G.R. No. 176266
G.R. No. 176266
G.R. No. 176266
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
- versus - NACHURA, JJ.
Promulgated:
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For Review is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01745,
which affirmed with modification the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Mandaluyong City, Branch 208, finding accused-appellant Felix Ortoa y Obia
guilty of raping his own thirteen-year old daughter, AAA.[3]
Appellant was charged with rape, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, in relation to Republic Act No. 7610. [4] The
Information against him reads:
That on or about the 3rd day of April, 2001, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
lewd designs and by means of force and intimidation, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with (sic) his own daughter, AAA, a
minor (13 years old), against her will and consent, thus debasing and/or demeaning the
intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being.[5]
AAA also stated that it was not the first time that appellant had sexually molested
her. She alleged that appellant started raping her when she was about three years
old by inserting his finger in her vagina. Thinking that appellant was merely
playing a game with her, AAA did not tell anyone about such incident. Eventually,
however, her mother discovered appellants reprehensible conduct when AAA got
pregnant. When asked if she delivered a child, AAA claimed that she had an
abortion after appellant made her take medicines.
BBB testified that she and appellant were in a common law relationship and
together they have seven children. She recalled that on 3 April 2001, she was at
home with some of her children including AAA. AAA then requested her and her
other children to leave the house as the former was experiencing stomach ache
and had to relieve herself. She then took her other children to the house of her
aunt. While conversing with her relative, BBB claimed that she suddenly felt
nervous. Sensing that something unusual was happening, she hurriedly went
home. When she arrived, she found AAA lying on the makeshift bed with
appellant sitting thereon. She noticed that AAA was on the verge of crying and her
shorts seemed to be hastily pulled up. She knew then appellant had again done
the unthinkable to their daughter AAA. When she confronted appellant about
what he had just done in their house at that time, he allegedly retorted, Why is
your face like that again as if youre always sinasalisihan.[7] After their brief
confrontation, appellant went back to the barbershop. It was at that moment
when BBB was able to finally talk to AAA. The latter allegedly told her that she
was again raped by appellant. Later that day, she went to discuss the matter with
Daylo who assured her of his help in going to the police.
The following night, BBB, together with AAA and Daylo, went to the police station
where they were referred to PO Gaviana. While she and AAA were being
interviewed by said police officer, her younger daughter, CCC, purportedly
said, Ako rin po Ma, ginagawa din sa akin ni Papa iyong ginagawa niya kay
Ate.[8] This statement made her feel even worse since it turned out that two of
her daughters had fallen prey to appellants bestial desires. BBB also corroborated
AAAs testimony regarding the latters pregnancy and the abortion induced by
appellant.
Dr. Freyra, a medico-legal officer of the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory,
testified that on 5 April 2001, their office received a request for the medical
examination on AAA.[9] Pursuant to their office procedure, she interviewed AAA
pertaining to her personal circumstances and the reason for the physical
examination. AAA disclosed that appellant started molesting her when she was a
child. Appellants malevolence was manifested when he satisfied himself by
inserting his finger into AAAs vagina when she was a young child until ultimately,
he started thrusting his penis into her sexual organ.
After the interview, Dr. Freyra said that she conducted the physical examination
on AAA which yielded the following findings:
FINDINGS:
Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female subject. Breasts are
Hemispherical with pale brown areola and nipples from which no secretions could be
pressed out. Abdomen is flat and soft.
GENITAL:
There is scanty growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and coaptated with
pinkish brown labia minora presenting in between. On separating the same disclosed an
elastic, fleshy type hymen with deep healed lacerations at 5.7 and 9
oclock positions. External vaginal orifice offers moderate resistance to the introduction
of the examining index finger. Vaginal canal is narrow with prominent rugosities. Cervix
is normal in size, color and consistency. x x x.[10]
PO Gaviana testified that on 4 April 2001, she interviewed AAA and BBB regarding
AAAs complaint of rape against appellant, and that AAA and BBB executed their
respective sworn statements[11] in her presence. After the interview, AAA was
referred to the crime laboratory for medico legal examination.
The trial court refused to believe appellants account of the case and rendered a
decision finding him guilty as charged, thus:
DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused FELIX ORTOA y OBIA guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED RAPE under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by RA 7659 in relation to RA 7610, and sentences him to suffer the penalty of
DEATH to be implemented in the manner as provided by law. The accused is hereby
ordered to pay AAA the sum of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to prepare the Mittimus and to transmit the
complete records of this case to the Honorable Supreme Court for automatic review.
The City Warden of Mandaluyong, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology is hereby
ordered to deliver forthwith the person of FELIX ORTOA y OBIA to the National Bilibid
Prisons, Muntinlupa City, with proper escort and security.[12]
The case was automatically elevated to this Court in view of the death penalty
imposed by the trial court. On 26 July 2005, we resolved to transfer this case to
the Court of Appeals pursuant to our holding in People v. Mateo,[13] which allowed
intermediate review by the appellate court of cases where the penalty imposed is
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, herein appeal is hereby DISMISSED for evident lack
of merit and the assailed Judgment is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION imposing
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA upon the Appellant without possibility of
parole.[14]
Appellant is once again before Us praying for his acquittal upon the ground that
the trial court gravely erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of qualified rape.[15]
Appellant insists that the trial court should not have given full faith and
credence[16] to AAAs testimony. He points out that the trial court should have
taken into account AAA and BBBs motive in filing the case against him as it is
possible that they were only moved by resentment towards him. Particularly in
the case of AAA, she admitted during her testimony that she felt bitter about her
fathers strictness towards her while BBB could have been provoked by his illicit
relationships and his irresponsibility.[17]
After thoroughly reviewing the records of this case and thoughtfully weighing the
parties respective claims, we hold that a denial of this appeal is in order.
In resolving rape cases, this Court has been traditionally guided by three
principles: (a) an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult for the
complainant to prove but more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to
disprove; (b) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two
persons are involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with
extreme caution; and (c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its
own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the defense.[18]
In the case before us, AAA recalled her cruel experience in the following manner:
Fiscal Tacla: Now, what happened? Is there anything that happened on April 3, 2001, at
your residence?
Fiscal Tacla: What did you do when your father told you to remove your shorts and
panty?
Witness: I did not agree.
Fiscal Tacla: So, in other words, you were made to remove your shorts and panty?
Witness: My father removed my shorts and my panty and he told me to spread my legs.
Fiscal Tacla: Where were you at that time when your father told you to spread your
legs?
Fiscal Tacla: Did you comply when you were told by your father to spread your legs?
Fiscal Tacla: So nothing happen[ed] when you did not spread your legs?
Witness: He was the one who spread my legs, sir.
Fiscal Tacla: When these things were happening to you, what did you do if any?
Fiscal Tacla: How did your father react when you said ayaw mo?
Fiscal Tacla: While your legs were forcibly spread by your father, what did you do[,] if
any?
Fiscal Tacla: When he was on top of you, were his pants on?
Fiscal Tacla: How sure are you that he inserted his penis to your vagina?
Witness: I saw it and I felt it, sir.
Fiscal Tacla: Did you tell that to your father while he was performing that act?
Fiscal Tacla: What happened when your fathers penis was inserted in your vagina?
Fiscal Tacla: When your father was doing this push and pull movement, how did you
feel?
Fiscal Tacla: What could be the reason why you felt pain?
Witness: Because my vagina was moved.
Fiscal Tacla: Even without your fathers penis inserted in your vagina, you still feel pain?
Witness: Sometimes.
Fiscal Tacla: How long did it take for your father to insert his penis in [your] vagina?
Fiscal Tacla: Did it take the whole afternoon for your father to insert his penis?
Fiscal Tacla: Did your father finally take off his penis from your vagina?
Witness: He ordered me to put on my panty and my shorts and then he stood up and
opened the door and the windows.[23]
AAAs vivid recollection of her ordeal that afternoon reveals her utter lack of
reluctance in charging appellant with the grave crime of rape. Her simple,
straightforward, and definitive answers to the questions propounded to her
underscores the truthfulness of her narration and the substance of her
accusation. Moreover, as AAA was only thirteen years old when the crime was
perpetrated, jurisprudence enjoins us to accord more weight to her testimony,
thus:
Moreover, settled is the rule that testimonies of rape victims, especially child victims,
are given full weight and credit. xxx. We have ruled that when a woman, more so if she
is a minor, says she has been raped, she says, in effect, all that is necessary to prove that
rape was committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth. Courts usually
give greater weight to the testimony of a girl who is a victim of sexual assault, especially
a minor, particularly in cases of incestuous rape, because no woman would be willing to
undergo a public trial and put up with the shame, humiliation and dishonor of exposing
her own degradation were it not to condemn an injustice and to have the offender
apprehended and punished. The embarrassment and stigma of allowing an examination
of her private parts and testifying in open court on the painfully intimate details of her
ravishment effectively rule out the possibility of false accusations of rape.[24]
(Appellant) having proferred the defense of denial and alibi, suffice it to say that denial
and alibi are the weakest defense and are practically worthless against the positive
identification made by the prosecution witness, especially by the rape victim. Between
the positive and categorical testimony of a rape victim on one hand and the accuseds
bare denial on the other hand, the former generally prevails. Universally accepted is the
rule that denial is a self-serving negative evidence that cannot be given greater weight
than the declaration of credible witness who testified on affirmative matters.[27]
Besides, it is not correct, as appellant would have us believe, that AAA was
impelled to initiate this case by his strictness towards her. It is true that AAA
testified that she abhorred appellants sternness but that was not the end of her
statement before the court. What she really detested was the fact that hiding
behind appellants pretentious concern for her well-being was a perverse sexual
desire that respected no one, not even his own child.[31]
We likewise reject appellants contention that BBB initiated the filing of the charge
against him because of his relationship with another woman. No matter how
enraged a mother could be, it would take nothing less than psychological
depravity for her to concoct a story too damaging to the welfare and well-being of
her own daughter.[32] Courts are seldom if at all convinced that a mother would
stoop so low as to expose her own daughter to the physical, mental and
emotional hardship concomitant to a rape prosecution just to assuage her own
hurt feelings.[33] It must also be emphasized that in this case, when BBB first found
out about appellants sexual transgression, she did not go to the police right away;
instead, she respected AAAs desire to keep her misfortune a private
matter. Indeed, nothing could be more wrenching for a mother than to watch her
own daughter suffer such irreparable injury. Yet BBB chose to abide by her childs
entreaty. It was only when they were confronted with the hopelessness of the
situation that they finally summoned the courage to have appellant account for
his misdeeds.
Anent the claim that the truthfulness of the accusation is affected by AAAs
failure to report the purported previous incidents of rape, we likewise rule against
appellant.There is no uniform behavior that can be expected from those who had
the misfortune of being sexually molested.[34] Some may have found the courage
early on to reveal the abuse they experienced; there are those who have opted to
initially keep the harrowing ordeal to themselves and tried to move on with their
lives. Again, to quote our holding in People v. Melivo
A rape victims actions are oftentimes overwhelmed by fear rather than by reason. It is
this fear, springing from the initial rape, that the perpetrator hopes to build a climate of
extreme psychological terror, which would, he hopes, numb his victim into silence and
submissiveness. Incestuous rape magnifies this terror, because the perpetrator is a
person normally expected to give solace and protection to the victim. Furthermore, in
incest, access to the victim is guaranteed by the blood relationship, proximity
magnifying the sense of helplessness and the degree of fear.[35]
In this case, the delay was sufficiently explained by AAA. According to her, when
she was still a young child and already subjected to the revolting behavior of
appellant, the latter threatened her with physical harm should she divulge his
misdeeds to anyone else. When she became pregnant, appellant resorted to
emotional blackmail by telling her that he would be imprisoned should she tell
anyone about what he had been doing to her. And when BBB wanted appellant to
move out of their house because of his appalling conduct, appellant had the
audacity to confront BBB with the fact that he was the sole breadwinner of their
family. It is therefore clear that appellant used every scheme he could think of to
dissuade AAA and BBB from going to the proper authorities. But more than
appellants actuations, AAA was discouraged by the public ridicule that she
expected to come her way. In her words:
Nalaman na noon ng aking Mama ang ginagawa ng aking Papa sa akin at tinanong ako
kung anong gusto kong mangyari, ang sabi ko ayoko pa dahil hindi ko pa kaya na
humarap sa ibang tao. [36]
Having sustained the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, we shall
now turn to the penalty to be imposed upon appellant. Under Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code, the death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any aggravating/qualifying circumstances enumerated
thereunder. One of these is (w)hen the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age
and offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse
of the parent of the victim. The Information in this case alleges both the minority
of AAA and her relationship with appellant and these were duly established
during the trial. Hence, the imposition of the death penalty by the trial court was
proper.
With the effectivity, however, of Republic Act No. 9346 entitled An Act Prohibiting
the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, the imposition of the penalty
of death has been prohibited. The proper penalty to be imposed on appellant in
this case is provided in Section 2, paragraph (a) of said law which prescribes that
the penalty of reclusion perpetua be imposed when the law violated makes use of
the nomenclature of the penalties under the Revised Penal Code.
As regards the award of damages, the appellate court affirmed the court a quos
award of the following amounts: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as
moral damages; and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
On the other hand, we deem it proper to modify the amounts awarded for moral
damages and exemplary damages to bring them at par with prevailing
jurisprudence. Thus, we increase the amount awarded as moral damages
from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00,[38] while the amount awarded as exemplary
damages should be reduced from P30,000.00 to P25,000.00.[39]
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan Vidal with Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes and Fernanda
Lampas Peralta, concurring; CA rollo, pp. 121-136.
[2]
Per then Presiding Judge Japar B. Dimaampao (now a member of the Court of Appeals); id. at 63-79.
[3]
Under Republic Act No. 9262, also known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004
and its implementing rules, the real name of the victim, as well as those of her immediate family members,
is withheld and fictitious initials are used to identify her in order to protect her privacy; People v.
Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, 19 September 2006, 502 SCRA 419, 421-422.
[4]
An Act Providing For Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination, Providing Penalties For its Violation, and for other Purposes.
[5]
Records, p. 1.
[6]
Id. at 32.
[7]
TSN, 7 August 2001, p. 12.
[8]
Id. at 22.
[9]
The request also included a physical examination on CCC; records, p. 385
[10]
Id. at 13.
[11]
Id. at 8-9 and 11.
[12]
Id. at 468-469.
[13]
G.R. Nos. 147678-87, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
[14]
CA rollo, p. 19.
[15]
Rollo, p. 55.
[16]
Id. at 57.
[17]
Id. at 58.
[18]
People v. Marahay, 444 Phil. 143, 146 (2003).
[19]
People v. Tismo, G.R. No. 44773, 4 December 1991, 204 SCRA 535, 553.
[20]
People v. Villanueva, 324 Phil. 443, 450 (1996).
[21]
People v. Almendral, G.R. No. 126025, 6 July 2004, 433 SCRA 440, 447.
[22]
People v. Canoy, 459 Phil. 933, 942 (2003).
[23]
TSN, 30 July 2001, pp. 88-93.
[24]
People v. Rosario, 455 Phil. 876, 886-887 (2003).
[25]
People v. Agbayani, 348 Phil. 341, 366 (1998).
[26]
People v. Mabunga, G.R. No. 96441, 13 November 1992, 215 SCRA 694, 704.
[27]
Rollo, pp. 77-78.
[28]
People v. Terrible, 440 Phil. 602, 614 (2002).
[29]
323 Phil. 412, 427-428 (1996).
[30]
People v. Agbayani, supra note 25 at 364-365.
[31]
TSN, 31 July 2001, p. 29.
[32]
People v. Padilla, G.R. No. 142899, 31 March 2004, 426 SCRA 648, 664.
[33]
People v. Agbayani, supra note 25 at 366-367.
[34]
People v. Mendoza, 432 Phil. 666, 682 (2002).
[35]
Supra note 29 at 422.
[36]
Records, p. 387.
[37]
354 Phil. 195, 209 (1998), cited in People v. Quiachon, G.R. No. 170236, 31 August 2006, 500 SCRA 704, 719.
[38]
People v. Pandapatan, G.R. No. 173050, 13 April 2007; People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 168174,
13 April 2007.
[39]
Id.