01 Brown V Marswin Marketing Inc
01 Brown V Marswin Marketing Inc
01 Brown V Marswin Marketing Inc
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FIRST DIVISION
Present:
DECISION
DEI,., CASTILLO,/.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 assails the January 18, 2013
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR. SP No. 124098. The CA
annulled and set aside the December 19, 2011 3 and January 31, 20124 Resolutions
of the National Labor Relation Commission (NLRC), which affinned the June
30, 2011 Decision5 of the Labor Arbiter (LA) declaring illegal the dismissal from
work of Ernesto Brown (Brown). L.ikewise assailed is the April 23, 2013 CA
Resolution6 denying Brown's Motion for Reconsideration.
Factual Antecedents
Decision
.... ' \ ,
., 1 .,..,
damages and attorney's fees against l\!1arswin Ivlarketing, Inc. (Marswin) and Sany
Tan (Tan), its owner and President. He prayed for reinstatement with full
backwages and payment of his other monetary claims.
8
In his Position Paper, alleged that on October 5, 2009, Marswin
employed him as building maintenance/ electrician with a salary of P-500.00 per
day; he was assigned at l\1arswin 's warehouse in Valenzuela, and was tasked to
maintain its sanitation and make nec1e2sary electrical repairs thereon.
Brown fmther averred that on Ivfay 28, 20 l 0, he reported at the l\1ain Office
of Marswin, and W(l.S told that it was already his last day of work. Allegedly, he
was made to sign a document that he did not understand; and, he was
no longer admitted back to work. Thus, he insisted that he was terminated without
due process oflaw.
9 10
For their part, Marswh11Tan argued in their Position Paper and Comment
that on October 4. 2009, Marswin, a domestic corporation engaged in wholesale
trade of construction materials. employed Brown as electrician; during his eight-
month stay, Jvlarswin received negative reports anent Brow11's work ethics,
competence, and efficiency. On May 28, 20 l 0, they summoned him at its Main
Office to purportedly discuss the complaints of the \Varehouse _r..,fanager and the
Warehouse Supervisor; during the they informed Brown of the following
charges against him:
xx xx
11. x x x [Si] Ernesto Brown ay aking pinatawag sa main office noong Mayo
28, 2010 para kausapin dahil sa mga nasabing reklamo sa kanyang
pagtatrabaho; noong aking binanggit sa kanya [ang] mga nasabing reklamo
ay wala man lang siyang kaimik imik; sinabi ko sa kanya na kung
ipagpapatuloy [nya] ang maling pagt:rabaho at hindi pagsunod sa mga
pinagagawa sa kanya ay walang magagawa ang opisina kundi tanggalin na
siya; nanatili siyang walang imik at nagsabi siya na tatawag siya sa
lranyang asawa at umalis sya; hindi na siya bumalik noon at hindi na
pumasok magmula noon at nakatanggap na nga lang kami ng reklamo
[mula] sa tanggapa[nl ng Labor Arbiter.xx x
12. Hindi totoo ang kanyang reklamo na siya ay dinismis; may legal na
kadahilanan na para siya ay dismisin pero hindi pa siya dinismis noong
Mayo 28, 201 O; siya mismo ang hindi na bumalik sa tanggapan xx x 13
a) backwages
b) 13tl1 monthpay
h ,,0
p
12
Id. at 34-35.
13
Id. at 35.
Decision 4 G.R. No. 206891
SOORDERED. 14
In mling that Brown was i!JegaUy dismissed, the LA noted that the alleged
complaints against Brov.m were embodied in Azucena's affidavit yet no actual
complaints or reports against him were adduced in evidence. The LA was also
llllconvinced that Brown left Marswin 's premises and abandoned his work
considering that he filed this illegal dismissal case; and his employer failed to
notify him to report back to work.
15
On appeal, the NLRC, through its Resolution dated December 19, 2011,
affirmed the LA Decision.
l11e NLRC held that the purpmted complaints against Brmvn were only
gathered by Azucena from the reports she supposedly received from the
Warehouse IV!anager and Supervisor; her afl:ldavit was hearsay and of poor
evidentimy va]ue. It ratioci.riated that :Nfarswin/Tan did not give Brmvn the
opportunity to confront his accusers, and did not observe due process in
terminating him. It also declared that i.here was no showing that Brown abandoned
his work as 1\ttarswiPifan did not cite him for his alleged refosal to return to work.
On Januaiy 31, 2012, the NLRC denied the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by Marswinffan.
On January 18, 2013, the CA annulled and set aside the NLRC Resolutions.
I.t entered a new judgment decia.'1ng t'1at dismissed and
1
therefore not entitled to backwages and l 3 h month pa/ffeA
14
Id. at 57-58.
15
Id. at 60-65.
Decision 5 G.R. No. 206891
In sum, the CA decreed that this case did not involve the dismissal of an
employee on the ground of abandonment, there being no evidence proving that
Brown was actually dismissed.
In its Resolution dated April 23, 2013, the CA denied the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Brown.
Issue
Aggrieved, Brown filed this Petition raising the sole issue as follows:
Brown contends that Marswin failed to discharge its burden to prove that he
committed abandonment. He argues that the fact that he challenges his dismissal
disproves that he abandoned his employment. He stresses that the reliance of
the CA on Azucena's affidavit is unwarranted as no actual complaints as regards
his supposed infractions were adduced in evidence. He posits that the bare
allegations of Azucena are hearsay, and are not proof that he c01mnitted any
infraction.
iv1arswir1/fan, on their end, counter that the Court should not give due
course to this Petition because it raises factual issues which are not within the
ambit of a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Our Ruling
As a rule, the Court is not a trier of facts and only questions of law may be
raised in a petition 1mder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. A departure from this
16
Rollo, p. 15.
Decision 6 G.R. No. 206891
is nevertheless allowed where the factual findings of the CA are contrary to those
of the lower courts or tribunals. In this case. the findings of the CA vary with
those of the NLRC and LA. /\s such, the Court deems it necessary to review the
records and detennine which findings and conclusion truly conform with the
evidence adduced by the pmties. 17
l\1oreover, in dismissal C!lses, the employer bears the burden of proving that
the employee was not terminated. qr if dismissed, that the dismissal was legal.
Resultantly, the failure of the employer to discharge such burden would mean that
tl1e dismissal is unjustified and thus, illegal. 18 The employer cannot simply
discharge such burden by its plain that it did not dismiss the employee;
and it is highly absurd if the employer will escape liability by its mere claim that
the employee abandoned his or her work. Jn fine, where there is no clear and valid
.{:', terrnmat1on,
cause ior . . t1el 1.nw treats .it' as a case O,l-" L1ega
11 l d"1sn11ssa
. 1. 19
Thus, in order -for the employer to discharge its burden to prove that the
employee committed abandomnent, which constitutes neglect of duty, and is a just
cause for dismissal, the employer must prove that the employee 1) failed to report
for work or had been absent without valid reason; and 2) had a dear intention to
discontinue his or her The second requirement must be manifested
by overt ads and is more determLnative in concluding that the employee is guilty
of abandonment. Tbjs is becal,;lse abandrni.ment is a matter of intention and cannot
be lightly presumed from indefinite acts. 20
Here, Brown contends that on -May 28, 2010, his employer informed him
that it was a.iready his last day of work; and, thereafter, he was no longer admitted
back to work. On the other hand, Marswin/Tan confirmed having summoned
Brown on May 28, 20 l 0 but they denied that he was dismissed, but that he left the
meeting and since then never returned for work.
In fact, in her A:n1c0na did not specify any overt act on the part of
Brown showing that he intended to cease working tor At the same tirne,
Azucena did nut establish that Marswin, on its end, exerted effort to convince
Brovm to return fi)r work, if only to show that IV1nrswin did not dis1niss him and it
1
was Brown who actually to return to And neither did I\.1arswin
him U!nl_h'" to re1'.1t
Se\! !vhnarp11s :'. lt:xat1 l'n1t1pp1:ies, me., t 1.R. No. ! 9 1(J l l, .January 28, 2015, 148 :scRA '.' ! l, 52 t 522.
ix OUT' Sound i'hils. v. Cowl o[Appeo!s, 676 P;1il. 472, :f'79(2011 ).
19
People: 's Jnr. v. G.R. No. 211312, DectJmber 5, 20 l 6.
10 l''";rot!1ers c
" orpor(.1t1on. <4"[>'f"''Lan
er
/ 1 ('. :.:. J: r;;.;uu:.:ro,
1 _, .l ..:,. n1 .. 39"1.:. , 4r('
11!. L) 102
. '.J 3)
21 S,.,, f 1'10 x <'It"\' 111JA'u1'11n1 G..... ;h'..... 'h IO{'e'.t16"".J, Apt:11 n 7flJ'
I f .J./. 1 ... '-' 1111r-1'" !
'.-1';,..!.I) !'!\_, , /O ... ; '757
1. '-'CR.A 01;.... ,-l.
" 17
Decision 7 G.R. No. 206891
In addition, on June 7, 2010, or just ten days after Brown's last day at work
(May 28, 2010), he already filed an illegal dismissal suit against his employer.
Such filing conveys his desire to return, and strengthens his assertion that he did
not abandon his work. To add, in his Complaint, Brown prayed for reinstatement,
which fUrther bolsters his intention to continue working for Marswin, and negates
abandonment.23 Indeed, the immediate filing of an illegal dismissal case especially
so when it includes a prayer for reinstatement is totally contrary to the charge of
abandonment. 24
their own affidavits to prove that Brown should be disciplined by his employer. As
stated by Azucena:
11. Dahi1 dito si Ernesto Brown ay aking pinatawag sa main office noong
Mayo 28, 2010 para kausapin dahil sa mga nasahing reldamo sa kanyang
pab,rtatrabaho xx x[.1 26
At the same time, Brown is entitled to attorney's foes of 10% of the total
monetary award as he was compelled to litigate to protect his rights and interest.
The legal interest of 6% per annum shall also be imposed on the total monetary
28
awards from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
Accordingly, the June 30, 2011 Decision of the Labor Arbiter, as affim1ed
by the December 19, 2011 Resolution of the National Labor Relations
Commission, is REINSTATED and AFPIRI\'IED with MODIFICATIONS in
that Ernesto Brown is also entitled to receive attorney's foes of 10% of the total
monetary awards. 111e legal interest of 6% per annum shall be imposed on tl-ie
monetary grants the date of finality of this Decision until folly
CA rollu, pp. 34-35.
27
Article 279. q( Tenure, -- In case;; of regular ernloyment, the employer shall not tenninate the
services of 1:1n except for a just ca1;.se or when <1uthorized by this Title. An employee who is
unjustly dismissed from work shall be ent!tl1:;d to reinstatem.;int without of seniority rights and other
privikges and to his foll backwages, inclu:;ive of allowances. and to his other benefits or their monetary
equiv::iknt computed from the time his was withheld from him up to the time of his
actual reinstatement. (now Article 294 of the l.abor Code qf'the Philippines, Amended & Renumbered, .July
21, 2015)
Balais, Jr. v. Se'Lon, G.R, No. 196557. June 15. 2016.
Decision 9 G.R. No. 206891
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
S.CAGUIOA
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13., Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.