Cebu Portland Cement Co. v. Municipality of
Cebu Portland Cement Co. v. Municipality of
Cebu Portland Cement Co. v. Municipality of
SYLLABUS
FERNANDO , J : p
According to the appealed decision: "From all the evidence, mostly documentary, adduced
during the hearing the following facts have been established. The efforts of the defendant
Treasurer to collect from the plaintiff the municipal license tax imposed by Amended
Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1959 on cement factories located within the Municipality of
Naga, Cebu, have met with rebuff time and again. The demands made on the taxpayer . . .
have not been entirely successful. Finally, the defendant Treasurer decided on June 26,
1961 to avail of the civil remedies provided for under Section 2304 of the Revised
Administrative Code and gave the plaintiff a period of ten days from receipt thereof within
which to settle the account, computed as follows . . .: De ciency Municipal License Tax for
1960 P80,250.00; Municipal License Tax for 1961 P90,000.00; and 20% Penalty
P34,050.00, stating in exasperation, 'This is our last recourse as we had exhausted all
efforts for an amicable solution of our problem.' " 1
It was further shown: "On July 6, 1961, at 11:00 A.M., the defendant Treasurer noti ed the
Plant Manager of the plaintiff that he was 'distraining 100,000 bags of Apo cement in
satisfaction of your delinquency in municipal license taxes in the total amount of
P204,300.00' . . . This notice was received by the acting of cer in charge of the plaintiff's
plant, Vicente T. Garaygay, according to his own admission. At rst, he was not in accord
with the said letter, asking the defendant Treasurer for time to study the same, but in the
afternoon he [acknowledged the] distraint . . ." 2
As was noted in the decision, the defendant Treasurer in turn "signed the receipt for goods,
articles or effects seized under authority of Section 2304 of the Revised Administrative
Code, certifying that he has constructively distrained on July 6, 1961 from the Cebu
Portland Cement Company at its plant at Tinaan, Naga, Cebu, 100,000 bags of Apo cement
in tanks, and that 'the said articles or goods will be sold at public auction to the highest
bidder on July 27, 1961, and the proceeds thereof will be utilized in part satisfaction of the
account of the said company in municipal licenses and penalties in the total amount of
P204,300.00 due the municipality of Naga- Province of Cebu' . . ." 3
The lower court likewise found as a fact that on the same day, July 6, 1961, the municipal
treasurer posted the notice of sale to the effect that pursuant to the provisions of Section
2305 of the Revised Administrative Code, he would sell at public auction for cash to the
highest bidder at the main entrance of the municipal building of the Municipality of Naga,
Province of Cebu, Philippines on the 27th day of July, 1961, at 9 o'clock in the morning, the
property seized and distrained or levied upon from the Cebu Portland Cement Company in
satisfaction of the municipal license taxes and penalties in the amount of P204,300.00,
specifying that what was to be sold was 100,000 bags of Apo cement. 4 No sale, as thus
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announced, was held on July 27, 1961. It was likewise stated in the appealed decision that
there was stipulation by the parties to this effect: "1. The auction sale took place on
January 30, 1962, . . ." 5
In this appeal from the above joint decision, plaintiff-appellant Cebu Portland Cement
Company upholds the view that the distraint of the 100,000 bags of cement as well as the
sale at public auction thereafter made ran counter to the law. As earlier noted, we do not
see it that way.
1. On the validity of the distraint In the rst two errors assigned, plaintiff-appellant
submits as illegal the distraint of 100,000 bags of cement made on July 6, 1961. Its
contention is premised on the fact that in the letter of defendant-appellee dated June 26,
1961, requiring plaintiff-appellant to settle its account of P204,300.00, it was given a
period of 10 days from receipt within which it could pay, failure to do so being the
occasion for the distraint of its property. It is now alleged that the 10-day period of grace
was not allowed to lapse, the distraint having taken place on July 6, 1961.
It suf ces to answer such a contention by referring to the explicit language of the law.
According to the Revised Administrative Code: "The remedy by distraint shall proceed as
follows: Upon the failure of the person owing any municipal tax or revenue to pay the same,
at the time required, the municipal treasurer may seize and distraint any personal property
belonging to such person or any property subject to the tax lien, in suf cient quantity to
satisfy the tax or charge in question, together with any increment thereto incident to
delinquency, and the expenses of the distraint." 6
The clear and explicit language of the law leaves no room for doubt. The municipal
treasurer "may seize and distraint any personal property" of the individual or entity subject
to the tax upon failure "to pay the same, at the time required . . ." There was such a failure
on the part of plaintiff-appellant to pay the municipal tax at the time required. The power of
the municipal treasurer in accordance with the above provision therefore came into play.
Whatever might have been set forth in the letter of the municipal treasurer could not
change or amend the law. It has to be enforced as written. That was what the lower court
did. What was done then cannot be rightfully looked upon as a failure to abide by what the
statutory provision requires. Time and time again, it has been repeatedly declared by this
Court that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for
interpretation. There is only room for application. That was what occurred in this case. 7
2. On the validity of the auction sale The validity of the auction sale held on January 30,
1962 is challenged in the next two errors assigned as allegedly committed by the lower
court. Plaintiff- appellant's argument is predicated on the fact that it was not until January
16, 1962 that it was noti ed that the public auction sale was to take place on January 29,
1962. It is its view that under the Revised Administrative Code 8 the sale of the distrained
property cannot take place "less than twenty days after notice to the owner or possessor
of the property [distrained] . . . and the publication or posting of such notice."
Why such a contention could not prosper is explained clearly by the lower court in the
appealed decision. Thus: "With respect to the claim that the auction sale held on January
30, 1962 pursuant to the distraint was null and void for being contrary to law because not
more than twenty days have elapsed from the date of notice, it is believed that the
defendant Municipality of Naga and Municipal Treasurer of Naga have substantially
complied with the requirements provided for by Section 2305 of the Revised
Administrative Code. From the time that the plaintiff was rst noti ed of the distraint on
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July 6, 1961 up to the date of the sale on January 30,1962, certainly, more than twenty
days have elapsed. If the sale did not take place, as advertised, on July 27, 1961, but only
on January 30, 1962, it was due to the request for deferment made by the plaintiff which
unduly delayed the proceedings for collection of the tax, and the said taxpayer should not
be allowed now to complain that the required period has not yet elapsed when the
intention of the tax collector was already well publicized for many months." 9 The
reasonableness of the above observation of the lower court cannot be disputed. Under the
circumstances, the allegation that there was no observance of the twenty-day period
hardly carries conviction.
The point is further made that the auction sale took place not on January 29, 1962, as
stated in the notice of sale, but on the next day, January 30, 1962. According to plaintiff-
appellant: "On this score alone, the sale . . ., was illegal as it was not made on the time
stated in the notice." 10
There is no basis to sustain such a plea as the nding of the lower court is otherwise.
Thus: "On January 16, 1962, the defendant Treasurer informed Garaygay that he would
cause the readvertisement for sale at public auction of the 100,000 bags of Apo cement
which were under constructive distraint . . . On January 19, 1962, the said defendant issued
the corresponding notice of sale, which xed January 30, 1962, at 10:00 AM., as the date
of sale, posting the said notice in public places and delivering copies thereof to the
interested parties in the previous notice . . . Ultimately, the bidding was conducted on that
day, January 30, 1962, with the representatives of the Provincial Auditor and Provincial
Treasurer present. Only two bidders submitted sealed bids. After the bidding, the
defendant- Treasurer informed the plaintiff that an award was given to the winning bidder, .
. ." 11
This being a direct appeal to us, plaintiff-appellant must be deemed to have accepted as
conclusive what the lower court found as established by the evidence, only questions of
law being brought to us for review. It is the established rule that when a party appeals
directly to this Court, he is deemed to have waived the right to dispute any nding of fact
made by the court below. 12
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dated July 23, 1964, is af rmed in toto. With
costs against plaintiff-appellant.
Concepcion, C . J ., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles,
JJ ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Decision of July 23, 1964 of the lower court, Record on Appeal, pp. 166-167.
2. Ibid, pp. 167-168.
12. Republic v. Luzon Stevedoring Corp., L-21749, September 29, 1967. See also Perez v.
Araneta, L-18414, July 15, 1968 and the cases cited therein.