City of Albuquerque v. Soto Enterprises, 10th Cir. (2017)
City of Albuquerque v. Soto Enterprises, 10th Cir. (2017)
City of Albuquerque v. Soto Enterprises, 10th Cir. (2017)
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
_________________________________
CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 16-2065
Defendant - Appellant.
_________________________________
Bradley H. Bartlett and David M. Mirazo, Mounce, Green, Myers, Safi, Paxson &
Galatzan, P.C., El Paso, Texas, for Defendant-Appellant.
Christopher J. Tebo, Assistant City Attorney (Jessica M. Hernandez, City Attorney, and
Nicholas Bullock, Assistant City Attorney, with him on the brief), City Attorneys Office,
Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
_________________________________
waived its right to remove by filing a motion to dismiss in state court. We hold that
BACKGROUND
Albuquerque residents. As part of those services, the City charges a fare payable by
cash or coin. The City hired Soto Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Miracle Delivery Armored
Services (Soto) to count the fare money, transport it by armored car to the Citys
bank for deposit, and verify the daily deposit amount with the City.
In the second half of 2014, the City noticed irregularities between the amount
of fare money that it internally recorded and the amount Soto deposited. After
investigating these irregularities, on October 30, 2015, the City sued Soto in New
Mexico state court, alleging contract and tort claims. In its complaint, the City
pleaded that it was a New Mexico municipal corporation and that Soto was a Texas
$246,057.54.
On February 9, 2016, though the City had not yet served process on Soto, Soto
filed three documents in state court in response to the complaint. At 2:18 p.m., Soto
filed a partial motion to dismiss (the motion to dismiss), asserting that the City had
1
An order remanding a case to state court is a final or collateral order because
it puts the litigants effectively out of court. First Union Mortg. Corp. v. Smith,
229 F.3d 992, 994 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517
U.S. 706, 714 (1996)).
2
failed to state a claim on its tort claims. At 2:23 p.m., Soto filed an answer. And at
3:38 p.m., Soto filed a notice of removal under 28 U.S.C. 1441 and 1446, alleging
diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332. So an hour and twenty minutes passed
In federal court, the City moved for a remand to state court, arguing that Soto
had waived its right to remove the case to federal court after participating in the state
court by filing the motion to dismiss. The district court agreed with the Citys
DISCUSSION
remand orders, the City filed a motion to dismiss Sotos appeal, arguing that we lack
jurisdiction. So, before we can address whether the district court erred in its waiver
Co. v. A & H Ins., Inc., 784 F.3d 725, 727-28 (10th Cir. 2015). We review questions
of our appellate jurisdiction de novo. Montez v. Hickenlooper, 640 F.3d 1126, 1130
I. Appellate Jurisdiction
waiver ruling, we are guided by two statutory subsections. The first is 28 U.S.C.
An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed
is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an order
remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant
3
to section 1442 or 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or
otherwise.
Because Soto removed the case under 1441, neither 28 U.S.C. 1442 (which
civil-rights cases) applies here. On its face, 1447(d) would lead us to believe that
we lack appellate jurisdiction to review the district courts remand order, but we
dont read that subsection in isolation. Instead, we read 1447(d) in pari materia
with its close neighbor, 1447(c), and confine the reach of 1447(d) to the two
remands mentioned in 1447(c). In re Stone Container Corp., 360 F.3d 1216, 1218
A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack
of subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the
filing of the notice of removal under section 1446(a). If at any time
before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.
So 1447(c) speaks to two bases of remand: (1) those based on a lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction, which have no time limit, and (2) those based on any defect
other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which must be filed within 30 days of
removal. This means that under the governing interpretation, 1447(d) limits our
1447(c). In re Stone, 360 F.3d at 1218 (quoting Dalrymple v. Grand River Dam
Auth., 145 F.3d 1180, 1184 (10th Cir. 1998)). When a district court remands on other
4
bases, we have appellate jurisdiction to review those remand orders. Am. Soda, LLP
v. U.S. Filter Wastewater Grp., Inc., 428 F.3d 921, 924 (10th Cir. 2005).
Here, the district court remanded the case to state court on a ground not
expressly specified in 1447(c), namely, that Soto waived its removal right by filing
falls within either of 1447(c)s two bases, and, until now, this court has not
wade[d] into that conflict. Harvey v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray
Reservation, 797 F.3d 800, 804 (10th Cir. 2015) (noting circuit split). To determine
A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Subject matter jurisdiction defines the courts authority to hear a given type
of case. Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (quoting
United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984)). [I]t represents the extent to
which a court can rule on the conduct of persons or the status of things. Id. (quoting
Blacks Law Dictionary 870 (8th ed. 2004)). And because parties cannot waive
2
The waiver in this case differs from other types of waiver, such as waiver by
a forum-selection clause in which a party contractually agrees to waive the federal
forum. Here, the district court found that Soto waived removal by filing a motion to
dismiss in state court, a form of waiver by participation during the state-court
proceedings rather than by agreement.
5
subject-matter jurisdiction, they can challenge it at any time prior to final
judgment. Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 571 (2004).
Moreover, the district courts have an independent obligation to address their own
subject-matter jurisdiction and can dismiss actions sua sponte for a lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction. United States v. Lugo, 170 F.3d 996, 1002 (10th Cir. 1999).
But procedural rules set by the Supreme Court and by common law do not
create or withdraw federal jurisdiction, Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 453 (2004)
(quoting Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370 (1978)), and a
litigation conduct, id. at 456. This stems from a fundamental principle that [o]nly
879 F.2d 1402, 1408 (7th Cir. 1989). It concerns the situation where a defendant has
participated in the state court before seeking removal. See 14B Charles Alan Wright
et al., Federal Practice and Procedure 3721 (4th ed. 2017) (A state court
defendant also may lose or waive the right to remove a case to a federal court by
taking some substantial offensive or defensive action in the state court action . . . .).
For instance, the defendant may have engaged in discovery, moved for summary
participation functions as a procedural limitation. Harvey, 797 F.3d at 809 (Hartz, J.,
6
And as a procedural, common-law limitation, waiver by participation doesnt
implicate subject-matter jurisdiction. See Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 453 (explaining that
Indeed, a court could not say otherwise without contradicting two of subject-
destroy subject-matter jurisdiction, U.S. Const. art. III, 1, and (2) that a partys
litigation conduct cant affect subject-matter jurisdiction, Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 453.
Also, unlike jurisdictional defects (which cannot be waived and can be raised sua
sponte by the court), courts lack authority to remand sua sponte for procedural
defects, and the parties can waive such defects by failing to raise them in a timely
manner. See, e.g., Smith v. Mylan Inc., 761 F.3d 1042, 1044 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding
that a district court cannot remand sua sponte based on a non jurisdictional defect
3
The City argues that waiver of the removal right can be colorably
characterized as evidencing a lack of federal jurisdiction. Appellee Response Br.
at 8-9. This misapplies the colorable-characterization standard, which applies when
the district court explicitly states one of the 1447(c) bases. In that instance, we
merely peek behind the district courts label to ensure that the district court did not
dress[] in jurisdictional clothing a patently nonjurisdictional ground or similarly
dress a non-defect ground in defect clothing. Hill v. Vanderbilt Capital Advisors,
LLC, 702 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Powerex Corp. v. Reliant
Energy Servs., 551 U.S. 224, 234 (2007)); see Harvey, 797 F.3d at 804, 807
(reviewing whether the district courts characterization of its remand as based on a
defect was colorable).
7
The Eleventh Circuit also treats waiver by participation as nonjurisdictional.
Cogdell v. Wyeth, 366 F.3d 1245, 1248-49 (11th Cir. 2004). In Cogdell, the court
declared that [w]aiver may be a proper basis upon which to find lack of removal
jurisdiction; however, waiver does not divest the court of subject matter jurisdiction.
Id. at 1249. The court noted that removal jurisdiction not only requires subject-matter
jurisdiction over the removed case, but it also requires compliance with statutory
procedural requirements, e.g., timeliness in removal and consent of all defendants. Id.
at 1248; see 28 U.S.C. 1446. So when a court finds that it lacks removal
We acknowledge that the Fifth Circuit has also examined this issue and
reached a different outcome. In re Weaver, 610 F.2d 335 (5th Cir. 1980). In Weaver,
the district court remanded a case to state court after determining that removal was
4
Though Cogdell preceded the Supreme Courts Carlsbad decision by five
years, it applied consistent logic. In Carlsbad, the Court analyzed supplemental
jurisdiction and subject-matter jurisdiction. 556 U.S. at 640. It determined that a
district court could decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law
claims, yet still have had subject-matter jurisdiction over them. Id. This shows that
supplemental jurisdiction, like removal jurisdiction, requires more than subject-
matter jurisdiction. To exercise supplemental jurisdiction, a district court must have
subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims, and then choose to exercise that
jurisdiction. Id.
5
In Weaver, the defendants participated in the state-court proceedings by
seeking and obtaining dissolution of a temporary injunction. 610 F.2d at 336.
8
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit concluded that a district courts belief that removal was
no longer available led to the logical inference that [the district court] felt
jurisdiction was lacking. Id. at 337. The court never explained what made this
inference logical, and we can fathom no explanation. To us, the inference relies on
necessarily shows that the federal court had no subject-matter jurisdiction over the
state claims.6 In fact, the federal court could have kept and resolved the removed
we can address the cases merits, we must also examine the second 1447(c) basis
B. Any Defect
Based on our circuits case law, we know that three grounds for remand
qualify within the meaning of any defects under 1447(c): (1) noncompliance with
6
In Rothner, the Seventh Circuit also exercised appellate jurisdiction to review
a remand order based on waiver by participation. 879 F.2d at 1416. It too considered
and rejected Weavers reasoning, finding it illogical, unpersuasive, and
unsound. Id. at 1417. Weavers reasoning is questionable even within the Fifth
Circuit. In Baris v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., 932 F.2d 1540, 1543-44 (5th Cir. 1991), the
court admonished the plaintiffs for confusing improper removal with a lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction and stated that this court has had little difficulty in
distinguishing between removal jurisdiction, on the one hand, and original or subject
matter jurisdiction, on the other hand.
9
the time limits provided in 1446(b); (2) noncompliance with the unanimity
rule in 1441(b), which forbids removal when a defendant is a citizen of the forum
state. Huffman v. Saul Holdings Ltd. Pship, 194 F.3d 1072, 1077 (10th Cir. 1999)
(timing requirements); Harvey, 797 F.3d at 805 (unanimity requirements); Am. Oil
Co. v. McMullin, 433 F.2d 1091, 1095 (10th Cir. 1970) (forum-defendant rule).7
Because these three grounds are defects under 1447(c), 1447(d) limits our
By contrast, the following grounds fall outside the any defect group: (1) the
(2) the district courts discretionary remand of pendent claims; (3) abstention; (4)
waiver of the federal forum in a forum-selection clause; and (5) the district courts
Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Thompson, 987 F.2d 682, 684 (10th Cir. 1993)
(pendent claims); Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 712 (1996)
7
In addition to these grounds, the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have held
that violations of 1445, which prohibits removing workers compensation claims,
are also defects under 1447(c). In re Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 756 F.3d 282, 292 (4th Cir.
2014); Kamm v. ITEX Corp., 568 F.3d 752, 756 (9th Cir. 2009); Albarado v. S. Pac.
Transp. Co., 199 F.3d 762, 766 (5th Cir. 1999).
8
When a district court bases its remand order on one of these statutory defects,
1447(d) limits our jurisdiction to reviewing only whether the remand order is
colorably characterized as based on the statutory defect, e.g., a lack of unanimity.
Harvey, 797 F.3d at 807. But 1447(d) prohibits us from reviewing whether the
district court correctly determined that a statutory defect existed. Id.
10
(abstention); Am. Soda, LLP, 428 F.3d at 924; Thermtron Prods., Inc. v.
Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 352 (1976), abrogated in part by Quackenbush, 517
U.S. 706 (crowded docket). Because these grounds fall outside 1447(c), they are
Knowing which grounds fall within or outside of the any defect group helps
us define their characteristics. As seen above, all members of the defect group share a
the legal requisites of the removal statutes. Snapper, Inc. v. Redan, 171 F.3d 1249,
1253 (11th Cir. 1999). The same cannot be said of the non-defect grounds. When a
its discretionary authority. Carlsbad, 556 U.S. at 640-41; Quackenbush, 517 U.S.
at 712. When a district court remands because the defendant waived removal in a
Serv. Corp. v. 1111 Prospect Partners, L.P., 105 F.3d 578, 581 (10th Cir. 1997). But
see Harvey, 797 F.3d at 806 (doubting whether 1447(d) allows review of merits
determinations that precede the remand (quoting Powerex, 551 U.S. at 235)). And
when a district court remands because its docket is too crowded, it exceeds its
authority and the remand is ultra vires. Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 351.
Thus, we hold that any defect applies solely to failures to comply with the
statutory requirements for removal. We agree with the Seventh Circuits sensible
conclusion:
11
It would be unreasonable to assume that Congress would create a
statutory right of removal, and in so doing go to the trouble of laying
out specific and detailed requirements for exercising that right, and
thenby means of the single word improvidentlyextend carte
blanche authority to the district courts to revise the congressional
scheme by remanding cases on any grounds that seem justifiable to
them.
171 F.3d at 1254 (analyzing the statutory revisions effect). In 1996, Congress
amended 1447(c). That section now states that [a] motion to remand the case on
the basis of any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be made
within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under section 1446(a).
language. 171 F.3d at 1254. As the court explained, an early version of the statute
(referred to here as the 1948 version) directed district courts to remand [i]f at any
time before final judgment it appears that the case was removed improvidently and
without jurisdiction. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. 1447(c) (1946)). Under this 1948
version, courts found that parties had improvidently removed cases when one of the
9
When the Seventh Circuit decided Rothner, the court interpreted an older
version of 28 U.S.C. 1447(c) that used the term improvidently rather than
defects. 879 F.2d at 1411. As the discussion illustrates, this change doesnt affect
our analysis.
10
Within this circuit, until now, it was unnecessary to analyze the statutory
changes that 1447(c) has undergone. See Harvey, 797 F.3d at 808-09 (Hartz, J.,
concurring) (assuming that the 1996 amendment was immaterial for that cases
purpose).
12
statutory, non-jurisdictional requirements for removal ha[d] not been satisfied. In re
Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 587 F.2d 642, 647 n.8 (5th Cir. 1978); see also
statutory provisions).
Though most courts interpreted the 1948 version narrowly, the term
causing some uncertainty to develop. Snapper, 171 F.3d at 1255. Because of this
with any defect in removal procedure. Id. at 1256 (quoting 28 U.S.C. 1447(c)
(1994)). After this amendment, courts continued to interpret the subsection narrowly.
Id. at 1256-57. But eventually a circuit split developed when it came to classifying
remands based on 1441(b), the forum-defendant rule.11 Id. at 1257-58. The Fifth
Circuit characterized this rule as a procedural defect, and thus a defect within
1447(c), while the Eighth Circuit characterized it as jurisdictional, and thus not a
defect within 1447(c). LaMotte v. Roundys, Inc., 27 F.3d 314, 316 n.3 (7th Cir.
11
The forum-defendant rule prohibits removal when a case is removed for
diversity jurisdiction and the defendant is a citizen of the State in which such action
is brought. 28 U.S.C. 1441(b)(2).
13
To resolve this confusion, in 1996, Congress amended the statute to its current
(1998). Based on this background, it appears that Congress intended to broaden the
meaning of any defect to include all statutory-based defects but never intended to
broaden the meaning beyond this. See Snapper, 171 F.3d at 1258. Instead, Congress
Snapper and other circuits that this statutory history shows that any defect is
limited to a failure to comply with the statutory requirements for removal. See, e.g.,
In re Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 756 F.3d 282, 292 (4th Cir. 2014) ([D]efect refers to a
failure to comply with the statutory requirements for removal . . . .); Kamm v. ITEX
Corp., 568 F.3d 752, 755 (9th Cir. 2009) (same); Holmstrom v. Peterson, 492 F.3d
833, 837 (7th Cir. 2007) (explaining that the legislative history reflects a
that are grounded in the precise directions that Congress has placed in the Judicial
Ericsson Inc., 201 F.3d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 2000) (defining defect as the failure to
comply with the various requirements for a successful removal, as set forth in
1446(a) and (b)); see also Graphic Commcns Local 1 B Health & Welfare Fund
A v. CVS Caremark Corp., 636 F.3d 971, 974-76 (8th Cir. 2011) (declining to
14
2. Waiver
Now that weve concluded that any defect means a failure to comply with
common-law creation not included in the removal statutes, it does not qualify as any
We acknowledge that some others judges would rule otherwise, relying on the
finding that the defendant waited too long in light of events taking place in state
court, even though the defendants time ran out in advance of the limit in the
statute. 879 F.2d at 1422 (emphasis in original). And, as Judge Hartz explained in
797 F.3d at 809 (Hartz, J., concurring). In Judge Hartzs words the remover lingers
too long in state court by removing beyond 1446(b)(1)s 30-day requirement; and
by participating in the state-court proceedings, the remover lingers too lovingly. Id.
removal under 1446(b)(1) have some similarities, their application differs. The
timing requirements of 1446(b)(1) are certain and easily calculated. But issues
15
about whether a defendant has sufficiently participated in a state court before
Rothner, 879 F.2d at 1404 (noting that because the district court believed that the
removing party had an improper motive for removing the case, it decided not to
follow a long-settled common law rule that opposing a motion for a temporary
restraining order does not waive the right to remove). And perhaps the most difficult
aspect of the waiver doctrine is that it depends on state procedural rules. See, e.g.,
Yusefzadeh v. Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, LLP, 365 F.3d 1244, 1246
(11th Cir. 2004) (finding that Floridas 20-day requirement for filing motions to
dismiss resulted in a quandary for defendants who filed for removal in a timely
manner but found themselves back in state court with no time left to file a motion to
dismiss).
Congress included any equitable ground in 1447(d), it might well have reached
all delays instead of just the timing delay identified in 1446. Things Remembered,
Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 134 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). And the City
could perhaps have fit waiver by participation within the equitable doctrine of laches,
which stems from the principle that equity aids the vigilant and not those who
slumber on their rights. Biodiversity Conservation All. v. Jiron, 762 F.3d 1036,
16
1090-91 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673, 687 (1995)).
II. Merits
The issue here is whether Soto waived its removal right by filing a motion to
dismiss in state court. In holding that Soto waived removal, the district court made a
legal determination that motions to dismiss alone are sufficient to constitute waiver;
Corp., 499 F.3d 1218, 1221 (10th Cir. 2007). But see Grubb v. Donegal Mut. Ins.
Co., 935 F.2d 57, 59 (4th Cir. 1991) (reviewing the factual findings underlying
or defensive action in the state court action indicating a willingness to litigate in that
tribunal before filing a notice of removal with the federal court. PR Grp., LLC v.
Windmill Intl, Ltd., 792 F.3d 1025, 1026-27 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Yusefzadeh,
365 F.3d at 1246). This waiver must be clear and unequivocal, meaning that short of
[the defendant] seeking an adjudication on the merits, the right to removal is not
12
Similar to remands based on waiver by forum-selection clauses, remands
based on waiver by participation dont fall within either 1447(c) ground; but these
remands based on waiver by participation still remain lawful through a district
courts inherent power to remand. Snapper, 171 F.3d at 1263 n.26.
17
lost . . . . Windmill, 792 F.3d at 1026 (quoting Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co., 327
F.3d 423, 428 (5th Cir. 2003)); Am. Soda, LLP, 428 F.3d at 927.
Here, though Soto could file an answer in state court without waiving removal,
see Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(c)(2), we conclude that Soto waived removal by also filing a
motion to dismiss in state court. We acknowledge that a mere hour and twenty
minutes passed between Sotos filing the motion to dismiss and its answer, and that
Soto never requested a hearing on its motion to dismiss. These actions may show
Sotos subjective intent to remove; but Soto showed its objective intent to remain in
state court by filing a motion to dismiss, which submitted the cases merits to the
state court for adjudication. See Alwert v. Cox Commcns, Inc. (In re Cox Enters.,
Inc. Set-top Cable Television Box Antitrust Litig.), 835 F.3d 1195, 1205 (10th Cir.
regardless of its intent, Sotos conduct in state court foreclosed its removal right.
Id. This is because the waiver rules aim to prevent defendants from seeking an
adjudication on the merits, which means that a state defendant can waive removal
even before the state court actually adjudicates the merits. Windmill, 792 F.3d
at 1026 (emphasis added) (quoting Tedford, 327 F.3d at 428). Soto sought the state
courts adjudication by addressing the substantive merits of the Citys tort claims.
See Styskal v. Weld Cty. Bd. of Cty. Commrs, 365 F.3d 855, 858 (10th Cir. 2004)
(explaining that an on the merits adjudication means one that passes directly on the
18
We hold that when a defendant files a motion to dismiss seeking disposition,
in whole or in part, on the merits in state court before removing the case to federal
court, it manifests a clear and unequivocal intent to submit the case to the state
courts jurisdiction, and thus waives removal. We favor a bright-line rule to avoid
piecemeal litigation that would distinguish cases based on the length of delay
between motions to dismiss and motions to remove and based on any number of like
We will not find waiver of the right to remove when a states procedural rules
for potential harm to defendants.14 For instance, upon remand, would a defendant lose
its opportunity to file a motion to dismiss because it failed to comply with a states
procedural rule?
13
Unlike motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, motions to dismiss for
defenses such as lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or insufficient process make it
unnecessary for a court to adjudicate the cases merits. Styskal, 365 F.3d at 858.
Because of this, such motions dont implicate waivers goal of promoting judicial
economy and preventing piecemeal and duplicative litigation.
14
Soto argues that this standard is inflexible and creates inconsistencies within
this circuit. Yet, Soto failed to present cases from this court to show what
inconsistencies this rule creates. To the flexibility issue, an inflexible standard brings
certainty to litigants, which outweighs our concern with the potential for harsh
results. We note that the district court case cited by Soto, May v. Board of County
Commissioners, 945 F. Supp. 2d 1277 (D.N.M. 2013), aligns with todays opinion.
Because the defendant in that case filed a motion to dismiss in state court based on
improper venue, it did not seek a final determination on the merits of the case before
removal, and thus retained its right to remove. Id. at 1297-98.
19
In Yusefzadeh, the Eleventh Circuit faced such a state procedural rule. The
Florida rule required defendants to file motions to dismiss within 20 days of service.
Yusefzadeh, 365 F.3d at 1246. When combined with the federal 30-day removal
period, this 20-day time limit created a quandary for state defendants. Id. (citing 28
U.S.C. 1446(b)). A defendant in Florida might have filed for timely removal only
to find itself back in state court where the time to file a motion to dismiss had run.
See id. But unlike the 20-day filing requirement in Yusefzadeh, New Mexicos
procedural rules didnt compel Soto to file a state motion to dismiss before its 30-day
removal period had expired. Further, when Soto filed its state motion to dismiss, the
City had not served process, meaning that the clock had not started running on either
removal or filing a motion to dismiss. So, absent Sotos participating in the state case
by filing a motion to dismiss, on remand, it would have had 30 days in which to file
its state motion to dismiss.15 Soto jumped the gun, unlike the defendants in
Yusefzadeh.
Still, Soto argues that state and federal rules of civil procedure allowed it to
file the motion to dismiss. In support, Soto cites Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
81(c) to show that defendants can file an answer in state court before removing a case
to federal court. Soto then combines this with New Mexico Rule of Civil Procedure
1-012(B), which requires parties to file their motions to dismiss before pleading, to
15
This hypothetical assumes that Soto removed on Day 1 of the removal
period.
20
show that, upon remand, it would have lost its opportunity to file a motion to dismiss
had it answered the complaint first before removing to federal court. From this, Soto
deduces that it could file the motion to dismiss without waiving its right to remove.
But Soto misses the point. For the exception to apply, we dont examine whether
procedural rules allowed the participation, we examine whether the procedural rules
compelled the participation. New Mexicos rule didnt compel Soto to answer the
Citys complaint and, consequently, didnt compel Soto to file its motion to dismiss
for two reasons: (1) the City never served Soto; and (2) Soto could have removed the
without needing to do so, we conclude that Soto waived its right to remove.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we DENY the Citys motion to dismiss this
21