IV.

History of the Guarantee against

Unreasonable Search and Seizure and the
Right to Exclusion of Illegally Seized Evidence
in the United States and in the Philippines

The origin of the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure in the Philippine
constitutions can be traced back to hundreds of years ago in a land distant from the
Philippines. Needless to say, the right is well-entrenched in history.
The power to search in England was first used as an instrument to oppress
objectionable publications.[187] Not too long after the printing press was developed,
seditious and libelous publications became a concern of the Crown, and a broad search
and seizure power developed to suppress these publications. [188] General warrants were
regularly issued that gave all kinds of people the power to enter and seize at their
discretion under the authority of the Crown to enforce publication licensing statutes. [189] In
1634, the ultimate ignominy in the use of general warrants came when the early great
illuminary of the common law,[190] and most influential of the Crowns opponents,[191] Sir
Edward Coke, while on his death bed, was subjected to a ransacking search and the
manuscripts of his Institutes were seized and carried away as seditious and libelous
publications.[192]
The power to issue general warrants and seize publications grew. They were also
used to search for and seize smuggled goods.[193] The developing common law tried to
impose limits on the broad power to search to no avail. In his History of the Pleas of
Crown, Chief Justice Hale stated unequivocally that general warrants were void and that
warrants must be used on probable cause and with particularity.[194]Member of Parliament,
William Pitt, made his memorable and oft-quoted speech against the unrestrained power
to search:

The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It
may be frail - its roof may shake - the wind may blow through it - the storm may enter
- the rain may enter; but the King of England may not enter; all his force dares not
cross the threshold of the ruined tenement. [195]

Nevertheless, legislation authorizing general warrants continued to be passed. [196]

In the 16th century, writs of assistance, called as such because they commanded all
officers of the Crown to participate in their execution,[197] were also common. These writs
authorized searches and seizures for enforcement of import duty laws.[198] The same
powers and authorities and the like assistance that officials had in England were given to
American customs officers when parliament extended the customs laws to the
colonies. The abuse in the writs of assistance was not only that they were general, but
they were not returnable and once issued, lasted six months past the life of the
sovereign.[199]
 These writs caused profound resentment in the colonies. [200] They were predominantly
used in Massachusetts, the largest port in the colonies[201] and the seat of the American
revolution. When the writs expired six months after the death of George II in October
1760,[202] sixty-three Boston merchants who were opposed to the writs retained James
Otis, Jr. to petition the Superior Court for a hearing on the question of whether new writs
should be issued.[203] Otis used the opportunity to denounce Englands whole policy to the
colonies and on general warrants.[204] He pronounced the writs of assistance as the worst
instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty and the fundamental
principles of law, that ever was found in an English law book since they placed the liberty
of every man in the hands of every petty officer.[205] Otis was a visionary and apparently
made the first argument for judicial review and nullifying of a statute exceeding the
legislatures power under the Constitution and natural law. [206] This famous debate in
February 1761 in Boston was perhaps the most prominent event which inaugurated the
resistance of the colonies to the oppressions of the mother country. Then and there, said
John Adams, then and there was the first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary
claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child Independence was born. [207] But the
Superior Court nevertheless held that the writs could be issued.[208]
Once the customs officials had the writs, however, they had great difficulty enforcing
the customs laws owing to rampant smuggling and mob resistance from the
citizenry.[209] The revolution had begun. The Declaration of Independence followed. The
use of general warrants and writs of assistance in enforcing customs and tax laws was
one of the causes of the American Revolution.[210]
Back in England, shortly after the Boston debate, John Wilkes, a member of
Parliament, anonymously published the North Briton, a series of pamphlets criticizing the
policies of the British government.[211] In 1763, one pamphlet was very bold in denouncing
the government. Thus, the Secretary of the State issued a general warrant to search for
the authors, printers, and publishers of [the] seditious and treasonable paper.[212] Pursuant
to the warrant, Wilkes house was searched and his papers were indiscriminately
seized. He sued the perpetrators and obtained a judgment for damages. The warrant was
pronounced illegal as totally subversive of the liberty and person and property of every
man in this kingdom.[213]
Seeing Wilkes success, John Entick filed an action for trespass for the search
and seizure of his papers under a warrant issued earlier than Wilkes. This became
the case of Entick v. Carrington, considered a landmark of the law of search
[214]

and seizure and called a familiar monument of English freedom. Lord Camden,
[215]

the judge, held that the general warrant for Enticks papers was invalid. Having
described the power claimed by the Secretary of the State for issuing general
search warrants, and the manner in which they were executed, Lord Camden
spoke these immortalized words, viz:

Such is the power and therefore one would naturally expect that the law to warrant it
should be clear in proportion as the power is exorbitant. If it is law, it will be found in
our books; if it is not to be found there, it is not law.
The great end for which men entered into society was to secure their
property. That right is preserved sacred and incommunicable in all instances where it
has not been taken away or abridged by some public law for the good of the
whole. The cases where this right of property is set aside by positive law are
various. Distresses, executions, forfeitures, taxes, etc., are all of this description,
wherein every man by common consent gives up that right for the sake of justice and
the general good. By the laws of England, every invasion of private property, be it
ever so minute, is a trespass. No man can set his foot upon my ground without my
license but he is liable to an action though the damage be nothing; which is proved by
every declaration in trespass where the defendant is called upon to answer for bruising
the grass and even treading upon the soil. If he admits the fact, he is bound to show
by way of justification that some positive law has justified or excused him. . . If
no such excuse can be found or produced, the silence of the books is an authority
against the defendant and the plaintiff must have judgment. . . (emphasis
[216]

supplied)

The experience of the colonies on the writs of assistance which spurred the Boston
debate and the Entick case which was a monument of freedom that every American
statesman knew during the revolutionary and formative period of America, could be
confidently asserted to have been in the minds of those who framed the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution, and were considered as sufficiently explanatory of what
was meant by unreasonable searches and seizures.[217]
The American experience with the writs of assistance and the Entick case were
considered by the United States Supreme Court in the first major case to discuss the
scope of the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure in the
1885 case of Boyd v. United States, supra, where the court ruled, viz:

The principles laid down in this opinion (Entick v. Carrington, supra) affect the very
essence of constitutional liberty and security. They reach farther than the concrete
form of the case then before the court, with its adventitious circumstances; they apply
to all invasions, on the part of the Government and its employees, of the sanctity
of a mans home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors and
the rummaging of his drawers that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is
the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and
private property, where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some
public offense; it is the invasion of this sacred right which underlies and constitutes
the essence of Lord Camdens judgment. (emphasis supplied)
[218]

In another landmark case of 1914, Weeks v. United States,[219] the Court,

citing Adams v. New York,[220] reiterated that the Fourth Amendment was intended to
secure the citizen in person and property against the unlawful invasion of the sanctity of
his home by officers of the law, acting under legislative or judicial sanction.
 With this genesis of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and the
jurisprudence that had built around it, the Fourth Amendment guarantee was extended
by the United States to the Filipinos in succinct terms in President
McKinleys Instruction of April 7, 1900, viz:

. . . that the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated.[221]

This provision in the Instruction was re-enacted in Section 5 of the Philippine Bill of
1902, this time with a provision on warrants, viz:

That the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated.

xxxxxxxxx

That no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or
things to be seized.[222]

The above provisions were reproduced verbatim in the Jones Law of 1916.
Then came the 1935 Constitution which provides in Article IV, Section 1(3), viz:

Section 1(3). The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.

Initially, the Constitutional Conventions committee on bill of rights proposed an exact

copy of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution in their draft, viz:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. [223]

During the debates of the Convention, however, Delegate Vicente Francisco proposed to
amend the provision by inserting the phrase to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may produce
in lieu of supported by oath or affirmation. His proposal was based on Section 98 of
General Order No. 58 or the Code of Criminal Procedure then in force in the Philippines
which provided that: (t)he judge or justice of the peace must, before issuing the warrant,
examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witness he may produce and
take their deposition in writing.[224] The amendment was accepted as it was a remedy
against the evils pointed out in the debates, brought about by the issuance of warrants,
many of which were in blank, upon mere affidavits on facts which were generally found
afterwards to be false.[225]
When the Convention patterned the 1935 Constitutions guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures after the Fourth Amendment, the Convention made
specific reference to the Boyd case and traced the history of the guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure back to the issuance of general warrants and writs of
assistance in England and the American colonies. [226] From the Boyd case, it may be
derived that our own Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures, which is an almost exact copy of the Fourth Amendment, seeks to protect rights
to security of person and property as well as privacy in ones home and possessions.
Almost 40 years after the ratification of the 1935 Constitution, the provision on the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures was amended in Article IV, Section 3
of the 1973 Constitution, viz:

Sec. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible
officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Noticeably, there were three modifications of the 1935 counterpart, namely: (1) the clause
was made applicable to searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose;
(2) the provision on warrants was expressly made applicable to both search warrant or
warrant of arrest; and (3) probable cause was made determinable not only by a judge,
but also by such other officer as may be authorized by law.[227]But the concept and purpose
of the right remained substantially the same.
As a corollary to the above provision on searches and seizures, the exclusionary rule
made its maiden appearance in Article IV, Section 4(2) of the Constitution, viz:

Section 4 (1). The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable

except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety and order require
otherwise.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
 That evidence obtained in violation of the guarantee against unreasonable searches
and seizures is inadmissible was an adoption of the Courts ruling in the 1967 case
of Stonehill v. Diokno.[228]
Sections 3 and 4 of the 1973 Constitution were adopted in toto in Article I, Section 1
of the Freedom Constitution which took effect on March 25, 1986, viz:

Section 1. The provision of . . . ARTICLE IV (Bill of Rights) . . . of the 1973

Constitution, as amended, remain in force and effect and are hereby adopted in toto as
part of this Provisional Constitution.[229]

Thereafter, pursuant to the Freedom Constitution, the 1987 Constitution was drafted
and ratified on February 2, 1987. Sections 2 and 3, Article III thereof provide:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by a judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

x x x x x x x xx

Section 3 (1). The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable

except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety and order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

The significant modification of Section 2 is that probable cause may be determined only
by a judge and no longer by such other responsible officer as may be authorized by
law. This was a reversion to the counterpart provision in the 1935 Constitution.
Parenthetically, in the international arena, the UDHR provides a similar protection in
Article 12, viz:

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right
to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

The ICCPR similarly protects this human right in Article 17, viz:

1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy,

family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation.
2. Everyone has the right to protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

In the United States, jurisprudence on the Fourth Amendment continued to grow from
the Boyd case. The United States Supreme Court has held that the focal concern of the
Fourth Amendment is to protect the individual from arbitrary and oppressive official
conduct.[230] It also protects the privacies of life and the sanctity of the person from such
interference.[231] In later cases, there has been a shift in focus: it has been held that the
principal purpose of the guarantee is the protection of privacy rather than property, [f]or
the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.[232] The tests that have more recently
been formulated in interpeting the provision focus on privacy rather than intrusion of
property such as the constitutionally protected area test in the 1961 case of Silverman
v. United States[233] and the reasonable expectation of privacy standard in Katz v. United
States[234] which held that the privacy of communication in a public telephone booth comes
under the protection of the Fourth Amendment.
Despite the shift in focus of the Fourth Amendment in American jurisdiction, the
essence of this right in Philippine jurisdiction has consistently been understood as respect
for ones personality, property, home, and privacy. Chief Justice Fernando explains, viz:

It is deference to ones personality that lies at the core of this right, but it could be
also looked upon as a recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily
ones home, but not necessarily excluding an office or a hotel room. (Cf. Hoffa v.
United States, 385 US 293 [1966]) What is sought to be regarded is a mans
prerogative to choose who is allowed entry in his residence, for him to retreat
from the cares and pressures, even at times the oppressiveness of the outside
world, where he can truly be himself with his family. In that haven of refuge, his
individuality can assert itself not only in the choice of who shall be welcome but
likewise in the objects he wants around him. There the state, however powerful,
does not as such have access except under the circumstances noted, for in the
traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. (Cf. Cooley: Near in
importance to exemption from any arbitrary control of the person is that maxim of the
common law which secures to the citizen immunity in his home against the prying
eyes of the government, and protection in person, property, and papers against even
the process of the law, except in specified cases. The maxim that every mans house is
his castle, is made part of our constitutional law in the clauses prohibiting
unreasonable searches and seizures, and has always been looked upon as of high value
to the citizen. (1 Constitutional Limitations, pp. 610-611 [1927]) In the language of
Justice Laurel, this provision is intended to bulwark individual security, home,
and legitimate possessions (Rodriquez v. Vollamiel, 65 Phil. 230, 239 (1937). Laurel
con.) Thus is protected his personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted
intrusion by the State. There is to be no invasion on the part of the government
and its employees of the sanctity of a mans home and the privacies of life. (Boyd
v. United States, 116 US 616, 630 [1886]) (emphasis supplied)
[235]
 As early as 1904, the Court has affirmed the sanctity and privacy of the home
in United States v. Arceo,[236] viz:

The inviolability of the home is one of the most fundamental of all the individual
rights declared and recognized in the political codes of civilized nations. No one can
enter into the home of another without the consent of its owners or occupants.

The privacy of the home - the place of abode, the place where man with his
family may dwell in peace and enjoy the companionship of his wife and children
unmolested by anyone, even the king, except in rare cases - has always been
regarded by civilized nations as one of the most sacred personal rights to whom
men are entitled. Both the common and the civil law guaranteed to man the right to
absolute protection to the privacy of his home. The king was powerful; he was clothed
with majesty; his will was the law, but, with few exceptions, the humblest citizen or
subject might shut the door of his humble cottage in the face of the monarch and
defend his intrusion into that privacy which was regarded as sacred as any of the
kingly prerogatives. . .

A mans house is his castle, has become a maxim among the civilized peoples of the
earth. His protection therein has become a matter of constitutional protection in
England, America, and Spain, as well as in other countries.

xxxxxxxxx

So jealously did the people of England regard this right to enjoy, unmolested, the
privacy of their houses, that they might even take the life of the unlawful intruder, if it
be nighttime. This was also the sentiment of the Romans expressed by Tully: Quid
enim sanctius quid omni religione munitius, quam domus uniuscu jusque
civium. (emphasis supplied)
[237]

The Court reiterated this in the 1911 case of United States v. De Los Reyes, et
al., to demonstrate the uncompromising regard placed upon the privacy of the home
[238]

that cannot be violated by unreasonable searches and seizures, viz:

In the case of McClurg vs. Brenton (123 Iowa, 368), the court, speaking of the right of
an officer to enter a private house to search for the stolen goods, said:

The right of the citizen to occupy and enjoy his home, however mean or humble, free
from arbitrary invasion and search, has for centuries been protected with the most
solicitous care by every court in the English-speaking world, from Magna Charta
down to the present, and is embodied in every bill of rights defining the limits of
governmental power in our own republic.
The mere fact that a man is an officer, whether of high or low degree, gives him no
more right than is possessed by the ordinary private citizen to break in upon
the privacy of a home and subject its occupants to the indignity of a search for the
evidence of crime, without a legal warrant procured for that purpose. No amount of
incriminating evidence, whatever its source, will supply the place of such warrant. At
the closed door of the home, be it palace or hovel, even blood-hounds must wait till
the law, by authoritative process, bids it open. . . (emphasis supplied)
[239]

It is not only respect for personality, privacy and property, but to the very dignity of the
human being that lies at the heart of the provision.
There is also public interest involved in the guarantee against unreasonable search
and seizure. The respect that government accords its people helps it elicit allegiance and
loyalty of its citizens. Chief Justice Fernando writes about the right against unreasonable
search and seizure as well as to privacy of communication in this wise:

These rights, on their face, impart meaning and vitality to that liberty which in a
constitutional regime is a mans birth-right. There is the recognition of the area of
privacy normally beyond the power of government to intrude.Full and
unimpaired respect to that extent is accorded his personality. He is free from the
prying eyes of public officials. He is let alone, a prerogative even more valued when
the agencies of publicity manifest less and less diffidence in impertinent and
unwelcome inquiry into ones person, his home, wherever he may be minded to stay,
his possessions, his communication. Moreover, in addition to the individual
interest, there is a public interest that is likewise served by these constitutional
safeguards. They make it easier for state authority to enlist the loyalty and
allegiance of its citizens, with the unimpaired deference to ones dignity and
standing as a human being, not only to his person as such but to things that may
be considered necessary appurtenances to a decent existence. A government that
thus recognizes such limits and is careful not to trespass on what is the domain subject
to his sole control is likely to prove more stable and enduring. (emphasis supplied)
[240]

In the 1967 case of Stonehill, et al. v. Diokno,[241] this Court affirmed the sanctity of
the home and the privacy of communication and correspondence, viz:

To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out

completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution,
for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication
and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace
officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional
provision above quoted - to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not
difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the
party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal
means. (emphasis supplied)
[242]

Even after the 1961 Silverman and 1967 Katz cases in the United States, which
emphasized protection of privacy rather than property as the principal purpose of the
Fourth Amendment, this Court declared the avowed purposes of the guarantee in the
1981 case of People v. CFI of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City,[243] viz:

The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and

seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person and property and
unlawful invasion of the security of the home by officers of the law acting under
legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy against such usurpation when
attempted. (Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 858; Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637
[1946]). The right to privacy is an essential condition to the dignity and
happiness and to the peace and security of every individual, whether it be of
home or of persons and correspondence. (Taada and Carreon, Political Law of the
Philippines, Vol. 2, 139 [1962]).The constitutional inviolability of this great
fundamental right against unreasonable searches and seizures must be deemed
absolute as nothing is closer to a mans soul than the serenity of his privacy and
the assurance of his personal security. Any interference allowable can only be for
the best causes and reasons. (emphasis supplied)
[244]

Even if it were conceded that privacy and not property is the focus of the guarantee
as shown by the growing American jurisprudence, this Court has upheld the right to
privacy and its central place in a limited government such as the Philippines, viz:

The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification

with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language of
Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: The concept of limited government has always
included the idea that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into
the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between
absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual,
in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of
limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual,
firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can
control. Protection of this private sector - protection, in other words, of the
dignity and integrity of the individual- has become increasingly important as
modern society has developed. All the forces of technological age - industrialization,
urbanization, and organization - operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate
intrusion to it. In modern times, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of
private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian
society. (emphasis supplied)
[245]
 The right to privacy discussed in Justice Douglas dissent in the Hayden case is
illuminating. We quote it at length, viz:

Judge Learned Hand stated a part of the philosophy of the Fourth Amendment in
United States v. Poller, 43 F2d 911, 914: [I]t is only fair to observe that the real evil
aimed at by the Fourth Amendment is the search itself, that invasion of a mans
privacy which consists in rummaging about among his effects to secure evidence
against him. If the search is permitted at all, perhaps it does not make so much
difference what is taken away, since the officers will ordinarily not be interested in
what does not incriminate, and there can be no sound policy in protecting what does.

xxxxxxxxx

The constitutional philosophy is, I think, clear. The personal effects and possessions
of the individual (all contraband and the like excepted) are sacrosanct from
prying eyes, from the long arm of the law, from any rummaging by
police. Privacy involves the choice of the individual to disclose or to reveal what
he believes, what he thinks, what he possesses. The article may be nondescript work
of art, a manuscript of a book, a personal account book, a diary, invoices, personal
clothing, jewelry, or whatnot. Those who wrote the Bill of Rights believed that
every individual needs both to communicate with others and to keep his affairs to
himself. That dual aspect of privacy means that the individual should have the
freedom to select for himself the time and circumstances when he will share his
secrets with others and decide the extent of the sharing (footnote omitted).This is
his prerogative not the States. The Framers, who were as knowledgeable as we,
knew what police surveillance meant and how the practice of rummaging through
ones personal effects could destroy freedom.

xxxxxxxxx

I would . . . leave with the individual the choice of opening his private effects
(apart from contraband and the like) to the police and keeping their contents as
secret and their integrity inviolate. The existence of that choice is the very
essence of the right of privacy. (emphasis supplied)
[246]

Thus, in Griswold v. Connecticut,[247] the United States Supreme Court upheld the
right to marital privacy and ruled that lawmakers could not make the use of contraceptives
a crime and sanction the search of marital bedrooms, viz:

Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for
telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of
privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights older than our
political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for
better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It
is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not
political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an
association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions. (emphasis
[248]

supplied)

In relation to the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, private

respondent Dimaano likewise claims a right to the exclusionary rule, i.e., that evidence
obtained from an unreasonable search cannot be used in evidence against her. To
determine whether this right is available to her, we again examine the history, concept,
and purpose of this right in both the American and Philippine jurisdictions.
The exclusionary rule has had an uneven history in both the United States and
Philippine jurisdictions. In common law, the illegal seizure of evidence did not affect its
admissibility because of the view that physical evidence was the same however it was
obtained. As distinguished from a coerced confession, the illegal seizure did not impeach
the authenticity or reliability of physical evidence. This view prevailed in American
jurisdiction until the Supreme Court ruled in the 1914 Weeks case that evidence obtained
in violation of the Fourth Amendment was inadmissible in federal court as it amounted to
theft by agents of the government. This came to be known as the exclusionary rule and
was believed to deter federal law enforcers from violating the Fourth Amendment. In
1949, the Fourth Amendment was incorporated intothe Due Process Clause under the
Fourteenth Amendment[249] and made applicable in the state system in Wolf v.
Colorado, but the Court rejected to incorporate the exclusionary rule. At the
[250]

time Wolf was decided, 17 states followed the Weeks doctrine while 30 states did
not.[251] The Court reasoned:

We cannot brush aside the experience of States which deem the incidence of such
conduct by the police too slight to call for a deterrent remedy not by way of
disciplinary measures but by overriding the relevant rules of evidence.There are,
moreover, reasons for excluding evidence unreasonably obtained by the federal police
which are less compelling in the case of police under State or local authority. The
public opinion of a community can far more effectively be exerted against oppressive
conduct on the part of police directly responsible to the community itself than can
local opinion, sporadically aroused, be brought to bear upon remote authority
pervasively exerted throughout the country. [252]

This difference in treatment on the federal and state level of evidence obtained
illegally resulted in the silver platter doctrine. State law enforcement agents would provide
federal officers with illegally seized evidence, which was then admissible in federal court
because, as with illegally seized evidence by private citizens, federal officers were not
implicated in obtaining it. Thus, it was said that state law enforcers served up the evidence
in federal cases in silver platter. This pernicious practice was stopped with the United
States Supreme Courts 1960 decision, Elkins v. United States.[253] Twelve years
after Wolf, the United States Supreme Court reversed Wolf and incorporated the
exclusionary rule in the state system in Mapp v. Ohio[254] because other means of
controlling illegal police behavior had failed.[255] We quote at length the Mapp ruling as it
had a significant influence in the exclusionary rule in Philippine jurisdiction, viz:

. . . Today we once again examine the Wolfs constitutional documentation of the right
of privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our
books, are led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence
secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all
persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. . .

Since the Fourth Amendments right to privacy has been declared enforceable against
the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against
them by the same sanction of exclusion as it is used against the Federal
Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance
against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be a form of words,
valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human
liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy
would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the
freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this Courts
high regard as freedom implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. At that time that
the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States through the
Due Process Clause, the cases of this court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that
as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence
seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf stoutly adhered to that
proposition. The right to privacy, when conceded operatively enforceable against the
States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its
protection and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks
and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due
process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches - state or federal - it was
logically and constitutionally necessary that the exclusion doctrine - an essential
part of the right to privacy - be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of
the right newly recognized by the Wolf case. In short, the admission of the new
constitutional right by Wolf could not consistently tolerate denial of its most
important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which
an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold
otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and
enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the
exclusionary rule is to deter - to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in
the only available way - by removing the incentive to disregard it. (Elkins v.
United States, 364 US at 217)
xxxxxxxxx

The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire
system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. (Cf.
Marcus v. Search Warrant of Property, 6 L ed 2d post, p. 1127) Having once
recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable
against the States, and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by
state officers is, therefore constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to
remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like
effect as other basic rights secured by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer
permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of
law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded
on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the
Constitution guarantees him, to the police officer no less than that to which
honest law enforcement is entitled, and to the courts, that judicial integrity so
necessary in the true administration of justice. (emphasis supplied)
[256]

It is said that the exclusionary rule has three purposes. The major and most often
invoked is the deterrence of unreasonable searches and seizures as stated in Elkins v.
United States[257] and quoted inMapp: (t)he rule is calculated to prevent, not repair. Its
purpose is to deter to compel respect for constitutional guaranty in the only effective
available way by removing the incentive to disregard it. [258] Second is the imperative of
judicial integrity, i.e., that the courts do not become accomplices in the willful
disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to uphold . . . by permitting unhindered
governmental use of the fruits of such invasions. . . A ruling admitting evidence in a
criminal trial . . . has the necessary effect of legitimizing the conduct which produced the
evidence, while an application of the exclusionary rule withholds the constitutional
imprimatur.[259] Third is the more recent purpose pronounced by some members of the
United States Supreme Court which is that of assuring the people all potential victims of
unlawful government conduct that the government would not profit from its lawless
behavior, thus minimizing the risk of seriously undermining popular trust in
government.[260] The focus of concern here is not the police but the public. This third
purpose is implicit in the Mapp declaration that no man is to be convicted on
unconstitutional evidence.[261]
In Philippine jurisdiction, the Court has likewise swung from one position to the other
on the exclusionary rule. In the 1920 case of Uy Kheytin v. Villareal,[262] the Court
citing Boyd, ruled that seizure or compulsory production of a mans private papers to be
used against him was tantamount to self-incrimination and was therefore unreasonable
search and seizure. This was a proscription against fishing expeditions. The Court
restrained the prosecution from using the books as evidence. Five years later or in 1925,
we held in People v. Carlos[263] that although the Boyd and Silverthorne Lumber Co.
and Silverthorne v. United States[264] cases are authorities for the doctrine that
documents obtained by illegal searches were inadmissible in evidence in criminal
cases, Weeks modified this doctrine by adding that the illegality of the search and seizure
should have initially been directly litigated and established by a pre-trial motion for the
return of the things seized. As this condition was not met, the illegality of the seizure was
not deemed an obstacle to admissibility. The subject evidence was nevertheless
excluded, however, for being hearsay. Thereafter, in 1932, the Court did not uphold the
defense of self-incrimination when fraudulent books, invoices and records that had been
seized were presented in evidence in People v. Rubio.[265] The Court gave three reasons:
(1) the public has an interest in the proper regulation of the partys books; (2) the books
belonged to a corporation of which the party was merely a manager; and (3) the warrants
were not issued to fish for evidence but to seize instruments used in the violation of
[internal revenue] laws and to further prevent the perpetration of fraud. [266]
The exclusionary rule applied in Uy Kheytin was reaffirmed seventeen years thence
in the 1937 case of Alvarez v. Court of First Instance[267] decided under the 1935
Constitution. The Court ruled that the seizure of books and documents for the purpose of
using them as evidence in a criminal case against the possessor thereof is
unconstitutional because it makes the warrant unreasonable and the presentation of
evidence offensive of the provision against self-incrimination. At the close of the Second
World War, however, the Court, in Alvero v. Dizon,[268] again admitted in evidence
documents seized by United States military officers without a search warrant in a
prosecution by the Philippine Government for treason. The Court reasoned that this was
in accord with the Laws and Customs of War and that the seizure was incidental to an
arrest and thus legal. The issue of self-incrimination was not addressed at all and instead,
the Court pronounced that even if the seizure had been illegal, the evidence would
nevertheless be admissible following jurisprudence in the United States that evidence
illegally obtained by state officers or private persons may be used by federal officers. [269]
Then came Moncado v. Peoples Court[270] in 1948. The Court made a categorical
declaration that it is established doctrine in the Philippines that the admissibility of
evidence is not affected by the illegality of the means used for obtaining it. It condemned
the pernicious influence of Boyd and totally rejected the doctrine in Weeks as subversive
of evidentiary rules in Philippine jurisdiction. The ponencia declared that the prosecution
of those guilty of violating the right against unreasonable searches and seizures was
adequate protection for the people. Thus it became settled jurisprudence that illegally
obtained evidence was admissible if found to be relevant to the case [271] until the 1967
landmark decision of Stonehill v. Diokno[272] which overturned the Moncado rule. The
Court held in Stonehill, viz:

. . . Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the
position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with
the American common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free
merely because the constable has blundered, (People v. Defore, 140 NE 585) upon the
theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is
protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained (Wolf v.
Colorado, 93 L.Ed. 1782), such as common-law action for damages against the
searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant
and against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal
punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal
remedies as may be provided by other laws.

However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and
eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means
of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures.[273]

The Court then quoted the portion of the Mapp case which we have quoted at length
above in affirming that the exclusionary rule is part and parcel of the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The Stonehill ruling was incorporated in Article
4, Section 4(2) of the 1973 Constitution and carried over to Article 3, Section 3(2) of the
1987 Constitution.

V. Application of the Natural Law

Culled from History and Philosophy:
Are the Rights Against Unreasonable Search and Seizure
and to the Exclusion of Illegally Seized Evidence Natural Rights
which Private Respondent Dimaano Can Invoke?

In answering this question, Justice Goldbergs concurring opinion in the Griswold

case serves as a helpful guidepost to determine whether a right is so fundamental that
the people cannot be deprived of it without undermining the tenets of civil society and
government, viz:

In determining which rights are fundamental, judges are not left at large to decide
cases in light of their personal and private notions. Rather, they must look to the
traditions and [collective] conscience of our people to determine whether a principle is
so rooted [there] . . . as to be ranked as fundamental. (Snyder v. Com. of
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). The inquiry is whether a right involved is of
such character that it cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles
of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions. . . .
Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932) (emphasis supplied)
[274]

In deciding a case, invoking natural law as solely a matter of the judges personal
preference, invites criticism that the decision is a performative contradiction and thus self-
defeating. Critics would point out that while the decision invokes natural law that abhors
arbitrariness, that same decision is tainted with what it abhors as it stands on the judges
subjective and arbitrary choice of a school of legal thought. Just as one judge will fight
tooth and nail to defend the natural law philosophy, another judge will match his fervor in
defending a contrary philosophy he espouses. However, invoking natural law because
the history, tradition and moral fiber of a people indubitably show adherence to it is an
altogether different story, for ultimately, in our political and legal tradition, the people are
the source of all government authority, and the courts are their creation. While it may be
argued that the choice of a school of legal thought is a matter of opinion, history is a fact
against which one cannot argue - and it would not be turning somersault with history to
say that the American Declaration of Independence and the consequent adoption of a
constitution stood on a modern natural law theory foundation as this is universally taken
for granted by writers on government.[275] It is also well-settled in Philippine history that the
American system of government and constitution were adopted by our 1935
Constitutional Convention as a model of our own republican system of government and
constitution. In the words of Claro M. Recto, President of the Convention, the 1935
Constitution is frankly an imitation of the American Constitution. Undeniably therefore,
modern natural law theory, specifically Lockes natural rights theory, was used by the
Founding Fathers of the American constitutional democracy and later also used by the
Filipinos.[276] Although the 1935 Constitution was revised in 1973, minimal modifications
were introduced in the 1973 Constitution which was in force prior to the EDSA
Revolution. Therefore, it could confidently be asserted that the spirit and letter of the 1935
Constitution, at least insofar as the system of government and the Bill of Rights were
concerned, still prevailed at the time of the EDSA Revolution. Even the 1987 Constitution
ratified less than a year from the EDSA Revolution retained the basic provisions of the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions on the system of government and the Bill of Rights, with the
significant difference that it emphasized respect for and protection of human rights and
stressed that sovereignty resided in the people and all government authority emanates
from them.
Two facts are easily discernible from our constitutional history. First, the Filipinos are
a freedom-loving race with high regard for their fundamental and natural rights. No
amount of subjugation or suppression, by rulers with the same color as the Filipinos skin
or otherwise, could obliterate their longing and aspiration to enjoy these rights. Without
the peoples consent to submit their natural rights to the ruler, [277] these rights cannot
forever be quelled, for like water seeking its own course and level, they will find their place
in the life of the individual and of the nation; natural right, as part of nature, will take its
own course. Thus, the Filipinos fought for and demanded these rights from the Spanish
and American colonizers, and in fairly recent history, from an authoritarian ruler. They
wrote these rights in stone in every constitution they crafted starting from the 1899
Malolos Constitution. Second, although Filipinos have given democracy its own Filipino
face, it is undeniable that our political and legal institutions are American in origin. The
Filipinos adopted the republican form of government that the Americans introduced and
the Bill of Rights they extended to our islands, and were the keystones that kept the body
politic intact. These institutions sat well with the Filipinos who had long yearned for
participation in government and were jealous of their fundamental and natural
rights. Undergirding these institutions was the modern natural law theory which stressed
natural rights in free, independent and equal individuals who banded together to form
government for the protection of their natural rights to life, liberty and property. The sole
purpose of government is to promote, protect and preserve these rights. And when
government not only defaults in its duty but itself violates the very rights it was established
to protect, it forfeits its authority to demand obedience of the governed and could be
replaced with one to which the people consent. The Filipino people exercised this highest
of rights in the EDSA Revolution of February 1986.
 I will not endeavor to identify every natural right that the Filipinos fought for in
EDSA. The case at bar merely calls us to determine whether two particular rights - the
rights against unreasonable search and seizure and to the exclusion of evidence obtained
therefrom - have the force and effect of natural rights which private respondent Dimaano
can invoke against the government.
I shall first deal with the right against unreasonable search and seizure. On February
25, 1986, the new president, Corazon Aquino, issued Proclamation No. 1 where she
declared that she and the vice president were taking power in the name and by the will of
the Filipino people and pledged to do justice to the numerous victims of human rights
violations.[278] It is implicit from this pledge that the new government recognized and
respected human rights. Thus, at the time of the search on March 3, 1986, it may be
asserted that the government had the duty, by its own pledge, to uphold human
rights. This presidential issuance was what came closest to a positive law guaranteeing
human rights without enumerating them. Nevertheless, even in the absence of a positive
law granting private respondent Dimaano the right against unreasonable search and
seizure at the time her house was raided, I respectfully submit that she can invoke her
natural right against unreasonable search and seizure.
The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a core right implicit in the
natural right to life, liberty and property. Our well-settled jurisprudence that the right
against unreasonable search and seizure protects the peoples rights to security of person
and property, to the sanctity of the home, and to privacy is a recognition of this
proposition. The life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his
person and property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life
lived with the assurance that the government he established and consented to, will protect
the security of his person and property. The ideal of security in life and property dates
back even earlier than the modern philosophers and the American and French
revolutions, but pervades the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of mans
existence, thus it has been described, viz:

The right to personal security emanates in a persons legal and uninterrupted

enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the
right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not
only by a deprivation of life but also of those things which are necessary to the
enjoyment of life according to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the
individual.[279]

The individual in the state of nature surrendered a portion of his undifferentiated liberty
and agreed to the establishment of a government to guarantee his natural rights, including
the right to security of person and property, which he could not guarantee by
himself. Similarly, the natural right to liberty includes the right of a person to decide
whether to express himself and communicate to the public or to keep his affairs to himself
and enjoy his privacy. Justice Douglas reminds us of the indispensability of privacy in
the Hayden case, thus: Those who wrote the Bill of Rights believed that every individual
needs both to communicate with others and to keep his affairs to himself. A natural right
to liberty indubitably includes the freedom to determine when and how an individual will
share the private part of his being and the extent of his sharing. And when he chooses to
express himself, the natural right to liberty demands that he should be given the liberty to
be truly himself with his family in his home, his haven of refuge where he can retreat from
the cares and pressures, even at times the oppressiveness of the outside world, to borrow
the memorable words of Chief Justice Fernando. For truly, the drapes of a mans castle
are but an extension of the drapes on his body that cover the essentials. In unreasonable
searches and seizures, the prying eyes and the invasive hands of the government prevent
the individual from enjoying his freedom to keep to himself and to act undisturbed within
his zone of privacy. Finally, indispensable to the natural right to property is the right to
ones possessions. Property is a product of ones toil and might be considered an
expression and extension of oneself. It is what an individual deems necessary to the
enjoyment of his life. With unreasonable searches and seizures, ones property stands in
danger of being rummaged through and taken away. In sum, as pointed out in De Los
Reyes, persons are subjected to indignity by an unreasonable search and seizure
because at bottom, it is a violation of a persons natural right to life, liberty and property. It
is this natural right which sets man apart from other beings, which gives him the dignity
of a human being.
It is understandable why Filipinos demanded that every organic law in their history
guarantee the protection of their natural right against unreasonable search and seizure
and why the UDHR treated this right as a human right. It is a right inherent in the right to
life, liberty and property; it is a right appertain(ing) to man in right of his existence, a right
that belongs to man by virtue of his nature and depends upon his personality, and not
merely a civil right created and protected by positive law. The right to protect oneself
against unreasonable search and seizure, being a right indispensable to the right to life,
liberty and property, may be derived as a conclusion from what Aquinas identifies as
mans natural inclination to self-preservation and self-actualization. Man preserves
himself by leading a secure life enjoying his liberty and actualizes himself as a rational
and social being in choosing to freely express himself and associate with others as well
as by keeping to and knowing himself. For after all, a reflective grasp of what it means to
be human and how one should go about performing the functions proper to his human
nature can only be done by the rational person himself in the confines of his private
space. Only he himself in his own quiet time can examine his life knowing that an
unexamined life is not worth living.
Every organic law the Filipinos established (the Malolos, 1935, 1973, and 1987
Constitutions) and embraced (the Instruction, Philippine Bill of 1902, and Jones Law) in
the last century included a provision guaranteeing the peoples right against unreasonable
search and seizure because the people ranked this right as fundamental and
natural. Indeed, so fundamental and natural is this right that the demand for it spurred the
American revolution against the English Crown. It resulted in the Declaration of
Independence and the subsequent establishment of the American Constitution about 200
years ago in 1789. A revolution is staged only for the most fundamental of reasons - such
as the violation of fundamental and natural rights - for prudence dictates that governments
long established should not be changed for light and transient reasons.[280]
Considering that the right against unreasonable search and seizure is a natural right,
the government cannot claim that private respondent Dimaano is not entitled to the right
for the reason alone that there was no constitution granting the right at the time the search
was conducted. This right of the private respondent precedes the constitution, and does
not depend on positive law. It is part of natural rights. A violation of this right along with
other rights stirred Filipinos to revolutions. It is the restoration of the Filipinos natural rights
that justified the establishment of the Aquino government and the writing of the 1987
Constitution. I submit that even in the absence of a constitution, private respondent
Dimaano had a fundamental and natural right against unreasonable search and seizure
under natural law.
We now come to the right to the exclusion of evidence illegally
seized. From Stonehill quoting Mapp, we can distill that the exclusionary rule in both the
Philippine and American jurisdictions is a freedom implicit in the concept of ordered liberty
for it is a necessary part of the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures,
which in turn is an essential part of the right to privacy that the Constitution protects. If the
exclusionary rule were not adopted, it would be to grant the right (against unreasonable
search and seizure) but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Thus, the
inevitable conclusion is that the exclusionary rule is likewise a natural right that private
respondent Dimaano can invoke even in the absence of a constitution guaranteeing such
right.
To be sure, the status of the exclusionary right as a natural right is admittedly not as
indisputable as the right against unreasonable searches and seizures which is firmly
supported by philosophy and deeply entrenched in history. On a lower tier, arguments
have been raised on the constitutional status of the exclusionary right. Some assert, on
the basis of United States v. Calandra,[281] that it is only a judicially-created remedy
designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect,
rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.[282] Along the same line,
others contend that the right against unreasonable search and seizure merely requires
some effective remedy, and thus Congress may abolish or limit the exclusionary right if it
could replace it with other remedies of a comparable or greater deterrent effect. But these
contentions have merit only if it is conceded that the exclusionary rule is merely an
optional remedy for the purpose of deterrence.[283]
Those who defend the constitutional status of the exclusionary right, however, assert
that there is nothing in Weeks that says that it is a remedy[284] or a manner of deterring
police officers.[285] In Mapp, while the court discredited other means of enforcing the Fourth
Amendment cited in Wolf, the thrust of the opinion was broader. Justice Clarke opined
that no man is to be convicted on unconstitutional evidence[286]and held that the
exclusionary rule is an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. [287]
Formulated in the Aquinian concept of human law, the debate is whether the
exclusionary right is the first kind of human law which may be derived as a conclusion
from the natural law precept that one should do no harm to another man, in the same way
that conclusions are derived from scientific principles, in which case the exclusionary right
has force from natural law and does not depend on positive law for its creation; or if it is
the second kind of human law which is derived by way of determination of natural law, in
the same way that a carpenter determines the shape of a house, such that it is merely a
judicially or legislatively chosen remedy or deterrent, in which case the right only has force
insofar as positive law creates and protects it.
In holding that the right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental
and natural right, we were aided by philosophy and history. In the case of the exclusionary
right, philosophy can also come to the exclusionary rights aid, along the lines of Justice
Clarkes proposition in the Mapp case that no man shall be convicted on unconstitutional
evidence. Similarly, the government shall not be allowed to convict a man on evidence
obtained in violation of a natural right (against unreasonable search and seizure) for the
protection of which, government and the law were established. To rule otherwise would
be to sanction the brazen violation of natural rights and allow law enforcers to act with
more temerity than a thief in the night for they can disturb ones privacy, trespass ones
abode, and steal ones property with impunity. This, in turn, would erode the peoples trust
in government.
Unlike in the right against unreasonable search and seizure, however, history cannot
come to the aid of the exclusionary right. Compared to the right against unreasonable
search and seizure, the exclusionary right is still in its infancy stage in Philippine
jurisdiction, having been etched only in the 1973 Constitution after the 1967 Stonehill
ruling which finally laid to rest the debate on whether illegally seized evidence should be
excluded. In the United States, the exclusionary rights genesis dates back only to the
1885 Boyd case on the federal level, and to the 1961 Mapp case in the state level. The
long period of non-recognition of the exclusionary right has not caused an upheaval, much
less a revolution, in both the Philippine and American jurisdictions. Likewise, the UDHR,
a response to violation of human rights in a particular period in world history, did not
include the exclusionary right. It cannot confidently be asserted therefore that history can
attest to its natural right status. Without the strength of history and with philosophy alone
left as a leg to stand on, the exclusionary rights status as a fundamental and natural right
stands on unstable ground. Thus, the conclusion that it can be invoked even in the
absence of a constitution also rests on shifting sands.
Be that as it may, the exclusionary right is available to private respondent Dimaano
as she invoked it when it was already guaranteed by the Freedom Constitution and the
1987 Constitution. The AFP Board issued its resolution on Ramas unexplained wealth
only on July 27, 1987. The PCGGs petition for forfeiture against Ramas was filed on
August 1, 1987 and was later amended to name the Republic of the Philippines as plaintiff
and to add private respondent Dimaano as co-defendant. Following the petitioners stance
upheld by the majority that the exclusionary right is a creation of the Constitution, then it
could be invoked as a constitutional right on or after the Freedom Constitution took effect
on March 25, 1986 and later, when the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987.

VI. Epilogue

The Filipino people have fought revolutions, by the power of the pen, the strength of
the sword and the might of prayer to claim and reclaim their fundamental rights. They set
these rights in stone in every constitution they established. I cannot believe and so hold
that the Filipinos during that one month from February 25 to March 24, 1986 were stripped
naked of all their rights, including their natural rights as human beings. With the
extraordinary circumstances before, during and after the EDSA Revolution, the Filipinos
simply found themselves without a constitution, but certainly not without fundamental
rights. In that brief one month, they retrieved their liberties and enjoyed them in their
rawest essence, having just been freed from the claws of an authoritarian regime. They
walked through history with bare feet, unshod by a constitution, but with an armor of rights
guaranteed by the philosophy and history of their constitutional tradition. Those natural
rights inhere in man and need not be granted by a piece of paper.
To reiterate, the right against unreasonable search and seizure which private
respondent Dimaano invokes is among the sacred rights fought for by the Filipinos in the
1986 EDSA Revolution. It will be a profanity to deny her the right after the fight had been
won. It does not matter whether she believed in the righteousness of the EDSA
Revolution or she contributed to its cause as an alleged ally of the dictator, for as a human
being, she has a natural right to life, liberty and property which she can exercise
regardless of existing or non-existing laws and irrespective of the will or lack of will of
governments.
I wish to stress that I am not making the duty of the Court unbearably difficult by taking
it to task every time a right is claimed before it to determine whether it is a natural right
which the government cannot diminish or defeat by any kind of positive law or action. The
Court need not always twice measure a law or action, first utilizing the constitution and
second using natural law as a yardstick. However, the 1986 EDSA Revolution was
extraordinary, one that borders the miraculous. It was the first revolution of its kind in
Philippine history, and perhaps even in the history of this planet. Fittingly, this separate
opinion is the first of its kind in this Court, where history and philosophy are invoked not
as aids in the interpretation of a positive law, but to recognize a right not written in a
papyrus but inheres in man as man. The unnaturalness of the 1986 EDSA revolution
cannot dilute nor defeat the natural rights of man, rights that antedate constitutions, rights
that have been the beacon lights of the law since the Greek civilization. Without respect
for natural rights, man cannot rise to the full height of his humanity.
I concur in the result.

[1] Decision, p. 26.

[2] Id.
[3] Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, 210 SCRA 589 (1992), p. 597.
[4] Kelly, J., A Short History of Western Legal Theory (1992), p. 20, citing Antigone, pp. 453-457.
[5] Rice, C., Fifty Questions on the Natural Law (1993), p. 31.
[6] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book V in the Great Books of the Western World, vol. 9 (Robert Maynard
Hutchins, editor in chief, 1952), p. 382.
[7] Aristotle, On Rhetoric, Book I, Chapter 13 in the Great Books of the Western World, vol. 9 (Robert
Maynard Hutchins, editor in chief, 1952), p. 617.
[8] Bix, B., Natural Law Theory, p. 224 in D. Patterson, A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory
(1996).
[9] Kelly, J., supra, p. 142, citing Decretum, D. I.
[10] Id., citing Decretum, D. 8. 2, 9 ad fin.
[11] Id., citing Aurea Doctons fo. 169.
[12] Id., citing Felix Fluckiger, Geschichte des Naturrechtes (1954), i. 426-8.
[13] Id.
[14] Kelly, J., supra, pp. 142-143.
[15] Id., p. 143.
[16] Altman, A., Arguing About Law (2001), p. 51.
[17] Aquinas, T., Summa Theologica I, II, Q. 90, art. 1 in the Great Books of the Western World, vol. 20
(Robert Maynard Hutchins, editor in chief, 1952), p. 208.
[18] Freinberg, J. and J. Coleman, Philosophy of Law (6th ed. 2000), p. 19.
[19] Aquinas, T., Summa Theologica I, II, Q. 91, art. 1, p. 208.
[20] Kelly, J., supra, p. 143.
[21] Altman, A., supra, p. 52.
[22] Aquinas, T., Summa Theologica I, II, Q. 91, art. 2, p. 208.
[23] Rice, C., supra, p. 44.
[24] Freinberg, J. and J. Coleman, supra, p. 23.
[25] Aquinas, T., Summa Theologica I, II, Q. 94, art. 2, p. 222.
[26] Id.
[27] Rice, C., supra, p. 45, citing Summa Theologica, II, II, Q. 81, art. 6; see also Summa Theologica, II, II,
Q. 85, art. 1.
[28] Id., citing T. E. Davitt, S.J., St. Thomas Aquinas and the Natural Law, Origins of the Natural Law Tradition
(1954), pp. 26, 30-31; Rommen, The Natural Law, p. 49; Summa Theologica, I, II, Q. 94, art. 2.
[29] Freinberg, J. and J. Coleman, supra, p. 24.
[30] Rice, C., supra, pp. 45-46.
[31] Freinberg, J. and J. Coleman, supra, p. 24.
[32] Rice, C., supra, pp. 45-46.
[33] Altman, A., supra, p. 52.
[34] Aquinas, T., Summa Theologica, I, II, Q. 95, art. 2.
[35] Rice, C., supra, p. 24.
[36] Freinberg, J. and J. Coleman, supra, p. 26; Altman, A., supra, p. 52.
[37] Aquinas, T., Summa Theologica I, II, Q. 91, art. 4, p. 222.
[38] Freinberg, J. and J. Coleman, supra, p. 30, citing Summa Theologica, I, II, Q. 91, art. 4.
[39] An important restatement was made by John Finnis who wrote Natural Law and Natural Rights published
in 1980. He reinterpreted Aquinas whom he says has been much misunderstood. He argues that
the normative conclusions of natural law are not derived from observations of human or any other
nature but are based on a reflective grasp of what is self-evidently good for human beings. The
basic forms of good grasped by practical understanding are what is good for human beings with
the nature they have. The following are basic goods: life (and health), knowledge, play, aesthetic
experience, sociability (friendship), practical reasonableness, and religion. (Bix, B., supra, pp. 228-
229.) He claims that Aquinas considered that practical reasoning began not by understanding this
nature from the outside . . . by way of psychological, anthropological or metaphysical observations
and judgments defining human nature, but by experiencing ones nature . . . from the inside, in the
form of ones inclinations. (Freeman, M.D.A. Lloyds Introduction to Jurisprudence [1996], p. 84,
citing J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights [1980], p. 34.)
Lon Fuller also adopted a natural law analysis of law and wrote that there is a test that a law must pass
before something could be properly called law. Unlike traditional natural law theories, however, the
test he applies pertains to function rather than moral content. He identified eight requirements for
a law to be called law, viz: (1) laws should be general; (2) they should be promulgated, that citizens
might know the standards to which they are being held; (3) retroactive rule-making and application
should be minimized; (4) laws should be understandable; (5) they should not be contradictory; (6)
laws should not require conduct beyond the abilities of those affected; (7) they should remain
relatively constant through time; and (8) there should be a congruence between the laws as
announced and their actual administration. He referred to his theory as a procedural, as
distinguished from a substantive natural law. (Bix, B., supra, pp. 231-232.)

Ronald Dworkin also occasionally refers to his approach as a natural law theory. Dworkin postulates that
along with rules, legal systems also contain principles. Quite different from rules, principles do not
act in an all-or-nothing way. Rather principles have weight, favoring one result or another. There
can be principles favoring contrary results on a single legal question. Examples of these principles
are one should not be able to profit from ones wrong and one is held to intend all the foreseeable
consequences of ones actions. These legal principles are moral propositions that are grounded
(exemplified, quoted or somehow supported by) on past official acts such as text of statutes, judicial
decisions, or constitutions. Thus, in landmark judicial decisions where the outcome appears to be
contrary to the relevant precedent, courts still hold that they were following the real meaning or true
spirit of the law; or judges cite principles as the justification for modifying, creating exceptions in, or
overturning legal rules. (Bix, B., supra, pp. 234-235.)
[40] Jones, T., Modern Political Thinkers and Ideas (2002), pp. 112-113.
[41] dEntreves, A., Natural Law (2nd ed., 1970), pp. 52 and 57.
[42] Rice, C. supra, p. 68, citing Aquinas, De Regimine Principum (On the Governance of Rulers) (Gerald B.
Phelan, transl., 1938), Book I, Chap. 2, 41.1. But Aquinas was also cautious of the opportunity for
tyranny of a king, thus he proposed that this power must be tempered, perhaps similar to the
modern day constitutional monarchy. (Rice, C. supra, pp. 68-69, citing Aquinas, De Regimine
Principum (On the Governance of Rulers) (Gerald B. Phelan, transl., 1938), Book I, Chap. 6, 54.)
[43] Patterson, C., The Constitutional Principles of Thomas Jefferson (1953), p. 47.
[44] Macpherson, C. Editors Introduction to J. Lockes Second Treatise of Government (1980), pp. xx-xxi.
[45] Locke, J., Second Treatise of Government (ed. C.B. Macpherson, 1980).
[46] Id., Ch. II, Sec. 4 (ed. C.B. Macpherson, 1980), p. 8.
[47] Id.
[48] Id., Ch. II, Sec. 6, p. 9.
[49] Id.
[50] Jones, T., supra, p. 126.
[51] Id., pp. 126-127.
[52] Locke, J., supra, Ch II, Sec. 7, p. 9.
[53] Jones, T., supra, p. 127.
[54] Locke, J., supra, Ch II, Sec. 13, p. 9; Jones, T., supra, p. 128.
[55] Id., Ch VIII, Sec. 95, p. 52.
[56] Jones, T., supra, p. 128, citing J. Locke, Second Treatise, Ch. 9, sect. 123, p. 350.
[57] Id., p. 128.
[58] Locke, J., supra, Ch IX, Sec. 124, p. 66.
[59] Jones, T., supra, pp. 128-129.
[60] Hamburger, P., Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, The Yale Law Journal, vol.
102, no. 4, January 1993, p. 926.
[61] Id., p. 924.
[62] Id., pp. 930-931; see also Calder v. Bull, I L. Ed. 648 (1798).
[63] Id., footnote 70, citing J. Jay, The Federalist No. 2 (1961), p. 37.
[64] Id., footnote 70, citing Letter from William Pierce to St. George Tucker, GA. ST. GAZ., Sept. 28, 1787,
reprinted in 16 Documentary History of the Constitution (1983), p. 443.
[65] Id., footnote 70, citing N. Chipman, Sketches of the Principles of Government (1793), p. 70.
[66] Jones, T., supra, p. 114.
[67] Haines, C., The Revival of Natural Law Concepts (1965), p. 58.
[68] Patterson, C., supra, pp. 27 and 49; see also Scott-Craig, T., John Locke and Natural Right, p. 42 in
Southern Methodist University Studies in Jurisprudence II: Natural Law and Natural Rights (A.
Harding, ed., 1965).
[69] Id., pp. 7-8.
[70] Hamburger, P., supra, pp. 931-932.
[71] Black, H., Blacks Constitutional Law (2nd edition), p. 2.
[72] Kurland, P. The True Wisdom of the Bill of Rights, The University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 59, no.
1 (Winter 1992), pp. 7-8.
[73] Haines, C., supra, p. 55.
[74] Id., p. 55, citing B.F. Wright, Jr., American Interpretations of Natural Law, American Political Science
Review, xx (Aug. 1926), 524 ff.
[75] Black, H., supra, p. 8.
[76] Watson, D., The Constitution of the United States (1910), vol. 1, pp. 108-109, citing Cooleys
Constitutional Limitations, pp. 68-69.
[77] Hamburger, P., supra, p. 955, citing N. Chipman, Sketches of the Principles of Government (1793), p.
16.
[78] Id., p. 955, footnote 132, citing Letter from George Washington to the President of Congress, in 1
Documentary History of the Constitution (1983), p. 305.
[79] Id., p. 956.
[80] Jones, T., supra, p. 142, citing T. Paine, The Rights of Man (1969), p. 90.
[81] Id.
[82] Id.
[83] Id.
[84] Id., p. 143, citing T. Paine, The Rights of Man (1969), p. 90.
[85] Id.
[86] Id.
[87]Id.

[88] Hamburger, P., supra, p. 918, citing J. Locke., Two Treatises of Government (1967), p. 322.
[89] Id., p. 919, citing J. Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance (ca June 20, 1785), in 8 The Papers of
James Madison 298, 299.
[90] Id., pp. 919-920, citing J. Witherspoon, An Annotated Edition of Lectures on Moral Philosophy (Lecture
X) (Jack Scott ed.1982), pp. 122-128.
[91] Id., pp. 920-921, citing J. Madison, Speech in House of Representatives (June 8, 1789), in Creating the
Bill of Rights (1991), p. 81.
[92] Id., pp. 921-922.
[93] Black, H., supra, pp. 443-444.
[94] Id., p. 444.
[95] Id., p. 445.
[96] Jones, T., supra, p. 114.
[97] Id.
[98] Estrada v. Desierto, et al., 353 SCRA 452 (2001), Concurring Opinion of Justice Mendoza, p. 549.
[99] dEntreves, A., supra, p. 51.
[100] Jones, T., supra, pp. 114-115.
[101] Id., p. 119.
[102] Id.
[103] Drost, P., Human Rights as Legal Rights (1951), pp. 32-33.
[104] Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, et al., 297 SCRA 754 (1998).
[105] Moskowitz, M., Human Rights and World Order (1958), pp. 80-83.
[106] Id., p. 157.
[107] Id., p. 164.
[108] Gutierrez, Jr., H., Human Rights - An Overview in The New Constitution and Human Rights (Fifth
Lecture Series on the Constitution of the Philippines) (1979), p. 3.
[109] Strauss, D. The Role of a Bill of Rights, The University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 59, no. 1 (Winter
1992), p. 554.
[110] Gutierrez, Jr., H., supra, p. 3, citing Dorr v. United States, 195 US 138 (1904).
[111] Bix, B., supra, p. 228.
[112] Jones, T., supra, p. 119.
[113] Bix, B., supra, p. 228.
[114] Strauss, D., supra, p. 555.
[115] 70 Phil. 578 (1940).
[116] Id., p. 582.
[117] 106 SCRA 325 (1981).
[118] People v. Agbot, supra, p. 333.
[119] 140 Phil 171 (1969).
[120] 344 SCRA 769 (2000).
[121] 41 Phil. 770 (1916).
[122] People v. de los Santos, 200 SCRA 431 (1991).
[123] Roa v. Insular Collector of Customs, 23 Phil. 315 (1917).
[124] Silva v. Court of Appeals, et al., 275 SCRA 604 (1997).
[125] Offshore Industries, Inc. v. NLRC, et al., 177 SCRA 50 (1989), citing Philippine Movie Pictures Workers
Association v. Premiere Productions, Inc., 92 Phil. 843 (1953).
[126] 229 SCRA 117 (1994).
[127] Fernando, E., Perspective on Human Rights: The Philippines in a Period of Crisis and Transition (1979),
pp. 1-2, citing Borovsky v. Commissioner of Immigration, et al., 90 Phil. 107 (1951);
Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, 90 Phil. 70 (1951); Chirskoff v. Commissioner of Immigration, et al.,
90 Phil. 256 (1951); Andreu v. Commissioner of Immigration, et al., 90 Phil. 347 (1951).
[128] Simon, Jr., et al. v. Commission on Human Rights, supra, p. 127.
[129] Id., pp. 126-127.
[130] Id., pp. 132-133, citing Blacks Law Dictionary (6th edition, 1934), p. 1324; Handbook on American
Constitutional Law (4th ed., 1927), p. 524.
[131] Id., pp. 132-133, citing Malcolm, The Constitutional Law of the Philippine Islands (2 nd ed., 1926), pp.
431-457.
[132] Id., p. 133, citing Blacks Law Dictionary (6th edition, 1934), p. 1325; Handbook on American
Constitutional Law (4th ed., 1927), p. 524.
[133] Bernas, J., A Historical and Juridical Study of the Philippine Bill of Rights (1971), pp. 2-3, citing C. Majul,
The Political and Constitutional Ideas of the Philippine Revolution (1957), pp. 2-3.
[134] Id., p. 2, citing Majul, supra, p. 3.
[135] Id., pp. 6-7, citing T. Agoncillo, Malolos: The Crisis of the Republic (1960), p. 19 and Majul, supra, p. 5,
both authors citing de Veyra, The Constitution of Biak-na-Bato, 1 J. of the Phil Historical Soc. I
(1941).
[136] Id., p. 7, citing T. Agoncillo, supra, pp. 19-20.
[137] Id., p. 8, citing Kalaw, The Constitutional Plan of the Philippine Revolution, I Phil. L. J., 204, 206 (1914).
[138] Id., p. 11, citing Kalaw, The Memoirs of Felipe Calderon (pts. 1-2), 4 Phil. Rev. 426, at 473 (1919).
[139] Id., citing Malcolm, Constitutional Law of the Philippine Islands 117 (2 nd ed. 1926).
[140] Id., pp. 11-12, citing Planes Constitucionales Para Filipinas (T. Kalaw ed. 1934), p. 37.
[141] Id., p. 12, citing Majul, supra, p. 179.
[142] Id., p. 13.
[143] Id., citing 1 Report of the (Schurman) Philippine Commission (1900), pp. 84-5.
[144] Id., pp. 13-14, citing G. Malcolm, Constitutional Law of the Philippine Islands (2nd ed. 1926), p. 223.
[145] Id., p. 15.
[146] Gonzalez-Decano, A., The Exclusionary Rule and its Rationale (1997), p. 8.
[147] Bernas, J., supra, p. 15.
[148] Gonzalez-Decano, A., supra, p. 8.
[149] 11 Phil. 669 (1904).
[150] Id., p. 692.
[151] Id.
[152] Bernas, J., supra, p. 17.
[153] Aruego, J., The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, vol. 1 (1935), p. 93.
[154] Id., pp. 93-94.
[155] Fernando, E., Political Law (1953), p. 42.
[156] Aruego, supra, pp. 94-95.
[157] Id., pp. 93-95, 149-151.
[158] Id., pp. 149-150.
[159] Fernando, E., supra, p. 42.
[160] Fernando, E., The Constitution of the Philippines (1974), pp. 3-7.
[161] Id., pp. 6-7.
[162] Fernando, Perspective on Human Rights: The Philippines in a Period of Crisis and Transition (1979),
pp. 24-26.
[163] Proclamation No. 3 (1986).
[164] Proclamation No. 1 (1986).
[165] Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, supra.
[166] Martin, R., Law and Jurisprudence on the Freedom Constitution of the Philippines (1986), pp. 1-5.
[167] De Leon v. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602 (1987).
[168] Article X, Sec. 3 and Article XII, Sec. 4 of the 1987 Constitution.
[169] Records of the Constitutional Commission, vol. I, p. 674.
[170] Article II, Sec. 11 of the 1987 Constitution.
[171] Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution; Simon, Jr. v. Commission on Human Rights, supra.
[172] Fernando, E., The Bill of Rights (2nd ed. 1972), p. 3, citing Laski, The State in Theory and Practice
(1935), pp. 35-36.
[173] Fernando, E. The Constitution of the Philippines (1974), p. 20, citing Hamilton, Constitutionalism in IV
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (1928), p. 255.
[174] Id., p. 20.
[175] Id., p. 21, citing 1 Schwartz, Commentary on the Constitution of the United States, The Powers of
Government (1963), pp. 1-2.
[176] Id., p. 21, citing Lectures on the Constitution of the United States, p. 64.
[177] Id., citing Malcolm and Laurel, Philippine Constitutional Law (1936), p. 6.
[178] Id., p. 33.
[179] Fernando, E., Government Powers and Human Rights (1973), p. 5.
[180] Fernando, E. The Constitution of the Philippines (1974), p. 34, citing III, S. Laurel, Proceedings of the
Philippine Constitutional Convention (1966), p. 335.
[181] Id., p. 34, citing III, S. Laurel, Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention (1966), p. 648.
[182] Black, H., Blacks Constitutional Law (2nd ed.), p. 8.
[183] Schwartz, B., The Great Rights of Mankind: A History of the American Bill of Rights (1977), pp. 2-3.
[184] G.R. No. 143802, November 15, 2001.
[185] 232 SCRA 192 (1994).
[186] Sales v. Sandiganbayan, et al., supra, p. 15, citing Allado v. Diokno, 232 SCRA 192 (1994), pp. 209-
210.
[187] Hall, Jr., J., Search and Seizure (1982), p. 13, citing Marcus v. Search Warrants of Property 367 US
717 (1961); Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 US 496 (1973); Lasson, The History and Development of the
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States (1937), pp. 23-24.
[188] Id., p. 13, citing Ladynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court (1966), pp. 20-22.
[189] Id., p. 14, citing Marcus v. Search Warrants, supra, pp. 724-727; Lasson, supra, pp. 24-29;
Ladynski, supra, p. 23.
[190] Id., citing Ladynski, p. 23.
[191] Id., citing Lasson, pp. 31-32 and Ladynski, p. 23; footnote 19.
[192] Id.
[193] Id., p. 14, citing Ladynski, p. 24.
[194] Id., citing Lasson, pp. 33-34, Ladynski, p. 27.
[195] Id., p. 15, citing Ladynski, p. 25.
[196] Id., citing Lasson, p. 37.
[197] Id., p. 14, citing Ladynski, p. 22.
[198] Id., citing Lasson, pp. 30-31; Ladynski, p. 23.
[199] Id., p. 15, citing Lasson, p. 54 and Ladynski, p. 31.
[200] Id., citing Ladynski, p. 31.
[201] Id., p. 15, citing Lasson, p. 55 and Ladynski, p. 31.
[202] Id., p. 16, citing Lasson, pp. 55-57 and Ladynski, p. 33, and Adams, J., 2 Legal Papers of John Adams
(1965), p. 112.
[203] Id., citing Lasson, pp. 57-58 and Ladynski, p. 33.
[204] Id., citing Lasson, p. 58 and Ladynski, p. 33.
[205] Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616, 625 (1885).
[206] Hall, Jr., J., supra, p. 16.
[207] Boyd v. United States, supra.
[208] Hall, Jr., J., supra, p. 16, citing Petition of Lechmere, Adams, pp. 108-147.
[209] Id., p. 16, citing Lasson, pp. 67-73 and Ladynski, p. 35.
[210] Id., p. 16.
[211] Id., pp. 16-17, citing Lasson, p. 43.
[212] Id., p. 17, citing Lasson, p. 43.
[213]Id., citing Lasson, p. 44.
[214] (1765) 19 Howells St Tr 1029.
[215] Id., p. 18, citing Boyd v. United States, supra; p.19, citing numerous cases where the Supreme Court
cited Entick v. Carrington, supra.
[216] Boyd v. United States, supra, p. 627.
[217] Id., pp. 626-627.
[218] Id., p. 630.
[219] 232 US 383 (1914).
[220] 192 US 585 (1903).
[221] Bernas, J., supra, p. 296. Although even as early as the Malolos Constitution of 1899, this right against
unreasonable searches and seizures has been protected with the sanctity of the domicile as the
primordial consideration. The provision was an almost exact reproduction of the Bill of Rights of the
Spanish Constitution (Bernas, J., supra, p. 11, citing Malcolm, Constitutional Law of the Philippine
Islands [2nd ed. 1926], p. 117), viz:
ARTICLE 10
No person shall enter the domicil of a Filipino or foreigner residing in the Philippine Islands without his
consent, except in urgent cases of fire, flood, earthquake or other similar danger, or of unlawful
aggression proceeding from within, or in order to assist a person within calling for help.
Outside of these cases, the entrance into the domicil of a Filipino or foreigner residing in the Philippine
Islands and the searching of his papers or effects, can only be decreed by a competent judge and
executed in the daytime.
The searching of the papers and effects shall always be done in the presence of the interested party or of
a member of his family, and, in their absence, of two witnesses residing in the same town (pueblo).
However, if an offender found in flagrante and pursued by the authorities or their agents should take refuge
in his domicil these may enter the same, but only for the purpose of his apprehension.
If he should take refuge in the domicil of another, request should first be made of the latter.
xxxxxxxxx
ARTICLE 13
All decrees of imprisonment, for the search of domicil, or for the detention of correspondence, whether
written, telegraphic, or by telephone, shall be for cause.
If the decree should lack this requisite, or if the causes on which it may be founded are judicially declared
unlawful or manifestly insufficient, the person who may have been imprisoned, or whose
imprisonment may not have been confirmed within the term prescribed in Art. 9 or whose domicil
may have been forcibly entered into, or whose correspondence may have been detained, shall
have the right to demand the liabilities which ensue. (Bernas, J., supra, pp. 292-293.)
[222] Bernas, J., supra, pp. 297-298.
[223] Aruego, J., supra, pp. 159-160.
[224] Gonzalez-Decano, A., supra, p. 9, citing E. Navarro, A Treatise on the Law of Criminal Procedure in
the Philippines (1952), pp. 395-396.
[225] Aruego, J., supra, p. 160.
[226] Laurel, J., Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Commission (1966), vol. III, p. 172; see also
Moncado v. Peoples Court, 80 Phil. 1 (1948), Dissenting Opinion of Justice Bengzon.
[227] Gonzalez-Decano, A., supra, p. 11.
[228] 20 SCRA 383 (1967); Fernando, E., The Constitution of the Philippines (1974), pp. 658-659.
[229] It may be argued that the Freedom Constitution had retroactive effect insofar as it provides that certain
articles of the 1973 Constitution, including the Bill of Rights, remain in force and
effect. Consequently, as these articles were in force after the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution
on February 25, 1986 and before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution on March 25, 1986,
private respondent Dimaano can invoke the constitutionally guaranteed right against unreasonable
search and seizure and the exclusionary right. Nevertheless, this separate opinion addresses the
question of whether or not she can invoke these rights even if the Freedom Constitution had no
retroactive effect.
[230] Hall, Jr., J., supra, p. 9, citing Silverman v. United States, 365 US 505 (1961); Schmerber V. California,
384 US 757 (1966); Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 US 523 (1967). Other
citations omitted.
[231] Id., citing Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 US 294 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 US
41 (1967); Stone v. Powell, 428 US 465 (1976). Other citations omitted.
[232] Katz v. United States, 389 US 347 (1967). Other citations omitted.
[233] 365 US 505 (1961).
[234] 389 US 347 (1967).
[235] Fernando, E., The Bill of Rights (1972), pp. 217-218.
[236] 3 Phil. 381 (1904).
[237] United States v. Arceo, supra, pp. 384-385.
[238] 20 Phil. 467 (1911).
[239] United States v. De Los Reyes, et al., supra, p. 473.
[240] Fernando, E., The Constitution of the Philippines (1974), p. 652.
[241] 20 SCRA 383 (1967).
[242] Stonehill v. Diokno, supra, p. 392.
[243] 101 SCRA 86 (1980).
[244] People v. CFI, supra, pp. 100-101.
[245] Valmonte v. Belmonte, 170 SCRA 256 (1989), citing Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 (1968), pp. 444-
445.
[246] Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 US 294 (1967), pp. 320-324.
[247] 381 US 479 (1965).
[248] Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965), pp. 485-486.
[249] The Fourteenth Amendment provides in relevant part, viz:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
[250] 338 US 25 (1949).
[251] Ducat, C., Constitutional Interpretation: Rights of the Individual, vol. 2 (2000), pp. 641-642.
[252] Wolf v. Colorado, supra, pp. 31-32.
[253] 364 US 206 (1960).
[254] 367 US 643 (1961).
[255] Ducat, C., supra, pp. 641-642.
[256] Mapp v. Ohio, supra, pp. 654-660.
[257] 364 US 206 (1960).
[258] Id., p. 217.
[259] LaFave, W. Search and Seizure: A Treatise in the Fourth Amendment, vol. 1 (2 nd ed., 1987), pp. 16-17,
citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968).
[260] Id., p. 17, citing United States v. Calandra, 414 US 338 (1974), dissent.
[261] Id.
[262] 42 Phil. 886 (1920).
[263] 47 Phil. 626 (1925).
[264] 251 US 385 (1919).
[265] 57 Phil. 384 (1932).
[266] Bernas, J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary (1996), pp. 194-
195.
[267] 64 Phil. 33 (1937).
[268] 76 Phil. 637 (1946).
[269] Bernas, J., supra note 266, pp. 197-198.
[270] 80 Phil. 1 (1948), pp. 1, 3-4.
[271] Wong & Lee v. Collector of Internal Revenue, et al., 104 Phil. 469 (1958), citing Moncado v. Peoples
Court, 8 Phil. 1 (1948); Medina v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 110 Phil. 912 (1961), citing Wong
& Lee, supra; Bernas, J., supra note 266, pp. 198-199.
[272] 20 SCRA 383 (1967).
[273] Stonehill v. Diokno, supra, pp. 393-394.
[274] Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, p. 493.
[275] See Note 65, supra.
[276] Pascual, C., Introduction to Legal Philosophy (1989), pp. 22-23.
[277] See C. Patterson, supra, p. 52.
[278] Proclamation No. 1 (1986).
[279] Sandifer, D. and L. Scheman, The Foundation of Freedom (1966), pp. 44-45.
[280] Estrada v. Desierto, supra, p. 549, citing the Declaration of Independence. That the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures is a natural human right may be inferred from the 1949 case
of Wolf v. Colorado, where Justice Frankfurter said:
The knock at the door, whether by day or night, as a prelude to a search, without authority of law but solely
on the authority of the police, did not need the commentary of recent history to be condemned
as inconsistent with the conception of human rights enshrined in the history and basic
constitutional documents of the English-speaking peoples.
[281] 414 US 338 (1974).
[282] Id., p. 348.
[283] LaFave, W., supra, p. 20.
[284] Id., citing Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a Principled Basis Rather than
an Empirical Proposition? 16 Creighton L. Rev. (1983) 565, p. 598.
[285] Id., citing Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the Criminal Cases, 1975
U. Ill. L.F. 518, 536, n. 90.
[286] Mapp v. Ohio, supra, p. 657.
[287] LaFave, supra, pp. 19-20.