Women Empowerment - Chapter 8

Chapter 8 303
The Role of Law in Empowering Women in India
Judiciary as Harbinger for Women Empowerment
The legislations alone cannot make justice

available to citizens in society. Seeking equality
in an unequal society is a task demanding concerted
action on the part of the individuals, the
community, government and the judiciary on a
continuing basis. This is what women as a class
must realize in their struggle for equal justice in
the democratic republic of India.
Gender justice is a concept understood

differently in different cultures and at different
periods in history. However, with the adoption of
universal standards against inequality and
discrimination and the evolution of a rights-based
approach in the empowerment of women, the concept
is today susceptible to judicial evaluation and
judicial determination. In this process the Indian
Courts have played a significant role during the
last five decades with the support of the liberal
provision of the Constitution, with the aid of a
series of pro-women international human rights
instruments and an increasingly assertive womens
movement within and outside the country. The
complaint seems to be that more could have been
done if the judges were so inclined. Furthermore,
Chapter 8 304
it is argued that the judicial system as a whole

did not change enough to absorb the emerging
standards of equity and equality vis--vis women
with the result the bulk of women approaching the
subordinate courts neither receive equal treatment
nor are able to access the full benefit of the
principle of equal justice under law.
It requires a lot of research to prove or

disprove the above proposition. As such, any
assessment can only be provisional and tentative.
It serves no purpose to apportion the blame for the
status of women today on different wings of
government on society at large. Given the fact that
Indian Constitution demand gender justice on terms
of equality and dignity and given the fact that
Indian judiciary has come to play a decisive role
in government based on fundamental rights and rule
of law, what needs to be addressed is how the
performance of judiciary in this regard can be
further improved towards advancing the realization
of the constitutional mandate of justice to women.
Judicial performance in this regard involves not
only few landmark decisions of superior courts
against discriminatory practices but extends to the
entire range of adjudicatory practices at staff of
lawyers and courts towards womens issues and the
Chapter 8 305
extent of participation of women get from the

system as a whole though progressive judgments from
superior courts do provide the direction for change
in substance and procedure.
The Constitution has paved the base of equal

status and number of legislations has provided
protection as well as support to the women in our
country. The positive result can be seen and felt
in all the walks of life around us. The status of
women in our country has risen to the present level
which may not be up to the mark but still
satisfactory. The present status is owed not only
to our Constitution and the legislations but to the
active judiciary as well as public spirited people
who successfully manoeuvred the status of women of
our country to the present level. The unbiased and
independent judiciary has always played the role of
a true Guardian of justice. Since independence many
a times the judiciary has pro-actively interpreted
and amplified the ambit of legislative provisions
in favour of the unprivileged half of the society,
i.e., the women of our country. Sometimes, these
actions have been initiated by the public spirited
people with the help of PILs (Public Interest
Litigations). These Public Interest Litigations
Chapter 8 306
have strong reformist kind of public opinion behind

them.
Though not welcomed by all, the action

initiated by Public Interest Litigations and the
pro-active role played by the Judiciary in
interpreting these PILs has always been praised by
most of the society, later on. Wherever the matters
involving issues of masses the Apex Court relaxed
the rule of locus standi and at the time of
interpreting looked beyond the frame to deliver the
decisions of far reaching consequences, we are
aware of today. Since the precedents have the
binding effect and as effective as law they are
also known as Judges made law. I have used the
term judges made law although a lot many people
have the opinion that judges declare law. There
is no need to get into the debate here as
Sabyasachi Mukharji, C.J. also quoted that, I
believe that we must do away with the childish
fiction that law is not made by the judiciary.
In C. Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A.M.

Bhattacharjee,1 the court said that the role of the
judge is not merely to interpret the law but also
to lay new norms of law and to mould the law to
1 1995 SCC (5) 457

Chapter 8 307
suit the changing social and economic scenario to

make the ideals enshrined in the Constitution
meaningful and a reality. The society demands
active judicial roles which formerly were
considered exceptional but now a routine.
In S. P. Gupta v. President of India2 the court

observed: The interpretation of every statutory
provision must keep pace with changing concepts
and values and it must, to the extent to which its
language permits or rather does not prohibit,
suffer adjustments through judicial interpretation
so as to accord with the requirements of the fast
changing society which is undergoing rapid social
and economic transformation.
The court also went on to say that, ....law

does not operate in a vacuum. It is therefore
intended to serve a social purpose and it cannot be
interpreted without taking into account the social,
economic and political setting in which it is
intended to operate. It is here that the Judge is
called upon to perform a creative function. He has
to inject flesh and blood in the dry skeleton
provided by the legislature and by a process of
dynamic interpretation, invest, it with a meaning
2 AIR 1982 SC 149, 1981 Supp (1) SCC 87, 1982 2 SCR 365
Chapter 8 308
which will harmonise the law with the prevailing

concepts and values and make it an effective
instrument for delivery of justice.
It is clear from the above statements that, not

only constitutional interpretation, but also
statutes have to be interpreted with the changing
times and it is here that the creative role of the
judge appears, thus the judge clearly contributes
to the process of legal development.
The courts do not always follow the precedent

blindly and do not always consider themselves bound
by the given principles. The court does evolve new
principles. However, the courts do always have to
follow within the limits of the constitution and
they cannot exceed the constitutional limits. When
new societal conditions and factual situations
demand the Judges to speak, they, without
professing the tradition of judicial lock-jaw, must
speak out.
Also, in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (Shriram

- Oleum Gas case)3 the court said that with the
development and fast changing society the law
cannot remain static and that the law has to
3Air 1987 SC 965. 142. 23

Chapter 8 309
develop its own new principles. The above decision

reflects that the courts do make law, they frame
new principles; interpret the statutes and the
constitution with the changing times.
Finally it can be summed up that, The courts

must not shy away from discharging their
constitutional obligation to protect and enforce
human rights of the citizens and while acting
within the bounds of law must always arise to the
occasion as guardians of the constitution,
criticism of judicial activism notwithstanding.
It has been accepted that judges filled the

gaps left by rulers, by using their discretion.
Austin accepted the utility of legislation by
judges. He says, I cannot understand how any
person who had considered the subject can suppose
that society could possibly have gone on if judges
had not legislated, or that there is any danger
whatever in allowing them that power which they
have in fact exercised, to make up for the
negligence or the incapacity of the avowed
legislator.4
4Web Article by Ashish Shrivastava available at

http://www.legalserviceindia.com/articles/juju.htm
Chapter 8 310
Despite of plethora of legislations due to

ineffective enforcement, women are exploited by the
male dominant society. Male dominant society has
always found the ways to circumvent the provisions
of the Act and act as a blockade against the women
empowerment. Due to failure of legislations to
protect the women the judiciary has come forward to
protect women. In protecting women the Indian
judiciary has removed all the procedural shackles
and has completely revolutionized the
constitutional litigations. The judiciary has
encouraged widest possible coverage of the
legislation by liberal interpreting the terms. The
judiciary has shifted from pragmatic approach,
which was conducive to all interests in the
society. The Courts have shown greater enthusiasm
in granting the Constitutional provisions for all
women. The judiciary by its landmark judgments had
filled up the gap created by the legislative
machinery. The judiciary has extended helping hands
to women when the legislature had denied it and
enabled their political and social empowerment in
the society.
All provisions of the Constitution and all laws

enacted by the legislature get their real meaning
and import through the process of judicial
Chapter 8 311
interpretation. The Constitutional mandate and the

various laws providing for protective
discrimination in favour of women relating to
several aspects of their social, economic and
political life have come up before the courts.
Through various devices like judicial review,
judicial activism, social action litigation and the
duty of enforcement of fundamental rights the
superior Courts in India have evolved a gender
jurisprudence which has given substance and life to
the constitutional scheme of protective
discrimination in favour of women. Below is
detailed overview of the judicial approach in
various cases, where the Courts have successfully
delivered their verdict to strengthen position of
women. If we go through the important decisions
relating to women in the last six decades we can
easily be convinced with the fact that the
judiciary has been so sensitive, innovative and
positive which deciding the cases relating to women
and their rights.
The most important contribution of judiciary

has been the decisions where the courts have
interpreted the right to equality, right to life
and liberty, right against exploitation, the
directive principles of state policy and
Chapter 8 312
fundamental duties in favour of women. Sometimes to

justify the states action, sometimes to protect
them and sometimes to remove gender inequity the
courts have expanded the ambit of provisions of our
Constitution.
1. Judicial Approach in the matters relating to

Education:
Education is a part of the development of the

personality of all in general and woman in
particular. In early cases some High Courts allowed
discrimination in matters of admission to
educational institutions on the ground of sex only.
In University of Madras v. Shanta Bai,5 the
respondent was refused admission to the college by
the Principal in pursuance of the directions given
by the University not to admit women into the
college. The respondents contention was that these
directions were opposed to Section 5(1) of the
Madras University Act, 1923 and that they were also
repugnant to Article 15(1) of the Constitution in
that they discriminate against her and therefore,
void. Three contentions were raised by the
University in this case viz., First, Article 15(1)
prohibits discrimination only by the State, the
5 AIR 1954 Mad 67, (1953) IIMLJ 287

Chapter 8 313
University of Madras is not a State and its

directions were, therefore, unaffected by the
operation of Article 15(1). Second, the right of a
citizen to get admission into an educational
institution is governed not by Article 15(1), but
by Article 29(2) and the Article does not prohibit
any restriction based on the ground of sex, and
third, the directions given by the University do
not deny the right of women to be admitted into
colleges, but only regulates the exercise of that
right and that having regard to the nature of the
right, the restrictions are reasonable and not
discriminatory.
The Court accepted all the three contentions in

favour of the University. The Court observed that:
Firstly, University is not a State, because it is
not maintained by State.6 Secondly, the combined
effect of Article 15(3) and 29(2) is that while men
students have no right of admission to womens
colleges, the right of womens to admission in
other colleges is a matter within the regulation of
the authorities of those colleges. Article 29(2) is
a special Article dealing with admission in
educational institutions and is the controlling
provision when the question related to admission to
the colleges arises. As in Article 29(2) word sex
Chapter 8 314
has not been used, the State can deny admission to

women in mens educational institutions. Thirdly,
the Commission, appointed in 1945 by the State
Government on the State of higher education and its
progress in the State of Madras, pointed out that
there is no sufficient number of womens colleges
to accommodate all those who want to receive higher
education. Co-education has become inevitable and
unless that is properly controlled, it might result
in evil and not good. The Syndicate of the
University requires that colleges which seek
permission to admit women students should provide
the necessary facilities for them. In fact there is
no regulation refusing admission to women students.
Thus, it is difficult to see how these regulations
can be regarded as discriminating against women.
It is submitted that the judgment is based on

the following erroneous considerations: Firstly,
the High Court interpreted Article 12 in a very
restricted and technical sense. When it is
technically observed that University is a State
aided institution and is not maintained by the
State and the educational institutions will be
within the purview of Article 15(1) only if it is
State maintained and not otherwise. Secondly, the
Court by applying the rule of interpretation that
Chapter 8 315
special law should be preferred over general law

gave overriding effect to Article 29(2) on the
basis that it is a special Article relating to the
admission to colleges. It is submitted that
constitution being the grundnorm, all the
provisions are special provisions and should be
given equal credence. Thirdly, the High Court
justified discrimination keeping in view the report
of fact finding body on which the rule made by the
syndicate was based. This cannot be a legal
criterion for allowing discrimination. The court
should have looked into factual situation. If the
factual position reveals the fact of
discrimination, the motive, object or the basis of
the rule, however sound it may be, it is
unconstitutional. Fourthly, for want of adequate
facilities, the Fundamental Rights conferred on
women cannot be denied, because State itself is
responsible for this by creating facilities for
male students and in failing to create equal
facilities for women. It would have been better if
the Court would have directed the State and
University to create equal facilities for both male
and female colleges. If the State fails to
discharge its responsibility, citizen should not be
asked to suffer.
Chapter 8 316
The view of Madras High Court did not hold the

field for a long time and a shift in judicial
outlook became clear during the second decade of
the functioning of the Constitution. In P. Sagar v.
State of Andhra Pradesh6, the Rules 5 and 6 of G.O.
issued by Health Housing and Municipal
Administration Department provided for reservation
of 30 per cent seats to women candidates for
admission to Medical Colleges in Andhra and
Telangana area. These rules were challenged on the
ground that they were meant for those who could not
come up in open selection and that the procedure
sought to be adopted by the Government in bringing
all women candidates into the reservation quota
without there being tested for open selection was
uncalled for and unwarranted under rules and were,
therefore, illegal. The Andhra Pradesh High Court
observed that the contention raised by the
petitioner ignores the provisions of Article 15(3)
which is an exception engrafted to clause (1) of
the said Article. Thus, in view of the Article
15(3) reservation for women cannot be denied.
Similarly, the reservation for sports women does
61968 AIR 1379, 1968 SCR (3) 565

Chapter 8 317
not offend the provisions of Articles 15(1) and

29(2) of the Constitution.7
In Padmaraj Samarendra v. State of Bihar8,

allotment of some seats for girl students in
Medical Colleges was challenged on the ground that
it is solely based on sex. The Court while
justifying the allotment of seats for girl students
observed that; firstly, allotment of seats is not a
reservation in the strict sense of the term. It is
an allotment of the source from which the seats
have to be filled, secondly, the requirement in the
State for a large number of lady doctors and the
mental aptitude and psychological background of
lady patients for treatment of gynaecological
diseases and obstetric services by lady doctors,
makes the allotment reasonable. Thus it cannot be
said to be discrimination on the ground of sex
alone.
2. Judicial Approach in the matters of Employment:
Rule 18(4) of the Indian Foreign Service

(Recruitment, Seniority and Promotion) Rules,
1961, which required permission before marriage
and denial of right to employment to married
7Sukhdeo v. Government of A.P., 1966-1 Andhra WR 294
8 AIR 1979 Pat 266
Chapter 8 318
women for panel employees in the government was

declared discriminatory by the Supreme Court on
the ground of sex and thus violative of Article
149 the Court upholding the principle of
equality of status put the female employees at
par with male employees. On the same lines the
Allahabad High Court10, has declared that the
condition in service that a nurse, male or
female, who married while in service was
required to resign, is violative of Article 24
of the Constitution. The Patna High Court also,
for ignoring the claim of woman officer,
declared Rule 12 of Bihar Service Code 1952 as
against Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution.11 Similarly, the Orissa High
Court has held the Orissa Service Rules
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution
which disqualified married women from being
selected to the post of District Judges.12 The
rule was declared discriminatory on the basis
of sex.
Hostile discrimination against women has always

been struck down by the Supreme Court of India from
9 C.B.Muthamma v. Union of India, AIR 1979 SC 1868
10 (1973) 1 Serv. L.R. 909(All.)
11 1975 Lab. I.C. 637 (Pat.)
12 Radha Charan v. State of Orissa, AIR 1969 Oris. 237.
Chapter 8 319
time to time. Since sex, like race and national

origin, is an immutable characteristic determined
solely by accident of birth, the imposition of
special disabilities upon the members of fair sex
would seem to violate the basic concept of our
system that legal burdens should bear some
relationship to individual responsibility.
Therefore, for being of fair sex if some disability
is attached, it amounts to hostile discrimination
against women violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India.
What is said about the fair sex equally applies

to a pregnant women also as pregnancy also is not a
disability but one of the natural consequences of
marriage and is an immutable characteristic of
married life. Thus, any unreasonable restriction on
the basis of pregnancy is violative of Article 14
of the Indian Constitution. The landmark case in
the history of womens right on this point is Air
India v. Nargesh Meerza13. In this case some of the
provisions of Air India Employees Service
Regulations and of Indian-Airlines (Flying Crew)
Service Regulations were declared against the
letter and spirit of Article 14 of the Constitution
13 AIR 1981 SC 1829

Chapter 8 320
of India. Regulation 46(1)(c) of the Air India

Employees Service Regulations, provided that An
Air Hostess was to resign from her service:(a) upon
attaining the age of 35 years, or (b) marriage, if
it takes place within four years of service, or (c)
on first pregnancy, whichever occurs earliest.
Justice Fazal Ali, while declaring clause c of
the above provision, i.e. termination of service on
the first pregnancy as violative of Article 14,
observed that, It seems to us that the termination
of the services of an Air Hostess under such
circumstances is not only a callous and cruel act
but an open insult to Indian womanhood - the most
sacrosanct and cherished institution. The judges
were constrained to observe that such a course of
action is extremely detestable and abhorrent to the
notion of a civilized society. Apart from being
grossly unethical, it smacks of a deep rooted sense
of utter selfishness at the cost of all human
values. Thus, such a provision was held not only
manifestly unreasonable and arbitrary but
containing the quality of unfairness and exhibiting
naked despotisms this, therefore was clearly
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.14
14 AIR 1981 SC 1829 at 1850.

Chapter 8 321
Regulation 47 further provided that the

Managing Director can extend the retirement age
from 35 years to 45 years to his discretion. About
this, the court observed that this provision did
not provide any guidelines, rules or principles
which may govern the exercise of discretion by the
Managing Director. Secondly, the provision did not
even give the right to appeal to higher authorities
in case of refusal to such extension. Therefore,
the extension of the retirement of an Air Hostess
depended on the mercy and sweet will of the
Managing Director. Such wide and uncontrolled
powers are clearly violative of Article 14, as the
provision suffered from the vice of excessive
delegation of powers. Similarly, in Bombay Labour
Union v. International Franchises Pvt. Ltd.15, the
Supreme Court has declared unconstitutional the
clause in the regulation of the Corporation which
required that unmarried women were to give up
service on marriage.
In C.B. Muthamma v. Union of India,16 the writ

filed by Miss Muthamma, a senior member of Indian
Foreign Service, speaks a story which makes one
wonder whether Articles 14 and 16 belong to myth or
15 AIR 1966 SC 942

16 AIR 1979 SC 1868
Chapter 8 322
reality. It was a unique example of sex

discrimination ultra-vires Articles 14 and 16 of
the Constitution of India. Rule 8(2) of the Indian
Foreign Services Rules, 1961 provided that a woman
member of the service shall obtain the permission
of the Government in writing before her marriage is
solemnized. At any time after marriage, a woman
member of the service may be required to resign
from service, if the Government is satisfied that
her family and domestic commitments are likely to
come in way of the due and efficient discharging of
duties. Justice Krishna Iyer while delivering the
judgment observed that Discrimination against
woman, in traumatic transparency, is found in this
rule. In these days of nuclear families, inter-
continental marriages and unconventional behaviour
one fails to understand the naked bias against the
gender of species. Both the rules were declared
violative of the principle of equality and held
discriminatory.
In Vijay Lakshmi v. Punjab University17, the

Division Bench of Supreme Court comprising M. B.
Shah and Dr. A. R. Lakshmanan, JJ, held that Rules
5, 8, 10 of Punjab University Calendar, Volume III,
17 AIR 2003 SC 3331

Chapter 8 323
providing for appointment of lady Principal in

Womens college or a lady teacher therein, cannot
be held to be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of
the Constitution, because classification is
reasonable and it has a nexus with the object to be
achieved. In addition, the State Government is
empowered to make such special provisions under
Article 15(3) of the Constitution. This power is
not restricted in any manner of Article 16. The
Court said:
On the concept of equality enshrined in the

Constitution, it can be stated that there could be
classification between male and female for certain
posts. Such classification cannot be said to be
arbitrary or unjustified, rules providing
appointment of lady principal or teacher would also
be justified. The object sought to be achieved is a
precautionary, preventive and protective measure
based on public morals and particularly in view of
the young age of the girl students to be taught.18
In Uttarakhand Mahila Kalyan Parishad v. State

of Uttar Pradesh19 the Apex court, very positively
allowed the writ in favour of lady teachers and
18 AIR 2003 SC 3333

19 AIR 1992 SC 1695
Chapter 8 324
female officials, where they demanded equal

remuneration as their male counter parts for the
similar work carried out by them.
In Mrs. Neera Mathur v. Life Insurance

Corporation of India20 the Supreme Court recognized
the right to privacy of female employee. Mrs. Neera
had been appointed by the LIC without them knowing
that she was pregnant. She applied for maternity
leave and when she returned thereafter she was
terminated. The reason given was that she had
withheld information regarding her pregnancy when
she had filled their questionnaire. The Supreme
Court on perusing the questionnaire was shocked to
find that it required women candidates to provide
information about the dates of their menstrual
cycles and past pregnancies. It considered them to
be an invasion of privacy of a person and violative
of Article 21 which guarantees right to life and
privacy. It, therefore, directed the LIC to
reinstate Mrs. Neera and to delete those columns
from its future questionnaires. In this case the
petitioner drew the attention of the Court to the
Equal Remuneration Act (25 of 1976) Section 4. The
Supreme Court upheld her contention and stated that
20 1992 AIR 392

Chapter 8 325
the employer was bound to pay the same remuneration

to both male and female workers irrespective of the
place where they were working unless it is shown
that the women were not fit to do the work of the
male stenographers.
In Maya Devi v. State of Maharashtra21, where

the requirement of husbands consent for wifes
application for public employment was struck down
as an anachronistic obstacle to womans equality
and economic justice, reflects this approach.
In Ram Bahadur Thakur (P) Ltd. v. Chief

Inspector of Plantations22 a woman worker employed
in the Pambanar Tea Estate was denied maternity
benefit on the grounds that she had actually worked
for only 157 days instead of the required 160 days.
The Court, however, drew attention to a Supreme
Court Decision23 wherein the Court held that for
purposes of computing maternity benefit all the
days including Sundays and rest days which maybe
wage-less holidays have to be taken into
consideration. It also stated that the Maternity
Benefit Act would have to be interpreted in such a
21 1986) 1 SCR 743

22 1982(2) LLJ 20
23 B. Shah v Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Coimbatore; 1978(1) LLJ 29
Chapter 8 326
way as to advance the purpose of the Act therefore

upheld the woman workers claim.
Upholding a service rule that preferred women

in recruitment to public employment to the extent
of 30% of posts, the Supreme Court stated in
Government of A.P. v. P.B. Vijayakumar24:
To say that under Article 15(3) job

opportunities for women cannot be created would be
to cut at the very root of the underlying
inspiration behind this Article. Making special
provision for women in respect of employments or
posts under the state is an integral part of
Article 15(3).
Also, In Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. Ltd v.

Audrey DCosta25 the Court observed that there was
discrimination in payment of wages to lady
stenographers and such discrimination was being
perpetuated under the garb of a settlement between
the employees and the employer. The Court finally
not only made it mandatory to pay equal
remuneration to lady stenographers as their male
counterparts but also observed that the ground of
financial incapability of the management cannot be
24 AIR 1995 SC. 1648
25 1987 AIR 1281
Chapter 8 327
a ground to seek exemption from the Equal

Remuneration Act, 1976.
The judiciary has played a significant role in

protecting the interests of the women working in
industries also. In B.Shah v. Presiding Officer26,
labour court, the Supreme Court pointed out
that, Performance of the biological role of
childbearing necessarily involves withdrawal of
a women from the workforce for some period
and she cannot work for her medical expenses
also. In order to enable the woman worker to
subsist during this period and to preserve her
health, the law makes a provision for maternity
benefit so that the women can play both her
productive and reproductive roles efficiently.
In another judgment of far reaching

consequence, the Supreme Court in Municipal
Corporation of Delhi v. Female Workers27 declared
that the maternity benefit is applicable to casual
workers and daily wage workers also. There is
nothing in the Maternity Benefit Act, which
entitles only regular women employees to the
benefit of maternity leave and not to those who are
26 1978 AIR 12, 1978 SCR (1) 701

27 (2000) 3 SCC 224)
Chapter 8 328
engaged on casual basis or on muster roll on daily

wage basis.
Judiciary has played an active role in

enforcing and strengthening the constitutional goal
of equal pay for equal work.
In a plethora of cases such as Peoples Union

for Democratic Rights v. Union of India28, Randhir
Singh v. Union of India29, Sanjit Roy v. State of
Rajasthan30, Mackinnon Mackenzie and Co. Ltd. v.
Andrey D Costa31 The Supreme Court reiterated that
equal pay for equal work enshrined in Article
39(a) is implicit in Article 14 and 16 of
the Constitution and hence become enforceable
in the court of law. In other words we can
say that the court has brought the equal
remuneration within the contours of fundamental
right of equality.
3. Judicial Approach in the matters relating

political justice for women:
It is a matter of hot controversy whether

provisions of Article 15(3) can be invoked for
28 AIR 1982 SC 1473

29 AIR 1982 SC 879
30 AIR 1983 SC 328
31 1987 AIR 1281
Chapter 8 329
giving rights to women for securing political

rights. The Supreme Court at the very beginning
ruled that the general prohibition against
discrimination in clause (1) of Article 15 also
extends to political rights and therefore, the
umbrella of protective discrimination can be used
to secure political rights to the women. Thus, it
is clear that sex is a valid ground for
discrimination in favour of women for securing
political justice and hence will not be violative
of Article 15(1) keeping in view provisions of
Article 15(3).
In Dattatrays Motiram v. State of Bombay32,

Bombay Municipal Borough Act, 1925 providing for
reservation of seats for women in the election to
the Municipality was challenged. It was argued on
behalf of the petitioner that discrimination in
favour of a particular sex is permissible provided
it is not only on the ground of sex; it should also
be based on other considerations. It was also
argued that Article 15(3) must be read to mean that
only those special provisions for women are
permissible which do not result in discrimination
against men. The Bombay High Court while rejecting
32AIR 1953 Bom 311, (1953) 55 BOMLR 323, ILR 1953 Bom 842
Chapter 8 330
this argument observed that if that was the object

of enacting Article 15(3), then Article 15(3) need
not have been enacted at all as a proviso to
Article 15(1). Therefore, as a result of the joint
operation of Article 15(1) and 15(3), the State may
discriminate in favour of women against men, but it
may not discriminate in favour of men against
women. Thus, the legislation does not offend
Article 15(1) by reason of Article 15(3). The Court
also pointed out that even today women are more
backward than men and it is the duty of the State
to raise the position of women to that of men. It
would be very difficult for women to be elected if
there was no reservation in their favour and
Government may well take the view that
participation of women are necessary in local
authorities before they decide any question
relating to them.
The Assam High Court, in Beney Bhusan

Chakravarty v. Govind Chandra Sharma33, upheld Rule
3 of the Election Rules under the Assam Municipal
Act, 1923 providing discrimination in voting
facilities in favour of female as constitutional
and not as violative of Article 15(3) of the
33 AIR 1955 Assam 1780

Chapter 8 331
Constitution. It is submitted that the court

rightly decided the case. Because of exemption
accorded to women, men stand benefited otherwise
social burden on them will increase in the matter
of looking after children, house hold duties etc.
for which they are generally unfit.
In Ram Chandra Mohton v. State of Bihar34, the

provisions of Bihar Panchayat Samitis and Zila
Parishads Act, 1961, providing for co-option of
women to Panchayat Samiti where no woman elected,
was challenged. The Patna High Court while
upholding the validity of the provisions observed:
Conferment of the right is a special provision,

so long as clause (3) of Article 15 stands as it
is, there is no scope for die argument that any
special right conferred upon women in the special
circumstances prevailing in this country can be
struck down as going against clause (1) of Article
15 as clause (3) operates in the nature of a
proviso to clause (1).
The Kerala High Court upheld the validity of

Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Ordinance, 1985,
providing for reservation of one seat for women in
34 AIR 1966 Pat. 214

Chapter 8 332
every society.35 The Rajasthan Government has

provided for thirty per cent of wards in
Municipalities, Municipal Corporations, Gram
Panchayats for women through an amendment in the
respective Acts to provide adequate representation
to women in local bodies and Gram Panchayats. The
judicial attitude to help women by way of special
provision in view of Article 15 (3) is also
discernible in another way. The judiciary has
declared such provisions unconstitutional which put
women in disadvantageous position by way of
discrimination. Thus in Cracknell v. State of
U.P.36, the validity of the provisions of Court of
Wards Act, 1912 was challenged. The Allahabad High
Court while declaring the provisions
unconstitutional held that the section classified
female proprietors in an arbitrary manner and
placed them in a more disadvantageous position than
male members without giving them any opportunity of
being heard. The court also observed that Section
8(1)(b) of the Act discriminates against women
solely on the basis of sex which is against the
35 K.R.Gopinathan Nair v. Senior Inspector-cum-S.T.O. Co-operative Societies Ltd. AIR

1987 Ker. 167
36 AIR 1962 All. 746 [Section 8(1)(b) of the Act provides that proprietors shall be deemed
to be disqualified to manage their own property when they are females declared by
provisional Government to be incapable of Managing their own property]
Chapter 8 333
very spirit of Article 15(1) and therefore,

unconstitutional. The Parliament has provided
opportunities in all levels of local government for
women in the year 1992 by Seventy-third and
Seventy-fourth constitutional Amendments. By these
Amendments one-third of total seats of Panchayat
have been reserved for women for their political
upliftment.37
It would be relevant to raise a question here

that why political empowerment of women and that
too through reservation of seats in Legislatures
has assumed importance? Answer is straight and
simple. First, very few women have been voluntarily
coming forward to take part in politics which has
been rendered tough and filthy. Second, our social
and political set up is dominated by the men who
have vested interest in deliberately keeping women
in the four walls of their houses. Third, all
political parties have failed to promote their
cause by giving them more tickets during elections.
Though women have earned right to vote yet their
struggle to exercise political power in proportion
to their number appears to have just began.
37 Article 243 D (d), Constitution of India.

Chapter 8 334
4. Judicial Approach in the matters relating of

crime against women:
The most shameful thing is that even after good

legislations the crimes against women are regularly
increasing. There are many crimes against womens
but the most heinous crime against women is sexual
harassment. Sexual Harassment is a social stigma
which has increased in number. The sexual
harassment not only includes rape or physical
harassment of women but also includes:
Unwelcome sexual gesture or behaviour whether

directly or indirectly as sexually coloured
remarks; physical contact and advances; showing
pornography; a demand or request for sexual
favours; any other unwelcome physical, verbal/non-
verbal conduct being sexual in nature.
Many instances showed the practice of sexual

harassment of the women. Sexual Harassment not only
hurts the physical body but also rips off the soul
of women. It has rightly been observed by Justice
Arjit Pasayat, While a murderer destroys the
physical frame of the victim, a rapist degrades and
defiles the soul of helpless women.
Chapter 8 335
Sexual harassment is a stigma on the society;

which not only hurts the women but also takes away
her dignity. Not only this, disclosure of this in
the society led to another trauma to the victim:
Due to the non-acceptance in the society

Keeping her apart from all the social
activities
Looking with suspicious eyes
Defamation in the society.
Fear of the society, fear of defamation of
the family in the society.
Due to the above reasons many sexual
harassment cases goes unreported as they
ruin the dignity of the women completely
and she cannot live a peaceful dignified
life in the society. The silence gives the
strength to such criminals which are the
greatest human rights violator. Here the
fear of the society plays the greatest
player who rips off the victims right.
In most of the rape cases the victim does not

complain due to above mentioned fears and there
exists a passive submission due to fear/threats by
offender. In the earlier cases the approach of the
Chapter 8 336
Apex Court was very primitive and most of the

decisions relied upon literal interpretations of
the provisions under Section 375. It seems that the
Apex Court sought after the reasons like absence of
penetration, unchaste character of women and
absence of injury indicates the consent of victim,
etc., to acquit the accused.
The cases like Pratap Mishra v. State of

Orissa38 and Laiq Singh v. State of U.P.39 the
Supreme Court reversed the consecutive convictions
in two subordinate courts and acquitted the accused
on the ground that absence of any injury on the
prosecutrix indicates the consent of the
prosecutrix.
But in 1978 when the Supreme Court acquitted

the accused in TukaRam v. State of Maharashtra40,
popularly known as the Mathura Trial, the judgement
was not accepted silently. The facts of the case
are as:
The Sessions Judge found the evidence

insufficient to convict the accused. The Bombay
High Court reversed the finding and sentenced the
38 1977 (3) SCC 41

39 1970 (2) SCC 561
40 1979 (2) SCC 143
Chapter 8 337
accused to rigorous imprisonment. In March 1972, a

16-year-old tribal girl was raped by two policemen
in the compound of Desai Ganj police chowky in
Chandrapur district of Maharashtra. Her relatives,
who had come to register a complaint, were
patiently waiting outside even as this heinous act
was being perpetrated in the police station. When
her relatives and the crowd threatened to burn the
police chowky down, the two guilty policemen,
Ganpat and Tukaram, reluctantly agreed to file a
panchnama. At the Sessions Court, Mathura was
accused of being a liar and that since she was
habituated to sexual intercourse, her consent was
given. The Nagpur bench of the Bombay High Court
set aside the judgment holding that that passive
submission due to fear induced by serious threats
could not be construed as willing sexual
intercourse. However, the decision of the Supreme
Court remains a blot on its record to this day. The
rationale for acquittal was that Mathura had not
raised an alarm and there were no visible marks of
injury on her body. The judgment did not
distinguish between consent and forcible
submission. This judgement highlighted the
inadequacy of laws to protect women who are victim
of rape and lack of enough safeguards to protect
Chapter 8 338
women visiting or summoned to a police station.

This marked judgement piloted the voice of
amendment in the existing penal provisions to make
them more effective in providing justice to
victims.
Again in Prem Chand v. State of Haryana41 the

Supreme Court reduced the minimum sentence of 10
years for rape to 5 years on account that the raped
girl was a woman of easy virtue. This again caused
an agitation and criticism by women organisations
which resulted in filing of a review petition. The
petition failed to sustain as the Apex Court just
clarified position.
In another shameful decision42 the Delhi High

Court allowed a rapist to go scot-free merely
because there were no marks of injury on his penis,
which the High Court presumed was an indication of
no resistance. The most important facts such as the
age of the victim (being seven years) and that she
had suffered a ruptured hymen and the bite marks on
her body were not considered by the High Court.
Even the eye witnesses, who witnessed this ghastly
act, could not sway the High Courts judgment.
41 1989 Supp (1) SCC 286

42 Mohd. Habib v. State, 1989 Cri LJ 137 (Delhi)
Chapter 8 339
The above are the few examples, enough to

highlight the insensitiveness of higher judiciary
towards such heinous crime against humanity. The
data of decisions in such cases by lower courts is
not available for consideration but we can easily
anticipate the critical situation. The real life
truth is when the rapist or the offender in such
cases is acquitted by lower courts only a few women
courageous enough move to higher courts to ask for
justice. The earlier attitude of higher courts was
not as sensitive as it should be which is quite
clear from the purview of above mentioned
decisions. The sensitiveness of the courts in such
crimes has improved over the time and visible in
the decisions afterward. In the past few decades
the higher judiciary has dealt with these issues
not only very thoughtfully but also very
proactively in a few cases.
As in State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh43, the

Supreme Court has advised the lower judiciary, that
even if the victim girl is shown to be habituated
to sex, the Court should not describe her to be of
loose character.
43 1996 SCC (2) 384

Chapter 8 340
In Chairman, Railway Board v. Chandrima Das44,

a practicing Advocate of the Calcutta High Court
filed a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India against the various railway
authorities of the eastern railway claiming
compensation for the victim (Smt. Hanufa Khatoon) a
Bangladesh national who was raped at the Howrah
Station, by the railway security men. The High
Court awarded Rs.10 lacs as compensation.
An appeal was preferred and it was contended by

the state that:
a) The railway was not liable to pay the

compensation to the victim for she was a
foreigner.
b) That the remedy for compensation lies in

the domain of private law and not public
law, i.e. that the victim should have
approached the Civil Court for seeking
damages; and should have not come to the
High Court under Article 226.
Considering the above said contentions, the

Supreme Court observed:
44 AIR 2000 SC 988

Chapter 8 341
Where public functionaries are involved and

the matter relates to the violation of fundamental
rights or the enforcement of public duties, the
remedy would be avoidable under public law. It was
more so, when it was not a mere violation of any
ordinary right, but the violation of fundamental
rights was involved - as the petitioner was a
victim of rape, which a violation of fundamental
right of every person guaranteed under Article 21
of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court also held that the relief can

be granted to the victim for two reasons- firstly,
on the ground of domestic jurisprudence based on
the Constitutional provisions; and secondly, on the
ground of Human Rights Jurisprudence based on the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 which
has international recognition as the Moral Code of
Conduct adopted by the General Assembly of the
United Nation.
In Sakshi v. Union of India45, the judges

sought refuge behind the strict interpretation of
penal statutes and the doctrine of stare decisis -
a view that any alteration [in this case, of the
definition of rape] would result in chaos and
45 1999 (6) SCC 591

Chapter 8 342
confusion, it directed the Law Commission of India

to respond to the issues raised in the petition.
The Law Commission, under the chairmanship of
Justice P. Jeevan Reddy, responded by saying that
the 156th Law Commission Report had dealt with these
issues. The Supreme Court, however, agreed with
Sakshi that the 156th Report did not deal with the
precise issues raised in the writ petition. In
August 1999, it directed the Law Commission to look
into these issues afresh.
After detailed consultations with the

organisations, the Law Commission released its 172nd
Report on the Review of Rape Laws, in 2000. The Law
Commission recommended changing the focus from rape
to sexual assault, the definition of which goes
beyond penile penetration to include penetration by
any part of the body and objects, taking into
account cunnilingus and fellatio.
The 172nd Law Commission report had made the

following recommendations for substantial change in
the law with regard to rape.
1. Rape should be replaced by the term

sexual assault.
Chapter 8 343
2. Sexual intercourse as contained in

section 375 of IPC should include all forms
of penetration such as penile/vaginal,
penile/oral, finger/vaginal, finger/anal
and object/vaginal.
3. In the light of Sakshi v. Union of India

and Others sexual assault on any part of
the body should be construed as rape.
4. Rape laws should be made gender neutral as

custodial rape of young boys has been
neglected by law.
5. A new offence, namely section 376E with the

title unlawful sexual conduct should be
created.
6. Section 509 of the IPC was also sought to

be amended, providing higher punishment
where the offence set out in the said
section is committed with sexual intent.
7. Marital rape: explanation (2) of section

375 of IPC should be deleted. Forced sexual
intercourse by a husband with his wife
should be treated equally as an offence
just as any physical violence by a husband
Chapter 8 344
against the wife is treated as an offence.

On the same reasoning, section 376 A was to
be deleted.
8. Under the Indian Evidence Act (IEA), when

alleged that a victim consented to the
sexual act and it is denied, the court
shall presume it to be so.
In recent case State of U.P. v. Chhotey Lal46,

Highlighting the difference between will and
consent, the court said that a nod for sexual
relations obtained by a man on the false pretext
would not amount to a legal or valid consent to
save him from punishment for rape. Even if there
were mutual consent, if the consent is based on a
false pretext made by the man then the consent
would stand as null and void and the intercourse be
termed as Rape.
Another remarkable decision in the Delhi

Domestic Working Womens Forum v. Union of India47
clearly highlights the judicial sensitiveness
towards this heinous crime. In this verdict the
Court observed that, It is rather unfortunate that
in recent times, there has been an increase in
46 2011 (2) SCC 550
47 1995 (1) SCC 14
Chapter 8 345
violence against women causing serious concern.

Rape does indeed pose a series of problems for the
criminal justice system. There are cries for
harshest penalties, but often times such crimes
eclipse the real plight of the victim. Rape is an
experience which shakes the foundations of the
lives of the victims. For many, its effect is a
long-term one, impairing their capacity for
personal relationships, altering their behaviour
values and generating and less fears. In addition
to the trauma of the rape itself, victims have had
to suffer further agony during legal proceedings.
This Court further observed as under:
The defects in the present system are:

Firstly, complaints are handled roughly and are not
even such attention as is warranted. The victims,
more often than not, are humiliated by the police.
The victims have invariably found rape trials a
traumatic experience. The experience of giving
evidence in court has been negative and
destructive. The victims often say, they considered
the ordeal to be even worse than the rape itself.
Undoubtedly, the court proceedings added to and
prolonged the psychological stress they had had to
suffer as a result of the rape itself. In this
Chapter 8 346
background, it is necessary to indicate the broad

parameters in assisting the victims of rape.
1. The complainants of sexual assault cases

should be provided with legal
representation. It is important to have
someone who is well-acquainted with the
criminal justice system. The role of the
victims advocate would not only be to
explain to the victim the nature of the
proceedings, to prepare her for the case
and to assist her in the police station and
in court but to provide her with guidance
as to how she might obtain help of a
different nature from other agencies, for
example, mind counselling or medical
assistance. It is important to secure
continuity of assistance by ensuring that
the same person who looked after the
complainants interests in the police
station represents her till the end of the
case.
2. Legal assistance will have to be provided

at the police station since the victim of
sexual assault might very well be in a
distressed state upon arrival at the police
Chapter 8 347
station, the guidance and support of a

lawyer at this stage and whilst she was
being questioned would be of great
assistance to her.
3. The police should be under a duty to inform

the victim of her right to representation
before any questions were asked of her and
that the police report should state that
the victim was so informed.
4. A list of advocates willing to act in these

cases should be kept at the police station
for victims who did not have a particular
lawyer in mind or whose own lawyer was
unavailable.
5. The advocate shall be appointed by the

court, upon application by the police at
the earliest convenient movement, but in
order to ensure that victims were
questioned without undue delay, advocates
would be authorised to act at the police
station before leave of the court was
sought or obtained.
6. In all rape trials anonymity of the victims

must be maintained, as far as necessary.
Chapter 8 348
7. It is necessary, having regard to the

Directive Principles contained under
Article 38(1) of the Constitution of India
to set up Criminal Injuries Compensation
Board. Rape victims frequently incur
substantial financial loss. Some, for
example, are too dramatized to continue in
employment.
8. Compensation for victims shall be awarded

by the court on conviction of the offender
and by the Criminal Injuries Compensation
Board whether or not a conviction has taken
place. The Board will take into account
pain, suffering and shock as well as loss
of earnings due to pregnancy and the
expenses of the child but if this occurred
as a result of the rape.
In the present situation, the third respondent

will have to evolve such scheme as to wipe out the
fears of such unfortunate victims. Such a scheme
shall be prepared within six months from the date
of this judgment. Thereupon, the Union of India
will examine the same and shall take necessary
steps for the implementation of the scheme at the
earliest.
Chapter 8 349
This decision recognises the right of the

victim for compensation by providing that it shall
be awarded by the Court on conviction of the
offender subject to the finalisation of Scheme by
the Central Government. If the Court trying an
offence of rape has jurisdiction to award the
compensation at the final stage, there is no reason
to deny to the Court the right to award interim
compensation which should also be provided in the
Scheme. On the basis of principles set out in the
aforesaid decision in Delhi Domestic Working
Womens Forum48, the jurisdiction to pay interim
compensation shall be treated to be part of the
overall jurisdiction of the Courts trying the
offences of rape which, as pointed out above is an
offence against basic human rights as also the
Fundamental Right of Personal Liberty and Life.
Apart from the above, this Court has the

inherent jurisdiction to pass any order it consists
fit and proper in the interest of justice or to do
complete justice between the parties.
Having regard to the facts and circumstances of

the present case in which there is a serious
allegation that Bodhisattwa Gautam had married
48 1995 (1) SCC 12

Chapter 8 350
Subhra Chakraborty before the God he worshiped by

putting Varmilion on her forehead and accepting her
as his wife and also having impregnated her twice
resulting in abortion on both the occasions, we, on
being prima-facie satisfied, dispose of this matter
by providing that Bodhisattwa Gautam shall pay to
Subhra Chakraborty a sum of Rs. 1,000/- every month
as interim compensation during the pendency of
Criminal Case No. 1/95 in the court of Judicial
Magistrate, I Class, Kohima, Nagaland. He shall
also be liable to pay arrears of compensation at
the same rate from the date on which the complaint
was filed till this date.
The Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v.

Madhukar Narayan Mardikar,49 upheld the right to
privacy of women of easy virtue against compulsions
for sexual acts against her will. Anti-
subordination vision in this approach infused
aspects of human dignity into right to privacy in
this case.
The case of Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan50 in

1997 has been credited with establishing sexual
harassment as illegal. The litigation resulted from
49 (1991) 1 SCC 57
50 AIR 1997 SC 3011
Chapter 8 351
a brutal gang rape of a publicly employed social

worker in a village in Rajasthan during the course
of her employment. The petitioners bringing the
action were various social activists and non-
governmental organisations. The primary basis of
bringing such an action to the Supreme Court in
India was to find suitable methods for the
realisation of the true concept of gender
equality in the workplace for women. In turn, the
prevention of sexual harassment of women would be
addressed by applying the judicial process.
Under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution, an

action was filed in order to establish the
enforcement of the fundamental rights relating to
the women in the workplace. In particular it sought
to establish the enforcement of Articles 14, 15,
19(1) (g) and 21 of the Constitution of India and
Articles 11 and 24 of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women.
In disposing of the writ petition with

directions, it was held that:
The fundamental right to carry on any

occupation, trade or profession depends on the
Chapter 8 352
availability of a safe working environment. The

right to life means life with dignity. The primary
responsibility for ensuring such safety and dignity
through suitable legislation, and the creation of a
mechanism for its enforcement, belongs to the
legislature and the executive. When, however,
instances of sexual harassment resulting in
violations of Arts 14, 19 and 21 are brought under
Art 32, effective redress requires that some
guidelines for the protection of these rights
should be laid down to fill the legislative
vacuum.
In light of these deliberations, the Court

outlined guidelines which were to be observed in
order to enforce the rights of gender equality and
to prevent discrimination for women in the
workplace.
These guidelines included the responsibility

upon the employer to prevent or deter the
commission of acts of sexual harassment and to
apply the appropriate settlement and resolutions
and a definition of sexual harassment which
includes unwelcome sexually determined behaviour
(whether directly or by implication) such as:
Chapter 8 353
physical contact and advances;
a demand or request for sexual favours;
sexually-coloured remarks;
showing pornography;
any other unwelcome physical, verbal or

non-verbal conduct of a sexual nature.
Furthermore the guidelines set out that persons

in charge of a workplace in the public or private
sector would be responsible for taking the
appropriate steps to prevent sexual harassment by
taking the appropriate steps, including:
The prohibition of sexual harassment should

be published in the appropriate ways and
providing the appropriate penalties against
the offender;
For private employees, the guidelines

should be included in the relevant
employment guidelines;
Appropriate working conditions in order to

provide environments for women that are not
Chapter 8 354
hostile in order to establish reasonable

grounds for discrimination;
The employer should ensure the protection

of potential petitioners against
victimisation or discrimination during
potential proceedings;
An appropriate complaints mechanism should

be established in the work place with the
appropriate redress mechanism;
Where sexual harassment occurs as a result

of an act or omission by any third party or
outsider, the employer and person-in-charge
will take all steps necessary and
reasonable to assist the affected person in
terms of support and preventive action.
Finally, the court stated that the guidelines

are to be treated as a declaration of law in
accordance with Article 141 of the Constitution
until the enactment of appropriate legislation and
that the guidelines do not prejudice any rights
available under the Protection of Human Rights Act
1993. The court gathered feminist vision as an
input for its reasoning from Convention on
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Chapter 8 355
Women, Directive Principles of State Policy,

affirmative action policy under Article 15(3) and
the idea of human dignity. It is because of this
vision that the extraordinary type of judicial law
making in this case became non-controversial and
acceptable.
Continuance of Vishaka reasoning in Apparel

Export Promotion Council51 with more clarification,
and the legislative efforts to concretise Vishaka
guidelines vindicate tenability of this approach.
This is the first case in which the Supreme Court
applied the law laid down in Vishakas case and
upheld the dismissal of a superior officer of the
Delhi based Apparel Export Promotion Council who
was found guilty of sexual harassment of a
subordinate female employee at the place of work on
the ground that it violated her fundamental right
guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution.
Enhanced sentences were introduced by amendment

in 1983, whereby the Legislature indicated that it
considers aggravated rape (including gang rape)
deserving of higher punishment. It is also
pertinent to note at this stage that in earlier
51 AIR 1999 SC 625

Chapter 8 356
cases the Supreme Court has ruled that the term

adequate and special reasons.
The rule of Corroboration of the Prosecutrix

has undergone a change through statutory amendments
as also through decisions of this Court. In State
of Himachal Pradesh v. Raghubir Singh52, this Court
observed as under, There is no legal compulsion to
look for corroboration of the evidence of the
prosecutrix before recording an order of
conviction. Evidence has to be weighed and not
counted. Conviction can be recorded on the sole
testimony of the prosecutrix, if her evidence
inspires confidence and there is absence of
circumstances which mitigate her veracity. In the
present case the evidence of the prosecutrix is
found to be reliable and trustworthy. No
corroboration was required to be looked for, though
enough was available on the record. The medical
evidence provided sufficient corroboration.
In State of Karnataka v. Mahabaleshwar Gourya

Naik53, the Court went to the extent of laying down
that even if the victim of rape is not available to
give evidence on account of her having committed
52 1993 (2) SCC 622

53 AIR 1992 SC 2043
Chapter 8 357
suicide, the prosecution case cannot be thrown away

over board. In such a case, the non-availability of
the victim will not be fatal and the Court can
record a conviction on the basis of the available
evidence brought on record by the prosecution.
In spite of the decision of this Court that

(depending upon the circumstances of the case)
corroboration of the prosecutrix was not necessary,
the cases continued to end in acquittal on account
of mishandling of the crime by the police and the
invocation of the theory of consent by the Courts
who tried the offence. To overcome this difficulty,
the legislature intervened and introduced Section
114-A in the Evidence Act by Act No. 43 of 1983
reading as under:- 114-A. Presumption as to absence
of consent in certain prosecutions for rape.- In a
prosecution for rape under clause (a) or clause (b)
or clause (c) or clause (d) or clause (e) or clause
(g) or sub-section (2) of Section 376 of the Indian
Penal Code (45 of 1860), where sexual intercourse
by the accused is proved and the question is
whether it was without the consent of the woman
alleged to have been raped and she states in her
evidence before the Court that she did not consent,
the Court shall presume that she did not consent.
This Section enables a court to raise a presumption
Chapter 8 358
that the woman who was the victim of rape had not
consented and that the offence was committed
against her will. The situation, however, has
hardly improved. Conviction rates for rape are
still lower than any other major crime and the
woman continue to argue even today that in rape
cases the victimized women, rather than the
rapists, were put on trial. A large number of women
still fail to report rapes to the police because
they fear embarrassing and insensitive treatment by
the doctors, the law enforcement personnel and/or
the cross-examining defence attorneys. The fear has
to be allayed from the minds of women so that if
and when this crime is committed, the victim may
promptly report the matter to the police and on a
charge sheet being submitted, the trial may proceed
speedily without causing any embarrassment to the
prosecutrix who may come in the witness box without
fear psychosis.
In the matters touching upon the issues like

prostitution the approach of the courts has been
very positive, in most of the cases they adopted
the reformist attitude like in the case of Gaurav
Jain v. Union of India54 where the court held that
54 (1997) 8 SCC 114

Chapter 8 359
the women found in flesh trade, should be viewed

more as victims of adverse socio-economic
circumstances rather than as offenders in our
society. The commercial exploitation of sex may be
regarded as a crime but those trapped in custom-
oriented prostitution and gender-oriented
prostitution should be viewed as victims of gender-
oriented vulnerability.
Though there is no movement against trafficking

in women still, some mainstream feminists and human
rights activists fight for the plight of these
women. The case of Upendra Baxi v. State of Uttar
Pradesh55 shows how deeply entrenched is the market
for sex trafficking. The Agra Protective Home was
constituted by and functioned under the penal law
The Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956.
In a letter to the Indian Express a member of

the Board of Visitors of the Agra Protective Home
described the pathetic condition of the Home in
which the girls were kept. Acting on this letter
which was written by Dr. Upendra Baxi and Dr.
Lokita Sarkar to the then Justice P.N. Bhagwati who
treated it as a writ petition.
55 (1983) 2 SCC 308

Chapter 8 360
The judgment transcending from 1989 to 1998 saw

three phases and ultimately the Supreme Court
transferred the case to the National Human Rights
Commission with certain guidelines recorded by the
Supreme Court. The guidelines were far reaching in
the changes they proposed to the existing framework
while staying within the framework of the Immoral
Traffic Prevention Act (ITPA) and the Constitution.
They required the person who is either removed
under Section 15(4) or rescued under Section
16(1) of ITPA and produced before a Magistrate to
be heard either in person or through a lawyer
(assigned by the Legal Aid Committee of the
District Court concerned) at every stage of
proceedings including admission to a Protective
Home, intermediate custody as well as discharge.
The Supreme Court further laid down that in

camera trial be held and that it should be the duty
of the court to ensure the presence of lawyers of
both sides. If under Section 15(4) and Section
16(1) it was a child, the child should be placed in
an institution recognised or established under the
Juvenile Justice Act, 1986.
The guidelines also required Magistrates to

maintain a list of those who have been given safe
Chapter 8 361
custody of persons rescued or removed on furnishing

undertakings. In the event of it being brought to
the Magistrates notice that such person has
returned to prostitution, the giver of the
undertaking, after an enquiry, would be debarred
from furnishing any undertaking in any proceeding
under the ITPA.
It was further suggested that the post of

special police officer shall, wherever possible, be
held by a woman police officer and that there
should be in place an Advisory Board consisting of
five leading social workers to be associated with
the special police officer.
In Bholanath Tripathi v. State of U.P.56,

public interest litigation was filed alleging that
a woman was held in confinement and was being used
for earning money by prostitution. The Supreme
Court directed the Commissioner appointed to make
enquiry and if satisfied prima facie about the
allegations, to remove her to a safe place and
secure her production before the Court. The police
and the other authorities of the State Government
concerned were also directed to afford assistance
to the Commissioner.
56 1990 Supp SCC 151: 1990 SCC (Cri) 543

Chapter 8 362
In Vishal Jeet v. Union of India57, in a public

interest litigation filed by a 1awyer, the Supreme
Court confined itself to the issues of child
prostitution and Article 23 in the context of
prostitution. Interpreting Article 23, the court
held that:
The expression traffic in human beings is

evidently a very wide expression including the
prohibition of traffic in women for immoral or
other purposes.
Expressing its disappointment the Court said:
Prostitution always remains as a running sore

in the body of civilisation and destroys all moral
values. The causes and evil effects of prostitution
maligning the society are so notorious and
frightful that none can gainsay it. This malignity
is daily and hourly threatening the community at
large, slowly but steadily making its way onwards,
leaving a track marked with broken hopes.
Therefore, the necessity for appropriate and
drastic action to eradicate this evil has become
apparent. . . .
Pained by the malaise, it added:

57 (1990) 3 SCC 318
Chapter 8 363
It is highly deplorable to note that many

poverty-stricken children and girls in their prime
youth are taken to the Flesh Market and forcibly
pushed into the flesh trade which is being carried
on in utter violation of all canons of morality,
decency and dignity of human kind.
The Supreme Court Division Bench speaking

through Justice S.R. Pandian, laid the following
measures for the purpose of eradicating the evil of
prostitution:
1. All the State Governments and Government of

the Union Territories should direct their
law-enforcing authorities concerned to take
appropriate and speedy action under
existing laws in eradicating child
prostitution without giving room for any
complaint of remissness or culpable
indifference.
2. The State Governments and Governments of
Union Territories should set up a separate
Advisory Committee within their respective
zones consisting of the secretary of the
Social Welfare Department or Board, the
Secretary of the Law Department,
Sociologists, Criminologists, Members of
Chapter 8 364
Womens Organisations, Members of the

Indian Council for Child Welfare and Indian
Council of Social Welfare as well as the
members of various voluntary social
organisations and associations, the main
aim of the Advisory Committee being to make
suggestions of:
a. the measures to be taken in eradicating
child prostitution, and
b. the social welfare programme to be

implemented for the care, protection,
treatment, development and
rehabilitation of the young fallen
victims, namely, the children and girls
rescued either from the brothel houses
or from the clutches of prostitution.
3. All the State Governments and Governments

of Union Territories should take steps in
providing adequate and rehabilitative homes
manned by well-qualified trained social-
workers, psychiatrists and doctors.
4. A Committee should be set up to evolve

welfare programmes to be implemented on the
national level for the care, protection,
Chapter 8 365
rehabilitation of the young fallen victims,

namely, children and girls and to make
suggestions for amendments to the existing
laws or for the enactment of any new law,
if so warranted for the prevention of
sexual exploitation of children.
5. A machinery should be devised for ensuring

proper implementation of the suggestions
that would be made by the respective
committees.
6. The Advisory Committee should also go deep

into the Devadasi system and Jogin
tradition and give their valuable advice
and suggestions as to what best the
government could do in that regard.
After the Vishal Jeet case another case where

the Supreme Court delved into the problem of
prostitution, especially child prostitution, with
extreme sensitivity was Gaurav Jain v. Union of
India58. In the initial PIL which dealt with
prostitution in general and the plight of children
of prostitute women in particular Ramaswamy, J.
interpreted certain provisions of the ITPA without
58 (1997) 8 SCC 114

Chapter 8 366
pronouncing on the constitutionality of several

other offending ones. Wadhwan, J. felt that such a
course was not correct since the parties had not
been informed or heard and there were no pleadings.
Ramaswamy, J., nevertheless issued directions. The
entire judgment was thereafter reviewed and
recalled by a Bench of three judges in Gaurav Jain
v. Union of India59.
Dwelling on the causes of prostitution the

Court said:
The Mahajan Committee Report, indicates that

in two villages in Bihar and some villages in West
Bengal, parents send their girl children to earn in
prostitution and the girls in turn send their
earnings for maintenance of their families. It
further indicates that certain social organisations
have identified poverty as the cause for sending
the children for prostitution in expectation of
regular remittance of income from prostitution by
the girls who have already gone into brothels.
It is also an inevitable consequence that over

the years the fallen women are accustomed to a
certain lifestyle and in terms of expenditure they
59 ibid
Chapter 8 367
need a certain amount of money for their upkeep and

maintenance. When they bear children it becomes an
additional burden for them. They are led or caught
in the debt traps. The managers of the brothels are
generally ladies. They do not allow the girls to
bear children. In case of birth against their
wishes, the unfortunate are subjected to cruelty in
diverse forms. In the process of maintaining
children again they land themselves in perpetually
growing burden of debt without any scope to get out
from the bondage. Thereby this process lends
perpetuity to slavery to the wile of prostitution.
Those who want to remain in prostitution have given
absence of alternative source of income, their
social non-acceptability, family customs, poverty,
ill-health and their despondence as the reason and,
thus, they want to continue in prostitution as the
last resort for their livelihood. They do not like
to remain in the red-light area but lack of
alternative source of livelihood is the prime cause
of their continuation in the profession.
Referring to the plight of prostitutes the

Court observed:
The prostitute has always been an object and

was never seen as a complete human being with
Chapter 8 368
dignity of person; as if she has had no needs and

aspirations of her own individually or
collectively. Their problems are compounded by
coercion laid around them and torturous treatment
meted out to them. When they make attempts either
to resist the prostitution or to relieve them from
the trap, they succumb to the violent treatment and
resultantly many settle for prostitution. A
prostitute is equally a human being. Despite that
trap she is confronted with the problems to bear
and rear children. Their children are equally
subjected to discrimination, social isolation. . .
In recent times however, there has been a growing
body of opinion by certain enlightened sections of
the society advocating the need to no longer treat
the fallen women as criminals or as objects of
shocking sexual abuse. They are victims of
circumstances and hence should be treated as human
beings like others so as to bring them into the
mainstream of the social order without any attached
stigma.
Activists through intervention of the Supreme

Court are compelling State Governments to initiate
action against ultrasound centres encouraging
female foeticide under the Pre-Natal Diagnostic
Techniques (Regulation and Prevention of Misuse)
Chapter 8 369
Act, 1994. Therefore, it is for the first time

since the enactment of this law about eight years
ago that States have started registering ultrasound
machines for a better supervision of their use.
The Indian Medical Association, too, has called

for action against doctors helping in such sex-
selection procedures. Activist Sabu George says60:
The problem with foeticide is that doctors are

promoting and encouraging it. It is one organised
crime against women encouraged by professionals.
Not only is sex determination a crime against

women but achieving a balance in sex ratio also a
crucial part of population stability. Expressing
its concern, an NGO, CEHAT, filed a Public Interest
Litigation highlighting this issue.
Expressing concern over this issue the Supreme

Court in CEHAT v. Union of India61 moved in to stop
illegal sex determination and directed all States
to confiscate ultrasound equipment from clinics
that are being run without licenses. The Health
Secretaries of Punjab, Haryana, Delhi, Bihar, Uttar
Pradesh, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh,
60 The Times of India dated May 7th, 2002

61 (2001) 5 SCC 577
Chapter 8 370
Kerala, Rajasthan and West Bengal were present to

explain the steps taken to implement the Pre-Natal
Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation and Prevention of
Misuse) Act, 1994.
A Bench comprising Arijit Pasayat, M.B. Shah

and B.N. Agarwal, JJ. said:
State Governments are directed to take

immediate action if such machines were being used
in clinics without license. The machines are to be
seized and sealed for the time being.
When the petitioners counsel Indira Jai Singh

said that the State Governments were casually
granting licences to ultrasound clinics the court
said:
The authorities should not grant certificate

of registration if the application form is not
complete.
The court also asked the manufacturers of

ultrasound machinesPhilips. Symonds, Toshiba,
Larsen and Toubro and Wipro GE - to give the names
and addresses of the clinics and persons in India
to whom they sold these machines in the last five
years This, the court said, would help the
Chapter 8 371
government find out whether these clinics or

persons were registered.
Again in a resumed hearing the Supreme Court

warned that health secretaries of States failing to
implement its orders banning sex determination of
foetus would be required to be present before the
court in the next hearing.
Shocked at the slackness of the Union and the

State Governments, the Supreme Court in CEHAT v.
Union of India62 main asked the authorities to file
within six weeks status reports regarding
implementation of Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques
(Regulation and Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1994. A
Bench comprising M.B. Shah and R.P. Sethi, JJ.,
said:
We make it clear that there is total slackness

on the part of administration in implementing the
Act.
It asked the authorities to implement the Act

and prosecute clinics, centres and laboratories
which aid and abet identification of the sex of the
foetus illegally.
62 (2001) 5 SCC 577

Chapter 8 372
When counsel for certain States said that the

authorities have issued warnings to several such
unregistered centres having ultrasound facilities,
an anguished Bench expressed surprise and wondered
whether the implementing authorities are aware of
law? The Act provides for prosecution and not
warning. Authorities under the provision of the Act
are not empowered to issue warnings and allow these
centres to continue their illegal activities.
It also castigated the Union Government for not

setting up an Appropriate Authority to implement
the Act. It should have set up the authority five
years ago, the court added.
Such, then, is the attitude of the government

towards a crime which hits at dignity even before
conception. There has to be a concerted effort by
all to stop this inhuman treatment of the female
foetus. By the intervention of the Apex Court,
prosecutions have been launched against the
offenders but, in all cases, it is the will to
protect the dignity of women which will ultimately
succeed.
Chapter 8 373
In CEHAT v. Union of India63, further

directions were issued by the Supreme Court. The
Centre and State Governments were directed to issue
advertisements to create awareness in the public
that there should not be any discrimination between
male and female child, and to publish annually the
reports of appropriate authorities for the
information of the public. National Monitoring and
Inspection Committee is to continue to function for
the effective implementation of the Act. Certain
States were directed to appoint State Supervisory
Boards and multi-member appropriate authorities.
The courts in cases of violation of human

rights are sensitive to the international
conventions and apply the same in a given case.
Article 51 provides for promotion of international
peace and security and Article 253 read along with
List I of Seventh Schedule authorises the
appropriate authority to make laws for honouring
international commitments. It is the principle of
jus cogens, making the international law
automatically incorporated in the municipal laws
which applies, in the absence of domestic law in
the field of sexual harassment.
63 (2003) 8 SCC 398

Chapter 8 374
Taking up cudgels against these macabre crimes

a writ petition was filed in Vishaka v. State of
Rajasthan64 for the enforcement of the fundamental
rights of working women under Articles 14, 19 and
21 of the Constitution of India in view of the
prevailing climate in which the violation of these
rights is not uncommon. With increasing awareness
and emphasis on gender justice there is an increase
in the efforts to guard against such violations;
resentment towards incidents of sexual harassment
is also increasing. The present petition was
brought as a class action by certain social
activists and NGOs with the aim of focussing
attention towards this societal aberration and
assisting in finding a suitable method for the
realisation of the true concept of gender
equality and preventing sexual harassment of
working women in all workplaces through the
judicial process, and filling fill the vacuum in
existing legislation. The immediate cause for the
filing of the writ petition was an incident of
brutal gang rape of a social worker in a village of
Rajasthan. However, no mention was made of that
case because it was the subject-matter of a
criminal case. But the incident revealed the
64 (1997) 6 SCC 241

Chapter 8 375
hazards to which a working woman was exposed and

the depravity to which sexual harassment can
degenerate and the urgency for safeguards by an
alternative mechanism to fulfil this deeply felt
and urgent social need. The judgment delivered by
J.S. Verma, C.J., Sujata Manohar and B.N. Kirpal,
JJ. highlighted the fact that, each incident of
like nature results in violation of fundamental
rights of Gender Equality and the Right of Life
and Liberty. It is a clear violation of the rights
under Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution.
One of the logical consequences of such an incident
is also the violation of the victims fundamental
right under Article 19(1)(g) to practise any
profession or to carry out any occupation trade or
business. Such violations, therefore, attract the
remedy under Article 32 for the enforcement of
these fundamental rights of women. This class
action under Article 32 of the Constitution was for
this reason and a writ of mandamus in such a
situation if it is to be effective needs to be
accompanied by directions for prevention as the
violation of this fundamental right is a recurring
phenomenon.
The Court realised that:

Chapter 8 376
The fundamental right to carry on any

occupation, trade or profession depends on the
availability of a safe working environment. Right
to life means life with dignity. The primary
responsibility, for ensuring such safety and
dignity through suitable legislation and the
creation of a mechanism for its enforcement, is of
the legislature and the executive. When, however,
instances of sexual harassment resulting in
violation of fundamental rights of women workers
under Articles 14, 19 and 21 are brought before us
for redress under Article 32, an effective
redressal requires that some guidelines should be
laid down for the protection of these rights to
fill the legislative vacuum.65
Apart from Article 32 of the Constitution of

India, the court referred to some other provisions
like Articles 15, 42, 51-A(a) and (e), 51, 253 and
the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution which
envisage judicial intervention for the eradication
of the social malaise of sexual harassment at the
workplace. In the absence of domestic law occupying
the field, to formulate effective measures to check
the evil of sexual harassment of working women at
65 (1997) 6 SCC 247

Chapter 8 377
all workplaces, the contents of international

conventions and norms played a significant role in
interpreting the guarantees of gender equality,
right to work with human dignity in Articles 14.
15, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution and the
safeguards against sexual harassment being explicit
therein.
The court was of the opinion that any

international convention not inconsistent with the
fundamental rights and in harmony with its spirit
must be read into these provisions to enlarge the
meaning and content thereof, to promote the object
of constitutional guarantee. This fact was implicit
from Article 51(c) and the enabling power of
Parliament to enact laws for implementing the
international conventions and norms by virtue of
Article 253 read with Entry 14 of the union list in
the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. The Court
found Article 73 also relevant as it provided that
the executive power of the Union shall extend to
matters with respect to which Parliament has power
to make laws. The executive power of the Union is,
therefore, available till Parliament enacts
legislation to expressly provide measures needed to
curb the evil. Thus, the power of the Court under
Article 32 for the enforcement of fundamental
Chapter 8 378
rights and the executive power of the Union have to

meet the challenge of protecting working women from
sexual harassment and of making their fundamental
rights meaningful. Governance of society by the
rule of law mandates this requirement as a logical
concomitant of the Constitutional scheme.
The progress made at each hearing in Vishaka v.

State of Rajasthan66 culminated in the formulation
of guidelines to which the Union of India gave its
consent. through the Solicitor-General, indicating
that these should be the guidelines and norms
declared by the Supreme Court to govern the
behaviour of employers and all others at workplaces
to curb this social evil.
According to the Court:
Gender equality includes protection from

sexual harassment and right to work with dignity,
which is a universally recognised basic human
right. The common minimum requirement of this right
has received global acceptance. The international
conventions and norms are, therefore, of great
significance in the formulation of the guidelines
to achieve this purpose.
66 (1997) 6 SCC 241

Chapter 8 379
The obligation of this court under Article 32

of the Constitution for the enforcement of these
fundamental rights in the absence of legislation
must be viewed along with the role of the judiciary
envisaged in the Beijing Statement of Principles of
the Independence of the Judiciary in the LAWASIA
region. These principles were accepted by the Chief
Justices of Asia and the Pacific at
The Government of India, at the Fourth World

Conference on Women in Beijing, made a commitment,
inter alia, to formulate and operationalise a
national policy on women which will continuously
guide and inform action at every level and in every
sector; to set up a Commission for Womens Rights
to act as a public defender of womens human
rights, to institutionalise a national-level
mechanism a monitor the implementation of the
Platform for Action.
Taking sexual harassment to be violation of

fundamental rights the Court said:
The meaning and content of the fundamental

rights guaranteed in the Constitution of India are
of sufficient amplitude to encompass all facets of
gender equality including prevention of sexual
Chapter 8 380
harassment or abuse. Independence of judiciary

forms a part of the constitutional scheme. The
international conventions and norms are to be read
into them in the absence of enacted domestic law
occupying the field when there is no inconsistency
between them. It is now an accepted rule of
judicial constitution that regard must be had to
international conventions and norms for construing
domestic law.
Referring to another case, the court held:
In Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa67 a

provision in the International Covenant of Civil
and Political Rights was referred to support the
view taken that an enforceable right to
compensation is not alien to the concept of
enforcement of a guaranteed right as a public law
remedy under Article 32, distinct from the private
law remedy in torts. There is no reason why these
international conventions and norms cannot,
therefore, be used for construing the fundamental
rights expressly guaranteed in the Constitution or
India which embody the concept of gender equality
in all spheres of human activity it.
67 (1993) 2 SCC 746

Chapter 8 381
In view of the above and the absence of enacted

law to provide for the effective enforcement of the
basic human right of gender equality and guarantee
against sexual harassment and abuse, more
particularly against sexual harassment at
workplaces, we Lay down Guidelines and Norms
specified hereinafter for due observance at all
workplaces or other institutions, until a
legislation is enacted for the purpose. This is
done in exercise of the power available under
Article 32 of the Constitution for enforcement of
the fundamental rights and it is further emphasised
that this would be treated as the law declared by
this court under Article 141 of the Constitution.
Thus, the guidelines and norms given by the

Supreme Court in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan68
continue to govern, in the absence of legislation
till now in the field of sexual harassment of women
at workplaces. Indeed a historic judgment,
responding to the needs of present-day society.
In a Public Interest Litigation by Sakshi69,

the petitioner contented that the interpretation of
Section 375 and 376 of Indian Penal Code and other
68 (1997) 6 SCC 241

69 1999 (6) SCC 591
Chapter 8 382
Sections are not consistent with current state of

affairs in society. The Apex Court requested the
Law Commission to examine the issue and the
feasibility of making recommendations for amendment
of Penal Code. The amendments are still pending in
the form of the Protection of Women against Sexual
Harassment at Workplace Bill, 2010.
Aghast with executive indifference coupled with

people phobia for male issues, right thinking NGOs
and individuals working against female foeticide
and infanticide filed a Public Interest Litigation
in the Supreme Court, i.e., CEHAT & Masoom and Sabu
George v. Union of India70. This case sought
immediate action to stop and prevent the misuse of
PNDT Act. An interim order was issued by the
Supreme Court on 2nd May 2001, directing the Central
and the State governments to set up an Appropriate
Authority and Advisory Board under the Act and that
the State government has to file quarterly reports
to show that steps have been taken to comply with
the Act. There was an order given to the Central
government to consider amending the Act.
Consequently the amendment was brought about in the
Act (PNDT) and the ultra-sound and the pre-
70 2001 (5) SCC 577

Chapter 8 383
conception diagnostic techniques have been brought

under one ambit & control. The ultra sound
procedures are clarified in detail. It also
mandated the appointment of a State Policy making
body.
In spite of the Centers pro-active stand, the

judicial system, relying much on the necessary
evidence, has not been able to nab the truant
doctors and clients engaged in this nefarious
exercise of continuing with pre-sex determination
tests. However, the Delhi government has already
banned X-Y separation as per Delhi Artificial
Insemination Bill 1995.
In a very recent decision in Budhadev Karmaskar

v. State of West Bengal71, the Apex Court dismissed
an appeal against the conviction for murder of a
sex-worker. In this case the Supreme Court has very
sensitively declared that even the sex-workers
being the citizens of the country are entitled to
right to life and dignity.
The role and position of sex-workers in the

society was noted by a bench of Justice Markandey
71 Criminal Appeal No. 135 of 2010, the order dated February 14, 2011
Chapter 8 384
Katju and Justice Gyan Sudha Misra of the Supreme

Court in the following terms:
This is a case of brutal murder of a sex

worker. Sex workers are also human beings and no
one has a right to assault or murder them. A person
becomes a prostitute not because she enjoys it but
because of poverty. Society must have sympathy
towards the sex workers and must not look down upon
them. They are also entitled to a life of dignity
in view of Article 21 of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court further directed the Central

and the State Governments to prepare schemes for
giving technical/vocational training to sex workers
and sexually abused women in all cities in India.
The schemes should mention in detail who will give
the technical/vocational training and in what
manner they can be rehabilitated and settled by
offering them employment. For instance, if a
technical training is for some craft like sewing
garments, etc. then some arrangements should also
be made for providing a market for such garments,
otherwise they will remain unsold and unused, and
consequently the woman will not be able to feed
herself.
Chapter 8 385
While the decisions in many cases demonstrate

the instances in which the Supreme Court stepped in
to safeguard the fundamental human rights of women
there are several instances where such rights are
brazenly violated.
After 22 years of the enactment of the Indecent

Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986,
the Gujarat government has recently authorised
inspectors of every police station to take steps
for implementation of the Act through a
notification.
The notification has been issued on a public

interest litigation (PIL) filed by a Vadodara-based
organisation. Mahila Punaruthan Sangh had filed the
PIL seeking courts directive to the state
authorities to take effective steps to prohibit
publication or circulation of any book, pamphlet,
paper, writing, photograph and the like
representing women in an indecent manner by
enforcing the Act.
It may be mentioned that the PIL was filed in

2001, but came before hearing after eight long
years. A division bench of the Gujarat High Court
headed by Chief Justice K. S. Radhakrishnan asked
Chapter 8 386
the government to submit a status report of the

implementation of this Act. After this, the
government earlier this month, issued the
notification appointing police inspectors to
implement the Act.
5. Judicial Approach of protective discrimination

favouring women for administrative convenience:
In Savitri v. K.K. Bose,72 while disposing of

application for grant of license, the Excise
Authorities preferred women applicants to men
applicants without any provision. The Allahabad
High Court held that since no special provision
had been made for women in respect of the grant of
liquor license, the grant of the license to the
appellant only on the ground that she was a woman
was not only made on an irrelevant ground but was
also discriminatory and violative of Article 15(1).
It is submitted that the Court rejected that
license only because preference was given to female
applicants over male applicants without any
provision i.e. without any protective legislation
of Article 15(3) of the Constitution.
72 AIR 1957 Mad. 622.

Chapter 8 387
In Baghu Ban Saudagar Singh v. State of

Punjab,73 the Division bench of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court upheld the order of the
Government of the Punjab rendering women ineligible
for all posts in mens jail except those of clerks,
on the basis that convicts in jails were habitual
and hardened criminals, guilty of heinous crimes of
violence and sex. So the women performing jail
duties would be in a more hazardous position that a
male warden. The court stuck a balance between non-
discriminatory treatment irrespective of sex and
social interest of maintaining administrative
efficiency and peace in jails. The court held that
discrimination involved in the case was not based
solely on the ground of sex, but administrative
efficiency and social facts coupled with sex.
In Aparna Basu Mallic v. Bar Council of

India,74 the Calcutta High Court has held that Bar
Council cannot deny the petitioner to be enrolled
as an Advocate. The petitioner did her LL.B. as
non-collegiate student from Calcutta University.
The Bar Council had failed to perform its functions
of laying down the conditions of enrolment. Its
function is to recognize the Indian Universities
73 AIR 1972 P & H 117

74 AIR 1983 Cal. 461
Chapter 8 388
for purposes of the Advocates Act. The Calcutta

University is recognized by the Bar Council. But
the Bar Council had refused to enrol the petitioner
on the ground that she had done her LL.B. as a non-
collegiate student. In Smt. Choki v. State of
Rajasthan,75 the Rajasthan High Court upheld Section
497 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 which
prohibits release of a person accused of a capital
offence on bail except women and children less than
16 years of age and sick men. The court held that
the State can make special provision for the
benefit of women and children.
Article 15(3) of the Constitution of India must

be treated as applying to both existing and future
laws for making special provisions in favour of
women. In Yusuf Abdul Aziz v. State of Bombay,76
Yusuf was charged with an offence of adultery under
section 497 of Indian Penal Code as violative of
Articles 14 and 15. The challenge under Article
15(1) was based on the last Para of Section 497
which provides that the wife not to be punished as
an abettor. The Chief Justice of the Bombay High
Court, Mr. M. C. Chhagla repelled the challenge
under Article 15(1) by observing that the
75 AIR 1957 Raj. 10

76 AIR 1954 SC 321.
Chapter 8 389
differential treatment was not based only on the

ground of sex, but on the ground of social position
of women in India. On appeal, Bose J. held that the
challenge under Article 15(1) was effectively met
by referring to Article 15(3). In dismissing the
appeal he observed:
It was argued that Clause (3) of Article 15

should be confined to provisions which are
beneficial to women and cannot be used to give them
a license the commit and abet crime. We are unable
to read any such restriction into the clause; nor
are we able to agree that a provision which
prohibits punishments is tantamount to a license to
commit the offence of which punishment has been
prohibited.77
The two Articles 14 and 15 read together

validate the impugned clause in Section 497 of the
IPC.78
In Girdhar Gopal v. State,79 it was held that

Section 354 of Indian Penal Code, which makes an
assault or use of criminal force, whether by a man
or woman, with intent to outrage the modesty of a
77AIR 1954 SC 321.

78 Id. at 322 (para 6)
79 AIR 1953 MB 147
Chapter 8 390
woman punishable, is based on a valid

classification under Article 14, and does not
violate Article 15(1) as it did not discriminate on
grounds only of sex but also on consideration of
propriety, public morals, decency decorum and
rectitude. It is submitted that decision is correct
but it should be rested on the ground that the
section is covered by Article 15(3). Under clause 3
of the Article 15 of the Constitution
discrimination can be made favouring the women and
not against them.
Further, this clause protects both the pre-

Constitution and post-Constitution laws the
principle was reiterated by Krishna Iyer, J., in
Bai Tahira v. Ali Husain Fiddalli Chothia.80
6. Judicial Approach in the matters relating to

Personal Laws affecting women:
Despite of many limitations to interfere into

the personal laws, the higher courts have shown a
lot of sensitiveness to the issues touching upon
the condition of women in family matters. On the
analysis of the case laws it is evident that the
activism of the courts is limited to the codified
80 (1979) 2 SCC 318.

Chapter 8 391
personal laws and that is mostly the Hindu laws,

which means only a fraction of female population is
benefitted.
Property is one of the important endowments or

natural assets to accord opportunity, source to
develop personality, to be independent, thus
effectuating the right of equal status and dignity
of person to women. In Pratap Singh v. Union of
India81, the Honble Supreme Court repelled the
challenge made to Section 14(1) of the Hindu
Succession Act, which provided that any property
possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired
before or after the commencement of the Act, shall
be held by her as a full owner and not as a Limited
Owner. The challenge to the validity of Section 14
(1) was on the ground that the said section
favoured Hindu women, on the ground of sex, to the
prejudice of male members of the Hindu community.
The Supreme Court held that Section 14(1) was
enacted to remedy to some extent the plight of
Hindu women and that there was hardly any
justification for the men belonging to the Hindu
Community to raise any objection to the beneficent
provisions contained in Section 14(1) on the ground
81 AIR 1985 SC 1695

Chapter 8 392
of hostile discrimination, since the said section

was protected by the express provisions contained
in clause (3) of Article 15 of the Constitution and
was a special provision enacted for the benefit of
Hindu women. The ambit and scope of Section 14(1)
of the Hindu Succession Act was considered by the
Supreme Court and its beneficial effect in further
empowering women was taken due note of in
Jagannathan Pillai v. Kunjithapadam Pillai82,
Thotasesha Rathamma v. Thota Manikyamma83, C.
Masilamani Muddaliar v. Idol of Sri
Swaminathaswami84, and Velamuri Venkata Siva Prasad
v. Kothuri Venkateswarlu85.
Judicial emphasis of Gender equality as the

prime consideration in interpretation of statutes
conferring property rights on women, has encouraged
legislation in this regard. The Supreme Court paved
way for other courts to follow it as a precedent
while deciding cases of womens right to property.
In Kotturu Swami v. Setra Verrawa86, a Hindu

widow who was wrongfully dispossessed filed a suit
82 AIR 1987 SC 1493

83 1991 (4) SCC 312
84 AIR 1996 SC 1697
85 2000 (2) SCC 139
86 AIR 1959 SC 577
Chapter 8 393
for possession in March 1956 before the passing of

the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The Court said that
on coming into force of the said Act, she must be
regarded as a female Hindu who possessed the
property for the purposes of section 14 and so she
became a full owner of it. The Supreme Court has
almost flexed quite far to interpret the section 14
as also the Hindu females other situational status
to her advantage. If not for such a liberal
interpretation most of the widows would have been
deprived of their right to inheritance of what is
there due. In Mary Roys case87, where the Supreme
Court held that the Indian Succession Act will
apply to the Christians of Kerala after the
integration of states. Christian women, the Court
said, cannot be given a lesser share in inheritance
under the old state law.
In Kirtikant D. Vadodaria v. State of Gujrat88

it was held that the obligation of the Hindu male
to maintain his wife, minor sons, unmarried
daughters and aged or inform parents is personal,
legal and absolute in character and arises from the
very existence of relationship between the parties.
The husband is liable to maintain his wife if he is
87 1986 (2) SCC 209

88 (1996) 4 SCC 479
Chapter 8 394
capable of earning. He cannot plead that he is

unable to maintain his wife due to financial
constraints.
While interpreting the Guardianship law in the

light of Article 15 by the Supreme Court in Githa
Hariharan89 equated the position of mother to that
of father in the matter of guardianship. This is
another feat in strengthening the position of
women.
The sense of insecurity, humiliation and

helplessness always keep a women mum. Our whole
socialisation is such that for any unsuccessful
marriage which results in such violence or divorce,
it is always the woman, who is held responsible.
Cultural beliefs and traditions that discriminate
against women may be officially discredited but
they continue to flourish at the grass root levels.
Family relations in India are governed by personal
laws. The four major religious communities are
Hindu, Muslim, Christian and Parsi each have their
separate personal laws. They are governed by their
respective personal laws in matters of marriage,
divorce, succession, adoption, guardianship and
maintenance. In the laws of all the communities,
89 (1999) 2 SCC 228

Chapter 8 395
women have fewer rights than that of man in

corresponding situations. It is really that women
of the minority communities in India continue to
have unequal legal rights and even the women of the
majority community have yet to gain complete formal
equality in all aspects of family life.
Gender inequality is most apparent in personal

laws. The best way to remove it is to enact uniform
civil code but our founding fathers has included it
as one of the Directive Principles of the State
policy (Article 44); not enforceable in the courts
of law. Directive principles are our goals; the
fundamental rights are means to achieve them. The
court decisions indicate that though the directive
principles are not enforceable yet the courts are
interpreting fundamental rights in their light.
There is a sort of fusion between the two in most
of the fields and the courts are in a way enforcing
them; except in the field of personal laws (uniform
civil code). Many have been urging the courts to
take more active role in this direction. They say
that:
Article 13 does not make any distinction

between personal law and in any other law.
Chapter 8 396
The Legislature is not likely to intervene

to make any legislation for political
reasons.
Personal laws are also subject to part III
of the Constitution.
Many provisions of personal laws violate
article 14 and 15(1) of the Constitution
and should be declared un-constitutional.
The Courts made some progress in this regard in

Sarala Mudgal v. Union of India90 and Madhu Kishwar
v. State of Bihar91 but subsequently the Supreme
Court dismissed the writ petition in Ahmedabad
Women Action Group (AWAG) v. Union of India92 saying
that:
The arguments involve issues of State policies

with which the court will not ordinarily have any
concern. The remedy lies somewhere else and not by
knocking at the doors of the Courts.
It is really a difficult task to sum up the

judicial approach towards women and women related
issues, as positive or negative. The approach, over
90 AIR 1995 SC 1531

91 AIR 1996 5 SCC 125
92 AIR 1997, 3 SCC 573
Chapter 8 397
the years has been, transformed from traditionalist

to activist.
By employing the traditional rules of

construction the Courts defeated gender justice in
adjusting challenges to bigamous marriages. In
Smt.Priya Bala Ghosh v. Suresh Chandra Ghosh93 and
Gopal Lal v. State of Rajasthan94 the courts said
that marriages celebrated without proper ceremonies
and in due from cannot be recognized as marriage to
sustain conviction for bigamy.
Depending on dictionary meaning of solemnized

the court elbowed out the policy and purpose of the
legislation. By making the burden heavy on the
prosecution without regard to the object of the
legislation, the court helped accused in bigamy
cases go scot-free and let women put to gross
subordination and inequality.95
In Yamunabhai v. Anantrao96 the Supreme Court

even refused to accept the plea of the second
wife to an order of maintenance under Section 125
of Cr.P.C. on the ground that the marriage was
93 AIR 1971 SC 1153

94 AIR 1979 SC 713
95 D. Sivaramayya, Fifty years of the Supreme Court, OUP and ILI (2000) pp. 291-92
96 AIR 1988 S.C. 644
Chapter 8 398
void. No amount of social context and social

justice arguments on the light of such women could
change the traditional approach of the judiciary to
the gender inequalities in the situation. The Court
was however persuaded to consider sanction of
interim maintenance pending decision of the
validity of the second marriage.
The courts approach on violence against women

varied between strict and liberal interpretations.
In rape cases the court initially insisted on
corroboration of the testimony of the prosecutrix,
delay in filing the FIR against the prosecution
case and reduced sentences of rapists including
child rapists on extraneous considerations ignoring
the trauma of rape victims.
Over the years, the legislature and the

judiciary tightened the law of rape and came to the
help of victims of sexual violence. In a recent
case the Supreme Court turned activist and directed
the National Commission for Women to frame a scheme
for payment of compensation to the victims of rape
on view of the gaps in the criminal law in this
regard (1995) 1 SCC 14 ). Minor variations in the
testimony of female victims are no longer
Chapter 8 399
considered enough for impeaching the testimony of

the victims of sexual violence.
In respect of construing property rights of

women, the court has adopted a liberal approach and
buttressed the rights of women to claim
constructive possession under the Hindu
Succession Act97 even in absence of actual
possession. In fact, the approach of the court gave
the widest possible interpretation and enlarged the
traditional property rights of Hindu women.
However, the Court showed reluctance to assert the
same activist approach and refused to invalidate
discriminatory featured of the customary Hindu Law
of Succession98.
On the issue of preferential rights of a male

to guardianship of a Hindu minor, the court found
gender-based inequality in section 6(a) of the
Hindu Minority and Guardians Act, 1956 and invoked
the provision of CEDAW and Beijing Declaration to
restore gender justice by interpreting the words
after him in Section 6(a) to mean in the absence
of for whatever reason99. Thus the
constitutionality of the Statute was upheld while
97 Kotturu Swami v. Setra Verrawa, AIR 1959 SC 577
98 AIR 1996 SC 1864
99 Gita Hariharan, 1999 (2) SCC 228
Chapter 8 400
giving mothers of minor children equal rights

become natural guardians when the father was alive.
On sexual harassment at work place, an activist

court openly advanced the cause of gender justice
based on international human rights instruments100
The court felt that the absence of legislation
should not be allowed to perpetrate gender based
violence against women at work places and laid down
a series of guidelines to be observed in all
institutions employing women, until legislation is
enacted for the purpose. The court literally
legislated on what constitution sexual harassment
and how complaints have to be processed promptly
and fairly through a mechanism which the court
itself devised through the judgment. The decision
constitutes a landmark in gender justice
development through judicial decision.
Maintenance is an issue on which the court has

of late taken progressively liberal approach
promotive of womens right to equal justice. While
in one case the court felt that maintenance should
encompass provisions for residence101 in another it
ruled that the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights
100 Vishakha, 1997 (6) SCC 241

101 Mangatmu v. Punni Devi; 1995 (5) SCALE 199
Chapter 8 401
on Divorce) Act should be interpreted beneficially

in favour of Muslim Women on the line of the Shah
Bano judgment102. This was done even when the
legislature took a regressive step in denying a
section of women what the secular law has provided
to avoid deprivation and exploitation.
Recognizing the importance of the Directive

Principle on Uniform Civil Code for promoting
equality of women, the court on several occasions
exhorted the legislature to initiate necessary
steps in realizing the object of the Directive.
Besides, the Courts itself tried to evolve,
incrementally using constitutional rights and
judicial review, some uniformity in matrimonial
laws of different communities103. However, on
Uniform Civil Code, the Court later restrained
itself stating that removal of gender
discrimination in personal laws involves issues of
State policies with which the court will not
ordinarily have any concern104. Thus perceived, the
picture which emerges of judicial performance on
gender justice is mixed of traditionalism and
restraint giving hope and despair intermittently.
102 AIR 1985 SC 945

103 Sarla Mudgal, AIR 1995 SC 1531
104 Ahmedabad Women Action Group v. Union of India; AIR 1997 SC 3614
Chapter 8 402
Of course, given the complex social reality and the

reluctance of the legislature to give what is due
to women though policy changes, courts can do very
little to change the situation all of a sudden. Yet
the court has compelled change and exposed the
double standards of political parties and
governments in their approach to the plight of
women. In whatever, the judges did, they invoked
the spirit of the Constitution and the provision of
international human rights instruments. In fact, by
doing so, they brought in a revolutionary principle
of domestic application of international law
through judicial interventions and gave to
themselves a potential weapon for continuing
improvement in delivery of justice to women and
other weaker sections of society.
Equality is the cardinal principle of the

Constitution of India. Several provisions under the
Indian Constitution try to bring gender equality.
It is evident from various cases discussed above
that judiciary played a crucial role in protecting
rights of women. In tune with constitutional
aspiration of gender equality various laws have
been enacted relating to prohibition of female
infanticide, dowry, exposure of women in
advertisements and films, female child marriage,
Chapter 8 403
atrocities and molestation, abduction and rape,

maternity benefits, medical termination of
pregnancy, prohibition of prostitution and
trafficking in women and protection in employment.
The positive judicial activism, stimulus for the
Indian legislatures to enact several new laws or to
bring about the changes in the existing ones with a
view to afford better protection to women is a
demand of the time wherein there is emphasis upon
womens empowerment.
Unfortunately in this regard the vast bodies of

decisional law of the subordinate courts where the
bulk of women ordinarily seek justice are not
available for review. Though in a precedent bound
system, one can expect the decisions of superior
courts to be the applicable law, it is common
knowledge that approaches and attitudes towards
facts and evidence of individual judges can make a
lot of difference in the outcome of the case
despite the law being common to all. In other
words, evaluation of judicial decisions on gender
justice can only give a partial not necessarily the
true picture of judicial performance in this
regard. A second yardstick for assessment of
judicial performance in gender justice is the
manner in which judges treat women in court whether
Chapter 8 404
they appear before them as litigants, witness,

victims, lawyers or subordinate staff. This is
where women experience discrimination and develop
perceptions of justice/injustice in the system
which build or erode their confidence in the
system. Therefore, it is a critical input in the
assessment of the system in respect of gender
justice.

Women Empowerment - Chapter 8

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Women Empowerment - Chapter 8

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Women Empowerment - Chapter 8

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Chapter 8 303

The Role of Law in Empowering Women in India

Judiciary as Harbinger for Women Empowerment

The legislations alone cannot make justice

Gender justice is a concept understood

it is argued that the judicial system as a whole

It requires a lot of research to prove or

extent of participation of women get from the

The Constitution has paved the base of equal

have strong reformist kind of public opinion behind

Though not welcomed by all, the action

In C. Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A.M.

1 1995 SCC (5) 457

suit the changing social and economic scenario to

In S. P. Gupta v. President of India2 the court

The court also went on to say that, ....law

which will harmonise the law with the prevailing

It is clear from the above statements that, not

The courts do not always follow the precedent

Also, in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (Shriram

3Air 1987 SC 965. 142. 23

develop its own new principles. The above decision

Finally it can be summed up that, The courts

It has been accepted that judges filled the

4Web Article by Ashish Shrivastava available at

Despite of plethora of legislations due to

All provisions of the Constitution and all laws

interpretation. The Constitutional mandate and the

The most important contribution of judiciary

fundamental duties in favour of women. Sometimes to

1. Judicial Approach in the matters relating to

Education is a part of the development of the

5 AIR 1954 Mad 67, (1953) IIMLJ 287

University of Madras is not a State and its

The Court accepted all the three contentions in

has not been used, the State can deny admission to

It is submitted that the judgment is based on

special law should be preferred over general law

The view of Madras High Court did not hold the

61968 AIR 1379, 1968 SCR (3) 565

not offend the provisions of Articles 15(1) and

In Padmaraj Samarendra v. State of Bihar8,

2. Judicial Approach in the matters of Employment:

Rule 18(4) of the Indian Foreign Service

women for panel employees in the government was

Hostile discrimination against women has always

time to time. Since sex, like race and national

What is said about the fair sex equally applies

13 AIR 1981 SC 1829

of India. Regulation 46(1)(c) of the Air India

14 AIR 1981 SC 1829 at 1850.

Regulation 47 further provided that the

In C.B. Muthamma v. Union of India,16 the writ

15 AIR 1966 SC 942

reality. It was a unique example of sex

In Vijay Lakshmi v. Punjab University17, the

17 AIR 2003 SC 3331

providing for appointment of lady Principal in

On the concept of equality enshrined in the