The Behavior Analyst 2011, 34, 185200 No.

2 (Fall)

Behaviorism, Private Events, and the Molar View

of Behavior
William M. Baum
University of New Hampshire
Viewing the science of behavior (behavior analysis) to be a natural science, radical behaviorism
rejects any form of dualism, including subjectiveobjective or innerouter dualism. Yet radical
behaviorists often claim that treating private events as covert behavior and internal stimuli is
necessary and important to behavior analysis. To the contrary, this paper argues that, compared
with the rejection of dualism, private events constitute a trivial idea and are irrelevant to
accounts of behavior. Viewed in the framework of evolutionary theory or for any practical
purpose, behavior is commerce with the environment. By its very nature, behavior is extended in
time. The temptation to posit private events arises when an activity is viewed in too small a time
frame, obscuring what the activity does. When activities are viewed in an appropriately extended
time frame, private events become irrelevant to the account. This insight provides the answer to
many philosophical questions about thinking, sensing, and feeling. Confusion about private
events arises in large part from failure to appreciate fully the radical implications of replacing
mentalistic ideas about language with the concept of verbal behavior. Like other operant
behavior, verbal behavior involves no agent and no hidden causes; like all natural events, it is
caused by other natural events. In a science of behavior grounded in evolutionary theory, the
same set of principles applies to verbal and nonverbal behavior and to human and nonhuman
organisms.
Key words: behavior analysis, behaviorism, dualism, evolution, mental, private, verbal
behavior, molar paradigm

Defining behaviorism, Skinner no agency, but are explained by other

(1974) wrote, Behaviorism is not natural events (Baum, 1995). Anoth-
the science of behavior; it is the er implication is that the science
philosophy of that science (p. 3). leaves out nothing important (i.e.,
One may define behaviorism by its that it is sufficient).
central proposition, what all behav- Advocates of radical behaviorism
iorists agree on, that a science of often say that its chief distinguishing
behavior is possible (Skinner, 1953, characteristic is its treatment of
1974; Watson, 1913; see Baum, 2005, private events. They say it is unlike
for further discussion). Watson other versions of behaviorism be-
(1913) proposed further that the cause it treats private events as well
science of behavior should be a as public events and therefore avoids
natural science, and Skinner (1945), the accusation that it ignores inner
coining the term radical behaviorism, life (Moore, 2008; Skinner, 1974).
similarly asserted that the science of For example, Skinner (1974) wrote,
behavior (behavior analysis) is a
natural science (Skinner, 1953). One A science of behavior must consider the place
implication is that behavioral events of private stimuli as physical things, and in
doing so it provides an alternative account of
are natural events and, just like the mental life. The question, then, is this: What is
weather or natural selection, involve inside the skin, and how do we know about it?
The answer is, I believe, the heart of radical
Earlier versions of this paper were presented behaviorism. (pp. 211212)
at the annual meetings of the Association for
Behavior Analysis, May 1995, and the Amer- Having said this much, however,
ican Psychological Association, August 1995. advocates carefully point out that
I thank Howard Rachlin for thoughtful private differs from mental. In the
comments on an earlier draft of the paper.
Address correspondence to the author, 611 view of radical behaviorists, mental
Mason #504, San Francisco, California 94108 things and events seem to occur in
(e-mail: Wm.Baum@unh.edu). some inner, imaginary space, usually

185
186 WILLIAM M. BAUM

called the mind. Because this inner, behaviorism is peripheral and ines-
imaginary space and all its contents sential. They are brought to the
are nowhere to be found in nature, center in a misguided effort to render
radical behaviorists see mental events behaviorism acceptable to laypeople
as fictional and deny them any role. by suggesting that they offer an
Private events, in contrast, are said to account of mental life. I am not
be just like public events except that saying they do not exist. Many
they occur within the skin (Skinner, different types of private events occur
1969, 1974; Zuriff, 1979). For exam- within the skin: neural events, events
ple, Skinner (1969) wrote, in the retina, events in the inner ear,
subvocal speech (i.e., thinking), and
An adequate science of behavior must consid- so on. All of these are possibly
er events taking place within the skin of the measurable and, therefore, possibly
organism, not as physiological mediators of
behavior, but as part of behavior itself. It can public. I will argue that private events
deal with these events without assuming that are not useful in a science of behav-
they have any special nature or must be ior, and, far from being a key
known in any special way. The skin is not defining aspect of radical behavior-
that important as a boundary. Private and
public events have the same kinds of physical ism, private events constitute an
dimensions. (p. 228) unnecessary distraction. Private
events are irrelevant to understanding
The radical behaviorists denial of the function of behavior, that is,
mental inner space and its contents is activities in relation to environmental
a rejection of a dualism that is events. Because the origins of behav-
fundamental to modern, common- ior always lie in the environment, the
sense folk psychology. In the com- origins of behavior are public. Mea-
monsense view, the self dwells in suring private events might help to
inner space while the body deals with understand the mechanisms of be-
the outer world. Accordingly, it havior, but understanding function is
seems obvious that thoughts, feelings, propaedeutic to studying mechanism;
and images remain forever intimate one must know what one is trying to
and private while outer actions alone explain before one can explain it.
are available for the inspection of Roughly speaking, the distinction
others. For example, a cartoon shows between function and mechanism is
a husband saying to his wife, No- the difference between understanding
bodys ever understood me, Joyce, why behavior occurs and understand-
not my teachers, not my parents, my ing how it occurs. Understanding
boss, my so-called friendsjust you, function entails relating an activity
babyyoure the only one whos ever to environmental events (present and
listened. Above the wife is a box past), whereas understanding mecha-
saying, Christ, will he ever put a nism entails tracing the causal chain
cork in it? Between her and her box between environment and behavior. I
is a string of circles, which we will argue that the ideas of private
immediately understand to indicate stimuli and private behavior, in
that the words in her box are particular, are irrelevant to under-
privateunknown and unknowable standing behavior in relation to
to the man. The rejection of this environment. To see why, we must
fundamental innerouter dualism is first review the problems with dual-
one of the features that makes radical ism.
behaviorism radical (Baum, 1995;
Baum & Heath, 1992; Catania &
DUALISM
Harnad, 1984).
In this paper, I will argue that, in Most, if not all, of the sciences had
comparison with antidualism, the to eliminate dualism early in their
role of private events in radical histories. The habit of supposing an
 DUALISM AND PRIVATE EVENTS 187

immaterial world or immaterial caus- Whorf (1956) wrote eloquently about

es behind or within the material the innerouter dualism inherent in
world cannot work for science, be- what he called the habitual thought
cause the relationship between the and behavior of Western culture:
immaterial and the material remains
forever a mystery. When we read Now, when WE think of a certain actual
about Descartess theory that the rosebush, we do not suppose that our thought
soul influenced the flow of animal goes to that actual bush, and engages with it,
like a searchlight turned upon it. What then
spirits by moving the pineal gland, we do we suppose our consciousness is dealing
wonder without hope of an answer with when we are thinking of that rosebush?
how the soul could move the pineal Probably we think it is dealing with a mental
gland. The historian Benjamin Far- image which is not the rosebush but a mental
surrogate of it. But why should it be
rington (1944/1980), writing about NATURAL to think that our thought deals
the origins of Greek science, con- with a surrogate and not with the real
trasted the Babylonian creation rosebush? Quite possibly because we are dimly
myth, in which the god Marduk aware that we carry about with us a whole
created the waters and lands, with imaginary space, full of mental surrogates. To
us, mental surrogates are old familiar fare.
Thaless proposal in the 6th century Along with the images of imaginary space,
B.C.: which we perhaps secretly know to be only
imaginary, we tuck the thought-of actually
The general picture Thales had of things was existing rosebush, which may be quite another
that the earth is a flat disc floating on water, story, perhaps just because we have that very
that there is water above our heads as well as convenient place for it. (Whorf, 1956,
all round us (where else could the rain come pp. 149150)
from?), that the sun and moon and stars are
vapour in a state of incandescence, and that Anticipating behaviorists objections
they sail over our heads on the watery to mental representations, Whorf
firmament above and then sail round, on the notes that mental surrogates are
sea on which the earth itself is afloat, to their
appointed stations for rising in the East. It is hard to escape because they are built
an admirable beginning, the whole point of into the English language and other
which is that it gathers together into a aspects of Western culture. Scientific
coherent picture a number of observed facts views that run counter to the habit-
without letting Marduk in. (p. 37)
ual thought and behavior of the
Farringtons main point was that culture, such as relativity theory,
scientific thinking originated in the encounter difficulty getting accepted,
rejection of dualism. Science seeks Whorf argued, because they must
explanations (coherent pictures) of speak in what amounts to a new
natural events in other, related, nat- language. This must apply with at
ural events, not in nonnatural causes. least as much force to a science of
As the need was for physics then, so behavior. Indeed, laying stress on
it is for a science of behavior now. private instead of mental may be seen
Eliminating dualism from a science as an attempt to talk in a new
of behavior, however, presents a language that still makes contact with
formidable problem. English and ordinary English.
other Western languages incorporate
mindbody dualism so intimately
TWO USES OF PRIVATE
that it is difficult to talk about
behavior without using terms that The word private gets used in two
sound dualistic. Skinner (1974) com- different ways (cf. Baum, 1993; Lu-
plained of this and warned his binski & Thompson, 1993, pp. 667
readers to resist being misled by 668; Rachlin, 2003). In the common-
phrases such as I have in mind sense, folk psychology view alluded
and words such as choose and to earlier, a private event can only be
aware. The linguist Benjamin known to its possessor. It might seem
188 WILLIAM M. BAUM

self-evident, for example, that think- cause, and its effects remain a mys-
ing can only be known to the one tery.
who thinks. According to this notion, The second use of private makes it
private events are private in principle, purely a practical affair. In this view,
can never be known to another, and the privacy of singing when I am
therefore are qualitatively different alone really is the same as the privacy
from public events. To try to exorcise of a thought or feeling. No private
this qualitative difference, some be- events are private in principle;
haviorists have claimed that private thoughts and feelings are public in
events are exactly like public events principle, if only we are able to invent
except in the size of the audience; apparatus to observe them. This idea
private events always have an audi- depends on the faith that with
ence of one, and public events have enough technical advances, even the
an audience greater than one (e.g., subtlest thought or feeling in one
Moore, 1995). Such a move fails, person could be observed by another.
however, to erase the dichotomy. For One has to believe, for example, that
example, how does one distinguish brain-scanning technology could ad-
between a potentially public event vance to the point at which an
that happens to have an audience of arrangement like that in Figure 1
one (i.e., occurs when the actor is would be possible; that a persons
alone) from a private event? If size of head might be put in a machine (say,
audience were the only criterion, then a helmet) that would be attached to a
my singing when I am alone would be monitor, and if the person thinks
a private event, but would become a Who am I?, the words Who am I?
public event if my wife were there to appear on the screen. This view at
hear it. This would contradict the least has the advantage that it truly
notion that private events are private makes no distinction between private
in principle, because it is a practical and public events, thereby leaving no
matter (accidental) whether my wife mysteries. The idea that private
happens to be there or not. Thus, size behavior and private stimuli are only
of audience is insufficient, and if accidentally private, however, en-
private events are private in principle, counters at least three problems.
they must be so according to some The first is that it rests on an article
unstated, unanalyzed other criterion. of faith that cannot be disconfirmed.
One suspects it is precisely the sort of No antiprivacy machine exists at
inaccessibility indicated by circles in present, and possibly none will ever
cartoons that places them in a world exist.
forever inside. Whatever its disadvantages, the
What that other criterion is mat- notion that private events are public
ters little, however, because, whatever in principle remains the only tenable
it is, it constitutes a qualitative position for radical behaviorism.
difference between private and public Skinner (1945) apparently recognized
events. Accepting in-principle private this. In his discussion of private
events would reintroduce the inner events, he wrote,
outer dualism that was to be avoided.
Instead of the mindbody problem, The response My tooth aches is partly
we would have the equally intractable under the control of a state of affairs to which
the speaker alone is able to react, since no one
problem of how a so-called private else can establish the required connection with
event could serve as a stimulus for the tooth in question. There is nothing
public behavior. How would anyone mysterious or metaphysical about this; the
know if it occurred or how it was simple fact is that each speaker possesses a
small but important private world of stimuli.
connected to a public act? If it cannot So far as we know, his reactions to these are
be made public, even with the help of quite like his reactions to external events.
instruments, it remains a ghostly Nevertheless the privacy gives rise to the
 DUALISM AND PRIVATE EVENTS 189

Figure 1. The implication of taking all private events to be public in principle. To suppose that
all private events are only private by accident, not in principle, some sort of arrangement like
this would have to be possible. Whenever a private thought or feeling occurred in a person
wearing the helmet, the thought or feeling (Who am I? here) would be displayed on
the monitor.

difficulty that we cannot, as in the case of the laboratory and not in everyday
public stimuli, account for the verbal response life, which is most of the time and of
by pointing to a controlling stimulus. It is
often supposed that a solution is to be found primary interest.
in improved physiological techniques. But Skinner (1945, 1974) took pains to
the problem of privacy cannot be wholly distinguish his view from what he
solved by instrumental invasion. No matter called methodological behaviorism,
how clearly these internal events may be
exposed in the laboratory, the fact remains
the view that private events are
that in the normal verbal episode they are inaccessible to direct scientific study
quite private. (pp. 275276) but may be studied indirectly in
verbal reports. He criticized method-
Skinner here points to a second ological behaviorism particularly for
problem with the antiprivacy ma- preserving dualism (Skinner, 1974).
chine. From a practical point of view, He argued instead that what is felt
even if private events might be or introspectively observed is not
exposed in the laboratory, in ev- some nonphysical world of conscious-
eryday life (the normal verbal epi- ness, mind, or mental life but the
sode) private events remain private. observers own body (pp. 1819).
Even if the antiprivacy machine Introspection, however, is notori-
existed, it would only be available in ously unreliable; that is why Watson
190 WILLIAM M. BAUM

(1913) rejected introspection as a can never serve as scientific explana-

method. Skinner presumably would tions of public behavior (Skinner,
agree, but in the preceding quote he 1974, p. 1718; the role of the
seems to credit introspection with environment). If behavior analysis
some degree of accuracy. People is a natural science, then putting
often express confusion or uncertain- together coherent pictures, to use
ty about private events (Is that a pain Farringtons phrase in the earlier
or an itch? Am I embarrassed or quote, requires observed activities
angry?), and also frequently lie in (natural events) to be related to
response to questions like, What observed events in the environment
are you thinking? In particular, (past and present natural events).
introspection could never reliably Behavior originates in the environ-
render private events public. The ment. Even if we learn much about
unreliability of introspection brings the physiology of behavior, we only
us to the third problem with acciden- learn about mechanisms and not
tal privacy. about the origins in the environment
The third and biggest problem is (see Thompson, 2007, for a review of
that, even if an antiprivacy machine research on mechanisms). If we learn
were invented, the machine would that a certain hormone induces nest
always be subordinate to the testi- building in canaries, we still need to
mony of the person being interrogat- know what, under normal circum-
ed. Even if a solution to privacy stances, stimulates secretion of the
like the antiprivacy machine (Fig- hormone (e.g., lengthening day in
ure 1) were to be realized, and the spring), and, beyond that, we still
monitor showed all manner of pri- need to know what history of natural
vate events (Who am I? pain in selection brought about this mecha-
foot, seeing a chicken, or hear- nism. Similarly, even if we were able
ing Beethovens Ninth Symphony), to measure events in the human brain
still nothing would prevent the per- that would permit us to predict
son being observed from denying that behavior, we would still need to study
any such event is occurring. Imagine the environmental events, past and
the machine were brought into a present, which led to the brain events
court of law, and the monitor and the behavior.
showed, I shot the sheriff, and the As Heath and I explained in 1992,
person said, I never thought any explanations in behavior analysis are
such thing; your machine is lying. historical. Folk psychology, cognitive
What could the onlooker do then? psychology, and physiological psy-
Insist the person is lying? The anti- chology focus on immediate causes of
privacy machine still requires the behavior (e.g., thoughts, information
person to corroborate the outcome, processing, and neurotransmitters).
presumably on the basis of introspec- Behavior analysis, like evolutionary
tion, which is always unreliable. biology, finds explanations in the
Thus, even an antiprivacy machine, past, in a history of selection. Thus,
were it to be invented, would fail to evolutionary biologists seek to un-
solve the problem of privacy alto- derstand how natural selection, act-
gether. Its promise proves to be an ing on populations of birds over
empty promise, and we cannot assert millions of years, resulted in canaries
with certainty that privacy is acciden- building nests and in their hormones
tal or that Private and public events being triggered by increasing day-
have the same kinds of physical light. If Toms car wont start when
dimensions (Skinner, 1969, p. 228). he needs to get to the airport, and he
Private events may be inferred by thinks, Mary owes me a favor, and
the verbal community in everyday calls Mary to give him a ride,
affairs, but inferred private events behavior analysts need to explain
 DUALISM AND PRIVATE EVENTS 191

how the calling and the thinking came ical status that is unambiguous. A
about, considering Toms history of contradiction arises because inferred
asking for help, with terms like favor, private events produce no less spe-
and his more specific history with cious explanations and have no less
Mary. At best, the thinking is addi- mysterious an ontological status than
tional behavior to be explained, but inferred mental events. The possibil-
usually, as Skinner noted, the think- ity of turning private events into
ing goes unobserved. Particularly if it public events, and thereby disambig-
is unobserved, Toms thinking uating their ontological status, re-
doesnt cause Toms calling. Behavior mains out of reach in everyday life
might be caused by environmental and is attainable, if at all, only in the
events like food, injuries, and people laboratory. If behavior analysis is a
exchanging favors, but, in a natural science, we cannot explain observed
science, it cannot be caused by behavior by simply making stuff up,
unobservable events. even if we insist that the stuff we are
Some confusion has arisen among making up is just like the stuff we
behaviorists on this score of unob- observe. Only in folk psychology do
servable causes. For example, Zuriff private thoughts cause behavior.
(1979) identified what he called 10 Even in the context of laboratory
inner causes of overt behavior experimentation, some behaviorists
implied in Skinners writings. He have advocated inferring private
commented that, in comparison with events. Lubinski and Thompson
mental causes, these private events (1993) claimed that they trained
leave no mystery about their onto- pigeons to report on private events.
logical status so that metaphysics Their experiment is diagrammed on
does not stand in the way of predic- the right in Figure 2, along with a
tion, control, and interpretation of conventional conditional discrimina-
behavior (p. 8). A little earlier in the tion on the left. In brief, a hungry
same article, however, he suggested pigeon was given one of two drugs, A
that covert stimuli are hypothesized or B, before its daily session. If Drug
to function the same as public A was given, pecks at the key marked
stimuli, except that they are located with the corresponding letter (A in
on the other side of the skin (p. 8). Figure 2) produced food; if Drug B
This seems to imply that private was given, pecks at the other key (B
events are hypothetical. This impres- in Figure 2) produced food. When
sion is strengthened by the further the pigeons pecked correctly, Lu-
statement that the properties of binski and Thompson concluded that
covert stimuli and responses are the pecks were under stimulus control
inferred from observations of analo- of the different private feelings pro-
gous overt stimuli and responses duced by the different drugs. In the
(p. 8). Finally, Zuriff notes approv- conditional discrimination dia-
ingly that radical behaviorism starts grammed on the left, a red or green
with the external world of stimuli key is first presented as the sample,
and responses and then [moves] them and then (sometimes after a delay)
inside the skin where necessary the choice keys, labeled A and B, are
(p. 8), apparently suggesting that presented. If the sample was green,
private events are inferred whenever pecks at A produce food; if the
one runs out of public explanations. sample was red, pecks at B produce
We are left with an ambiguous food. In both experiments, correct
description, in which private events performance may be explained by
are hypothesized or inferred, consid- public events: the colors and the
ered internal as opposed to external drugs. In the conditional discrimina-
(a usage that sounds dualistic) and tion, particularly if a delay elapses
yet are pronounced to have ontolog- between the sample and the choice,
192 WILLIAM M. BAUM

Figure 2. The Lubinski and Thompson (1993) experiment compared to a conditional

discrimination of color. They claimed that the pigeons discrimination reflected feelings
produced internally by the drugs, but their results are more easily understood as discrimination
between the public drugs themselves.

one might be tempted to posit some Cable, 1976, for further discussion).
private event (a trace or representa- The drug might produce changes in
tion of the sample) to control the the pigeons body, but as long as
pecking at the choice key. The these changes go unmeasured (re-
discrimination, however, is between main private), they are useless for
the red and green circles. No need explaining the pigeons behavior; the
arises to put copies of the circles public events of the drugs and the
inside the pigeon, and keeping the colored circles suffice.
stimuli publicin the environment Philosophers who regard behavior-
avoids confusion over who sees the ism as incomplete pose the following
circles (i.e., the actual pigeon and not challenge (e.g., Dennett, 1978). Imag-
an imagined inner pigeon peering ine that Tom rides the Number 4 bus
into an imagined inner space). Simi- home every day. We see him riding
larly, in the Lubinski-Thompson ex- the bus, but no cause for this
periment, instead of inferred private behavior is evident. He must be
stimuli, the equivalent of an inferred riding the bus because he wants to
copy of the red circle, one may point go home and believes this bus will
to the public drugs. Just as one may take him there. Thus, behavioral
omit imagined inner representations accounts are incomplete, because
of the circles, one may omit imagined one cannot explain behavior without
inner feelings produced by the drugs reference to mental causes. Behavior-
and avoid confusion over who feels ists respond that such explanations
the feelings and where the feelings are circular, because the only way we
reside. The preponderance of correct know that Tom wants or believes is
responses constitutes a discrimina- that he behaves (e.g., rides the bus).
tion between Drug A and Drug B. The causes are not evident because
That is all. In either experiment, and they lie in the past, that is, in Toms
in any discrimination, the decision history with home and buses.
about what is a correct response and Including private events in behav-
what is an error depends on what the ioral accounts undermines the behav-
experimenter knows (the color or iorists response. The philosopher
drug presented), which is public. A may reply that private events hardly
discrimination consists of a change in differ from wants and beliefs. Tom
behavior with a change in environ- might be sitting on the bus and
ment, but an onlooker (experimenter) reciting to himself that he needs to
must judge the change in environ- get out at 79th Street. How different
ment (see Herrnstein, Loveland, & is that?
 DUALISM AND PRIVATE EVENTS 193

THE DILEMMA OF iorism be presented as if it deals with

PRIVATE EVENTS conventional concepts, making it
seem acceptable on false grounds, or
Radical behaviorists who consider
should it be presented as the truly
private events to be useful additions
radical position it is (i.e., the com-
to explanations of behavior sit on the
plete denial of dualism) risking its
horns of a dilemma. Should private
seeming inadequate and implausible?
events be included or should they be
excluded? On the one hand, to What is the way out? How to
exclude private events would be to preserve the science of behavior and
deny what almost everyone says, that yet have the science be complete and
his or her private thoughts and plausible? I argue that the answer lies
feelings determine public behavior; in adopting a molar view of behavior.
to deny this would seem to open
behaviorists to the philosophers ac- THE MOLAR VIEW
cusation that behaviorism is incom- OF BEHAVIOR
plete because it neglects an important Organisms fill the seas, land, and
part of behavior, the very accusation air because they carry genetic mate-
that Skinner strove to avoid. On the rial and because that genetic material
other hand, to concede the impor- reproduces more often when in or-
tance of private events is to introduce ganisms than when not. Otherwise
hypothetical events that appear to be the genetic material would have
(and perhaps actually are; see Zuriff, remained in the original soup (see
1979, discussed above) hidden causes Dawkins, 1989, for a book-length
and to undermine the behaviorists discussion). Why did selection favor
claim to a true natural science of organisms? What is the advantage? In
behavior. Either way, the mentalists a word, it is behavior. To be an
seem to win. organism, to be alive, is to behave.
If explanations are sought in public Organisms interact with their envi-
events and all privacy is assumed to ronment, and that commerce with the
be accidental, and there is no other environment is behavior, and its
consistent position for behaviorists, importance lies in its effects on
then the position is the same as that reproductive success via the environ-
of Watson (1930), who argued, for ment. Organisms produce offspring,
example, that thought is subvocal feed themselves and their offspring,
speech. Instead of subvocal, Skinner build shelters, avoid predators, and
used the word covert. Neither term change the world around them in
solves the problem that private events myriad ways. All of these advanta-
remain hidden when one is explaining geous effects occur through time, on
another creatures behavior. average and in the long run. Behavior
Behaviorists should be careful is, by its very nature, extended in
about the claim that radical behav- time. Just as any one individual in a
iorism deals with thoughts and feel- population may fail (may die without
ings at all, because laypeople are leaving progeny), so any individual
likely to conclude that radical behav- action may fail. Advantage and
iorism incorporates the conventional success occur over time, on average
notion of thoughts and feelings, that and in the long run. Just as natural
is, as things or events in mind-space. selection operates on populations and
Radical behaviorism admits to no cannot be understood by looking at
such inner space. That denial makes individuals, so behavioral selection
the verbal behavior of behaviorists operates on extended patterns of
unconventional (Hineline, 1995), and activity and cannot be understood
that unconventionality poses the by looking at moments. At any
same dilemma: Should radical behav- particular moment, for example, we
194 WILLIAM M. BAUM

might see a pigeon poised with its we view a snapshot of a moment, we

back parallel to the ground and its see, for example, Tom with a shovel
beak extended, but when we see an in the garden, but we have little idea
extended sample in which it marches what activity is occurring. Viewing
along pecking at seeds on the ground, over a slightly longer timeframe, we
only then do we understand that it is see that Tom is digging a hole.
foraging. The insight that behavior is Viewing on a scale longer than that,
commerce with the environment tells we see that Tom is digging a ditch.
us both that behavior is extended in Longer still, and we see he is laying a
time and that behavior and its effects pipeline. Longer than that, and we
are concrete and measurable. In other see he is installing a waterfall in his
words, all the behavior and effects garden. And so on. At each time
that matter are public. scale, we see public activity, and no
In the molar view of behavior, problem arises. But, let Tom stop for
activities are more extended or less a while and lean on his shovel,
extended in time, which means they looking at the ground; then the
have the property of scale; more temptation arises to suppose he is
extended activities are defined on a thinking privately about his project.
longer time scale than less extended, However, we dont know what he is
more local, activities (Baum, 2002, doing at that moment; he might be
2004). A canary building a nest resting or thinking about getting
gathers material, puts it in the nest, something to eat. In a larger time
and works it in with its feet. Building frame, we might see that he resumes
the nest is a more extended activity, digging after a while, and even
defined on a longer time scale, and its though he took a short break, he is
parts (less extended activities) are still working on his project. Whatever
defined on a shorter time scale. covert speech may have occurred
The philosophers challenge, Tom hardly matters, because Tom is en-
is riding the Number 4 Bus because gaged during the period of observa-
he wants to go home and believes tion in the activity of digging a ditch,
that this bus will take him there, laying a pipeline, or installing a
leads behaviorists to respond that waterfall. Seen on a longer time scale,
this explanation is circular, because the activity is continuous, and any
the only evidence for the wanting or private events that occur may be
believing is Toms behavior of riding ignored (Baum, 2002).
the bus, getting off at the correct Suppose that after pausing, Tom
stop, and getting home. That re- resumes digging in a different direc-
sponse overlooks a problem with tion, and we ask why. Tom says that
the philosophers argument itself. he encountered a buried electric line
The challenge begins with a false and had to dig around to avoid it. We
premise: that Tom can ride the bus might say that Tom encountered a
at a moment. Momentary behavior problem that he solved by changing
is an oxymoron. By its very nature, direction. Whatever subvocal or
behavior is extended in time. If Tom overt verbal behavior may have
is sitting on the bus, we cannot tell if occurred, it was part of an extended
he is going home, to the store, or activity, that is, solving the problem.
somewhere else. A momentary snap- Any private actions or stimuli were
shot is subject to maximal uncertain- neither causal nor essential. The
ty; only with a larger time sample do verbal behavior and the change in
we become certain about what Tom direction were both due to encoun-
is doing. tering the buried electric line, a public
The temptation to posit private event. Dealing with the electric line
events arises when an activity is was a less extended part of digging
viewed on too small a time scale. If the ditch and laying the pipeline.
 DUALISM AND PRIVATE EVENTS 195

The molar view also allows us to the context of her other overt activ-
avoid hypothesizing about the pri- ities, Janes activities about the death
vate events that are called feelings penalty are her belief in its wrong-
or sensory events. The temptation to ness. Anyone who watches the ex-
view seeing, hearing, and being in tended patterns of Janes activities
pain as private events arises when we could know as well as Jane what
look at behavior over too short a Janes desires and beliefs are. Indeed,
time span. Does the zebra see the such an observer might know better
lions stalking it? At a moment, we than Jane, because another persons
cannot say. We have to watch for a actions are easier to observe than
while, until the zebra takes evasive ones own; people pay money to
action, before we conclude that the psychotherapists for exactly this rea-
zebra sees the lions. A police officer son.
asks a motorist, Didnt you see that
stop sign? If the motorist says no, ARE SENSATIONS PRIVATE?
the officer might be tempted to
suppose some private seeing oc- Events that might be considered
curred, but would have no basis to private sensations or private stimuli
conclude the motorist is lying, be- may be treated the same way as beliefs
cause the officer has seen only the and desires. Philosophers pose the
subsequent driving past the sign. following problem for behaviorists
Indeed, the point may be extended (Rachlin, 2003). Suppose that two
to all inferred events, private or persons are seated in a room where
mental. Carrying on from the point music is playing, and neither is
that in everyday life and in the moving but one of them is deaf.
laboratory most of the time we have How could the two be distinguished
access only to public stimuli and except by their private experience of
public behavior, Rachlin (1994, the music? This challenge is really just
2003) argued that mental events, another version of Tom riding the
including thinking, feeling, and sens- bus. If one is restricted to observing
ing, may be identified with the public them at a moment, one cannot say
activities from which they are in- which person is deaf and which can
ferred. Drawing on the writings of hear. Afterwards, however, one of
Aristotle and Gilbert Ryle (1949), them will talk about the music and
Rachlin identified mental events like enjoyment of it, whereas the other will
believe, want, intend, know, hear, have nothing to say about it. In a
see, be in pain, and so forth with more extended time frame, the dis-
extended patterns of public behavior. tinction between deafness and hearing
For Jane to believe that the death is readily made; the extended patterns
penalty is wrong, for example, means of public behavior of the two persons
Jane speaks out against it whenever make the difference (Baum, 2011b).
the subject comes up, gives money to Suggesting that one person is enjoying
organizations that work to oppose it, the music privately would be the
joins in demonstrations against it, wrong answer, because it would con-
and so on. If enough of these cede the mentalists point by referring
activities occur, over a period of time, to a hidden mental criterion.
people around Jane will assert that A more challenging example is
she believes the death penalty is pain, because pain is usually taken
wrong. Jane herself will assert her to be the quintessential private event.
belief on the same grounds. No As we saw earlier, Skinner considered
private or mental event need come pain to be a private stimulus. To
into the account. understand why this is an error,
Following Rachlin, we may go a Figure 2 may help, because it made
step further and assert that, seen in the point that inferred inner feelings
196 WILLIAM M. BAUM

were unnecessary to understanding sion such speech. If Tom makes the

discrimination. Although some insult claim, one possibility is that he shut
to the body stimulates nerve endings himself away in a separate room, say,
that may be involved in pain, the cut, and thereby rendered all his behavior
burn, pressure, blow, or tear is the necessarily private. People usually
origin of the pain and is always mean by the claim, however, that
observable. The stimulation of the others were present but saw no pain
nerve endings is like light stimulating behavior. The claim is based on the
receptors in the retina. If Jane stops possibility that some conditions (e.g.,
her car at a red light, the stimulus an injury or a pinched nerve) might
that controls her stopping is the red be present that would ordinarily
light, not an inner representation or result in public pain behavior, but
sensation of the red light. Similarly, if that some other conditions (e.g.,
Jane has a pinched nerve in her spine, being at a wedding) might override
the pinched nerve is the event con- the usual activity. If Tom succeeds in
tributing to her pain, not an inner arranging that no one sees any of his
representation or sensation of pain. pain behavior, then everyone around
When she complains, I am in pain, him concludes he is not in pain. In
she is not complaining about an inner contrast, if he shows pain behavior,
sensation or private stimulus, but and no one sees any circumstance to
about the pinched nerve (assuming conclude he is faking, then usually
she is not faking). The pinched nerve onlookers will conclude he is in pain
may be regarded as a stimulus, but it and will act sympathetically; try to
is not private, except perhaps in the soothe him, offer palliatives, call an
trivial sense that no one has taken the ambulance, and so on. Whether or
necessary X-rays. not the person is in pain resides in the
Laypeople and philosophers often onlookers behavior, particularly the
claim that one may be in pain but not onlookers behavior in an extended
show it. On that basis, they insist that time frame.
pain must be private. Rachlin (1985) A football player who is hit by an
argued that this is a logical impossi- opposing player but goes on to
bility, because to be in pain is to show receive a pass might after the game
it. If a soccer player flops to the complain and groan, and X-rays
ground, clutching his leg, rolling show that he has a broken rib. The
about, grimacing, and groaning, we immediate causes of his pain behav-
are likely to say he is in pain. If ior are the broken rib and the
thereby he stops the game to his presence of sympathetic onlookers.
teams advantage, we are tempted to If he is asked whether he was in pain
conclude he is faking. We will decide while making that great catch, he
only later, if ever, in a longer time might say he was in pain but was
frame, on the basis of his ability to ignoring it at that moment. But, how
continue playing or his limping, could he know that? Even if the
whether he was faking or not. Con- broken rib was affecting nerve end-
versely, if someone actually succeeds ings that could in turn affect his
in showing no pain behavior at all, brain, his nervous system was re-
we conclude that person was not in sponding only to the broken rib. If he
pain; regardless of what the person was ignoring anything, he was ignor-
might claim later, for all practical ing the broken rib (the injury now
purposes, he or she was not in pain. made public) and not some inner
Similar to Skinners (1945) treat- pain thing, not a private stimulus. To
ment of such utterances, another onlookers, he was not in pain then,
approach to understanding the claim, even if the X-rays combined with his
I was in pain but didnt show it, is pain behavior lead present onlookers
to ask what conditions might occa- to conclude he is in pain now.
 DUALISM AND PRIVATE EVENTS 197

The conclusion that ones being in From an evolutionary perspective

pain depends on the judgment of or a therapeutic perspective, only
onlookers, rather than on ones own public behavior matters. Whatever a
judgment, might seem counterintui- human or nonhuman animal may
tive. A layperson might still insist think or feel privately, the private
that he or she has been in pain but thinking and feeling cannot affect
not shown it. More accurately, we reproductive success; only commerce
might reply, you succeeded in engag- with the environment, such as mov-
ing in so little pain behavior that no ing about, gaining resources, inter-
one around noticed. You were faking acting with conspecifics, avoiding
not being in pain, so to speak, and predators, and the like, in other
people around you saw no reason to words, events that are observable
behave as if you were in pain. They and measurable (i.e., public) can
would have behaved so, too, if you advance reproductive success. Natu-
exhibited pain behavior but you ral selection cannot affect inner
seemed to be faking. Ultimately, we events, whether they are labeled
still decide about what a person is or mind, psychology, philosophy, think-
is not doing on the basis of prior and ing, or feeling, but natural selection
subsequent behavior in an extended can favor advantageous behavioral
time span. tendencies and patterns, as long as
The real solution to the problem they are influenced to some extent by
of privacy is to see that private genes. If a therapist were to change a
events are unnecessary to under- clients private thoughts and feelings
standing behavior. They might or without changing any public behav-
might not exist; they are irrelevant. ior (were such a thing possible), the
A complete account of behavior can therapist would have failed, because
be had without them. Recalling that the aim of therapy, even psychoanal-
behavior exists only as commerce ysis, is to help the client live more
with the environment and consists of effectively. If Jane asserts that she
activities more extended or more feels better about her life but contin-
local in time, we need not talk about ues her addiction, stays in an abusive
any private events to understand the relationship, cringes from her boss,
function of behavior. Mechanisms and continues to attempt suicide, no
inside the skin, particularly in the one should believe her. Indeed, for
nervous system but also in glands any practical purpose, only public
and muscles, are important to un- behavior matters. A safety engineer
derstanding how behavior is accom- doesnt want people only to think
plished, but understanding how the privately that wearing a seat belt is
environment causes an organism to good; the actual buckling up is what
behave one way rather than another matters. If we can predict, control,
depends on a larger time frame, that and understand public behavior, our
is, the history of the individual and understanding will not be incomplete
the species to which the individual due to the omission of private events,
belongs (Baum, 2002, 2005). If be- because private events are irrelevant;
haviorists wish to understand why only public behavior matters to
people talk about private and mental evolution and for all practical pur-
things and events or to avoid the poses.
accusation that behaviorists fail to
address peoples inner life of
THE MISTAKE OF
thoughts and feelings, they may
PRIVATE EVENTS
follow Rachlins suggestion that pri-
vate and mental terms are verbal Whorfs (1956) point about the
behavior occasioned by extended need to speak in another language
patterns of behavior. is well illustrated by the concept of
198 WILLIAM M. BAUM

verbal behavior, which amounts to assert also that first-person state-

speaking about lay concepts like ments are incorrigible. They mean
language, reference, and meaning in by this that no one can question what
an entirely different vocabulary Jane says about herself, because she
(speaking about language in a differ- alone is privy to the private events
ent language, Whorf might say). that underlie her statement. Even if
Skinner (1957) defined verbal behav- we set aside the possibility that Jane
ior as operant behavior of a speaker is lying or faking, we know that first-
reinforced by the behavior of another person statements can be unreliable
organism present (the listener) and (people change what they say). For
acquired as a result of membership in example, an athlete may report no
a verbal community of speakers and pain from an injury in the heat of
listeners. The definition covers not play, but complain of the pain later.
only speech but also gestures (e.g., From the viewpoint of radical
signing). Skinner aimed, however, behaviorism, first-person utterances
not to establish a distinct category and third-person utterances are in-
but exactly the opposite: to liken stances of verbal behavior, and they
verbal behavior to other operant are controlled by similar, if not
behavior and to overcome the seem- identical, conditions in the environ-
ing difference (Baum, 2005). Much of ment. We look at the dogs paw for a
the confusion about private events thorn and in the childs ear for a
derives from failure to grasp fully the swollen eardrum; Janes dentist will
implications of replacing mentalistic find the decay that explains all of her
notions about language with verbal pain behavior, including her saying
behavior. If a dog limps, whines, and she is in pain. Injuries, pinched nerves,
whimpers, we may unhesitatingly say excessive blood flow to the brain, and
that it is in pain, our utterance being other afflictions all are potentially
occasioned by its pain behavior. If a made public and, when made public,
preverbal infant cries, grimaces, make our responses to pain behavior
whines, whimpers, and swipes at its more sympathetic and less suspicious
ear, we may say it is in pain or has an of faking. When Jane complains of a
earache, our utterance being occa- toothache, she is not peering at some
sioned by its pain behavior. If Jane, inner pain thing (or a private stimu-
an adult human, grimaces, groans, lus) and reporting on it; she is
and holds her face, we may say she is responding to the injury in her tooth
in pain or has a toothache, our (Baum, 2011a). When Skinner (1945)
utterance being occasioned by her wrote famously, my toothache is just
pain behavior. If, in addition, she as physical as my typewriter (p. 285),
says, I have a toothache, that one wonders just what he meant. He
utterance is just more pain behavior; treated the toothache as a private
it only makes our utterances about stimulus, but the statement remains
her pain more likely and more cryptic. Is the private stimulus the
sympathetic (Baum, 2011a). injury to the tooth? That would be
Many philosophers and other men- physical. But he says toothache,
talists, committed as they are to not tooth. The private stimulus
innerouter dualism, would insist cannot be some inner pain thing; that
that first-person statements like I would not be physical. In the molar
am in pain differ fundamentally view, the toothache is the pain behav-
from third-person statements like ior (hand to jaw, facial expressions,
She is in pain. They do so because groans, and so on, p. 277), which
they assume that first-person state- Skinner called collateral responses,
ments are based on private events, plus the persons verbal complaints
whereas third-person statements are and assertionsthat behavior is just
based on public events. Usually, they as physical as a typewriter.
 DUALISM AND PRIVATE EVENTS 199

Much confusion arises from the less as he or she did when the thing
notion that Jane reports on or was seen (with eyes open in good
observes some inner private event light; see Rachlin, 2003, for addition-
when she says she is in pain. The al discussion of imagination).
mentalistic way of looking at observ- As it is with cows and flowers, so it
ing is to suppose that it is a single is with pain and other so-called
activity directed at different objects. private events. When one reports on
Observing a cow differs from observ- the oboe playing in a piece of music,
ing a flower, in the mentalistic view, one is engaging in verbal behavior
because inner attention is directed that includes words like oboe,
toward two different objects in the plaintive, surprising, and so on.
external world. The weakness of this It is occasioned by the music. No
view appears when we ask questions inner oboe enters the picture. Simi-
like, Who does the inner attend- larly, when one reports on pain, one
ing? and Is the observer in the is engaging in verbal behavior that
external world with the objects? (see includes words like hurts, sharp,
Baum, 2011a, for additional discus- excruciating, and so on. No inner
sion). pain thing enters the picture, and if
In radical behaviorism, which re- the person is not faking, the pain
jects mentalism and dualism in favor behavior is occasioned, in part, by an
of monism, the observer or reporter injury or other condition that is at
is the whole organism, and the least potentially public.
behavior of observing or reporting
is public verbal and nonverbal be- CONCLUSION
havior. Observing a cow and observ-
ing a flower are not the same activity In the mentalistic view of verbal
directed at two different objects, but behavior, which relies on phrases like
are two qualitatively different activi- using language and symbolic
ties. One pattern consists of orienting communication, a speaker is said
toward the cow, saying that it looks to produce speech, that is, to act as
like a Holstein, that it seems skinny, an agent who talks for his or her self.
and so on; the other pattern consists A natural science includes no place
of orienting toward the flower, smell- for hidden, unobservable causes;
ing it, saying that it is lovely, perhaps not spirits, not essences, not an inner
picking it, and so on. When we see self (Baum, 1995, 2005; Ryle, 1949;
such behavior, we say the person sees Skinner, 1969). Radical behaviorism
(observes) the cow or the flower. The views all behavioral events as natural
presence of the cow or flower alone events, like earthquakes, rain, sun-
cannot suffice to produce the behav- sets, cell division, birth, death, and
ior of observing or reporting; taxes, including verbal behavior. Ut-
other conditions usually have to be terances are episodes of verbal activ-
met, such as the presence of other ity, like running a race or walking
people who might respond to the home. Speech, like bird song, comes
utterances and a history of interac- down to sounds that affect the
tions with cows or flowers. The behavior of conspecifics (humans)
activities are occasioned by all of who hear them. Thus, when someone
these circumstances, but not by any speaks of thoughts or feelings, we
inner copy of a cow or flower need not imagine private events as
(Skinner, 1969). Moreover, if one causing the utterance, but rather we
imagines a cow or flower (sees it must seek the determinants in envi-
in the absence of the thing seen; ronmental events present and past.
Skinner, 1969), still the imagining The past events are invisible in the
involves no inner copy or private present, but they were public and
event. The person behaves more or observable, and all inferences about
200 WILLIAM M. BAUM

them are testable, unlike inferences Dennett, D. C. (1978). Skinner skinned. In

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