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The Foreign Policies of Small States: Challenging Neorealism in Its Own Backyard
Author(s): Miriam Fendius Elman

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Source: British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Apr., 1995), pp. 171-217
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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B.J.Pol.S. 25, 171-217 Copyright? 1995 CambridgeUniversityPress
Printed in Great Britain
The Foreign Policies of Small States:

Challenging Neorealism in Its Own Backyard
MIRIAM FENDIUS ELMAN*
The received wisdom in internationalrelations suggests that we can best account for the foreign
policies of small states by examining structural/systemicratherthan domestic level factors. This
article challenges this scholarly consensus. The distribution of power and the balance of threat
do influence domestic institutional formation and change in emerging states. However, the
subsequent military strategies of these weak states are likely to reflect such domestic institutional
choices in a number of important and predictable ways. The article tests this argument against
pre-1900 US domestic regime change and foreign security policy. The historical evidence
suggests that while internationalpreconditions were critically linked to constitutional reform, the
institutional structures and rules of democratic presidentialism affected both the timing and
substance of US military strategies in later periods. The US case study provides a springboard
for speculating on the international context of democratization in Eastern Europe and the
long-term foreign-policy consequences of this domestic regime choice.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war, a number
of small states have entered upon the world scene.' How has the international
*Department of Political Science, Columbia University. Previous versions of this article were
presented at the 1993 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, the New York
State Political Science Association, and the International Studies Association. Funding for this
research was generously provided by the William T. R. Fox Fellowship in Political Science and the
Morris Abrams Award in International Relations. The author thanks Emmanuel Adler, Vincent
Augur, Lawrence Dodd, Colin Elman, Annette Baker Fox, Beau Grosscup, Virginia Hauffler, Jerel
Rosati, Jack Snyder, Hendrik Spruyt, Yaacov Vertzberger, the Journal's editors and anonymous
referees for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.
' In this
article, the terms 'weak', 'small', and 'insecure' are used interchangeably. When 'small
state' appears in the text, it should be understood to mean 'small' in terms of power ratherthan size.
For a similar conceptualization, see Michael Handel, Weak States in the International System
(London: Frank Cass, 1981), pp. 10-11; and Peter R. Baehr, 'Small States: A Tool for Analysis?',
World Politics, 3 (1975), 456-66, at p. 461. For an alternative definition based on population size,
see Colin Clarke and Tony Payne, eds, Politics, Security and Development in Small States (London:
Allen & Unwin, 1987). The most convincing definitions are those which view smallness in terms
of capabilities as well as how those capabilities are applied against whom, when, and for what sets
of goals. Resource capabilities necessarily constrain the scope and domain of foreign policy. Thus
a small state can be defined by its limited capacity to: (1) influence the security interests of, or directly
threaten,a great power; and (2) defend itself against an attack by an equally motivated great power.
See Robert O. Keohane, 'Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics',
International Organization, 23 (1969), 291-310, at pp. 295-6; Jack S. Levy, War in the Modern
Great Power System, 1495-1975 (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1983), pp. 9-10,
13; Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968),
p. 29; Handel, WeakStates in the International System, pp. 36, 68-9, 171; Annette Baker Fox, 'The
Small States in the InternationalSystem, 1919-1969', International Journal, 24 (1969), 751-64, at
p. 752; Eric J. Labs, 'Do Weak States Bandwagon?' Security Studies, I (1992), 383416, at p. 409.
172 ELMAN
environment affected the democratization process in these emerging states?

Now that democratic institutions have been selected, how will this domestic
regime choice affect their foreign policies?
International relations (IR) theory offers little help in answering these
questions. While IR theorists have addressed the foreign policies of great
powers, they have largely ignored the study of small states. Moreover, even
when scholars do refer to weak states, systemic ratherthan domestic factors are
accorded causal primacy. The received wisdom in the field is that domestic
determinants will be less salient when studying small state behaviour because
external constraints are more severe and the international situation is more
compelling. Including domestic affairs in our analysis would only detract from
an already satisfactory explanation based on the small state's position in the
international system and its interaction with the great powers.
Given this scholarly consensus, small state foreign policy provides a unique
opportunity for those scholars who insist that domestic politics matters in
explaining international and foreign-policy outcomes. Put more formally, weak
state foreign policy presents a crucial test for domestic level theory. It is
precisely in such cases where the conventional wisdom suggests that
internationalfactors can adequately account for state policy. If we can show that
domestic politics matters even in these instances where we would expect that
it should not, then we will have provided the strongest possible support for
domestic level theorizing.
This article is divided into three sections. In Section i, I review the received
wisdom in the field which assumes that neorealism has the home-court
advantage in explaining small state behaviour.2 Assertions that international
2
Neorealism assumes that interniationalconstraints influence state behaviour. In general, inter-
national pressures will override domestic interests, internal political struggles, and the characteris-
tics of particular states in foreign-policy decision making. Given that the international system is
anarchic and that states must consequently ensure their own security, the exigencies of the inter-
national environment will be paramount in decision makers' calculations. Accordingly, a state's
behaviour is viewed as a response to the constraints and incentives of its aggregate power relative
to others (i.e., the distribution of capabilities) or the degree of aggressive intent on the part of
external actors (i.e., the balance of threat). Neorealists assume that statesmen will respond rationally
to these preconditions and will choose that foreign-policy course which is most likely to maximize
security benefits and minimize security risks. While neorealists recognize that systemic/structural
factors may prevent statesmen from pursuing optimal strategies, it is presumed that elites are
domestically unconstrained. In contrast to this structural/systemic argument, unit or domestic level
theories expect that state attributes and societal conflicts will affect foreign-policy choices. It is
assumed that foreign policy will not always reflect national security interests or systemic/structural
imperatives. Rather, the characteristics of particular states and the ideologies and local interests of
societal and state actors will often render statesmen incapable of responding to the exigencies of the
international environment. For seminal works that distinguish between external and internal levels
of analysis as determinants of state behaviour, see Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War: A
Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959) and J. David Singer, 'The Level
of Analysis Problem in International Relations', World Politics, 14 (1961), 77-92. For recent
The Foreign Policies of Small States 173
factors have causal priority in such cases are not uncommon. In fact, most
students view small state behaviour as a function of either the international
distribution of power or the balance of threat. Changes in small state foreign
policies are considered isomorphic to fluctuations in the structure of the
international system and/or the degree of threat posed by the great powers. In
light of this scholarly consensus, small state foreign policy poses a hard case
for domestic level theory while it is easy on alternative systemic/structural
explanations. Thus a successful refutation of the received wisdom would pose
an even more significant challenge to neorealism in other contexts - it would
do much to legitimize domestic level approaches while seriously diminishing
neorealism's claim for explanatory primacy in the study of international
relations.3
In Section ni, various domestic level theories of foreign policy are rejected in
favour of an 'institutional' approach. Historical institutionalism suggests that
we study the development of domestic rules and structuresseparately from their
effects over time. This two-stage research strategy is necessary because the
variables that are important for explaining institutional formation and change
may be less important in accounting for subsequent state behaviour. For
example, while international factors play a dominant role in predisposing
statesmen towards particular democratic institutional alternatives, subsequent
state practices may reflect these recent domestic institutional choices ratherthan
the constraints of the internationalenvironment. Paradoxically, neorealism has
greater explanatory power in accounting for domestic regime choice in
emerging states than it does for explaining their subsequent military strategies.
In Section inl,I review pre-1900 US domestic regime change and subsequent
military strategy. American state building in the 1780s provides an opportunity
for testing how the international environment influences the choice between
alternative democratic institutional arrangements, if at all. The historical
evidence suggests that systemic/structural conditions play a dominant role in
democratic institutional formation and change. When emerging states are faced
with severe external threats to their survival, regime reformers are more likely
to choose presidential institutional features. When such exogenous pressures are
(F'rnotecontinued)
overviews of the debate, see Richard Rosecrance and ArthurA. Stein, 'Beyond Realism: The Study
of Grand Strategy', in Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, eds, The Domestic Bases of Grand
Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic
Politics and International Ambitions (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 21-3; and
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and International
Imperatives (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 12-17, 247.
3
By exploring small state foreign policy and showing that domestic politics counts, this article
aims to question the assumed causal primacy of neorealism. However, I remain firmly rooted in the
classical realist tradition, which never disregarded the important role of domestic level factors. As
Snyder notes, 'Realism must be recapturedfrom those who look only at politics between societies,
ignoring what goes on within societies' (Snyder, Myths of Empire, p. 20).
174 ELMAN
absent, statesmen enjoy a wider range of alternatives. They may choose

presidential type systems, but parliamentary institutions may also appear
attractive.
US foreign security policy during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries also
provides a ready testbed for judging the merits of a domestic politics alternative
to the study of small state behaviour. Specifically, I identify the determinants
of military strategy during the Quasi War (1798-1800); the War of 1812; and
the Mexican-American War (1846-48).4 Each case pits neorealism against the
proposed domestic level argument. Since the two theories lead us to expect
different foreign policies, I examine the actual outcomes to see which theory
predicts more reliably. The domestic institutional argument gains credibility by
providing the best explanation for US military strategies. The defeat of
neorealism in this competition can be considered particularly significant
because the theory fails in an area in which it claims to be strong.
The cases demonstrate how the rules and structuresof presidentialism, rather
than the constraints of the external environment, influenced US military
strategies. The historical evidence suggests that US foreign policies during this
period failed to reflect prevailing international conditions and can only be
understood from a domestic level perspective. Specifically, domestic institu-
tional features affected both the timing and substance of US military strategies.
Systemic/structural factors lead us to expect foreign-policy behaviour which is
not borne out by the empirical evidence. The proposed domestic level approach
provides a closer historical fit.
In conclusion, the article suggests that the kinds of causal arguments
appropriatefor explaining state choices during periods of crisis when domestic
institutions are first created, may be less appropriatein later periods - while the
external environment affects domestic institutional development, these institu-
tional designs will condition subsequent foreign policy outcomes. Neorealism
assumes that such domestic'regime type has only a limited affect on a state's
foreign policy, if at all.5 According to neorealism, domestic politics can be
4
Military strategy is how states decide 'which wars shall be fought, or if war should be fought'
(see Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the
World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 285). These cases comprise the three
foreign wars that the United States fought as a weak state as well as the security issues which
dominated domestic debate during the initial years of the American republic.
5 It is often
argued that while neorealism can account for general recurring patterns of state
behaviour, it does not attempt to explain the foreign policies of specific states. For example, Waltz
says that a theory of foreign policy is requiredin orderto explain how an individual state will respond
to the constraints posed by the international system (see Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International
Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 71-2). Nevertheless, Waltz does derive
different foreign polices, such as alignment strategies, from different distributions of power.
Balancing, chain-ganging, and buckpassing behaviour, which Waltz depicts as the product of the
system and its given polarity, are not general systemic or international outcomes but are rather
alternative foreign-policy strategies. In short, neorealism is a theory of foreign policy. But it differs
from other theories of foreign policy by assuming that state behaviour will be responsive to
international constraints and incentives ratherthan domestic level pressures. For additional studies
'black boxed', because, whatever their different internal characteristics, all

states must nevertheless act in similar ways to ensure their security in a self-help
world. Past research on small states has relied on this view of international
relations. The scholarly consensus views small state behaviour from a
state-centric perspective in which foreign-policy outputs are a response to
external constraints. By contrast, I argue that whether internationalor domestic
factors mattermore is an empirical question and should not be assumed a priori.
In contests between levels of analysis, neither domestic nor international
arguments automatically win.
I. HOW SHOULD WE STUDY SMALL STATE FOREIGN POLICY?
The Scholarly Consensus

While mainstream IR has largely ignored the study of weak states, scholars have
suggested that we can account for their behaviour by focusing on the effects of
the internationalsystem. The reasoning is as follows: since small states are more
preoccupied with survival than are the great powers, the international system
will be the most relevant level of analysis for explaining their foreign-policy
choices. Because weak states are typically faced with external threatsto national
survival, foreign policy will reflect an attentiveness to the constraints of the
international environment and foreign-policy goals will be less constrained by
the domestic political process. By contrast, domestic politics will necessarily
play a greater role in an explanation of great power foreign policy. Generally
speaking, great powers are faced with a lower level of external threat in
comparison to small states and thus have more options for action. This increased
range of choice will tend to make foreign policy formation more susceptible to
domestic political influences. Consequently, unit level variables cannot be
ignored when explaining great power foreign policy."
(F,'nolecontinued)
which employ the structural/systemiclevel of analysis in explaining particularforeign policies, see
Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine; Benjamin Miller, 'Explaining Great Power Cooperation
in Conflict Management', World Politics, 45 (1992), 1-46; and Joseph M. Grieco, Cooperation
Amon,gNations: Europe, America and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1987).
6 See Waltz, Theory of International Politics,
pp. 194-5. With regardto the determinantsof small
state foreign policy, Waltz is ambiguous. On the one hand, he argues that small state security and
foreign policy will be dependent on structural constraints, such as the degree of great power
competition. Small states will need to be more attentive to these external constraints due to their
'narrower margin for error' (Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 184-5, 195). On the other
hand, Waltz claims that the smaller the state, the more it is likely to take international constraints
for granted, since nothing it does can significantly effect the internationalsystem. Moreover, because
great powers focus their attention on those states most likely to present a security threat, they will
be less interested in weak states. As a result, small states will face fewer external constraints and
their behaviour will be more likely to reflect domestic political influences (Waltz, Theory of
International Politics, pp. 72-3).
176 ELMAN
Arguments that presume the salience of different levels of analysis in the

study of great versus small state behaviour have been raised in several seminal
texts. Well-known early examples include Wolfers and Rosenau. The former,
in his famous analogy of the 'burning house', emphasizes that states' fear for
survival is a variable ratherthan a constant and that 'the closer nations are drawn
to the pole of complete compulsion', the more they can be expected to conform
in their behaviour and act in a way that corresponds to structuralmodels.7 For
Wolfers, the need to analyse decision making and domestic politics is most
essential in the study of great power foreign policy, where environmental
constraints are less severe and hence differences in state behaviour are more
pronounced. Similarly, in assessing the relative explanatory power of structural
and domestic factors in foreign policy, Rosenau suggests that the international
environment will be more importantin an analysis of small state ratherthan great
power foreign policy.8
In recent years, this scholarly consensus has been reinforced. It is generally
assumed that because of the different internationalcontexts in which small and
large states operate, their foreign policies will reflect different sets of
constraints. Domestic level pressures will have more relevance for explaining
the foreign-policy choices of states which are less exposed to the international
environment. For example, Jervis argues that the security dilemma is
particularly acute for small states that cannot afford to be cheated and are less
likely to be buffered from the consequences of foreign-policy mistakes. Unlike
great powers, small states lack a 'margin of time and error' when responding
to external exigencies. Since the costs of being exploited are much higher for
small states than they are for great powers, the former will feel the effects of
anarchy to a greater extent. Consequently, statesmen in small states will need
to be 'more closely attuned' to external constraints than will great power
leadership.9
Similarly, Snyder assumes that the study of small state and great power
behaviour require different analytical foci. He points out that 'among the great
powers, domestic pressures often outweigh internationalones in the calculations
of national leaders'.'1 Since great powers 'enjoy a substantial buffer from the
pressures of international competition', domestic political explanations are
good predictors of their foreign policy strategies. When studying the foreign
policies of small states, Snyder does not expect domestic political theories to
fit as well. Whereas 'great powers adapt their foreign strategies to their domestic
7 Arnold
Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore, Md:
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), pp. 13-16.
x James Rosenau, 'Pre-theories and Theories of InternationalPolitics', in R. Barry Farrell, ed.,
Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, II.: Northwestern University
Press, 1966), pp. 47-8.
9 Robert
Jervis, 'Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma', WorldPolitics, 30 (1978), 167-214,
at pp. 172-3.
"'Snyder, Myths of Empire, p. 20. See also Miroslav Nincic, Democracy and Foreign Policy: The
Fallacy of Political Realism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 16.
circumstances', small states are more 'exposed to the vagaries of international

security and economic competition'. Since small state foreign policy strategies
will reflect an attentiveness to external exigencies, international/structural
explanations should suffice."
Like Snyder, Schweller argues that domestic level explanations will be less
useful when it comes to small states. According to Schweller, domestic
institutional constraints explain why great power democracies have consistently
pursued foreign policies short of war when confronted with rising challengers.
By contrast, small democratic states 'have not had their foreign policy options
constrained by those [domestic politicall elements that have ruled out preventive
war for other democracies'.12 Rather than being susceptible to domestic level
influences, Schweller concludes that 'extreme systemic constraints' can account
for weak state foreign policy and military behaviour.'3
Walt concurs with this received wisdom. In explaining the alliance patterns
of small states, he suggests that weak states are more likely to bandwagon with
an aggressive great power than balance against it. He attributes this foreign
policy strategy to the position of small states in the international system. Since
weak states are vulnerable to the aggressive demands of great powers, they will
ally with a dominant power in order to avoid immediate attack. Bandwagoning
is likely to be a preferred alliance strategy when the threatening great power is
geographically proximate and has a strong offensive capacity as well as when
alternative great power allies are unavailable.'4 Labs' recent study of small state
alignment similarly concludes that systemic-level conditions determine the
foreign policies of weak states. Like Walt, Labs argues that whether weak states
are more likely to balance or bandwagon against a great power threat is a
function of systemic factors, such as geographic proximity and the availability
of alternative alliance options.15 He concludes that neorealism is 'powerful in
16
predicting weak state behavior'.
Lastly, in their study of state behaviour in the post-cold war era, Goldgeier
and McFaul argue that while domestic politics will have an increasing influence
i Snyder, Myths of Empire, pp. 62, 317-18.

12
Randall L. Schweller, 'Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More
Pacific'?', World Politics, 14 (1992), 235-69, at p. 267.
"
Schweller, 'Domestic Structure and Preventive War', pp. 253, 264-8.
14
Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987),
pp. 21-31. Walt's point is not that small states prefer to bandwagon, but ratherthat they will often
be forced to select this course of action due to their vulnerable international position. Yet, Walt's
insistence that weak states choose bandwagoning strategies 'reluctantly' makes it difficult to falsify
his argument.If a small state bandwagons, Walt can point to its geographic proximity to a threatening
great power or to the unavailability of allies - 'balance of threat' theory scores a success. If a small
state balances, Walt can always argue that this strategy should be its first choice even'fit is a good
candidate for bandwagoning - once again, 'balance of threat' theory scores a success. That Walt's
theory is non-falsifiable highlights the ambiguity of neorealist policy prescriptions where virtually
any foreign-policy action would appear to confirm the theory.
15Labs, 'Do Weak States Bandwagon?', pp. 385-6.
16
Labs, 'Do Weak States Bandwagon?', p. 406.
178 ELMAN
on great power foreign policy, the behaviour of small states on the periphery
of the international system will continue to reflect structural/systemic
constraints: 'structuralrealism is inadequate to explain the behavior of states in
the core but is relevant for understanding regional security systems in the
periphery'.7
To what extent has the small state literaturereflected the scholarly consensus
found in mainstream IR theory? We would expect that those works specifically
devoted to the study of small states would question the received wisdom's
empirical validity. Yet, 'to a large extent, small states research concentrates its
efforts on the level of structurallydetermined behavior patterns. All authors, to
some degree, startfrom the assumption that the structuralattributesof smallness
are by far the most important, if not the only, criteria that determined small
states' policy'.18
Analysts typically assume that because small states lack the necessary
self-sufficiency to defend themselves against great powers, they will be
'continually preoccupied with the question of survival'.19 Since small states
have both more to fear as well as more to lose, structural constraints and
incentives will exert a powerful influence on the decision-making calculus. For
example, in a recent study of small state security and foreign policy, Handel
argues that
domestic determinants of foreign policy are less salient in weak states. The
internationalsystem leaves them less room for choice in the decision making
process. Their smaller margin of error... makes the essential interests of weak
states less ambiguous.KennethWaltz's 'thirdimage' is thereforethe most relevant
level of analysis.2?
Much of the small state literature tends to concur with Handel that the
international level of analysis is a good predictor of small state foreign policy.
17James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, 'A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the
Post-Cold War Era', International Organization, 46 (1992), 467-91, at p. 470, see also pp. 475-6,
479. Contraryto Goldgeier and McFaul's assertions, much of the literatureon developing countries
does not insist that structuralexplanations are clearly dominant. For example, Rothstein frequently
refers to domestic considerations in explaining the foreign-policy choices of underdeveloped
countries. He argues that a variety of domestic level variables are salient for this category of weak
state, primarily because 'questions of legitimacy, authority, and national identification remain
unsettled' (see Robert L. Rothstein, The Weakin the Worldof the Strong: The Developing Countries
in the International System (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 35). Recent analyses
of Third World security and foreign policy which also focus on domestic political influences include
Steven R. David, 'Explaining Third World Alignment', World Politics, 43 (1991), 233-56; and
Mohammed Ayoob, 'The Security Problematic of the Third World', World Politics, 43 (1991),
257-83.
IHHans
Vogel, 'Small States' Efforts in InternationalRelations: Enlarging the Scope', in Otmar
Holl, ed., Small States in Europe and Dependence (Vienna: Braumuller, 1983), p. 57.
"9
Handel, Weak States in the International System, p. 36.
20Handel, Weak States in the International System,
pp. 3, 261-2; see also R. P. Barston,
'Introduction',in R. P. Barston,ed., The Other Powers: Studies in the Foreign Policies of Small States
(New York: Barnes and Noble, 1973), p. 19; Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, p. 182.
For example, in Fox's seminal study of small state behaviour during the Second
World War, foreign policy is largely considered a response to external
conditions, such as the degree of great power competition and the demands made
upon the small state by great power belligerents.2' Similarly, Paul's recent
account of small state military strategy suggests that their strategic choices are
primarily a reflection of external constraints and opportunities rather than
internal pushes and pulls. Consistent with the received wisdom in the field, he
argues that a small state's decision to wage war depends on systemic factors such
as alliance support from other great powers and the anticipated reactions of the
stronger state: 'the timing of war is greatly affected by a weaker
state's ... assessment of the loopholes in the opponent's strategy and tactics.' 22
In sum, mainstream IR theorists in general, and most small state researchers
in particular, explain small state foreign policy by focusing on the prevailing
features of the international system and on small state-great power interaction.
Bjol puts it well: 'For the small state, as Rosenau has pointed out, the
environment is a much more important variable than for the great power, and
hence any reasoning about its role should probably start by an identification of
the type of international system in which it has to operate'.23
Challenging Neorealism in Its Own Backyard

The received wisdom in the field suggests that structural/systemic variables
have the home-court advantage in accounting for weak state foreign policies.
Given this scholarly consensus, the study of small state behaviour provides a
unique opportunity for dealing neorealism a major blow as well as for
demonstrating the merits of domestic level approaches to foreign policy
analysis. Small state behaviour offers a particularly good test of neorealism
because it is a crucial case. According to Stinchcombe, theories gain credibility
by being pitted against each other in crucial experiments: 'by eliminating the
most likely alternative theory, we increase the credibility of our theory much
more than we do by eliminating alternatives at random'.24Posen claims that
'our goal of theory testing should be the construction of particularly difficult
tests - tests that one intuitively expects the theory to pass only with difficulty'.25
Similarly, Grieco notes that 'the most powerful way to test a theory is to
21Annette Baker
Fox, The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in WorldWarII (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1959).
22
T. V. Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation By Weaker Powers (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1994), p. 176.
23
Erling Bjol, 'The Small State in International Politics', in August Schou and Ame Olau
Brundland,eds, Small States in International Relations (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiskell, 1971), pp.
32-4.
24
ArthurL. Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories (New York: Harcourt,Brace, and World,
1968), p. 25.
25
Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, p. 38.
180 ELMAN
determine if the propositions derived from it hold in circumstances in which they

are unlikely to do so, and in which comparable but divergent propositions from
competing theories very much ought to be validated'.26
Based on this criterion, small state behaviour is essentially a hard case for
domestic level theory while it is easy on the alternative neorealist explanation.
Since small state behaviour is likely to reflect the constraints of the international
environment, it should offer the best confirmation of neorealist assertions.
Indeed, neorealism should have little difficulty in explaining small state foreign
policy because these cases are precisely where we would expect unit level
influences to play a less significant role. Finding that domestic politics does
indeed matter in these unlikely instances will challenge the explanatory power
of neorealism while justifying the need for domestic level analysis.
II. DOMESTIC LEVEL THEORIES OF FOREIGN POLICY: TRADITIONAL

APPROACHES AND HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM
'Society' Versus 'State'

Challenging the scholarly consensus regarding the determinants of small state
foreign policy requires that we test neorealism against a domestic politics
explanation. The logical step would be to adopt a theory of domestic politics
already advanced in the field. However, most prove insufficient in accounting
for the foreign policies of internationally weak, democratic states.27
Liberal polities are constructed to allow for the participation of both state and
societal actors in policy formation. Consequently, monocausal 'society' or
'state' centred theories will fail to capture domestic political processes
adequately. Societal arguments, which view state behaviour as a function of
pressures from domestic groups, often neglect the possibility that state actors
and institutions can hinder or facilitate the capacity of these groups to influence
policy outcomes. Moreover, such approaches often neglect that state actors can
have interests and goals of their own, which may or may not coincide with
societal preferences.28
On the other hand, state-centred approaches, which view foreign policy as the
output of the administrative and decision-making apparatus of the state's
26
Joseph M. Grieco, 'Understanding the Problem of InternationalCooperation: The Limits of
Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Futureof Realist Theory', in David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism
and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993),
p. 306.
27 In this article, I define democracy in its minimalist sense. A state can be categorized as democratic
if government leaders are determined by elections contested by independent political groups; the
transfer of power between these political groups is peaceful and is based on election results;
government officials are not systematically controlled by non-elected individuals or institutions; and
citizens have the right to express political views, organize for political action and seek alternative
sources of information without fear of punishment.
28 A seminal example of the societal approach is Helen Milner, Resisting Protectionism: Global
Industries and the Politics of International Trade (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).
executive branch, often neglect the fact that the successful implementation of
state policy requires the co-operation of powerful societal groups.29Moreover,
statist approaches commonly fail to take sufficient account of the more subtle
forms of public pressure. For example, in democracies, the executive typically
has institutional incentives to anticipate the reactions of domestic groups and
to revise policies to accord with citizens' expected attitude towards future
policies. Thus, while the executive may encounter little domestic opposition,
statists are incorrect to infer that this consensus implies executive autonomy
from societal forces.
Lastly, state-centred approaches which view policy outcomes as a function
of organizational structure (i.e., the relative strength of the state in relation to
society), obscure the role of political bargaining which inevitably occurs in all
democratic states, whether 'weak' or 'strong'.30 This 'domestic structure'
approach identifies the boundaries within which political choices are made but
fails to explain specific foreign-policy formation. Additionally, the domestic
structure approach derives outcomes from fairly fixed contextual features. It
assumes that political outcomes can simply be 'read off' an institutional
configuration.3' Consequently, the domestic political process which necessarily
intervenes between state-societal preconditions and foreign-policy outcomes is
underspecified.
The Institutional Approach

Institutionalism, often termed the 'new institutionalism' or 'historical institu-
tionalism', addresses the shortcomings of both societal and statist approaches.32
Indeed, an institutional approach is especially well suited for the study of
foreign-policy formation in democratic states, because it attempts to account for
the open interplay between state and society and the ways in which institutional
designs impinge upon both state and societal actors.33
Central to institutionalism is the belief that factors internal to political
29
Exemplars of this type of statist argument include Robert Gilpin, US Power and the
Multinational Corporation (New York: Basic Books, 1975); and Stephen D. Krasner,Defending the
National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and US Foreign Policy (Princeton. NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1978).
0"See, for example, Peter Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies
of the Advanced Industrial States (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978).
31 Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, 'Historical Institutionalism in
Comparative Politics', in
Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth, eds, Structuring Politics: Historical
Institutionalism in Comparative Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 14.
32
See Thelen and Steinmo, 'Historical Institutionalism'. See also James G. March and Johan P.
Olsen, 'The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life', American Political
Science Review, 78 (1984), 734-9.
33
Thelen and Steinmo, 'Historical Institutionalism', p. 10. I define institutions here as sets of rules
thatprescribepermissible behaviour. Institutionsdefine acceptable patternsof conduct which channel
social behaviour in a certain direction rather than in the many directions that would otherwise be
possible.
182 ELMAN
institutions affect the flow of history. Without denying the importance of

societal conflict and the calculations of self-interested actors, institutionalists
posit a more autonomous role for institutions.34Two propositions are central to
the institutional approach. First, institutional arrangementsare said to influence
the struggles between societal and government actors. They do so by providing
the arenas within which social forces contend as well as by setting terms and
available resources. Institutions constrain and empower policy makers by
delineating specific repertoires of policy instruments, thereby influencing the
strategies ultimately adopted: 'Once developed, ... actors tend to view solutions
to particular problems through the lens of the instruments that are available to
them; their options are limited or expanded by the tools they have at hand'.35
Secondly, institutions will mediate the interests and capacities of state and
societal actors even after the ideas and conditions responsible for their formation
are no longer present. Institutions are likely to have long-term policy
implications beyond the control and intentions of their designers. As Krasner
notes, 'the basic characteristic of an institutional argument is that prior
institutional choices limit available future options'.36 Thus, institutionalism
requires that we study how governance structures initially develop as well as
how they constrain and enable subsequent policy choices: 'just as the rules make
a difference, so does the way in which they are adopted'.37
International Effects on Domestic Institutional Formation and Change38

Recent studies of democratic regime transition have increased our understand-
ing of how domestic institutions are formed and subsequently revised. These
studies emphasize that institutional formation and change tend to occur during
periods of crisis in which existing political rules and structures are discredited
and new sets of rules are adopted: 'the transitional phase can be seen ... as a
formative period, akin to a critical juncture, during which choices set countries
34 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of
Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1989); Thelen and Steinmo, 'Historical Institutionalism', p. 2.
35
Stephen Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly
Industrializing Countries (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 46.
Stephen D. Krasner,'Sovereignty: An InstitutionalPerspective' in James A. Caporaso, ed., The
36
Elusive State: International and Comparative Perspectives (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publica-
tions, 1989), p. 74.
37
Guiseppe DePalma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay in Democratic Transitions (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1990), p. 214.
38
Studies linking the international environment to national political developments have a long
traditionin the Comparativistliterature.See, for example, Charles Tilly, ed., TheFormation of Nation
States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975); and Theda Skocpol,
States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1979). For concise
overviews of this 'second image reversed' research agenda, see Gabriel A. Almond, 'The
International-National Connection', British Journal of Political Science, 19 (1989), 237-59; and
Peter Gourevitch, 'The Second Image Reversed: The InternationalSources of Domestic Politics',
hiternational Organization, 32 (1978), 881-91 1.
on a particular trajectory'.39During this period, potential regime opponents

and/or elites realize that the old system no longer 'works' and needs
amendment.40This institutional reform is affected by crisis which generates
changes in the relative bargaining power of various domestic groups: 'political
actors discover that sources of political strength or power have changed. The
critical juncture may [produce] new sources of political strength'.4' These
domestic political realignments determine when the conditions are ripe for
certain domestic institutional reforms to take hold.
In analysing these transition periods, factors internal to the state have usually
received the most attention. When internationalfactors are considered, scholars
have pointed out that democratization is facilitated by 'settlement, colonial rule,
defeat in war, or fairly direct imposition' and that the successful experience of
Western countries with democracy has provided an important 'demonstration
effect' for other states.42Additionally, they have suggested that democratization
has been fostered by the deliberate attempts of Western governments to
'proclaim the "promotion of democracy" as an important goal in foreign
policy'.43 However, there has been little attempt to link exogenous conditions
to the political process by which democratic regime transitions occur. Indeed,
currentstudies come close to arguing thatdemocratic institutional outcomes can
be neatly 'read off' the type and credibility of incentive structures which
external actors present to potential democratizers.
Students of regime transition have been careful to identify contextual
conditions for democratization without minimizing the role of strategic choice
in shaping the particular institutions that emerge.44Context and structure may
compel the modification or abandonment of existing political institutions, but
they do not determine whether a new regime will result in their place or what
type it would be. Leadership, political coalition-making and bargaining are
considered essential elements of the causal sequence. Yet, despite the frequent
39Gerardo L. Munck and Carol Skalnik

Leff, 'Structure,Process, and Choice in Regime Change:
The Institutional Forms of Emerging Democracies in South America and Eastern Europe' (paper
presented at the annual convention of the International Studies Association, Acapulco, Mexico,
1993), p. 4.
40 DePalma, To
Craft Democracies, p. 29.
4' Gretchen Casper and Michelle Taylor, 'When Competitors Cooperate' (paper presented at the
annual convention of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Ill., 1993), pp. 13-14.
42
Samuel P. Huntington, 'Will Countries Become More Democratic?' Political Science Quarterly,
99 (1984), 193-218, at pp. 205-7.
43 Lawrence
Whitehead, 'International Aspects of Democratization', in Guillermo O'Donnell,
Philippe C. Schmitter and Lawrence Whitehead, eds, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule:
ComparativePerspectives (Baltimore, Md: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 3; see also
Philippe C. Schmitter, 'The International Context of Contemporary Democratization', Stanford
Journal of InternatiolnalAffairs, 2 (1993), 1-34.
44
See, for example, DePalma, To Craft Democracies; Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave:
Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991),
p. 39; and Juan J. Linz, 'Transitions to Democracy', Washington Quarterly, 13 (1990), 143-64.
184 ELMAN
claim that 'a democratic regime is installed not by trends but by people',45 there
has been little study of how international preconditions affect the interaction
between domestic groups. For instance, little attention has been devoted to how
international factors, such as the threat of invasion or war, may influence the
bargaining game between government and opposition. Moreover, since external
preconditions tend to be included in a long list of additional domestic level
variables, the independent effect of these international factors on the domestic
political process is obscured.46Lastly, recent studies of democratization fail to
recognize that the international context can have a crucial bearing on the type
of democratic regime likely to emerge.47
I suggest that international factors are more likely to be linked to domestic
regime formation and change when states are faced with severe threats.
Specifically, international threats may trigger foreign-policy crises which, in
turn, strengthen the bargaining position of regime reformers vis-t-vis status quo
proponents. Exogenous pressures can provide a 'window of opportunity' for
advocates of regime reform. Reformers can draw attention to external threats
and poor foreign-policy performance in order to justify the necessity for regime
change and delegitimize the position of those who support the status quo.
Moreover, given serious external threats, statesmen will tend to choose
domestic institutions on the basis of their likely impact on foreign-policy
performance. Since minimizing these internationalthreatsand ensuring survival
of the polity will be of prime importance, specific domestic rules, structuresand
decision-making procedures will be fashioned with this goal in mind. Once
statesmen have opted for democracy, the choice between various institutional
alternatives will be influenced by the perceived effects that these differing
systems will have on immediate foreign-policy options. Ceteris paribus, we can
expect that when faced with serious exogenous threats and foreign-policy
failures, advocates ofdemocratization will be predisposed towards presidential
institutional arrangemernts.Unsuccessful foreign policies will discredit claims
for a decentralized democratic system, such as parliamentarism, and will
legitimize arguments for increased centralization and stronger democratic
options. In presidential systems, the executive is separately elected and therefore
relatively autonomous from societal forces representedin the legislative branch.
Statesmen are likely to assume that such an institutional arrangement will
contribute to more efficient foreign policies by enabling the executive branch
to base strategy on the national interest rather than on the demands of
particularistic groups. In sum, the external environment influences domestic
45
Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 107.
46
See, for example, Huntington, The Third Wave; and Casper and Taylor, 'When Competitors
Cooperate'.
47
Students of regime transition rarely differentiate between alternative democratic arrangements,
focusing instead on transitions to democracy in general. For example, Huntington claims that an
analysis of the differences between democracies may facilitate explanations of the effects of
democratic systems once created, but will provide little informationon how democratic governments
are initially forged. See Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 109.
political development by altering the relative credibility of competing

institutional alternatives.
Exogenous threats do not automatically result in domestic regime transition.
In most instances domestic institutions will be able to cope with external
pressures. At other times, revisions of existing rules and structures can be
instituted without a wholesale transformationof the traditional regime. Indeed,
internationalpressures are more likely to generate domestic institutional change
in emerging states. Unlike great powers, new states have much more to lose from
poor foreign-policy performance and are less likely to survive in the face of
severe exogenous threats. Consequently, they will be more likely to adjust
domestic institutions to the demands of the international environment and they
will have more incentives to tailor internal rules and structures towards
achieving greater efficiency in foreign policy. Additionally, systemic/structural
factors are more likely to affect the decision-making calculus, because domestic
institutions have yet to be consolidated. Since domestic institutions are not yet
considered established rules-of-the-game, they will be expendable for more
efficient structures. Yet, even when elites in newly independent states realize
that existing institutions are inadequate, regime change is not guaranteed. The
consolidation of a new set of institutional rules will be dependent on whether
bargains, pacts and deals can be successfully concluded. Often this will require
the amendment of new institutions such that no group will be likely to attain
disproportional benefits.48 Thus, while the specification of international
preconditions cannot foretell whether statesmen will produce new institutions,
it can nevertheless provide information about what kind of behaviour we can
expect from the actors involved.
Domestic Institutional Effects on Foreign Policy

Essential to an institutional approach is the assumption that policy is the product
of institutions whose previous historical development can significantly effect
the political process in later periods. During transition periods, politics is an
'evolving game of experimentation and adaptationto new historical conditions'.
Once institutions are selected, we can begin to see politics in terms of a
'well-ordered game with more or less fixed rules'.49 In Katzenstein's words:
'periods of great crisis can profoundly affect the way domestic politics is
organized; periods of relative normality can ... reinforce that pattern of
organization .50
4XOn the role of distributional conflicts in the emergence of institutions see Jack Knight,
Institutionsand Social Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), especially pp. 26-8,
40-1,126-8.
49
Lawrence C. Dodd, 'Political Learning and Political Change: Understanding Development
Across Time' (paper presented at the annual convention of the Midwest Political Science
Association, Chicago, 11., 1993), p. 48.
50
Katzenstein, Small States in WorldMarkets: Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
186 ELMAN
Both rational choice and sociological perspectives address the mechanisms

of such institutional influence. Rational choice approaches suggest that since
institutions will tend to be fairly stable over time, we can focus on the individual
responses to incentive structures provided by various institutional designs.51
The approach directs foreign policy analysis towards the strategic use skilful
entrepreneursmake of institutional logics. State and societal actors can rely on
institutional features in order to advance their preferred national security
agendas. But since institutions delineate specific repertoires of policy
instruments, they will inevitably preclude some foreign policy options while
allowing for others. Additionally, the approach directs foreign-policy analysis
towards the way in which given institutional structuresand rules provide greater
bargaining power to some actors over others. Insofar as various political groups
disagree about the appropriatedirection of national security and foreign policy,
institutions are likely to affect which foreign security agendas rule the day by
privileging some groups at the expense of others. In sum, institutions can be
considered strategic resources in distributional conflicts precisely because they
help some actors prevail over others; institutions matter because they influence
the nature of political competition.52 The key is to identify those institutional
components which are likely to provide certain groups with increased
foreign-policy leverage.
The rational choice approach is criticized by scholars who argue that it
neglects the sociological aspects of political interaction. For example, Wendt
points out that institutions influence 'notjust by creating external constraints on
the behavior of exogenously constituted actors', but through the acquiring of
'new understandings of self and other'.53Institutions persist because they are
tied to actors' commitments to their identities. Over time institutional
frameworks will cease to be challenged not only because they allow actors to
maximize their interests but also because individuals cannot even conceive of
appropriatealternatives. As Grafstein comments, 'members work within their
institutions and not on them because to step outside the institutional structure
is to step into a social void'.54 In short, sociological institutionalism rejects the
notion that actors are already equipped with identities and preferences before
51Larry L. Kiser and Elinor Ostrom, 'The Three Worlds of Action: A Metatheoretical Synthesis
of Institutional Approaches', in Elinor Ostrom, ed., Strategies of Political Inquiry (Beverly Hills,
Calif.: Sage Publications, 1982), p. 181. According to rational choice theories, institutions will tend
to be 'sticky' because: ( I ) relying on pre-existing institutions is less costly thancreating and enforcing
new ones; and (2) institutions create interest groups with a stake in maintaining existing rules and
structures.
52 Thelen and
Steinmo, 'Historical Institutionalism', pp. 2-3; Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard
Times.:Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1986), pp. 28, 61-2, 229.
53 Alexander
Wendt, 'Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power
Politics', International Organization, 46 (1992), 391-425, at p. 417.
54 Robert
Grafstein, Institutional Realism: Social and Political Constraints on Rational Actors
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992), p. 100.
they encounter institutional constraints. Rather, institutions matter precisely

because they help to define actors' goals and interests in the first place.
Institutional arguments based on sociological perspectives suggest a
competing approachto the study of institutional influence. This approachdirects
foreign policy analysis towards the ways in which actors invoke institutional
rules in order to justify their own foreign-policy choices and delegitimize
alternative foreign-policy options. Invoking institutional features is a useful
strategy since it involves equating policies with the approval of a desired social
order. By proving that certain foreign-policy measures are sanctioned by
domestic institutions, these policy options will be accorded a greater degree of
legitimacy than would otherwise be the case. Ceteris paribus, actors who
succeed in linking foreign-policy options to the legitimacy of the domestic
institutional framework will increase their bargaining leverage vis-a-vis
competing political groups. The sociological perspective also suggests that
foreign-policy strategies may be redefined in order to coincide with pre-
established institutional rules and norms. Rather than pursue foreign policies
which contradict embedded institutional frameworks, actors will tailor their
policy choices to accord with them. Such reconciliation will often require an
adjustment or abandonment of certain foreign-policy options.
Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy: A Two-Step Institutional Model

The preceding discussion suggests that political behaviour can only be
explained in the context of institutionally created incentives and available
options. Current foreign-policy preferences and capabilities cannot be under-
stood without looking at prior institutional choices: 'the possible options
available at any given point in time are constrained by available institutional
capabilities and these capabilities are themselves a product of choices made
during some earlier period'.55 I have also suggested that understanding
institutional formation and subsequent stability requires that we differentiate
between 'politics in crisis' and 'politics in normal times'. Institutions tend to
be formed and reformed in periods of acute crisis; they will tend to persist in
the absence of such exogenous influences.56 This notion that rapid political
change occurs during short-term upheavals followed by longer periods of
stability and stasis forms the basis of an institutional approach to foreign policy
(see Figure 1).57
55
Krasner, 'Sovereignty', p. 75.
56
See Gabriel Almond, Scott C. Flanagan and Robert Mundt, Crisis, Choice, and Change:
Historical Studies of Political Development (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1973).
57 The argument that fundamental institutional change occurs in an episodic and discontinuous
manner bears a close resemblance to punctuated equilibrium theory. This evolutionary theory
assumes that genetic change occurs rarely and rapidly. Once a sharp break in the ancestral lineage
takes place, species do not change substantially over long periods of time. Recently, political
scientists have noted the implications of punctuatedequilibrium theory for institutionalanalysis. See
Miriam Fendius, 'PunctuatedEquilibriumand InternationalRelations Theory: An Example of Cross
IndependentVariable Intervening Process
Stare 1 TI: International crises T2:Affectsgroupactors: T3: Societalands

Punctuation (i.e.,severemilitarythreats) r forinstitutional
pressure actorsbargainover
changeto alleviatehardship newsocialcontrac
builds
Stage 2 T5: Institutionsset up at T4 T6: Societalandstateactorschoose

prescribea particular * policiesbasedon T5
Equilibrium repertoireof foreign
securitypolicyoptions
Fig. 1. Domestic politics and foreign policy: a two-step institutionalist model

There are several advantages to the proposed institutional perspective. First,

it allows for a reciprocal interplay between agency and structure.58On the one
hand, at critical junctures, the activity of political actors can bring about a
change in social structure. For instance, while severe international threats are
constraints that domestic actors are compelled to deal with, any resulting
institutional change depends on how actors perceive they can best cope with
these external threats as well as maintain domestic political power. Even when
domestic institutions are restructuredto changes in the international environ-
ment, elites will attempt to retain their positions within the new institutional
framework. Consequently, political engineering matters. On the other hand,
once formed, social structures constrain agents - even as the latter retain the
freedom to manoeuvre within institutional boundaries. The study of political
choice remains essential precisely because institutions delimit a range of
possible policy options rather than determine any particular path. Indeed,
agency matters after institutions are developed and not just in moments of
institutional breakdown. Thus, by bracketing time into crisis and non-crisis
periods, the approach accounts for both the influence of institutions as well as
the purposeful behaviour of political actors. Institutions become both products
and constraints.59
Secondly, institutionalism can incorporateboth rational choice and sociolog-
ical perspectives. Both approaches illuminate domestic institutional influences
on foreign policy. Institutionalism merely states that actors' choices will be
based on a repertoire of pre-existing policy options. It makes no a priori claim
as to whether actors will manipulate institutional features in order to achieve
their preferred foreign-policy goals or whether they will legitimize these goals
by invoking institutional norms - both strategies are potentially feasible.
Lastly, the proposed institutional argumentassumes that new institutions may
be beneficial or dysfunctional for society as a whole. The irony of institutional
choice is that the rules and structuresdesigned to cope with immediate problems
may be ineffective for dealing with future challenges. Institutions, and the
policies they generate, may end up being suboptimal because new rules and
structures tend to express the politics and requirements of the moment. For
example, new sets of institutions may initially prove adaptive insofar as they
enable actors to deal with immediate foreign policy problems in innovative
(F', te
(c onltinlued)
Fertilization Between the Natural and Social Sciences' (paper presented at the annual convention
of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 111.,1993).
58 For useful overviews of the
'agent-structure' problem in IR, see Alexander Wendt, 'The
Agent-Structure Problem in InternationalRelations Theory', International Organization, 41 (1987),
335-68; and David Dessler, 'What's at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate', International
Organization, 43 (1989), 441-73.
59
Thelen and Steinmo, 'Historical Institutionalism', pp. 10-17; Walter Carlsnaes, 'The
Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis', International Studies Quarterly, 36 (1992),
245-70, at pp. 256, 263.
190 ELMAN
ways. Later, the very same institutional features can provide actors with the
means for advancing their own particularistic goals at the expense of national
security.
III. THE CASE STUDY: THE UNITED STATES, 1781-1848
In this section of the article, the institutional perspective depicted above is tested
via a diachronic study of US foreign security policy during the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries.60The American case was selected for two reasons. First,
small state researchershave failed to include US foreign policy prior to the Civil
War in their historical examples. This omission is odd, particularly because of
the general consensus among diplomatic historians regarding the weakness and
insecurity of the young American republic.61Secondly, the case study suggests
that US foreign policies during this period reflected domestic political
considerations in ways that diplomatic historians have largely overlooked.
While partisan and sectional conflict is often cited in explanations of early US
involvement in international wars, these 'society-centred' analyses often fail to
refer to the pre-existing institutional frameworks within which domestic groups
acted. An analysis of early American foreign policy from an institutional
perspective should therefore improve our understanding of the American case
in particular and domestic political influences on small state foreign policy in
general.
The case study is organized as follows. First, I present various reasons for
categorizing the United States prior to the mid-1800s as a small state. Next, I
look at how internationalthreats contributed to a strengthening of the American
state as pre-existing institutions delineated in the Articles of Confederation were
replaced with a new set of rules and resources.62International threats became
a bargaining advantage for advocates of regime reform. Federalists maintained
that political engineering was required in order to forge a new political structure
which could better cope with external threats. Presidentialism emerged as an
attractive model for building national power without sacrificing centralization
6"For concise overviews of US foreign relations during this period see Julius W. Pratt,A History
of United States Foreign Policy, 3rdedn (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1972), pp. 1-135, and Alexander
DeConde, A History oJfAmericanForeign Policy, Volume I: Growth to World Power (1700-1914),
3rd edn (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1978), pp. 37-189.
61
See, for example, Bradford Perkins, 'Introduction', in BradfordPerkins, ed., The Causes of the
Warof 1812: National Honor or National Interest? (New York: Holt, Rinehart,and Winston, 1962),
p. 1; DeConde, A History of American Foreign Policy, p. 36; Pratt,A History of United States Foreign
Policy, p. 3; Frederick W. Marks, 'Power, Pride and Purse: Diplomatic Origins of the Constitution',
Diplomatic History, 11 (1987), 303-19, at p. 313.
62The emergence of American democracy is typically depicted as a slow process of incremental
change. See Linz, 'Transitions to Democracy', p. 143. Moreover, it is often assumed that, in contrast
to continental Europe, US institutional development was insulated from military threat. See Felix
Gilbert, ed., The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975). This
article suggests otherwise. The forging of the US presidential system coincided with severe external
threats and was 'telescoped' into a few critical years.
and state autonomy to the demands of fractious citizens. But the Constitution
and presidential democracy became politically viable only after a series of
bargains and compromises ensured that the interests of key domestic groups
would not be jeopardized under the new institutional framework.63Lastly, I
discuss the impact of these institutional structureson US foreign security policy.
Focusing on US decision making prior to the Quasi War, the War of 1812 and
the Mexican-American War, I conclude that domestic politics provides a better
explanation of US military strategy than do neorealist accounts. In each case,
foreign policy is linked to the constraints and incentives of presidentialism. The
previous historical development of this particular type of democratic system
significantly affected foreign-policy outcomes in later periods. Consequently,
the scholarly consensus that the international level of analysis can best account
for small state foreign policy is seriously challenged. In so far as the American
case is concerned, the historical evidence does not support the causal primacy
of neorealism over a domestic level approach.
The United States as a Weak State

Prior to the mid-1800s, the United States can be defined as a small state for
several reasons. First, US survival was at risk from great power threats. US
expansion and economic growth during the pre-Civil War period should not
mislead us into assuming that US survival was assured. On the contrary, it was
only secure insofar as the European powers were too absorbed with their own
rivalries on the European continent to notice developments in the new world.
But the United States could not defend itself when faced with a concerted effort
on the part of a great power. Secondly, US statesmen could not disregard
European power struggles. Policies had to be considered in light of anticipated
European reactions. US policy makers could exploit and manipulate European
conflicts to their own advantage. They did so mainly by purchasing territory
from over-extended European powers who needed to focus their attention on
the aspirations of would-be European hegemons. But the US had little influence
over the course of Europeanevents and could not significantly affect the security
of the European great powers. This lack of influence was a function of resource
scarcity relative to the European great powers.64Lastly, America's geographic
63 In
arguing that the period 1781-87 constituted a 'critical period' in early American history, I
concur with American historians who view the US Constitution as a fundamental departurefrom
earlier institutions ratherthan the 'crowning success of the movement for a more populargovernment
that had started with the revolution'. See Gerald N. Grob and George A. Billias, Interpretations of
American History, Volume I: To 1877 - Patterns and Perspectives, 6th edn (New York: The Free
Press, 1992), p. 161. Instead of the Revolutionary and Constitutional periods representing a
continuous line of progressive political evolution, the period from 1781 to 1787 is a 'dramatic story
of change'. For a concise discussion of this tradition in US constitutional historiography, see Grob
and Billias, Interpretations of American History, pp. 159-81.
64 In their
coding of the great powers, Singer and Small include the United States only after the
Spanish-American War. See J. David Singer and Melvin Small, The Wages of War, 1816-1965: A
192 ELMAN
location should not fool us into thinking that US survival was guaranteed. That
the US was geographically distant from Europe did not mean that it was on the
political periphery of the European state system. Even as late as the 1840s, half
of the North American continent remained unsettled and without firm
allegiance. The vast regions of Oregon, New Mexico and California remained
under foreign control and subject to the rival claims of the European powers.
International Effects on Domestic Institutional Change, 1781-87

American state building in the 1780s is one of the most controversial periods
of US history. There are numerous conflicting interpretations concerning the
demise of the Articles of Confederation and the subsequent adoption of a
stronger central government. Some historians have viewed this period in terms
of class conflict. According to this socio-economic interpretation, 'the
Constitution [is] a document of dissent that emerged from a clash of economic
interests among various elements of American society'.65 Others have stressed
the role of ideas, particularly the 'elite conception of republicanism' fostered
by the Federalists and the more egalitarian conception of politics advanced by
the Anti-Federalists.66 Such interpretations, however compelling, tend to
downplay the exigencies of defence and international commerce and the
problems of diplomacy.67 While the characteristics of the social and political
groups that struggled for and against institutional innovation are important, it
is also necessary to focus on the international context and how it shaped the
political process.
During the 1780s five issues threatened US national security. First, the new
union faced hostile Indian tribes to both the north and south. Secondly, despite
the recent peace treaty with Britain, the latter retained its military garrisons
along the northernfrontier.These posts not only jeopardized a lucrative fur trade
but also facilitated British collusion with various Indian tribes. As Marks notes,
'nearly every Indian raid in the Northwest was blamed on the British'.68Thirdly,
Spain retained control of both banks of the lower Mississippi River and could
therefore deny American settlers access to the key port of New Orleans.
Fourthly, American shipping, no longer automatically protected by the British
(F'nole continued)
Statistical Handbook (New York: Wiley, 1983), pp. 41-2. Similarly, Levy does not rank the United
States as a majorpower until after the late 1800s (see Levy, Warin the Modern Great Power System,
1495-1975).
65 Grob and Billias, Interpretations of American History, p. 168.
66On this
view, see Isaac Kramnick, 'The "GreatNational Discussion": The Discourse of Politics
in 1787', William and Mary Quarterly, 45 (1988), 3-22.
67
Peter Onuf, 'Reflections on the Founding: Constitutional Historiography in Bicentennial
Perspective', William and Mary Quarterly, 46 (1989), 341-75, at p. 358.
68FrederickW. Marks,
Independence on Trial: Foreign Affairs and the Making of the Constitution,
2nd edn (Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1986), p. 19.
flag, was increasingly plagued with a series of raids by the North African
Barbary pirates. Lastly, most American industries were seriously affected by
heavy British trade restrictions imposed in the aftermath of American
independence. By closing the British West Indies, Newfoundland and Nova
Scotia to American ships, Britain curtailed American trade substantially.69
The Articles of Confederation undermined the government's ability to diffuse
these international crises effectively. For example, faced with Britain's
discriminatory trade practices, Congress was unable to retaliate. Under the given
rules of the game, the power to regulate commerce remained in the hands of
individual states. Since the Confederation sought to retain newly won state
sovereignty from federal encroachment, Article IX stipulated that: 'no treaty of
commerce shall be made whereby the legislative power of the respective states
shall be restrained from imposing such imposts and duties on foreigners as their
own people are subject to, or from prohibiting the exportation or importation
of any species of goods or commodities'.70 According to this rule, the decisions
of Congress were little more than recommendations. Since Congress could not
obligate the states to comply with a common trade policy, successful retaliation
required the adoption of identical restrictions by every state. However, the
individual states were unable to adopt similar measures.7' Gorlin describes this
well:
Connecticut refused to pass any legislation, and the port of New Haven received
the British ships that could not land in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, or Rhode
Island. Virginia refused to pass discriminatory legislation on the basis that such
legislation would be self-defeating if the barred goods could reach Virginia via
Maryland and North Carolina. The inconsistency in the application of laws led
Massachusetts to suspend its navigation act in July 1786, and Pennsylvania repealed
most of its high duties when its neighboring states refused to match the tariff rates.72
69
Marks, Independence on Trial, pp. 59-65.
7oExcerpted from George Anastaplo, The Constitution of 1787: A Commentary(Baltimore, Md:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), p. 249. That the Articles sought to limit federal powers is
understandablegiven the 'deep distrustof executive authorityproducedby the long colonial struggle
with appointedEnglish governors' (see Keith J. Polakoff, Political Parties in American History (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981), p. 8). Following the Revolutionary War, it is unlikely thatelites would
have opted for an institutional arrangementwhich centralized government power. After all, they had
just rebelled violently in order to maximize the liberties of individual states. Limiting, ratherthan
expanding, the powers of the central government was the primary objective.
71 British statesmen refused to take Congressional attempts to negotiate seriously, noting that
Congress would not have the authorityto enforce any commercial treaty.See Daniel G. Lang, Foreign
Policy in the Early Republic: The Law of Nations and the Balance of Power (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1985), p. 83. Co-operation at the internationallevel was, therefore, hindered
because one contracting party, in this case the British, was aware of the other's domestic-level
impediments. On how domestic institutional features can affect an executive's international
bargaining abilities, see Robert Putnam, 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level
Games', International Organization, 42 (1988), 427-60, especially pp. 448-9.
72
Jacques J. Gorlin, 'Foreign Trade and the Constitution', in Robert A. Goldwin and Robert A.
Licht, eds, Foreign Policy and the Constitution (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute,
1990), p. 57.
194 ELMAN
Nor was the central government able to force state compliance to national
treaty provisions. While the Articles gave Congress the power to negotiate with
foreign nations, it failed to make treaties the supreme law of the land. Congress
had no institutional mechanism for coercing states which refused to abide by
international agreements. Inevitably, this complicated negotiation with the
British. The latter insisted that they would vacate Northern posts only if the
United States fully complied with the terms of the peace treaty, namely enforce
the collection of pre-war debts owed to British creditors. When many of the
individual states refused to comply, the British argued that retaining the
Northern posts was justified.73
Congress's inability to enforce treaties also complicated relations with Spain.
Despite Spanish attempts to negotiate an alliance and treaty of commerce with
the United States, these negotiations were hindered by Southern state
intransigence.74Five southern states refused to agree to the Spanish demand that
the United States relinquish its claim to sole navigation of the Mississippi. Since
under Article IX of the Confederation, the concurrence of nine states was
required to ratify any international treaty, negotiations with the Spanish
amounted to little. Even if a treaty with the Spanish could be negotiated, the five
opposing states would deny the necessary majority needed for its final approval.
Thus, since the requirement for an extraordinary majority diminished the
likelihood that international agreements would be ratified, there was little
incentive to negotiate with Spain.
Also absent from the Articles were federal taxation powers. According to the
given institutional rules, Congress 'had to rely on the willingness of the
individual states to pay assessments levied on them; it had no way to enforce
payment'.75 Inevitably, this forced Congress to borrow on foreign credit. By
1786 the United States was unable to pay its interest on these foreign loans and
credit was seriously endangered. When Congress attemptedto avoid bankruptcy
by levying a 5 per cent customs duty, New York's rejection of the scheme
guaranteed its failure. Since, under the Articles' rule of unanimity, every state
had to agree to the terms of an increase in congressional power, New York's
rejection ensured stalemate despite the fact that most states agreed to the
measure.76 This lack of an independent source of revenue also exacerbated
problems with the British. Without the power to tax, Congress was unable to
raise troops. Thus, even if the United States had been able to carry out its treaty
obligations, it still would have had little military leverage with which to compel
the British to relinquish their Northern garrisons.
73 Norman A. Graebner, Foundations of American Foreign Policy: A Realist Appraisal from

Franklin to McKinley (Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1985), p. 14.
74Lang, Foreign Policy in the Early Republic, p. 79.
75
Walter Bers, 'The Writing of the Constitution of the United States', in Robert A. Goldwin and
Art Kaufman, eds, Constitution Makers on Constitution Making: The Experiences of Eight Nations
(Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1988), p. 128.
76Marks, 'Power, Pride, and Purse', p. 310.
Lack of funds and military power also hindered negotiations with the Indians.
As Marks explains: 'Warfare could never be conclusive unless crowned by a
treaty. Yet treaties were enormously expensive; they required generous gifts for
the Indians, strong military support, and highly paid agents steeped in native
customs and language'.77Without the ability to negotiate with the Indian tribes,
a two-front war appeared inevitable. In fact, by 1786 there were large
concentrations of Indians on both the southern and northernborders. Both could
count on support from British and Spanish outposts. Finally, the inability to
effectively raise taxes meant that the United States could not fund a naval
squadron capable of patrolling the Mediterranean against the Barbary pirates:
plans to form an alliance with the European powers to maintain a permanent
naval force that would protect commercial shipping failed to materialize.78
Due to these internationalthreats and poor foreign-policy performance, many
Congressmen realized that increased centralization and a stronger national
government were required. Indeed, the primary reason for inviting representa-
tives to the Annapolis and Philadelphia conventions was to revise the Articles
of Confederation in order to ensure more effective government policies. With
the existing government unable to cope with the threat of war, bankruptcy and
commercial distress, 'the least that could be done was to establish a strong
central government which could have control over all foreign relations'.79
During the constitutional convention and subsequent ratification debate,
Federalists in support of a strong central authority had to contend with
Anti-Federalists who feared that increased federal powers would override state
autonomy and, by extension, individual liberties.80The Federalists, however,
had a bargaining advantage over their opponents. Most agreed that external
forces threatened the new republic. Thus, the high stakes and shortness of time
increased the bargaining power of the Federalists. Moreover, 'because nearly
everyone wanted the government strengthened in the area of foreign affairs, the
issue provided the Federalists with the basis for a national consensus and with
the primary theme of their campaign'.8'
In particular,the Federalists were able to argue that strengthening the national
government vis-a-vis the states would preserve democratic principles as well as
77Marks, Independence on Trial, 18.

p.
7X Marks, Independence on Trial, p. 45; Graebner, Foundations of American Foreign Policy,
p. 41.
79 Max Farrand,The
Framing of the Constitution of the United States (New Haven, Conn.: Yale
8( While the Anti-Federalists acknowledged the need to revitalize Congress, they tended to
emphasize the dangers that consolidation posed for republican government. On the Anti-Federalist
viewpoint see HerbertJ. Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1981); and Peter Onuf, 'State Sovereignty and the Making of the Constitution' in
Terence Ball and J. G. A. Pocock, eds, Conceptual Change and the Constitution (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 1988), especially pp. 86-8.
81Frederick W. Marks,
'Foreign Affairs: A Winning Issue in the Campaign for Ratification of the
United States Constitution', Political Science Quarterly, 86 (1971), 444-69, at p. 469.
196 ELMAN
state security.82According to the Federalists, tyranny would be avoided due to

the separation of powers between the branches of the new government and the
increased number of interests that would necessarily have to compete against
each other in an expanded polity.83But a larger republic would also ensure the
states' security. By authorizing the central government to pool their resources
and by limiting the independence and excessive power of the individual states,
each state would have greater safety from the European powers than they would
acting on their own. Thus, for instance, Roger Sherman insisted that the 'great
end' of the new regime was to 'protect the several states' against 'foreign
invasion'. Similarly, Oliver Ellsworth and Edmund Randolf argued that the
independence of the separate states made them dependent on the foreign powers
of Europe and that, under the Articles of Confederation, Congress was unable
to 'protect the states'. In sum, 'the Federalists insisted that only a strong union
could guarantee the survival of the states. Outside the union, the states would
be vulnerable to internaland external assault'.84 Thus, while the Anti-Federalists
stressed the adequate provision of one collective good (i.e., democracy), the
Federalists were able to show that their institutional alternative would provide
for two collective goods (i.e., democracy and security).
Although many of the delegates arriving at Philadelphia were ardent
nationalists, the forging of a new institutional framework was not guaranteed.
Indeed, replacing the Articles of Confederation with a new institutional
framework was preceded by a series of bargains between government elites.
Most of the delegates wanted to revise provisions in the Articles of
Confederation in order to secure a stronger, more effective, national govern-
ment. But each had different visions of what this new regime should look like.
While the delegates realized that their respective states would be worse off
without some agreement, they disagreed about what the terms of this agreement
should be. Each representative sought to secure provisions which would benefit
his own state and regional interests.
For example, delegates from small states wanted equal representation in the
Senate in order to ensure that their interests would not be overridden by larger
states in the Union. Conversely, representatives from larger states preferredthe
Virginia Plan, which called for proportional voting representation in both
legislative branches. Such an institutional rule would maximize the bargaining
position of the larger states within the new government. The solution to this
distributional conflict, often termed the 'great compromise', revolved around
the relative intensity of preferences and aversion to the status quo. Small state
delegates preferredto retain the Articles of Confederation ratherthan accept an
institutional alternative which threatened their interests. Delegates from large
states preferred to compromise on this issue rather than retain the status quo.
82
See, for example, Federalist No. 37 in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers (New York:
Penguin, 1961).
83See Federalist Nos. 9, 10, 48 and 51 in Rossiter, The Federalist Papers.
84
Quoted in Onuf, 'State Sovereignty and the Making of the Constitution', pp. 80-4.
Equal representationin the Senate was considered a small price to pay for a new,
more effective national government.85
Distributional conflicts also arose between Southern and Northern states. For
instance, Southern delegates insisted that the executive's authority to negotiate
treaties be subject to approval by two-thirds of the Senate body. Through this
institutional rule, Southern delegates hoped to avoid future foreign-policy
actions which worked to their disadvantage. In calling for this measure,
Southern states pointed to previous executive negotiations with Spain. During
these negotiations, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs had offered to relinquish US
rights to the Mississippi in favour of commercial concessions which would
primarily benefit Northern interests. In order to avoid such executive discretion
in the future, Southern delegates insisted on a Senatorial check and balance.
Sectional conflicts were mitigated largely because of internationalpressures.
Significant in this regardis the compromise between Southern states, threatened
by Spain's presence in Florida and Louisiana, and Northern states, threatened
by British trade restrictions. These external economic and military threats
became important stimulants to the political bargaining necessary for institu-
tional reform. It was the Northern merchants, shippers and manufacturerswho
were most hurt by British trade restrictions. Conversely, Southerners were less
interested in commerce. Committed to an agricultural economy based on
slavery, they were either opposed or indifferent to Northern demands for a
national commercial system. Southern states, however, were dependent on the
military and naval capacities of the Northern states. The Southern states felt a
stronger sense of insecurity and realized that Northern assistance might be
needed in the near future. Consequently, the Southern states acquiesced to
granting Congress the power to regulate trade in return for Northern
protection.86
American state building in the 1780s resulted in the adoption of a stronger
government which decreased the influence of individual states. The prior
institutional framework established by the Articles of Confederation sought to
preserve state autonomy and curtail the powers of a central government. The
Articles were replaced by a new institutional framework which limited the
states' ability to influence foreign policy. Indeed, many of the new institutional
features stemmed from the need to deal more effectively with Europeanpowers.
Delegates realized that in order to ensure more efficient foreign-policy
performance, government leadership would need the authority to set priorities,
innovate and implement decisions. This in turn would require that the national
85
By attaining an equal voting rule in the Senate, small state delegates guaranteed that state
sovereignty would be preserved in the new system. Thus, distributional conflict led to the
convention's decision to qualify the commitment to centralization and concede a larger role to the
states. Ironically, equal representation in the Senate became a useful bargaining chip for the
Federalists. Federalists could claim that they were just as concerned with states' rights as were the
Anti-Federalists and that representation in the Senate was linked to preserving these rights. See
Federalist Nos. 39 and 62 in Rossiter, The Federalist Papers.
86
On this issue, see Marks, Independence on Trial, pp. 147-51, 181-3.
198 ELMAN
government be empowered to impose losses on influential groups, namely the

states. Thus, for example, the new Constitution granted Congress the power to
regulate trade, to draw revenue directly from individual citizens and to raise
troops directly. In providing for the 'common defense, security of liberty and
general welfare', Congress could override the laws of individual states and could
sanction aberrant states with military force. Moreover, the Constitution
established a new national executive which would command the armed forces
and bring 'speed, secrecy, and efficiency' into the foreign-policy making
87
process.8
The distinguishing features of the new Constitution and presidential system
were accountability and electoral origins. The head of government would be
dependent on the electorate and could not be forced to resign by the legislature
barring the unusual process of impeachment. The Framers rejected parliamen-
tary features, such as the fusion of executive and legislative powers and the
selection of the executive by Congress, because of the perceived effects such
measures would have for foreign policy. A parliamentary system would have
produced outcomes similar to those under the Articles of Confederation. In a
parliamentary system, the legislature, with its local and insular interests, would
have continued to dominate foreign policy. It was precisely this kind of
parochialism that the Framers wanted to avoid.88Thus, for example, delegates
did not want the executive to be dependent on the legislature with considerable
debate revolving around executive election.89 Similarly, in attempting to
minimize the influence of popular pressures from the legislature and avoid the
chaos which could result from mass politics, the Framers agreed upon a
bicameral Congress. In creating the executive and Senate, the Framers sought
to insulate foreign-policy making from factional interests. Unlike the unicam-
eral legislature under the Articles, it was assumed that the executive and Senate
would be less subject to narrowself-interests and would be less likely to sacrifice
the public good. Conducted by a relatively impartial executive and Senate,
foreign policy would be more 'rational' and would tend to reflect the general
welfare rather than the interests of a few states or regions.9"
Due to these new institutional rules, the United States was able to maintain
an army and navy which would counteract Indian raids, drive the British out of
the Northern frontier, force open the Mississippi and subdue the Barbarypirates.
Thus, the new institutional framework empowered US statesmen by facilitating
more efficient foreign-policy responses to previously intractable international
threats. The fact that the new presidential system enabled statesmen to minimize
security threats facilitated its consolidation. Federalists could refer to effective
foreign policy under the new Constitution in securing legitimacy for the new
regime.
87
See Federalist No. 70 in Rossiter, The Federalist Papers.
x See Federalist Nos. 48 and 71 in Rossiter, The Federalist Papers.
89
Farrand,TheFramingof the Constitutionof the UnitedStates,pp. 78-9, 115.
90 See Federalist Nos. 10 and 64 in
Rossiter, The Federalist Papers.
Domestic Institututional Effects on Foreign Policy, 1787-1848

The Quasi War. In 1793, the wars of the French Revolution broke out and
continued throughout the decade. The principal antagonists were France and a
coalition of nations supported by Britain. Britain instituted a naval blockade of
France and seized neutral vessels suspected of carrying contraband goods.
While the US merchant marine was seriously affected by these restrictions, a
crisis with Britain was averted by the negotiation of Jay's Treaty. France
interpretedthe treaty as an American move to support the British and retaliated
by seizing US ships bound for English ports. These depredations continued,
culminating in an undeclared naval war between the United States and France.
To what extent do structural/systemic variables account for US foreign policy
prior to the Quasi War? On the one hand, based on the distribution of
capabilities, the United States 'had the strongest motives to avoid war. It had
much to lose and little to gain'. In almost every category, US military defences
were 'lamentably weak'.9' There was no navy; many coastal forts had been
stripped of their armaments; there was a shortage of small arms and cannons;
and the army numberedonly 3,500. Given the balance of military forces between
France and the fledgling American state, we would expect the United States to
take a defensive position against the French rather than pick a fight. Indeed,
based on the 'balance of power', the United States should have avoided war.
Risking war with France would not have been a rational response to the
constraints of the international system.
On the other hand, based on the 'balance of threat', neorealism suggests the
opposite. First, due to French-Spanish affinity at the time, US statesmen feared
Spain would cede Louisiana to France. It was perceived that such a security
threatcould only be mitigated through war.92Secondly, some evidence suggests
that President Adams expected British support in the war. This aid would
significantly decrease the 'dread of conflict' and might have enabled the United
States to acquire French holdings in the new world. Thirdly, many Executive
officials believed the status quo to be worse than war. US trade could suffer no
greater loss once hostilities began. Consequently, war with France could be
considered a sensible response to external threats.
Thus, in this case, neorealism appears indeterminate. Because structural/sys-
temic analysis leads to contradictory predictions, it does not prove very helpful
in accounting for the actual policies that the United States did undertake.
By contrast, an institutional approach can account for US decision making
before the Quasi War in a variety of ways. First, the case demonstrates how
domestic institutions can empower statesmen by offering foreign-policy options
not previously available. Specifically, the Constitution altered the course of US
foreign policy in large measure because it made possible actions and policies
91
Alexander DeConde, The Quasi War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Undeclared Naval War
with France, 1797-1801 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1966), pp. 22, 90.
92
Lang, Foreign Policy in the Early Republic, pp. 121-2.
200 ELMAN
which otherwise would have been beyond reach. The new Constitution enabled
actors to forge international treaties that were binding on individual states as
well as raise an effective armed force. The Federalists would have been unable
to negotiate Jay's Treaty with the British had the Articles still been in effect.93
Nor would the United States have been able to organize a centrally controlled
naval retaliation against the French had the Constitution not been ratified.
Secondly, US foreign policy prior to the Quasi War demonstrates that
foreign-policy makers tend to put domestic institutional features to strategic use.
As previously discussed, domestic institutions can influence military strategy
by providing components which are subsequently used to advance specific
foreign-policy goals. In this case, Federalists believed that US security could
be enhanced only by close commercial ties with Britain.94Yet, they were able
to implement these foreign-policy objectives only by relying on Constitutional
features of treaty ratification. Since the new Constitution required only Senate
approval for treaty ratification, Federalists found themselves with a unique
opportunity. Having secured control of the Executive and a majority in the
Senate, the new institutional rules enabled the Federalists to negotiate and ratify
a treaty with Britain.95President Washington takes much of the credit for using
Constitutional features to Federalist advantage. Once Jay's Treaty was
negotiated, Washington referred it to a special session of the Senate.
Republicans, a minority in the Senate, who would have been able to block
ratificationunderthe old rules of the Articles of Confederation, were now unable
to do so. The new rules of treaty ratification delineated by the Constitution thus
influenced foreign policy outcomes by providing greater bargaining power to
the Federalists over the Republicans. These new rules increased the Federalists'
ability to pursue their preferred foreign-policy agenda. Negotiation with the
British became possible where before it was not.
Thirdly, consistent with sociological institutionalism, the case also suggests
that foreign-policy makers will invoke domestic rules and norms in order to
justify their actions as well as tailor foreign-policy options to accord with
pre-established institutional frameworks. For example, after the disclosure of
Jay's Treaty resulted in a Republican uproar, Washington thwarted opposition
by invoking Constitutional features. Since the Constitution rendered foreign
treaties as the supreme law of the land, President Washington argued that Jay's
Treaty could, therefore, not be amended or revoked.96 He thus tried to
de-legitimize the opposition's attempts to have the treaty reconsidered.
Moreover, because war measures conflicted with the provisions of the
93Under the terms of the treaty, the United States recognized the British position on neutralrights
in return for the evacuation of Northern military posts still held by the British. See DeConde, A
History of American Foreign Policy, pp. 52-67.
94DeConde, A History of American Foreign Policy, p. 50; Albert Bowman, 'Jefferson, Hamilton,
and American Foreign Policy', Political Science Quarterly, 71 (1956), 18-41, at pp. 20-1.
95Graebner, Foundations of American Foreign Policy, p. 92.
96
Polakoff, Political Parties in American History, p. 44.
US-French alliance of 1778 and the Constitution stipulated that treaties were
the supreme law of the land, Federalists sought to reconcile their policies within
Constitutional boundaries by voting a law that formally abrogated all treaties
with France. This act was initiated on the premise that, without it, the Federalist
programme might appear unconstitutional.97 Yet despite these domestic
considerations, the law had internationalrepercussions. It effectively ended the
hope of reconciliation with the French. For their part, Republicans invoked the
Constitution in attempting to stop approval of Jay's Treaty. Republicans in the
House claimed that the concept of separation of powers gave them the right to
judge the treaty. Republicans also argued that the Federalist programme was
unconstitutional by pointing out that only Congress had the right to declare war
and it had never done so against France.98These examples suggest that the
Constitution was already becoming a partof social identity. Both Federalists and
Republicans tailored their foreign-policy choices to pre-existing Constitutional
features. Domestic actors worked within the limits of given domestic
institutions. Foreign policies were pursued only insofar as they conformed to
Constitutional rules.
The timing of the US retaliation against France (why 1798?) and its character
(why quasi?) is also illuminated by an institutional approach. In order to
understandUS military strategy prior to the outbreak of hostilities with France,
we must trace the power struggles between the Federalists and the Republicans.
Such coalitional analysis, however, will only provide half of the story. The case
shows that it is necessary to study coalition-making within the context ofexisting
institutions.
First, foreign-policy options were constrained by Constitutional features
which required bicameral deliberation on matters of war. Prior to 1798,
Federalists held a majority in the Senate but lacked such voting strength in the
House. With such a division along party lines, Congress was unable to enact
even limited measures for defence - 'The Republicans were strong enough in
the House to delay action on almost any matter'. Thus, due to the composition
of the legislative body, Congressional 'power of the purse', and the
Constitutional requirement that both houses vote on matters pertaining to war,
'the nation would have to wait in a state of undeclared, or unofficial, war'.99
However, once the Federalists gained majorities in both houses, they succeeded
in voting bill after bill that put the United States on a war footing. In the course
of three months, twenty laws for waging the Quasi War were passed.'00
Therefore, the timing of the war appears to have been contingent on
Constitutional features and party politics.
Secondly, foreign-policy options were largely a function of the Federalist/
97
DeConde, The Quasi War, p. 102.
'8 Lang,
Foreign Policy in the Early Republic, p. 152; Graebner, Foundations of American
Foreign Policy, p. 97.
99
DeConde, The Quasi War, pp. 62, 68-9.
'{' DeConde, The Quasi War, pp. 90, 101.
202 ELMAN
Republican rift. Many Federalists who feared the rise of Republicanism

welcomed the crisis: 'they saw in these [foreign affairs] developments the means
by which their party could retain power. Foreign policy, they believed, could
be used as a weapon against domestic adversaries'. ll The foreign-policy option
of war with France could be used as a means for destroying the Republican
cause. War had a particular appeal to High Federalists (i.e., Hamiltonian
followers) because it would purge the government of domestic opposition. War
would 'expose the disloyalty of the opposition party and allow Federalists, as
patriots, the chance to crush internal opposition in the name of national
security'.102 US foreign-policy options with regard to French overtures for
negotiation were coloured by this Federalist/Republican conflict and Federalist
attempts to manipulate Constitutional features. High Federalists believed that
the possibility of peace with France would freeze popular support for the
Federalist party. As DeConde notes, 'The growth, even the support, of the party
had come to depend on a continuation of the Quasi War'.103 Consequently,
Hamiltonian Federalists tried to delay the nomination of negotiators, thereby
prolonging the conflict. Such stalling tactics were feasible due to institutional
constraints. Since the Constitution required Senate confirmation of appoint-
ments abroad and Federalists held a Senate majority, domestic institutional rules
empowered Federalist foreign-policy options rather than those of their domestic
contenders.
The War of 1812. When France and England resumed warfare in 1803,
restrictions on American trade became a favoured weapon. The American
merchant marine, seeking to trade with both sides, was caught in the middle of
the British-French war of attrition. Since Britain had a larger navy than France,
it was able to enforce a blockade more tightly and seize more American ships.
Added to these restrictions on commerce was the British practice of impressing
American seamen for service in the British navy under the claim that these
sailors were British citizens or deserters. Thus, although the United States was
against both French and British policies, American hostility was largely directed
at the latter. The administration attempted to protect American trade and seamen
by a series of economic sanctions which were either rejected by American
merchants or had little effect on British and French policy makers. Finally, the
United States decided to resume trade with both Britain and France until one
of these nations agreed to respect American neutral rights. In that event, the
United States would initiate an embargo of the other. When France agreed to
the US offer, trade with Britain was placed under sharp restrictions. As the
reduction in exports from the United States began to have an effect on the British
01
02
DeConde, The Quasi War, pp. 85, 328-9. In fact, Federalist war plans included an attempt to
attack Louisiana as a way of avoiding French dominance and hence Republican influence in the area.
See Lang, Foreign Policy in the Early Republic, pp. 123-4.
103
economy, the Orders in Council were repealed. Britain, however, had acted too
late. On 1 June 1812, President Madison recommended war against Britain and
a declaration of war was soon approved by both the House and Senate.
To what extent does neorealism account for the US decision to wage war
against Britain in 1812? An assessment of the US and British capabilities would
lead us to expect that the US should not have favoured war. Indeed, the reason
behind Jefferson's economic embargo policy vis-a-vis Britain was the 'utter
impossibility of deciding to declare war against the foremost land and sea power
in the world'.'04 From a balance of military forces, the US decision to wage war
against Britain cannot be considered a rational response to external exigen-
105
cies.
Yet, we can argue that US military strategy was a response to the 'balance
of threat'. A US declaration of war would have been rational considering the
external threat which the United States faced at the time. For instance, several
diplomatic historians claim that the United States was reacting to British
economic pressures. The continuation of the status quo under such circum-
stances was considered to be worse than war. As Horsman notes, 'America's
position was so hopeless in regard to the European belligerents that it seemed
that no war could make it worse ... the failure of economic coercion made war
or absolute submission to England the only alternatives, and the latter presented
more terrors to the recent colonists'.'06 Moreover, with the purchase of
Louisiana from France, the external pressures which had forced the United
States into the hands of Britain were removed and war became a viable
foreign-policy option.
Thus, as with the Quasi War case, neorealism leads to contradictory
predictions. An institutional perspective provides a closer historical fit. Indeed,
there are several problems with viewing US military strategy as a reaction to
external circumstances such as British maritime restrictions and a relaxation of
the French threat. First, some historians have pointed out that US policy makers
disregarded the European balance of power. The United States failed to
acknowledge that Britain had no choice but to impose restrictions on neutral
trade in order to counter Napoleon's hegemonic aspirations.107Historians
suggest that if US decision makers had been reacting to external exigencies they
104
Reginald Horsman, The Causes of the War of 1812 (New York: Octagon Books, 1972),
pp. 142, 179.
105
For example, the British army numberedapproximately 300,000 in comparison to some 11,000
US troops hastily assembled in 1812. In naval strength,Britain had over 700 ships and approximately
150,000 men; the American navy totalled 16-20 ships and only 4,000 personnel. Moreover, the
British, as the leading industrial nation of Europe, could easily produce enough goods to support a
military engagement in North America. The United States, however, was primarily an agricultural
society and could not supportsuch a wide-scale military machine. See T. HarryWilliams, The History
of American Wars from 1745-1918 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981), p. 97. Thus, we would
expect the United States to assume a defensive position against Britain rather than pick a fight.
'6 Horsman, The Causes of the War of 1812, pp. 186, 266.
107 Horsman, The Causes
of the War of 1812, pp. 24, 80, 112, 120, 136, 264-5.
204 ELMAN
would have been less hostile to British policy.'08 Secondly, it is not clear why
the removal of the threat of war with France meant that the United States would
have to go to war with Britain. US-French reconciliation did not make war with
any other foreign country inevitable. Lastly, the neorealist argument that US
foreign policy was a rational reaction to external threat cannot account for the
United States failing to go to war earlier. By 1812, British restrictions on trade
were 'old grievances' and had been more burdensome in previous years.
Moreover, it was not the New England maritime section, representing the
interests directly affected by British naval infringements, which supported the
decision to go to war. Rather, as the Congressional vote on the declaration of
war demonstrates, it was the Southern and Western states which were its most
vigorous champions.'09
Most historians view the conquest of British-held Canada as a significant
factor in explaining US decision making prior to the war. But diplomatic
historians have presented varying motives for this Western expansion: (1) the
Western states advocated war with Britain as a means of obtaining the fertile
agricultural lands of Canada; (2) the conquest of Canada was considered an
effective method of prosecuting the war with Britain since it would require the
British to fight on land as well as on sea; (3) the annexation of Canada would
eliminate British aid to the Indians on the north-western frontier; (4) the
conquest of Canada would increase the sectional bargaining power of the
Northern states in Congress; and (5) the retention of Canada would eliminate
the general threat for American security which stemmed from the British
presence along the northern borders.
An institutional argument unites these seemingly disparate interpretations.
Expansion into Canada could only be contemplated in light of procedures
delineated by existing institutions. According to the Constitution, Congress was
authorized to decide the admittance of new states into the Union. But the
Constitution provided few rules for such Congressional action. This lack of
guidelines was bound to spark controversy since the conditions for admitting
territories into states would critically influence the relative power and
bargaining strength of the existing states. Ultimately, it was the Louisiana
Purchase of 1803, concluded amidst sectional conflict, which set the rules for
Congressional action. As DeConde notes, the Louisiana Purchase 'set a
precedent for acquiring territoryand people by threatand treaty'. A decade later,
these rules expanded the options of groups favouring expansion into Canada."'
Expansionists, regardless of their underlying motives, could rely on Constitu-
tional authorization and the subsequent precedent of the Louisiana Purchase
108
See, for example, Graebner, Foundations of American Foreign Policy, p. 121.
'09Perkins, 'Introduction', pp. 3-4.
110
DeConde, A History of American Foreign Policy, p. 77. That these rules influenced policy
options can be seen as early as 1807 when President Jefferson stated that 'if the British do not give
us the satisfaction we demand, we will take Canada, which wants to enter the Union'. Quoted in
Horsman, The Causes of the War of 1812, p. 169.
in order to justify their actions. Indeed, the case is an example of how

pre-existing institutions set the 'menu of available practices', thereby
empowering certain groups over others. The case appears to corroborate
Snyder's claim that domestic politics matters in explaining instances of
over-expansion. Pre-existing institutions can empower, and facilitate the
options of, concentrated interests favouring expansion."'
An institutional perspective also unites the argumentsof diplomatic historians
in a different way. Historians claim that the South and West had a number of
reasons to vote for war, including a desire to preserve US honour and maritime
rights in the face of British trade restrictions and secure foreign markets for
exports. Historians would therefore have us explain US military strategy by
coalitional analysis. As in the Quasi War case, however, coalition-making
cannot be divorced from the specific institutions within which these coalitions
acted. Indeed, it is not Western and Southern interests per se that are the most
interesting fact, but ratherthis 'remarkable [regional] unity'. This united front
facilitated a pro-war majority in Congress. Since the Constitution authorized
Congress to declare war, it was only when this pro-war majority was secured
that war with Britain became a viable foreign-policy option.
Lastly, an institutional perspective can account for the political process prior
to war. The US declaration of war can be considered the product of a sectional
bargain between the West and the South, each attempting to strengthen their
regional power in Congress by acquiring new territory.112However, this bargain
was facilitated by institutional constraints. With only nine votes in the House
of Representatives, the Western states could not get a vote of war without
support of Southern congressmen."13As Horsman explains, 'it was a voting
impossibility for the West to take America into war for grievances peculiarly
its own. Clay had sounded the clarion call on behalf of the West, but for voting
strength he was to depend on the intimate alliance and joint leadership of the
South'.114 The annexation of Canadian territory would result in the addition of
several Northern states into the Union, thereby increasing anti-slavery political
power in Congress. Therefore, Southerners would only agree to such an
expansionist policy if Florida, which would presumably enter the Union as a
slave state, would be added to the national domain as well. Since Spain and
' Snyder, Myths of Empire. According to Snyder's criteria, the War of 1812 can be considered
an instance of over-expansion. The United States was effectively 'self encircled' by Britainand, given
its military power relative to that of Britain, US expansion into Canada extended 'beyond the point
where material costs [equalled] material benefits'. US foreign policy in this case corroborates
Snyder's claim that, while democratic structuresmay predispose against over-expansion, they by no
means rule out such dysfunctional behaviour.
112
Julius W. Pratt, 'The Bargain Between the South and West', in Perkins, ed., The Causes of the
War of 1812, pp. 66-7.
113Of the seventy-nine votes for war in the House, only nine came from Kentucky, Tennessee and
Ohio while a total of thirty-seven came from the South Atlantic states.
114Horsman, The Causes
of the War of 1812, p. 183.
206 ELMAN
Britain were allies at the time, war with Britain would facilitate both the
conquest of Canada and Florida."15
In sum, US foreign policy vis-a-vis Britain can be considered a 'triumph of
Constitutional orthodoxy ... it reveals the irreversibility of the American
commitment to the form of government decided upon in 1787-1788'.'16 Prior
to the war, control over national security could be seized by warring sectional
factions in Congress precisely because the Constitution granted Congress a
significant role in foreign-policy making. Thus, while the executive did not
favour aggression, the logrolling of powerful societal groups in Congress
nevertheless led the state down that road.
The Mexican-American War. In March 1845, when President Tyler signed a

House annexation resolution admitting Texas into the Union, Mexico formally
broke off all diplomatic relations with the United States. Newly elected
President Polk quickly ordered 1,500 troops into the still disputed area between
the Rio Grande and the Nueces Rivers. Mexico, indignant over the annexation
of Texas, demanded that these troops be withdrawn behind the Nueces. When
US compliance was not forthcoming, Mexican cavalry and American troops
soon clashed on what President Polk insisted was 'American soil'. Congress
promptly declared a state of war with Mexico.
It would appear that neorealism can easily account for US foreign policy on
Mexico. US military forces were far superior to those of Mexico. Given the
balance of military forces, territorial expansion through war with Mexico would
have afforded large benefits at minimal costs. "7 However, this 'distribution of
capabilities' argument overlooks US relations with the European powers during
this period. Indeed, US foreign-policy making prior to the Mexican conflict was
conducted in the shadow of a possible war with Britain." 8 Congressmen from
both the Democratic party and the Whig opposition feared that aggressive
policies towards Mexico, such as the annexation of Texas, 'promised war with
England and Mexico and ultimate disaster for the nation'.19 The business
community was especially worried. American merchants feared that the British
would withhold credit or impose trade sanctions as a response to US hostilities
with Mexico: 'And if the British navy should blockade major American ports,
1"5DeConde, A History of American Foreign Policy, pp. 94-8.

16 James
Sterling Young, The Washington7Community, 1800-1828 (New York: Columbia
117See Williams, The History,of American Warsfrom 1745-1918, p. 161. While the 'balance of
power' may have provided incentives for war, it did not require such a strategy. Since Mexico posed
little threat, US statesmen had several options short of war. Thus, under permissive international
conditions, neorealism proves indeterminate. Domestic level arguments are needed to explain the
foreign policy ultimately selected.
118 The stabilization of relations with England and the diffusion of the dispute over Oregon
occurred shortly after war with Mexico was under way.
19Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy, p. 106.
what then but disaster?'"20Mexican officials also believed that US-British

relations were so strainedthat Mexico would receive substantialaid from Britain
once the fighting commenced.121 Given the possibility of British intervention on
behalf of Mexico, it is far from clear that a Mexican-American war would
provide more benefits than costs.
Equally difficult for neorealism to explain is US reluctance to conquer more
Mexican territoryonce it became possible. As the war progressed and the threat
of European intervention was removed by the Oregon settlement and renewed
Franco-British rivalry, the assimilation of Mexico seemed both defensible and
militarily possible. Given the lack of external constraints, it is odd that the
United States failed to act as a 'taker'. Historians have cited ideological factors
motivating US actions, referring to moral and racial reasons behind the rejection
of the 'all of Mexico' movement.122 Such interpretations neglect a different
domestic level argument, one that rests on domestic political struggles within
institutional boundaries. Partisan politics and institutional constraints saved
Mexico from losing a much larger portion of its territory.
US foreign policy on Mexico demonstrates how domestic institutions
empower foreign-policy makers by expanding the available repertoireof policy
options as well as how self-interested actors can manipulate domestic
institutional features in pursuit of their foreign-policy goals. While institutions
constrain actors by obliging them to work within given boundaries, there are a
number of rules from which they may choose. Consequently, coalitional
analysis is an integral part of any institutional argument.
Foreign-policy options regardingthe question of Texas centred upon attempts
by both pro- and anti-annexation forces to invoke Constitutional features. After
a treaty to annex Texas was defeated in the Senate in 1844, pro-annexation
Democrats chose a new strategy: annexation via joint resolution.123 To be
ratified, a joint resolution required only a simple majority in each house rather
than the more stringent two-thirds Senate approval necessary for treaty
ratification. Annexationist forces argued that such a joint resolution was
constitutional. Congress would simply be exercising its prerogative to decide
upon the admittance of new states into the Union.124Anti-annexationist Whigs
12(1John H. Schroeder, Mr. Polk's War:American Opposition and Dissent, 1846-1848 (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1973), p. 35.
121
Seymour V. Connor and Oddie B. Faulk, NorthAmerica Divided: The Mexican-American War,
1846-1848 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 28.
122See
Schroeder, Mr. Polk's War, pp. 75, 149; Norman A. Graebner, Empire on the Pacific:
A Study in American Continental Expansion, 2nd edn (Claremont, Calif.: Regina Books, 1983),
p. 91.
'23 Connor and Faulk, North America Divided, p. 20.
124Frederick
Merk, History of the Westward Movement (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978),
p. 297. That pro-annexationistforces used the Constitution to justify parochial interests is clear from
PresidentTyler's supportof the joint resolution. Previously a strictconstructionistof the Constitution
in matters of domestic policy, we would have expected Tyler to oppose annexation by any means
other than that expressly listed in the Constitution. Yet, Tyler declared that Congress as well as the
Senate was authorized to annex territory: 'the power of Congress is fully competent in some other
208 ELMAN
feared that Texas would increase slave state territory and the voting power of
the slave-holding south. Thus, they also invoked the Constitution in order to
thwart ratification of the joint resolution. Whigs relied on the Louisiana and
Oregon precedents for guidelines regarding state entry into the Union. They
claimed that foreign territorycould only be acquired by treaty. In effect, Whig
opponents objected to annexation by joint resolution as a usurpation of the
Senate's treaty-making powers.125
The transfer of the annexation issue to Congress was a clever manipulation
of institutional features. It brought the issue to a body where a mere majority
would give victory to pro-expansionist interests. The joint resolution passed in
the House despite repeated warnings from Mexico that annexation would be
regarded as a declaration of war. As Connor and Faulk claim, 'there can be no
question but that the annexation of Texas precipitated a reaction among patriotic
zealots in Mexico which produced wal'.126 Hence, rules governing the
ratification process and state entry into the Union empowered various state and
societal groups. In furtheringtheir interests, these domestic actors chose options
which lead them down a particular foreign-policy path. Had domestic
institutions been otherwise, it is likely that the unilateral annexation of Texas
would have been precluded, thus forestalling war.
Events prior to the outbreak of hostilities with Mexico support the claim that
institutional rules of sequence in decision making will have important
ramifications for policy outcomes. While the Constitution authorized Congress
to declare war, it did not restrict the ability of the Executive to send US troops
outside national borders. Indeed, there was nothing in the Constitution to
prevent the president from deploying troops in the critical period between the
outbreak of hostilities and a formal declaration of war.127 The Constitution
allowed pro-annexationist President Polk to movefirst (i.e. set the agenda). Even
before annexation had been approved by the Texan Congress, Polk sent a small
army to the Rio Grande. When US and Mexican troops clashed, Congress was
forced to move second. Its options were significantly reduced by the fact that
the President had already sent troops to the disputed area. Anti-annexation
(F'note continuedl)
form of proceeding to accomplish everything that a formal ratificationof a treatycould accomplish'.
See Merk, History of the Westward Movement, pp. 288, 293, 297; Polakoff, Political Parties in
American History, p. 153.
15
Schroeder, Mr. Polk's War, p. 7.
126
Connor and Faulk, North America Divided, p. 27; see also Pratt, A History of United States
Foreign Policl, pp. 117-18; DeConde, A History of American Foreign Policy, pp. 170, 178;
Graebner, Empire on the Pacific, p. 108.
127
Much attention has been devoted to whether Polk was drawn into war against his wishes due
to Mexican belligerency or whether he instigated the war in order to acquire territoryfrom Mexico.
It is clear that Polk accepted Texas's annexation which commanded majority support of the
Democratic party. On the other hand, Polk sought to end hostilities with Mexico and supported an
expansion of the campaign only after Mexico proved unwilling to negotiate. My point here is that
regardless of Polk's intentions, institutionalfactors crucially effected the executive's ability to realize
its goals.
forces in Congress did not have the option of voting against the war bill since
this would deny support for the embattled American army in the field, thereby
exposing them to the politically fatal charge of disloyalty. As Schroeder notes,
the Mexican-American War
exposed a critical weakness in the system of checks and balances devised by the
founding fathers ... the President had dramatically demonstrated his almost
unrestrained power, independent of Congress, to involve the nation in war.
Americantroops had been maneuveredinto a position along the Rio Grandewhich
virtually guaranteeda Mexican reprisal;once the shots had been fired, Congress
had no real choice but to follow the President into war.'28
Foreign-policy options considered after the conflict with Mexico had begun
can also be considered a function of domestic politics rather than external
exigencies. As in the cases of the Quasi War and the War of 1812, coalitional
analysis is crucial to explaining which of these foreign-policy options was
chosen. But such a 'society-centred' approach must also take account of the
constraints and resources provided by pre-existing institutions.
Conservative Whigs (i.e., Cotton Whigs) sought to preserve party unity by
proposing that no Mexican territory should be taken. This strategy was meant
to stem the increasing division within the Whig party over the slavery issue.
With pro- and anti-slavery coalitions beginning to emerge within the party, the
strategy presented an alternative upon which both Northernand SouthernWhigs
could safely unite. Thus, this 'No Territory' policy was primarily a political
strategy designed to protect the Whig party rather than a means of ending the
war.'29 Given their numerical disadvantage in Congress, however, this Whig
strategy was bound to be rejected - the expansionist Democratic majority would
not accept such a self-defeating restriction. Whig radicals (i.e., the Conscience
Whigs) offered a competing foreign-policy strategy, one which was also tied to
domestic considerations. For these opposition Congressmen, the annexation of
Texas along with the Mexican War represented a scheme of the slave states to
extend their territory and hence increase their voting power in Congress.
Consequently, Conscience Whigs argued that pro-annexation forces should be
expressly prohibited from admitting the new territory gained from Mexico as
slave states. Since Congressional passage of such an act would automatically
ensure that any Mexican territory acquired in the war would be free territory,
radical Whigs reasoned that Polk and his pro-slavery supporterswould lose their
incentive for fighting the Mexicans. 30 Thus radical Whigs were just as
concerned about domestic political power as the conservative wing of the party.
Both sought foreign-policy strategies that would enhance the political power of
the Whig party and the free states.
Polk's policy towards Mexico also reflected increasing divisions in the
12_Schroeder, Mr. Polk's War, pp. xii-xiii, 24.

129
Schroeder, Mr. Polk's War, pp. 87-8.
'3 Schroeder, Mr. Polk's War, pp. 124-6; Graebner, Empire on the Pacific, pp. 186-9.
210 ELMAN
Democratic party. Northern and Western Democrats, who had advocated

forcing the British to relinquish 'all of Oregon', viewed Polk's request for a
declaration of war against Mexico as 'selling out to the South and picking on
defenseless Mexico instead of standing honorably against the British'. They
demanded that the party not involve itself in a war of conquest in the southwest.
Together with the Whigs, these Democrats voted against Polk's appropriations
and appointments.
By December 1847, US forces had occupied Mexico City and were in control
of Mexican seaports as well as all of her northernprovinces. The prevention of
what appeared to be the impending annexation of all of Mexico, a policy which
would have been rational given external opportunities, has its roots in domestic
politics. In fact, the 'all Mexico' coalition was blocked due to an unlikely
coalition between anti-slavery Whigs and pro-slavery Democrats.'13 As
previously mentioned, Northern Whigs feared that the whole of Mexico, if
annexed, would become slave territory.But, by 1848, Southern Democrats were
convinced that slavery could not be extended beyond Texas or below the Rio
Grande. It was thought that slavery would not flourish in the vast portion of
Mexican land due to the lack of cultivable soil. Since Mexican territory would
thus become free territory, its annexation would weaken Southern bargaining
power.'32 Thus anti- and pro-slavery groups found themselves strange
bedfellows with regard to foreign-policy options - a continuation of the war to
subjugate all of Mexico would be politically devastating to their respective
sectional interests.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has used US state building and subsequent military strategy from
1781 to 1848 as a benchmark against which to challenge the theoretical primacy
granted to neorealism in the study of small state behaviour. I have argued that
while neorealism provides a persuasive explanation for domestic institutional
choices in the new American republic, it proves less useful in accounting for
US foreign security policies in later periods.
This finding should come as some surprise to both Comparativists and IR
scholars. Comparativists have assumed that internal political processes
determine democratic institutional development in newly independent states.
By contrast, in IR there is a long tradition which suggests that external factors
are more likely to influence the foreign policies of these weak states. This article
has suggested that there is little reason to accept the validity of such traditional
claims about the domains within which domestic and internationalvariables will
be valid. Paradoxically, international and domestic factors will often influence
state practice when we least expect it.
'13 Schroeder, Mr. Polk's War, pp. 130, 152, 155.
'132Bradford Perkins, The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: The
Creation of a Republican Empire, 1776-1865 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993),
pp. 196-7.
That foreign-policy making is susceptible to domestic political constraints

has become almost a truism among IR theorists. Indeed, few would disagree
that, among the great powers, domestic politics can generate national security
policies which fail to correspond to systemic/structural imperatives. On the one
hand, domestic politics may prevent policy responses which are dictated by the
'balance of power' and the 'balance of threat'. Alternatively, domestic politics
may produce military strategies which should be precluded by these inter-
national exigencies.133 But finding that domestic groups and constitutional
arrangements play an important role in great power foreign-policy making
should hardly be surprising. Since great powers are less constrained by the
international environment, we would expect domestic political processes to
matter. Small state foreign policy ratherthan great power behaviour necessarily
constitutes a more demanding test for domestic level theories.
Contraryto received wisdom, this article has shown that small state behaviour
is not immune from domestic political influences. It may well be that small state
foreign security policy can be viewed as a state-centric phenomenon in which
military strategy is a response to internationalpressures. But this is a proposition
to be tested empirically ratherthan one to be assumed a priori. Contrary to the
state-centric approach, the cases I have examined reveal that even the most
vulnerable states may display foreign policies explicable only in terms of
domestic politics. This is especially true for weak states which are also
domestically liberal. Various institutional designs for representative democra-
cies are likely to condition the foreign policies of all democratic states, whether
they are great powers or small states. In sum, the historical evidence presented
here suggests that the causal primacy granted to international explanations of
small state behaviour is unwarranted. The influence of particular domestic
institutional constraints on foreign policy deserves more attention than it
currently receives from small state researchers.
Although most IR theorists would concede that a state's foreign policy is to
some degree an extension of its internal situation, even the staunchest supporters
of domestic level theorizing have argued that domestic politics is less likely to
matter when foreign threats appear great. It is assumed that domestic level
theory will be less useful in explaining decisions to go to war because the high
stakes require a vigilant attention to national security interests and international
circumstances. For example, Posen claims that when external threatis low, great
power military doctrines will be shaped by domestic organizational biases,
while in periods of high external threat these doctrines will conform to
international exigencies.134 Contrary to Posen, I have argued that domestic
political constraints do not drop out of the foreign-policy equation merely
because war seems more probable. Since domestic level arguments can explain
small state decisions to go to war, then we have reason to support such theories
133
Rosecrance and Stein, 'Beyond Realism', pp. 17-18.
134
Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, especially pp. 80, 239-40.
212 ELMAN
with greaterconfidence when considering the more obvious cases of great power
military strategy, even when external threats are extreme.
All this is not to say that neorealists should pack their theoretical tents and
steal away into the night.135 Ratherthan reject neorealism completely, we should
distinguish the conditions under which it has value from those situations where
it is likely to be less relevant. The aim of such research would not be a refutation
of neorealism, but rather a clearer understanding of the domains within which
domestic and international explanations are likely to prove superior and a more
precise sense of the relative importance of external and internal constraints.136
For example, this article has suggested that neorealism's explanatory power
varies indirectly with the persistence of a given political regime. In early periods
of a nation's history, international explanations should have causal primacy.
Statesmen in newly independent states should be responsive to external stimuli
and should react to external threats in order to protect the emerging state's
survival. As in the case of early American state building, the nature of the
international environment is likely to affect both the bargaining positions of
various domestic groups as well as the perceived merits of domestic institutional
alternatives. However, in later periods, state behaviour may be better explained
from a domestic level perspective. The domestic institutions formed to deal with
particularinternationaland foreign-policy problems will tend to survive beyond
this acute phase and are likely to constrain the state's responses to subsequent
international challenges. US foreign-policy making prior to the Quasi War, the
War of 1812 and the Mexican-American War reveals that pre-established
domestic institutions affected both the timing and substance of subsequent US
military strategy. In short, historical sequence matters - domestic institutions
created during earlier critical junctures constrain the state's response to future
crises.
The points I have raised in this article suggest a variety of directions for further
research on small states. One promising line of inquiry concerns whether
democracy decreases the likelihood of effective small state foreign-policy
action. It is frequently claimed that democratic institutions create problems for
foreign-policy making. These problems are said to originate in the structureof
political authority and the manner in which foreign-policy decision making is
apportioned within liberal governments.137 For example, in a recent study of the
connection between US democracy and foreign policy in the post-1945 period,
Nincic argues that the Constitution's joint allocation of foreign-policy authority
to the executive and legislative branches of government often contributes to
35
I adaptthis phrasefrom G. John Ikenberry,'Conclusion: An InstitutionalApproach to American
Foreign Economic Policy', International Organization, 42 (1988), 219-43, at pp. 221-2.
136 Andrew
Moravcsik, 'Liberalism and International Relations Theory' (Harvard University,
Center for International Affairs, Working Paper No. 92-6, April 1993), p. 41.
137
Kjell Goldmann, 'Democracy Is Incompatible with InternationalPolitics: A Reconsideration
of a Hypothesis', in Kjell Goldmann, Sten Berglund and Gunnar Sjostedt, eds, Democracy and
Foreign Policy: The Case of Sweden (Aldershot, Hants: Gower, 1986), pp. 1-3.
'incoherent' foreign policy. Specifically, a democratic system based on the

principle of electorally separated branches with shared powers hinders
governmental consensus and, therefore, increases the likelihood that foreign-
policy behaviour will be disconnected from international circumstances to
which, in principle, it should be responsive.'38 The review of pre-1900 US
foreign policy presented here lends support for this claim. US foreign policy
throughout this period failed to correspond to internationalconditions. Partisan
politics and domestic institutional features decreased the likelihood of
conducting effective national security policies. Since the United States often
failed to respond rationally to international circumstances, this article
corroborates the classic notion that there is a trade-off between democratic
institutions and the effectiveness of foreign policy. More research is required
on foreign-policy making within internationally weak, domestically liberal
states in order to fully assess whether democratic ideals are compatible with the
realities of international politics.
A second avenue for new research on small states might address the debate
about presidential versus parliamentarygovernment. '9 The central claim of this
literature is that the balance of power between the executive and legislature in
decision making varies greatly from one democratic country to the next and that
these differences matter. For example, presidentialism is said to have the
disadvantage of less democracy (i.e., representation) but the advantage of
government stability, while parliamentarism is said to have the opposite
consequences of greater democracy and instability. However, the direct effects
of presidential and parliamentary systems on foreign-policy outcomes have
been less studied.
In terms of presidential government, the cases I have examined highlight three
disadvantages for foreign policy: (1) executive-legislative deadlock; (2)
temporal rigidity; and (3) legislative parochialism. In presidential systems,
conflict between the two branches of government tends to increase because each
is an independently elected organ and lacks any institutional method for
resolving disagreement: 'the inability of the assembly to remove the executive
and of the executive to remove the assembly prevents either branch from
resolving political crises based on fundamental mutual opposition'.140Further-
more, because both branches are popularly elected and the tenure of each is
unaffected by relations with the other, the need for co-operation between the
president and congress is less urgent. Neither the president nor legislators have
1X Nincic, Democracy and Foreign Policy.

139
See, for example, Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus
Government in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984); Arend
Lijphart, ed., Parliamentary versus Presidential Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1992); Richard Rose and Ezra N. Suleiman, eds, Presidents and Prime Ministers, 2nd edn
(Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1981); Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M.
Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1992).
140
Shugart and Carey, Presidents and Assemblies, p. 29.
214 ELMAN
institutional incentives to compromise with one another, thus increasing the

chance for political deadlock. This increased tendency for executive-legislative
division in presidential regimes means that foreign policy will often fail to reflect
national security interests and will be dominated by interbranch rivalries. For
example, during the Mexican-American War, Polk's loss of support in
Congress lengthened the duration of the war and hindered the US bargaining
position. 141
As a consequence of executive-legislative deadlock, executives in presiden-
tial systems are likely to manipulate constitutional and extra-constitutional
features in order to bypass congressional intransigence. Such activism on the
part of the executive is likely because presidents hold a popular mandate and
are thus convinced that they possess independent authority. Opposition to his
or her policies will, therefore, be more 'irksome' to presidents than to prime
ministers, who realize that political power is part of a temporary coalition.142
Such presidential activism is just as likely with regard to foreign policy as it is
for domestic policy. For example, since the Second World War, US presidents
have sought to overstep hostile legislatures by forging executive agreements
rather than formal treaties which would require a two-thirds consent of the
Senate. Yet, executive attempts to bypass the legislature were just as common
in earlier periods. For example, prior to the Mexican-American War, shifting
the Texas annexation issue from the Senate to the House ensured that the
executive's pro-expansionist interests would be realized.
In contrast to parliamentary government, where legislators can at any time
between elections cause realignments and break governments, presidentialism
lends a rigidity to the political process precisely because Congress cannot
dismiss the executive except in extraordinary circumstances:
[presidentialism]makes adjustmentto changing situations extremely difficult; a
leader who has lost the confidence of his own party or the parties that acquiesced
to his election cannot be replaced. He cannot be substitutedwith someone abler to
compromise with the opposition...'43
For example, despite the fact that President Polk had lost support from members
of both parties in Congress, legislators had no institutional mechanism for
141
While executive-legislative division can generate inefficient foreign-policy outcomes, unified
government does not automatically ensure that foreign policies will be tailored to international
circumstances. Moderate foreign policy may coincide with divided partycontrol of the executive and
legislative branches while unified government may not. For instance, priorto the Quasi War, the fact
that the Federalists held executive and senatorial majorities increased the likelihood of a costly war
with Britain. The fact that Republicans dominated the House ensured against the conflict's escalation.
Because the House and the presidency were controlled by different parties, foreign policies were less
aggressive than they might otherwise have been.
142Juan J. Linz, 'The Perils of Presidentialism', in
Lijphart,ed., Parliamentary versus Presidential
Government, p. 123.
143 Juan J. Linz, 'Presidential or
ParliamentaryDemocracy: Does It Make a Difference?', in Juan
J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds, The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative
Perspectives, Vol. I (Baltimore, Md: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp. 9-10.
removing the president. In a parliamentarysystem, legislators would have been

able to call for a vote of confidence. In such a circumstance, it is unlikely that
Polk would have received the necessary majority in Congress to remain in office.
Had Congress been able to secure a new executive more in tune with shifting
congressional majorities, it is likely that the course of the war would have
proceeded quite differently. Moreover, the fact that the executive and legislature
have separate electoral origins means that the foreign policies of presidential
democracies are likely to be inflexible.'44 Early American foreign policy lends
support to this hypothesis. New foreign policies tended to coincide with
electoral turnovers which altered the distributionof power within Congress. For
example, the timing and direction of the Quasi War was affected by 'critical
elections' which changed the voting power of the Federalists vis-a-vis the
Republicans. It was only after the Federalists gained a majority in Congress that
they were able to alter the war's scope.
Finally, because presidential systems separate the electoral origins of the
executive and legislative branches, foreign policy is likely to reflect parochial
and particularistic interests. Since congressmen need not tie their chances for
re-election to a national policy position, they can spend a great deal of time
'courting personal followings in their own district'.145 Since presidential
democracies encourage legislative participation in policy making so as to
provide effective checks and balances on executive action, foreign policy is
likely to reflect the partisan and local interests that dominate congressional
attention; narrow ideological and local interests will often influence foreign-
policy choices and take precedence over the demands of national security. This
was especially the case with regardto military strategy prior to the War of 1812.
Despite the more moderate stance of the executive, a majority of Congress
favoured war with Britain in order to advance their particularsectional interests.
In this case, logrolling in Congress determined the course of US security policy.
The preceding comments underscore the irony of domestic institutional
choice - while decision makers may initially adopt presidentialism in order to
solve the foreign-policy problems of the moment, this institutional design is
likely to generate long-term problems for foreign policy which its designers
neither intended nor anticipated. I have argued that advocates of democratiza-
tion will often have strong incentives to choose presidential systems precisely
because present foreign-policy performance will be weighted heavily in the
decision-making calculus. Indeed, the fact that many newly independent states
decide in favour of presidential government casts doubt on a growing scholarly
consensus that parliamentarismis best. According to currentwisdom, countries
144Richard Gunther and

Anthony Mughan, 'Political Institutions and Cleavage Management', in
R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman, eds, Do Institutions Matter? GovernmentCapabilities in the
United States and Abroad (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993), p. 276.
145
Shugart and Carey, Presidents and Assemblies, pp. 170-3, 227; R. Kent Weaver and Bert A.
Rockman, 'Assessing the Effects of Institutions', in Weaver and Rockman, eds, Do Institutions
Matter?, pp. 17, 33.
216 ELMAN
opting for democracy should reject presidentialism because its zero sum and
'winner take all' character heightens the dissatisfaction of losing groups and,
by extension, increases the likelihood of domestic conflict.146 But, as this article
has demonstrated, when the leaders of newly independent states choose between
democratic alternatives, they will not merely be interested in their domestic
consequences. If an emerging state is faced with external threats, statesmen
cannot afford to concentrate only on long-term domestic stability - they must
also consider short-term foreign-policy performance. In terms of increasing
immediate foreign-policy options, presidential democracy may appearas a more
attractive option than parliamentary alternatives.
A comparison between US democratization and the more recent democratic
revolutions in Eastern Europe underscores this international-national connec-
tion. In the US case, internationalthreats were coupled with poor foreign-policy
performance under a decentralized democratic system. As a result, the Framers
of the US Constitution tried to design a new democratic government which
would minimize the impact of parochial interests on foreign policy and were
predisposed to a system which would maximize executive autonomy. Because
international circumstances threatened national survival, an executive less
likely to be buffeted by societal whims became all the more necessary. Thus
presidentialism was an attempt to adapt domestic circumstances to a rapidly
deteriorating external environment. By contrast, a number of East European
countries have opted for parliamentary institutional designs.'47 To be sure,
parliamentarism has been defended there because of its perceived capacity for
ensuring that the interests of both government and opposition are represented
in the new system. Yet, had the international environment been more
threatening, reformers would have had to weigh these domestic advantages
against the likely consequences of parliamentarismfor foreign policy. With the
external threatof Soviet intervention removed, East European reformers did not
have to worry about creating a strong executive capable of decisive and
independent action in foreign affairs. They needed to be less concerned about
whether a powerful legislature would be likely to bloc foreign-policy action for
local and particularisticgoals. Indeed, contraryto the experience of the Framers
of the US Constitution, East European reformers had many more choices.
Adopting parliamentarismposed far less of a risk in Eastern Europe than it did
for the early American republic. Increased centralization and a strengthening of
the executive branch of the state vis-a-vis society was an option ratherthan an
imperative.148
146
See, for example, Linz and Valenzuela, eds, The Failure of Presidential Democracy.
147
Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia have chosen parliamentarysystems.
14X Whereas severe external threat tends to be associated with presidentialism, the absence of
exogenous pressures fails to produce any determinate domestic outcome. Under permissive
internationalconditions, statesmen have an increased range of choice. Parliamentarism,presidential-
ism and regimes that present a mixture between the two are each viable alternatives. That the new
Europe displays such a wide array of democratic institutional types lends support to this argument.
In sum, any generalized claim for the causal priority of international or

domestic explanations of small state behaviour is unwarranted.Both levels of
analysis matter because while the international environment influences
domestic political choices, these institutional decisions shape foreign policies
in later periods. In emerging states, domestic institutional development may
often be a reaction to external circumstances, but there is no guarantee that
ensuing foreign-policy strategies will reflect these internationalexigencies. The
recent democratization of Eastern Europe presents a golden opportunity for
studying these issues. Since these events have provided a set of new cases of
small states which have also opted for particulardemocratic governments, they
can supply additional empirical evidence about how current constitutional
experiments might influence subsequent small state foreign policy. As newly
independent states increasingly turntowards democracy, we should benefit from
this careful and systematic study of domestic politics in general and alternative
political systems in particular.

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The Foreign Policies of Small States: Challenging Neorealism in Its Own Backyard

Author(s): Miriam Fendius Elman

The Foreign Policies of Small States:

environment affected the democratization process in these emerging states?

absent, statesmen enjoy a wider range of alternatives. They may choose

'black boxed', because, whatever their different internal characteristics, all

I. HOW SHOULD WE STUDY SMALL STATE FOREIGN POLICY?

The Scholarly Consensus

Arguments that presume the salience of different levels of analysis in the

circumstances', small states are more 'exposed to the vagaries of international

i Snyder, Myths of Empire, pp. 62, 317-18.

Challenging Neorealism in Its Own Backyard

determine if the propositions derived from it hold in circumstances in which they

II. DOMESTIC LEVEL THEORIES OF FOREIGN POLICY: TRADITIONAL

'Society' Versus 'State'

The Institutional Approach

institutions affect the flow of history. Without denying the importance of

International Effects on Domestic Institutional Formation and Change38

on a particular trajectory'.39During this period, potential regime opponents

39Gerardo L. Munck and Carol Skalnik

political development by altering the relative credibility of competing

Domestic Institutional Effects on Foreign Policy

Both rational choice and sociological perspectives address the mechanisms

they encounter institutional constraints. Rather, institutions matter precisely

Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy: A Two-Step Institutional Model

Stare 1 TI: International crises T2:Affectsgroupactors: T3: Societalands

Stage 2 T5: Institutionsset up at T4 T6: Societalandstateactorschoose

Fig. 1. Domestic politics and foreign policy: a two-step institutionalist model

There are several advantages to the proposed institutional perspective. First,

III. THE CASE STUDY: THE UNITED STATES, 1781-1848

The United States as a Weak State

International Effects on Domestic Institutional Change, 1781-87

73 Norman A. Graebner, Foundations of American Foreign Policy: A Realist Appraisal from

77Marks, Independence on Trial, 18.

state security.82According to the Federalists, tyranny would be avoided due to

government be empowered to impose losses on influential groups, namely the

Domestic Institututional Effects on Foreign Policy, 1787-1848

Republican rift. Many Federalists who feared the rise of Republicanism

in order to justify their actions. Indeed, the case is an example of how

The Mexican-American War. In March 1845, when President Tyler signed a

1"5DeConde, A History of American Foreign Policy, pp. 94-8.

what then but disaster?'"20Mexican officials also believed that US-British

12_Schroeder, Mr. Polk's War, pp. xii-xiii, 24.

Democratic party. Northern and Western Democrats, who had advocated

That foreign-policy making is susceptible to domestic political constraints

'incoherent' foreign policy. Specifically, a democratic system based on the

1X Nincic, Democracy and Foreign Policy.

institutional incentives to compromise with one another, thus increasing the

removing the president. In a parliamentarysystem, legislators would have been

144Richard Gunther and

In sum, any generalized claim for the causal priority of international or

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