THE INNER WORD PRIOR TO LANGUAGE

AUGUSTINE AS PLATONIST ALTERNATIVE TO GADAMERIAN HERMENEUTICS

Phillip Cary

Hans-Georg Gadamer wants to uphold the in- this heresy is represented by the great church fa-
separability of thought and language, and so does ther Augustine, who is the fountainhead of
John Arthos in his new book, The Inner Word in Christian orthodoxy in the West as well as the
Gadamer’s Hermeneutics.1 Arthos focuses on source of the concept of verbum interius. Some-
the Augustinian and Thomistic concept of inner thing interesting and complex is going on here, in
word, verbum interius, not only because it looks Gadamer’s text as well as Arthos’s.
to be a crucial nodal point linking language and As a first approximation, I’d say what’s hap-
the inner workings of the mind, but also because pening is that Augustine is not quite what any of
G ad amer h imself in d icated th at h is us want him to be. This has been a repeated theme
hermeneutical thinking has grown from it as a of my own scholarship for years: I’m an Augus-
crucial point of departure (IW 98; cf. 1). The im- tine scholar who brings to both Catholic and
portance of this concept and its history is enough Protestant theologians the bad news that Augus-
to justify a whole book devoted to the interpreta- tine isn’t quite what they want him to be. Above
tion of a single ten page section of Wahrheit und all, he is more Platonist than anyone really wants
Methode, containing Gadamer’s discussion of him to be, and in that regard Gadamer is in the
the inner word (III, 3, B).2 same boat with the theologians.
It turns out to be a strikingly ambivalent sec-
tion. It includes a paragraph of sharply critical Distinguishing Sensible and Intelligible
rhetorical questions aimed at Augustine (cf. IW Well, what’s wrong with Platonism, after all?
265f.; TM 381), who gave the West the concept As Gadamer notes (IW 279; TM 382), Plato de-
of verbum interius together with the insistence scribes thinking as an inner conversation of the
that it does not in fact have anything to do with soul with itself, and the point of this description is
language. “It is not Greek nor Latin nor of any precisely to support Plato’s contention that
other tongue,” Augustine insists (On the Trinity “thought [dianoia] and speech [logos] are the
15:19), but a word of the intellect alone—pre- same.”4 This sounds pretty close to the desired
cisely thought without speech! Gadamer quite unity, even though Gadamer thinks that “Plato
rightly identifies this as a consequence of Augus- undoubtedly did not consider that the process of
tine’s “thoroughly Platonist devaluation of sensi- thought, if conceived as a dialogue of the soul, it-
ble phenomena” (IW 249; TM 380), and Arthos self involves a connection with language” (TM
comments, “This part of Augustine’s theory is 368; cf. IW 280). Nonetheless, you would think
anathema to hermeneutics” (IW 250). that this is closer to the unity of thought and
Arthos’s condemnation of Augustine at this speech Gadamer is after than the concept of the
point is strikingly, though no doubt inadvertently, inner word, which Augustine explicitly denies is
ecclesiastical, employing the word “anathema,” the kind of thinking we do when we silently use
which is the solemn term used for cursing a here- the words of a particular language. Again,
tic who preaches a false gospel.3 If philosophical Gadamer is well aware of this, and alludes to the
hermeneutics is meant to be good news—in that passage where Augustine insists that the inner
sense a kind of evangelion or gospel—then it ap- word is “neither uttered [prolativum] in sound
parently originated with a concept that turned out nor thought of in the likeness of sound
to be heretical. It is all the more interesting that [cogitativum in similitudine soni].”5 The inner
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word is precisely not what Plato seems to have ner life of the soul, the intellect is more inward
been thinking of, a speaking silently to ourselves than the imagination, where we speak to
in a particular language. It has no such connec- ourselves silently in words that are still images of
tion with sensible sound, not even imagined the sounding words outside us.
sound. To grasp it, says Augustine, we must un- Augustine does not deny that the inner word
derstand a word “not only before it sounds, but can be formed by our understanding of external
even before the images of its sounds are consid- things. This becomes a key point in the Thomistic
ered in thought, for this is something that pertains argument cited by Gadamer, to the effect that the
to no language.”6 This is why Augustine says that inner word need not be reflective.11 But insofar as
when the inner word is uttered externally, i.e., the inner word is an apt analogy to the procession
“spoken in sound or some other bodily sign,” of the eternal Word in the Trinity, it is indeed re-
then “it is not spoken as it is, but as it can be seen flective, or rather introspective: for the mind is
or heard by the body.”7 Plato had never envi- not like the eye, which has to look outside itself to
sioned so sharp and explicit a contrast between see itself, using something like a mirror as a me-
the intelligible logos of the mind and the sensible dium of reflection. Instead, it turns directly to it-
sound of language. In this regard Augustine is self: “something pertaining to its own nature is in
more Platonist than Plato is. its sight and it is called back to it when it thinks of
The Platonist contrast between sensible and itself by a turning that is incorporeal, not in the
intelligible is something Plato sometimes for- dimension of space.”12 Though there is a sense in
gets, but never Augustine. It systematically gov- which the mind is in its own memory even when
erns Augustine’s talk about the inner word and it’s not thinking about itself, what generates the
indeed the whole inner space of the soul. The inner word is this active turning or conversion of
point is that the soul is a different dimension of the mind to itself, which puts itself directly in its
being from the body, a higher and incorporeal di- own mental sight: “And in this way, when the
mension of being that is closer to God.8 This mind turns to itself in thought, it makes a trinity,
closeness is of course not a bodily or spatial prox- in which now a verbum also can be understood;
imity, but consists precisely in its capacity for in- for it is formed out of the thought itself, with the
tellectual vision, its ability to see the Platonic will joining them both.”13 Hence I think Arthos
ideas in the mind of God.9 So the inner word is an gets it wrong here when he says, commenting on
intellectual word, the product of intellect in its this same book of Augustine’s treatise On the
love of vision. For by love the intellect either Trinity, that “the act of reflection . . . is not a con-
draws near or else turns away and departs from scious turning of the mind to self, as if such a
the intelligible Truth, the way the Prodigal Son thing were possible” (IW 127). Quite the con-
goes into a far country and later returns to his di- trary: in Augustine, the turning of the mind to it-
vine Father in a voyage that was “not by feet” in a self, putting itself in its own sight (conspectus
key Neoplatonist metaphor in Augustine’s Con- ejus), is exactly what it means to think about it-
fessions.10 To be close to God is to love and seek self, and this is how it generates an inner word
understanding of divine Truth, whereas to be far that serves in an analogy of the divine Trinity.
from God is to love created things more than their The point is ontological: as God is not de-
Creator. This closeness is often tracked by the pendent on the creation in order to know himself
language of superiority (the soul is higher and or to generate his eternal Word, so the mind does
better than bodies, and its power of reason is not have to look outside itself—which is to say, at
higher and better than the senses, which it shares something inferior to itself—to understand itself.
with the souls of beasts), but also by the language This parallel explains why the movement of the
of inwardness. The inner is higher, better, more second half of Augustine’s great treatise On the
intelligible, and closer to God than are external, Trinity (books 8–15) is ever more inward, a jour-
sensible, and bodily things, including the sound- ney deeper into “the inner man,” a grand execu-
ing words of human language. And within the in- tion of the project of inward turn that has been on
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193
Augustine’s mind since near the beginning of his semiotic theory of language does step into this
career as a Christian writer. This turning of the ontological framework in which the truth we ulti-
soul to itself is mapped on the terrain of the onto- mately seek is not to be found in external things,
logical hierarchy of a Christian Neoplatonism, including language.
where God is higher and more inward than the Hence his early treatment of language in the
soul, which is higher and more inward than bod- treatise On the Teacher begins by positing that
ies.14 The verbum interius takes its place at the “words are signs” (par. 3) and ends by arguing
higher levels of this inward journey of the soul, that “nothing is learned through its signs” (par.
closer to the ultimate inwardness of God. So it’s 33) and in particular, “we learn nothing from
not accidental that it has nothing to do with those signs that are called words” (par. 34). This
outward things like language. is clearly not a promising semiotics for those who
want to find in language the truth of being. Once
Augustine’s Semiotic Theory of Language again, the sensible/intelligible distinction deter-
That is not the end of the bad news about Au- mines the ontological and epistemological land-
gustine for Gadamer’s hermeneutical project. scape here, combined with Augustine’s new
The reason the inner word has nothing essentially brand of Platonist inwardness: words do have a
to do with language is that “it comes before all the use, he argues, which is to admonish and remind
signs by which it is signified,” including those us to look with our own minds and see for our-
audible signs we ordinarily call “words.”15 The selves, learning not from sensible things but from
notion that words are signs is not accidental, but the inner teacher, which is Christ—not Christ ex-
part of the foundation of Augustine’s philosophy ternally incarnate in flesh, but Christ as eternal
of language, which puts him in the camp of those Truth and Wisdom (replacing the figure of Rea-
who, in Gadamer’s view, make language into “a son, the inner teacher in Soliloquies), who
mere tool of communication” (TM 375), an “in- teaches us intelligible things by revealing them to
strument of subjectivity” (TM 377). To think of us in the intellectual light shining within our
words as signs “takes us away from the nature of souls (par. 38).
language” (ibid.), Gadamer contends in the sec- Augustine’s theory of language is thus an ex-
tion of Truth and Method immediately preceding quisite example of Gadamer’s point that once
his discussion of the inner word. He sees this Plato carries out his intention in the Cratylus,
semiotic view of language as intimately con- which is to “banish knowledge to the intelligible
nected with the real result at which Plato is aim- sphere,” the only alternative is to treat words as
ing in his own treatment of language in the signs. This is an “epoch-making decision about
Cratylus: “to demonstrate that no objective truth thought concerning language,” Gadamer contin-
(aletheia ton onton) can be attained in language” ues, because “ever since in all discussions of lan-
(TM 378). guage the concept of image (eikon) has been re-
Augustine is indeed an heir of Plato in this re- placed by that of the sign (semeion or
gard. In his early work, especially the inner dia- semainon),” although he notes this is “not espe-
logue with Reason for which he invents the new cially emphasized” in Plato’s text itself (TM
Latin term Soliloquia—“soliloquies,” the inner 374). I don’t think Gadamer has got this quite
dialogues of one who is alone—Augustine con- right. It is true that Plato set the stage for a
tends that a bodily or sensible thing is never semiotic theory of language, but the theory did
“truly true” (vere verum) because it has “no true not explicitly emerge until Augustine. There are
form and beauty” (vera . . . forma et species) but reasons why no such theory could have emerged
only “a kind of image of the true” (quaedam in Greek thought.
imago veritatis) and thus is at best verisimilar or I have tried to show elsewhere that Augustine
similar to the truth, “true by a sort of imitation” was in fact the first thinker to classify words as a
(imitatione aliqua verum).16 Though he does not species of signs. He must virtually re-invent an-
try to carry through this distinction for long, his cient semiotics to do so. Greek semiotics had
PHILOSOPHY TODAY
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been exclusively a theory of inference, never a in our fallen state where intellectual vision is in-
theory of linguistic meaning. This is why Plato sufficient for one mind to understand another, we
never treated words as a type of sign (semeion, need words as sensible intermediaries between
which should not be confused with semainon, soul and soul.19 This is why the inner word be-
which is the term for semantics not semiotics; comes incarnate, as it were, “made sound” (fit
semainon is indeed a term that concerns linguis- sonum) in a way analogous to the divine Word
tic meaning, but it is used by the Stoics, sticklers “made flesh” (fit carnem), so that it might tra-
for technical vocabulary, who insist on distin- verse the distance between soul and soul.
guishing it sharply from semeion, which con- This “incarnation” of the word of the human
cerns empirical inference, not language). Aris- mind in sound is an analogy Augustine develops
totle, likewise, is often thought to classify words in the context of his semiotic theory of language
as a type of sign in the opening page of his logical in On Christian Doctrine, a decade or more be-
treatise On Interpretation, but this is in fact a me- fore the treatise On the Trinity, though he does
dieval reading which assimilates Aristotle’s view not yet use the term “inner word.”
to Augustine’s.17 The Greek semeion is a sensible
In order that what we carry in our mind may be
object which lets you know of the presence of brought into the mind of a hearer through the ears
some hidden object—the stock example being of the flesh, the word we bear in our hearts [verbum
that smoke is a sign (semeion) of fire. This is not a quod corde gestamus] is made sound and called
promising basis for a semiotic account of the na- speech [locutio]. Yet our thought is not turned into
ture of language. What enables Augustine to ar- that sound but rather, while remaining whole in it-
rive at a semiotics of language is the distinctively self, takes on the form of the voice [formam vocis]
Latin usage of terms like significare, which had by which it insinuates itself into the ears without
no equivalent in Greek, because they concerned any blemish of change. Thus the Word of God, un-
not the direction of inference from sign to thing changed, nonetheless was “made flesh and dwelt
signified, but the direction of expression from the among us.”
20

soul’s communicative intent to the bodily signs

that express it. We can see this usage of You will notice that the key point of the analogy
significare quite vividly in Cicero’s writings on is that the word remains unchanged, even as it as-
rhetoric, in which significationes are bodily hints sumes or takes on [assumit] a lower form: the in-
and gestures that convey the emotions of the telligible word of the heart or mind (which Au-
speaker’s soul (motus animi). It’s Augustine who gustine later calls verbum interius) taking on the
applies this expressionist semiotics to language, form of the audible voice and the eternal Word of
classifying words as signs used by the soul to sig- God, the second person of the Trinity, taking on
nify and express its will to communicate. Augus- human flesh. For the ontological hierarchy of
tine’s semiotic theory of language is presented at Platonism does not allow for lower things to
the beginning of the second book of On Christian change higher things. The eternal God remains
Doctrine, and becomes decisive for Western absolutely unchangeable, even in the incarnation
semiotics ever since. 18 There could be no (or else the incarnate God would no longer be
Saussure or Derrida without it. God) while the inner word of the heart remains
whole in itself, still dwelling in the heart, even as
The Inner Word as Theological Analogy it assumes the lower, sensible form of audible
words. This is the ontological reason why the in-
Augustine’s expressionist semiotics is indeed ner word is not in Latin or Greek or any other lan-
Platonist in inspiration, for reasons closely re- guage. It is above the sensible level of being and
lated to the ontological point about the soul’s remains so, even when it assumes the form of au-
closeness to God discussed above. Once again dible speech. Otherwise it would not be a good
the distinction between sensible and intelligible analogy for the eternal Word, which remains
is crucial to keep in mind. The thoughts of our immutable even when it assumes the form of
souls are not perceptible to the bodily senses, so mortal flesh.
THE INNER WORD PRIOR TO LANGUAGE
195
 The trinitarian form of the inner word analogy the beginning of his hermeneutical journey, it
develops a bit later in Augustine’s career. Here, does not seem to me to offer much help in
the key point is to make sure the eternal Word, the conceiving of the essential unity of thought and
second person of the Trinity, is not made to de- language.
pend on his relation to the created world. Unlike
some earlier, pre-Nicene forms of trinitarian doc- A Powerful Alternative
trine, the eternal word in Augustine’s theology It would be a mistake to suppose that Augus-
does not proceed from God the Father in order to tine fell short of an adequate account of the
create the world. He proceeds as the Father’s own hermeneutical experience because of a rigid or
Word of self-understanding, the intellect of God doctrinaire Platonism. This is not because Au-
knowing itself. The Word is thus eternally begot- gustine is no Platonist, but because his Platonism
ten of the Father, “begotten not created” as the is not rigid and doctrinaire. On the contrary it is
Nicene creed says, and would have existed even supple and powerful, providing a nuanced and
if God had never created the world and Jesus of compelling interpretation of the experience of
Nazareth had never existed. Again, this is one understanding that has formed the Western imag-
more reason why the inner word cannot have an ination for centuries. It does not represent a fail-
essential relation to audible language: it would ure to appreciate the unity of language and
imply by analogy that the eternal Word had an es- thought, but rather presents, quite deliberately, a
sential relation to the creation, which would powerful alternative to the unity of language and
make him less than God the Father, as in the pre- thought—an alternative, that is, to what Gadamer
Nicene form of trinitarianism called “subordina- thinks is at the heart of the hermeneutical experi-
tionism.” Gadamer is indicating his awareness of e n c e . A u g u s tin e wa n ts u n d e r s tan d in g
this point when he says “the direct reference to (intellectus) to be something higher and prior and
utterance [Äusserung] and becoming sound more inward than language, and his expressionist
[Lautwerden] is in the end rejected by Christian semiotics has taught some of the most important
th eo lo g y alo n g w ith th e r ejectio n o f thinkers of the West to want the same thing.
subordinationism” (IW 239; TM 380). To conclude, then, let me present a sample of
In short, there are systematic ontological, this power, found in a little-known passage from
epistemological and theological reasons why the Augustine’s treatise On Catechizing the Un-
verbum interius in Augustine cannot have any es- learned (par. 3). The passage is about tradition, in
sential connection with language.21 As a result, it a very active sense: the catechizing Augustine is
is not really a promising concept for Gadamer’s concerned with is leading up to baptism, which is
purposes, and that is why his section on the inner preceded by the traditio symboli, literally the
word is so complex and ambivalent. Things do “handing down of the creed.” Those receiving in-
not really get any better when he moves to dis- struction for baptism, called catechumens, were
cuss scholastic theology and Thomas Aquinas. not taught the creed until shortly before baptism,
The Thomistic texts he has in mind (helpfully in a formal ceremony in which the creed was
presented in an appendix in Arthos’ volume) do handed down (tradidi) to them. Thus the work of
not make any essential connection between the catechizing is the interpretive work of preparing
inner word and language. This is as we should ex- catechumens for this act of tradition, so that they
pect, since they are operating under the same will understand the creed, which summarizes the
theological constraints as Augustine: the inner faith into which they are going to be baptized.
word is developed primarily as an analogy to the The problem is that catechetical lectures get
eternal Word in the Trinity, which means it can- boring. Why is that, when what they have to ex-
not have any essential relation to what is onto- press is so important, even beautiful? Augus-
logically inferior to it, not even when it is “incar- tine’s explanation focuses on the difference in
nate” in sound. However much the term verbum ontological levels between the spoken language
interius may have stirred Gadamer’s thoughts at of the lecture and the understanding (intellectus)
PHILOSOPHY TODAY
196
it is supposed to convey. The outward word of Yet we are not allowed by the sound of our voices
discourse is just not adequate for expressing the to bring forth and as it were spread out before the
traces (vestigia) of understanding that remain in sense of our hearers these traces which under-
memory after the intuitive flash of understanding standing impressed upon our memory, in the same
that so excites the mind. These traces are what way that a face is plain and manifest; for these are
within, in the mind, while that is outside in the
Augustine later in his career calls the inner word.
body. From this one can conclude how far different
So here is the explanation of why Augustine
the sound in our ear is from that stroke of under-
often finds his own lectures boring:
standing, when it is not even similar to those im-
22
I too am almost always displeased by my own dis- pressions of the memory.
course [sermo]. I am eager for something better,
Augustine here interprets his experience of lan-
which I often enjoy inwardly before beginning to
guage in terms of a three-level Platonist hierar-
unfold it in sounding words, and insofar as I fall chy of God, soul and body. What Augustine
short of this initial impulse I am grieved that my loves is that moment of intellectual vision in
tongue cannot suffice for my heart. For my will is which, with a flash of intuition, the soul inwardly
that those who hear me may understand all that I touches the eternity of divine Truth above it. This
understand, and I realize that I have not spoken contact with eternity is brought down to a lower
well enough to accomplish this, precisely because ontological level when it impresses its traces in
such understanding saturates the mind like a quick the soul’s own memory—traces which Augus-
flash of light, while the speaking is long and tine later calls verbum interius—and then it is
drawn-out and far different, and as it rolls on, the brought down to the lowest level when it is ex-
other has already concealed itself in its hiding pressed outwardly in words accessible to the
place. Nevertheless, because it impresses a certain bodily senses, using Latin or some other
kind of traces upon the memory, it lasts through the language.
period of time taken up by the syllables. This is a powerful interpretation of the experi-
And it is because of such traces that we are able to ence of understanding which has held sway in the
carry through to completion the sounding signs West for centuries, and the separation of lan-
which we call Latin or Greek, Hebrew or whatever guage and thought is one of its essential
other language, whether we merely think these consequences. It has convinced many Westerners
signs or actually utter them with the voice. For that at the center of their minds or hearts is the
these traces are neither Latin nor Greek nor He- possibility of an experience of the divine that is
brew, and they are not the property of any one peo- too deep for words. I think this interpretation of
ple, but act in the mind as the face does in the body. experience—and for that matter of the divine—is
We say “anger” one way in Latin, another way in a mistake, but it is certainly not a trivial one, a
Greek, and yet another for each different language; mere piece of thoughtless rigidity. It is an epochal
but an angry face is neither Latin nor Greek. Hence and innovative approach to semiotics that has led
not all peoples will understand when someone says to the conviction, still widely taken for granted
“iratus sum,” but only the Latins; but if the emotion today, that language is merely an inadequate out-
burning in the soul bursts forth in the face and af- ward expression or sign of a deeper, more
fects the expression on it, everyone realizes that inward, pre-verbal experience.
they’re looking at someone who’s angry.
ENDNOTES

1. John Arthos, The Inner Word in Gadamer’s Herme- together with translation and commentary, but I will
neutics (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University also give page numbers from Gadamer, Truth and
Press, 2009). Henceforth cited inline as IW. Method (New York: Crossroad, 1985). Cited inline
2. I will translate from the German given in The Inner as TM.
Word, which includes the text of the whole section 3. See the use of the Greek term anathema in the New

THE INNER WORD PRIOR TO LANGUAGE

197
 Testament letter of Paul to the Galatians 1:8f., which 10. The striking amalgam of the Biblical parable of the
is the model for the anathemas appended to the origi- Prodigal Son with the Plotinian imagery of a journey
nal Nicene Creed, for which see, e.g., J. N. D. Kelly, not by feet or ship or chariot (Enneads 1:6.8) is used
Early Christian Doctrines (San Francisco: Harper to explain the possibility of the soul’s distance as
and Row, 1978), 232. well as nearness to God in Confessions 1:28.
4. Sophist 263e; cf. also Theaetetus 189e, where again 11. Truth and Method, 385 (= The Inner Word, 335);
dianoia is a logos that the soul has with itself. And cf. Gadamer appears to be thinking of the Thomistic
Philebus 38c39a, where this silent inner dialogue is treatise De Natura Verbi Intellectus, 279–280; cf.
dramatized and then explained as a kind of writing The Inner Word, 275–76.
[graphein] of words [logoi] on the soul. Note also
12. “Aliquid pertinens ad ejus naturam sit conspectus
that the spoken logos is described as “the image of
ejus, et in eam, quando se cogitat, non quasi loci
dianoia in the voice” in Theaetetus 308c.
spatium, sed incorporea conversione revocetur” (Au-
5. Augustine, On the Trinity 15:19, alluded to in Truth
gustine, On the Trinity 14:8).
and Method (380; cf. The Inner Word, 249). All
translations from Latin are my own. 13. “Ac per hoc, quando [mens] ad se ipsam cogitatione
convertitur, fit trinitas, in qua jam et verbum possit
6. Augustine, On the Trinity 15:19: “verbum, non
solum antequam sonet, verum etiam antequam intelligi; formatur quippe ex ipsa cogitatione,
sonorum ejus imagines cogitatione volvantur, hoc voluntate utrumque jungente” (ibid., 14.3).
enim est quod ad nullam pertinet linguam. . . .” 14. For this inward turn and its Platonist background, see
7. Ibid., 15:20. Gadamer quotes the second half of this Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self, chapters
in Latin: “non dicitur, sicuti est, sed sicut potest 3 and 5.
videri audirive [not “audivire” as in Arthos] per cor- 15. “Omnia quibus significatur signa praecedit” (Augus-
pus” (Truth and Method, 380; The Inner Word, 249). tine, On the Trinity 15:20).
8. “There is nothing of all that God created that is closer 16. Soliloquies 2:32. For a fuller discussion of Augus-
to him than the soul,” Augustine says in an early tine’s distinction between verum and veri simile,
work, On the Quantity of the Soul, 77. That closeness which in his early work parallels the intelligible-sen-
is due to the possibility of inward illumination (On sible distinction, see Phillip Cary, Outward Signs:
the Morals of the Church, 18) which pertains to the the Powerlessness of External Things in Augustine’s
reason and understanding of the mind, by which the Thought (New York: Oxford University Press,
human soul is superior to the irrational animals (City 2008), 57–64.
of God 11:2). In this same higher, intellectual part of 17. See ibid., 22–23, 32–34.
the soul is located the true image of the triune God, 18. I make the argument for the absence of a semiotic
which explains why “there is nothing in all of God’s theory of language in Greek philosophy in Outward
creation so close to him in nature,” City of God 11:26. Signs, chapter 1. I present Augustine’s semiotics and
9. In a little essay “On Ideas” (= On 83 Different Ques- its sources in chapter 3.
tions, 46), Augustine makes the first and decisive ar-
19. That language is a product of the fall is something
gument in the Christian West for the thesis that Pla-
Augustine hints at on a number of occasions. The op-
tonic Ideas are constituents of the mind of God, with
posite side of the coin is the notion that in the king-
the implication that Platonist intellectual vision is ac-
dom of God there will be no need for language, be-
tually the vision of God. It’s worth noting, for this au-
dience, that the argument proceeds by describing cause minds will be able to see minds directly.
Platonic ideas as logoi, and translating logoi as Augustine is the first Christian writer known to me to
rationes, the divine reasons or formative plans in develop this idea, based on some notions in Plotinus.
God’s mind by which the creation is formed. For dis- 20. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, 1:12. At the end
cussion cf. Phillip Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Augustine is quoting John 1:14.
Inner Self (New York: Oxford University Press, 21. For further discussion of the inner word in Augus-
2000), 53f. A translation of “On Ideas” is included in tine, see Outward Signs, 144–48.
the appendix to this book. 22. On Catechizing the Unlearned, 3.

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