a copy of the summons and of the order of publication, paid the
respondents was invalid. They submit that although the case filed before the postage, and sent the documents by registered mail to the formers last
trial court was denominated as an action for specific performance, it was known address.1awphi1.n
actually an action quasi in rem, because it involved a piece of real property
located in the Philippines. In general, trial courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
by the service of summons. Where the action is in personam and the
o in actions quasi in rem involving ownership of a parcel of defendant is in the Philippines, such service may be done by personal or
land, it is sufficient that the trial court acquire jurisdiction substituted service, following the procedures laid out in Sections 6 and 7 of
2
over the res. Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court
o the summons by publication, which they effected
subsequent to the substituted service of summons, was Personal service of summons is preferred to substituted service. Only if the
allegedly sufficient. former cannot be made promptly can the process server resort to the latter.
Respondents maintain that the proceedings in the trial court were null and the proof of service of summons must
void because of the invalid and defective service of summons.
(a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons within
The Return of Summons issued by the process server of the RTC failed to a reasonable time;
state that he had exerted earnest efforts to effect the service of summons.
He allegedly tried to serve it personally on them on July 22, 1998 at No. 32 (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and
Ariza Drive, Camella Homes, Alabang
(c) state that the summons was served upon a person of
He, however, resorted to substituted service on that same day, supposedly sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the
because he could not find respondents in the above address. address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place
of business, of the defendant
They further allege that the person to whom he gave the summons was not
even a resident of that address.
Respondents argue that the case filed before the trial court was an action for
specific performance and, therefore, an action in persona.
The summons by publication was insufficient to enable the trial court to

acquire jurisdiction over the persons of respondents.

It is likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these At best, the Return merely states the alleged whereabouts of respondents
circumstances be stated in the proof of service or in the without indicating that such information was verified from a person who had
officers return. knowledge thereof. without specifying the details of the attendant
circumstances or of the efforts exerted to serve the summons, a general
The failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with statement that such efforts were made will not suffice for purposes of
all the foregoing requirements of substituted service complying with the rules of substituted service of summons.
renders the service of summons ineffective.
The service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officers
Defective Personal Service of Summons Return; otherwise, any substituted service made in lieu of personal service
cannot be upheld.
In the instant case, it appears that the process server hastily and
capriciously resorted to substituted service of summons without Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the requirements of
actually exerting any genuine effort to locate respondents. substituted service renders said service ineffective
A review of the records reveals that the only effort he exerted was to go to Summons by Publication Improper
No. 32 Ariza Drive, Camella Homes, Alabang on July 22, 1998, to try to
serve the summons personally on respondents. It must be noted that extraterritorial service of summons or summons by
publication applies only when the action is in rem or quasi in rem.
While the Return of Summons states that efforts to do so were ineffectual
and unavailing because Helen Boyon was in the United States and Romeo The first is an action against the thing itself instead of against the
Boyon was in Bicol, it did not mention exactly what efforts -- if any -- were defendants person; in the latter, an individual is named as defendant, and
undertaken to find respondents. Furthermore, it did not specify where or the purpose is to subject that individuals interest in a piece of property to the
from whom the process server obtained the information on their obligation or loan burdening it.
whereabouts. The pertinent portion of the Return of Summons is reproduced
as follows: In the instant case, what was filed before the trial court was an action for
specific performance directed against respondents. While the suit
"That efforts to serve the said Summons personally upon incidentally involved a piece of land, the ownership or possession thereof
defendants Sps. Helen and Romeo Boyon were made but the was not put in issue, since they did not assert any interest or right over it.
same were ineffectual and unavailing for the reason that Moreover, this Court has consistently declared that an action for specific
defendant Helen Boyon is somewhere in the United States of performance is an action in personam.
America and defendant Romeo Boyon is in Bicol thus
substituted service was made in accordance with Section 7, Having failed to serve the summons on respondents properly, the RTC did
Rule 14, of the Revised Rules of Court." not validly acquire jurisdiction over their persons. Consequently, due process
demands that all the proceedings conducted subsequent thereto should be
The Return of Summons shows that no effort was actually exerted and no deemed null and void.
positive step taken by either the process server or petitioners to locate and
serve the summons personally on respondents.

FILOMENA DOMAGAS, petitioner, vs.VIVIAN LAYNO JENSEN, service on the respondent, the defendant in Civil Case No. 879, was proper
respondent. ( petition for review on certiorari, under Rule 45) since her brother Oscar Layno, a resident and registered voter of Barangay.
Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, received the complaint and summons for
FACTS: and in her behalf.
MTC * TC rendered a decision in favor of the respondent.
* Filomena Domagas filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondent
Vivian Jensen before the MTC. CA -affirmed the decision with modification
* The summons and the complaint were NOT served on the respondent - The petitioner appealed the decision to the CA.
because the latter was apparently out of the country. This was relayed to the -The CA ruled that the complaint in Civil Case No. 879 was one for
Sheriff by her (the respondents) brother, Oscar Layno, who was then in the ejectment, which is an action quasi in rem.
respondents house at No. 572 Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. - since the defendant therein was temporarily out of the country, the
The Sheriff left the summons and complaint with Oscar Layno, who received summons and the complaint should have been served via extraterritorial
the same. service under Section 15 in relation to Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of
* TC rendered judgment in favor of DOMAGAS Court, which likewise requires prior leave of court. Considering that there
* The respondent failed to appeal the decision and a writ of execution was was no prior leave of court and none of the modes of service prescribed by
issued. the Rules of Court was followed by the petitioner, the CA concluded that
there was really no valid service of summons and complaint upon the
RTC respondent, the defendant in Civil case.
* JENSEN filed annulment of decision of MTC against the petitioner on the
ground that due to the Sheriffs failure to serve the complaint and summons SC
on her because she was in Oslo, Norway, the MTC never acquired The petitioner assails the decision of the CA, alleging that the appellate court
jurisdiction over her person. erred in holding that the respondents complaint for ejectment is an action
Respondents allegations: quasi in rem. The petitioner insists that the complaint for forcible entry is an
the service of the complaint and summons through substituted service action in personam; therefore, substituted service of the summons and
on her brother, Oscar Layno, was improper because of the following: (a) complaint on the respondent, in accordance with Section 7, Rule 14 of the
when the complaint in Civil Case No. 879 was filed, she was not a resident Rules of Court, is valid. The petitioner, likewise, asserts that Oscar Layno is
of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, but of Oslo, Norway, and a resident and a registered voter of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao,
although she owned the house where Oscar Layno received the summons Pangasinan; hence, the service of the complaint and summons on the
and the complaint, she had then leased it to Eduardo Gonzales; (b) she was respondent through him is valid.
in Oslo, Norway, at the time the summons and the complaint were served;
(c) her brother, Oscar Layno, was merely visiting her house in Barangay RULING:
Buenlag and was not a resident nor an occupant thereof when he received In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
the complaint and summons; and (d) Oscar Layno was never authorized to necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over
receive the summons and the complaint for and in her behalf. the person of a resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court
* In her answer the petitioner alleged that the respondent was a resident of can be acquired by personal service of summons as provided under Section
Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan and was the owner of the subject 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If he cannot be personally served with
premises where Oscar Layno was when the Sheriff served the summons summons within a reasonable time, substituted service may be made in
and complaint; that the service of the complaint and summons by substituted accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is temporarily out of the

country, any of the following modes of service may be resorted to: (a) occupant of the house was a lessor, Eduardo Gonzales, and that Oscar
substituted service set forth in Section 8; (2) personal service outside the Layno was in the premises only to collect the rentals from him. The service
country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of of the summons on a person at a place where he was a visitor is not
court; or (4) any other manner the court may deem sufficientThus, any considered to have been left at the residence or place or abode, where he
judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the has another place at which he ordinarily stays and to which he intends to
defendant is null and void.33 return.
In the present case, the records show that the respondent, before and after Therefore, the respondent was not validly served with summons and the
his marriage to Jarl Jensen on August 23, 1987, remained a resident of complaint in Civil Case No. 879 on April 5, 1999, by substituted service.
Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. This can be gleaned from the Hence, the MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 26, 1992 in which she declared that respondent; the decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. 879 is null and void.
she was a resident of said barangay. Moreover, in the Real Estate Mortgage
Contract dated February 9, 1999, ten days before the complaint in Civil Case G.R. No. 161417 February 8, 2007
No. 879 was filed, the petitioner categorically stated that she was a Filipino
and a resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. Considering MA. TERESA CHAVES BIACO, Petitioner,
that the respondent was in Oslo, Norway, having left the Philippines on vs.
February 17, 1999, the summons and complaint in Civil Case No. 879 may PHILIPPINE COUNTRYSIDE RURAL BANK, Respondent.
only be validly served on her through substituted service under Section 7,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant

cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding FACTS:
section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendants residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then Biaco is the husband of petitioner Ma. Teresa Chaves Biaco. While
residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular employed in the Philippine Countryside Rural Bank (PCRB) as branch
place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. manager, Ernesto obtained several loans from the respondent bank as
evidenced by promissory notes.
Strict compliance with the mode of service is required in order that the court
may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.The statutory Ernesto executed a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land in favor of the
requirement of substituted service must be followed faithfully and strictly and bank as a security for the loans. The real estate mortgages bore the
any substituted service other than that authorized by the statute is rendered signatures of the spouses Biaco. Ernesto failed to settle the loans.
ineffective.
RTC
The Return of Service filed by Sheriff Eduardo J. Abulencia on the service of Respondent bank filed a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage
summons do not show that as of April 5, 1999, the house where the Sheriff against the spouses Ernesto and Teresa Biaco before the RTC.
found Oscar Layno was the latters residence or that of the respondent Summons was served to the spouses Biaco through Ernesto at his
herein. Neither is there any showing that the Sheriff tried to ascertain where office (Export and Industry Bank) located at Jofelmor Bldg., Mortola
the residence of the respondent was on the said date. It turned out that the Street, Cagayan de Oro City

Ernesto received the summons but failed to file an answer. Hence, of against the person. An action quasi in rem is one wherein an individual is
the spouses Biaco were declared in default named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his
Rendered a decision ordering defendants spouses BIACO (BOTH) interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property.
to pay plaintiff bank.
Hence, the property was forclosed In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case.
Petitioner sought the annulment of the RTCs decision contending that the
trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction because summons were served In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of
on her through her husband without any explanation as to why the defendant is NOT a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court
personal service could not be made. provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction
over the res is acquired either (1) by the seizure of the property under legal
CA process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (2) as a
denied petition for annulment of judgment, result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court
MFR DENIED is recognized and made effective.
The Court of Appeals considered the two circumstances that kept petitioner Nonetheless, summons must be served upon the defendant not for the
in the dark about the judicial foreclosure proceedings: (1) the failure of the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due
sheriff to personally serve summons on petitioner; and (2) petitioners process requirements.
husbands concealment of his knowledge of the foreclosure proceedings. On
the validity of the service of summons, the appellate court ruled that judicial A resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court, such as
foreclosure proceedings are actions quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction petitioner in this case, must be personally served with summons as provided
over the person of the defendant is not essential as long as the court under Sec. 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If she cannot be personally
acquires jurisdiction over the res. served with summons within a reasonable time, substituted service may be
effected (1) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence
ISSUE: WON TERESA was denied due process when she was ordered to with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (2)
pay the bank along with his husband despite the lack of personal service of by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of business with
summons to her? some competent person in charge thereof in accordance with Sec. 7, Rule
14 of the Rules of Court.
HELD: YES
In this case, the judicial foreclosure proceeding instituted by respondent
The question of whether the trial court has jurisdiction depends on the nature PCRB undoubtedly vested the trial court with jurisdiction over the res. A
of the action, i.e., whether the action is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem. judicial foreclosure proceeding is an action quasi in rem. As such,
The rules on service of summons under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court jurisdiction over the person of petitioner is not required, it being
likewise apply according to the nature of the action. sufficient that the trial court is vested with jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his
personal liability. An action in rem is an action against the thing itself instead

There is a dimension to this case though that needs to be delved into. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Petitioner,
Petitioner avers that she was not personally served summons. Instead, vs.
summons was served to her through her husband at his office without any SPS. IRENEO M. SANTIAGO and LIWANAG P. SANTIAGO,
explanation as to why the particular surrogate service was resorted to. The CENTROGEN, INC., REPRSENTED BY EDWIN SANTIAGO, Respondent.
Sheriffs Return of Service dated March 21, 2000 states:
Facts:
xxxx
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner
Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) seeking to reverse and set aside the
That on March 16, 2000, the undersigned served the copies of Summons, Decision1 of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution affirming the Order of
complaint and its annexes to the defendants Sps. Ernesto R. & Ma. Teresa the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz, Laguna, enjoining the
Ch. Biaco thru Ernesto R. Biaco[,] defendant of the above-entitled case at extrajudicial foreclosure sale of a parcel of land covered by Transfer
his office EXPORT & INDUSTRY BANK, Jofelmore Bldg.[,] Mortola St., Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-131382 registered under the name of
Cagayan de Oro City and he acknowledged receipt thereof as evidenced Spouses Ireneo and Liwanag Santiago.
with his signature appearing on the original copy of the Summons.
Petitioner BPI is a banking institution duly organized and existing as such
Petitioner was denied due process and was not able to participate in under the Philippine laws.
the judicial foreclosure proceedings as a consequence. The violation
of petitioners constitutional right to due process arising from want of Private respondent Centrogen, Inc. (Centrogen) is a domestic corporation
valid service of summons on her warrants the annulment of the engaged in pharmaceutical business, duly organized and existing as such
judgment of the trial court. under the Philippine laws and represented in this act by its President, Edwin
Santiago, son of private respondents Spouses Ireneo M. Santiago and
The trial court granted respondent PCRBs ex-parte motion for deficiency Liwanag P. Santiago.
judgment and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution against the
On several occasions, private respondent Centrogen obtained loans from
spouses Biaco to satisfy the remaining balance of the award. In short, the
Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) in different amounts, the total of
trial court went beyond its jurisdiction over the res and rendered a personal
which reached the sum P4,650,000.00, as evidenced by promissory notes
judgment against the spouses Biaco.
executed by Edwin Santiago.
While the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the res, its jurisdiction is limited As a security for a fraction of the loan obligation, Ireneo M. Santiago
to a rendition of judgment on the res. It cannot extend its jurisdiction beyond executed a Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land covered by TCT No.
the res and issue a judgment enforcing petitioners personal liability. In T-131382 registered under his name and located at Sta Cruz, Laguna. The
doing so without first having acquired jurisdiction over the person of mortgage secured the principal loan in the amount of P490,000.00. Later on,
petitioner, as it did, the trial court violated her constitutional right to due the same property secured another loan obligation in the amount of
process, warranting the annulment of the judgment rendered in the case. P1,504,280.00.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Subsequently, however, Centrogen incurred default and therefore the loan
obligation became due and demandable.
G.R. No. 169116 March 28, 2007

Meanwhile, FEBTC merged with BPI, with the latter as the surviving copy of the summons to the Branch Manager of BPI Sta. Cruz, Laguna
corporation. As a result, BPI assumed all the rights, privileges and Branch, as evidenced by the Sheriffs Return.
obligations of FEBTC.
Instead of filing an Answer, BPI filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on
RTC: the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and other
procedural infirmities attendant to the filing of the complaint. In its Motion to
BPI filed an Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage over the Dismiss,
subject property before the RTC of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. In order to validly
effect the foreclosure, a Notice of Sale was issued by the Provincial Sheriff. BPI claimed that the Branch Manager of its Sta. Cruz, Laguna
On the same day, the Spouses Santiago were served with the copy of the Branch, was not one of those authorized by Section 11, Rule 14 of
Notice of Sale. the Revised Rules of Court9 to receive summons on behalf of the
corporation.
The summons served upon its Branch Manager, therefore, did not
bind the corporation.
Upon receipt of the Notice of Sale, the Spouses Santiago and Centrogen
In addition, it was alleged that the complaint filed by the Spouses
filed a Complaint seeking the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
Santiago and Centrogen lacked a Certificate of Non-Forum
and Preliminary and Final Injunction and in the alternative, for the annulment
Shopping and was therefore dismissible.
of the Real Estate Mortgage with BPI.
Finally, BPI underscored that the person who verified the complaint
The complaint alleged that the initial loan obligation in the amount of was not duly authorized by Centrogens Board of Directors to
P490,000.00, including interest thereon was fully paid as evidenced by a institute the present action as required by Section 23 of the
Union Bank Check in the amount of P648,521.51 with BPI as payee. Such Corporation Code.
payment notwithstanding, the amount was still included in the amount of
computation of the arrears as shown by the document of Extra-Judicial
In an Order, the RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and emphasized that the
Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage filed by the latter.
nature of the case merited its removal from the purview of Section 11, Rule
In addition, the Spouses Santiago and Centrogen asseverated that the 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. Based on the provisions of Section 5, Rule
original loan agreement was for the amount of Five Million Pesos. Such 58 of the Revised Rules of Court,13 the RTC declared that the instant Order
amount will be supposedly utilized to finance the squalene project of the is still valid and binding despite non-compliance with the provisions of
company. However, after the amount of Two Million Pesos was released and Section 11, Rule 14 of the same Rules.
was accordingly used in funding the erection of the structural details of the
After summary hearing on the Spouses Santiago and Centrogens
project, FEBTC, in gross violation of the agreement, did not release the
application for Temporary Restraining Order, the RTC, issued an Order
balance of Three Million Pesos that will supposedly finance the purchase of
enjoining the Provincial Sheriff from proceeding with the extra-judicial
machineries and equipment necessary for the operation. As a result, the
foreclosure sale of the subject property until the propriety of granting a
squalene project failed and the company groped for funds to pay its loan
preliminary injunction is ascertained.
obligations.
The RTC ordered the service of new summons to BPI in accordance with the
BPI was summoned to file and serve its Answer to the Complaint filed by
provisions of the Revised Rules of Court.
Spouses Santiago and Centrogen. On the same day, the Sheriff served a

Issue:
In compliance with the aforesaid Order, the Branch Clerk of Court caused Whether the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of BPI when the
the issuance of a new summons, a copy of which was served upon the original summons was served upon the branch manager of its Sta. Cruz,
Office of the Corporate Secretary of the BPI, as evidenced by the Sheriffs Laguna Branch.
Return.
Ruling:
The RTC issued an Order granting the application for the issuance of a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction filed by the Spouses Santiago and Centrogen. It We are not persuaded.
enjoined the extra-judicial foreclosure sale of the subject property pending
resolution of the main action for Annulment of Real Estate Mortgage or until Basic is the rule that a strict compliance with the mode of service is
further orders of the trial court. In issuing the Writ of Preliminary Injunction, it necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court over a corporation. The officer
rationalized that to allow the foreclosure without hearing the main case upon whom service is made must be one who is named in the statute;
would work injustice to the complainant and since Spouses Santiago and otherwise, the service is insufficient. The purpose is to render it reasonably
Centrogen claimed that the first loan in the amount of P490,000.00 secured certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action
by the property subject of the extra-judicial sale had long been paid by against it or to insure that the summons be served on a representative so
Centrogen through a Union Bank Check presented as evidence. integrated with the corporation that such person will know what to do with
the legal papers served on him.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by BPI was denied by the RTC in its
Order. Applying the aforestated principle in the case at bar, we rule that the service
of summons on BPIs Branch Manager did not bind the corporation for the
CA: branch manager is not included in the enumeration of the statute of the
persons upon whom service of summons can be validly made in behalf of
Aggrieved, BPI filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals the corporation. Such service is therefore void and ineffectual.
seeking the reversal of the adverse Orders of the RTC.
However, upon the issuance and the proper service of new summons,
The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming the assailed Orders of before the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued, whatever defect
the RTC and dismissing the Petition for Certiorari filed by BPI. The Court of attended the service of the original summons, was promptly and accordingly
Appeals declared that jurisdiction was acquired upon the service of new cured.
summons. Before the assailed Orders were therefore issued, the RTC
properly acquired jurisdiction over the person of BPI. It bears stressing, that the Branch Clerk of Court issued a new summons
which was properly served upon BPIs Corporate Secretary, as evidenced by
the Sheriffs Return.
Undaunted, BPI filed this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule The subsequent service of summons was neither disputed nor was it
45 of the Revised Rules of Court. mentioned by BPI except in a fleeting narration of facts and therefore enjoys
the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. The Process
BPI vehemently insists that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over Servers Certificate of Service of Summons is a prima facie evidence of facts
its person and consequently, the Order issued by the RTC, permanently set out in that certificate.
enjoining the foreclosure sale, was therefore void and does not bind BPI.

Inarguably, before the Order granting the application for Writ of Preliminary THE PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE & GENERAL INSURANCE
Injunction was issued, the RTC already acquired jurisdiction over the person COMPANY, petitioner,
of BPI by virtue of the new summons validly served on the Corporate vs.
Secretary. The fact that the original summons was invalidly served is of no HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
moment since jurisdiction over BPI was subsequently acquired by the Regional Trial Court, Davao City, Branch 10, and MILAGROS P.
service of a new summons. MORALES, respondents.
In the case of G&G Trading Corporation v. Court of Appeals,2 this Court Facts:
made the following pronouncements:
In explaining the test on the validity of service of summons, Justice Florenz The petitioner is a domestic corporation duly organized under
Regalado stressed that substantial justice must take precedence over Philippine laws with principal address at the Philamlife Building,
technicality and thus stated: United Nations Avenue, Ermita, Manila, and with a regional office in
Davao City.
The ultimate test on the validity and sufficiency on service Respondent Milagros P. Morales filed a Complaint for damages
of summons is whether the same and the attachments and reimbursement of insurance premiums against the petitioner
thereto where ultimately received by the corporation under with the RTC of Davao City.
such circumstances that no undue prejudice is sustained o The complaint specifically stated that the petitioner could
by it from the procedural lapse and it was afforded full be served with summons and other court processes
opportunity to present its responsive pleadings. This is but through its Manager at its branch office located at
in accord with the entrenched rule that the ends of Rizal St., Davao City.
substantial justice should not be subordinated to Thereafter, Summons, together with the complaint, was served
technicalities and, for which purpose, each case should be upon the petitioner's Davao regional office, and was received by its
examined within the factual milieu peculiar to it. Insurance Service Officer, Ruthie Babael.
Afterwards, the petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on
In any event, as it is glaringly evident from the records of the case that the ground of lack of jurisdiction over its person due to improper
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant was validly acquired by the service of summons.
court by the valid service of a new summons before the writ of preliminary o It contended that summons was improperly served upon
injunction was issued and guided by jurisprudential pronouncements its employee in its regional office at Davao City, and that
heretofore adverted to, we hold that the proceedings attendant to the the said employee was not among those named in Section
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction were regular. 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure upon
whom service of summons may be properly made.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is
The respondent filed an Amended Complaint, alleging that
DENIED. The Decision, and the Resolution, rendered by the Court of
summons and other court processes could also be served at its
Appeals, are hereby AFFIRMED.
principal office at the Philamlife Building, U.N. Avenue, Ermita,
Manila, through the president or any of its officers authorized
G.R. No. 147937 November 11, 2004 to receive summons.

RTC denied the petitioner's motion to dismiss and directing the to Sec. 1(a), Rule 16 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
issuance of an alias summons to be served at its main office in Procedure.
Manila.
The RTC held that the improper service of summons on the Respondents contention:
petitioner is not a ground for dismissal of the complaint considering
that the case was still in its initial stage. The respondent, for her part, avers that the receipt of the amended
o It ruled that the remedy was to issue an alias summons to complaint together with the alias summons by the petitioner cured
be served at the principal office of the petitioner. the defects in the first service of summons.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said order. She argues that any procedural defect on the service of alias
o In the meantime, the petitioner received an Alias summons is not sufficient to warrant the dismissal of the case.
Summons together with a copy of the amended complaint.
The RTC denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and
Issue: Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
supplemental oral motion to strike out the amended complaint.
petitioner as defendant therein.
o The RTC reiterated that it would be improper to dismiss
the case at its early stage because the remedy would be
Held: Yes.
to issue an alias summons.
The petitioner filed with the CA a special action for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65, with application for a writ of preliminary The trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
injunction and/or temporary restraining order, assailing the orders denied the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioner due to lack of
of the RTC. jurisdiction over its person.
CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the assailed orders of the A case should not be dismissed simply because an original
RTC. summons was wrongfully served.
o The CA held that the service of the alias summons on the It should be difficult to conceive, for example, that when a
amended complaint upon the authorized officers of the defendant personally appears before a Court complaining that he
petitioner at its principal office in Manila vested the RTC had not been validly summoned, that the case filed against him
with jurisdiction over its person. The CA, likewise, denied should be dismissed.
the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. An alias summons can be actually served on said defendant.
Hence, this petition for review. The Rules on Civil Procedure provide that the amended complaint
supersedes the complaint that it amends.
Petitioners contention: Contrary to the petitioners claim, the summons issued on the
amended complaint does not become invalid.
In fact, summons on the original complaint which has already been
The petitioner avers that Sec. 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised
served continues to have its legal effect.
Rules of Civil Procedure is strict as to the persons upon whom valid
o Thus, where the defendant has already been served
service of summons on a corporation can be made.
summons on the original complaint, the amended
o The petitioner argues that where summons is improperly
complaint may be served upon him without need of
served, it becomes ministerial upon the trial court, on
another summons.
motion of the defendant, to dismiss the complaint pursuant

o Conversely, when no summons has yet been validly The complaint alleged that Pacleb secured a judgment by default
served on the defendant, new summons for the amended from California Superior Court ordering the petitioners to pay
complaint must be served on him. $56,204.69 as loan repayment and share in the profit.
In the instant case, since at the time the complaint was amended, The summons was served on petitioners' address in San Gregorio,
no summons had been properly served on the petitioner and it Alaminos, Laguna, as was alleged in the complaint, and received
had not yet appeared in court, new summons should have been by a certain Marcelo M. Belen.
issued on the amended complaint. Atty. Alcantara entered his appearance on behalf of the petitioners
Hence, the CA was correct when it held that, technically, the trial and filed an answer to the complaint and alleged that the petitioners
court should have ordered the issuance of an original summons, were actually resident of California, USA contrary to respondents
not an alias summons. averments. He also claimed in his answer that petitioners liability
After all, an alias summons is merely a continuation of the original was extinguished by the release of an abstract judgment in the
summons. same collection case.
In this case, however, there was no sense in issuing an alias For petitioners failure to attend the pre-trial conference, the RTC
summons on the original complaint since the complaint had already ordered an ex-parte presentation of evidence in favor of
been amended. The trial court should have instead issued a new respondents. However, before the scheduled presentation of
summons on the amended complaint. evidence, Atty. Alcantara filed a motion to dismiss citing the
Nonetheless, the CA deemed it necessary to treat the alias judgment of dismissal issued by the Court of California.
summons as a matter of nomenclature, considering that the The RTC suspended the said presentation pending the submission
rationale behind the service of summons to make certain that the of the order of the Court of California. But Atty. Alcantara failed to
corporation would promptly and properly receive notice of the filing present the said order of dismissal. Subsequently, the RTC denied
of an action against it has been served in this case. the Motion to Dismiss.
The CA held that it would be a great injustice to the respondent if The respondents then filed an amended complaint and explained
the complaint would be dismissed just because what was issued that they were forced to withdraw the case in California for high
and served was an alias summons; that she would be made to file cost of litigation. Petitioners claimed in their answer the defenses
a new complaint and thus, incur further monetary burden. of lack of cause of action, res judicata, lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter and over the persons of the defendants.
Sps. Belen v Chavez Petitioners failed to appear on the pre-trial conference, and were
declared in default. Atty. Alcantara passed away without the
Petitioner: SPS. DOMINGO AND DOMINGA BELEN RTC being informed at such fact until much later.
And the copy of the order intended for Atty. Alcantara was returned
Respondents: HON. PABLO R. CHAVEZ, SPS. SILVESTRE AND with notation Addressee Deceased. And on Aug. 14, 2003, it was
PATRICIA PACLEB then sent to the purported address of the petitioners and was
received by a certain Leopoldo Avecilla.
Facts:
Upon the motion of the respondents, the RTC issued a writ of
A petition for review on certiorari which sought to nullify the RTC
execution.
decision.
On 16 December 2003, Atty. Carmelo B. Culvera entered his
Sps. Pacleb filed an action for enforcement of foreign judgment
appearance as counsel for petitioners. On 22 December 2003, Atty.
against Sps. Belen before the RTC of Batangas.
Culvera filed a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution (With Prayer to

Defer Further Actions). On 6 January 2004, he filed a Notice of present address of the party is known and if the person who
Appeal from the RTC Decision averring that he received a copy receives the same is not the addressee, he must be duly
thereof only on 29 December 2003. authorized by the former to receive the paper on behalf of the
The RTC denied the motion to quash as well as the MR. On party.
appeal under Rule 65, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari
and the subsequent MR. In this case, since the filing of the complaint, petitioners could not be
physically found in the country because they had already become
Issue: permanent residents of California, U.S.A. It has been established during the
W/N there was a valid service of the copy of the RTC decision on the trial that petitioners are former residents of Alaminos, Laguna, contrary to
petitioners. NO. the averment in the complaint that they reside and may be served with court
processes thereat. The service of the RTC decision at their former address
Held: in Alaminos, Laguna is defective and does not bind petitioners.
Petition was GRANTED. The notice of appeal was GIVEN DUE COURSE.
Santos vs. PNOC Exploration Corp., G.R. No. 170943, Sept. 23, 2008
Rationale:
As a general rule, when a party is represented by counsel of This is a petition for review on the decision of the CA.
record, service of orders and notices must be made upon said FACTS:
attorney and notice to the client and to any other lawyer, not Dec. 23, 2002. PNOC filed a complaint before the RTC Pasig for
the counsel of record, is not notice in law. The exception to this collection of sum of money from the unpaid balance of car loan
rule is when service upon the party himself has been ordered by Santos obtained while he was still a member of its board of
the court. In cases where service was made on the counsel of directors.
record at his given address, notice sent to petitioner itself is not Personal service of summons to petitioner failed because he could
even necessary. not be located in his last known address. Subsequently, on
respondent's motion, the trial court allowed service of summons by
In this case, the Court ruled that upon the death of Atty. publication.
Alcantara, the lawyer-client relationship between him and Respondent caused the publication of the summons in Remate on
petitioners has ceased, thus, the service of the RTC decision on May 20, 2003. Thereafter, respondent submitted the affidavit of
him is ineffective and did not bind petitioners. publication of the advertising manager of Remate and an affidavit of
service of respondent's employee to the effect that he sent a copy
The subsequent service on petitioners' purported "last known of the summons by registered mail to petitioner's last known
address" by registered mail is also defective because it does not address.
comply with the requisites under Section 7 of Rule 13 on service by The petitioner failed to file his answer within the prescribed period,
registered mail. It contemplates service at the present address of and upon motion from respondent the case was set for ex parte
the party and not at any other address of the party. Service at the reception of evidence.
party's former address or his last known address or any After presentation by PNOCs evidence, the case was deemed
address other than his present address does not qualify as submitted for decision on October 15, 2003.
substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 7, On October 28, 2003, petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion for
Rule 13. Therefore, service by registered mail presupposes that the Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer." He alleged that

the affidavit of service submitted by respondent failed to comply diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be
with Section 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as it was not effected upon him by publication in a newspaper
executed by the clerk of court. He also claimed that he was denied of general circulation and in such places and for
due process as he was not notified of the ex parte presentation of such times as the court may order.
evidence order.
The RTC denied the MR and held that the rules did not require the The Court said that the in rem/in personam distinction was
affidavit of service by mail to be executed by the clerk of court. significant under the old rule because it was silent as to the kind of
Further, due process was properly observed. And it also denied action to which the rule was applicable. Because of this silence, the
the admission of the answer of Santos for filing beyond the Court limited the application of the old rule to in rem actions only.
reglementary period. However, this has been changed. The present rule expressly states
Petitioner appealed before the CA, but the court sustained the RTC that it applies "[i]n any action where the defendant is designated as
orders. And the subsequent MR was also denied. an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are
unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry." Thus, it
ISSUES: now applies to any action, whether in personam, in rem or quasi in
Whether the rule on service by publication applies only in actions in rem. rem.
NO.
2. The Rules of Court provides that service of summons by publication
Whether the affidavit of service of the copy of the summons should have is proved by the affidavit of the printer, his foreman or principal
been prepared by the clerk of court. NO. clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising manager of the
newspaper which published the summons. The service of
Whether the RTC lacks jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner for summons by publication is complemented by service of summons
improper service of summons. NO. by registered mail to the defendant's last known address. This
complementary service is evidenced by an affidavit "showing the
RULING: deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication in the
Petition was DENIED. post office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered
1. The Court ruled that since petitioner could not be personally served mail to his last known address."
with summons despite diligent efforts to locate his whereabouts,
respondent sought and was granted leave of court to effect service The Court said the rules do not require that the affidavit of
of summons upon him by publication in a newspaper of general complementary service be executed by the clerk of court. While the
circulation. Thus, petitioner was properly served with summons by trial court ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its orders and
publication. processes, the duty to make the complementary service by
registered mail is imposed on the party who resorts to service by
Sec. 14 Rule 14 of the Rules of Court publication.
Service upon defendant whose identity or
whereabouts are unknown. - In any action where 3. The Court ruled that the petitioner voluntarily appeared in the action
the defendant is designated as an unknown when he filed the "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to
owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts Admit Attached Answer." This was equivalent to service of
are unknown and cannot be ascertained by

summons and vested the trial court with jurisdiction over the person Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Caloocan City issued a
of petitioner. Certification dated 3 October 2007 bearing the details of Civil Case which
Koyama had instituted against him. Wong asserted that he would not
Sec. 20 Rule 14 Rules of Court hesitate to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the RTC, should the proper
Voluntary appearance. - The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action procedure be observed -denied
shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to * Wong, by special appearance of counsel, then filed a Motion to Dismiss
dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of Civil Case No. asserting, among other grounds, that there was no service of
the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. summons upon him, hence, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over his
person; and that he was not given the opportunity to oppose Koyamas
ALEXANDER TAM WONG, Petitioner, vs.CATHERINE FACTOR- Motion to have him declared in default-DENIED
KOYAMA, Respondent. (For Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 )
Facts: CA
RTC * Wong went to CA via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 insisting that
* a Complaint for specific performance, sum of money, and damages, filed there was no valid service of summons upon him, and that he was not
with by Catherine Factor-Koyama (Koyama) against Wong, notified of Koyamas Motion to have him declared in default -DISMISSED
* RTC issued summons addressed to Wong at his residence, No. 21 West * MR- DENIED
Riverside Street, San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City. However, the
original summons and the accompanying copy of the Complaint and its SC
Annexes were eventually returned to the RTC by Sheriff IV Renebert B. Wong avers herein that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over his person
Baloloy (Sheriff Baloloy), who indicated in his Sheriffs Return that said court since he was not served the summons.
process should already be deemed "DULY SERVED." According to his RULING :Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action
Return, Sheriff Baloloy had repeatedly attempted to serve the summons at brought against him or her. In a civil action, jurisdiction over the defendant is
Wongs residential address on 27 July 2007, 8 August 2007, and 10 August acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendant's
2007, but Wong was always not around according to the latters voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily
housemaids, Marie Sandoval (Sandoval) and Loren Lopez (Lopez). Sheriff submit to the court's jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of
Baloloy then attempted to leave the summons with Criz Mira (Mira), Wongs summons, any judgment of the court, which has no jurisdiction over the
caretaker, who is of legal age, and residing at the same address for two and person of the defendant, is null and void.
a half years, but Mira refused to acknowledge or receive the same. Where the action is in personam, i.e., one that seeks to impose some
* Koyama moved for the RTC to declare him in default, and to allow her to responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant through
present her evidence ex parte and/or to render judgment in her favor - the judgment of a court,and the defendant is in the Philippines, the service of
granted summons may be made through personal or substituted service in the
* Wong subsequently filed with the RTC, by registered mail sent on 5 manner described in Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of
October 2007, a Manifestation claiming that he did not receive any summons Court, which provide:
from said court. According to him, he was only informed unofficially by a
tricycle driver on 27 September 2007 regarding papers from a court in SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant. Whenever practicable, the
Caloocan City, which the tricycle driver returned to the court after failing to summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in
locate Wong. This prompted Wong to file an inquiry12 dated 28 September person, or if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
2007 with the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Caloocan City as
regards any case that might have been filed against him. In response, the

SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot Civil Case. Apart from establishing that Sheriff Baloloy went to Wongs
be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, residence on three different dates, and that the latter was not around every
service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the time, there is nothing else in the Sheriffs Return to establish that Sheriff
defendants residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then Baloloy exerted extraordinary efforts to locate Wong. During his visits to
residing therein; or (b) by leaving the copies at the defendants office or Wongs residence on 27 July 2007 and 10 August 2007, Sheriff Baloloy was
regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. informed by the housemaids that Wong was at his office. There is no
showing, however, that Sheriff Baloloy exerted effort to know Wongs office
It is well-established that a summons upon a respondent or a defendant address, verify his presence thereat, and/or personally serve the summons
must be served by handing a copy thereof to him in person or, if he refuses upon him at his office. Although Wong was out of town when Sheriff Baloloy
to receive it, by tendering it to him. Personal service of summons most attempted to serve the summons at the formers residence on 8 August
effectively ensures that the notice desired under the constitutional 2007, there was no indication that Wongs absence was other than
requirement of due process is accomplished.The essence of personal temporary or that he would not soon return.
service is the handing or tendering of a copy of the summons to the
defendant himself. Evidently, the Return failed to relay if sufficient efforts were exerted by
Sheriff Baloloy to locate Wong, as well as the impossibility of personal
Service of summons in person of defendants is generally preferred over service of summons upon Wong within a reasonable time. Sheriff Baloloys
substituted service.Substituted service derogates the regular method of three visits to Wongs residence hardly constitute effort on his part to locate
personal service. It is an extraordinary method since it seeks to bind the Wong; and Wongs absence from his residence during Sheriff Baloloys
respondent or the defendant to the consequences of a suit even though visits, since Wong was at the office or out-of-town, does not connote
notice of such action is served not upon him but upon another to whom the impossibility of personal service of summons upon him. It must be stressed
law could only presume would notify him of the pending proceedings. that, before resorting to substituted service, a sheriff is enjoined to try his
best efforts to accomplish personal service on the defendant. And since the
The Court requires that the Sheriffs Return clearly and convincingly show defendant is expected to try to avoid and evade service of summons, the
the impracticability or hopelessness of personal service.Proof of service of sheriff must be resourceful, persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the
summons must (a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a process on the defendant.
reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and
(c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and NEVERTHELES even without valid service of summons, a court may still
discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, if the latter voluntarily
regular place of business, of the defendant. It is likewise required that the appears before it. Section 20, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court
pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service recognizes that:
or in the officers return. The failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with
all the foregoing requirements of substituted service renders the service of Section 20. Voluntary Appearance.The defendants voluntary appearance
summons ineffective. in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a
motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the
IN THE CASE AT BAR: Sheriff Baloloys Return dated 14 August 2007 person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
described the circumstances surrounding the service of the summons upon
Wong. The Court, after a careful study of Sheriff Baloloys Return, finds that The RTC acquired jurisdiction over Wong by virtue of his voluntary
he improperly resorted to substituted service upon Wong of the summons for appearance before it in Civil Case by virtue of an Order dated 20 November

2008 (while this petition is pending in SC) allowing Wong to cross-examine present in the courtroom. The counsel of respondent spouses
Koyama. Wong, through his counsel, took advantage of the opportunity Mogol took hold of the summons and the copy of the complaint and
opened to him by the said Order and aggressively questioned her during the read the same. Thereafter, he pointed out to the process server
23 January 2009 hearing, despite his knowledge that the RTC had not yet that the summons and the copy of the complaint should be
lifted the 25 September 2007 Order declaring him in default. By actively served only at the address that was stated in both documents,
participating in the 23 January 2009 hearing, he effectively acknowledged i.e., at 1218 Daisy St., Employee Village, Lucena City, and not
full control of the RTC over Civil Case and over his person as the defendant anywhere else. The counsel of respondent spouses Mogol
therein; he is, thus, deemed to have voluntarily submitted himself to the apparently gave back the summons and the copy of the complaint
jurisdiction of said trial court. to the process server and advised his clients not to obtain a copy
and sign for the same. As the process server could not convince
The Court further stresses the fact that the RTC already rendered a Decision the respondent spouses Mogol to sign for the aforementioned
in Civil Case on 8 July 2009. Wong filed with the RTC a Notice of Appeal on documents, he proceeded to leave the premises of the courtroom.
10 August 2009. Given these the Court deems it unnecessary to still address the process server of the MeTC of Manila issued a Return on
the issue of whether Wong was improperly declared in default by the RTC in Service of Summons - UNSERVED, declaring that:
its Order dated 25 September 2007. This is to certify that on October 3, 2000, the undersigned tried
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. Costs against the petitioner. to serve a copy of the Summons issued by the Court in the
above-entitled case together with a copy of Complaint upon
G.R. No. 177007 July 14, 2009 defendant Leodegario Mogol[,] Jr. and Alicia Mogol doing
business under the name/style of "Mr. Homes Appliance" (sic)
SANSIO PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner, at MTC (sic) Branch 24 Ongpin (sic) (courtroom) as requested
vs. by plaintiff counsel, but failed for the reason that they refused
SPOUSES ALICIA AND LEODEGARIO MOGOL, JR., Respondents. to received (sic) with no valid reason at all.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Declare [Respondents] in Default
alleging that respondent spouses Mogol at the refusal to accept the
FACTS:
summons for no valid reason at all constitutes a valid service of
summons.
RTC Respondent spouses Mogol filed an Opposition to the Motion
Petitioner Sansio alleged that respondent spouses Mogol to Declare [Respondents] in Default. They posited that Section
purchased from petitioner air-conditioning units and fans 3, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court requires that the complaint must
worth P217,250.00 and P5,521.20, respectively. Respondent contain the names and residences of the plaintiff and
spouses Mogol apparently issued postdated checks as payment defendant. Therefore, the process server should have taken
therefor, but said checks were dishonoured. Petitioner Sansio filed notice of the allegation of the complaint, which referred to the
a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages against respondent address of respondent spouses Mogol wherein court
spouses Mogol for their failure to settle their obligation. processes may be served. If such service, as alleged in the
The process server of the MeTC of Manila served the complaint, could not be complied with within a reasonable time,
summons and the copy of the complaint on respondent spouses then and only then may the process server resort to
Mogol at the courtroom of the MeTC of Manila, Branch 24. substituted service.
Respondent spouses were in the said premises. Respondent
spouses Mogol referred the same to their counsel, who was also

RESPONDENTS were declared in default it ruled that Section 6, SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant. Whenever practicable,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court does not specify where service is to the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the
be effected. For obvious reasons, because service of summons is defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by
made by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, the tendering it to him.
same may be undertaken wherever the defendant may be found.
Respondent spouses Mogol were, thus, validly served with SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the
summons and a copy of the complaint. For failing to file any defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in
responsive pleading before the lapse of the reglementary period the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving
therefor, the Motion to Declare [Respondents] in Default filed by copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some
petitioner was declared to be meritorious. person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein; or (b) by
respondent spouses Mogol Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and/or leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of business
Injunction - DISMISSED with some competent person in charge thereof.
CA It is well-established that summons upon a respondent or a defendant must

Reversed RTCs decision - no valid service of summons to the be served by handing a copy thereof to him in person or, if he refuses to
respondent spouses because after the MTC incident, there was no receive it, by tendering it to him. Personal service of summons most
longer any attempt to serve the summons to the spouses effectively ensures that the notice desired under the constitutional
requirement of due process is accomplished. The essence of personal
ISSUE: WON the said summons was actually served upon the defendant. service is the handing or tendering of a copy of the summons to the
defendant himself, wherever he may be found; that is, wherever he may
HELD: YES. be, provided he is in the Philippines.
A summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought There was already a valid service of summons in the persons of respondent
against him or her. In a civil action, jurisdiction over the defendant is spouses Mogol at the courtroom of the MeTC of Manila, Branch 24. The act
acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendant's of the counsel of respondent spouses Mogol of receiving the summons
voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily and the copy of the complaint already constituted receipt on the part of
submit to the court's jurisdiction, or when there is no valid service of his clients, for the same was done with the latters behest and consent.
summons, any judgment of the court, which has no jurisdiction over the Already accomplished was the operative act of "handing" a copy of the
person of the defendant, is null and void. summons to respondent spouses in person. Thus, jurisdiction over the
persons of the respondent spouses Mogol was already acquired by the
Where the action is in personam, i.e., one that seeks to impose some MeTC of Manila, Branch 25. That being said, the subsequent act of the
responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant through counsel of respondent spouses of returning the summons and the copy of
the judgment of a court, and the defendant is in the Philippines, the service the complaint to the process server was no longer material.
of summons may be made through personal or substituted service in the
manner provided for in Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, Furthermore, the instruction of the counsel for respondent spouses not to
which read: obtain a copy of the summons and the copy of the complaint, under the lame
excuse that the same must be served only in the address stated therein, was
a gross mistake. Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court does not require

that the service of summons on the defendant in person must be effected Petitioner,
only at the latters residence as stated in the summons.
- versus -
Respondent spouses Mogol principally argue that Section 6 of Rule 14
cannot be singled out without construing the same with Section 7. They posit
that, in a civil case, summons must be served upon the defendants R. S. AMPELOQUIO REALTY DEVELOPMENT,
personally at the designated place alleged in the complaint. If the defendants INC.,
refuse to receive and sign the summons, then the process server must
tender the same to them by leaving a copy at the residence of the Respondent.
defendants. If the summons cannot be served in person because of the
absence of the defendants at the address stated, then the same can be
served by (1) leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence
with some person of suitable age and discretion residing therein, or (2) Facts:
leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of business with
some competent person in charge thereof. This is a petition for review of the Court of Appeals Decision dated 14 July
2005 and Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 78259. The Court of Appeals
reversed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch
Said arguments must fail, for they have no leg to stand on.
206 (RTC).
Axiomatically, Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court cannot be Petitioner B. D. Long Span Builders, Inc. and respondent R. S. Ampeloquio
construed to apply simultaneously. Said provisions do not provide for Realty Development, Inc. are corporations duly organized and existing under
alternative modes of service of summons, which can either be resorted to on the laws of the Republic of the Philippines.
the mere basis of convenience to the parties. Under our procedural rules,
service of summons in the persons of the defendants is generally preferred Petitioner and respondent entered into an Agreement wherein petitioner
over substituted service. Substituted service derogates the regular method agreed to render rip rapping construction services at respondents
of personal service. It is an extraordinary method, since it seeks to bind the Ampeloquio International Resort in Ternate, Cavite, for the contract price of
respondent or the defendant to the consequences of a suit, even though P50 million. On the same day, the parties entered into a second Agreement
notice of such action is served not upon him but upon another whom the law for the same construction project, stipulating a contract price of P30 million,
could only presume would notify him of the pending proceedings. For hence bringing the total contract price of the project to P80 million. Both
substituted service to be justified, the following circumstances must be Agreements required petitioner to deposit with respondent a cash bond of
clearly established: (a) personal service of summons within a reasonable one percent (1%) of the contract price, to be returned to petitioner upon
time was impossible; (b) efforts were exerted to locate the party; and (c) the completion of the project. In compliance, petitioner deposited with
summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing respondent a cash bond amounting to P800,000.
at the partys residence or upon a competent person in charge of the partys
office or place of business. Respondent failed to fulfill its obligations under the Agreements, resulting in
the cancellation of the project. Petitioner demanded the return of the
B. D. LONG SPAN BUILDERS, INC., P800,000 cash bond, but respondent refused to do so. Petitioners legal
counsel sent two (2) demand letters to respondent, but the latter still refused
to return the P800,000 cash bond.

RTC: appearance in court and their submission to its authority. The service of
summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process. As a rule, if
Petitioner (plaintiff) filed with the RTC a complaint for rescission of contract defendants have not been validly summoned, the court acquires no
and damages against respondent (defendant). Summons and a copy of the jurisdiction over their person, and a judgment rendered against them is null
complaint were served on respondent, through its staff member, Romel and void.
Dolahoy.
As a rule, summons should be personally served on the defendant. In case
Respondent failed to file an Answer or any responsive pleading to the of a domestic private juridical entity, the service of summons must be made
complaint. Upon motion of petitioner, the RTC issued an Order, declaring upon an officer who is named in the statute (i.e., the president, managing
respondent in default, and allowing petitioner to present evidence ex parte. partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house
counsel), otherwise, the service is insufficient. The purpose is to render it
Judgment is rendered declaring the aforesaid contracts entered into by reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice
plaintiff with defendant, for the rip rapping construction project at the in an action against it or to insure that the summons be served on a
Ampeloquio International Resort in Ternate, Cavite, as RESCINDED. representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will know
what to do with the legal papers served on him. However, if the summons
CA:
cannot be served on the defendant personally within a reasonable period of
Upon receipt of the RTC decision, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with time, then substituted service may be resorted to.
the Court of Appeals. After considering the pleadings filed by petitioner and
Nonetheless, the impossibility of prompt personal service must be shown by
respondent, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment which reversed and set
stating that efforts have been made to find the defendant personally and that
aside the decision of the RTC.
such efforts have failed. This is necessary because substituted service is in
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but this was denied by the derogation of the usual method of service. It is a method extraordinary in
Court of Appeals in its Resolution. character and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the
circumstances authorized by statute. The statutory requirements of
Hence, this appeal. substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any
substituted service other than that authorized by statute is considered
Issue: ineffective.
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that there was invalid service of In this case, the Return by Process Server provides:
summons upon respondent, and hence the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over said respondent. This is to certify that:
Ruling: On October 17, 2002 at about 11:00 o'clock in the

morning, undersigned tried to cause the service of the
We find the appeal without merit. Summons together with the attached complaint & its
annexes in the above-entitled case to the defendant at his
Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint. given address on record. Mr Romel Dalahoy, a staff of
On the other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired said Realty received the said Summons with the attached
either through the service of summons upon them or through their voluntary complaint & its annexes as evidenced by the former's

signature as appearing on the original copy of the may file a motion for new trial under Section 1(a) of Rule 37;
aforesaid Summons. if he discovered the default after the judgment has become final
and executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section 2 of
Henceforth, the said Summons with the attached Rule 38; and
complaint & its annexes to Atty. Evangeline V. Tiongson, he may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as
Clerk of Court V, this Court, is respectfully returned, DULY contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set
SERVED, by substituted service. aside the order of default has been presented by him.
Thus, respondent, which had been declared in default, may file a notice of appeal
October 17, 2002, Muntinlupa City
and question the validity of the trial courts judgment without being
considered to have submitted to the trial courts authority.
Angelito C. Reyes
Process Server
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Court of Appeals
Clearly, the summons was not served personally on the defendant Decision and Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 78259. Let the case be
(respondent) through any of the officers enumerated in Section 11 of Rule REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings upon valid service of
14; rather, summons was served by substituted service on the defendants summons to respondent.
staff member, Romel Dolahoy. Substituted service was resorted to on the
servers first attempt at service of summons, and there was no indication that G.R. No. 171916 December 4, 2009
prior efforts were made to render prompt personal service on the defendant.
CONSTANTINO A. PASCUAL, substituted by his heirs, represented by
Moreover, nothing on record shows that Romel Dolahoy, the staff member Zenaida Pascual, Petitioner,
who received the summons in respondents behalf, shared such relation of vs.
confidence ensuring that respondent would surely receive the summons. LOURDES S. PASCUAL, Respondent.
Thus, following our ruling in Orion, we are unable to accept petitioners
contention that service on Romel Dolahoy constituted substantial
Facts:
compliance with the requirements of substituted service.
Petitioners contention that respondents filing of Notice of Appeal effectively Petitioner filed a Complaint for Specific Performance with Prayer for
cured any defect in the service of summons is devoid of merit. It is well- Issuance of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with Damages before
settled that a defendant who has been declared in default has the following the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan against respondent.
remedies, to wit: The process server, in his Return of Service dated May 21, 2002,
reported, among others that:
he may, at any time after discovery of the default but before
judgment, file a motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default The undersigned Process Server of this
on the ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, Honorable Court went at defendant's given
mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has a meritorious address at No. 4 Manikling St., Talayan
defense; Village, Quezon City on May 20, 2002 to serve
if judgment has already been rendered when he discovered the the summons and copy of the Complaint
default, but before the same has become final and executory, he

together with the annexes thereto in defendant's residence but the undersigned was
connection with the above-entitled case. not permitted to go inside her house and was
given information by her maid that the defendant
At the time of the service of the said summons, was not there.
the defendant was not at her home and only
her maid was there who refused to receive the The defendant's car was parked inside her
said summons [in spite] of the insistence of the house and inquiries/verification made on her
undersigned. neighbors revealed that the defendant was
inside her house at the time of service of said
The undersigned, upon his request with the summons and probably did not want to show-up
Brgy. Clerk at the said place, was given a when her maid informed her of undersigned's
certification that he really exerted effort to presence.
effect the service of the said summons but
failed due to the above reason. (Annex "A"). WHEREFORE, the undersigned court process
server respectfully returned the alias summons
The following day, May 21, 2002, the dated May 29, 2002 issued by the Hon. Court
undersigned went back at defendant's residence "UNSERVED" for its information and guidance.
to have her receive the subject summons but
again the above defendant was not at her Malolos, Bulacan, May 30, 2002.
house.
Subsequently, on August 14, 2002, the process server returned
WHEREFORE, the original summons and copy with the following report, stating that a substituted service was
of the complaint is hereby returned to the effected:
Honorable Court NOT SERVED.
This is to certify that on the 14th day of August,
Malolos, Bulacan, May 21, 2002. 2002, I personally went at Dr. Lourdes Pascual's
residence at #4 Manikling Street, Talayan
Thereafter, an alias summons was issued by the RTC and, on May Village, Quezon City, to serve the copy of the
29, 2002, the following report was submitted: Summons dated August 12, 2002, together with
a copy of the Complaint and its annexes thereto.
The undersigned, on May 29, 2002, made a 3rd
attempt to serve the alias summons issued by Defendant Dr. Lourdes Pascual was out during
the Hon. Court relative with the above-entitled the time of service of the said summons and
case at the given address of the defendant. only her housemaid was present. The
undersigned left a copy of the same to the latter
The undersigned, accompanied by the barangay who is at the age of reason but refused to sign
officials of the said place, proceeded at the same.

WHEREFORE, the undersigned respectfully In a case where the action is in personam and the defendant is in
return the service of summons duly served for the Philippines, the service of summons may be done by personal
information and guidance of the Honorable or substituted service as laid out in Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of
Court. the Revised Rules of Court.
o A plain and simple reading of the above provisions
Malolos, Bulacan, August 14, 2002. indicates that personal service of summons should and
always be the first option, and it is only when the said
For failure of the respondent to file a responsive pleading, petitioner summons cannot be served within a reasonable time can
filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default to which the the process server resort to substituted service.
respondent filed an Opposition, claiming that she was not able to
receive any summons and copy of the complaint. Requirements to effect a valid substituted service:
The RTC declared respondent in default and allowed petitioner to
file his evidence ex-parte. 1. Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service
Respondent filed an MR but was denied.
Consequently, trial court found in favor of the petitioner. o The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff
Respondent then filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of Default, with must show that defendant cannot be served promptly
the argument of non-service of summons upon her. or there is impossibility of prompt service.
This was denied by the RTC.
Respondent filed an MR which was denied. 2. Specific Details in the Return
Aggrieved, respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 which was granted by the same Court. o The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons
Hence, this present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 the facts and circumstances surrounding the
of the Rules of Court, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order attempted personal service. The efforts made to find
and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. the defendant and the reasons behind the failure must
Petitioner insists that there was a valid substituted service of be clearly narrated in detail in the Return.
summons and that there should be a presumption of regularity
in the performance of official functions. 3. A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion
Respondent claims that there was no proper service of summons
as the maid who was purportedly served a copy thereof was o If the substituted service will be effected at
illiterate and has denied being served in a sworn statement defendants house or residence, it should be left with
executed before a notary public and, thus, the RTC never acquired a person of "suitable age and discretion then residing
jurisdiction over her person. therein."
o A person of suitable age and discretion is one who has
Issue: Whether there was a proper and valid substituted service of attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is
summons. considered to have enough discernment to understand the
importance of a summons.
Held: No.

o "Discretion" is defined as "the ability to make decisions again the above defendant was not at her
which represent a responsible choice and for which an house.
understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may be
presupposed". xxxx
o Thus, to be of sufficient discretion, such person must know
how to read and understand English to comprehend the
Similarly, in the Return of Service dated May 30, 2002, pertinent
import of the summons, and fully realize the need to
details were wanting, as it reads:
deliver the summons and complaint to the defendant at
the earliest possible time for the person to take
xxxx
appropriate action.
The undersigned accompanied by the barangay

4. A Competent Person in Charge
officials of the said place proceeded at
defendant's residence but the undersigned was
o If the substituted service will be done at defendants office
not permitted to go inside her house and was
or regular place of business, then it should be served on a
given information by her maid that the defendant
competent person in charge of the place.
was not there.
A cursory reading of the three Officer's Returns does not show
any compliance with the said requisite. The Return of Service
The defendant's car was parked inside her
dated May 21, 2002 inadequately states that:
house and inquiries/verification made on her
neighbors revealed that the defendant was
xxxx inside her house at the time of service of said
summons and probably did not want to show-up
At the time of service of the said summons, the when her maid informed her of undersigned's
defendant was not at her home and only her presence.
maid was there who refused to receive the said
summons [in spite] of the insistence of the xxxx
undersigned.
Lastly, the Return of Service dated August 14, 2002 was no

The undersigned, upon his request with the
different. It reads:
Brgy. Clerk at the said place, was given a
certification that he really exerted effort to effect
xxxx
the service of the said summons but failed due
to the above reason. (Annex "A").
Defendant Dr. Lourdes Pascual was out during
the time of service of the said summons and
The following day, May 21, 2002, the
only her housemaid was present. The
undersigned went back at defendant's residence
undersigned left a copy of the same to the latter
to have her receive the subject summons but

who is at the age of reason but refused to sign manner of substituted service by the process server was apparently
the same. invalid and ineffective.
As such, there was a violation of due process. Jurisdiction over the
xxxx defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or
the defendants voluntary appearance in court.
The above Return of Summons does not show or indicate the When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the courts
actual exertion or any positive steps taken by the officer or jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of summons, "any
process server in serving the summons personally to the judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the
defendant. person of the defendant is null and void."
The Return of Summons shows no effort was actually exerted and
no positive step taken by either the process server or petitioners to RP v DOMINGO
locate and serve the summons personally on respondents.
At best, the Return merely states the alleged whereabouts of - Respondent Alberto A. Domingo filed a Complaint for Specific
respondents without indicating that such information was verified Performance with Damages against the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH). Domingo alleged that he entered
from a person who had knowledge thereof.
into seven contracts with the DPWH Region III for the lease of his
Certainly, without specifying the details of the attendant
construction equipment to said government agency. The lease
circumstances or of the efforts exerted to serve the summons, a
contracts were allegedly executed in order to implement the
general statement that such efforts were made will not suffice
emergency projects of the DPWH Region III
for purposes of complying with the rules of substituted service
- Despite repeated demands, Domingo asserted that the DPWH
of summons.
Region III failed to pay its obligations. Domingo was, thus,
The necessity of stating in the process server's Return or Proof of
compelled to file the above case for the payment
Service the material facts and circumstances sustaining the validity
- Thereafter, summons was issued by the RTC. The Proof
of substituted service was explained by this Court in Hamilton v.
of Service of the Sheriff dated May 9, 2002
Levy, from which we quote:
- Domingo filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default in view of
the failure of the DPWH Region III to file a responsive pleading
x x x The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of
within the reglementary period
summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officer's Return;
- The motion was deemed submitted for resolution. Counsel for
otherwise, any substituted service made in lieu of personal service cannot
Domingo timely filed a Manifestation, showing compliance with the
be upheld. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of
order of the trial court.
the usual method of service. It is a method extraordinary in character and,
- RTC declared the DPWH Region III in default and thereafter set
hence, may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized
the date for the reception of Domingos evidence ex parte.
by statute. Here, no such explanation was made. Failure to faithfully, strictly,
- After the ex parte presentation of Domingos evidence, the RTC
and fully comply with the requirements of substituted service renders said
rendered judgment on February 18, 2003, finding that:
service ineffective.
o From the evidence presented by [Domingo], testimonial
and documentary, it was convincingly proven that
Applying the above disquisitions, the jurisdiction over the person of [Domingo] is entitled to the relief prayed for.
the respondent was never vested with the RTC, because the

- Domingo filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Jurisprudence further instructs that when a suit is directed against an
[15]
Execution, asserting that the DPWH Region III failed to file an unincorporated government agency, which, because it is unincorporated,
appeal or a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration despite its possesses no juridical personality of its own, the suit is against the agency's
[30]
receipt of a copy of the RTC decision granted principal, i.e., the State. In the similar case of Heirs of Mamerto Manguiat
[31]
- Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the v. Court of Appeals, where summons was served on the Bureau of
Solicitor General (OSG), filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition Telecommunications which was an agency attached to the Department of
for Annulment of Judgment with Prayer for the Issuance of a Transportation and Communications, we held that:
Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. Rule 14, Section 13 of the 1997 Rules of
- the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, dismissing the Procedure provides:
Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by the Republic
-
[20]
Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above SEC. 13. Service upon
decision, but the Court of Appeals denied the same public corporations. When the
defendant is the Republic of
the Philippines, service may be effected
ISSUE: whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the Petition for on the Solicitor General; in case of a
Annulment of Judgment filed by the Republic. province, city or municipality, or like
public corporations, service may be
HELD: Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action effected on its executive head, or on
brought against him. Service of such writ is the means by which the court such other officer or officers as the law
acquires jurisdiction over his person. Jurisdiction over the person of the or the court may direct.
defendant is acquired through coercive process, generally by the service of
summons issued by the court, or through the defendant's voluntary It is clear under the Rules that where the
[29] defendant is the Republic of the Philippines, service of
appearance or submission to the court.
summons must be made on the Solicitor General. The
BUTEL is an agency attached to the Department of
Transportation and Communications created under
Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court states that: E.O. No. 546 on July 23, 1979, and is in charge of
providing telecommunication facilities, including telephone
SEC. 13. Service upon public corporations. systems to government offices. It also provides its
When the defendant is the Republic of services to augment limited or inadequate existing similar
the Philippines, service may be effected on the private communication facilities. It extends its services to
Solicitor General; in case of a province, city or areas where no communication facilities exist yet; and
municipality, or like public corporations, service may be assists the private sector engaged in telecommunication
effected on its executive head, or on such other officer or services by providing and maintaining backbone
officers as the law or the court may direct. (Emphasis telecommunication network. It is indisputably part of the
ours.) Republic, and summons should have been served on
the Solicitor General.

We now turn to the question of whether jurisdiction over BUTEL, and all proceedings therein
summons was properly served according to the Rules of are null and void. (Emphases supplied.)
Court. Petitioners rely solely on the sheriff's return to prove
that summons was properly served. We quote its contents, In the instant case, the Complaint for Specific Performance with
viz: Damages filed by Domingo specifically named as defendant the DPWH
Region III. As correctly argued by the Republic, the DPWH and its regional
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on office are merely the agents of the former (the Republic), which is the real
the 19th day of May 1999, the party in interest in Civil Case No. 333-M-2002. Thus, as mandated by
undersigned caused the service of Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the summons in this case should
Summons and Complaint upon have been served on the OSG.
defendant J.A. Development
Corporation at the address indicated in
the summons, the same having been
received by a certain Jacqueline delos Quite inexplicably, the Court of Appeals failed to apply, nay, to even
Santos, a person employed thereat, of consider, the provisions of Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court in
sufficient age and discretion to receive rendering its assailed Decision. A perusal of the Decision dated May 19,
such process, who signed on the lower 2006 shows that the appellate court mainly dissertated regarding the
portion of the Summons to acknowledge functions and organizational structures of the DPWH and the OSG, as
receipt thereof. provided for in the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, in an attempt to
demonstrate the relationship between the DPWH and its regional offices, as
Likewise, copy of the well as to refute the claim that the service of summons upon the Republic
Summons and Complaint was served should be made exclusively upon the OSG. Such an oversight on the part of
upon defendant Bureau of the Court of Appeals is most unfortunate given the relevance and materiality
Telecommunications at the address of Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court to the instant case, in addition to
indicated in the Summons, a copy of the the fact that the Republic itself quoted the aforesaid provision in its petition
[33]
same was received by a certain Cholito before the appellate court.
Anitola, a person employed thereat, who
signed on the lower portion of the The Court, nonetheless, subscribes to the ruling of the Court of
Summons to acknowledge receipt Appeals that the Republic is not estopped from raising the issue of
thereof. jurisdiction in the case at bar in view of the alleged entry of appearance of
the OSG, in behalf of the Republic, in the other civil cases supposedly filed
It is incumbent upon the party alleging that by Domingo against the DPWH Region III. As held by the appellate court,
summons was validly served to prove that all requirements the other civil cases presumably pertained to transactions involving Domingo
were met in the service thereof. We find that this burden and the DPWH Region III, which were totally different from the contracts
was not discharged by the petitioners. The records show involved in the instant case. The fact that the OSG entered its appearance
that the sheriff served summons on an ordinary in the other civil cases, notwithstanding that the summons therein were only
employee and not on the Solicitor General. served upon the DPWH Region III, has no bearing in the case now before
Consequently, the trial court acquired no us. All this indicates is that, despite the improper service of summons in

these other civil cases, there appeared to be notice to the OSG and RULING:
voluntary appearance on the latters part.
Oh yeah!!!
RULE 14 SEC. 15 TO 20
Under Section 17, extraterritorial service of summons is proper:
G.R. No. L-48375 August 13, 1986 1.) When the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff;
2.) When the action relates to, or the subject of which is,
property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or
JOSE C. CARIAGA, JR. AND MARIETA CARIAGA, petitioners,
claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent;
vs.
3.) When the relief demanded in such an action consists,
THE HON. ANTONIO Q. MALAYA, CAROLINA ALMONTE CARIAGA-
wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest
SOON AND ANA ALMONTE CARIAGA, respondents.
in property located in the Philippines; and
4.) When defendant non-resident's property has been attached
(Guys sobrang hinigsian ko nalang, mahigsi rin kasi yung kaso) within the Philippines (Sec. 17, Rule 14, Rules of Court).
This is a petition for certiorari to review and to set aside two orders of the
In any of such four cases, the service of summons may, with leave of court,
respondent Judge dated January 16, 1978 and April 11, 1978 giving validity
be effected out of the Philippines in three ways:
to the service of summons by registered mail upon the defendants Jose C.
1.) by personal service;
Cariaga, Jr. and Marieta Cariaga-Celis (petitioners herein), who are residing
2.) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such
abroad. Petitioners aver that the issuance of said orders by the respondent
places and for such time as the court may order, in which case
Judge is tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.
a copy of the summons and order of the court should be sent
FACTS: by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant;
and
Plaintiffs Cariaga-Soon (herein private respondents) filed an action 3.) in any other manner which the court may deem sufficient.
for Recovery of Real Property with Damages against defendants The third mode of extra-territorial service of summons was substantially
Cariaga (petitioners) before the CFI of Laguna. complied with.
Upon motion of the plaintiffs, the court granted them leave to effect
MARGARITA ROMUALDEZ-LICAROS, petitioner, vs. ABELARDO B.
extra-territorial service of summons through registered mail upon
LICAROS, respondent.
defendants on the ground that the latter were residing abroad.
Facts:
Defendants then filed a motion to set aside said summons in the
* Abelardo Licaros (Abelardo, for short) and Margarita Romualdez-Licaros
trial court
(Margarita, hereafter) were lawfully married but later agreed to separate
The trial court denied said motion from bed and board.
Thereafter, the defendants filed the instant petition for review on *Margarita left for the United States and there applied for divorce- granted
certiorari (R45) on August 6, 1990
*August 17, 1990, Abelardo and Margarita executed an Agreement of
Separation of Properties and was followed-up by a petition filed on August
ISSUE: Whether the summons were properly served upon defendants 21, 1990 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati for the dissolution of the

conjugal partnership of gains of the spouses and for the approval of the of Appeals concluded that any irregularity in the service of summons
agreement of separation of their properties- granted onDecember 27, 1990 involves due process which does not destroy the trial courts jurisdiction over
the res which is the parties marital status. Neither does such irregularity
* on June 24, 1991, Abelardo commenced for the declaration of nullity of his invalidate the judgment rendered in the case. Thus, the Court of Appeals
marriage with Margarita, based on psychological incapacity under the New dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment.
Family Code. As Margarita was then residing at 96 Mulberry Lane, Atherton, Hence MArgarita went to Sc via petition for review on certiorari
California, U.S.A.
* Abelardo moved that summons be served through the International SC
Express Courier Service -DENIED and Instead, it ordered that summons be Issue: I. Whether Margarita was validly served with summons in the case for
served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Abelardo?
three (3) consecutive weeks, at the same time furnishing respondent a copy
of the order, as well as the corresponding summons and a copy of the Ruling:
petition at the given address in the United States through the Department of Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought
Foreign Affairs, all at the expense of Abelardo. Respondent was given sixty against him. Service of such writ is the means by which the court acquires
(60) days after publication to file a responsive pleading. jurisdiction over his person.[9]
* On July 15, 1991, Process Server, Maximo B. Dela Rosa, submitted his As a rule, when the defendant does not reside and is not found in the
Officers Return which states that Summons were received thru Pat G. Philippines, Philippine courts cannot try any case against him because of the
Martines receiving Clerk of Department of Foreign Affairs a person impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily
authorized to receive this kind of process. appears in court. But when the case is one of actions in rem or quasi in rem
* On November 8, 1991, TC declared the marriage between Abelardo and enumerated in Section 15,[10] Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, Philippine
Margarita null and void. courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. In such instances,
Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over the
CA person of the non-resident defendant is not essential.[11]
9 years after....Margarita commenced a petition the petition when Actions in personam[12] and actions in rem or quasi in rem differ in that
she received a letter dated November 18, 1991 from a certain Atty. Angelo actions in personam are directed against specific persons and seek personal
Q. Valencia informing her that she no longer has the right to use the family judgments. On the other hand, actions in rem or quasi in rem are directed
name Licaros inasmuch as her marriage to Abelardo had already been against the thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments with
judicially dissolved by the Regional Trial Court of Makati respect thereto as against the whole world.[13]
Margarita' ground At the time Abelardo filed the petition for nullity of the marriage in 1991,
B) THE TRIAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND DECIDE Margarita was residing in the United States. She left the Philippines in 1982
THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE. together with her two children. The trial court considered Margarita a non-
CA RULING: The Court of Appeals also rejected Margaritas claim that the resident defendant who is not found in the Philippines. Since the petition
trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide the Petition for Declaration affects the personal status of the plaintiff, the trial court authorized
of Nullity of Marriage for improper service of summons on her. The case extraterritorial service of summons under Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of
involves the marital status of the parties, which is an action in rem or quasi in Court. The term personal status includes family relations, particularly the
rem. The Court of Appeals ruled that in such an action the purpose of relations between husband and wife.[14]
service of summons is not to vest the trial court with jurisdiction over the Under Section 15 of Rule 14, a defendant who is a non-resident and is not
person of the defendant, but only to comply with due process. The Court found in the country may be served with summons by extraterritorial service

in four instances: (1) when the action affects the personal status of the WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in dismissing the
plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is property petition to annul judgment is AFFIRMED.
within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest,
actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded consists, wholly or in G.R. No. L-34314 May 13, 1975
part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the
Philippines; or (4) when the property of the defendant has been attached SOFIA PASTOR DE MIDGELY, petitioner,
within the Philippines. vs.
In these instances, extraterritorial service of summons may be effected THE HONORABLE PIO B. FERANDOS, Judge of the Court of First
under any of three modes: (1) by personal service out of the country, with Instance of Cebu, Branch IX and LEWELYN BARLITO QUEMADA,
leave of court; (2) by publication and sending a copy of the summons and Special Administrator of the Testate and Intestate Estate of ALVARO
order of the court by registered mail to the defendants last known address, PASTOR Y TATO, respondents.
also with leave of court; or (3) by any other means the judge may consider
sufficient.
Facts:
Applying the foregoing rule, the trial court required extraterritorial service of
summons to be effected on Margarita in the following manner:
x x x, service of Summons by way of publication in a newspaper of general Alvaro Pastor, Sr. was allegedly the owner of properties and rights in mining
circulation once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, at the same time, claims located in Cebu and supposedly held in trust by his son, Alvaro
furnishing respondent copy of this Order as well as the corresponding Pastor, Jr. Pastor, Sr. died on June 5, 1966. He was survived by his two
Summons and copy of the petition at her given address at No. 96 Mulberry legitimate children, Mrs. Midgely and Alvaro Pastor, Jr. Respondent
Lane, Atherton, California, U.S.A., thru the Department of Foreign Affairs, all Quemada claims to be his illegitimate child.
at the expense of petitioner.[15] (Emphasis ours)
The trial courts prescribed mode of extraterritorial service does not fall As administrator and as heir of Alvaro Pastor, Sr., Quemada filed in the CFI
under the first or second mode specified in Section 15 of Rule 14, but under a complaint against the spouses Alvaro Pastor, Jr. and Maria Elena Achaval,
the third mode. This refers to any other means that the judge may consider Mrs. Midgely, Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation and
sufficient. Caltex (Philippines), Inc. to settle the question of ownership over certain
The Process Servers Return of 15 July 1991 shows that the summons real properties and the rights in some mining claims. Quemada's theory
addressed to Margarita together with the complaint and its annexes were is that those properties and income belong to the estate of Alvaro Pastor,
sent by mail to the Department of Foreign Affairs with acknowledgment of Sr.
receipt. The Process Servers certificate of service of summons is prima
facie evidence of the facts as set out in the certificate.[16] Before proceeding Allegedly, without complying with the requirements of Rule 14 of the Rules of
to declare the marriage between Margarita and Abelardo null and void, the Court, Quemada caused extraterritorial service of summons to be made in
trial court stated in its Decision dated 8 November 1991 that compliance that case through the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Philippine
with the jurisdictional requirements hav(e) (sic) been duly established. We Embassy in Madrid, Spain, which effected the service of the summons by
hold that delivery to the Department of Foreign Affairs was sufficient registered mail upon Mrs. Midgely and the Pastor, Jr. spouses at their
compliance with the rule. After all, this is exactly what the trial court required respective address in Alicante and Barcelona, Spain.
and considered as sufficient to effect service of summons under the third
mode of extraterritorial service pursuant to Section 15 of Rule 14. Alvaro Pastor, Jr. and Mrs. Midgely, in their respective letters to the
Philippine Embassy dated February 11 and 12, 1971, acknowledged the

service of summons but reserved the right to contest the courts The lower court has acquired jurisdiction over the person of Mrs.
jurisdiction over their persons. Midgely by reason of her voluntary appearance. The reservation in her
motion to dismiss that she was making a special appearance to contest the
Through counsel, Mrs. Midgely and the Pastor, Jr. spouses entered a court's jurisdiction over her person may be disregarded because it was
special appearance and filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack nullified by the fact that in her motion to dismiss she relied not only on the
of jurisdiction. They contended that as nonresidents they could be ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person but also on the ground that
summoned only with leave of court and that the requirements laid there was no showing that earnest efforts were exerted to compromise the
down in section 17 of Rule 14 should have been observed. As additional case and because she prayed "for such other relief as" may be deemed
ground they alleged that the complaint does not show that earnest efforts "appropriate and proper".
toward a compromise have been made, as required in article 222 of the Civil
Code in suits between members of the same family (See sec. 1[j], Rule 16, Having shown that Mrs. Midgely had voluntarily submitted to the lower
Rules of Court). Quemada opposed the motion to dismiss. court's jurisdiction when she filed her motion to dismiss (see sec. 23,
Rule 14, Rules of Court), the inevitable conclusion is that it did not
Respondent Quemada alleged that the service of summons upon Mrs. commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying her motion to
Midgely was not for the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction over her dismiss. The petitioner argued that the lower court does not have
person but merely as a matter of due process. jurisdiction over the res, a contention that is palpably baseless.
RTC Quemada's action against Mrs. Midgely may be regarded as a quasi in

MTD DENIED (there is jurisdiction over her person and rem action where jurisdiction over the person of the nonresident
properties) defendant is not necessary and where service of summons is required
article 222 was inapplicable to the case because Quemada's only for the purpose of complying with the requirement of due process.
civil status was involved and article 2035 of the Civil Code
prohibits a compromise on a person's civil status. An action quasi in rem is an action between parties where the direct object is
MFR DENIED to reach and dispose of property owned by them, or of some interest therein.
action filed by Quemada was for the recovery of real properties Quemada's action falls within that category.
and real rights.
With respect to the extraterritorial service of summons to a nonresident
The petition for certiorari herein was filed on November 3, 1971. defendant like Mrs. Midgely, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
provides:t.hqw
ISSUE: WON RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying Mrs. Midgely's
motion to dismiss based on the grounds of (a) lack of jurisdiction over her SEC. 17. Extraterritorial service. When the defendant does not
person and (b) lack of a showing that earnest efforts were exerted to effect reside and is not found in the Philippines and the action affects the
a compromise. personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which
is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or
Held: YES claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief
demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant
from any interest therein, or the property of the defendant has been

attached within the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be (3) service of summons may be effected in any other manner
effected out of the Philippines by personal service as under section which the court may deem sufficient. That third mode of
7; or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such extraterritorial service of summons was substantially complied with
places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a in this case.
copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by
registered mail to the last known address of the defendant, or in The subject matter of the action for reconveyance consists of properties of
any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order granting Alvaro Pastor, Sr. Mrs. Midgely claims an actual interest in those properties.
such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less She has been receiving a share of the income therefrom. Therefore, the
than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the defendant must extraterritorial service of summons upon her was proper. As already noted,
answer. the action against her is quasi in rem..
Under section 17, extraterritorial service of summons is proper The record does not show whether Judge Ferandos was consulted by the
Clerk of Court and by Quemada's counsel when the service of summons
(1) when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff; was effected through the Philippine Embassy in Madrid. But although there
was no court order allowing service in that manner, that mode of
(2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is, property service was later sanctioned or ratified by Judge Ferandos. He
within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or corrected the defect in the summons by giving Mrs. Midgely the sixty-day
interest, actual or contingent; reglementary period for answering the complaint.
(3) when the relief demanded in such an action consists, wholly or This Court clarified that in a quasi in rem action jurisdiction over the
in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property person of the nonresident defendant is not essential. The service of
located in the Philippines, and summons by publication is required "merely to satisfy the constitutional
requirement of due process". The judgment of the court in the case would
(4) when defendant nonresident's property has been attached settle the title to the shares of stock and to that extent it partakes of the
within the Philippines (Sec. 17, Rule 14, Rules of Court). nature of a judgment in rem. Consequently, the lower court had jurisdiction
to try the case even if it had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of
Idonah Slade Perkins. The judgment would be confined to the res. No
In any of such four cases, the service of summons may, with leave of
personal judgment could be rendered against the non-resident.
court, be effected out of the Philippines in three ways:
G.R. No. L-48955 June 30, 1987

(1) by personal service;
BERNARDO BUSUEGO, petitioner,
(2) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such vs.
places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE LAZARO, ROMEO LAZARO
copy of the summons and order of the court should be sent by and VIVENCIO LOPEZ, respondents.
registered mail to the last known address of the defendant, and
Facts:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner asks us to set aside the sufficient time to look for another place where the five families composed
decision of the Court of Appeals, declaring null and void the judgment by mostly of little children, can reside.
default and the orders issued by the Court of First Instance of Pasig.
The lower court granted Romeo's motion and accordingly, the execution of
Petitioner Bernardo Busuego commenced action before the Pasig Court of the default judgment was held in abeyance.
First Instance against Jose Lazaro, Romeo Lazaro, Ernesto Lazaro, and
Vivencio Lopez, to recover possession of a parcel of land and a three (3) The defendants through Atty. Roldan filed with the lower court a motion for
unit apartment house standing in Bo. Jesus de la Pena Marikina, Rizal. reconsideration of the judgment by default and/or to dissolve the writ of
execution, solely on the ground that neither the defendants nor their counsel
Immediately thereafter, summons was issued in the name of the four were ever furnished a copy of the judgment by default. This motion was
defendants and per sheriff's return, was personally served at the address verified by Romeo Lazaro who described himself as "one of the defendants
given in the complaint, upon the defendants "through [defendant] Dr. Ernesto in the-case" and as "representing them [the defendants] in the instant
Lazaro, personally." pleadings.
Defendants, through Atty. Gerardo B. Roldan, Jr., filed a motion for an Upon opposition of petitioner, the lower court denied the motion, finding the
extension of fifteen (15) days to file answer, stating that "his [Atty. Roldan's] above-motion to be purely dilatory in nature and plain harassment on the
services was (sic) secured by the defendants formally only the other day," part of the defendants.
and that he "need[ed] sufficient time to study the case, before filing any
responsive pleading or pleadings." The motion was granted by the lower The respondents, through their new counsel, Atty. Oliver Lozano, filed with
court. the same court an omnibus motion, which included a motion to lift the order
of default, a second motion for reconsideration and a motion to quash the
Defendants through Atty. Roldan asked for another extension of ten (10) writ of execution issued pursuant to the default judgment, alleging for the
days to answer, as "[Atty. Roldan] has not yet conferred with all of [the four first time that their failure to answer was due to lack of notice.
(4) defendants] which [was] necessary before any responsive pleading
[could be] filed by him." The lower court granted this second extension. Petitioner opposed vigorously the above motion contending that, the
defendants could not pretend absence of proper notice after they, through
Notwithstanding the extensions granted, no answer was filed by the counsel, had filed the two motions for extension of time to answer.
defendants, for which reason, and upon motion of plaintiff Busuego, the
lower court declared the defendants in default. Subsequently, plaintiff's case
was heard and his evidence received, and on the basis of that evidence the
trial court rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiff. The lower court denied the omnibus motion, holding the motion for extension
of time to vacate filed by respondent Romeo Lazaro for all the defendants to
Almost two years later, plaintiff filed before the lower court an ex parte be equivalent to waiver of service of summons.
motion for execution of the default judgment, which the lower court granted.
Defendants, through their new counsel, filed what in effect was a third
Romeo Lazaro, one of the defendants and a respondent herein, "on his motion for reconsideration of the judgment by default, alleging that: the lower
[own] behalf and on behalf of other defendants," filed a motion to hold court never acquired jurisdiction over their persons because of lack of proper
execution in abeyance praying that "for humanitarian reasons, an extension service of summons; and that the motion for extension of time to vacate the
of 30 days, within which to vacate the premises [be allowed] to give them premises, filed by their co-defendant Romeo Lazaro, after the judgment by
default had become executory, was not equivalent to waiver of summons.

The third motion for reconsideration having been denied, defendants brought In the present case, it appears that the sheriff had availed of substituted
a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, asserting that the orders, service in seeking to serve the summons upon all the defendants by serving
judgment and writs complained of were all void for want of jurisdiction over a copy thereof "through Dr. Ernesto Lazaro personally." Perusal, however, of
theirpersons. the sheriff's return reveals that the sheriff failed to specify therein what prior
efforts, if any, had been exerted to serve summons upon the other
The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, 8 basically upholding the defendants personally within a reasonable period of time, and the lack of
respondents' contention and providing: success of such efforts, before proceeding to substituted service. Such
specification in the sheriff's return is essential for enforcement of the rule
(a) insofar as the petitioner Ernesto Lazaro is concerned, dismissing the under the Revised Rules of Court that substituted service may be resorted to
petition; and only where it is not possible to serve the defendant or defendants promptly
in person.
(b) insofar as the petitioners Romeo Lazaro, Jose Lazaro and Vivencio
Lopez, are concerned, granting the petition and the writs prayed for, We therefore uphold the respondent appellate court's finding that, while
declaring null and void the order of default, judgment by default, order of Ernesto Lazaro was validly served, with respect to respondents Jose Lazaro,
execution, writ of execution, notice to vacate, and making permanent the Romeo Lazaro and Vivencio Lopez, there was no valid service of summons
restraining order heretofore issued in these proceedings. effected. We are, nonetheless, unable to sustain its conclusion that the trial
court never acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the said respondents.
As earlier noted, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can also be
Hence, the petition before us.
acquired by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its
authority, for voluntary appearance is equivalent to service of summons.
Issue: In the case before us, the defendants appeared before the trial court a
number of times without raising any objection to the improper service of
Whether jurisdiction was lawfully acquired by the court a quo over the summons:
persons of the respondents Jose Lazaro, Romeo Lazaro and Vivencio
Lazaro. the defendants, through Atty. Gerardo Roldan, appeared in court
and filed two successive motions for extension of time to file an
answer to the complaint;
more than two years after rendition of the judgment by default by
Ruling: the trial court, defendants, through their co-defendant Romeo
Lazaro, filed a motion for extension of time within which to vacate
Basically, there are two (2) ways by which a court acquires jurisdiction over the premises involved and to look for another place to live in,
the person of the defendant or respondent: raising no question concerning the jurisdiction of the trial court over
the persons of the defendants; and
(a) by service of summons upon the defendant; and
the defendants, through their counsel Atty. Roldan, moved for
reconsideration of the judgment of the trial court and for dissolution
(b) by voluntary appearance of the defendant in court and his submission to
of the writ of execution, again without contesting the jurisdiction of
its authority.
the court over their persons.

numerous claimants, titled and untitled alike, each either pressing to own a
piece of it, or striving to protect one's right as a titled owner.
We hold that by anyone or more of these acts, and certainly by the whole
series of acts, the defendants, respondents herein, effectively waived the
Petitioners herein are World War II veterans, their dependents and
initial lack of jurisdiction over their persons and submitted to the authority of
successors-in-interest. Together, they filed a class suit primarily for
the trial court.
Quieting of Title before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
In particular, petitioners claimed that the real property, which has
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED
an aggregate area of 502 hectares, were part of forest lands
and SET ASIDE insofar as concerns respondents Romeo Lazaro, Jose
belonging to the government; that they and their predecessors-in-
Lazaro and Vivencio Lopez. With respect, however, to defendant Ernesto
interest have occupied said property continuously, adversely, and
Lazaro, same decision is hereby AFFIRMED. This decision is immediately
exclusively for more than thirty (30) years; and that they have
executory. Costs against respondents.
accordingly filed applications for land titling in their respective
Furthermore, Atty. Gerardo B. Roldan, Jr. and Atty. Oliver O. Lozano are names with the appropriate government agency.
hereby required to show cause, within ten (10) days from notice hereof, why While petitioners claim that the land in dispute was part of the
they should not be subject to disciplinary action for abusing court public domain, they named as respondents several persons and
proceedings. SO ORDERED. corporations who are titled owners of subdivided parcels of
land within the subject property.
G.R. No. 91486 January 19, 2001 One of those so impleaded as a party-respondent was the Vil-Ma
Maloles Subdivision (Vil-Ma).
The individual lot owners of the said subdivision, however, were not
ALBERTO G. PINLAC, ATTY. ERIBERTO H. DECENA, RODOLFO F.
specifically named.
REYES, FELIPE BRIONES, JUANITO METILLA, JR., FELIPE A. FLORES,
HERMINIO ELEVADO, NARCISO S. SIMEROS, petitioners, Since personal service of summons could not be effected on Vil-Ma
and some of the other named respondents, petitioners moved for
vs.
leave of court to serve summons by publication which was
COURT OF APPEALS
granted.
Accordingly, the summons was published in the "Metropolitan
RULING: The court orders relied upon by petitioners did not specify the
Newsweek", a periodical edited and published in the City of
place and the length of time that the summons was to be
Caloocan and Malolos, Bulacan. (PLS. TAKE NOTE)
published. In the absence of such specification, publication
Some of the named respondents filed their respective responsive
in just any periodical does not satisfy the strict requirements
pleadings, while the others, including Vil-Ma, failed to answer, and
of the rules.
were thus declared in default.
Consequently, petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex
Facts:
parte against the defaulted respondents.
RTC rendered a Partial Decision in favor of petitioners, declaring
The instant case springs from a contentious and protracted dispute over a some of the parcels of land as owned by the petitioners and
sizeable piece of real property situated in what is now known as Old Balara, declaring the certificates of title of some of the private respondents
Sitio Veterans, Barrio Payatas and Silangan, all of Quezon City. There are null and void.

CA SC agrees with the CAs conclusion that the Partial Decision is null
and void insofar as private respondents are concerned since the
On May 17, 1989, or exactly one (1) year and fifty-seven (57) days latter were not duly served summons or notified of the proceedings
after the above-quoted judgment by default was rendered, a against them.
Petition for Annulment of Judgement with Certiorari, Prohibition and The summons and the Partial Decision were published in a local
Mandamus was brought before the Court of Appeals by the newspaper edited and published in Caloocan City and Malolos,
titled owners of the subdivided lots within Vil-Ma. Bulacan.
They assailed the default judgment which nullified all their titles, However, the Court of Appeals found the publication in said
arguing that the court a quo had no jurisdiction over them and their newspaper, namely the "Metropolitan Newsweek," to be invalid
respective titled properties. because the said periodical is not considered a newspaper of
They also alleged that they only came to know of the adverse general circulation in Quezon City where the subject property
judgment when petitioners sought the execution of the judgment by is located, as required by Presidential Decree No.1079, Section 1.
attempting to dispossess some of the titled owners of the lots and While the service of summons by publication may have been done
making formal demands for them to vacate their respective with the approval of the trial court, it does not cure the fatal defect
properties. that the "Metropolitan Newsweek" is not a newspaper of general
They were never made parties to the Civil Case, nor were their lots circulation in Quezon City.
described in the complaint, published summons, and Partial The Rules strictly require that publication must be "in a
Decision. newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for
Named defendant was VIL-MA, a totally separate and independent such time as the court may order."
entity which had already ceased to exist way back in January of The court orders relied upon by petitioners did not specify the
1976. place and the length of time that the summons was to be
Moreover, the summons, as well as the Partial Decision was published. In the absence of such specification, publication in
not published in a newspaper or periodical of general just any periodical does not satisfy the strict requirements of
circulation. (PLS. TAKE NOTE) the rules. (PLS. TAKE NOTE)
Thus, the defective service of summons to said defendant did not The incomplete directive of the RTC coupled with the defective
place the individual lot owners under the trial court's jurisdiction, nor publication of the summons rendered the service by publication
are they bound by the adverse judgment. ineffective.
The Court of Appeals granted the petition and annulled the Partial The modes of service of summons should be strictly followed in
Decision in the Civil Case based on its finding that the trial court's order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the respondents,
lack of jurisdiction over the persons of respondents. and failure to strictly comply with the requirements of the rules
Petitioners' MR was denied. regarding the order of its publication is a fatal defect in the service
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari. of summons.
It cannot be over emphasized that the statutory requirements of
Issue: Whether the publication of the summons was legal, valid and proper. service of summons, whether personally, by substituted service, or
by publication, must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any
mode of service other than that prescribed by the statute is
Held: NO.
considered ineffective.

Gonzales v. State Properties (2001) before the court can act on the motion for leave to serve
summons by publication?
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTTIORARI ASSAILING THE DECISION
OF THE CA HELD:
FACTS: 1. NO. In the present case, respondent was able to show that the
whereabouts of the other defendants were unknown, and that
- State Properties filed a complaint for Recovery of Property, based summons could not be served personally or by substituted service.
on ownership against Gonzales as well as his brothers and sisters. Hence, it cannot be required to serve such summons prior to or
The complaint also had a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or contemporaneous with the notice of raffle. The raffle, therefore,
preliminary injunction (PI) may proceed even without notice to and the presence of the said
- The case was raffled to Branch 253 of the RTC Las Pias and adverse parties.
summons was duly served to Gonzales
o Gonzales filed an Omnibus Motion praying that there be Administrative Circular No. 20-95 which provided for the requisites of a raffle
another raffle because the other defendants (his brothers of cases, has been incorporated into Section 4 (c), Rule 58 of the 1997
3
and sisters) did not receive any notice of raffle (there was Rules of Civil Procedure. The pre-requisites for conducting a raffle when
an Admin Circular requiring it) there is a prayer for a writ of PI or TRO are:
o State Properties then filed a Motion for Service of
Summons BY PUBLICATION on all defendants except the a. Notice to
petitioner, for the reason that their (the brothers and b. Presence of the adverse party or person to be enjoined.
sisters) residences could not be ascertained. c. Notice shall be preceded or accompanied by a service of
This motion was granted by the court summons to the adverse party or person to be enjoined.
They also received a Notice of Raffle
- During the Raffle, Gonzales and his counsel appeared by opposed The prior or contemporaneous service of summons may be dispensed with
the holding of the raffle since the other defendants were likewise in the following instances:
NOT notified of the raffle (they invoked Admin Circular No. 20-95)
o The court granted
i. When the summons cannot be served personally
o State filed an MR which was granted
or by substituted service despite diligent efforts
Citing Section 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court
ii. When the adverse party is a resident of the
Philippines temporarily absent therefrom
ISSUES: iii. When the party is not a non-resident
1. Whether or not the CA acted with GADLEJ in holding that if

summons COULD NOT be personally served, raffle could be
held without notice to parties?
2. Whether or not the CA GADLEJ in holding that in a case where
the parties are unknown, the case will have to be raffle first

The requirement of notice of the raffle to the party whose whereabouts are FACTS:
unknown does not also apply x x x because the case will have to be raffled
first before the court can act on the motion for leave to serve summons by Complaint was filed against petitioner Purita de la Pea by Pedro
publication. R. de la Pea, Benjamin P. Briones, spouses Julia de la Pea and
Jose Alberto, Godofredo de la Pea, Virginia de la Pea and Maria
The second paragraph of Section 4 (c) of Rule 58 clearly provides that the de la Pea in the RTC of Balanga, Bataan, seeking:
service of summons may be dispensed with "where the summons could not (a) the annulment of the deed of sale and deed of
be served personally or by substituted service despite diligent efforts." extrajudicial partition executed between Fortunata de la Pea and
Purita de la Pea;
2. NO. In ordinary suits, notice of a raffle is given to the parties in (b) the partition of the estates of Fortunata de la Pea and
order "to afford [them] a chance to be heard in the assignment of Gavina de la Pea, and;
their cases." According to Justice Feria, the raffle of cases is done (c) the award in their favor of actual, moral and exemplary
in open session with adequate notice, "so that parties or their damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs of the suit.
counsel will be prevented from choosing judges to hear their case."
Petitioner filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars praying that
all the heirs of Gavina and Fortunata and the entire estate of each
Petitioner has no ground to object, since he himself had been given notice
be properly included and defined. GRANTED. The bill of particulars
prior to the holding of the raffle. Furthermore, he has no standing to
was filed. Petitioner Purita de la Pea filed her Answer with
complain on behalf of the other parties, because he does not claim to
Counterclaim.
represent them.
On 27 July 1988 and 21 September 1988 the parties entered into
partial compromise agreements. They agreed to settle their
In any event, the other defendants had been located and served summons.
respective claims regarding Lot No. 524 and to dispense with the
In fact, the case was subsequently raffled on December 8, 1999, and a
intervention earlier filed by Danilo Cruz.
pretrial conducted on May 9, 2000. The other defendants have not
Judge Vivencio S. Baclig dismissed the complaints.
complained of any impropriety in the raffle. Their silence on this question
Respondents herein as plaintiffs before the trial court received copy
demonstrates the utter lack of merit of petitioner's contention.
of the aforesaid decision on 2 July 1993.
On 15 July 1993, plaintiffs filed their MR which is now being
RULE 15 MOTIONS
assailed as pro forma since it did not contain a notice of hearing.
DENIED. No cogent and compelling reason to warrant the reversal
PURITA DE LA PEA, JUDGE VIVENCIO S. BACLIG, RTC-Br. 2,
or modification of the decision sought to be reconsidered.
Balanga, Bataan, petitioners,
Consequently, on 20 August 1993, plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal
vs.
and/or Extension of Time to File Appeal. DENIED!!! Period to
PEDRO R. DE LA PEA, BENJAMIN P. BRIONES, SPOUSES JULIA DE
appeal had already lapsed as it was not tolled by the motion for
LA PEA and JOSE ALBERTO, GODOFREDO, VIRGINIA, and MARIA,
reconsideration earlier filed, the latter being pro forma for lack of a
all surnamed DE LA PEA, and the COURT OF APPEALS-Fourth
notice of hearing.
Division, respondents.
With regard defendant's motion for execution, the court a quo found
Petition for review on Certiorari no necessity to issue a writ considering its earlier ruling dismissing
plaintiffs' complaint and defendant's counterclaim.

The Court of Appeals: null and void the order of the trial court FLORANTE F. MANACOP, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and F.F.
declaring private respondents' motion for reconsideration pro forma. CRUZ & CO., INC., respondents.
Petitioner moved to reconsider the ruling of the Court of Appeals
and reiterating her claim that a motion for reconsideration without a FACTS:
notice of hearing was a mere scrap of paper hence it did not * respondent corp filed a complaint for a sum of money, with a prayer for
warrant the attention of the court. DENIED! The motion for preliminary attachment, against a land in Quezon City owned by Manacop
reconsideration was not a mere scrap of paper so that the notice of Construction President Florante F. Manacop for failure to pay the sub-
appeal was timely filed. contract cost pursuant to a deed of assignment signed between petitioner's
corporation and private respondent.
ISSUE: Whether the motion complied with the requirements stated in * respondent submitted an amended complaint intended to substitute
Section 4 & 5, Section 15 of Rules of Court? Manacop Construction with Florante F. Manacop as defendant who is "doing
business under the name and style of F.F. Manacop Construction Co., Inc.".
RULING: *summons to the substituted defendant below was granted
NOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO! *petitioner filed his answer to the amended complaint
* Petitioner filed Omnibus Motion on September 5, 1990grounded on (1)
The requirements laid down in Sec. 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of irregularity that attended the issuance of the disputed writ inspite the
Court that the notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall absence of an affidavit therefor; (2) the feasibility of utilizing the writ prior to
state the time and place for the hearing of the motion, are mandatory. If not his submission as party-defendant, and (3) exemption from attachment of his
religiously complied with, they render the motion pro forma. As such the family home- denied
motion is a useless piece of paper that will not toll the running of the CA
prescriptive period. A petition for certiorari w filed by petitioner-dismissed; MR- denied
Hence he went to Sc..
In the instant case, there is no dispute that the motion for
reconsideration filed by the plaintiffs did not contain any notice of hearing. It
was therefore pro forma, hence it did not suspend the running of the ISSUE:Did respondent court err in dismissing the challenge posed by
prescriptive period. The copy of the decision was received on 2 July 1993. petitioner against the denial of his omnibus motion?
Consequently, respondents had until 17 July 1993 within which to file their
notice of appeal. Since they filed their Notice of Appeal and/or Motion for
RULING: NO
Extension of Time to File Appeal on 20 August 1993 or 49 days after receipt
Petitioner harps on the supposition that the appellate court should not have
of the decision, the appeal was clearly filed out of time. On that date the
pierced the veil of corporate fiction because he is distinct from the
decision of the court a quo already attained finality 34 days earlier, hence,
personality of his corporation and, therefore, the writ of attachment issued
could no longer be reviewed much less modified on appeal. The filing of
against the corporation cannot be used to place his own family home in
the Notice of Appeal and/or Extension of Time to File Appeal was a futile
custodia legis. This puerile argument must suffer rejection since the doctrine
exercise. There was no longer any period to appeal nor a decision that could
in commercial law adverted to and employed in exculpation by petitioner,
still be appealed.
during the pendency of his petition for certiorari in the appellate court and
even at this stage, may not be permitted to simply sprout from nowhere for
such subtle experiment is prescribed by the omnibus motion rule under
Section 8, Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus:

A motion attacking a pleading or a proceeding shall include all objections 1978) within which to file his Record on Appeal. Said Motion was
then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived. not acted upon by the TC.
The spirit that surrounds the foregoing statutory norm is to require the
movant to raise all available exceptions for relief during a single opportunity On March 30, 1978 - petitioner submitted his Record on Appeal and
so that multiple and piece-meal objections may be avoided. also filed a Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Execution alleging
petitioner also seeks to capitalize that ipso facto took place when the that the Decision had already become final and executory as
complaint against him was amended. He proffers the idea that the extinction petitioner's Motion for extension of time to file Record on
of a complaint via a superseding one carries with it the cessation of the Appeal failed to comply with the requirements of the Rules of
ancilliary writ of preliminary attachment. We could have agreed with Court on Motions, and therefore, did not toll the running of the
petitioner along this line had he expounded the adverse aftermath of an period to perfect an appeal.
amended complaint in his omnibus motion. But the four corners of his motion
in this respect filed on September 5, 1990 are circumscribed by other salient On April 24, 1978 - TC disapproved petitioner's Record on Appeal.
points set forth by Us relative to the propriety of the assailed writ itself. This MR denied
being so, petitioner's eleventh hour effort in pressing a crucial factor for
exculpation must be rendered ineffective and barred by the omnibus motion
rule. CA
CA dismissed Petition for "Certiorari and Mandamus"
G.R. No. L-51458 July 19, 1982 Record on Appeal as the same was filed beyond the
prescribed period.
MANUEL YAP, petitioner, MR denied
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RAYMOND AND LYDIA
TOMASSI, respondents. SC - Petition for Review on Certiorari
Facts: ISSUE: WON the Motion for extension should mandatorily comply with the
requirements of the Rules on Motions (RULE 15) before the same may be
acted upon by the TC?
RTC
On September 11, 1973, Respondents spouses Tomassi, filed a
HELD: NO.
complaint for Damages against petitioner Manuel Yap.
Yap filed his Answer with Special Defenses and Counterclaim. Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 provide:
On January 31, 1978, TC ordered Yap to pay respondents. Section 4. Notice.-Notice of a motion shag be served by
the applicant to all parties concerned at least three
Copy of the Decision was received by petitioner-defendant on days before the hearing thereof, together with a copy
February 10, 1978. He filed, on March 2, 1978, a Notice of appeal, of the motion, and other papers accompanying it. The
and on March 7, 1978, a Cash Appeal Bond and Motion for Court, however, for good cause may hear a motion on
Extension of twenty days from March 13, 1978 (or until April 2,

shorter notice, specially on matters which the Court may Facts:
dispose of on its own motion.
PETITION to review the resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Section 5. Contents of Notice.-The notice shall be directed
Petitioner seeks reversal of the Resolution of the respondent Court of
to the parties concerned, and shall state the time and
Appeals setting aside the judgment by default rendered against private
place for the hearing of the motion.
respondent by the Court of First Instance, and directing that said respondent
be allowed to file its answer to the complaint and after joinder of issues.
Section 6. Proof of service to be filed with motion.-No
motion shall be acted upon by the court, without proof of This case originated from a complaint filed by petitioner Igmedio Azajar
service of the notice hereof, except when the court is against respondent Cham Samco and Sons, Inc., in the Court of First
satisfied that the rights of the adverse party or parties Instance of Camarines Sur. Azajars claim, briefly, is that he had purchased
are not affected. from defendant (Cham Samco), thru the latters agent, 100 Kegs of nails of
various sizes, specified in one of Cham Samcos printed order forms, and
As a general rule, notice of motion is required where a party has a right to had given to the agent Pl8,000.00 in full payment thereof; but in breach of
resist the relief sought by the motion and principles of natural justice demand contract, Cham Samco had offered to deliver only a part of the quantity
that his right be not affected without an opportunity to be heard. The three- ordered.
day-notice required by law is intended not for the benefit of the movant
but to avoid surprises upon the adverse party and to give the latter Cham Samco filed a motion to dismiss on two grounds:
time to study and meet the arguments of the motion.
failure of the complaint to state a cause of actionthe complaint's
language indicating not a perfected sale but merely an offer to buy
The Motion in question does not affect the substantive rights of private
by plaintiff that was partly accepted by defendant, and failing to
respondents as it merely seeks to extend the period to file the Record
show that as explicitly required by the order form, prices had been
on Appeal, which extension may be granted by the Trial Court upon
confirmed by Cham Samcos Manila Office," and
application made prior to the expiration of the original period. Neither
that venue was improperly laidCham Samcos invariable
was there any claim that said Motion, which was grounded on justifiable
condition in transactions of this nature, as Azajar well knew from
reason, was interposed to delay the appeal.
many such transactions in the past, being that any legal action
thereon must be instituted in the City of Manila."
Dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is frowned upon as the
policy of the Court is to encourage the hearing of appeals on the
merits. Litigants should be afforded every opportunity to establish the merits The motion to dismiss contained a notice addressed to the Clerk of Court.
of their cases without the constraints of technicalities.
It is this notice that has given rise to the controversy at bar.
IGMEDIO AZAJAR, petitioner, vs.
Contending that such a notice was fatally defective and rendered the Motion
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division) and CHAM to Dismiss incapable of tolling the period to answer, Azajar filed a motion to
SAMCO & SONS, INC., respondents. declare Cham Samco in default, which the Court granted. The Court
pronounced Cham Samco in default and allowed Azajar to present evidence
ex-parte.

Defendant thru counsel, instead of filing an answer to the complaint, filed a Court has been that a failure to comply with the requirement is a fatal flaw.
Motion to Dismiss which, in legal contemplation, is not a motion at all Such notice is required to avoid surprises upon the opposite party and give
because the notice therein is directed to the Clerk of Court instead of to the the latter time to study and meet the arguments of the motion, as well as to
party concerned without the requisite notice of time and place of hearing the determine or make determinable the time of submission of the motion for
filing thereof did not suspend the running of the period to file the required resolution.
responsive pleading. That seventeen (17) days had lapsed and defendant
failed to file any responsive pleading.
The Trial Court rendered judgment by default against defendant Cham Ruling:
Samco.
Cham Samcos belief that it was not necessary that its motion to dismiss be
Cham Samco filed a Motion for New Trial. It contended that its failure to set for hearing was avowedly engendered by two factors, namely:
observe the rules governing notice of motions was due to excusable
negligence, because the grounds alleged in the Motion to Dismiss were all in
such nature and character that addressed themselves to a motu proprio
1) the fact that while the Rules of Court specify the motions which can be
resolution by the court and thus rendered a hearing dispensable. It also
heard only with prior service upon adverse parties,"15 said Rules do not
alleged certain defenses available to it which if duly alleged and proven,
point out which written motions may be ex parte, preferring, it appears, to
would absolve it from all liability. This motion was denied.
leave to the court, in motions other than those specified, the discretion either
to ex parte resolve* * or to call the parties to a hearing * *;and
Cham Samco went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari asserting that the 2) the further fact that its motion to dismiss was based on two grounds on
trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of which a hearing was superfluous, the first, failure of the complaint to state a
jurisdiction in declaring it in default and then rendering judgment by default. cause of action, being determinable exclusively from the allegations of the
The petition was dismissed for lack of merit by the Court of Appels complaint and no evidence being allowable thereon; and the second, that
But on motion for reconsideration seasonably presented, the Court of venue is improperly laid, being resolvable exclusively on the basis of
Appeals reversed itself. It set aside the Trial Courts order of judgment by documents annexed to the motion.17
default, and Order denying Cham Samcos motion for new trial, and directed
the lower Court to allow Cham Samco to file its answer to the coinplaint and
upon due joinder of issues, to try and decide the case on the merits. These considerations, to be sure, did not erase movants duty to give notice
to the adverse party of the date and time of the hearing on its motion, the
It was wrong, of course, for Cham Samco to have failed to set its motion to
purpose of said notice being, as already stressed, not only to give the latter
dismiss for hearing on a specified date and time. The law explicitly requires
time to oppose the motion if so minded, but also to determine the time of its
that notice of a motion shall be served by the appellant to ail parties
submission for resolution. Without such notice, the occasion would not arise
concerned at least three (3) days before the hearing thereof, together with a
to determine with reasonable certitude whether and within what time the
copy of the motion, and of any affidavits and other papers accompanying it;
adverse party would respond to the motion, and when the motion might
and that the notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, stating the
already be resolved by the Court. The duty to give that notice is imposed on
time and place for the hearing of the motion. The uniform holding of this
the movant, not on the Court.

Withal, the reasons for Cham Samcos erroneous notion of the dispensability On 9 June 2003, respondent filed her Memorandum.
of a hearing on its motion to dismiss are not utterly without plausibility. This On 19 June 2003, the RTC dismissed the appeal.
circumstance, taken together with the fact, found by the Intermediate Respondent moved for the Reconsideration. But was denied by the
Appellate Court and not disputed by petitioner Azajar, that Cham Samco has RTC.
meritorious defenses which if proven would defeat Azajars claim against it In the main, respondents Motion for Reconsideration is premised
on the argument that she filed a timely "Motion for Extension of
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals appealed from, are Time To File Memorandum," dated and filed on June 3, 2003, but
affirmed. Costs against petitioner. that her motion was not acted upon by this Court.
o She adds that her appeal memorandum was filed well
G.R. No. 167471 February 5, 2007 within the period sought by her in her "Motion for
Extension of Time to File Memorandum" so that her
GLICERIA SARMIENTO, Petitioner, appeal should not have been dismissed.
vs. RTC stated that it did not take cognizance of defendant-appellants
EMERITA ZARATAN, Respondent. "Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum," and rightly so,
because it did not contain a notice of hearing as required by
Facts: Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, an omission for
which it could offer no explanation.
On 2 September 2002, petitioner Gliceria Sarmiento filed an Aggrieved, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari in the Court of
ejectment case against respondent Emerita Zaratan, in the Appeals, which was granted.
Metropolitan Trial Court. The appellate court nullified and set aside the orders of the RTC
On 31 March 2003, the MeTC rendered a decision in favor of and ordered the reinstatement of respondents appeal.
petitioner. Consequently, respondents appeal memorandum was admitted
Respondent filed her notice of appeal. and the case remanded to the RTC for further proceedings.
Thereafter, the case was raffled to the RTC of Quezon City, Branch Hence, this appeal by petitioner.
223.
In the Notice of Appealed Case, the RTC directed respondent to Issue: Whether the lack of notice of hearing in the Motion for Extension of
submit her memorandum. Time to file Memorandum on Appeal is fatal, such that the filing of the
Respondents counsel having received the notice on 19 May 2003, motion is a worthless piece of paper.
he had until 3 June 2003 within which to file the requisite
memorandum. Held: No. Procedural due process was substantially complied with by
But on 3 June 2003, he filed a Motion for Extension of Time of respondent.
five days due to his failure to finish the draft of the said
Memorandum. Petitioner avers that, because of the failure of respondent to include
He cited as reasons for the delay of filing his illness for one week, a Notice of Hearing in her Motion for Extension of Time to file
lack of staff to do the work due to storm and flood compounded by Memorandum on Appeal in the RTC, the latters motion is a
the grounding of the computers because the wirings got wet. worthless piece of paper with no legal effect.
But the motion remained unacted.

The three-day notice required by law is intended not for the benefit As it appears, respondent sought extension prior to the expiration
of the movant but to avoid surprises upon the adverse party and to of the time to do so and the memorandum was subsequently filed
give the latter time to study and meet the arguments of the motion. within the requested extended period. Under the circumstances,
o Principles of natural justice demand that the right of a substantial justice requires that we go into the merits of the case to
party should not be affected without giving it an resolve the issue of who is entitled to the possession of the land in
opportunity to be heard. question.
o The test is the presence of the opportunity to be heard, as Further, it has been held that a "motion for extension of time x x x is
well as to have time to study the motion and meaningfully not a litigated motion where notice to the adverse party is
oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based. necessary to afford the latter an opportunity to resist the
application, but an ex parte motion made to the court in behalf of
There are, indeed, reasons which would warrant the suspension of the one or the other of the parties to the action, in the absence and
Rules: usually without the knowledge of the other party or parties."
As a general rule, notice of motion is required where a party has a
a) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, right to resist the relief sought by the motion and principles of
natural justice demand that his rights be not affected without an
opportunity to be heard.
b) the merits of the case,
It has been said that "ex parte motions are frequently permissible in
procedural matters, and also in situations and under circumstances
c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
of emergency; and an exception to a rule requiring notice is
favored by the suspension of rules,
sometimes made where notice or the resulting delay might tend to
defeat the objective of the motion."
d) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon,
dilatory, and and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid,
technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override,
e) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. substantial justice, and thereby defeat their very aims.
As has been the constant rulings of the Court, every party-litigant
Elements or circumstances (c), (d) and (e) exist in the present should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
case. disposition of his cause, free from constraints of technicalities.
The suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case. Parenthetically, it must be noted also that when the appeal was
The motion in question does not affect the substantive rights of dismissed on 19 June 2003, the memorandum was already filed in
petitioner as it merely seeks to extend the period to file court on 9 June 2003.
Memorandum.
The required extension was due to respondents counsels ANECO REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PETITIONER,
illness, lack of staff to do the work due to storm and flood, VS. LANDEX DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, RESPONDENT
compounded by the grounding of the computers.
There is no claim likewise that said motion was interposed to delay Facts:
the appeal.

Aneco filed an injunction case with damages before the RTC inorder to It must be stressed that there are no vested right to technicalities.
restrain Landex from constructing a concrete fence on its lot claiming that The requirement of a notice of hearing in every contested motion is
they were deprived access to their property. Landex on its Answer claimed part of due process of law.
that said fence does not deprive Aneco access to their property since the
initial subdivision plan agreed by Aneco and its original owner FHDI, will no The notice alerts the opposing party of a pending motion in court
longer be continued as also defined in the Deed of Sale. and gives him an opportunity to oppose it. What the rule forbids is
not the mere absence of a notice of hearing in a contested motion
RTC- Ruled infavor of Aneco. but the unfair surprise caused by the lack of notice. It is the dire
consequences which flow from the procedural error which is
Landex moved to reconsider but failed to include a notice of hearing. RTC proscribed. If the opposing party is given a sufficient opportunity to
set a hearing for the said MR. Aneco failed to attend. RTC gave Aneco oppose a defective motion, the procedural lapse is deemed cured
additional time to comment. and the intent of the rule is substantially complied.
RTC- issued an order denying Anecos motion for execution. Rules of procedure, and this includes the three (3) days notice
requirement, are liberally construed in order to promote their object
RTC- issued an order granting the motion for reconsideration of Landex and and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive
dismissed the complaint of Aneco. determination of every action and proceeding (Section 2, Rule 1,
Rules of Court).
Aneco appealed to the CA.
Court made it clear that lapses in the literal observance of a rule of
CA- affirmed the decision of the RTC on the ground that Aneco is aware that
procedure may be overlooked when they have not prejudiced the
the lots sold to them is no longer a subdivision lot thus the road in dispute
adverse party and have not deprived the court of its authority.
ceases to be a road lot.
Aneco moved for reconsideration. Denied. Hence this appeal under Rule 45
2. No. Aneco failed to prove any legal right to prevent, much less
Issue: W/N CA erred in liberally applying Section 5 of Rule 15 regarding restrain, Landex from fencing its own property. Article 430 of the
notice of hearing when it admitted Landex motion despite its lack of notice Civil Code gives every owner the right to enclose or fence his land
of hearing. or tenement by means of walls, ditches, hedges or any other
means. The right to fence flows from the right of ownership. As
W/N Aneco may enjoin Landex from constructing a concrete wall on its own owner of the land, Landex may fence his property subject only to
property. the limitations and restrictions provided by law
G.R. No. 169135 June 18, 2010
Held:
JOSE DELOS REYES, Petitioner,
1. No. In the absence of any palpable error, RTC and the CA vs.
JOSEPHINE ANNE B. RAMNANI, Respondent.
exercised their discretion in opting for a liberal rather than a strict
application of the rules on notice of hearing.

respondent Manila Southcoast Development Corporation.
FACTS: > the MTC ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered respondent to vacate the
1977 RTC rendered a decision in favor of the respondent disputed land
1978 writ of execution was issued and a bidding and auction sale ** RTC
over a certain property was conducted. > Respondent appealed to RTC which reversed the MTC decision and
o respondent was the highest bidder. A certificate of sale dismissed petitioners complaint
was issued and annotated in favor of the respondent. > MR was filed by petitioner which was set for hearing on 26 February 2004
2004 respondent filed a motion for the issuance of an order a copy of the MR was sent to respondents counsel by registered mail on 23
directing the sheriff to execute the final certificate in her favor. February 2004.
Petitioner opposed stating that: >During the 26 February 2004 scheduled hearing of the motion, the RTC
o Subject motion was not accompanied by a notice of judge reset the hearing to 2 April 2004 because the courts calendar could
hearing not accommodate the hearing of the motion. All the parties were notified of
o 1977 decision cannot be executed as it is barred by the schedule for the next hearing.
prescription > 3 March 2004, or 6 days after the scheduled hearing on 26 February 2004,
that respondents counsel received a copy of petitioners Motion for
ISSUE: Whether the subject motion was defective for lack of a notice of Reconsideration.The rescheduled hearing on 2 April 2004 was again reset
hearing? on 7 May 2004 because the RTC judge was on official leave.
>The 7 May 2004 hearing was further reset to 6 August 2004.
RULING: >After the hearing, respondent filed its Motion to Dismiss dated 9 August
2004,claiming that non-compliance with the three-day notice rule did not toll
NO! the running of the period of appeal.
> On 4 October 2004, the RTC denied petitioner's MR for failure to appeal
Motion was valid. The subject motion is a non-litigious motion. While, as a within the 15 days reglementary period and ruled MR was fatally flawed for
general rule, all written motions should be set for hearing under Section 4 failure to observe the three-day notice rule.
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, excepted from this rule are non-litigious >Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the Order-denied
motions or motions which may be acted upon by the court without CA
prejudicing the rights of the adverse party. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, alleging
that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Motion
Respondent is entitled to the issuance of the final certificate of sale as a for Reconsideration and Omnibus Motion for petitioners alleged failure to
matter of right and petitioner is powerless to oppose the same. The subject observe the three-day notice rule.
motion falls under the class of non-litigious motions. > CA dismissed the petition and ruled that the three-day notice rule under
Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is mandatory and non-
FAUSTO R. PREYSLER, JR., vs. MANILA SOUTHCOAST compliance therewith is fatal and renders the motion pro forma.
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, > MR denied , henceforth petitioner went to SC
FACTS:
**MTC-Batangas ISSUE: WON 3 day notice rule is absolute?NO
> petitioner Fausto R. Preysler, Jr. filed a complaint for forcible entry against

RULING: (read sections 4,5,6, of R.15) hearing was served.
The three-day notice rule is not absolute. A liberal construction of the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioner failed to comply with the
procedural rules is proper where the lapse in the literal observance of a rule three-day notice rule because although respondent received petitioners
of procedure has not prejudiced the adverse party and has not deprived the Motion for Reconsideration six days after the scheduled hearing on 26
court of its authority. February 2004, the said hearing was reset three (3) times with due notice to
Jehan Shipping Corporation v. National Food Authority,[14] the the parties. Thus, it was only on 6 August 2004, or more than five months
Court held that despite the lack of notice of hearing in a Motion for after respondent received a copy of petitioners Motion for Reconsideration,
Reconsideration, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of that the motion was heard by the RTC. Clearly, respondent had more than
due process where the adverse party actually had the opportunity to be sufficient time to oppose petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. In fact,
heard and had filed pleadings in opposition to the motion. The Court respondent did oppose the motion when it filed its Motion to Dismiss dated
held under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, mandatory is 9 August 2004.
the requirement in a motion, which is rendered defective by failure to comply THUS, there was substantial compliance with procedural due process.
with the requirement. As a rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is Instead of dismissing petitioners Motion for Reconsideration based merely
considered pro forma and does not affect the reglementary period for the on the alleged procedural lapses, the RTC should have resolved the motion
appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading. based on the merits.
>> three-day notice required by the Rules is not intended for the benefit of >>>>WON RTC Erred in dismissing Omnibus Motion? YES
the movant. Rather, the requirement is for the purpose of avoiding surprises RTC erred in dismissing petitioners Omnibus Motion for allegedly
that may be sprung upon the adverse party, who must be given time to study failing to comply with the three-day notice requirement. The RTC found that
and meet the arguments in the motion before a resolution of the court. the notice of hearing of petitioners Omnibus Motion which was set to be
Principles of natural justice demand that the right of a party should not be heard on 12 November 2004 was received by respondent on 9 November
affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard.The test is the presence 2004.
of opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion and Section 4 of Rule 15 provides that [e]very written motion required to be
meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based. heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner
as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the
>>>>WON RTC erred in dismissing MR which was affirmed by CA?YES date of the hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on
RTC gave petitioner ten days within which to comment on respondents shorter notice. Thus, the date of the hearing should be at least three days
Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner filed its Opposition to the Motion on after receipt of the notice of hearing by the other parties. In this case, the
November 26, 2001. In its 14-page Opposition, it not only pointed out that petitioners Omnibus Motion was set for hearing on 12 November 2004.
the Motion was defective for not containing a notice of hearing and should Thus, to comply with the notice requirement, respondent should have
then be dismissed outright by the court; it also ventilated its substantial received the notice of the hearing at least three days before 12 November
arguments against the merits of the Motion and of the Supplemental Motion 2004, which is 9 November 2004. Clearly, respondents receipt on 9
for Reconsideration. Notably, its arguments were recited at length in the trial November 2004 (Tuesday) of the notice of hearing of the Omnibus Motion
courts January 8, 2002 Joint Resolution. Nevertheless, the court proceeded which was set to be heard on 12 November 2004 (Friday), was within the
to deny the Motions on the sole ground that they did not contain any notice required minimum three-days notice.
of hearing. As explained by Retired Justice Jose Y. Feria in his book, Civil Procedure
The requirement of notice of time and hearing in the pleading filed by a Annotated, when the notice of hearing should be given: The ordinary
party is necessary only to apprise the other of the actions of the former. motion day is Friday. Hence, the notice should be served by Tuesday at the
Under the circumstances of the present case, the purpose of a notice of latest, in order that the requirement of the three days may be complied with.

If notice be given by ordinary mail, it should be actually received by Private respondents aver that being foreign corporations, petitioners should
Tuesday, or if not claimed from the post office, the date of the first notice of have such license to be able to maintain an action in Philippine courts. In so
the postmaster should be at least five (5) days before challenging petitioners' personality to sue, private respondents point to the
Tuesday. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. fact that petitioners are the copyright owners or owners of exclusive rights of
distribution in the Philippines of copyrighted motion pictures or films, and
RULE 16 MOTION TO DISMISS also to the appointment of Atty. Rico V. Domingo as their attorney-in-fact, as
being constitutive of "doing business in the Philippines" under Section 1
(This is a VERY long case... yung other issue is about the validity of (f)(1) and (2), Rule 1 of the Rules of the Board of Investments.
search warrant which the SC upheld pero di ko na nilagay dahil obiter
dictum lang yun for our civ pro topic) As foreign corporations doing business in the Philippines, Section 133 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, or the Corporation Code of the Philippines, denies
G.R. No. 110318 August 28, 1996 them the right to maintain a suit in Philippine courts in the absence of a
license to do business. Consequently, they have no right to ask for the
issuance of a search warrant.
COLUMBIA PICTURES, INC., ORION PICTURES CORPORATION,
PARAMOUNT PICTURES CORPORATION, TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX
FILM CORPORATION, UNITED ARTISTS CORPORATION, UNIVERSAL The Corporation Code provides:
CITY STUDIOS, INC., THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY, and WARNER
BROTHERS, INC., petitioners, Sec. 133. Doing business without a license. No foreign
vs. corporation transacting business in the Philippines without
COURT OF APPEALS, SUNSHINE HOME VIDEO, INC. and DANILO A. a license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted
PELINDARIO, respondents. to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in
any court or administrative agency of the Philippines; but
such corporation may be sued or proceeded against
before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any
valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws.
FACTS:
Petitioners are foreign corporations not licensed to do business in the

Philippines.
ISSUE: WON case should be dismissed for petitioners lack of legal capacity
to sue?
Complainants (herein petitioners) lodged a formal complaint with the NBI for
violation of PD No. 49 (Decree on Protection of Intellectual Property), as
amended, and sought its assistance in their anti-film piracy drive. Held: NO. (It is merely respondents procedural tactic)
Among the grounds of respondents for a motion to dismiss under the Rules Lack of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the exercise
of Court are lack of legal capacity to sue and that the complaint states no of his civil rights, or does not have the necessary qualification to appear in
cause of action. the case, or does not have the character or representation he claims.

On the other hand, a case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue SPOUSES GERMAN ANUNCIACION and ANA FERMA ANUNCIACION
upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, hence and GAVINO G. CONEJOS, petitioners, vs.
grounded on failure to state a cause of action.
PERPETUA M. BOCANEGRA and GEORGE M. BOCANEGRA,
The term "lack of capacity to sue" should not be confused with the term respondents.
"lack of personality to sue." While the former refers to a plaintiff's general
Facts:
disability to sue, such as on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack
of juridical personality or any other general disqualifications of a party, the PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court
latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest. of Appeals.
Correspondingly, "lack of capacity to sue" can be a ground for a motion This is a petition for review on certiorari, assailing the Decision, and the
to dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue (Rule Resolution, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 65516. The CA
16 Section 1(d)); whereas the term "lack of personality to sue" can be decision affirmed the Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
used as a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the fact that the Branch 40 in Civil Case No. 00-98813 which dismissed the complaint for
complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no cause of Quieting of Title and Cancellation of TCT No. 122452 of petitioner Spouses
action. (Rule 16 Section 1(g)); German Anunciacion and Ana Ferma Anunciacion and their co-petitioner,
Gavino G. Conejos.
The ground available for barring recourse to our courts by an unlicensed
foreign corporation doing or transacting business in the Philippines should Petitioners filed before the RTC, Manila, a complaint for Quieting of Title and
properly be "lack of capacity to sue," NOT "lack of personality to sue." Cancellation of TCT No. 122452, docketed as Civil Case No. 00-98813. The
Certainly, a corporation whose legal rights have been violated is undeniably complaint averred that defendants (respondents) may be served with
such, if not the only, real party in interest to bring suit thereon although, for summons and legal processes through Atty. Rogelio G. Pizarro, Jr., with
failure to comply with the licensing requirement, it is not capacitated to office address at 2830 Juan Luna St., Tondo, Manila. The summons,
maintain any suit before our courts. together with the copies of the complaint, were then served on Atty. Pizarro.
The record shows that before the filing of the said complaint, Atty. Pizarro
wrote a demand letter on behalf of respondents and addressed to petitioner
This Court's REJECTS the common procedural tactics of erring local
German Anunciacion, among others, demanding that they vacate the land
companies which, when sued by unlicensed foreign corporations not
owned by his clients (respondents), who needed the same for their own use.
engaged in business in the Philippines, invoke the latter's supposed
lack of capacity to sue. The doctrine of lack of capacity to sue based on
failure to first acquire a local license is based on considerations of public
policy. It was never intended to favor nor insulate from suit unscrupulous Respondents, through their counsel, Atty. Norby C. Caparas, Jr., filed a
establishments or nationals in case of breach of valid obligations or violation Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint stated no cause of
of legal rights of unsuspecting foreign firms or entities simply because they action. Petitioners filed their Comment on the Motion to Dismiss.
are not licensed to do business in the country.
A Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and Reply to the Comment on the Motion
G.R. No. 152496. July 30, 2009.* to Dismiss was filed by respondents, alleging an additional ground that
petitioners failed to pay the required filing fee. The petitioners filed, their

Opposition to the Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and Comment to the that the service made to Atty. Rogelio Pizarro, Jr. was deemed service upon
Reply to the Comment on the Motion to Dismiss. respondents/defendants.
Thereafter, respondents filed a Second Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and In the case at bench, service upon Atty. Pizarro did not fall under the
Manifestation citing the following grounds: aforequoted rule and therefore cannot qualify as substituted service. Since
the service made by Petitioners was defective, the Public Respondent court
1.) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending never did acquire jurisdiction over the persons of defendants and therefore
party. correctly ordered the dismissal of the complaint.
2.) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the decision but it, too, was
denied by the CA in its Resolution.
3.) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit
Petitioners then filed their Additional Comment on the Motion to Dismiss, their respective memoranda. In compliance, the respondents filed their
Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and Comment on the Second Supplemental Memorandum, while the petitioners filed their Memorandum.
Motion to Dismiss.
The trial court sustained the respondents and dismissed the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction over the persons of respondents as defendants. Ruling:
Aggrieved, petitioners filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari, seeking We find merit in the petition.
the nullification of the RTC Orders, on the ground that the said orders were
issued with grave abuse of discretion. Respondents, through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss, with only one
ground, i.e., that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action.
Under this ground, respondents raised the issues quoted hereunder:
I. Defendants anchored their complaint on a WRONG Decree of

Registration;
The CA dismissed the petition upon finding that there was no waiver of the
ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of respondents in the form of II. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines has recognized the
voluntary appearance. Applying Section 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of authenticity of TCT No. 122452; and
Civil Procedure, the CA held that although the grounds alleged in the two (2)
earlier Motion to Dismiss and Supplemental Motion to Dismiss were lack of III. Plaintiffs do NOT have the legal personality to quiet the title of the
cause of action and failure to pay the required filing fee, the filing of the said subject property.
motions did not constitute a waiver of the ground of lack of jurisdiction on
their persons as defendants. The CA then concluded that there was no The filing of the above-mentioned Motion to Dismiss, without invoking the
voluntary appearance on the part of respondents/defendants despite the lack of jurisdiction over the person of the respondents, is deemed a
filing of the aforesaid motions. The CA also rejected petitioners contention voluntary appearance on the part of the respondents under the aforequoted

provision of the Rules. The same conclusion can be drawn from the filing of We likewise cannot approve the trial courts act of entertaining supplemental
the Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and Reply to the Comment on the motions to dismiss which raise grounds that are already deemed waived. To
Motion to Dismiss which alleged, as an additional ground for the dismissal of do so would encourage lawyers and litigants to file piecemeal objections to a
petitioners complaint, the failure of plaintiffs to pay the required filing fee complaint in order to delay or frustrate the prosecution of the plaintiffs cause
again but failed to raise the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the court over the of action.
person of the respondents.
To be sure, a trial court should be cautious before dismissing complaints on
the sole ground of improper service of summons considering that it is well
within its discretion to order the issuance and service of alias summons on
It was only in respondents Second Supplemental Motion to Dismiss dated the correct person in the interest of substantial justice.
November 27, 2000 that respondents for the first time raised the courts lack
of jurisdiction over their person as defendants on the ground that summons Accordingly, the Court finds that the CA erred in dismissing the petition and
were allegedly not properly served upon them. The filing of the said Second affirming the challenged orders of the RTC which dismissed the complaint
Supplemental Motion to Dismiss did not divest the court of its jurisdiction on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the respondents who
over the person of the respondents who had earlier voluntarily appeared were the defendants.
before the trial court by filing their motion to dismiss and the supplemental
motion to dismiss. The dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The CAs Decision and the
jurisdiction over the person of the respondents after they had voluntarily Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 65516 affirming the Orders of the RTC in Civil
appeared before the trial court clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion Case No. 00-98813 are reversed and set aside. Consequently, Civil Case
amounting to lack of jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the No. 00-98813 is hereby ordered REINSTATED.
RTC.
G.R. No. 176014 September 17, 2009
Quite apart from their voluntary appearance, respondents Supplemental
Motion to Dismiss and Second Supplemental ALICE VITANGCOL and NORBERTO VITANGCOL, Petitioners,
vs.
Motion to Dismiss were clearly in violation of Rule 15, Section 8 in relation to
NEW VISTA PROPERTIES, INC., MARIA ALIPIT, REGISTER OF DEEDS
Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules.
OF CALAMBA, LAGUNA, and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
Respondents failure to raise the alleged lack of jurisdiction over their Respondents.
persons in their very first motion to dismiss was fatal to their cause. They are
already deemed to have waived that particular ground for dismissal of the Facts:
complaint. The trial court plainly abused its discretion when it dismissed the
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the Subject of the instant controversy is lot in the name of Maria A.
defendants. Under the Rules, the only grounds the court could take Alipit and Clemente A. Alipit, married to Milagros.
cognizance of, even if not pleaded in the motion to dismiss or answer, are: On June 18, 1989, Maria and Clemente A. Alipit, with the marital
(a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) existence of another action consent of the latters wife, executed a Special Power of Attorney
pending between the same parties for the same cause; and (c) bar by prior (SPA) constituting Milagros A. De Guzman as their attorney-in-fact
judgment or by statute of limitations. to sell their property.

Pursuant to her authority under the SPA, De Guzman executed a Ruling of the RTC
Deed of Absolute Sale conveying to New Vista Properties, Inc.
(New Vista) a parcel of land with an area of 242,540 square meters The trial court denied Vitangcols and Maria Alipits separate
situated in Calamba, Laguna. motions to dismiss the amended complaint.
In the deed, however, the lot thus sold was described as lot no. As there held by the RTC, the amended complaint sufficiently
1702. stated a cause of action.
Following the sale, New Vista immediately entered the subject lot, From the above order, Vitangcol sought reconsideration.
fenced it with cement posts and barbed wires, and posted a RTC granted reconsideration and dismissed the amended
security guard to deter trespassers. complaint.
SC interpose at this point the observation that the property In reversing itself, the RTC made much of the fact that New Vista
delivered to and occupied by New Vista was denominated in the did not attach the SPA to the amended complaint. To the RTC, this
SPA as Lot No. 1735, while in the deed of absolute sale in favor of omission is fatal to New Vistas cause of action for quieting of title,
New Vista the object of the purchase is described as Lot No. 1702. citing in this regard the pertinent rule when an action is based on a
The controversy arose more than a decade later when respondent document.
New Vista learned that the parcel of land it paid for and occupied, Aggrieved, New Vista interposed an appeal before the CA.
i.e., Lot No. 1702, was being claimed by petitioners Vitangcol on
the strength of a Deed of Absolute Sale for Lot No. 1702 entered Ruling of the CA
into on August 14, 2001 by and between Vitangcol and Maria Alipit.
New Vista lost no time in protecting its rights by, first, filing a notice
CA reversed the RTC Order, reinstating New Vistas amended
of adverse claim over the certificate of title, followed by
complaint for quieting of title, and directing Vitangcol and Maria
commencing a suit for quieting of title before the RTC.
Alipit to file their respective answers thereto.
Vitangcol moved to dismiss the complaint which New Vista duly
CA denied Vitangcols motion for reconsideration.
opposed. An exchange of pleadings then ensued.
Hence, the instant petition.
On June 27, 2003, or before Maria Alipit and Vitangcol could
answer, New Vista filed an amended complaint, appending
thereto a copy of the 1989 deed of absolute sale De Guzman, Issue: Whether lack of cause of action is a ground for a dismissal of the
as agent authorized agent of the Alipits, executed in its favor. complaint through a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the ROC.
Thereafter, Vitangcol filed a motion to dismiss, followed by a similar
motion interposed by Maria Alipit which New Vista countered with Held: No.
an opposition.
Unlike in its original complaint, New Vistas amended Lack of cause of action is not a ground for a dismissal of the
complaint did not have, as attachment, the SPA. (PLS. TAKE complaint through a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules
NOTE) of Court.
It, however, averred that Clemente and Maria Alipit had ratified and For the determination of a lack of cause of action can only be made
validated the sale of Lot No. 1702 by their having delivered during and/or after trial.
possession of said lot to New Vista after receiving and retaining the What is dismissible via that mode is FAILURE OF THE
purchase price therefor. COMPLAINT TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION

Sec. 1(g) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion Facts:
may be made on the ground "that the pleading asserting the claim
states no cause of action." The petition at bar evolved from a dispute between brother and
The rule is that in a motion to dismiss, a defendant hypothetically sister over the use of the business name or style "GATCHALIAN
admits the truth of the material allegations of the ultimate facts THE HOUSE OF NATIVE LECHON
contained in the plaintiffs complaint. Alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
When a motion to dismiss is grounded on the failure to state a on the part of respondent Presiding Judge, spouses-petitioners,
cause of action, a ruling thereon should, as a rule, be based only through the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65, Revised Rules of
on the facts alleged in the complaint. Court, prayed for the annulment of the latter's judgment by default
However, this principle of hypothetical admission admits of Private respondent filed a Complaint for damages based on
exceptions. defendants' (petitioners herein) use of plaintiff's (now private
Among others, there is no hypothetical admission of conclusions or respondent) trade name and style of "Gatchalian-The House of
interpretations of law which are false; legally impossible facts; facts Native Lechon and Restaurant"
inadmissible in evidence; facts which appear by record or Petitioners as defendants therein filed an "Urgent Ex- Parte Motion"
document included in the pleadings to be unfounded; allegations for extension of time of 15 days within which to file an Answer
which the court will take judicial notice are not true; and where the which the Court granted
motion to dismiss was heard with submission of evidence which Instead of filing the Answer within the extended period of fifteen
discloses facts sufficient to defeat the claim. (15) days, defendants filed through their counsel, Atty, Esmeraldo
New Vistas threshold contention that De Guzmans SPA to sell M. Gatchalian, a "Motion to Dismiss Complaint Together With
should not be considered for not having been incorporated as part Prayer for Preliminary Injunction
of its amended complaint is incorrect since Vitangcol duly submitted o That the complaint states no cause of action
that piece of document in court in the course of the June 7, 2004 o That venue is improperly laid
hearing on the motion to dismiss. o That there is another action pending between the same
Thus, the trial court acted within its discretion in considering said parties for the same cause of action
SPA relative to the motion to dismiss the amended complaint. Private respondent filed an "Ex-Parte Motion to Declare Defendants
The trial court, however, erred in ruling that, taking said SPA into in Default" on
account, the amended complaint stated no cause of action. o that the defendants failed to file an answer within the
Indeed, upon a consideration of the amended complaint, its reglementary period
annexes, with the June 18, 1989 SPA thus submitted, the Court is Court finding the reasons stated in the "Ex-Parte Motion to Declare
inclined, in the main, to agree with the appellate court that the Defendants in Default" filed by plaintiff, through counsel to be well-
amended complaint sufficiently states a cause of action. taken, granted said motion and allowed the plaintiff to present
evidence exparte
Respondent judge rendered his decision in favor of the plaintiff
Defendants through counsel moved for the reconsideration of the
court's order
o defendants were denied of their rights of procedural due
Barraza v Campos process
o defendants were also denied of their day in court

Court denied defendants' motion for reconsideration 11, computed from the time he received notice of the denial or deferment,
Upon an "Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution", the unless the court provides a different period
Court in its Order granted the motion and caused the issuance of a
writ of execution This Section 1 of Rule 11 in relation to Section 4 of Rule 16 allows the
Defendants through a new counsel, Atty. M. Castillo, filed an defendant to file his answer not only within the original fifteen (15) days
"Urgent Omnibus Motion" period but also within "a different period (as) fixed by the court. "
o Court denied defendants' Omnibus Motion
Hence this petition Without resolving petitioners' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, respondent
Judge declared defendant in default in his Order of December 1, 1978. This
is clearly in contravention of the Rules for under Section 3, Rule 16, the
Issue: W/N instead of filing an answer, the act of filing a motion to dismiss court after hearing may deny or grant the motion or allow amendment of
the compliant was proper pleading, or may defer the hearing and determination of the motion until the
trial if the ground alleged therein does not appear to be indubitable. And it is
only from the time that the movant receives notice of the denial or deferment
Held: This is clearly allowed under Section 1, Rule 16, Rules of Court of the motion to dismiss that the period within which he shall file his answer
is computed, which period is prescribed by Rule 11, unless the court
A motion to dismiss is the usual, proper and ordinary method of testing the provides a different period
legal sufficiency of a complaint. The issue raised by a motion to dismiss is
Simeon Mandae, plaintiff and appellant, vs. Eustaquio Gumarad and Regino
similar to that formerly raised by a demurrer under the Code of Civil
Procedure Lagundino, defendants and appellees
A motion to dismiss under any of the grounds enumerated in Sec. 1, Rule 8 "It appearing that the motion to dismiss was filed before the
(now Sec. 1, Rule 16) of the Rules of Court, must be filed within the time for expiration of the period for filing defendants' answer as extended by
pleading, that is, within the time to answer the court, there was no legal reason for declaring defendants in
default. "
Private respondents' argument that although a motion to dismiss interrupts
Epang vs. Ortin de Layco
the running of the period within which to file an answer, this refers to the
original period of fifteen (15) days within which to file the responsive
"The petitioner having filed a motion to dismiss, he was entitled to
pleading and not to the extension of time within which to file the answer, is
have that motion resolved before being required to answer, since a
without merit.
motion to dismiss interrupts the time to plead. It follows, therefore,
There is nothing in the Rules which provide, directly or indirectly, that the that the petitioner was incorrectly declared in default, and the
interruption of the running of the period within which to file an answer when a holding of the trial of the case on the merits in his absence, without
motion to dismiss the complaint is filed and pending before the court, refers notice to him of the day of the hearing, was a denial of due process.
only to the original period of fifteen (15) days and not to the extension of time Consequently, the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations was
to file the answer as granted by the court. It may be true that under Section 4 invalid and must be set aside."
of Rule 16, if the motion to dismiss is denied or if the termination thereof is
CARMELITA T. PANGANIBAN, petitioner,
deferred, themovant shall file his answer within the time prescribed by Rule

vs. o Considering that there has been a breach of the SLDA
and that an ejectment case has been filed, this petition is
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, respondent. no longer proper
RTC denied the MR of Petitioner for failure of the latter to appear at
FACTS:
the hearing
Petitioner filed a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Petitioner entered into a Sublease and Dealer Agreement (SLDA)
Court with the Supreme Court
with Respondent
o SC issued a Resolution referring the said Petition to the
o Respondent leased a gasoline station
CA
o Respondent is not the owner of the lot subject of the
CA denied the petition
lease; Respondent is only leasing the lot from the owner,
o Denied the Petition for Declaratory Relief on the ground of
Serafin Vasquez, pursuant to a lease agreement effective
litis pendentia
for 15 years.
The case of Declaratory Relief should be abated
In a letter, private respondent notified petitioner that the SLDA was
in favor of the case for Unlawful Detainer
expiring.
o With regard to Petitioners contention that it is this Court
Believing that the SLDA had not yet expired and was still effective
which has jurisdiction over her petition, the CA pointed out
until December 31, 2002, petitioner continued to pay rentals for the
that it was merely yielding to the Courts order;
gasoline station.
Accordingly, the CA has concurrent jurisdiction with this
o Private respondent refused to accept the payments.
Court and there is no special reason for this Court to take
Petitioner filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with the RTC of
Cognizance of the case
Makati
o Respondent filed an Answer.
Respondent filed an Unlawful Detainer case against Petitioner with ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in affirming the dismissal of the case on the
the MTC of Caloocan ground of litis pendentia which was filed long after the Respondent filed its
o 8 months after filing its Answer, Respondent filed a Answer?
Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss. Private respondent
claimed that the issue of the renewal of the lease should RULING:
be raised in the unlawful detainer case pending before the
Metropolitan Trial Court. Close but no cigar. NO!
Petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings since the
other case filed with the Regional Trial Court involved the same The Court of Appeals applied Rosales and University Physicians Services,
parties and issues. DENIED Inc. in sustaining the dismissal of the action for declaratory relief to give way
MTC decided in favor of the Respondents (Unlawful Detainer case) to the ejectment suit.
o Ordered Petitioner to vacate the premises and surrender o Rosales Case:
possession thereof and to pay Respondents Lessee filed an action for continued enforcement
Petitioner appealed from the said decision which is now pending of the lease contract
with the RTC of Caloocan Lessor filed a case for unlawful detainer
RTC ordered the dismissal of the Petition for Declaratory Relief Lessor filed a MTD the complaint of the Lessee
because of the pendency of the ejectment case

Lesse filed a MTD for the dismissal of the In this case, the bona fide existence of litis pendentia is beyond dispute.
ejectment case also on the ground of litis Requisites of litis pendentia:
pendentia contending that the case he file earlier
should be entertained first (1) The identity of parties, or at least such as representing the
Court held that if the plaintiff has any same interests in both actions;
right to the extension of the lease at all, (2) The identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
such right is a proper and legitimate being founded on the same facts;
issue that could be raised in the (3) The identity of the two cases such that judgment in one,
unlawful detainer case because it may regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res
be used as a defense to the action.' In judicata in the other
other words, the matter raised in the
Court of First instance of Cavite may be Petitioner questions the preference given by the RTC and the CA to the
threshed out in the ejectment suit, in unlawful detainer case filed by private respondent. Petitioner maintains that
consonance with the principle based on priority in time, the action for declaratory relief, the case filed
prohibiting multiplicity of suits. And the earlier, should not have been abated in favor of the ejectment suit, a case
mere fact that the unlawful detainer filed much later.
case was filed later, would not change
the situation to depart from the Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that
application of the foregoing rule situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the
o University Physician Services Case: same cause of actions and that the second action becomes unnecessary
The issue of whether private respondent had the and vexatious.
right to occupy the subject apartment unit should
therefore be properly threshed out in an We have set the relevant factors that a court must consider when it has to
ejectment suit and not in an action for damages determine which case should be dismissed given the pendency of two
where the question of possession is likewise the actions:
primary issue to be resolved
i. The date of filing, with preference generally
The requirement that a motion to dismiss should be filed within the time for given to the first action filed to be retained
filing the answer is not absolute. Even after an answer has been filed, a ii. Whether the action sought to be dismissed
defendant can still file a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: was filed merely to preempt the latter action
(1) Lack of jurisdiction, or to anticipate its filing and lay the basis for
(2) Litis pendentia, its dismissal
(3) Lack of cause of action, and; iii. Whether the action is the appropriate vehicle
(4) Discovery during trial of evidence that would constitute a ground for litigating the issues between the parties
for dismissal
The mere fact that the action for declaratory relief was filed earlier than the
Litis pendentia is also one of the grounds that authorize a court to dismiss a case for unlawful detainer does not necessarily mean that the first case will
case motu proprio. be given preference.

In Cruz v. Court of Appeals, we have ruled that the earlier case can be respondent Judge (di sinabi sa case kong anung cv case )Claiming that the
dismissed in favor of the later case if the later case is the more appropriate adverse decision in 1st case was due to the mishandling of the same by the
forum for the ventilation of the issues between the parties. counsel who represented him therein
-defendants 2nd case were petitioner BA Finance Corporation whom private
Clearly, the interpretation of a provision in the SLDA as to when the SLDA respondent claims to be the real owner of the cargo truck involved in the
would expire is the key issue that would determine petitioner's right to accident; the Metro-Taisho Insurance Corporation, which issued the
possess the gasoline service station. When the primary issue to be resolved insurance policy covering the same; Atty. Ireneo Calderon, the counsel who
is physical possession, the issue should be threshed out in the ejectment represented him in 1st case; and Robert Chua, the driver of the other vehicle
suit, and not in any other case such as an action for declaratory relief to that figured in the accident
avoid multiplicity of suits. Moreover, the Metropolitan Trial Court had already -Petitioner BA Finance Corporation was served summons , Eleven days
resolved the unlawful detainer case in favor of private to respondent even later, petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion for extension of time to file
before the Regional Trial Court dismissed the action for declaratory relief. answer and/or motion to dismiss -the respondent Judge gave the petitioner a
period of 15 days, counted from January 2, 1982 and to expire on January
It would have been an exercise in futility for the Regional Trial Court to 18, 1982 (sic), within which to file its answer or motion to dismiss the
continue the proceedings in the action for declaratory relief when the complaint.
Metropolitan Trial Court had already ruled that the term of the SLDA was for -On January 13, 1982, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
only five years. Also, the decision of the MTC would amount to res judicata the complaint states no cause of action- DENIED, for being "devoid of merit."
should it attain finality. -Petitioner filed MR of the order dated March 1, 1982.
- respondent filed motion to strike out the petitioner's motion for
Laches definitely had not yet set in when private respondent filed the reconsideration on the alleged ground that the motion for reconsideration
unlawful detainer case 269 days after the expiration of the SLDA. Private was filed out of time. It was argued by counsel for the private respondent
respondent did not sleep on its right when it filed the unlawful detainer case that when the petitioner filed its motion to dismiss on January 13, 1982, it
well within the prescriptive period for filing the action had already used 11 days out of the 15 days' extension granted to it by the
Court in the order of January 4, 1982; that having received the order denying
Private respondent therefore shall one year or 365 days from July 31, 1995 its motion to dismiss on March 8, 1982, the petitioner had only the remainder
to file the case for unlawful detainer; The expiration of the term of the lease of 4 days or up to March 12, 1982 within which to file its answer to the
immediately gives rise to a cause of action, of which a demand is no longer complaint; consequently, the filing of the motion for reconsideration on
necessary. March 17, 1982 was already beyond the reglementary period for filing the
answer- granted and petitioner was declared in default.
BA finance v hon. Pineda cfi- rizal judge and Antonio sy respondents -On April 19, 1982, the petitioner filed a motion to lift order of default- denied
- petitioner filed MR of default order- granted and ordering it to file its answer
FACTS: to the complaint within 15 days from notice thereof. The petitioner had by
CFI- NUEVA ECIJA (1st case) then, or on May 11, 1982, already filed its answer.
Private respondent Antonio Sy was adjudged liable in favor of the plaintiffs in -MR- judge reversed its decision on default
Civil Case for damages resulting from a vehicular accident involving a cargo The proceedings taken subsequent thereto are not clear from the record.
truck supposedly owned by him. RTC ruled that for respondents and ordered the defendants therein,
CFI-RIZAL (2nd case) magulo na facts... including herein petitioner, but excluding Atty. Ireneo Calderon, to pay unto
-SY filed civil case which was assigned to the sala presided over by the the private respondent the total sum of P 228,255.64 as moral and

exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. by the petitioner against the denial of its motion to dismiss is a mere scrap of
paper for lack of proof of service; and (2) the motion for reconsideration filed
the provision in question, Section 4 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court by the petitioner against the order of May 4, 1982 which denied the
SEC. 4. Time to plead. If the motion to dismiss is denied or if petitioner's motion to lift order of default is pro-forma for being Identical to
determination thereof is deferred, the movant shall file his answer within the petitioner's opposition to the plaintiff's motion to declare the petitioner in
period prescribed by Rule 11, computed from the time he received notice of default.
the denial or deferment, unless the court provides a different period. The lack of palpable merit of said grounds leads to a natural impression that
the respondent Judge was determined to prevent the petitioner from being
given a chance to defend itself in the case filed against it by the private
ISSUE:WON judge erred in declaring petitioner in default?YES respondent, contrary to repeated exhortations and pronouncements from the
Supreme Court frowning upon judgments by default on purely technical
RULING: grounds. The new arguments resorted to by the respondent Judge were not
even mentioned in the motion of the private respondent to strike out the
It is undisputed that the petitioner was given an extension of time within answer, nor were they mentioned by the respondent Judge in his first order
which to file its answer which was to expire on January 18, 1982. On declaring the petitioner in default. The motion to strike out filed by the private
January 13, 1982, it filed a motion to dismiss which was denied, and notice respondent and the order of respondent Judge dated April 5, 1982 declaring
of which was served on the petitioner on March 8, 1982. When the petitioner the petitioner in default made reference only to the alleged fact that the
filed a motion for reconsideration on March 17, 1982, it was well within the motion for reconsideration of the denial of the motion to dismiss was filed
15-day period within which to file the answer counted from the date it beyond the reglementary period. Such ground, as aforementioned, had been
received notice of the denial of its motion to dismiss which was on March 8, acknowledged by the respondent Judge himself in his order of July 14, 1982
1982. Yet, on the erroneous belief that the petitioner had only to its credit the to be erroneous.
balance of the period to answer that it did not consume by the time it filed its
motion to dismiss, the respondent Judge ruled that the filing of the motion for The allegation that the motion for reconsideration of the denial of the motion
reconsideration on March 17, 1982 was already beyond the reglementary to dismiss filed by the petitioner lacks the requisite notice of hearing and
period and forthwith declared tile defendant in default. proof of service is a factual distortion. On page 4 of said motion for
After declaring the petitioner in default in the order of April 5, 1982 and after reconsideration which has been attached as Annex "F" of the petition ,it
denying the motion to lift order of default in the order of May 4, 1982, the clearly appears that the petitioner's counsel set the said motion for hearing
respondent Judge made a complete turnabout in his order of June 10, 1982 on April 16, 1982 and that a copy of the same was sent by registered mail to
by setting aside the default declaration of the petitioner, giving no reason the counsel for the private respondent on March 17, 1982. The private
therefor except the catch phrase "in the interest of justice." Then, another respondent filed a motion to strike out the said motion for reconsideration
change of mind on the part of the respondent Judge was manifested in his thereby showing that private A. respondent had notice of the motion for
order of July 14, 1982 which reiterated the order of April 5, 1982 declaring reconsideration long before the scheduled hearing thereof on April 16, 1982.
the petitioner in default. This time, the respondent Judge woke up to his
mistake and ruled that the petitioner had 15 days from the date it received The imputation that the motion to reconsider the order of May 4, 1982 which
notice of tile denial of its motion to dismiss on March 11, 1982 within which denied the petitioner's motion to lift order of default is pro-forma reveals a
to file its answer respondent Judge stubbornly persisted in maintaining his misconception of the concept of pro-forma motions for reconsideration. It is
view that the answer of the respondent to the complaint was filed out of time not every motion for reconsideration that reiterates grounds or arguments
by alleging two new grounds, namely: (1) the motion for reconsideration filed aired in a previous motion that may be declared pro-forma. It will be noted

that the motion for reconsideration herein involved is of an interlocutory private respondent alleging that it was no longer amenable to the renewal of
order, and not of a final judgment or final order. There should be a distinction its 25-year lease contract because of its pressing need to use the subject lot
in determining whether a motion for reconsideration may be declared pro- for national and provincial offices.
forma depending on whether it is directed against a final judgment or order,
or only against an interlocutory order. In the case of the former, a repetition In respondents answer, he contends that the contract of lease had not yet
of arguments or grounds already sufficiently discussed in prior incidents may expired and, assuming that it had expired, he has exercised his option to
properly be categorized as being merely for purposes of delay. In the case of stay in the premises for another 25 years as expressly provided in the said
interlocutory orders, a reiteration of the ground or argument previously contract. Petitioner filed its reply to private respondent's answer.
advanced is not necessarily indicative that the movant filed the motion
merely for gaining delay. It must be remembered that, normally, when an On October 16, 1989, private respondent filed this time a "Motion for
interlocutory order is sought to be reviewed or annulled by means of any of Preliminary Hearing as if a Motion to Dismiss Has Been Filed" on the
the extra legal remedies of prohibition or certiorari, it is required that a ground that the complaint states no cause of action, reiterating its argument
motion for reconsideration of the question order must first be filed, such that the original term of 25 years stipulated in the contract of lease had not
being considered a speedy and adequate remedy at law which must first be yet expired and that, at any rate, under said contract he has the exclusive
resorted to as a condition precedent for filing of any of such proceedings option to renew the same for another 25 years.
(Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 65, Rules of Court). There is no similar requirement in
taking an appeal from a final judgment or order should the questioned
On October 26, 1989, MTC - ordered respondent to vacate the premises
interlocutory order be subject to attack only on one ground, as in the case of
subject of the ejectment case.
the default declaration herein involved, a motion for reconsideration against
the order complained of would necessarily and inevitably contain a repetition
of the ground previously alleged. In so doing, the movant is praying the court On November 8, 1989, private respondent filed a "Manifestation/Motion"
to give his motion a second look, in the hope that the court would realize its before said trial court praying that the issues raised in the motion for
supposed error, correct the same, and thereby preclude the necessity of preliminary hearing, apparently because it was in the nature of a motion
seeking relief in a higher tribunal. to dismiss, be first resolved instead of rendering judgment on the
pleadings. Thereafter, on November 10, 1989, private respondent received
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. a copy of the October 26, 1989 decision of the MTC, hence he filed a notice
of appeal to the RTC.
G.R. No. 94733 February 17, 1993
--------- I added this discussion about rule 15 kasi baka biglang itanong------
MUNICIPALITY OF BIAN, LAGUNA, represented by Hon. Bayani
Alonte, Municipal Mayor of Bian, Laguna, petitioner, RTC granted petitioner's motion for discretionary execution and issued a writ
vs. of execution
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JESUS M. GARCIA, respondents.
On December 29, 1989, respondent filed with the CA a petition for certiorari,
Facts: with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, assailing the
aforesaid order of execution pending appeal on the ground that petitioner
failed to furnish private respondent with a copy of the motion contrary
On September 27, 1989, petitioner filed Civil Case No. 2473 for unlawful
detainer, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, against

to Section 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, hence the invalidity of the prayed for. It rests largely on the sound discretion of the trial court. The use
lower court's order which granted the writ of execution. of the word "may" in said provision shows that such a hearing is not a
matter of right demandable from the trial court. Where the provision
CA - set aside the questioned order for being violative of the requirement in reads "may," this word shows that it is not mandatory but discretional. It is an
Section 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court which provides that no motion auxiliary verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission and possibility.
shall be acted upon by the court without proof of prior notice thereof to
the adverse party. MR denied. G.R. No. 109068. January 10, 1994.*
----------- RTC and CA ruled only on the issue under rule 15 so petitioner filed GAUDENCIO GUERRERO, petitioner, vs.
this certiorari in SC-------
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOCOS NORTE, BR. XVI, JUDGE LUIS B.
BELLO, JR., PRESIDING, AND PEDRO G. HERNANDO, respondents.
ISSUE: WON MTC committed a grave abuse of discretion or exceeded its
jurisdiction when it failed to conduct a preliminary hearing, as prayed for in Facts:
private respondent's "Motion for Preliminary Hearing as if a Motion to
Dismiss Has Been Filed," before summarily rendering judgment on the PETITION for review of the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Ilocos
merits of the case Norte.
HELD: NO. The said motion of private respondent is anchored on the ground Filed by petitioner as an accion publiciana against private respondent, this
that the complaint allegedly states no cause of action since the original term case assumed another dimension when it was dismissed by respondent
of 25 years stipulated in the contract of lease had not yet expired and Judge on the ground that the parties being brothers-in-law the complaint
assuming that it had expired, private respondent had made known to should have alleged that earnest efforts were first exerted towards a
petitioner his exclusive option to renew it for another 25 years. compromise.
Admittedly, the complaint does not allege that the parties exerted earnest
Section 5, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court (old rule pa to...) pertinently efforts towards a compromise and that the same failed. However, private
provides: respondent Pedro G. Hernando apparently overlooked this alleged defect
since he did not file any motion to dismiss nor attack the complaint on this
Sec. 5. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. Any ground in his answer. It was only at the pre-trial conference, that the
of the grounds for dismissal provides for in this Rule, relationship of petitioner Gaudencio Guerrero and respondent Hernando was
except improper venue, preliminary hearing MAY be had noted by respondent Judge Luis B. Bello, Jr., they being married to half-
thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed. sisters hence are brothers-in-law, and on the basis thereof respondent
Judge gave petitioner five (5) days to file his motion and amended
The aforequoted provision allows the grounds for a motion to complaint to allege that the parties were very close relatives, their
dismiss to be set up as affirmative defenses in the answer if no respective wives being sisters, and that the complaint to be maintained
motion to dismiss has been filed. should allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise were exerted but
failed. Apparently, respondent Judge considered this deficiency a
However, contrary to the claim of private respondent, the preliminary hearing jurisdictional defect.
permitted under the said provision is NOT mandatory even when the same is

Guerrero moved to reconsider the Order claiming that since brothers by Further, Art. 151 is complemented by Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the Rules
affinity are not members of the same family, he was not required to exert of Court which provides as a ground for a motion to dismiss (t)hat the suit is
efforts towards a compromise. Guerrero likewise argued that Hernando was between members of the same family and no earnest efforts towards a
precluded from raising this issue since he did not file a motion to dismiss nor compromise have been made.
assert the same as an affirmative defense in his answer.
But the instant case presents no occasion for the application of the above-
Respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration holding that quoted provisions. As early as two decades ago, we already ruled in Gay on
[f]ailure to allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise is jurisdictional v. Gayon that the enumeration of brothers and sisters as members of the
such that for failure to allege same the court would be deprived of its same family does not comprehend sisters-in-law. In that case, then Chief
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. He warned that unless the Justice Concepcion emphasized that sisters-in-law (hence, also brothers-
complaint was amended within five (5) days the case would be dismissed. in-law) are not listed under Art. 217 of the New Civil Code as members of
the same family. Since Art. 150 of the Family Code repeats essentially the
The 5-day period having expired without Guerrero amending his complaint, same enumeration of members of the family, we find no reason to alter
respondent Judge dismissed the case, declaring the dismissal however to existing jurisprudence on the matter. Consequently, the court a quo erred in
be without prejudice. ruling that petitioner Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of private respondent
Hernando, was required to exert earnest efforts towards a compromise
Guerrero appeals by way of this petition for review the dismissal by the court before filing the present suit.
a quo. He raises these legal issues:
In his Comment, Hernando argues that x x x x although both wives of the
(a) whether brothers by affinity are considered members of the same family parties were not impleaded, it remains a truism that being spouses of the
contemplated in Art. 217, par. (4), and Art. 222 of the New Civil Code, as contending parties, and the litigation involves ownership of real property, the
well as under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the Rules of Court requiring earnest spouses interest and participation in the land in question cannot be denied,
efforts towards a compromise before a suit between them may be instituted making the suit still a suit between half-sisters x x x x
and maintained; and,
(b) whether the absence of an allegation in the complaint that earnest efforts
towards a compromise were exerted, which efforts failed, is a ground for Finding this argument preposterous, Guerrero counters in his Reply that his
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. wife has no actual interest and participation in the land subject of the xxx
suit, which the petitioner bought, according to his complaint, before he
married his wife. This factual controversy however may be best left to the
court a quo to resolve when it resumes hearing the case.
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed Orders are SET
Considering that Art. 151 herein-quoted starts with the negative word No,
ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 16, or whichever
the requirement is mandatory that the complaint or petition, which must be
branch of the court the case may now be assigned, is directed to continue
verified, should allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been
with Civil Case No. 10084-16 with deliberate dispatch.
made but that the same failed, so that, [i]f it is shown that no such efforts
were in fact made, the case must be dismissed. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-45107 November 11, 1991 sum of P70,000.00 representing advance rentals on the fishpond
which he had previously tendered to, but refused by the spouses
BENEDICTO RAMOS, petitioner, Ortanez and Pablo Roman.
vs. P. R. Roman, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that
HON. ELVIRO L. PERALTA, Presiding Judge, Branch XVII, Court of venue was improperly laid, the complaint states no cause of action
First Instance of Manila, SPOUSES JUVENCIO ORTANEZ and JULIANA and the court has no jurisdiction over the subject of the action or
S. ORTANEZ, MINDANAO INSURANCE CO., INC. and P. R. ROMAN, suit.
INC., respondents. In its motion to dismiss, P. R. Roman, Inc. cited the pendency
before the then CFI of Bataan of Civil Case No 4102 instituted
Facts: by P.R. Roman, Inc. against petitioner Benedicto Ramos on
August 13, 1976 to quiet its title over the Salgado fishpond.
(PLS. TAKE NOTE)
Petitioner started occupying the Salgado fishpond in 1964 by virtue
Respondent CFI of Manila issued an order dismissing consignation
of a lease contract executed in his favor by private respondents
case.
spouses Juvencio and Juliana Ortanez.
o for the reason, principally, that there is already a case
Unknown to petitioner, title to said property was in the name of
pending between the same parties and for the same
Philippine International Surety Co., Inc., a corporation founded,
cause in Court of First Instance of Bataan, which is
organized and 99.5%-owned by the Salgado spouses.
precisely for the ownership of the subject matter of the
Later renamed Mindanao Insurance Co., Inc., said corporation was
property allegedly leased to the plaintiff herein.
placed under receivership and liquidation on June 20, 1968.
o In the said case, the defendant therein, Benedicto Ramos,
Thereafter on February 23, 1976, respondent P. R. Roman, Inc.
who is the plaintiff in the case at bar, filed a motion for
purchased from Mindanao Insurance the Salgado fishpond.
leave to file a third-party complaint against the spouses
The deed of sale was signed by the receiver and duly approved by surnamed Ortanez and the Mindanao Insurance Company
the liquidation court. Inc.
Apparently due to this development, the spouses Ortanez refused o All the issues respecting the fishpond, including the lease
to accept from petitioner the advance rentals on the fishpond due contract, are necessarily involved in the case pending now
on March 15, 1976 in the amount of P30,000.00. in Bataan.
On or about May 1, 1976, petitioner received a letter from Don o Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but was
Pablo R. Roman informing him of the latter's acquisition of the unsuccessful.
fishpond and intention to take possession thereof.
In his letter-reply, petitioner reminded Mr. Roman of his lease
Hence this petition FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI.
contract over the fishpond and refused to consent to the intended
take over.
1. The respondent court erred in not holding that the only
Notwithstanding petitioner's objection, P. R. Roman, Inc. took over
issue in consignation of funds is whether the defendant is
possession of the fishpond.
willing to accept the proffered payment or not.
On August 2, 1976, petitioner filed before the CFI of Manila an
action against private respondents Juvencio and Juliana Ortanez,
Mindanao Insurance and P. R. Roman, Inc. for consignation of the

2. The respondent court erred in not holding that the and binding effect of the lease contract and the existence of
prerogative of choosing the proper venue belongs to the the supposed obligor-obligee relationship.
plaintiff. They further contend that a plaintiffs right of choice of venue is not
absolute, but must invariably bow to the dismissal of the case
3. The respondent court erred in holding that the because of litis pendentia which, in refutation of petitioner's
subsequent filing of Civil Case No. 4102 before the Court argument, does not require that there is a prior pending action,
of First Instance of Bataan is a bar to the prosecution of merely that there is a pending action.
Civil Case No. 103647 before it.
Issue: Whether petitioners contention is meritorious.
Petitioners contention:
Held: No.
Petitioner contends that the Bataan quieting-of-title case cannot
serve as a bar to his Manila consignation Civil Case because they Under the rules and jurisprudence, for litis pendentia to be invoked
involve different issues. as a ground for the dismissal of an action, the concurrence of the
Quieting of title case deals with the question of ownership while the following requisites is necessary:
only issue involved in his consignation case is whether or not the
defendant is willing to accept the proffered payment. (a) Identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest
In fact, petitioner posits, the action to quiet title is a useless futile in both actions;
exercise as he does not question P. R. Roman Inc.'s ownership of
the fishpond under consideration, but merely wishes to assert his (b) Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
leasehold and possessory rights over said property under the founded on the same facts; and
"Kasunduan sa Pag-upa."
He further contends that compelling him to litigate before the
(c) The identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment
Bataan court would render nugatory his right as a plaintiff to choose
that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is
the venue of his action.
successful, amount to res judicata in the other.
Besides, Consignation case was filed on August 2, 1976, ahead of
Quieting of title case which was filed on a much later date, August
These requisites are present in the case at bar.
13, 1976, after the Manila CFI had already acquired jurisdiction
over the consignation case. It is worthwhile mentioning that in his basic petition for review, one
of the assigned errors of petitioner is that the respondent court
erred in not holding that the parties in quieting of title case are not
Respondents contention:
the same as the parties in the consignation case.
o However, in his brief, no further mention of this assigned
Private respondents counter that while it may be true that error was made; a clear indication of petitioner's admission
theoretically, the main issue involved in a consignation case is of the identity of parties in quieting case and consignation
whether or not the defendant is willing to accept the proffered case, particularly as he filed a third party complaint in the
payment, in the consignation case brought by petitioner, other quieting case against the spouses Ortanez and Mindanao
issues were pleaded by petitioner himself, such as the validity Insurance.

Anent the second element, petitioners contention that the only But this right given to the plaintiff is not immutable.
issue in a consignation case is whether or not the defendant is It must yield to the greater interest of the orderly administration
willing to accept the proffered payment is true only where there is of justice, which as in this case, may call for the dismissal of an
no controversy with respect to the obligation sought to be action on the basis of litis pendentia to obviate the possibility of
discharged by such payment. conflicting decisions being rendered by two different courts.
o His consignation case, however, is not as simple. While The Rules of Court are not perfect. It does not pretend to be able to
ostensibly, the immediate relief sought for in his make everyone happy simultaneously or consecutively or all the
consignation case is to compel therein defendants to time.
accept his advance rentals, the ultimate purpose of such Even the Rules of Court has hierarchy of values; thus, the choice
action is to compel the new owner of the fishpond to of venue may bow to dismissal of the case because of litis
recognize his leasehold rights and right of pendentia.
occupation. At any rate, petitioner cannot complain of any inconvenience arising
o In the last analysis, therefore, the issue involved in the from the dismissal of the consignation case.
consignation case is the right of possession over the Being the defendant in the quieting of title case, he cannot but
fishpond intertwined with the validity and effectivity of the litigate before the Bataan court, and bringing his consignation case
lease contract. before the same court would actually save him time, effort and
o This is the same issue involved in quieting case. litigation expenses.
o Although an action for quieting of title refers to ownership,
P. R. Roman, Inc. in its complaint in the quieting case
LITIS PENDENCIA
also raised its right of possession over the fish pond.
Finally, the rule on litis pendentia does not require that the later
RES JUDICATA
case should yield to the earlier case.
What is required merely is that there be another pending action,
Whatever decision may be handed down in The Quieting case not a prior pending action.
would constitute res judicata in the consignation case is beyond Considering the broader scope of inquiry involved in the quieting of
cavil. title case and the location of the property involved, no error was
Should the Bataan court rule that the lease contract is valid and committed by the lower court in deferring to the Bataan court's
effective against P. R. Roman, Inc., the petitioner can compel it jurisdiction.
to accept his proffered payment of rentals; otherwise, he may
not do so.
Universal Robina Corporation vs Albert Lim GR 154338 October 5, 2007
VENUE Facts:
Petitioner sold to respondent grocery products in the total amount
Petitioner next contends that the dismissal of the consignation case of P808,059.88.
deprived him of his right to choose the venue of his action. After tendering partial payments, respondent refused to settle his
Verily, the rules on the venue of personal actions are laid down obligation despite petitioners repeated demands.
generally for the convenience of the plaintiff and his witnesses.

Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Quezon City, a complaint against
respondent for a sum of money. Held: No trial court cannot motu proprio dismiss petitioners complain on the
The trial Court issued an Order dismissing the complaint motu ground of improper venue.
proprio on ground of lack of jurisdiction and improper venue Clearly, in personal actions, the plaintiff may commence an action either in
because the plaintiff corporation has its principal office at the place of his or her residence or the place where the defendant resides.
Pasig City and the defendant is from Laoag City. However, the parties may agree to a specific venue which could be in a
Petitioner filed a MR together with an amended complaint alleging place where neither of them resides.
that the parties agreed that the proper venue for any dispute Sec. 1, Rule 9 of the same Rules provides for instances when the trial court
relative to the transaction is Quezon City. may motu proprio dismiss a claim, thus:
The trial court granted the motion and admitted petitioners Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded.
amended complaint. Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in
Summons was served upon respondent but failed to file an answer the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the
seasonably. Upon motion of the petitioner, the trial court issued an pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over
Order declaring him in default and allowing petitioner to present its the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same
evidence ex parte. parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or
However, the trial court was still unsure whether venue was by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
properly laid, thus it issued an order directing petitioner to file a In Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court, this Court held that a trial court
memorandum of authorities on whether it can file a complaint in may not motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of improper venue
QC. because justice and fairness take primary importance and the fact that the
Subsequently the trial court again issued an order dismissing defendant failed to challenge the venue in a motion to dismiss, thus he
the complaint on the ground of improper venue for the reason cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted to challenge the wrong
that there is no connection whatsoever between QC and the venue, which is deemed waived.
parties. The official place of business is Pasig and the In Rudolf Lietz Holdings Inc. v. Registry of Deeds of Paraaque, the Court
defendants residence is Laoag City were all stipulated in the likewise held that a trial court may not motu proprio dismiss a complaint on
Complaint. But the stipulation of the proper filing is at the back the ground of improper venue, thus:
of the delivery receipt saying that the venue shall be in QC was Rule 9, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that defenses
not stated in the complaint nor admitted to have been signed and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are
by the defendant. deemed waived. The court may only dismiss an action motu proprio in
case of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res
Petitioner filed a MR but was denied by the trial court.
judicata and prescription. Therefore, the trial court in this case erred
Petitioner then filed with the CA a petition for review. But it was
when it dismissed the petition motu proprio. It should have waited for
dismissed due to petitioners failure to attach an explanation why
a motion to dismiss or a responsive pleading from respondent, raising
copies of the petition were not served by personal service but by
the objection or affirmative defense of improper venue, before
registered mail, in violation of Sec. 11, Rule 14 of 1997 Rules of
dismissing the petition. Petition for Review is Granted
Civil Procedure. Petitioner filed a MR but it was also denied.
Hence, this petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
G.R. No. 156164 September 4, 2009
Issue: W/N the trial court may dismiss motu proprio petitioners complaint on
the ground of improper venue.

SPS. LEONARDO AND MILAGROS CHUA, Petitioners, ISSUE: Whether the jurisdiction to entertain criminal complaints is lodged
vs. with the city prosecutor and that the jurisdiction of the HLURB under P.D.
HON. JACINTO G. ANG, DENNIS R. PASTRANA, IN THEIR CAPACITIES No. 957 is limited to the enforcement of contractual rights, not the
AS CITY AND ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR OF PASIG, RESPECTIVELY, investigation of criminal complaints?
FERDINAND T. SANTOS, ROBERT JOHN L. SOBREPEA, NOEL M.
*
CARIO, ROBERTO S. ROCO, ALICE ODCHIQUE-BONDOC, ROMULO RULING:
T. SANTOS AND ENRIQUE A. SOBREPEA, JR., Respondents.
Yes.
(Guys ang labo ng case na to it did not mention anything about Rule 16.)
The public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
Petition for certiorari filed by the spouses Leonardo and Milagros Chua. the criminal complaints for violation of P.D. No. 957 on the ground that
jurisdiction lies with the HLURB.
FACTS:
Nothing in P.D. No. 957 vests the HLURB with jurisdiction to impose the
Petitioners (as buyers) and Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. (FEPI, as Section 39 criminal penalties. What the Decree provides is the authority of
developers) executed a Contract to Sell a condominium unit. the HLURB to impose administrative fines under Section 38.
Despite the lapse of 3 years, FEPI failed to construct and deliver
the contracted condominium unit to the petitioners. We hold that the public respondent prosecutors should have made a
Petitioners filed on September 3, 2002 a Complaint-Affidavit before determination of probable cause in the complaint before them, instead of
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City accusing the private simply dismissing it for prematurity.
respondents, as officers and directors of FEPI, of violating P.D. No.
957. The implementing rules themselves expressly acknowledge that two
The petitioners alleged that the private respondents did not separate remedies with differing consequences may be sought under the
construct and failed to deliver the contracted condominium unit to Decree, specifically, the administrative remedy and criminal prosecution.
them and did not register the Contract to Sell with the Register of
Deeds. The determination of the criminal liability lies within the realm of criminal
Of the 7 private respondents, only private respondent Alice procedure as embodied in the Rules of Court.
Odchique-Bondoc filed a Counter-Affidavit. She countered that the
City Prosecutor has no jurisdiction over the case since it falls under
Petitioners raise a pure question of law involving jurisdiction over criminal
the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB.
complaints for violation of P.D. No. 957.
Assistant City Prosecutor Dennis R. Pastrana and Pasig City
Prosecutor Jacinto G. Ang (public respondents), dismissed the
complaint for being premature. Present case requires prompt action because public interest and welfare are
involved in subdivision and condominium development.
o The Resolution held that it is the HLURB that has
exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving real estate
business and practices. We stress that the immediate recourse to this Court that this Decision allows
should not serve as a precedent in other cases where the prosecutor
dismisses a criminal complaint, whether under P.D. No. 957 or any other

law. Recourse to (a) the filing a motion for reconsideration with the City or that the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution had
Provincial Prosecutor, (b) the filing a petition for review with the Secretary of become final and executory upon the lapse of the 15-day reglementary
the DOJ, (c) the filing a motion for reconsideration of any judgment rendered period without any timely appeal having been filed by either party.
by the DOJ, and (d) intermediate recourse to the CA, are remedies that the
dictates of orderly procedure and the hierarchy of authorities cannot The Courts Ruling: The petition has no merit.
dispense with. Only the extremely peculiar circumstances of the present *** Petitioner further claims the trial court erred in applying to her motion to
case compelled us to rule as we did; thus our ruling in this regard is a rare dismiss Section 7 of the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
one that should be considered pro hac vice. Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Petitioner argues that if
indeed the provision is applicable, the same is unconstitutional for setting an
SUSIE CHAN-TAN v JESSE C. TAN, obstacle to the preservation of the family.
***Respondent stresses neither petitioner nor her counsel appeared in court
FACTS: at the hearings on respondent's omnibus motion or on petitioners motion to
* Petitioner and respondent were married but later petitioner filed a dismiss.
case for the annulment of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The parties submitted to the court a compromise agreement - approved SEC. 7. Motion to dismiss. No motion to dismiss the petition shall be
* RTC -rendered a decision declaring the marriage void under Article allowed except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or
36 of the Family Code on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity of over the parties; provided, however, that any other ground that might warrant
the parties. The trial court incorporated in its decision the compromise a dismissal of the case may be raised as an affirmative defense in an
agreement of the parties on the issues of support, custody, visitation of the answer.
children, and property relations.
*petitioner left the country bringing the children with her. The clear intent of the provision is to allow the respondent to
*Respondent filed an omnibus motion seeking in the main custody of the ventilate all possible defenses in an answer, instead of a mere motion to
children. The evidence presented by respondent established that petitioner dismiss, so that judgment may be made on the merits. In construing a
brought the children out of the country without his knowledge and without statute, the purpose or object of the law is an important factor to be
prior authority of the trial court; petitioner failed to pay the P8,000,000 considered. Further, the letter of the law admits of no other interpretation but
remaining balance for the Megaworld property which, if forfeited would that the provision applies only to a respondent, not a petitioner. Only a
prejudice the interest of the children; and petitioner failed to turn over to respondent in a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of void
respondent documents and titles in the latters name-GRANTED marriage or the annulment of voidable marriage files an answer where any
*Petitioner filed MR alleging denial of due process on account of accident, ground that may warrant a dismissal may be raised as an affirmative
mistake, or excusable negligence-DENIED which was filed beyond the 15- defense pursuant to the provision. The only logical conclusion is that Section
day reglementary period. It also declared petitioner in contempt of court for 7 of the Rule does not apply to a motion to dismiss filed by the party who
non-compliance with the partial judgment and the 17 May 2004 resolution. initiated the petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or
*petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for reconsideration of the annulment of voidable marriage.
the Resolution. She claimed she was no longer interested in the suit. Since petitioner is not the respondent in the petition for the annulment
Petitioner stated that the circumstances in her life had led her to the of the marriage, Section 7 of the Rule does not apply to the motion to
conclusion that withdrawing the petition was for the best interest of the dismiss filed by her. Section 7 of the Rule not being applicable, petitioners
children. She prayed that an order be issued vacating all prior orders and claim that it is unconstitutional for allegedly setting an obstacle to the
leaving the parties at the status quo ante the filing of the suit-DENIED It held preservation of the family is without basis.

On November 23, 2001, petitioner Frederick Dael filed a Complaint for
Section 1 of the Rule states that the Rules of Court applies suppletorily breach of contract and damages against respondent-spouses Beltran. In his
to a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or the complaint, petitioner alleged that respondents sold him a 3 hectares parcel
annulment of voidable marriage. In this connection, Rule 17 of the Rules of of land. Petitioner alleged that respondents did not disclose that the land
Court allows dismissal of the action upon notice or upon motion of the was previously mortgaged. Petitioner further alleged that it was only on
plaintiff, to wit: August 6, 2001 when he discovered that an extrajudicial foreclosure over the
Section 1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff. A complaint may be property had already been instituted, and that he was constrained to bid in
dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before the extrajudicial sale of the land conducted on August 29, 2001.
service of the answer or of a motion for summary judgment. Upon such
notice being filed, the court shall issue an order confirming the dismissal. x x Possession and ownership of the property was delivered to him when he
x paid the bid price of P775,100. Petitioner argued that respondents' non-
disclosure of the extrajudicial foreclosure constituted breach of contract on
Section 2. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff. Except as provided in the implied warranties in a sale of property as provided under Article 1547 of
the preceding section, a complaint shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs the New Civil Code. He likewise claimed that he was entitled to damages
instance save upon approval of the court and upon such terms and because he had to pay for the property twice.
conditions as the court deems proper. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
On January 10, 2002, respondents filed a MTD on the ground that
However, when petitioner filed the motion to dismiss on 4 November petitioner had no cause of action since the contract to sell stated that the
2004, the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution of the vendor was Benedicto Beltran and the vendee was Frederick George Ghent
trial court had long become final and executory upon the lapse of the 15-day Dael, petitioners son.
reglementary period without any timely appeal having been filed by either
party. The 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution may no
The RTC on the same day ordered petitioner to clarify whether or not he and
longer be disturbed on account of the belated motion to dismiss filed by
Frederick George Ghent Dael were one and the same person; whether or
petitioner. The trial court was correct in denying petitioners motion to
not they were Filipinos and residents of Dumaguete City; and whether or not
dismiss. Nothing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes
Frederick George Ghent Dael was of legal age, and married, as stated in the
final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable.
Contract to Sell. Petitioner did not comply. Instead, petitioner filed a Notice
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review.
of Dismissal on February 20, 2002.
RULE 17 DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS

On May 28, 2002, the RTC dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
G.R. No. 156470 April 30, 2008

Arguing that the RTC erred in dismissing the complaint with prejudice based
on respondents' Motion to Dismiss, and not without prejudice based on his
FREDERICK DAEL, petitioner, Notice of Dismissal, petitioner filed a MR but it was denied.
vs.
SPOUSES BENEDICTO and VILMA BELTRAN, respondents.
Hence, this petition.
Facts:

ISSUE: WON the RTC erred in dismissing the complaint for breach of Motion to Dismiss filed by respondents became moot and academic and the
contract and damages based on the motion to dismiss filed by herein trial court should have dismissed the case without prejudice based on the
respondents and not on the notice of dismissal promptly [filed] by herein Notice of Dismissal filed by the petitioner.
petitioner before respondents could file a responsive pleading, under rule 17,
section 1 of the 1997 rules of civil procedure. Moreover, to allow the case to be dismissed with prejudice would
erroneously result in res judicata and imply that petitioner can no longer file
HELD: YES. a case against respondents without giving him a chance to present evidence
to prove otherwise.
Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
G.R. No. 58986. April 17, 1989.*
SECTION 1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff. - A complaint may
be dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a notice of dismissal at any DANTE Y. GO, petitioner, vs.
time before service of the answer or of a motion for summary
HON. FERNANDO CRUZ, Judge, etc., CITY SHERIFF OF CALOOCAN
judgment. Upon such notice being filed, the court shall issue an
CITY, and CALIFORNIA MANUFACTURING CO., INC., respondents.
order confirming the dismissal. Unless otherwise stated in the
notice, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice
operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff
who has once dismissed in a competent court an action based on Facts:
or including the same claim.
PETITION for certiorari to review the restraining order issued by the Court of
Under this provision, it is mandatory that the trial court issue an order First Instance of Rizal.
confirming such dismissal and, unless otherwise stated in the notice, the
dismissal is without prejudice and could be accomplished by the plaintiff
through mere notice of dismissal, and not through motion subject to approval
California Manufacturing Co., Inc. (hereinafter, simply, California) brought an
by the court. Dismissal is ipso facto upon notice, and without prejudice
action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Dante Go, accusing
unless otherwise stated in the notice. The trial court has no choice but to
him of unfair competition. The gravamen of Californias complaint was that
consider the complaint as dismissed, since the plaintiff may opt for such
Dante Go, doing business under the name and style of Sugarland
dismissal as a matter of right, regardless of the ground.
International Products,and engaged like California in the manufacture of
spaghetti, macaroni, and other pasta, was selling his products in the open
Respondents argue that the Motion to Dismiss they filed precedes the Notice market under the brand name, Great Italian, in packages which were in
of Dismissal filed by petitioner and hence, the trial court correctly gave it colorable and deceitful imitation of Californias containers bearing its own
precedence and ruled based on the motion. brand, Royal. Its complaint contained an application for preliminary
injunction commanding Dante Go to immediately cease and desist from the
This argument is erroneous. Section 1 of Rule 17 does not encompass a further manufacture, sale and distribution of said products, and to retrieve
Motion to Dismiss. The provision specifically provides that a plaintiff may file those already being offered for sale.
a notice of dismissal before service of the answer or a motion for summary
judgment. Thus, upon the filing of the Notice of Dismissal by the plaintiff, the

About two weeks later, California filed a notice of dismissal with the Court. from proceeding with the case of unfair competition filed in his office by
California against Dante Go.
Four days afterwards, California received by registered mail a copy of Dante

Gos answer with counterclaim, which had been filed with the Court. Dante Gos thesis is that the case filed against him by California in the
Manila Court remained pending despite Californias notice of dismissal.
According to him, since he had already filed his answer to the complaint
before California sought dismissal of the action three (3) days afterwards,
A fire broke out at the Manila City Hall destroying among others the sala of such dismissal was no longer a matter of right and could no longer be
Judge Tengco and the records of cases therein kept, including that filed by effected by mere notice in accordance with Section 1, Rule 17 of the Rules
California against Dante Go. of Court, but only on plaintiffs motion, and by order of the Court; hence, the
Caloocan Court acted without jurisdiction over the second action based on
the same cause. He also accused California of forum shopping, of selecting
California filed another complaint asserting the same cause of action against a sympathetic court for a relief which it had failed to obtain from another.
Dante Go, this time with the Court of First Instance at Caloocan City. This
second suit was docketed as Civil Case No. C-9702 and was assigned to
the branch presided over by Judge Fernando A. Cruz. Ruling:
The petitioner is in error. What marks the loss by a plaintiff of the right to
cause dismissal of the action by mere notice is not the filing of the
Judge Cruz issued an ex parte restraining order directing the defendant x x
defendants answer with the Court (either personally or by mail) but the
to immediately cease and desist from the further manufacture, sale,
service on the plaintiff of said answer or of a motion for summary judgment.
promotion and distribution of spaghetti, macaroni and other pasta products
This is the plain and explicit message of the Rules. The filing of pleadings,
contained in packaging boxes and labels under the name GREAT ITALIAN,
appearances, motions, notices, orders and other papers with the court,
which are similar to or copies of those of the plaintiff, and x x recall x x all his
according to Section 1, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, means the delivery
spaghetti, macaroni and other pasta products using the brand, GREAT
thereof to the clerk of the court either personally or by registered mail.
ITALIAN.
Service, on the other hand, signifies delivery of the pleading or other paper
to the parties affected thereby through their counsel of record, unless
delivery to the party himself is ordered by the court, by any of the modes set
On the day following the rendition of the restraining order, Dante Go filed the forth in the Rules, i.e., by personal service, service by mail, or substituted
present petition for certiorari, etc. with this Court praying for its nullification service.
and perpetual inhibition. This Court, in turn, issued a writ of preliminary
injunction restraining California, Judge Cruz and the City Sheriff from
enforcing or implementing the restraining order, and from continuing with the
Here, California filed its notice of dismissal of its action in the Manila Court
hearing on the application for preliminary injunction in said Civil Case No. C-
after the filing of Dante Gos answer but before service thereof. Thus having
9702. The scope of the injunction was subsequently enlarged by this Courts
acted well within the letter and contemplation of the afore-quoted Section 1
Resolution to include the City Fiscal of Manila, who was thereby restrained

of Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, its notice ipso facto brought about the Sometime in April, 1960, private respondents Porferio Ytoriaga and
dismissal of the action then pending in the Manila Court, without need of any Consolacion Lopez filed against Ana Hedriana and petitioner
order or other action by the Presiding Judge. The dismissal was effected Fermin Jalover a complaint in the CFI of Iloilo.
without regard to whatever reasons or motives California might have had for The action involves the possession and ownership of an accreted
bringing it about, and was, as the same Section 1, Rule 17 points out, land.
without prejudice, the contrary not being otherwise stated in the notice Respondents prayed that they be declared the owners of the
and it being the first time the action was being so dismissed. increased portion of land and petitioners to vacate the premises
and restore possession to the former.
The case was set for trial.
On September 4, 1963, private respondents, formally offered
There was therefore no legal obstacle to the institution of the second action
documentary evidence, and upon the admission thereof, they
in the Caloocan Court of First Instance based on the same claim. The filing
rested their case. (PLS. TAKE NOTE)
of the complaint invested it with jurisdiction of the subject matter or nature of
Whereupon, continuation of trial was ordered transferred until
the action. In truth, and contrary to what petitioner Dante Go obviously
believes, even if the first action were still pending in the Manila Court, this further assignment.
circumstance would not affect the jurisdiction of the Caloocan Court over the Trial was postponed many times stretching to a period of more than
second suit. The pendency of the first action would merely give the 6 years, until January 26, 1970, when the case was called for trial,
defendant the right to move to dismiss the second action on the ground of and the Presiding Judge dismissed the case, for failure of private
auter action pendant, or litis pendentia. respondents to appear in court, in an order which reads:
The complaint was filed on April 6, 1960 up to the

present the trial of the case has not been
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against petitioner. The finished. The counsel of record for the plaintiff is
temporary restraining order, and the amendatory Resolution are SET Atty. Amado Atol who since several years ago
ASIDE. has been appointed Chief of the Secret Service
of the Iloilo City Police Department. Plaintiff did
G.R. No. L-35989 October 28, 1977 not take the necessary steps to engage the
service of another lawyer in lieu of Atty. Atol.
FERMIN JALOVER, petitioner,
vs. Two years later, private respondents' lawyer, Atty. Amado B. Atol,
PORFERIO YTORIAGA, CONSOLACION LOPEZ and HON. VENICIO filed an MR of the order dismissing the case.
ESCOLIN, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch V, Court of First Atty. Atol alleged that the said respondents did not fail to prosecute
Instance of Iloilo, respondents. because, during the times that the case was set for hearing, at least
one of said respondents was always present, and the record would
Facts: show that the transfers of hearing were all made at the instance of
petitioner or his counsel; and, moreover, private respondents
had already finished presenting their evidence.

Petitioner opposed the motion on the ground that the order of respondents themselves, and not upon their as attorney of
dismissal issued two years before was an adjudication on the record, Atty. Amado B. Atol, and that there was no court order
merits and had long become final. directing that the court's processes, particularly the order of
Respondent Judge denied the MR on the ground that the order of dismissal should be served directly upon private respondents.
dismissal had become final long ago and was beyond the court's It is settled that when a party is represented by counsel, notice
power to amend or change. should be made upon the counsel, and notice upon the party
Private respondents then filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment. himself is not considered notice in law unless service upon
The petition for relief was given due course, and respondent Judge the party is ordered by the court.
set aside the order of dismissal by the CFI, and setting the The term "every written notice" used in Section 2 of Rule 13
continuation of the trial for September 15, 1972. includes notice of decisions or orders.
The reasons stated by respondent Judge in support are: Private respondents' counsel of record not having been served
with notice of the order dismissing the case, the said order did
1. While respondent Porferio Ytoriaga was furnished with a copy of not become final.
the dismissal order, his counsel, Atty. Atol, was never served It will also be noted that, as found by respondent Judge, private
with a copy thereof, hence, pursuant to the settled rule that respondents adduced their evidence and rested their case on
where a party appears by attorney, a notice to the client and not September 4, 1963, or more than six years before the dismissal
to his attorney is not a notice of law, the said order of dismissal of the case.
never became final; and (PLS. TAKE NOTE) It was, therefore, the turn of petitioner, as defendant, to present his
evidence.
2. The order of dismissal was without legal basis, considering that
private respondents had already presented their evidence and Respondents absence at the hearing waived only right to cross-
rested their case on September 4, 1963, and the hearing examine and not Failure to Prosecute.
scheduled for January 26, 1970 was for reception of petitioner's
evidence; In the premises, private respondents could not possibly have
failed to prosecute they were already past the stage where
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. they could still be charged with such failure.
Hence, the present special civil action. As correctly held by respondent Judge, private respondents'
absence at the hearing scheduled on January 6, 1970 "can only be
Issue: Whether the case has long become final and executory. construed as a waiver on their part to cross-examine the witnesses
that defendants might present at the continuation of trial and to
object to the admissibility of the latter's evidence."
Held: No.
The right to cross-examine petitioner's witnesses and/or object to
his evidence is a right that belongs to private respondents which
Order of Dismissal served to respondents, not to their counsel of they can certainly waive.
record.
Such waiver could be nothing more than the "intentional
relinquishment of a known right," and as such, should not have
It is uncontroverted that the order dismissing the case for private beer taken against private respondents.
respondents' "failure to Prosecute," was served upon private

To dismiss the case after private respondents had submitted their On 11 September 1972, another complaint entitled "Recovery of
evidence and rested their case, would not only be to hold said Possession" was lodged by Rabanes before the same court against
respondents accountable for waiving a right, but also to deny them the same defendants in the action for injunction.
one of the cardinal primary rights of a litigant, which is, corollary to Two (2) days later, or on 13 September 1972, the action for
the right to adduce evidence, the right to have the said evidence injunction was ordered dismissed by the trial court.
considered by the court. After trial in the second action involving recovery of possession, the
The dismissal of the case for failure to prosecute, when in truth Court of First Instance of Cagayan, on 24 September 1976,
private respondents had already presented their evidence and rendered judgment declaring Rabanes as the rightful owner of the
rested their case, and, therefore, had duly ,prosecuted their case, land and ordered petitioners to vacate the same.
would in effect mean a total disregard by the court of evidence
presented by a party in the regular course of trial and now forming On 18 September 1980, the appellate court rendered judgment,
part of the record. affirming in toto the trial court's judgment.
The ends of justice would be better served if, in its deliberative
function, the court would consider the said evidence together with ISSUE: Whether the first suit, although styled as for "Injunction", had for its
the evidence to be adduced by petitioner. actual primary purpose the recovery of the land in dispute and, therefore,
after its dismissal, no other action for recovery of possession of the same
Petition for relief from judgment land and against the same parties could be pursued by the same
complainant
A petition for relief is available only if the judgment or order

complained of has already become final and executory; but here,
as earlier noted, the order of dismissal never attained finality for the HELD: The defense of res judicata was unavailing to the petitioners,
reason that notice thereof was not served upon private because the prior injunction suit against them, which was dismissed, was
respondents' counsel of record. merely an ancillary and not a main action.
The petition for relief may nevertheless be considered as a second
motion for reconsideration or a motion for new trial based on fraud Under Sections 1 & 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, it can be
and lack of procedural due process. clearly deduced that a writ of injunction presupposes the pendency
of a principal or main action. There being no main action when the
BENJAMIN VALLANGCA, RODOLFO VALLANGCA and ALFREDO 7 July 1971 suit for injunction was filed, the latter was correctly
VALLANGCA, petitioners dismissed. Accordingly, there could be no prior judgment on the
vs. merits to speak of that resulted in res judicata from such dismissal
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and NAZARIO RABANES, respondents of the injunction suit on 13 September 1972.
FACTS:
ISSUE: Whether the dismissal order of 13 September 1972, in the injunction
suit, not having been made without prejudice, bars the second action for
Since Ana Billena and her three (3) sons were in possession and
recovery of possession
actual cultivation of the land in question, Rabanes filed against
them on 7 July 1971 an injunction suit.

HELD: Under Sec. 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, when the court issues, o The petition is filed against respondents because having
upon the plaintiff's instance, a dismissal order that is silent as to whether it is filed the case in the RTC after filing a notice of withdraw
with or without prejudice, such as in the case at bar, the presumption is, that the case pending in the SC. Petitioners charge that "the
it is without prejudice. act of respondents in filing 2 petitions involving the same
issues before the SC and the RTC, both pending,
G.R. No. 134171 November 18, 1998 constitutes forum-shopping and contempt of court." Citing
Rule 7, Sec. 5 of the RoC.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY and ARTURO C. LOMIBAO, petitioners,
vs. The SC granted respondents' prayer for leave to withdraw their
RICHARD J. GORDON, ANACLETO M. DIAS, and ORLANDO E. petition.
MENDIOLA, respondents. Respondents deny the charge against them. They contend that
they complied with Rule 7, Sec 5 by disclosing in the certification of
This is a petition to declare respondents Richard J. Gordon, Anacleto M. non-forum shopping attached to their petition for certiorari and
Diaz, and Orlando E. Mendiola in contempt of court. prohibition before the RTC, the existence and subsequent
withdrawal of their petition for prohibition before this Court.
FACTS:
ISSUE: Whether the respondents are guilty of forum shopping?
The case was filed in the SC because of respondent Gordon's

apprehension that he would be removed and replaced as chairman RULING:
of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) upon the change of
administration. We find for respondents.
The petition was for prohibition to prevent Gordon's ouster as
chairman of the SBMA on the ground that he had a fixed term of Forum-shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for
office of six years which would not expire until February 10, 2004. the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the
o President Erap issued Administrative Order No. 1, purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment.
canceling the appointment of Richard J. Gordon as
Chairman of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority for a In the case at bar, although respondent Dick Gordon filed a petition for
term of 6 years. prohibition before the SC and, after two days, filed the same petition
before the RTC, the fact remains that (1) before filing his petition in the
Instead of a temporary restraining order, respondent Gordon fried RTC he first filed a notice of withdrawal of his petition which the SC
(yes, FRIED ang nakalagay sa original case, LOL!) a "Notice of granted and (2) he withdrew his petition for the following reason:
Withdrawal of his Petition.
o On that same day, he filed a petition for certiorari and Due, however, to the present policy of the Court requiring
prohibition in the RTC of Olongapo City. parties and their counsel to adhere strictly to the hierarchy
The filing of the case in Olongapo gave rise to the present petition of courts and in order to obviate any technical objection on
to declare respondents in contempt of court filed by Executive this ground, petitioner has deemed it fit to withdraw, as he
Secretary Ronaldo Zamora and Arturo C. Lomibao. hereby withdraws, the instant petition so that it may be

filed in the proper court where it can be ventilated on its amended to include 20 additional defendants. 17 defendants had not been
merits. summoned a -CFI issued an order directing the plaintiffs to exert efforts to
cause said defendants to be summoned.
It is clear from respondents' actions and explanation that they had no -Over two years later the court dismissed the case for failure of the plaintiffs
intention of disregarding court processes. They in fact complied with R7 S5 to comply with said order.
of the Rules.
To reiterate, respondent Gordon filed a notice of withdrawal of his petition RULING: Section 3 of Rule 17 of the present Rules of Court
before the SC prior to the filing of his petition in the RTC as the appropriate
forum. While it is true he and his counsels did not wait for the Court to act on Failure to prosecute. If plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial, or to
the "Notice of Withdrawal of Petition" filed by them before filing substantially prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with
the same petition in the RTC. these rules or any order of the court, the action may be dismissed upon
motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion. This dismissal shall
have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided
To be sure, respondents could have apologized at the very least for the time
by court.
of the Supreme Court which they had taken and made an effort to explain
why they have to refile their case without awaiting the Court's resolution on
Construing this provision, it was held in Smith Bell & Co. v. American
their notice of withdrawal of the petition. Because those people from the SC
President Lines, Ltd., 5 and this view was reiterated in subsequent cases, 6
are narcissistic douchebags.
that "... (t)he dismissal of an action pursuant to this rule rests upon the sound
discretion of the court ... ." .
G.R. No. L-27187 July 22, 1971 ANTONIO MONTEJO and
CONSOLACION BIBERA, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. As to what constitutes an "unreasonable length of time," within the purview
VICENTA UROTIA, as heir of JUANA BIBERA, ET AL., defendants- of the above-quoted provision, We have ruled that it "depends upon the
appellees. circumstances of each particular case"; that "the sound discretion of the
court" in the determination of said question "will not be disturbed, in the
These are appeals from orders of dismissal for failure to prosecute. absence of patent abuse"; and that "the burden of showing abuse of judicial
Inasmuch as the issues therein are substantially the same, these nine (9) discretion is upon appellant since every presumption is in favor of the
cases are herein decided jointly. (9 cases sya pro yong Kay montejo lng correctness of the court's action." 7
nilagay ko)
CASE 1- CFI Antonio Montejo and Consolacion Bibera seek: a) to prevent CASE 1: MONTEJO assails the order of dismissal appealed from upon the
the foreclosure of a mortgage on several parcels of land they claim to own in ff. grounds:
common with the defendants, as well as on several personal properties FIRST GROUND:a) that the duty to serve summons upon the defendants
allegedly belonging exclusively to plaintiff Antonio Montejo; b) to have said devolves upon the clerk of court, not upon the plaintiffs; a
parcels of land partitioned among its co-owners; c) the release, from the The appellants contend that under sections 1, 2, and 3, of Rule 31, Rules of
aforementioned mortgage, of the said personal properties and of plaintiffs' Court, it is the duty of the clerk of court and not of the plaintiff to include a
shares in said land; and d) the collection of certain sums of money allegedly case in the trial calendar after the issues are joined and that it is also the
due from the defendants to plaintiff Antonio Montejo. duty of the clerk of court and not the plaintiff to fix the date for trial and to
-There were 24 defendants under the original complaint, which was

cause a notice to be served upon the parties. court and unless there be an abuse of such discretion this Court will not
SUPREME COURT SAID: But the duty imposed upon the clerk in these interfere with the exercise of that discretion. ... 14
sections of the Rules does not relieve the plaintiff of his own duty to
prosecute the case diligently, for the non-performance of that duty by plaintiff CASE 3: As regards L-29373, having been rendered pursuant to a
is by section 3 of Rule 30 made an express ground for dismissing the action. compromise between plaintiff Bolivar and defendant Bandayrel, who has not
If the clerk, therefore, in the present cases had been negligent, it was assailed the validity of said compromise, the judgment of the City Court was
plaintiff's duty to call the court's attention to that fact so that the not appealable. Regardless of whether or not Bandayrel had failed to
administration of justice would not suffer delay. exercise reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal, the same
SECOND GROUND: that service of summons by publication is not feasible was, therefore, dismissed properly.
in this case.
The second ground did not justify plaintiffs' inaction for three (3) years. If CASE4: with respect to L-29454, that from March 24, 1961, when the case
there was no means of summoning any of the defendant's, plaintiffs should was set for trial, to December 8, 1966, when it was dismissed, over five (5)
have so informed the court and moved for their exclusion from the complaint, years and eight (8) months had elapsed, during which plaintiff had done
within a reasonable period of time, so that the case could be disposed on nothing to prosecute the case, and that, in its order of March 17, 1964, the
one way or another instead of being left pending indefinitely, the contributing lower court had already warned the parties "that no further postponement
to the clogging of our court dockets. Besides, plaintiffs could have asked that shall be granted," it is clear that the order of dismissal therein appealed from
the defendants be summoned by publication, pursuant to sections 16 and 17 was fully justified.
of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, the action being one for partition of real
properties in the Philippines. CASE 5: in L-29542 it does not show that there was a patent abuse of
discretion in dismissing the case for failure on his part, as plaintiff therein, to
CASe 2: Appellant in L-29098 alleges that the failure of his counsel to prosecute it for over eleven (11) months considering that the subject matter
appear at the pre-trial, on January 4, 1968, was due to the fact that he then of the litigation was a small sum of money 16 and that appellant's claim
had to attend the trial of another case; that he had filed, on December 27, therefor had been found by the city court to be groundless. 17
1967, a motion for postponement of said pre-trial upon such ground; and
that, although the motion was denied on December 29, 1967, notice of the CASE 6: In L-30711, both parties were notified, on August, 8, 1966, that the
order to this effect was not received by him until January 12, 1968, or eight record of the appeal taken by the plaintiff therein from the judgment of
(8) days after the scheduled pre-trial. These reasons are insufficient to dismissal rendered by the municipal court of General Santos had been
warrant a reversal of the order appealed from. Appellant was represented by received by the Court of First Instance of Cotabato. Yet, up to January 30,
the "Achacoso, Ocampo and Simbulan" Law Firm, on behalf of which Atty. 1969, when the case was ordered dismissed, or for about two (2) years and
Sabino P. Palomares, Jr. had appeared. If Atty. Palomares had another case a half, plaintiff-appellant had taken no step whatsoever to prosecute its
set for trial on January 4, 1968, any of the three (3) members of the law firm claim. The excuse given by counsel for the plaintiff is that he was waiting for
could have and should have appeared at the pre-trial of the case at bar. the clerk of the court of first instance to issue the proper notice of pre-trial,
Moreover, in the absence of an order granting said motion for without which the case would not be ready for trial. This excuse is untenable.
postponement, appellant's counsel was not justified in assuming that the In the language of the Smith Bell case:
motion would be granted. ... (T)he duty imposed upon the clerk ... does not relieve the plaintiff of his
The fact that the plaintiffs had filed a motion for continuance ... does not own duty to prosecute the case diligently, for the non-performance of that
entitle the plaintiffs to presume that their motion for continuance would be duty by plaintiff is by section 3 of Rule 30 made an express ground for
granted. Motions for postponement are left to the sound discretion of the trial dismissing the action. If the clerk, therefore, in the present cases had been

negligent, it was plaintiff's duty to call the court's attention to that fact so that BENEDICTA M. SAMSON and MARCIAL M. SAMSON, Petitioners,
the administration of justice would not suffer delay. vs.
HON. JUDGE GERALDINE C. FIEL-MACARAIG, BANK OF THE
CASE 7: the order of dismissal for the inaction of plaintiff in L-30744, from PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST CO., ATTY. JULIA
August 14, 1967 when she filed her reply, with an answer to the CECILY COCHING-SOSITO, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR
defendant's counterclaim to January 23, 1969 or for over seventeen MARIKINA CITY,Respondents.
(17) months when said order was issued was, likewise, justified.
Appellant's argument to the effect that the case was not ready for trial, no Facts:
pre-trial having as yet been held, is for the reasons adverted to in relation
to L-30711 devoid of merit. Petitioners obtained a loan amounting toP10,000,000 from FEBTC. The loan
was secured by a real estate mortgage. When petitioners failed to comply
CASE 8: in L-30933, more than five (5) years having elapsed from the with the terms of the loan agreement, FEBTC extra-judicially foreclosed the
submission of appellants' record on appeal on April 14, 1962, to August 11, mortgaged properties.
1967, when the appeal was dismissed. Appellants maintain that their duty to
see to it that the record on appeal was transmitted and certified to the
On 8 June 2000, only one bidder, FEBTC, submitted its bid, thereby causing
appellate court starts only from its approval. It is their duty as appellants to
the sheriff to postpone the public auction sale to 29 June 2000, in
exercise diligence in the prosecution of their appeal. Obviously this duty
accordance with SC AM No. 99-10-05-0 and the Notice of Sheriff's Sale
includes that of securing the approval of the record on appeal and its
which states, inter alia:
transmittal to the appellate court.
CASE 9: the mistake allegedly committed by the office secretary of In the event that there are less than two (2) participating bidders in
appellant's counsel, in L-31072, in making the entry for the hearing of the the original date of auction sale as afore-stated, the same shall be
case, on February 6, 1969, in the space for February 11, 1969, in his new postponed to June 29, 2000 at the same time and place without
pocket calendar, is too flimsy to warrant a reversal of the order of dismissal need of republication and reposting [of] this notice.
complained of, apart from being difficult to believe. At any rate, the sworn
statement of appellant Olilang, attached, by way of affidavit of merit, to his On 29 June 2000, the mortgaged real properties were sold at public auction
motion for relief, does not satisfy the requirements therefor, it being no more to FEBTC as the highest bidder, and a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor
than a general, abstract assertion of a conclusion that he has "a valid and of the bank.
meritorious cause of action against the respondents" therein, without any
fact in support thereof. Almost two years later, petitioners, together with Pepito, Zenaida, Julieta,
Edgardo, Rolando, Rempson, and Rocky, all surnamed Samson, filed a
WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from in each one of these nine (9) case for "Annulment of Extra-judicial Foreclosure and/or Nullification of Sale
cases are hereby affirmed, with costs against the respective appellants, and the Certificates of Title, plus Damages and with Prayer for a Temporary
except appellant in L-30711, which is the Government. It is so ordered. Restraining Order [TRO] and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction." They
questioned the validity of the 29 June 2000 auction sale for alleged lack of
G.R. No. 166356 February 2, 2010 posting and publication requirements.

RTC - denied plaintiffs application for TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary The failure of the Ex-Officio Sheriff to file her Answer should not have
Injunction. On 20 June 2003, RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to prevented petitioners from performing their duty under Section 1 of
prosecute for an unreasonable length of time. MR denied on 22 Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which provides:
December 2003.
Section 1. When conducted. After the last pleading has been
CA dismissed Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. MR denied. served and filed, it shall be the duty of the plaintiff to promptly
move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial.
ISUUE: WON CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari for plaintiffs
failure to prosecute despite the fact that one of the defendants, Ex-Officio Petitioners could have availed of other remedies, such as the filing of a
Sheriff Julia Cecily Coching-Sosito, had not yet submitted her responsive motion to declare Ex-Officio Sheriff in default, to avoid unnecessary delay in
pleading hence, the issues were not yet joined and it was still premature for court proceedings.
petitioners to move for a pre-trial of the case.
HELD: NO.
RTC dismissed the case with prejudice for failure to prosecute for an
unreasonable length of time, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of
Court which states, thus:
Section 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. If, for no justifiable

cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation
of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his
action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with
these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be
dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the courts own
motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute
his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal
shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless
otherwise declared by the court.
The RTC Order dated 20 June 2003 was a final judgment which disposed of
the case on the merits. This was even clarified in the subsequent RTC Order
of 22 December 2003 (which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration)
wherein the lower court stated that: "Therefore, the dismissal was with
prejudice or a dismissal that had the effect of adjudication upon the merits in
accordance with Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court."

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Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013

Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon 1

According to American Jurisprudence: Facts:

Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon 2

Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon 3

Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon 4

Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon 5

Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon 6

Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon 7

Donata MONTEMAYOR through her son SALVADOR VITUG

Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon 8

Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon 9

Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon 10

Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon 11

Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon 12

Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon 13

Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon 14

Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon 15

Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon 16

On June 11 , 1930, defendant, with one Jacinto Figueroa executed a REM in SC

Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon 17

Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon 18

CGR Corporation, claimed to have occupied 37.3033 hectares of

Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon 19

Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon 20

1. Ordering the plaintiff to pay

Bacalan is a lessee of a one-door ground floor space in a building owned by

Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon 21

Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon 22

Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon 23

The above provision presupposes that the different causes of action

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ISSUE: WON petitioners are real parties-in-interest? Facts:

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SC Assuming that Matilde is indeed incapacitated, it is her legal guardian who

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. RULING: PETITIONERS HAVE NO LOCUS STANDI.

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ADMINISTRATION;and MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF

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