The Journal of the American Academy of Religion, L / l

The Sociology of Dogmatics:

Niklas Luhmann's
Challenge to Theology
Garrett Green

emands that theology take seriously its social and cultural context

D have been voiced repeatedly in recent years, both by theologians

themselves and by their interpreters and critics in other fields. It has
long been apparent that insights into the sociology of knowledge have
important implications for theology as for all areas of human inquiry. The
growth of religious studies as a field—and increasingly as the intellectual
and institutional environment for theologians in the English-speaking
world—has intensified pressures to take account of the external social world
in which theology is done. Though these pressures have led theologians to
pay more attention to sociology, social anthropology, and social history, the
only concrete result seems to have been a proliferation of methodological
proposals and programmatic essays.
Another demand frequently heard in the midst of the disciplinary iden-
tity crisis through which theology has been struggling since the passing of
the great systematicians who dominated the 1930s, 40s, and 50s is for an
alternative to theologies based on metaphysical presuppositions or onto-
logical principles. This appeal was sounded earlier by Karl Barth, but nei-
ther his alternative nor any other has achieved widespread acceptance by
contemporary theologians, who continue to insist on the need for a new kind
of fundamental or foundational theology.
For the most part, of course, these theological frustrations have
remained an in-house affair, attracting little attention from other disciplines.
Hecently, however, a notable exception has appeared on the scholarly horizon:
a comprehensive theory of religion, by a thoroughly "secular" sociologist,

^arrett Green (Ph.D., Yale) is Associate Professor of Religious Studies at Connecticut

College and has recently spent two years as an Alexander von Humboldt Research Fel-
'(nv at the University of Tübingen. He has translated and written the introduction to
'' 'elites Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation (Cambridge University Press, 1978).
20 Garrett Green

which assigns a major social function not just to religion generally but to
dogmatic theology in particular. From the prolific pen of Niklas Luhmann,
sociologist at the University of Bielefeld in West Germany, comes a theory
that restores religion to a central position in sociology, ascribes to "religious
dogmatics" a crucial role in the guidance of religion, and even enables a
detailed sociological analysis and critique of specific Christian doctrines. The
dialogue with theologians that Luhmann expressly invites has begun to take
shape in G e r m a n y , / l / especially since the publication of Funktion der
Religion, in which his theory of religion—including an attempt to provide a
sociological grounding of theology—appears in its most developed
formulation. Ecclesiastical interest in Luhmann has also spread beyond the
theological faculties to leaders of the West German Protestant churches, who
have engaged his services as a consultant.
The opportunity for intensive dialogue between sociology and theology
at a sophisticated theoretical level is to be welcomed, and theologians should
be appreciative of a social-scientific theory that takes the theological enter-
prise seriously enough to enter into its problems and procedures in detail.
Luhmann offers a refreshing change from sociological theories that treat
theology, if at all, merely as an epiphenomenal superstructure obscuring the
underlying economic, political, and cultural realities of religious behavior.
But theologians (and church leaders) should also beware of being flattered
into accepting too quickly a definition of their own enterprise which offers
answers to fundamental questions that they have been unable to answer for
themselves. For Luhmann makes the bold claim, in contrast to most of the
tradition of sociology, that sociological analysis can explain not only the
"externar' actions of religious individuals and institutions but also the
"inner" realm of faith and religious experience that has been so jealously
guarded by modern theology as its exclusive preserve. Luhmann himself
warns that "the relations that could be established between sociological the-
ory and religious dogmatics are closer, more abstract, more fruitful, and
more dangerous than one commonly assumes" (1977:73).
Luhmann's thought is of particular relevance to theologians, because it
speaks directly to the two issues mentioned at the outset, which* continue
both to fascinate and to frustrate the work of theology: the social location
and significance of the theological enterprise itself, and the need for a new
kind of theory independent of metaphysical and ontological presuppositions.
In view of the exceptional linguistic and conceptual demands that Luhmann
makes on his readers, and the nearly total absence of English translations of
his work,/2/ the first step must be a brief description of the nature and aim
of his theory as a whole (I), followed by an attempt to recount the broad
outlines of his theory of religion (II) and the special role of "religious
dogmatics" (III). Then on the basis of this account I want to highlight the
challenges posed by the theory for Christian theology and to suggest the
direction that an adequate theological response should take (IV).
The Sociology of Dogmatics: Niklas Luhmann's Challenge to Theology 21

1
Luhmann emerged as a social theorist to be reckoned with in a pub-
lished debate with Jürgen Habermas which attracted the attention of
German academics beyond the ranks of professional sociologists. After a late
start in academic life—he first studied law and had a career in public
administration—Luhmann has been making up for lost time at a breath-
taking pace in a series of essays and books covering most of the main areas
of modern society. His work is tied together by a general theory of society
both comprehensive in scope and grounded in a conceptually in sharp con-
trast to other European sociology.
But to consider Luhmann's theory simply from the point of view of
sociology as that field has usually been understood would be to risk seriously
misconstruing both its content and its significance for theology. For
Luhmann makes some bold—even audacious—claims on behalf of his the-
ory that put him in competition not only with the theories of other sociolo-
gists but also with the main traditions of Western philosophy. One critic
maintains that the motive underlying all of Luhmann's work, and its chief
weakness, is his attempt to solve philosophical problems by sociological
means (Hondrich:89ff.). Luhmann, for his part, is quite explicit about his
designs on territory traditionally occupied by philosophy, openly announcing
his intention to "resolve epistemology into an instance of the application of
systems theory" (1977:17). He sees himself as the proponent of a qualita-
tively new kind of theory, frankly relativistic, lacking any fixed points of
reference, and characterized by the ability to combine high degrees of both
choice (Beliebigkeit) and specification (1975:200-201). He repeatedly con-
trasts this type of theory to old-style metaphysical and ontological theories,
for which his favorite pejorative is alteuropäisch (e.g., 1974:196-97). "The
goal of knowledge," he claims, "is no longer the establishment of unchange-
able, self-identical substance in its essence, but control over alternatives"
(1974.36). To achieve this goal, he proposes not simply a particular sociolog-
ical theory but rather a complex and multifacted "Supertheorie" (1978:9-
27), a comprehensive framework for all special scientific endeavors.
Luhmann normally refers to his program as functional systems theory,
and he draws many of his key concepts from Talcott Parsons (cf., e.g., 1951,
1968). (In a reversal of the German-laden English prose familiar to theolo-
gians, Luhmann's works are sprinkled with anglicized German and
sociological English—"adaptive upgrading," "loose coupling.") This Parsonian
base has been developed further by the use of concepts derived from
Husserlian phenomenology. To make matters even more complex (not a
drawback according to Luhmann's criteria), he links up systems theory with
two other recent theoretical enterprises, evolutionary theory and
communications theory (1975:193-203). These various theory elements cannot
he reduced to a unified base, yet they "mutually presuppose one another."
22 Garreit Green

Each of them is a "self-referential" complex of concepts, which can be

combined with elements from the others in a process of "relationizing" to
achieve new and more sophisticated means for analyzing particular social
phenomena. Although Luhmann affirms the goal of combining these indepen-
dent elements into "a coherent theory," he acknowledges that the results are
extremely complicated; he likens them to the patterns created by the
intersecting concentric waves produced by three stones thrown simultaneously
into the water. He characterizes the resulting mode of argumentation as
"neither linear, nor circular, but labyrinthine"—and few of his readers are
likely to disagree.
One further way in which Luhmann seeks to overcome the limitations
of the old European tradition is especially important for his theory of reli-
gion. In order to avoid fixed ontological presuppositions, he replaces unitary
concepts with relations. In analyzing social experience and behavior, he thus
endeavors to establish not unchanging entities or structures of being but
rather abstract reference-points from which apparently diverse social phe-
nomena can be fruitfully compared. Such a theoretical point of reference
can be fixed by locating a particular problem for which the social system
seeks a solution. When viewed from the perspective of such a "reference-
problem," "different possibilities of behavior [and] social circumstances that
appear externally to be quite diverse can be treated as functionally equiva-
lent" (1974:35). Luhmann calls this kind of theory functional-structural, in
contrast to the structural-functional systems theory advocated by Parsons
and others. In the latter theory, the structure of the system is presupposed as
the basis for investigating the functional achievements required to maintain
the system. Luhmann argues that functional-structural systems theory has
the major advantage of being able to treat the systematic structure itself as a
question and to investigate the meaning and function of system-building in
general (1974:113-14).

II
The point of departure for Luhmann's theory of religion is the problem
of complexity, "the ultimate attainable material reference-problem of func-
tional inquiry." Complexity means that the world "has no limits"; it always
contains more possibilities than can be realized, or even recognized (1973:3-
5). The basic concepts of systems theory, system and environment, are
directed to this problem: systems are structured arrangements for reducing
complexity by limiting and controlling contacts with the environment; the
environment is defined relatively as everything lying beyond the boundaries
of the system. Stated most simply, "a system is its difference from the envi-
ronment, an order for defining and maintaining a boundary" (1975:211,
emphasis added). The function of the system is to maintain a complexity-
differential between itself and its environment, which it does by selectivity,
The Sociology of Dogmatics: Niklas Luhmann's Challenge to Theology 23

by strictly limiting the quantity and nature of contacts with the environ-
ment. But all selection entails the risk of omission and error.
As a result of the process of selection, the environment is necessarily
twofold: it consists of what has been selected systematically, or determinate
complexity; and also of what has not been selected, indeterminate complexity.
The definitive problem for religion—its reference-problem—is the
transformation of indeterminate into determinate complexity. Precisely
because the problem is insoluble, it becomes the "catalyst" for the devel-
opment of religion (1977:20). This extremely abstract description can be
rendered somewhat more specific by concentrating on those systems of special
concern to the sociologist: what Luhmann calls "meaning-constitutive psychic
and social systems"—in other words, human individuals and societies. Here
the selection necessary for meaningful experience and action precipitates the
following twofold environment: on the one hand, an accessible environment
of ordered and familiar things and events subject to normal expectations and
probabilities; on the other hand, the inaccessible environment beyond,
experienced as the unexpected, the surprising, the disappointing ("intangible
like a bang behind one's back" [1977:17]). Luhmann, adapting terms from
Husserl's phenomenology, calls the first experience representation and the
second appresentation; they correspond to what in traditional terms would be
called reality and possibility. Their simultaneous presence in all human life is
the fundamental fact to which religion responds. "In all meaningful
experience and action," Luhmann writes, "more is continually appresented
than can be represented" (1977:22). The social system is therefore subjected to
a continuous pressure to give shape to the elusive transcendence beyond the
accessible environment, to represent and formulate it; but because
representation always takes place in a context of further appresentation, the
world forever eludes definitive formulation. Religion performs the social
function of transforming this indeterminable world into a determinable one,
one which can compensate for the inevitable risk of selection and protect
against the threat of arbitrary change in the relationship of system and
environment. In order to carry out this task, religion must itself venture to
give representational form to indeterminate appresentation. "But over the
course of a long history," Luhmann explains, "it specializes its particular
efforts on representations that absorb the risk of representation" (1977:27).
Religion fulfills this function by "sacralizing" the realm of the indeter-
minate through a process of "ciphering." Ciphers are not simply symbols,
since their purpose is not to point to something different; "they have their
meaning not in any relation to something else but are it themselves." They
replace the indeterminate, and also hide it, leaving it a mere "empty hori-
zon" without reality (1977:33). Ciphers, unlike signs, are not substitutable,
since they disguise and replace their origin, thereby "generating knowledge
by reductive determination" (1977:84-85). For this reason the function of
religion in transforming indeterminate into determinate complexity remains
24 Garrett Green

"latent," both for religious experience and for dogmatics. An example of

religious ciphering—the most important one in Western culture—is the
formula Gód, to which we will return below.
Indeterminate complexity thus serves as the general reference-problem
for which religion assumes special responsibility in the social system.
Luhmann analyzes it, using the concepts of modal logic, as the problem of
contingency. In simplest terms, he is saying that social choices always take
place in a context of further unrealized possibilities. This situation poses the
problem of contingency, logically defined as the negation of both necessity
and impossibility, and experienced as the sense that anything actual might
also be otherwise: why is the world like this instead of any number of other
possible ways? The function of religion is to deal with this problem, "to
transform indeterminable into determinable contingency" (1977:189).
But Luhmann's concept of religion is not sufficiently defined by
describing the reference-problem. Although the functional aspect of religion
is thereby given, Luhmann's concept also contains an evolutionary dimen-
sion. The basic problem posed by the twofold environment and the need to
transform complexity or contingency does not simply produce a stable func-
tional structure but rather initiates a developmental process. The continuous
pressure of the reference-problem "catalyzes" the development of a wide
range of religious forms, which vary according to cultural and historical
conditions. Religious institutions, in a way analogous to biological evolution,
are exposed to ceaseless evolutionary influences, producing a long history in
which various forms are generated, undergo change, and die out. But even
the reference-problem does not remain unchanged but splits apart into rela-
tively more concrete and soluble special problems. Luhmann discusses two
examples (1977:114ff.). The first is the so-called rites of passage, which func-
tion to determine the indeterminate in the specific case of individual status-
transformations, as in the Christian rites of baptism, confirmation, marriage,
and burial. A second example is the religious function of explaining and ab-
sorbing disappointments, which are experienced either as anxiety in anticipa-
tion of future possibilities or as insecurity occasioned by past disappointments.
Luhmann's theory makes it impossible to define religion either solely by
its reference-problem or solely in terms of the functions it develops in
response to this problem. He claims that this "detached conceptuality" is
precisely the advantage of functional analysis over "a definitory-categorizing
procedure." He also finds it superior to monofunctional definitions of reli-
gion solely on the basis of its integrating function, which is contradicted by
the facts, or its interpretive function, which "short-circuits" analysis by simply
presupposing the need to interpret as an unexamined given (1977:10-12). His
aim is to replace two-term functional relations with three-term relations that
can determine the function of religion both positively, in relation to a
particular problem, and negatively, in contrast to solutions offered by
functionally equivalent forms. His concept of religion thus tries to account
The Sociology of Dogmatics: Niklas Luhmann's Challenge to Theology 25

for both the unity and variety of religion, to do justice to its diverse forms in
such a way that "one can nevertheless also say that they 'always mean the
same thing'" (1977:20).

Ill
Luhmann's sociology of theology is a further development of his general
theory of religion but one that plays a particularly crucial role and constitutes
the most original feature of the theory. Traditionally, sociologists who have
produced general theories of religion (Marx and Durkheim, for example) have
had little to say about the specific contents of theology; while those who have
produced sociological analyses of particular doctrines (such as Max Weber's
work on capitalism and Protestantism) have not provided a comprehensive
account of the sociological meaning of theology as such. Luhmann lays claim
to a theoretical perspective from which he can not only explain religious
dogmatics generally but also analyze the social functions of particular
doctrines, even to the extent of proposing explicit theological reforms.
Theology, or "religious dogmatics"—Luhmann uses the terms almost
interchangeably—emerges in the course of the religious evolution of West-
ern Christendom. Two sorts of differentiation that occur in social evolution
must be distinguished, both of which play a role in the emergence of theol-
ogy. First, the social system develops in such a way that the religious func-
tion comes to be differentiated as a special subsystem enjoying considerable
independence from the total system as well as from other subsystems. Mod-
ern global society has largely moved beyond the earlier stages of segmentary
and stratified organization, becoming highly differentiated into autonomous
functional subsystems for politics, economy, science, religion, etc. The reli-
gious system retains a connection to the total society but specializes in fulfill-
ing a particular function. A second kind of differentiation is meanwhile
occurring within the subsystem in response to its increased autonomy and to
obstacles encountered in performing its function. As in all self-referential
systems, three types of relations are internally differentiated: (1) the relation
of the subsystem to the total social system takes the form of function; (2) the
relation to other subsystems within society is performance; and (3) its rela-
tion to itself is differentiated as reflection. In the religious system of the
modern West (Luhmann apparently has only the Christianity of Europe and
North America in view) these three appear, respectively, as church, social
service, and theology (1977:54-59).
Assigning to theology responsibility for the reflection of the religious
system means that its primary subject matter is the identity of the system
itself. Theology accordingly emerges in social evolution in response to
threats to religious identity, which may be occasioned practically by the
»ailure of religious intentions in reality, socially by encounters with other
re
ugious systems, and temporally by increasing distance from its historical
26 Garrett Green

origin and source of revelation (1977:59-61). But the deepest roots of reli-J
gious dogmatics are embedded in the original ciphering of the religious
function. Luhmann argues both that religion performs the task of trans-
forming indeterminate into determinate complexity and that it remains
unconscious of this function. If the function were to become explicitly the-
matic, religion would be exposed to comparison and possible replacement.
Dogmatics therefore grows up as a kind of ersatz for the latent function, a
replacement for the missing functional consciousness of religion. As religion
becomes increasingly free of specific situations in the course of social evolu-
tion, it develops a need for interpretation. Religious dogmatics can be
defined as the "verbal and conceptual equipment for this interpretive func-
tion" at any given cultural and historical point in its development. The task
performed by ritual at an earlier stage of religious evolution is transformed
by "adaptive upgrading" into dogmatic interpretation. Dogmatics does not
treat its social function as an explicit theme but reflects on religious themes
and symbols, which in turn are related to experience. In this regard theology
can be most fruitfully compared not with science but with jurisprudence
(1977:85-88). Particularly significant in contrast to other sociological theories
of religion is the central function that Luhmann assigns to theology for the
coordination of the whole religious system. Under the impact of the func-
tional differentiation of society, experienced in the religious system as "secu-
larization," the theological function has become more rather than less impor-
tant in the modern era, thus increasing the interest and potential fruitiulness
of a dialogue between sociologists and theologians. \
The seriousness with which Luhmann takes theology is most evident in
the detailed analysis he devotes to a wide range of particular Christian doc-$
trines. These analyses include some of his most interesting and original
observations. Undoubtedly the most important of these doctrinal excursuses
is Luhmann's interpretation of the concept God as the "contingency
formula" of Western religion. Contingency formulas are defined as "symbols
or groups of symbols that serve to translate the indeterminate contingency of
a particular functional sphere into determinable contingency" (1977:201);
An example from another social sphere is the formula scarcity in the
economic system, which reduces to calculable proportions the arbitrary
possibilities expressed in the wish to have more or to have something else,
The religious formula God has traditionally reduced the complexity of the
world by grounding its contingency in a supreme principle conceived a¡
both perfect and personal. Luhmann believes that theology has encountered
difficulty since the eighteenth century because perfection has been replaced
by the principle of development as the highest ideal of bourgeois society, h
theology that responds to contingency today with a concept of a perfect Goq
thus comes into conflict with an evolution-oriented science, including
sociology (1977:133). One wonders whether Luhmann might revise thil
judgment if he were aware of recent process theology.
The Sociology of Dogmatics: Niklas Luhmann's Challenge to Theology 27

A second doctrinal issue particularly important in Luhmann's theory of

religion is his thesis that faith functions as the religious "communications
medium," analogous to truth, love, money, art, and power in other func-
tional spheres. "Communications media," according to his definition, "are
symbolic codes that establish the rules for the possible combination of sym-
bols and are thereby able simultaneously to insure a transfer of selective
achievements" (1977:91). In the case of religion, the immediacy of religious
experience requires some means of regulation and control as soon as it
becomes the content of communication among individuals. The church as
the arena of "spiritual communication" provides the institutional structure.
Dogmatics has the task of overseeing the communications medium—for
example, it must guard against both "inflation" and "deflation" of faith by
holding it in balance between the extremes of inflexible fixation and vapid
neutralization. Luhmann cites "civil religion" as an example of religious
inflation, fundamentalism as an example of deflation (1977:124).

IV
Luhmann's theory presents a challenge to theology in the double sense
of the word: it contains dangers to which theology must not fall prey, but it
also offers constructive possibilities by provoking theologians to rethink their
own enterprise, by throwing fresh light on old issues, and by demonstrating
new conceptual resources. Even a theory which theology dare not accept
uncritically or on its own terms may nevertheless contain useful insights and
suggest theoretical models which theologians can put to work for their own
purposes and according to their own proper criteria.
The persistent problem of relating theology to its social environment
would seem to be the point at which functional systems theory could make
its greatest contribution to the work of theology. Luhmann explicitly offers
the aid of his theory in the diagnosis of social structures in their interaction
with religion. He invites theology, in its role as the reflective sphere of reli-
gion, to employ the analytical tools of systems theory as a basis for its guid-
ance of the religious system (1977:271). In accepting this invitation, how-
ever, theology would be acquiescing in a definition of its own work that
would fundamentally alter its nature and betray its basic commitments.
The crucial issue is posed by Luhmann's identification of Christian
theology with "religious dogmatics." The issue of the theological significance
of religion was raised by Karl Barth's theological critique of religion and
debated vigorously for a time in response to Dietrich Bonhoeffer's poignant
but elliptical rejection of religion in his prison letters. More recently, however,
most theologians seem either to have ignored the issue or quietly acquiesced to
a consensus that their work serves the enterprise called religion./3/ If
Luhmann is right, theology in fact has no other ground, subject matter, or
raison d'être than religion; it is by definition the self-reflection of religion,
28 Garrett Green

the instrument by which the religious subsystem maintains its identity and
regulates its intercourse with the whole social system and with its sister
subsystems. It is to be judged by its success in enabling religion to perform
its social function smoothly and efficiently, avoiding either a loss of identity
or disruptive conflicts with other systems such as politics or the economy.
Luhmann wants to assist theologians in carrying out their task by offering
them a theoretical instrument designed to lay bare the functional structures
underlying their own "media-code." They will then be in a position to
achieve greater "structural compatibility" with modern functionally-
differentiated society. They might choose, for instance, to exchange their
contingency formula God for one more in keeping with a development-
oriented culture; or they might follow Luhmann's advice to abandon the
"supplementary myth of the resurrection" in favor of a concept of divine
self-negation without a "happy end" as a more promising means for medi-
ating the duality of suffering and salvation (cf. 1977:198-200).
A half-century ago Barth argued that modern Protestant theology, in a
process that began as far back as the orthodox schools of the seventeenth
century and reached its zenith in the liberalism of his own theological teach-
ers, had managed "to exchange its own birthright for the concept of religion"
(KD 1/2:320; cf. CD 1/2:294). The dependence of theology on a nontheolog-
ical concept of religion seems hardly to have lessened in the meantime;
indeed, if theologians like Rahner, Lonergan, and Tracy are representative,
one would now have to include Roman Catholics, too. Contrary to a common
assumption, the point of Barth's critique of religion was never to deny that
Christianity is a religion/4/ or to suggest that theology has nothing to do with
religious studies. In fact, Barth argues that to deny that revelation can be
understood as religion is to deny revelation itself (KD 1/2:308; CD 1/2:283).
God's revelation in Christ was, is, and will remain bound to the Christian
religion as one religion among others, with which it has significant
continuities.
The crucial point is the error of making religion the criterion for theol-
ogy; and it is just this point that Luhmann's sociology of dogmatics brings
clearly into focus. Pannenberg, who dismisses the theological critftiue of
religion at the outset of his reply to Luhmann as "a self-destructive impulse"
in the theology of the recent past, misses this central issue. By misstating the
theological alternative as "the separation of biblical revelation from the
religious life of humanity" (1978:99), he forfeits the basis for an effective
critique of Luhmann's account of the theological task. The real issue raised
by Luhmann for theology is contained in Barth's question whether "that
which we think we know about the essence and phenomenon of religion is
to serve as the standard and explanatory principle for God's revelation, or
vice versa" (KD 1/2:309; cf. CD 1/2:284). Luhmann—who of course makes
no pretense to being a theologian—quite obviously chooses the first option.
He by no means denies revelation; on the contrary, he treats it as the key
The Sociology of Dogmatics: Niklas Luhmann's Challenge to Theology 29

concept of dogmatics. But its importance is precisely its role as "the most
functional dogma," able to ground the concept of dogma itself as the
self-revelation of revelation. He can then add: "Theology formulates this
self-reference as God's identity" (1977:173). For Luhmann the criterion of
theology is its social function, which can be understood only with the help of
functionalistic sociology; left to itself, "religious dogmatics" is only the fig
leaf covering the functional nakedness of religion.
Once the normative consequences implicit in Luhmann's account of the
relationship between theology and society have been uncovered, it becomes
clear why theologians must decline his offer of assistance with this problem.
The difficulty is inherent in his concept of theory and the claims he
advances on behalf of it. A theory, according to Luhmann, is an instrument
for dealing with social problems, and it is subject to the criterion not of truth
but of success in problem-solving. Such a theory is fixed in none of its terms,
any one of which can be modified if the need should arise. The very mod-
esty of this concept of theory becomes the basis for Luhmann's immodest
claim to present a super-theory (Messner: 1), a sociology conceived as the
queen—a more fitting title would be manager—of the sciences, theology
included. Here the danger is not reductionism, which has so often been the
case with social-scientific theories of religion, but imperialism. And theology,
having learned the dangers of disciplinary imperialism the hard way, should
be especially wary of becoming anyone else's handmaid. However justified
Luhmann may be in seeking to ferret out the social function of dogmatics,
he is unable to show why this function ought to be taken as the norm for
theology. Indeed, he does not even try but simply assumes that sociological
theory is an adequate groundwork for dogmatics. This uncritical assumption
is finally self-contradictory, for his claim that dogmatics takes the place of
functional consciousness in religion implies that it is incompatible with a
sociological analysis of its function. Indeed, seen in this light, Luhmann
appears to be proposing that theologians abandon dogmatics in favor of
functional systems theory. The implication, though Luhmann never
advances the claim, seems to be that his social theory is the functional equiv-
alent of dogmatics.
The very real danger represented by Luhmann's transformation of
social function into dogmatic norm ought not to frighten off theologians too
quickly, however. For Luhmann belongs to that select group of thinkers
whose failures can be more interesting and instructive than the successes of
less gifted and more timid minds. In the first place, even if he cannot tell
theologians what they ought to be doing, he can at least do them the service
of shedding new light on religion. Even his sociology of dogmatics succeeds
at least in showing the intimate and intricate ways in which all religious
experience and action, including the "inner" world of faith and dogma, is
ini plicated in the functioning of society. Luhmann's vision of the social
w
orld, and of religion as one of its aspects, is surely one of the most original,
30 Garrett Green

sophisticated, and conceptually powerful theories to come along for some

time; it has already succeeded in undermining the unquestioned preemi-
nence of the Frankfurt School in German social thought.
But the main potential of Luhmann's theory for contributing positively
to Christian theology lies in that other perennial concern of modern dogmat-
ics, mentioned at the outset: the quest for a qualitatively new kind of foun-
dational theory, one free of any prior commitment to a metaphysics or to
ontological first principles. Luhmann contributes to this task more implicitly
than explicitly, more by analogy than by design. In brief, he presents in his
own social theory an example of a relativistic or relational thinking that aims
at illuminating its subject in a manner that is coherent yet never
systematically complete. The result is a conceptual arrangement that is
flexible and adaptable, admittedly circular, and able to bring otherwise
unrelated phenomena into comparative relationships based on their relations
to a common problem. "Foundational security," he claims, "is in fact
scientifically dispensable" (1975:201).
Now such a manner of thinking bears a striking formal resemblance to
much of the theological tradition. For example, Luhmann's rejection of
"foundational security" (Grundlagensicherheit) sounds very much like Karl
Barth's refusal on principle to offer any philosophical or methodological
grounding for dogmatics (e.g., KD I/2:954ff.; CD I/2:853ff.). Barth eschews
the notion that theology should be a "system," understood as "a closed and
complete interconnection of principles and corollaries constructed under the
presupposition of a certain basic intuition (Grundanschauung) by the use of
certain sources of knowledge and certain axioms" (KD 1/2:963; cf. CD
1/2:861). Rather, theology must always retain an "open center," resisting
every temptation to fill it with some kind of presupposition or first principle
(such as "religion"). Systems theory as defined by Luhmann is quite obvi-
ously not 3L "system" in this sense; on the contrary, it has formal similarities
to Barth's own procedure.
Such parallels between sociological systems theory and a nonsystematic
theological method—all the more remarkable in view of their virtually total
divergence in content—invite further comparative exploration. Might theol-
ogians use Luhmann's thought heuristically to construct a truly theological
systems theory? Such a program would mean taking Luhmann's description
of the ideal modern theory more seriously and consistently than he does
himself. He maintains that there are no rules governing the selection of
reference-problems to be explored and consequently no absolute basis for
determining what is to be taken as a system in the first place; these choices
spring from an original theory-commitment (Theorieentscheidung; cf.
Messner:2). Luhmann himself makes such a commitment on behalf of soci-
ology, whose theme he takes to be human activity. "My proposal," he says,
"is to choose the problem of complexity itself as the ultimate reference-point
of functional analyses, to conceive all systems as the comprehension and
The Sociology of Dogmatics: Niklas Luhmann's Challenge to Theology 31

reduction of complexity, and to assess them in this extremely abstract per-

spective as comparable and exchangeable" (1974:260). A theological pro-
gram is conceivable on the basis of a different, but formally comparable,
theory-commitment. Let me conclude with a brief sketch of how such a
program might look.
The theme of theology, God, can be paraphrased (in terms parallel to
Luhmann's sociological program) as divine activity. Christian dogmatics has
chosen to pursue this theme in relation to the ultimate reference-point of
Jesus Christ. This "theory-commitment" is formally comparable to that of
the sociologist, notwithstanding the fact that it is existentially of a different
order, since the theological theory-commitment is only one aspect of a
Christian faith-commitment. Faith, though it serves as the personal precon-
dition for the theologian, does not function as a metaphysical presupposition
for theology. Formally, the ultimate source of theology in personal faith is
equivalent to the preliminary but "ungroundable" decisions necessary for
any theoretical enterprise.
Theology, understood as a theoretical undertaking in which the prob-
lem of God's activity is explored in relation to Jesus Christ, permits a "rela-
tionizing" (Relationierung, Luhmann's cumbersome but important concept)
of dogmatic issues. For example, the first great controversy in the history of
dogma, which culminated in the Nicene doctrine of the Trinity, involved a
relational issue: "Is the Divine which appeared on the earth and has made its
presence actively felt [in Jesus Christ] identical with the supreme Divine that
rules heaven and earth?" (Harnack.l). The theological attempt to conceive
God in relation to Jesus Christ led to a relational (nonmetaphysical) concept
of God as a Trinity, whose individual members are not parts of a whole but
are constituted by their interrelations: "they mutually presuppose one anoth-
er" (Luhmann, 1975:201; cf. p. 21 above). This "relationizing" of the
concept of God was followed by a "relationizing" of Christology in the
formula of Chalcedon, in which the identity of the incarnate Logos is
understood to be constituted by the relation of his relations to divinity and
humanity. The central doctrines of the Reformation allow a similar analysis.
The Protestant doctrine of justification replaces the Roman Catholic
metaphysical concept of faith as an infused habitus with a relational
definition: from the perspective of Jesus Christ as the ultimate point of
reference, faith is conceived as the relation between two other relations—
that of the believer to Christ, and that of Christ to the Father. From this
perspective faith appears as the functional equivalent of works, with which
it can then be fruitfully compared. Might not a corresponding method be of
help in resolving characteristically modern dogmatic issues, such as the
relationship between Christian faith and other religions?
Such a view of theology employs Luhmann's own theoretical tools on
behalf of a dialogue between sociological and theological theory. What
emerges is a way of conceiving sociological systems theory as indeed the
32 Garrett Green

functional equivalent of Christian dogmatics—but in a radically different

sense from Luhmann's own account of theology as "religious dogmatics."*
Luhmann can even be cited in support of such a theological appropriation
of his theory, for he claims that functional analysis proceeds "neither deduc-
tively nor inductively, but heuristically" (1973:2). Luhmann deserves the
dialogue with theology that he has requested. If theologians are bold enough
to accept the challenge, it will not be the first time they have confronted a
theory that proposes an Aufhebung of their own enterprise. It is a risky
business, but one that might offer a worthwhile alternative to sterile in-house
discussions of the nature of theology, and to unbecoming chasing after the
skirts of cultural fads.

NOTES
/!/ The most notable examples to have appeared so far are Rendtorff and the
exchange between Luhmann and Pannenberg. The present article depends, in addi-
tion to the items listed explicitly as "Works Consulted," on various working papers
and discussions of the theological study group on Luhmann's theory in Tübingen
under the leadership of Dr. Michael Welker. I would also like to thank the
Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for travel and fellowship support that enabled
me to participate in the Tübingen group.
/2/ The Edwin Mellen Press of Toronto has announced plans to publish the
second chapter of Luhmann's book on religion (1977) as a separate volume, to be
entitled Religious Dogmatics and the Evolution of Societies, translated with an
introduction by Peter Beyer.
/3/ A notable exception to this trend is the work of Jürgen Moltmann (see, e.g.,
1974:32ff., 321ff.).
/4/ This common misinterpretation in the English-speaking world is due in part
to one of the most egregious translation errors in modern theology. In the title of §17
of the Church Dogmatics ("Gottes Offenbarung als Aufhebung der Religion"), the
translator has rendered Aufhebung with "Abolition" (KD 1/2:304; CD 1/2:280). To
make matters worse, the key occurrences of the same term in the final sentences of
both the first and second subsections have been translated differently each time, as
"abolition" and "abrogation" (KD 1/2:324, 356; CD 1/2:297, 325). The context makes
unmistakably clear that Barth uses the term in the deliberately ambiguous sense first
introduced by Hegel to signify the crucial dialectical transition in his philosophy
("the negation of the negative"): Aufhebung in this sense means both "annulment"
and "preservation" or "elevation." The title of the third subsection of §17 ("True
Religion") should remove any doubts about Barth's intention to use Aufhebung in
both its senses.
The Sociology of Dogmatics: Niklas Luhmann's Challenge to Theology 33

WORKS CONSULTED
Barth, Karl
CD 1/2 Church Dogmatics. Eds. G. W. Bromiley and T. F.
Torrance. Vol. 1, The Doctrine of the Word of God,
pt. 2. Trans. G. T. Thomson and Harold Knight.
Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1956.
KD 1/2 Die kirchliche Dogmatik. Vol. 1, Die Lehre vom Wort
Gottes, pt. 2. 6th ed. Zurich: Theologischer Verlag
Zürich, 1975.
Habermas, Jürgen, and Luhmann, Niklas
1971 Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie—Was
leistet die Systemforschung? Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp Verlag.
Harnack, Adolf
1961 History of Dogma. Vol. 4. Trans. Neil Buchanan. Re-
print ed. New York: Dover.
Hondrich, Karl Otto
1973 "Systemtheorie als Instrument der Gesellschaftsanalyse:
Forschungsbezogene Kritik eines Theorieansatzes." In
Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie: Bei-
träge zur Habermas-Luhmann-Diskussion (Theorie-
Diskussion Supplement 1), edited by Franz Maciejewski,
pp. 88-114. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.
Luhmann, Niklas
1973 Vertrauen: Ein Mechanismus der Reduktion sozialer
Komplexität. 2nd ed. Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag.
1974 Soziologische Aufklärung: Aufsätze zur Theorie sozialer
Systeme. Vol. 1. 4th ed. Opladen: Westdeutscher Ver-
lag.
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Gesellschaft. Vol. 2. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
1977 Funktion der Religion. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp
Verlag.
1978 "Soziologie der Moral." In Theorietechnik und Moral,
edited by Niklas Luhmann and Stephan H. Pfürtner,
pp. 8-116. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.
Luhmann, Niklas, and Pannenberg, Wolfhart
1978 "Die Allgemeingültigkeit der Religion: Diskussion über
Luhmanns Religionssoziologie." Evangelische Kommen-
tare 11:350,355-57.
34 Garrett Green

Messner, Brigitta
1980 "Der Anspruch der Theorie Niklas Luhmanns." Unpub-
lished working paper for the theological study group on
Luhmann's theory. Tübingen.
Moltmann, Jürgen
1974 The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the
Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology.
Trans. R. A. Wilson and John Bowden. New York:
Harper & Row.
Pannenberg, Wolfhart
1978 "Religion in der säkularen Gesellschaft: Niklas Luh-
manns Religionssoziologie." Evangelische Kommentare
11:99-103.
Parsons, Talcott
1951 The Social System. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
1968 "Systems Analysis II: Social Systems." International
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 15:458-73. Ed.
David L. Sills. N.p.: Macmillan, and Free Press.
Rendtorff, Trutz
1975 Gesellschaft ohne Religion? Theologische Aspekte einer
sozialtheoretischen Kontroverse (Luhmann/Habermas).
Munich: R. Piper & Co.
 ^ s
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