Otto Rank - Truth and Reality

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and Reauty
Otto Rank
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TRUTH AND REALITY
BOOKS BY OTTO RANK IN
NORTON PAPERBACK
Truth and Reality
Will Therapy
TRUTH
AND REALITY
BT
OTTO RANK
Authorized Translation from the German,
with a Preface and Introduction, by
JESSIE TAFT
WW NORTON & COMPANY INC

NEW YORK
Copyright ©
1936 by Alfred A Knopf, Inc.
Copyright renewed 1964 by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc
Published simultaneously in Canada by GeorgeJ. McLeod Limited, Toronto.
Printed in the United States of America.
All Rights Reserved
First published in the Norton Library 1978

by arrangement with Alfred A. Knopf, inc.
W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. is also the publisher of the works ot Erik H.
Erikson, Otto Fenichel, Karen Horney, Harry Stack Sullivan, and The
Standard
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud.
Truth and Reaitly. Translated by Jessie Taft. Published July 1936. Original title:
Wahrhtti and Wirklichkeit. EnluurfEiner Philosophi, dti Seeluchen.

Copyright 1929 by Franz Deuticke.
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Rank, Otto, 1884-1939.

Truth and reality.
(The Norton Library)
Translation of Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit.
1. Will. 2. Psychoanalysis. 3. Psychology,
Pathological. 4. Psychiatry and religion.

I. Title.
BF613.R313 1978 150'.19"5 78-15067

ISBN 0-393-00899-1
12J4567890
CONTENTS
translator's preface vii
I. THE BIRTH OF INDIVIDUALITY 1
U. WILL AND FORCE 13

ni. KNOWING AND EXPERIENCING 24
IV. TRUTH AND REALITY 35
V. SELF AND IDEAL 48
VI. CREATION AND GUILT 62
vn. HAPPINESS AND REDEMPTION 84
COMPLETE LIST OF PUBLISHED WORKS OF

DR. OTTO RANK 98
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE
Truth and Reality is the third volume of Rank's "Grundziige

einer genetischcn Psychologic auf Grund der Psychoanalyse dor
Ichstruktur" (Outlines of a Genetic Psychology on the basis
of the Psychoanalysis of the Ego Structure). The first volume,
published in 1927, is concerned with the biological development of
the ego, including the genesis of genitality, the origin of guilt
feeling, and the genesis of the object relation, and discusses the
psychic mechanisms such as projection, identification, and,Je-
îal,an important concept which Rank introtluces as morejj asic
than rcBresMOftr-It has never been published in English but was
delivered in lecture form under the auspices of the New York
School of Social Work in 1926, before it appeared in German.
Volume Two, "Gestaltung und Ausdruck der Personlichkeit"
(The Development of Personality), published in 1928, goes be-
yond the biological level to the essentially human development
of man as an emotional, social and ethical being. It contains dis-
cussions of character formation as contrasted with something
we call personality, the development of the emotional life, edu-
cation, social adaptation, creativity, and the helping function.
Like the first volume, this book also was presented first in the
United States as a lecture course for the New York School of
Social Work and for the Pennsylvania School of Social Work in
1927, although it has not appeared in an English translation.
"Truth and Reality," the third volume, like the other two, was
offered first in Elnglish in lecture form, in this case for the Penn-
sylvania School of Social Work alone, just before its publication
in German in forms the conclusion of the two vol-
1929. While it
umes just described, it presents in clear, integrated form an

original point of view representing Rank's unique contribution
to psychology and philosophy, which had not come through into
full consciousness until this final book was written. Although
"The Trauma of Birth," published in German in 1924', marks the
TRANSLATOR S PREFACE
beginning of Rank's development beyond Freudian psychoanaly-
sis, the first two volumes of "Genetische Psychologie,"
while they
differ radically from the orthodox psychoanalytic approach, are

not yet clearly differentiated from Freudian psychology. Before
the third volume was written Rank had found the key to his own
theoretical organization in a sudden realization of the role of the
will in the analytic situation.
Under the illumination of that discovery he wrote simul-
taneously the second volume of his "Technik der Tsychoana-
lyse" * showing the relation of will to the therapeutic process and
repudiating completely the Freudian psychoanalytic method,
and this third volume of "Genetische Psychologie," "Truth and
Reality," in which he develops the psychological and philosophic
implications underlying his new vision of the therapeutic process.
In "Truth and Reality" Rank offers not one more psychology
of the individual in the interest of therapy, but a philosophy of
man's willing, an historical sketch of the evolution of will itself
with its inexhaustible creativity, its dynamic of projection and
denial and its ever increasing burden of fear and guilt.
J.T.
Philadelphia
December 1935
1 This volume appears as Part One of "Will Therapy."
viii
TRUTH AND REALITY
A LIFE HISTORY OF THE HUMAN WILL
Jesus. / am come to bear witness unto the truth.
Pilate What
: is truth?
I
THE BIRTH OF INDIVIDUALITY

(^The most important event in the life of a
Jman is the moment when he becomes con-
/scious of his own ego." —Tolstoi
The lines of thought comprehended in this book constitute a

preliminary statement of the final working out of a coHcept of
the psychic which I had anticipated in the work of my youth
"Der Kunstler" ^ (1905) almost a quarter of a century ago.*
The consequent building up and shaping of this early concep-
tion led me gradually to a "genetic" and "constructive" psychol-
ogy which, on the basis of practical analytic experiences, has
psychology. This approach threw
finally crystallized into a will
such meaningful light upon the psychological foundation of
epistemology and ethics that it led me ultimately to a philos-
ophy of the psychic which I now attempt to outline in the
following chapters. The practical, therapeutic aspect of the will
psychology I developed in the second part of my "Technique
of Psychoanalysis" which was published simultaneously.
While at first I was completely under the influence of Freudian
realism and tried to express my conception of the creative man,
the artist, in the biological-mechanistic terms of Freud's natural
1 "Der Kunstler. Ansatze zu einer Sexualpsychologie." Hugo Heller, Vienna
and Leipzig 1907. Second and third editions the same 1918. "Der KUnstler and
andere Beitrage zur Psychoanalyse des dichterischen Schaffens." Fourth en-
larged edition. International Psychoanalytic Press, Leipzig, Vienna, Zurich
1925 (Imago-Bucher I).
2 Translator's Note: The German word "seelisch" has no exact equivalent in
English. Ihave used "psychic" in lieu of something better, but it does not
carry satisfactorily the reference to th e conce pt of the soul in p rimitive
cultures to which Rank relates modern psychology~t7VT2s book "Seelenglaiibe
und Psychologie."
8"Technik der Psychoanalyse, II. Die analytische Reaktion in ihren kon-
struktiven Elementen." F. Deuticke, Leipzig and Vienna, 1928. English trans-
laUon, "Will Therapy," Book I. Alfred A. Knopf, 1936.
1
TRUTH AND REALITY
science ideology, on the basis of my own experience, I have since
been enabled to formulate these common human problems in a
common human language as well. "The Trauma of Birth," ^ a
book written in 1923, marks the decisive turning point in this
development. There I compared to the creative drive of the in-
dividual as treated in "Der Kiinstler," the creation of the
individual himself, not merely physically, but also psychically
in the sense of the "rebirth experience," which I understood
psychologically as the actual creative act of the human being.
For in this act the psychic ego is born out of the biological cor-
poreal ego and the human being becomes at once creator and
creature or actually moves from creature to creator, in the ideal
case, creator of himself, his own personality.
This conception of the birth of individuality from the self as
a consequent psychological carrying out of the original trauma
of birth from the mother, leads also to another kind of method-
ology of treatment and presentation. While in "The Trauma
of Birth" I proceeded from a concrete experience in the analytic
situation and its new interpretation, and as in "Der Kiinstler"
strove to broaden it into the universally human and cultural,
my present conception just reversed is based on the universally
—
human yes, if you will, on the cosmic idea of soul, and seeks
to assemble all its expressions in the focal point of the separate
individuality. It has to do neither with a leading back of the
general, the supra-individual, to the concrete and personal, nor
with a wishing to explain the one from the other. Although this
may often be the appearance, yes, at times may even underlie
it, yet this is not the object of this presentation which rather
sets for itself the goal of viewing the two worlds of macrocosm
and microcosm as and only as far as possible, pointing
parallel,
out their inter-dependence and their reactions upon one another.
In this attempt, excursions into the history of culture are nat-
urally unavoidable, in order at least to note the great counter-
part of the individual in a few of its typical forms.
1 "Das Trauma der Geburt und seine Bedeutung fUr die Psychoanalyse."
International Psychoanalytic Press, Leipzig, Vienna, Zurich, 1924 (Interna-

tionale Psychoanalytische Bibliothek XIV). French translation in the "Biblio-
theque Scientifique," Payot, Paris, 1928. English translation in "International
Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method," London 1928,
Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd.
2
task, however, as indicated in "Genetische Psychol-
The main
ogie" continues to be the presentation of the chief actor and at
the same time chief onlooker, the individual ego, in this, his dual
role.This involves not only the duality of actor and self-obser-
ver, but has yet another meaning, in that, for civilized man, the
miheu is no longer the natural reality, the opposing force of an
external world, but an artistic reality, created by himself which
we, in its outer as in its inner aspects, designate as civilization.
In this sense civilized man, even if he fights the outside world,

is no longer opposed to a natural enemy but at bottom to him-
self, to his own creation, as he finds himself mirrored, particu-
larly inmanners and customs, morahty and conventions, social

and cultural institutions. The phenomenon thus described is of
fundamental meaning for the understanding of the human being's
relation to the outer world as well as to his fellow man. For
while Freud's reality psychology emphasized essentially the in-
fluence of outer factors, of the milieu, upon the development of
the individual and the formation of his character, even in "Der
Kiinstler" I opposed to this biological principle, the spiritual
principle which alone is meaningful in the development of the
essentially human. ThisJs_bMed_^ssentiiyixj>2^^
that the inner world, taken in from_th e outside by~nleaiisjTqf
in the course of time an independent
entiticaligx IKaTljecome ^____
ower, w hich in its t uTrTbyj^âiTprojectjonr lucnces eCTid
seeks jto.-a4*«F-th€-es±£r»al, that its correspondence to the inner
iseven more close. This relation to ouT
êaT^n^TrTcontrast to_ adaptation, and comprehend as will
pRenomena. ThcTindication of its psychological determinants

and dynamic factors in terms of this will psychology, forms the
main content of the following chapters.
This conception of the influencing and transforming of the
miheu by the individual allows for the inclusion of the creative,
the artist type, for whom there is no place in Freud's world pic-
ture where all individual expressions are explained as reactions to
social influences or as biological instincts and therewith are re-

duced to something outside the individual. For with Freud the
individual in the nucleus of his being (the so-called "id") is sub-
ject to the great natural laws, under the guise of the "repetition
compulsion," while personality consists of the layers of identifica-
3
TRUTH AND REALITY
tions which form the basis of the parental super-ego. This per-
haps may
account for the great mass, the average, although
even here can be true only roughly, but it can never explain
it
the creative t3'pe nor the so-called "neurotic," who represents

the artist's miscarried counterpart. In this cursory survey I
should like to characterize the creative type, in a preliminary
way only, in this regard, that he is able, in a way soon to be
described more closely, to create voluntarily from the impulsive
elements and moreover to develop his standards beyond the identi-
fications of the super-ego morality to an ideal formation which
consciously guides and rules this creative will in terms of the
personality. The essential point in this process is the fact that he
evolves his ego ideal from himself, not merely on the ground of
given but also of self-chosen factors which he strives after con-
sciously.
As a result the ego, instead of being caught between the two
powerful forces of fate, the inner id and the externally derived
super-ego, develops and expresses itself creatively. The Freudian
ego driven by the libidinal id and restrained by parental morality,
becomes almost a nonentity, a helpless tool for which there re-
mains no autonomous function, certainly not willing whether this
be creative or only a simple goal conscious striving. In my view
the ego is much more than a mere show place for the standing con-
flict between two great forces. Not only is the individual ego
naturally the carrier of higher goals, even when they are built on
external identifications, it is also the temporal representative of
the cosmic primal force no matter whether one calls it sexuality,
libido, or id. v{]he ego accordingly is strong just in the degree to
which it is the representative of this primal force and the strength
of this force represented in the individual we call the wilh This
will becomes creative, when it carries itself on through the ego
into the super-ego and there leads to ideal formations of its
own, which, if you will, in the last analj'sis arise from the id,
at all events not from without.lOn this account, the creative man
of every type has a much stronger ego than the average man, as
we see not only in geniusbut also in the neurotic, whose con-
vulsed hjrpertrophied ego just what creates the neurosis, psy-
is
chologically a creative achievement just as much as any other.J

The creative type, whose denial we see in the inferior neurotic is
4
therefore not only characterized by a stronger impulse life, but
also by a wholly special utilization of it, the most important
aspect of which I consider the ideal formation from the own self
(i. e. on the basis of the own impulsive make-up) whose "nega-
tive" we have to recognize in the neurotic symptom formation.

However, while the neurotic so strengthens his repressions
against his stronger than average impulsive self, that they
finallymake him completely incapable of willing and acting, in
the creative man there occurs a qualitatively different impulse
displacement, which manifests itself psychologically as ideal
formation with simultaneous expression in conscious creative
activity of will. Such a conception makes creative power and
creative accomplishment comprehensible for the first time, rather
than the insipid and impotent concept of sublimation, which pro-
longs a shadowy existence in psychoanalysis. From this view-
point one could say that with human beings sometimes even
impulsive expressions are only a weaker, less satisfactory sub-
stitute for that which the creative power of will would like. There-
fore, as it were, not only the phantasy-produced substitute for
unattained reality, but even the reality which is attainable, is
only a weaker substitute for the insihausiiiilg willing.
The psychological understanding of the creative type and of
its miscarriage in the neurotic, teaches us therefore to value the
ego, not only as a wrestling ground of (id) impulses and (super-
ego) repressions, but also as conscious bearer of a striving
force, that is, as the autonomous representative of the will and
ethical obligation in terms of a self constituted ideal. Freud's
original wish fulfilment tjieory feyTmiehnearcr to this recogni-
tion than hislaier_2octrin£_of_instincts) which actually only
repres^^g^j^^biokigiain^Sf th eu ugaS§clQus_wisK£»?' We easily
recognize in the Freudian wish the old will of the academic psy-
chologists, although in the romantic guise of natural philosophy,
while the wish, as I first explained it in "Der Kiinstler," actually
corresponds to an impulse tendency which later was ascribed to

the supra-individual id. But the rftnsrion s wish fulfilment ten-
/^d enry of thp pg^. for the designation of which the suitable word
'**wilPj exists, extends (as Freud himself finally had to perceive
he Ego and Id") much further than he was willing to
admit, while the instinctual impulse tendency in men is less ex-
^ ^^îCMfi ^Mh^ a^.

TKUTH AND REALITY
tensive than he originally thought, since it is repressed by the
powerful super-ego factors for Freud and, for me, in addition,
is molded by the self-created ideal formation. Also this fact ap-
pears clearly in the dream phenomenon in which Freud has seen

the wish fulfilment tendency, since the conscious wishes of the
day are often strong enough to put through their fulfilment in
dreams while the ostensibly stronger unconscious wishes (the
impulse drives) are almost regularly blocked bj' the ethical re-
pressions,still watchful even in sleep (Freud's censor). All these
facts and considerations would have been able to save psj'cho-

analysis from an over-valuation of the power of the unconscious
impulsive men, and from the under-valuation of his con-
life in
scious willing ego, if a kind of psychic compulsion, which reaches

far beyond the personal psychology of its creator, had not,
of necessity, blocked it. Before we seek the source and nature of
this compulsion, I should like to justify here briefly by way of
introduction what causes me to speak of a compulsion. The
whole of psychoanalysis in its theoretical and practical aspects
is actually an unparalleled glorification of consciousness and its
power as I have already observed in "Der Kiinstler," while

Freud himself designates his theory as a psychology of the un-.
conscious and as such wishes it to be understood. It certainly is
that, too, but the more it became a doctrine of the unconscious,
the less it remained psychologv\ As a theory of the unconscious
it became a biological foundation of psychology as which I also
tried to present it in "Der Kiinstler." In its mechanisms of

super-ego formation it gives on the other hand a foundation of
characterolog}'. The actual field of psychology, the conscious
ego, with its willing, its sense of duty, and its feeling, psycho-
inalysis has treated verj' like a step-child because it has placed
the ego almost entirely under the guardianship of extra-indi-
vidual factors, of the id and the super-ego, at least as far as
theory is concerned. In practice, however, psychoanalysis rep-
resents, as has already been said, a glorification of the power of
consciousness ; meaning, according to which
in its therapeutic
neurosis is cured by making conscious the unconscious motive
underlying it, in its cultural significance as a tremendous broad-
ening of consciousness in the development of humanity, as I
represented it in "Der Kiinstler," and finally in its scientific
6
meaning, as the recognition and knowledge of a part of the
unconscious in nature.
Before we can investigate how such a contradiction could
arise between theory formation, the facts on which it rests, and
the conclusions to which it leads, we must review the factors
which, according to our viewpoint, psychoanalj'sis has under-
valued. At first we said it was the significance of the inner, in-
dependently of the outer factors, then the significance of the
creative will, and finally the meaning of a conscious sense of
duty. We recognize now that these factors belong together
intimately and condition one another, yes, in a certain sense, rep-
resent one and the same thing. We started from the "inner"
which originally was an "outer," but became inner, and as its
representative we accept the super-ego in the Freudian sense,
that is, as far as it is built up on identifications. If we add to
this "outer" also the id which is in a certain sense supra-indi-
vidual because generic, that which Jung designates in the racial
sense as collective unconscious, there remains left over as the
actual own "inner" of the individual, his ego, which we have dis-
tinguished as bearer of the creative will, or generally speaking,
of the conscious personality. If we have once acknowledged its
—
power and psychoanalysis, as already said, had recognized but
denied it —
there appear as a result further interesting per-
spectives which the old academic psychology in spite of its
recognition of the meaning of conscious willing, could not let
itselfdream of because it lacked the dynamic viewpoint which
psychoanalysis, it is true, conceived purely on the level of bio-
logical instinct while we approach it rather from the basis of the
individual creative.
First of all, there is the possibility of the creative reaction
of this strengthened willing ego upon the overcome instinctual
id on the other hand, there follows therefrom the already noted
;
influencing of the super-ego formation through the self-con-

structed ideal. The first effect leads us into the most impei»taat
but also the darkest field of all psycholo gy, namely, the emo-
tional life, while the effect of the willing ego, on the other side,"
comprehends all actual sublimation phenomena, therefore the
spiritual, in the broadest sense. In a word we encounter here for
the first time the actual ground of psychology, the realm of
7
TRUTH AND EEALITY
willing and not in the biological or
ethics in the purely psychic,
moral sense, therefore not in terms of any supra-individual force,
but of freedom as Kant understood it metaphysically, that is,
beyond external influences. Psychoanalysis has scarcely ap-
proached the problem of the emotional life because the "uncon-
scious" feelings which it accepted corresponding to the "un-
conscious" wishes were not so easily reducible to instinctive life
as the latter. In want of a better explanation, one could perhaps
allow the assumption to serve that the affects correspond to
such unconscious feelings but the whole sphere of human emo-
tions, important as they are, with their finely
graded scale
is as undeniably a phenomenon of
consciousness, as the whole
man himself. One can better accept from this standpoint the
Fxeudiaft-esclanation o f consciousnes&.as,AlkgD§g-Oi;ggj?JgI-tll^
perception_orgsyxhicjualities" in the genetic sense. Probably
consciousness even earlier was entirely a sense organ for the
perception of external qualities (sensation psychology) which
it still is today also ; later was added the function
of the percep-
tion of inner qualities and a further developmental level of

consciousness was that of an independent and spontaneous organ
for partial ruling of the outer as of the inner world. Finally,
consciousness became an instrument of observation and knowl-
edge of itself (self-consciousness) and as such again it has
reached in psychoanalysis and the will psychology which I built
further upon it, a peak of development and self-knowledge. The
individual ego frees itself therefore always more and more with
the weapon of increased power of consciousness, not only from
the rule of environmental natural forces, but also from the
biological reproduction compulsion of the overcome id; it in-
fluences thereby also more and more positively the super-ego de-
velopment in terms of the self-constructed ideal formation and
finally in a creative sense the outer world, whose transformation
through men on its side again reacts upon the ego and its inner
development.
Thus we are finally led back again from the problem of will
to the problem of consciousness and this all the more, the more
psychological we remain. For however fundamental and im-
portant the will —whatever one may understand by that— for all
stimulation of the individual to acting, feeling and thinking*

finally we can only comprehend all these phenomena in and
through consciousness, (in this deeper sense psychology can of
necessity be nothing other than a psychology of consciousness
;J
yes, even more, a psychology of consciousness in its various as-

pects and phases of development. We shall examine later this
relativity, not only of all conscious human knowledge, but of all
phenomena of consciousness itself/First of all we face the whole
problem of psychology, namely, that we become aware of the
actual driving factors in our psychic life always only through
the medium of consciousness, but that this consciousness itself
isnothing firm, constant, or unaJterabla There results from this
situation a series of difficulties withoutKnowledge of which every
psychology is impossible, since the understanding of these con-
tradictions^ forms the very warp and woof of phychologj' as such.
These difficulties are: firs t, that we, as said, are aware of the
willphenomena only through the medium of consciousness ; sec-
ond, that this conscious self offers us no fixed standpoint for
observation of these phenomena, but itself ceaselessly alters, dis-
places and broadens them. This leads to the third and perhaps
most important point, namely, that we can observe these fluctuat-
ing phenomena of consciousness itself only through a kind of
^p^rt?;onsciousnegs-whichwe_^ll self -c onsciousne ss. &eLf-/}u/fi/le/^gsS
"The difficulties are complicated still more seriously when we Jy
take into consideration the fact that consciousness itself and its
development are determined essentially by will phenomena or at
least are influenced in far reaching fashion. We can hardly do
justice to this highly complicated state of affairs when we say
that a constant interpretation and reinterpretation takes place
from both sides. Consciousness is constantly interpreted by will
and the various levels of will, yes, consciousness originally is
probably a
itself will phenomenon that
consciousness was an
; is,
instrument for the fulfilment of will before it advanced to the

will controlling power of self-consciousness and
finally of ana-
lytic hyperconsciousness,which on its side again interprets will
and will phenomena continuously in order to make it useful for
its momentary interests. If we actually want to pursue psy-
chology we must protect ourselves from extending further this

constantly reciprocal process of interpretation by any kind of
theory formation. Theory formation of every kind is then only
9
TRUTH AND REALITY
an attempt to oppose to the manifold spontaneous attempts at
interpretation by will and consciousness a single interpretation
as constant, lasting, true. This, however, on the basis of the
considerations just presented, is exactly anti-psychological,
since t he essen ce_gf_psxchic_grocesses_cons ists in
changg and_in
the variability o f the possibilities of interpretatio n. The com-
pulstBTTto theory formation corresponds then to a longing after
a firm hold, after something constant, at rest, in the flight of
psychic events. Is there perhaps some way out, which might free
us from this external compulsion to interpretation or at least let
us rest a moment beyond it? Certainly it is not the way of his-
torical or genetic analysis. For aside from the fact that even the
final elements to which we can arrive by this path still represent
phenomena of interpretation, it is also unavoidable that on the
uninterrupted analytic path to these elements we should fall
upon the interpretation compulsion of consciousness and of the
will also. There remains therewith psychologically no other re-
course than just the recognition of this condition and perhaps
also an attempt to understand why it must be so. This would be
the purely psychological problem, beyond which there begins
again the kind of interpretation which we designate as knowledge
in the broadest sense of the word. This knowledge, however, is
not an interpretative understanding, but an immediate experienc-
ing, therefore a form of the creative, perhaps the highest form of
which man is capable, certainly the most dangerous form, because
it can finally lead to pain, if it opposes itself to
Uving inhibit-
it pleasurably.
ingly, instead of confirming We
shall treat in the
-
following chapters this contrast_ between knowing and experi
encin£which rnlminntps" tinan£jn_the-prnhlpm of "truth o r
reality" in ordefÊvpirtrnrnyTo" recognize in the opposition of
tKemost longed for psychic states of happiness and salvation,
the double role of consciousness or of conscious knowing, as the
source of all pleasure but also of all suffering.
Here I should like to go further by way of introduction as
far as the location of the problem itself is concerned, and [esti-
mate the value of knowledge for the understanding of our own
soul lifcÂVe sought before for a way out from the contradictory
interpretative compulsion, in which will excites consciousness
and consciousness excites will. It is that kind of know ledge w;hich
10
THE BIETH OF INDIVIDUALITY
one can best desi^nate_as(t)hilbsophicêcause at l eastjts_tenH-^
encyîs directed notuponthis oF that content but u pon t he
exlslenceôf tjia^henoniena themselve s. The philosopher creates,-'
as little as the artist or the religious believer, merely from his own
personality. What' manifests itself in all of them, although in
different form, is at once something supra-individual, natural,
cosmic, which accordingly and to this extent also has value some-J
how for all humanity. At all events here we run against tHe
problem of form, which is just the essential thing psycho-
logically. But mani-
in the creative individual, in genius, there is
fested, becomes more or less conscious, not only a bit of the
primal, but just as much the individual, the personal. How far
and to what extent the knowledge is universally valid depends
entirely on the relation of these two elements in this mixture
and their effect on each other. At all events, the individual is
danger, or at least the attempt, of again interpret-

liable to the
ing the universal which becomes conscious of itself in him in
terms of his individual personal development, that is, speaking
psychologically, of representing it as an expression of his will and
not of a supra-individual force (compulsion). This is the psy-
chology of the world view which in contrast to theory building,
as we have previously characterized it, as flight from the in-
terpretative doubt, represents an immediate creative experience
not only of the individual himself, but of the cosmos manifested
in him.
Again peak of the human elevation of
here, on the highest
conscipusne^^ and its we run upon the same
creative expression,
basic ônfliigi) of will and co mpulsi on which goes through the
(
whole development of man and the prQcess_iif-bo coming -con-

scious. In the creative individual this conflict is manifest only
at times, and we can b est desc ribe it thus, that nature becomes
e conscious of herself in sin lan who at the same time with
lovhich we dLgignatejis^nai-
Tries always to free himself further from the prinii-
jive . It lias todo. thi^re fo re. w ith a conflictual separation of the
individual from the mass, undertaken and continued at every
step of development into the new, and this I should like to desig-
nate as the n cvf^ comjilctsd birth of indi viduali ty. For the whole
consequence of evolution from blmcT impul se through conscious
11
TRUTH AND REALITY
will to self conscious knowledge, seems still somehow to corre-
spond toa"coTrtniued resuitof births, rebirths and new births,
which reach from the birth of the child from the mother, beyond
the birth of the individual from the mass, to the birth of the
creative work from the individual and finaflj to the birth of
knowledge from the work. In this sense, the contrast of will and
consciousness as we have recognized it as the psychological prob-
lem par excellence, somehow corresponds to the biological con-
trast of procreation and birth. At all events we find in all these
phenomena, even at the highest spiritual peak, the struggle and
pain of birth, the separation out of the universal, with the
pleasure and bliss of procreation, the creation of an own indi-
vidual cosmos, whether it be now physically our own child, crea-
tivelyour own work or spiritually our own self. At bottom it is
and remains our own act of will, which we oppose to the outer
force of reality as the inner pressure after truth.
12
II
WILL AND FORCE

"Man is fearful of things which cannot
hurt him and he knows it; and he longs for

things which can be of no good to him and
he knows it; but in truth it is something in
man himself of which he is afraid and it is
something in man himself for which he
longs." —Rabbi Nachman
Mt ee-introdttction of the will concept into psychology solves

a succession of problems in such a simple and satisfying way that
it may seem to some a deus ex machina. But I know too well that
I have not brought it in as such on the contrary that I have

;
busied myself long and intensively in the attempt to solve certain

problems which psychoanalysis had brought up anew without
coming to a satisfactory solution. Only after a struggle against
prejudices of every kind did the acceptance of will as a psycho-
logical factor of the first rank seem unavoidable but soon also
became a matter of course, so much a matter of course that I
had to say to myself that only a tremendous resistance could
have hindered the complete recognition and evaluation of will
as a great psychic power.
Thus the problem soon presented Itself to me as a universal
one, going far beyond the critique of psychoanalysis. Why must
plays so great a role in reality, or to
will be denied if it actually
formulate it in anticipation, why is the will valued as bad, evil,
reprehensible, unwelcome, when it is the power which consciously
and positively, yes even creatively, forms both the self and the
environment? If one puts the problem thus, then one sees at the
same time that^his apparently necessary contradiction is not
only the basic problem of all psychology, but lies at the root of
all religious dogma as well as of all philosophic speculation. jIn
a word, not only all religion and philosophy are avowedly moral-
13
TRUTH AND REALITY
isticbut psychology was also and must continue to be, as long
as it cannot place itself beyond this will problem and thus be
able to solve it. Religion and philosophy are, as we know, highly
valued because of their-^trralistic t enden cjea^ and their ethical
content while it is the pride of psychologists tji_d£iil_thLs weajc-
ness in theirjcTence. Certainly psychology should not be moral-
istic,but it was necessarily so as long and as far as it busied
with the content of soul life which is saturated and pierced
itself
through and through with moralistic principles. To an unusual
degree this is true for therapeutically oriented psychoanalysis
and that constitutes in my mind its greatest advantage as an
educational method. As psychology it has been obliged in its
theory formation to justify this moral-pedagogic character in
part and in part to deny it. However anti-moralistic psycho-
analysis may seem, at bottom for Freud, will —
or whatever he
—
understands by that term is exacth' as "bad" as for the Old
Testament man or the Buddhist or the Christian, exactly as
reprehensible as it still is for Schopenhauer or other philosophers
who played reason against it.
The problem therefore is not peculiarly psychoanalytic, not
even purely psychological, but cultural and human. Its solution
depends upon one single point. The conception of will as evil,
itscondemnation or justification, is the basic psychological fact
which we must understand and explain instead of criticizing it
or taking it as presupposition or finally as a primary phe-
nomenon as psychoanalysis has done in the concept of guilt.
That is the point at which real psychology begins. That psycho-
analysis could not go on beyond this point is understandable
from its nature as a therapeutic method, f sychoanalvsis bega n
a^JtheramS its knowledge comes from that source and psycho-
therapy according to its nature must be oriented morally or at
least normatively. Whether it has to do with the medical concept
of normality or with the social concept of adaptation, therapy
can never be without prejudice for it sets out from the stand-
point that something should be otherwise than it is, no matter
how one may formulate it. E<>4^.-liologv, ori tliir rnn*^''«ryi "Ih'mIJ^
d escribe what itj^hnii- it ji, «"'), whui^P'^^îbl e. explain why
i must be so These two diametrically opposed principles, Janus-
t .
headed psychoanalysis has necessarily mixed up and the lack of

14
"WILL AND FORCE
insight into this condition as well as a later denial has finally
led to such confusion that now therapy is psychologically
oriented and theory moralistically so instead of the reverse.
A closer interpretation of this paradoxical state of affairs
will best lead into the understanding of the will problem under-
lying it. The
psychoanalj'tic patient seemed in the beginning to
suffer from repression of impulse, from inhibitions ; evidently
because he denied impulse as bad, as unethical. One can quite well
imagine therapy resulting when an authority (doctor or priest)
or a loving person permits the individual this impulse satisfac-
tion in other words says to him, "It is not bad as you assert, but
;
good (necessary, beautiful, etc.)." This kind of therapy has

always existed and still does today, in religion, in art, and in
love. Also psychoanalysis began with it and essentially has al-
ways remained with it. First it operated directly, as Freud en-
couraged his patients to a normal sexual relation, that is,
psychologically speaking, permitted it. But even in all the compli-
cated outgrowths of psychoanalytic therapy and theory this
one justification tendency still remains the actually effective
therapeutic agent. Only now they say, "your evil wishes" —
as
prototypes of which CEdipus and castration wishes, the worst
—
that man can wish, are brought forth "are not evil, or at least
you are not responsible for them for they are universal." That
is not only correct but is often therapeutically effective espe-
cially with trusting natures, not in the ironical but in the psy-
chological sense of the word, with men who always seek some
kind of excuse for their willing and find it now in the id instead
of in God. But as men have seen through the so-called priestly
deception, which actually is a self-deception, so they finally see
through every kind of therapeutic self-deception and it is just
that from which they suffer, just that which forms the very root
of the neurosis. AVhen I say "see through," I do not mean neces-
sarily consciously, but guilt feeling, which humanity perceives
always and ever increasingly in spite of this apparent absence
of responsibility, is the best proof of what this kind of therapy
denies today, in a certain sense has always denied, and to that
extent has worked only partially.
In what I have already described in "Der Kiinstler" as the
spontaneous therapies of human kind, religion, art, philosophy,
15
TRUTH AND EEALITY
this form of consolation works, partly because of their uni-
versality, partly because in them man accuses himself of this
evil will that he would like to deny. In ritual, in artistic satisfac-
tion, in teaching, man is unburdened and comforted through

the others, the priests, the artists, the wise. But in the content
of these therapeutic systems, accusation and punishment domi-
nate as religious humility, resignation, as tragic guilt and sin,
and as justification in terms of the ethical reaction formation.
In a word, in all these projections of the great will conflict, man
confesses in one or another way that he is himself sinful, guilty,
bad. Exactly the same process of justification and self accusa-
tion we see unroll itself in psychoanalysis only here it appears
in the therapeutic and psychological terminology of our natural
science age, although it seems unavoidable to bring in the con-
tentually richer ideas and symbols of earlier systems. In its
technique, psychoanalysis is exactly as much a matter of con-
solation and justification as therapy must be according to its
nature. That is, it quiets man concerning his badness, since it
says to him that all others are thus also and that it lies grounded
in human nature. Therefore psychoanalysis in the content of its
system, of its theory, must count exactly as all the former justi-
fication attempts of humanity. In psychoanalytic theory, in-
stinct is evil, bad, reprehensible; the individual is small and
insignificant, a play-ball of the idand the super-ego guilt feel- ;
ing and remains a final insoluble fact.

is
Hence it comes about that psychoanalytic theory represents

the necessary opposite to the therapy, as the religious system or
church dogma represents the necessary opposite to ritualistic
practice, the ritual of atonement. It is a completion just as the
creativework of the individual represents a completion and not
merely an expression of actual experience. It follows that psy-
choanalysis cannot be an independent unprejudiced psychology
but must be the necessary balance to its therapeutic practice,
often enough its willing servant.
It psychology, even so, but it becomes the psychology
is still
of the therapist, who needs such a theory for the justification

of his practice and simultaneously for the denial of his moral-
pedagogical attitude. In this sense, however, this very attitude
itself again becomes the object of psychology which asks
further
16
WILL AND FORCE
why every kind of therapist needs a justification at all and why
just this one? The objection that psychoanalytic theory is
founded on the experiences of the practice of therapy and that
just this constitutes its value, especially its scientific value is
not entirely sound. Psychoanaly tic theory is founded on one
si ngle ex perience, .the fact ftf ^he analytic situation, whichTiow-
ever is an essentially therapeutic one, that is, rests on th g

relation of the patient to the doctor. As the patient represents
the object, could one expect to obtain even in the summation of
his various experiences, a universal human psychology? It would
represent only the psychology of a part of humanity, let us
say even of the majority, namely those in need of help. The

psychology of the helper, of the therapj st, would rema in and
this side of human nature is at least just as important.
My contention goes far beyond this conclusion in maintain-
ing that psychoanalysis betrays much more of the psychology
of the therapist, of the helper, of the active willing person, only it
represents it as the psychology of the patient, the seeker for
is not to deny the psychological value of
help, the willness. This
psychoanalysis in which as I believe, we can study the funda-
mental problems of human soul life as never before and nowhere
else, only we must first agree on certain basic questions upon
whose our fruitful utilization of psychoanalysis de-

clarification
pends. In a word, the psychology of the normal man, the average
type given us by psychoanalysis is in reality the psychology of
the creative man, not only of Freud, as Michaelis has shown
beautifully in the single case,^ but of the type. It unveils to us
the psychology of the strong man of will, who while almost God
hims£l£-4nd_creator of men in his practice, in his theory must
raeny his ^godlikenesS with all its characteristics and represent
himself as aTsmalT^ weak, helpless creature, a person actually
seeking help and comfortN —
^ s.c^v^^ V '.^ SJC"^^ î
Although enough human tragedy lie^ in this apparently un-
avoidable fate of the creative type, the~deniaLxontinued into
the work, the philosophy, darkens its nobleaspect. For the work
born out of this superhuman internal struggle to represent an
* Edgar Michaelis: "Die Menschenheitsproblematik der Freudschen Psycho-

analyse. Urbild und Maske. Eine grundsatzliche Untersuchung zur neueren
Seelenforschung." Leipzig 1925.
17
TRUTH AND REALITY
infallible revelation of the latest universally valid
psychological
truth may be comprehensible as a reaction against the content

of the system, but brings so many trifling features into the
picture of the personality as well that the tragedy almost turns
into a farce. NiStzsch^, who experienced thoroughly the
whole
tragedy of the "ereative man and admitted in his "amor fati"
the willingness to pay for it, is in myopmion the first and has
"been^^Ttoô^ the opl^ psjcKoISgiiCrHewas at all events the
first wKoTêcognized the "moral" danger in every
philosophiz-
ing and psychologizing and sought to avoid it. He would have

^îff^succeeded still better, that is at a lesser cost, if he had recognized
(including the
\i\<^ the necessity of the "moral" in all psychologizing
^ therapeutic) instead of analyzing the philosophers from that
viewpoint in so masterly a way. At any rate he recognized the
problem and was right to see in it a danger for himself first of
all, although correctly understood it is not the
common danger
he made it. In this sense he is at all events much less philosopher,
that is, moralist, than Freud for example and accordingly also
much more a psychologist than he. Certainly his freedom from

office and had to buy so dearly had much to
calling which he
do with In no case, however, was he a therapist who needed
it.
seeker
a psychological justification, no, not even a patient, a
for help, in spite of all his illnesses. JHe was himself, which is
the first requirement for a psychologist^ and therefore he

was
will, who
also the first and only one who could affirm the evil
even glorified it. That was his psychological product for
which
he paid not with system building and scientific rationalization,
but with personal suffering, with his own experience.
Nietzsche's contribution, therefore, based on Schopenhauer's
important discovery of will, is the separation of the will from the
guilt problem (the moral). He has not completely solved the
problem, could not solve it, because for its solution the analytic
experience was necessary. By which I mean not so much the ex-
periences of the analyst through the patient, but also and much
more the experience of humanity with psychoanalysis. As Nie-
will denial of
tzsche's will affirmation represents a reaction to the
the Schopenhauerian system, so Freud's theory is
again to be
understood as a throwback from Nietzsche's attitude to an al-
18
WILL AXD FOKCE
most Schopenhauerian pessimism and nihilism. I do not doubt
that fmy vill psychology which has arisen from per sona l experi-^
Mic^represents in its turn a reaction against FreuHV^making
evil" of the will I shall show further that the whole
;
history of
mankind in the individual himself and in the race represents just
such a sequence of will action and reaction, of affirmation and
denial. I shall then show also that in the historical
develop-
mental process of this will conflict, as in its individual mani-

festations we have to do not merely with a repetition in the sense
of the Freudian fatalism but that a continuous evolution can be
traced in terms of the broadening of consciousness and the de-
velopment of self-consciousness. For as little as Freud's theory is
a "repetition" of the closely related one of Schopenhauer, so
little has my will psychology to do with
Nietzsche's "will to
power," with which Nietzsche has again finally smuggled evalua-

tion into psychology. With this comparison I mean only to point
to a common psychological aspect of experience, which neces-
sarily conditions these reactions, and which we intend to make
the object of our investigation.
The will in itself is not as "evil" as the Jew-hating Schopen-|
hauer believes along with the Old Testament, nor as "good" asl
the sick Nietzsche would like to see it in his glorification.|j:t
exists as a psychological fact and is the real problem of psy-

chology, first as to its origin, how it has evolved in man, and \
second why we must condemn it as "bad" or justify it as "good," l
instead of recognizing and affirming it as necessar^ The episte^

mological question, whence it comes, what it means psycho-
logically, will throw a light upon the ethical question of con-
demnation or justification in the answering of which, however,
we must guard against bringing in moralistic evaluations before
we have recognized their psychological source. Which is to say
also that we must guard against bringing therapeutic viewpoints
into psychology withQPi'euik or pedagogical aims with .4îto> or
ethical values with i^ffn^-for at bottom they all involve one and
the same cardinal err or. That the will must be justified in
therapy, we already know, yes, even the patient is caught in the
denial of it, that is in guilt feeling, and his seeking for help is
just an expression of this will conflict. That the will in pedagogy
19
TRUTH AND REALITY
isreprehensible, goes without saying, for pedagogy is obviously
a breaking of the will as ethics is a will limitation and therapy
will justification.
If I said we must guard ourselves against bringing in thera-
peutic elements, that moral evaluations into psychology, then

is,
I must elucidate this further before I go into a sketch of a

philosophy of the psychic (seehsch). Although my will psy-
chology has resulted not wholly from analytic experience, but
also represents the result of my philosophic, pedagogic, re-
ligious and cultural studies, still I will not deny that it was
essentially analytic practice that crystallized for me all of these
various materials, differing in kind and value, into a psycho-
logical experience. I must present these analytic experiences
elsewhere not only from lack of space but also on objective
grounds in order to exclude as much as possible a mixture of the
two viewpoints since they correspond to two different world
views. But this external separation would not necessarily
guarantee an inner separation if I had not at the same time
in my analytic work struggled through to a technique which
tries to avoid the therapeutic in the moral pedagogical sense.
What, you will probably ask, is this new method and what does
it aim at if not re-education since any cure for mental suffering
is excluded anyway?^ To say it in one word, the aim is sel f
devel opment that is, the person is to develop himself into that
;
which he is and not as in education and even in analytic therapy

to be made into a good citizen, who accepts the general ideals
without contradiction and has no will of his own. This, as
Keyserling " recently noted pertinently, is the confessed purpose
of Adler's leveling pedagogical cure and as Prinzhorn ^ has seen,
the unconfessed but clear purpose of Freudian psychoanalysis
which purports to be revolutionary but is really conservative,
pff one understood the will psychology only a little, one must at
Teast know that this conservatism is the best metjiod of breeding
re volutio nary, w4ilful^ men who for the most part are driven into
1 See the observations on "Leiden und Helfen" in Part II of my "Genetische
Psychologic."
2"Vom falsehen Gemeinschaftsideal" (Der Weg zur Vollendung, 14 Heft,
1927).
3 Hans Prinzhorn: "Leib-Seele —Einheit." Ein Kernproblem der neuen Psy-
chologie, 1927.
20
"VÎLL AND FORCE
the neurosis V<
y the npprps^îvp majrirify wV-° n th ° y "^°"^^ <-n f'^-
press^t heir wills!\ No., the man who suffers from pedagogical,
social and ethical repression of will, must again learn to will,
and not to force on him an alien will is on the other hand the
best protection against excesses of will which for the most part
only represent reactions J In my view the patient should make
himself what he is, should will it and do it himself, without force
or justification and without need to shift the responsibihty for it.|

How method leading to this end and utilize itf
I present the
Here it has this value only
practically, I will discuss elsewhere.
to show how and in how far I can apply my practical experiences
to the founding of my will psychology justifiably because as a
matter of fact they are not th erapeutic in the moralistic peda-
gogical sense huJLarg constructiv e. Otherwise I should not have
succeeded at all in understanding what a tremendous role will
psychology plays in general. In the Freudian analysis the pa-
tient is measured by a minimum scale, as it were, as perhaps the
weak-sighted by the ophthalmologist in order to be brought up
to normal vision. This minimum scale consists of the primitive
fear pictures of the CEdipus and castration complexes together
with all related sadistic, cannibalistic and narcissistic tendencies.
Measured by these the modern civilized man certainly feels him-
self better than the more evil primitive, at all events not worse,
and thus we get the basis for the therapeutic justification.
Please do not misunderstand me. I am not making fun of this,
any more than of the necessary profession of the ophthalmologist
or the normal vision of my chauffeur. But if, for example, a weak
visioned painter can create better pictures when he works with-
out glasses, it would be folly to educate him to the wearing of
spectacles because he then would see the same as his neighbor the
banker. It is just as foolish to educate a man who is inhibited
in his self-development by the norm of the CEdipus complex,
which he seeks to escape. By this holding up of a mythological
decalogue as a confessional mirror one can probably work thera-
peutically, but one must know what one does, not for the sake
of a fanatical sense of honor, but in order to be able to succeed in
actuality. However, one must also be ready to admit that the
moraUty lying at the bottom of this therapy is the Jewish-Chris-
tian morality which it seeks to conserve, while that part of hu-
21
TRUTH AXD KEALITV
manity which has already outgrown it includes the main body of
neurotics, whom one can scarcely hope to cure with the morahty
from which as a matter of fact they suffer. That, however, is the
therapeutic significance of the CEdipus complex; a kind of
mythologizing of the fourth commandment, which perhaps still
lingers in the Greek CEdipus story but, as I shall show, is cer-
tainly not its meaning.
Psychologically the CEdipus complex as I have already indi-
cated inmy "Genetische Psychologic" has no other significance
— —
than that of a great even if not the first will conflict between
the growing individual and the counter will of a thousand year
old moral code, represented in the parents. Against this itself,
nothing is to be said ; it must probably have its value as it has
so long preserved itself and thereby apparently mankind. The
child must subject himself to it, not in order that he should
let his father hve and not marry his mother, but that he should
not believe in general that he can do what he wishes, that he

should not even trust himself to will. Also on another ground
than that of the dominance of the strongest must one render
acknowledgment to this old testament moral code against which
perhaps at bottom all hatred of Jews is directed! Apparently we
have to thank the reaction against it for all great revolutionaries
of spirit and deed, who have displaced the old. For on this power-
ful imprint of centuries the counter will strengthens itself, trains
itself, must first of all seek the most different by-paths and
disguises, in order finally to prevail, and when it has reached this
goal, deny itself in guilt feeling.
Here only a constructive therapy, which must not even be an
can take hold helpfully. I do not mean con-
indi\-idual therapy,
structive in the sense of a medically oriented normal therapy as
it is handled in the analytic situation by Freud, who interprets
as resistance the counter will of the patient awakened by the

authoritative pressure of the therapist. Here lies the moralistic
pitfall into which the analyst falls hopelessly when he steps in as
therapist of society and not of the indi%'idual. For against this
parent-like representative of the social will is aroused the self
will of the weakest patient although it is interpreted by the

Freudian therapist as resistance on the basis of his own will and
in terms of his own social and moral ideals ; that is, as some-
22
WILL AND FORCE
thing which must be overcome or even broken instead of being
furthered and developed. Without the understanding and cour-
age of a constructive therapy, individual therapy degenerates
into a mass education which is based on the traditional world
view and the Jewish-Christian morality. We shall see elsewhere in
how far a freeing of will in education, as it is already utilized
today in the program of modern pedagogj', works and is justified
psychologically. At all events, to correct always seems easier to
me than to prevent or to educate, p articularly because there is
a natur^ll endency to self healing, yes, even to over-heaJiag (in
Ostwald's sense), while the tendency to self ed ucation if it
exists ^t all events is muc h harder to awake n and to developj as
itpresupgosesonjthe part of thejndividual the accep tance of
iiis own_wilirThis tendency," the clTnstructive technique which I
have eyolve4«i-4Bdividual cases, tries to build up into a principle

of ^dividualization^^ê presentation of which I must postpone
to alate r L?iiie gfterthe fundamental psychological problem of
will and for :e is known and recognized in its universal meaning.
\l
23
Ill
KNOWING AND EXPERIENCING

"As the fish does not live outside of the dark abyss.
So man should never strive for knowledge regarding his own essence."
-Lao-Tse
Since we have come back to our original point of departure, the

overcoming of external force through the inner freedom of will,
we have now to indicate in a general way how we conceive the out-
line of a philosophy of the psychic after this'neo-Copernican
reversaf'to c anscious will as the centra l poin t of psychology, j f
not of world history Consciousness, as an mstrument of knowl-
.
edge turned toward the inside seeks truth, that is, inner actuality
in contrast to the outer truth of the senses, the so-called "reality."
Instinct lifted into the ego sphere by consciousness is the power
of will, and at the same time a tamed, directed, controlled in-
stinct, which manifests itself freely within the individual per-
sonality, that is, creatively. Indeed as free toward the outer
it is
as toward the inner.But only the inner effects interest us here,

first upon the id, life itself, and next upon the higher
the instinct
super-ego aspects and ideal formations of the self. Just as the
creative will represents the conscious expression of instinct, in a
banal sense the act, so emotion represents the conscious aware-
ness of instinct, thatis, the emotional tone is an index of the
"what" of the In both cases, however, it is consciousness

will.
which lends to the phenomenon ils authentic psychological sig-

nificance.
The influence of the power of consciousness on the ego-ideal
formation has a double effect in the ethical sphere likewise, an
active one, corresponding to the act of will and the
and passive
emotional perception in the purely psychic sphere ; active in the
creative expression of the momentary ego ideal as it manifests
24
KNOWING AND EXPEKIENCING
itself in work; passive in the formation of definite ethical,
aesthetic, and logical norms for doing and making, without
whose concurrence no kind of action is possible. Nay more, these
norms modify still further the content of the original pure in-
stinctual drives, which were already modified by consciousness
and indeed go beyond content into form, since they prescribe the
only possible form in which this particular individual can realize
and objectify the content of the momentary instinctual drive.
In a word, in the perceptual sphere of emotional life the ego modi-
fies the instincts (hfted into the sphere of wiU by being made
conscious) into definite interests or desires whose carrying over

into deed or work again depends on the spiritual forms, if you
will, the psychological categories, created from the individual's
ego-ideal formation. This is the schema of a_co nstructive will .
psyiholegy, in the center of which we again place the conscious

ego, with its old rights and newly won prerogatives.
From this constructive psychology it is only a step to a widely
comprehensive point of view which I designate as a philosophy
of the psychic because it includes not only the psychological
problem of "Will and Force" but also the epistemological prob-
lem of "Truth and Reality," the ethical problem of "Creation
and Guilt" and finally, the religious problem of "Happiness and
Salvation." And I believe it is impossible to handle or to under-
stand any one without the others. For at the moment when we per-
ceive the mechanism of the instinctive drive set in motion, molded
into ethical willing by the conscious ego (and this has been ab-
stracted from a wealth of observation and experience), a reac-
tion results with hitherto incomprehensible inexorableness, a
reaction which psychoanalysis has designated as guilt feeling.
This guilt feeling in spite of all the efforts of psychoanalysis re-
mains not only an unsolved riddle, but in my opinion has led the
whole of psychology astray, including psychoanalysis. For this
guilt feeling which seems to enter so inevitably into the function-
ing of the psychic mechanism like the friction in the operation of
a machine, leads to the rationalization of our motives, to the in-
terpretation of our emotions, to the falsifying of truth, and to
the doubting of the justification of our will. However, as soon
as we restore to the will its psychological rights, the whole of

psychology becomes of necessity a psychology of consciousness,
25
TRUTH AXD REALITY
which it is anyway according to its nature, and the "psychology
of the unconscious" unveils itself to us as one of the numerous
attempts of mankind to deny the will in order to evade the con-
scious responsibility following of necessity therefrom. The un-
avoidable guilt feeling shows the failure of this attempt, is as it
were the "neurotic" throw-back of the denied responsibility. This
enthroning of the conscious will upon its natural rights is no
backward step from psychoanalytic knowledge, but a necessary
step forward and beyond it to include the psychological under-
standing of the psychoanalytic world view itself.
Freud's presentation of the "Ego and the Id" presents a de-
velopmental level of our mental life as it may have existed once
and perhaps in the child's development it returns to that level to
a certain degree, where the ego, as it were, shyly hfts its head
out of the id, perhaps even then against it, and comes upon the
moralistic super-ego factors as they are represented by the
parent authorities externally. But from this birth hour of the ego
from the womb of the id to the self conscious pride —
yes,
analytic super-pride —
of the achieved ego consciousness is a long
and highly complicated path which Freud does not follow
through, and has not even seen, as he still insists on understand-
ing the modern individual from the earlier level. The conscious
ego of the individual since the time of the setting up of father
rule, although this still exists formally, has itself become a
proud
tyrant, who, like Napoleon is not satisfied with the position of
of an
a leading general or first consul, nor even with the role
emperor among kings, but would become ruler of the whole
world kingdom. Herein lies the unavoidable tragedy of the ego
and from this springs its guilt also. Speaking purely psycho-
logically, as we presented it in our schema of a constructive
psychology, the ego had gradually become the conscious in-
terpreter and executor of the impulsive self and as long as it
was
or could be only that, it found no hindrance in the ethical
norms
one
of the ideal ego. Man was one with himself as he had been
with nature before the development of the conscious ego.
The
inner tragedy, which we designate as conflict, and the
gudt
necessarily inhering in it, appear only when to the
purely m-
terpretative "I will" (which I must do anyway) is added the "It
is not so" which denies the necessity.
26
KNOWING AND EXPEEIENCING
This goes along with an alteration of consciousness as well as
the power of will. Consciousness, which primarily had been only
an expression and tool of the will, soon becomes a self dependent
power, which can not only support and strengthen the will by
rationalization, but also is able to repress it through denial. On
the other hand, the will which up to then had been only executive
now becomes creative, but at first only negatively so, that is, in
the form of a denial. The next step serves to justify and main-
tain this denial and leads to the positive creation of that which
should be, that is, to that which is as the ego wills it in terms of
its own ideal formation. Psj-chologically speaking, this means, as
the ego wants the id. I believe, however, that this ego-ideal for-
mation not only works transformingly upon the id, but is itself
the consequence of an id already influenced bj' the will.
Perhaps these last statements of process may seem to many a
mere playing with words, an accusation to which most philo-
sophic discussions as well as psychological formulations are
easily open, language, which is the only material of psycho-
logical research and philosophic presentation, is rightly famed
for a sheer uncreative psychological profundityj Certainly it
seems to me that verbal expression itself represents a psycho-

logical formulation if not actually an interpretation. Instead of
turning to a "philosophy of grammar" to which Freud's opposi-
tion of "Iand it" would indeed give occasion, we will illustrate
the thoughtswe have just formulated in psychological terminol-
ogy with the plastic picture speech of mythical religious sym-
bolism, n'he nucleus of all mythical religious tradition is the
nobility and tragic fall of the hero who comes to grief through
his own presumption and the guilt arising therefrom. That is
the myth of humanity^jever recurring in the various levels of de-
velopment involving man in his two aspects as a willing and a
self-conscious individual. The hero myth shows man more as
willing, the religious myth shows him more as an ethical indi-
vidual. In relation to the portentous advance of the power of
consciousness, the biblical myth of the fall has presented the
human tragedy in its noblest form. Man, who advances like God
in his omniscience, falls away from nature through conscious-
ness, becomes unfortunate in that he loses his naive unity with
the unconscious, with nature. Here we see for the first time in
TRUTH AND REALITY
our presentation, but by no means for the first time in the history
of mankind, unconsciousness, oneness with nature, identified
with the wholesome, the good, and consciousness with fate.^
Psychoanalysis notoriously preaches just the opposite, but only
in its therapy, while theoretically it must enthrone the uncon-
scious in order to unburden consciousness.
Without going into the broader meaning of the myth of the
fallat this point, I should like to illustrate its difference from
the hero myth as classic Greece represents it. There man, the
hero, appears as creator, as actor, and his likeness to God comes
to expression in his deeds, as for example with Prometheus, who,
like the Gods, presumes to create men. The biblical myth on the
contrary represents this Godlikeness, not on the creative level,
but on the level of consciousness, that is, it consists in knowing,
in self-consciousness. The contrast between these two myths, the
religious and the heroic, signifies not only a contrast between
different races, times, and developmental levels, but between two
world views, or better said, between two great principles, which
we here seek to comprehend as experience and knowledge, living
and knowing. The hero myth represents experience (Hving), the
deed, the will, which consciousness could only restrict, as we find
it expressed in the O^^dipus story " but the hero comes to grief
and must come to grief in the fact that he cannot know before-
hand and does not even want to know so that he can act. The re-
ligious myth represents "knowing," the knowledge of God, that
is, self knowledge, and here man suffers again in that, knowledge
about himself interferes with naive action, restrains him and

torments without affording him the satisfaction and liberation
which the deed grants. He cannot accomplish through action
any more because he thinks, because he knows too much. Now
i man longs for naive unconsciousness as the source of happiness,
and curses the knowledge bought so dearly. In the heroic myth
the moral runs that with a little insight into pride of will, the fall
could have been avoided, which is not correct, but at all events it
1 See in this connection the literary remains of Alfred Seidel who committed
suicide, published by Prinzhorn under tliis title, "Bewusztsein als Vcrhangnis,"
Bonn 1927.
- See also "Will Tlierapy," Book I, chap. v.
28
represents knowledge as the source of salvation and the strong
active will as fate.
Here is shown again the fact that there is no criterion for what
isgood or bad, as there is no absolute criterion for true or false,
since it is one thing at one time, and another at another. The
psychological problem which has been raised by this way of un-
derstanding myths is in my opinion the basic problem of all
psychology which I should hke to formulate thus Why must we :
always designate one side as bad or false and the other as good
or right? This primary psychological problem cannot be an-
swered by saying that we do it because it has been learned from
our parents and they again from their parents and so on, back
to the original pair. That is the explanation which the Bible gives
and Freud also in his primal horde h^^pothesis. Our individual-
istic ethics isexplicable psychologically but not historically. It
is not a cumulative phenomenon of morals piled one upon the
other for centuries, nor could it be propagated through cen-
turies if something in the individual himself did not correspond
to it, which all great minds have recognized and Kant has pre-
sented so admirably. At all events, we can expect to find the
answer only in the individual himself and not in the race or its
history. This basic problem appears also in all mythology and
rehgion that undertake to explain how evil, sin, guilt came into
the world, that is, psychologically speaking, why we must form
these ideas. Both mythology and religion answer the question
finally by saying that the conscious will, human willing in con-
trast to natural being, the root of the arch evil which we desig-
is
nate psychologically as guilt feeling. In the oriental religious

systems it is known as evil, in the Jewish as sin, in the Christian
as guilt. This transformation is related to the development of
conscious willing just outlined whose first externalization we
recognized as a denial, a negation. On account of its negative
origin the will is always evil as, for example, with Schopenhauer
who harks back to the corresponding oriental teachings. The
idea of sin as the biblical presentation teaches, is related to the
next developmental level where will, consciously defiant, is af-
firmed, thatis, where knowledge thereof already introduces pride.
Finally the Christian idea of guilt under whose domination we

29
TKUTH AND REALITY
just as under that of the Jewish idea of sin, is the reac-
still live
tion to the positively creative will tendencies of man, to his pre-

sumption in wanting to be not only omniscient like God, but to
be God himself, a creator.
Here one might be tempted to think of Freud's "father com-
plex" and to derive this creative will from the CEdipus complex.
This, however, would be to leave the actually creative unex-
plained, a lack of psychoanalytic comprehension which Freud
himself has seen and admitted. For Freud, that which we call
"will" originates, as it were, in the father identification, in the
wish to be in the father's place. But this conception itself in my
opinion is nothing other than a denial of the own will, which is
ascribed to the father (identification) or to God. For Adler
again, the will, crudely put, is not father identification, but
father protest, the wanting to be otherwise, which again is only
a method of interpretation —
even if a correct one. Actually the
will is both, or rather neither. It is indeed positive and negative,
will and counter-will, in the same individual at the same time, as
I have already expressed it, principally in "Der Kiinstler." The
will, in a certain stage of development is projected upon the
father, is objectified in him, because the father represents a

strong will, because he in actuality represents a symbol of the
will or resistance to it. The real problem lies in man himself,
beyond identification, beyond the biological, and guilt feeling
comes not primarily because one wants to put himself in the
father's place which one ought not to do, but because in develop-
ing, one vmst become father, creator, and will not. The authentic
psychological problem, therefore, lies in this, whence the "ought
not" on the one side, and the "will not" on the other.
Just as the father is not the prototype of will but only its
symbolic representative — —
and not the first even then so God too
is not simply a deified fatlier as Freud will have it, but an ideal
created in man's image, in a word, a projection of the consciously

willing ego. This religious justification turns out much more
nobly just because the actual father, who is only a weak repre-
sentative of the will is thereby ignored, and does not disturb the
nobility of the ego projection. The father, therefore, is only a
first modest personification of conscious will which soon is not
satisfied with this real representative but symbolizes its nest

30
great developmental step in the creative, all powerful and all
knowing God. In the religious myths, the creative will appears
personified in God, and man already feels himself guilty when he
assumes himself to be like God, that is, ascribes this will to him-
self. In the heroic myths on the contrary, man appears as himself
creative and and fall is ascribed to God,

guilt for his suffering
that is, to his own Both are only extreme reaction phe-
will.
nomena of man wavering between his Godlikeness and his noth-

ingness, whose will is awakened to knowledge of its power and
whose consciousness is aroused to terror before it. The heroic
myth strives to justify this creative will through glorifying its
deeds, while religion reminds man that he himself is but a crea-
ture dependent on cosmic forces. So the creativ.fi-g ill -a ut amat-
ically biln gs the_guilLxeaction with it, as the self reducing de-

pression follows the manic elation. In a word, will and guilt are
tfiejjjrr^nrnplpjnpntar Y sides of-Oiie-aMd Lliu-sa me phenomenon,
which Schopenhauer, resting on the Hindoo teachings, has per-
ceived and comprehended most deeply of all moderns. A philos-1
ophy of will accordingly must either be deeply pessimistic if itl
emphasizes the guilt side, or extremely optimistic like Nietzsche!
if it affirms its creative power.
In psychoanalysis we find both aspects but not harmoniously

united, rather they stand side by side as one of the numerous un-
reconciled contradictions. As therapy, analj'sis is optimistic,
believes as it were in the good in men and in some kind of capacity
for and possibility of salvation. In theory it is pessimistic man ;
has no will and no creative power, is driven by the id and re-

pressed by the super-ego authorities, is unfree and still guilty.
Here lies before us so transparent a contradiction that one can
only wonder how it was possible and must again recognize therein
a psychological problem so fundamental that it leads far bej'ond
a critique of psychoanalysis, ^ree will belongs to the idea of
guilt or sin as inevitably as day to nighK and even if there were
none of the numerous proofs for the inner freedom of the con-
scious will, the fact of human consciousness of guilt alone would
be sufficient to prove the freedom of will as we understand it psy-
chologically beyond a doubt. We say man reacts as if he were
guilty, but if he reacts so it is because he is guilty psychologically,
feels himself responsible, consequently no psychoanalysis in the
31
TRUTH AND REALITY
world can relieve him of this guilt feeling by any reference to
complexes however archaic. Therefore one should not only per-
mit the individual to will but actually guide him to willing in
order at least to justify constructively the guilt feeling which he
can by no means escape. I do not mean by rationalizations, re-
ligious, pedagogic or therapeutic, but through his own creative
action, througli the deed itself.
At this point we can formulate whence the guilt feeling arises

and what means. We have contrasted will and consciousness
it
previously and have seen that now the one, now the other is in-
terpreted as "bad" or "false," according to whether the experi-
ence side or the knowledge side is emphasized, and depending upon
the momentary overweighting of the one sphere by the other. In
the conscious perception of will phenomena the knowledge side
is emphasized; in theimmediate content of willing, it is the ex-
perience side. Only when the moral evaluation "bad," which re-
strains the individual in the experience of childhood, is trans-
ferred from the content of willing to the will itself, does the
ethical conflict within the individual arise out of the external
will conflict through the denial of the own will, finally
and this,
However, guilt is also determined
leads to consciousness of guilt.
on the will side and this double source makes it a strong invincible
power. For against this supremac^-Cff consciousness which sets
/7 up for the indivicJuâUiimseliii^^tbital' norms of right and wrong
•
(not thei^HcraFones of gw)d and bad) the will reacts with a con-
demnationoTconsciousness, whicITit perceives as restriction, and
this is the state of affairswhich we describe as consciousness of
guilt. In this sense guilt consciousness is simply a consequence
of conciousness, or more correctly, it is the self-consciousness
of the individual as of one willing consciously. As the Fall pre-
sents it —
knowing is sin, knowledge creates guilt. Consciousness,
which restrains the will through its ethical norms, is perceived
by the latter to be just as bad as the individual's own will is seen
to be by consciousness. Guilt consciousness is therefore actually
a consequence of increased self-consciousness, yes at bottom is
just this in its most fateful working out as conscience. We can-
not occupy ourselves here with the different possibihties and
forms of the restriction of consciousness upon the one side and
the repression of will upon the other, although this makes com-
32
KXOWIXG AXD EXPEEIENCIXG
prehensible the different forms and degrees of the so-called neu-
rotic reactions.^ It important here to recognize that the
is
neurotic tvpe represents not a form of illness but the most indi-
vidualistic beings of our age in whom awareness of the concepts,
badness, sin, guilt, has finally developed into tormenting self-
consciousness of this relationship.
The neurotic tvpe of our age, whom we meet in places other
than the consulting room of the neurologist and the treatment
room of the analyst, is therefore only the further development
of that negative human type which has existed as long as the
will has existed in our mental lives, and shows one side of this
conflict in extreme form. It is the man in whom is manifested a
will as strong as that of the creative man of action, only in the
neurotic patient this will expresses itself in its original negative
character, as counter-will, and at the same time is perceived
through the medium of conscious knowledge as consciousness of
guilt. The so-called neurotic s, there fore do not r epresent a class
,
of sick^peopleTupoft^he-cu re of wji^rn f "'"'"ptv mustc oncentra te^;

they represent rather the extreme outgrowth of the modern type
of man, whose cure both individually and socially is possible only
in one and the same way —
no matter whether this ensues in the
form of an individual therapy, a general educational reform or
finally on the ground of a world view, the basis of which is formed
by knowledge of the state of affairs just described. At all events,
for indi\'idual as for social therapy, a world view is indispensable
and the more one strives against this presupposition the less
prospect one has of finding a solid basis for educational reforms
or therapeutic results.) Yes, one is surprised how this comes to
pass of itself if one does not set out to want to make the person
other than he is, but permits him to be what he is, without his
needing to feel guilty or inferior on account of it. The neurotic
type, which we all represent to a certain extent, suffers from the
fact that he cannot accept himself, cannot endure himself and
will have it otherwise. [The therapy accordingly cannot be cor-
rective but only affirmative; it must transform him from a nega-
tive person of suffering and guilt to a positive man of will and
action, which he was in the beginning even if his soul life has be-
1 See also in this connection the chapter "Likeness and Difference" in Book I
of "WiU Therapy."
33
TRUTH AXD REALITY
come ever more complicated and painful with the increase of
consciousness.
We are, therefore, human beings, who through consciousness,
through too much self-knowledge are restricted or hindered in
living, a tjê which Shakespeare pictured psj'chologically in
such a masterly fashion in Hamlet, who in our age for the first
time has found complete recognition. We must not forget, how-
ever, that knowledge also has a creative side, as for example,
Shakespeare himself shows in the creation of the Hamlet figure.
Evidently he himself represented the Hamlet type, which did not
hinder him, unlike his hero, from using his conflict creatively
instead of perceiving it merely as a restriction. Knowing, there-
fore, when it works creatively, can be a substitute for living, yes
itself a form of experiencing. It becomes then an inner victory
of will if one may speak thus, instead of an outer, but it is a vic-
tory of will which the individual must pay for in every case with
some kind of deficit. The active hero who represents the conscious
power of will can act because he knows only his will, not its
origin and motives he comes to grief just in this, that he cannot
;
foresee the consequences of his act. The passive man of suffering

cannot act because his self-consciousness restricts his will which
manifests itself as guilt feeling in the face of the deed. The spirit-
ually creative type which I have characterized as "artist," lives
in constant conflict between these two extreme possibilities. The
• artist solves it for himself and others since he transposes tlie will
I affirmation creatively into knowledge, that is, expresses his will
and changes the unavoidable guilt feeling into ethical
spiritually
ideal formation, which spurs him on and qualifies him for ever
'higher performance in terms of self-development.
34
IV
TRUTH AND REALITY

"Nur der Irrtum, ist das Leben,
Vnd das Wissen ist der Tod."
"Only in Error is there Life;

Knowledge is Death." _ ScHILLER
In the previous chapters we have elaborated the contrast be-

tween knowing and experiencing in terms of the development of
consciousness from a tool of will and an instrument of will af-
firmation, to the tormenting self-consciousness of the modern
individual. Knowledge knowledge leads finally
in the sense of self
to constant awareness of itself, and since it is always present in
immediate experience too, disturbs it grievously if it does not

block it completely. To this development of consciousness into
the neurotic self restriction of living there corresponds the gen-
eral evolution of the neurosis from a basic will problem to a prob-
lem of consciousness.^ If in the first place, the will was bad and
its denial to blame for all suffering, now conscious knowledge
about ourselves and our problems, in other words the insight into
this denial process, constitutes the evil, the sin, or the guilt.
The problem of consciousness has yet another aspect which is
opposed to this termination in tormenting self-consciousness and
this is consciousness as a source of pleasure. Consciousness origi-
nally as a tool of the will and an instrument for its accomplish-
ment or for a source of pleasure just as is the
justification is
carrying out of will itself.CYes, the consciousness which confirms

will and approves of its accomplishment is the very source of
pleasureTÎn this psychological sense, pleasure and displeasure

are act ually only tw o opposite consciousaspects_xiL_wIII_j}h£z_
nomena. The puttinglrvenrfT^fll in living plus the consciousness
of it in experience is the mechanism of the pleasure feeling which
1 See in this connection "Will Therapy," Book I, chap. v.

35
TRUTH AND REALITY
(we callJiappinessPlt is at once a double, really a redoubled en-
joyment, first in the act of will itself and again in the reflecting
mirror of consciousness which says "yes" once more to the will
achievement. Only when consciousness is placed in the service of
the counter-will and manifests itself as a tendency to repression
or denial, do we feel unpleasantness and experience in the sum-
mation of painful feeling and the simultaneous consciousness
thereof, the sense of pain contrasted with pleasure which also rep
resents a reflection phenomenon of consciousness. Both reactions
relate to the present attitude of consciousness, to the will expres-
sion revealed in experience. Knowledge, on the contrary, is more
an historical process, which follows experience and feeling, al-

though it is often very immediate. Knowledge separates con-
sciousness from experiencing, or rather is itself a consequence
of this separation and has the tendency to preserve the pleasur-
able, to remember it and to deny and forget the painful.
(TVhy this never quite succeeds is not only the problem of the
neurosis, but of all human suffering) In other words, how does it
happen that consciousness turns from an organ for pleasure in
the service of will fulfilment into an organ of pain in consequence
of will denial. I believe this comes about because consciousness
from the beginning has a negative character, just as will orig-
inally is negative, denying. The negative side of consciousness,
however, is its connection with reality, just as the will also
emerges as counter-will on the reality of the strange will. Con-
sciousness originally by means of the sense organs is the me-
diator of reahty, of the real world, and as such has the capacity
to cause pain, like reality. It opposes the will accordingly as
reality does (for example in morals) because originally and even
it is the psychic representative, not only of will, but
further also
of reahty. In other words, consciousness is intensified reahty

which we perceive with pain as long as and insofar as the will is
not able to put it into its service, to overcome it, which it strives
to do with outside reality also. In this sense all is real that op-
poses itself to our will as invincible resistance, whether it be outer
reahty or the inner reality of consciousness.
In order to come from this reality side to the inner truth side
of consciousness, we must take a further step in the building up
of the will psychology and ap])roa ch_ the difficult sphere o f the
36
TRUTH AND REALITY
emotion al For the area in which all these will and conscious-
lifg.
ness phenomena take place perceived in sense terms as pleasure

and pain, or spiritually as happiness and sorrow, is the emo-
tional sphere standing equally close to will and consciousness
where all these activities come together and flow into one anoth er.
frhe emotional life represents accordingly the strongest inner
[force. It even stronger than the sexual instinct which is always

is
capable of being controlled and satisfied somehow. Not so the

I emotional life, which is uncontrollable and insatiable, j-es, whose!
/verv essence consists of its inability to be controlled or satisfied^
Ifwe consider first the relation of the emotional life to the
sphere of will, we find that it is a two-fold one. All that we desig-
nate as emotion in the n^^wer.sensp>of the word, love, gratitude,
longing, tenderness, is only the breaking, or rather the
finally
sof1^ning_Qi_tlie_wi]l:.It is not that we subject our own will to the
will of the other by means of emotion, but rather our ow n softened
will is the emotion itsel f, a kind of self subjection, inthe face of
our pride. The defeiis£_against this yi elding o f self -will we per-
ceive asjhame the affirmation oFTt as fove, and th e_denial as hatga,
.
a kind orliardening of the will.'''Here we touch upon the second

side of the relation of will to the emotional life, namely, the
(affect^. For what I call affect is a kind of warding off of emo-
tiôn, actually an attempt to guide it back into the sphere of will
as psychic action, while emotion is passive. Scorn, anger, hate

are affirmations, exaggerations of the negative will which sets
itself against the rising softening influence of emotion by divert-
ing it into the sphere of will as a defense. On the other hand, the
affirmation of emotion through the will, or better said, its release
into emotion, leads not to subjection to the other, but to that
which we call surrender, a kind of beneficent release of will.
We must postpone a discussion of the relation of the emotional
lifeto the sexual life which is so often emphasized but has never
been understood, to the chapter on "Happiness and Redemption"
in order to turn now to the relation of the emotional sphere to
consciousness. Of the affirmation of will-hardening manifested
is only
in the affect, there this to be said, that it momentarily
overpowers consciousness order afterwards to force it to
in
justify the affect expression. Where this does not succeed, the
originally denied emotion appears afterwards in the reaction of
37
TRUTH AND REALITY
repentance, which often leads to the complete breaking of will.
The influence of emotion as a will phenomenon upon the sphere of
consciousness shows itself where will denies the emotional yield-
ing, without increasing it to full denial in an affect. This partial
denial is certainly not without influence upon the emotional
sphere where it manifests itself as the transformation of
itself,
positive emotion (love) into guilt feeling, thus again proving
guilt to be the result of miscarried denial. The influence upon
consciousness a manifold, to a large extent a grave one, which
is
aff'ects not only all of our behavior but also our thinking and so
leads us back to the theme "Truth and Reality."

The original nature of denial is seen in the attempt to oppose
to a painful reality, the power of the individual will. Soon, how-
ever, the denial mechanism is turned entirely inward where it
expresses itself in the emotional sphere as affect and in the sphere
of consciousness as repression. This leads secondarily then to
all the thought processes which we know as distortion, ration-
alization, justification and doubt. Repression as I have already
shown before ^ is denial continued in conscious thought and ap-
pears when the individual becomes aware of emotional denial and
wants to repress the associated memory content in order to be
free of the feeling (which however has its origin in the sphere of
will not consciousness). This repression can fail of its purpose
or succeed only partially and then doubt sets in, which brings
into question the reality of what has been thought, that is, the
truth, si nce it c an neither repress it consciously, nor deny it emo-
tionally .^[oubU therefore, is origi nally int e nded to sh alce truth.
it is the intellectual struggle forTruth, for cert aiatX:^ This, how-
ever, is nothing other than the old battle lifted from the sphere
of will and emotion into the sphere of consciousness and is con-
ducted with the same inevitability and stubbornness as the orig-
inal will conflict itself. Accordingly no argument avails against
doubt because truth is what it avoids, just as no arguments con-
vince the counter-will, of which doubt is only the intellectual
manifestation.
If doubt represents the conscious counter-will, truth represents
the will intellectually. Crudely put, one might say : "What I will
'See the chapter "Verleugnung uiid Realitatsanpassung" in "Genetische
Psyehologie" Part I.
38
TRUTH AND REALITY
is true, that what I make truth," or to be bap^l, "what I want
is,
to believe." Also here again the problem is not one of content,

namely to decide what the truth is, but rather what truth is and
this setting of the problem contains the solution in itself just as
the laconic answer of Pilate to the announcement of Jesus that he_
had come to bring the truth.(Trut)i, however, is not only a.suh.-|
jective concep t andg.CC<»«liÎ^lapsychological problem, but'
a n/Siotioi? likeVs£pposite doubt^hich has long been recog-
it is
nized as such. Both have liotWTTyCodo with reah tv except that
|inth stand in Truth is what I beheve or affirm,
opposition to it .
doubt is But the reality which penetrates

denial, or rejection.
consciousness through our sense organs can influence us only by
way of the emotional and becomes either truth or falsehood
life
accordingly ; stamped as psychic reality or unreality.

chat is, is
In the interaction of will and consciousness as it manifests itself

in the emotional life we find a continuous influencing of one
sphere by the other. Even the purely sensory consciousness is not
merely receptive, but is guided and restricted by will. (J see or
hear what I want to, not what i^ What is can only be learned by
overcoming the tendency to deny all that I do not want to see or
hear or perceive. Still more clearly is intellect influenced by will,
for logical, causally directed thinking, going beyond the effort
to shut out the painful is the positive, active expression of the
will to control reality. The third level of cxeatiye consciousness
or phantasy,is the most positive expression of the counter-will,
which noFonly says "I will not perceive what is," but "I will that
it is otherwise, i.e. just as I want it. And this, only this is truth."
Truth therefore is the conscious concomitant, yes, the affirma-
tion of the constructive or creative completion of will on the in-
tellectual level, just as we understand the perception of pleasure
as the emotional affirmation of will expression. Accordingly"?
truth brings intellectual pleasure as doubt brings intellectual!,
pain. Truth as positive emotional experience means "it is good,
that I will is right, is pleasurable." It is, therefore, willing itself
the affirmation of which creates intellectual pleasure. That we do
not know truth in its psychological nature but set it up as it
were outside of every psychology, yes, as the criterion of psy-

chology itself, as again related to its content. If we did not do
that, this last intellectual way to justify will, the will to truth as a
39
TRUTH AND REALITY
drive to knowledge which shall make an end of doubt would also be
denied us. Once more we cannot enjoy completely the pleasure
of truth seeking because it is an expression of our own will which
even here on the level of knowledge and self knowledge needs the
content of a general truth equally vahd for all, in order to deny
itsown truth, its own individuality. And here, in my opinion, we
hit upon the most pti ra doxical phenomenon of the human soul.
the understanding of whic h I consider the most im^jictAaLzggult
o?~mv re lativity theory of knowledge. It concerns the law of
continuous developmen t of our general psychological knowledge.
This results not as one might think pedagogically, by the hand-
ing over and broadening of the already known, whereby he who
follows knows more or sees better. No, it is not only that he knows
more, he knows differently because he himself is different. And
this "being different" is related to the continuous development
of self consciousness, which alters the whole individuality because
it determines it. This knowing differently about ourselves, about
our own psychic processes is in this sense only a new interpreta-

tion of ourselves, with which and in which we free ourselves from
the old, the bygone, the past, and above all froinoujjisj;n past.
Creative individuals, in their advancing knowledge, represent
therefore only the increased self knowledge of mounting self con-
sciousness which manifests itself in them. Only in this sense can
their truth also serve as the truth and not in relation to any
extra-psychological content of the truth-emotion which trans-
forms the positive affirmation of willing into conviction.
WHIiJiwuseparation of -the content _of truth from the feeling
of_trueness, there is revealed to us the problem of truth and
reality in its complete practical meaning, as well as in its psy-
chological and epistemological aspect. The only "trueness" in
terms of actual psychic reality is found in emotion, not in think-
ing, which at best denies or rationalizes truth, and not necessarily
in action unless it follows from feeling and is in harmony with
it. This, however, is seldom the case because the will for the most
part does not permit it but preserves for itself the supremacy
over the sphere of action. Then, however, action ensues either on
the basis of conscious thought guided by will or is the expression
of an affect and is, therefore, not emotionally true in either case.
For the most part it stands thus, that the denial tendency arising
40
TKUTH AND REALITY
from the negative origin of will and ruling our entire spiritual
life in the sphere of thought and action, particularly as far as it
concerns our relations to other people, manifests itself as self-

deception concerning its own emotions, but really is the truth.
The paradox therein is this, that exactly what we pretend con-
sciously to be the truth, this it actually is psychically. It is only
that we attach to emotion, as it were, this intellectual denial in
order not to admit it to ourselves and the other. Again the will
in its negative form —
^presses in past emotion and must deny even
while it sanctions it. This is the psychological side of the situa-
tion. In relation to practical action, to behavior, the result is
that we pride ourselves on playing a role when it has to do with
true emotional reaction. AVe actually play, then, what we are in
truth, but perceive it as untrue, as false, because again we can-
not accept ourselves without rationalization. Just so, in the ex-
aggeration of an action or reaction, the more genuine it is, the
more we perceive it as voluntary exaggeration. (I play the in-
jured role, means, I am injured.)
The understanding of this relation between truth and reality
is not only highly important psychologically as it reveals to us
the ;psychic truth-s t atus _ o£__Lying pretension, dramatization,
,
but also practically for judging the actions resulting therefrom.

This explains why we rightly judge a man by h is actions and
these again according to their manifest appearance, as not only
the laity but also justice and education do. For the psychic mo-
tivation, upon which one finally stumbles with careful analysis,
may be psychically true but it is not actually like the act itself
whose psychological understanding always includes its interpre-
tation in terms of the will-guilt problem. Accordingly, therefore,
the so-called Freudian slip is psychologically truer than the
correct behavior which always rests on a denial of what we
really want to do and which usually comes through only in
blunders where at the same time it is made ineffective, as also
in the dream through the sleeper's incapacity for action. Here
also light falls upon the peculiar phenomenon of the intentional
blunder, in whose mechanism the emotionally true intention
again betrays itself. In this sense the majority of our actions as
we have previously described in conscious acting, pretending,
falsehood, are really would-be shps.
41
TRUTH AND REALITY
From not only a new comprehension of human be-
this results
havior, but also an understanding of it, a view of life that is
therapeutic in an anti-analjtic sense. It is to the effect that our

seeking the truthîn hugiaa, motiv es for ac ting and thinking^ is
Ses^tmHiyer With th etrutIu-»we~€«QQPtJi^«.-41.''o beable toiive
o ne needs illusion s, not only Ollfpr i11"g'"opf: such as art, religion,
CU(
^Lft. philosophy, science and love afford, but inner illusions which
first condition the outer. T he more a maj ^«" tn1r» r ^âlitj as
i
truthjappearance a s essence^ the s ounder, the better adjusle d.

tKe4tffppl^' V ill" tie be At the moment when we begin to search
.
after truth we destroy reality and our relation to it. Be it that

we find in the beloved person in truth a substitute for the mother,
or for another person, or for ourselves. Be it that, just reversed,
we establish through analysis that we really love the hated per-
son, but must displace this love upon another person, because
our proud will does not permit that we confess this to ourselves.
In a word, the displacements are the real. Reality unveils itself
to analysis always as something displaced, psychologically un-
true. This is a cognitive fact but no life principle. It is not at
all a matter of putting an end to these displacements because it
is impossible as the analytic situation teaches us best of all, where
the patient only continues this displacement process further, in

denying the actual feeling relation to the analyst, and displacing
it upon other persons or situations. This displacement, if it suc-
ceeds, we regard and rightly so as healing, for this constantly
pretending and blundering, is
effective process of self-deceiving,
no psychopathological mechanism, but the essence of reality,
the — as it —continuous
were blunder. This is also the authentic
wisdom of the Greek ffidipus myth, whose hero would live hap-
pily in his displaced world of appearance if he were not driven
by his intellectual pride, the will to truth, to expose his reality
as lies, as appearance, as falsehood. He carries out his will
pleasurably in the search for truth, in the overcoming of ob-
stacles, but suffers in the content of what he finds, which brings
to consciousness the denied emotions (in the case of ffidipus, for
his parents).
From this conception there results a paradoxical but deep in-
sight into the essence of the neurosis. If man is the more normal,
healthy and happy, the more he can accept the appearance of
42
TRUTH AND REALITY
reality as truth, that is, the more successfully he can repress, dis-
place, deny, rationalize, dramatize himself and deceive others,
then it follows that the suffering of the neurotic comes not from
a painful reahty but from painful truth which only secondarily
makes reality unbearable. Spiritually the neurotic has been long
since where psychoanalysis wants to bring him without being
able to, namely at the point of seeing through the deception of
the world of sense, the falsity of reality. He suffers, not from all
the pathological mechanisms which are psychically necessary for
living and wholesome but in the refusal of these mechanisms
which is just what r obs him ^f the illusions important for living;_
Thejieurotic, as distinguished from the creative man of will
whom the hero OCdipus represents on the intellectual level, is no t
the voluntary happy s e eker of truth, but the forced, urilmpfiy^
finder of jl—He seeks, moreover, no general objective truth, and
finds his own subjective truth, which runs like this "I am so —
little and bad and weak and worthless that cannot deceive my-
I
self about myself, cannot accept myself as a worthwhile indi-
vidual." ,
While the average well adjusted man can make the reality that
is generally accepted as truth into his own truth, the creative
searcher after truth seeks and finds his own truth which he then
—
wants to make general that is, real. He creates his reality, as
it were, from his truth. The neurotic, on the other hand, finds his
subjective truth but cannot accept it as such and destroys there-

with the given reality, that is, the pleasurable relation to it, as
he is neither in position to make it his truth nor to translate his
truth into reality. The difference lies again in the attitude or
rather in the kind of consciousness, in its relation to will. The
average man has reality consciousness more strongly developed,
the creative type will consciousness, the neurotic individual self-
consciousness. Reality consciousness comes from adaptation of
will, the creative phantasy consciousness from will affirmation,
the neurotic self consciousness from will denial. The will itself is
justified in the first case, generally and socially ; in the second

case, individually and ethically ; in the third case it is denied.
The differing quality of conscious attitude to the will prob-

lem which decides the predominance of pleasure or pain, of
destruction or construction, depends essentially upon the funda-
43
TRUTH AND REALITY
mental significance of the content problem. Reality conscious-
ness is predominantly oriented from the standpoint of content;
its truth is, as already said, the actual, and is therefore ex-
clusively content. The creative consciousness is also contentual
but in distinction employs predominantly subjective material,
phantasies of every kind, which in the last analysis represent
will phenomena. The neurotic self consciousness, on the contrary,
busies itself in an introspective way, which we can only designate
as psychological, with the psychic processes themselves, and they
consequently represent his predominant content. Certainly the
neurotic also has real content and phantasy content, of the first
too little, of the latter too much, but the essential thing in his
form of consciousness is still the introspective self-consciousness
of the psychic processes as such. Also in this sense and on this ac-
count, the neurotic is much nearer to actual truth psycholog-
ically than the others and it is just that from which he suffers.
Psychoanalytic therapy then works therapeutically for the
neurotic in that it offers him new contents for the justification
of his will in the form of scientific "truth." It works therefore on
the basis of illusion exactly like religion, art, philosophy and
love, the great spontaneous psychotherapies of man, as I called
them in "Der Kiinstler." On the other hand, the psychotherapy
which lets the individual first of all accept himself and through
that learn to accept reality, must also, according to its nature,
use illusions not truth in the psj'chological sense because it is
that from which the neurotic suffers. In this sense, psychoanal-
ysis too is therapeutic but only so long or with those individuals
who are still capable of this degree of illusion and with a class
of neurotics whom we see today, this is often no longer possible.
The insoluble conflict in which psychoanalysis itself is caught
arises because it wants to be theory and therapy at the same time
and this is just as irreconcilable as truth with reality. As psy-
chological theory it seeks truth, that is, insight into psychic
processes themselves and this works destructively, as neurotic
self consciousness shows only too clearly. As therapy it must
oft'er the patient contentual consolations and justifications which
again cannot be psychologically true, or, as far as they are

true, cannot work therapeutically.
This brings us back again to the part played by the will prob-
44
TRUTH AND KEALITY
km in the neurosis. This disintegrating destructive character of
selfconsciousness arises in the last analysis from the original
negative character of will which works itself out, not only toward
the outside as resistance, but also toward the inside as counter-
will.The destructive element enters first through denial, nega-
tion, and finally relates to our emotions, that is, to ourselves.
Here the psychology of the neuroses branches off and can be
comprehended only as the opposite of the psychology of the
creative individual who confirms his will and himself but not
in terms of the psychology of the average man. The fundamental
methodological error of Freudian psychology is that it is
oriented therapeutically on the psychology of the normal man

and knows the creative only in its negative expression as neu-
rosis. The Freudian psychology pictures the man as he would
be if he were normal, healthy, but the mistake lies in this that the
neurotic individual cannot be made normal and healthy in this
way, but only through the positive, creative affirmation of will,
which the moralistic pedagogical therapist wants to translate
into normal adaptation. The neurotic loses out, however, be-
cause of the relation to reality, because he knows too much truth
about himself, no matter whether this manifests itself as guilt
consciousness, inferiority feeling, or incapacity for love. Jl is at,
bnttomjilwajsonlvin capacitv for illu sion, but an incapacity for
illusion which concerns the sphere of will in the same way as it
does the sphere of consciousness both of which the creative type

affirms, while the normal man does not perceive them
at all as
separated forces which oppose one another. The neurotic not

only turns his consciousness as a self-tormenting introspection
toward the inside but he also turns his will as counter-will inside
instead of putting it outside like the constructive man of
action.
With him it is not only denial of painful reality or rather of

painful emotion which makes reality resistant to him, but it is the
denial of feeling in general through the will which
finally ex-
cuses the denying factor itself, i.e. the counter-will, on

moral
grounds, or rationalizes it ethically and accordingly either suf-
fers from guilt feeling or from the breaking of the will, or
both.
He must then explain, motivate, understand, rationalize, justify

each of his acts of will, whether positive or negative, instead of
simply affirming them, which makes homo sapiens into that
45
TRUTH AND REALITY
thought specialist among living beings, whose extreme develop-
mental type we have before us in the classic form of the neurosis
of our time, the compulsion neurosis.
\__On_the other side, this tendency to deny will expressions and
the need to justify the denial has led to all the creations of
genius, as we know them from the religious formation of heroes
to philosophic ethics] These universal justification therapies
fail before the all destroying self consciousness which is no longer
capable of illusions and unsparingly exposes even the last great

attempt of this kind, psychoanalysis, as it has all earlier ones
because it seeks to give at one and the same time comforting con-
tents which no longer delude and psychological truth which does
not comfort. Therefore not only must every effective therapy
be purely subjective, because of the difference of individualities
and the corresponding neurotic types, it must also be relative
because we all represent this neurotic type of intensified self con-
sciousness whose destruction of reality, of truth, of illusion and
of itself, we are only now experiencing in its full strength. We
find ourselves in a transition period inwhich we still seek mightily
for new illusions without being able to utilize them therapeu-
tically just as we struggle violently for truth about ourselves
which makes us ever more unhappy. Psychoanalysis, as I have
said, gives both. This was its strength and becomes more and
more its weakness, the more it is dragged into this irresistible
knowledge process of hyperconsciousness.
This process has now reached a point in the sphere of con-
sciousness which the neurotic type shows equally clearly l Pa rallel
with the denial of feeling, as we have just described it, there goes
also the denial of consciousness and indeed to the degree that the
aw areness of inner trut h approaches so mething w e do not want
tosee_be£ause it isjjainluland Tfcstructive.yrhe stronger denial
tendency of the neurotic therefore is also 'a defense mechanism
against this domination by self consciousness which must know
the truth without the individual's wanting it. The neurotic type
of our day, therefore, must rather learn not to see the inner truth
about himself, not to have to sec it, as his self consciousness rep-
resents only a manifestation of the negative will. When he can
again will positively and translate this into action or creative
achievement, then his self consciousness does not need to torment
46
TRUTH AND REALITY
itself with the question why it cannot will or to create his thinking
Here also a positive basis of his will
in justification of this will.
to truth becomes apparent. Truth is to free from doubt, from
the insecurity of our whole system of thought which is built up
on interpretative negativism, as represented in the endless ra-
tionalizations of our will and consciousness motives. Here again
truth as inner emotional experience opposes the uncertainty of
reality and the thought processes corresponding to it. In the
inner awareness of our true feelings the neurotic self conscious-
ness manifests itself in its most tormenting form, in the ob-
jectified content of truth we have found the last greatest com-
fort of illusion, of which the self conscious type of our age is still
capable. Its positive affirmation corresponds to a pleasurable

act of will ; its subjective perception which is related to the emo-
tional life, is painful, sorrowful; its constructive transformation
into a general truth, although actually representing an illusion,
is creative.
47
V
SELF AND IDEAL
"This above all: to thine own self be true."
—Shakespeare
We return now to the presentation of the inner will conflict,

particularly as it is manifested in its effect on the ethical ideal
formation^n the analytic situation we see and feel the will of
the patient as "resistance" to our will, just as the child breaks
his willon the will of the parents and at the same time strengthens
it^But the anah'sis of the adult gives us this advantage, tliat we
can throw this resistance back upon the individual himself, pro-
vided we work constructively that is, we can show the patient
;
that he"acTuaIIy~suIfersfrom a purely inner conflict between will

and consciousness, but analysis enables him to project it as an
outward one. Now the form and manner in which this inner con-
flict appears and what effects it produces within and without,
constitute the actual subject matter of the will psychology,

which is to be independent of moral, pedagogic and social view-
points. The latter we must examine in their turn in judging those
situations where we are concerned with the collision of one will
with another or with the will of the group. Just now we have to
do rather with individual consciousness and particularly with
that aspect of it which expresses itself positively and construc-
tively as ideal formation.
As we are interested here only in the positive, constructive,
creative side of the conflict, and indeed only with a specific form
of it, it is necessary to remind ourselves that we must ascribe
even to the positive will a negative origin with whose genesis we

have busied ourselves elsewhere. Long since, especially in the first
part of "Genetische Psychologic," I have pointed out the sig-
nificance of the mechanism of denial for all thinking and acting.

In this denial there is evidenced as I would like to emphasize now,
48
SELF AND IDEAIi
the original negative nature of will power, which, as Goethe puts
it "always intends the bad and constantly creates the
good." At
all events we see man but especially in the
in various situations,
so-called neurotic reactions, think if he were ruled by
and act as
two wills which struggle against each other, as formerly the own
will struggled against an external, opposing will. These two
factors which lie at the root of all duaHstic world views, from the
Persian Zarathustrianism to the system of Schopenhauer, were
described by Freud in the beginning as the conscious and the un-
conscious, later with a deepened meaning, as the ego and the id.
Accordingly unconsciousness was at first identified with sexual-
ity, consciousness with the ego while Freud later desexualized
;
the id somewhat or rather made it more cosmic, on the other hand

he ascribed to the ego unconscious elements also. This connect-
ing of new terminology with old contents is more confusing than
clarifying, especially as the ego plays a relatively slight role
with Freud despite its unconscious elements because it is ruled
by the two great powers, the id and the super-ego, which repre-
sents the moral code. I have no occasion to go back to this ter-
minology here, because I would like to describe the phenomena
just as they present themselves to me, except to make clear
where and in how far my conception differs from the former one.
I see and understand the two opposing powers in the individual
as the same forces that are experienced as a conflict of wills in

the clash of two individuals, namely, will forces. The one force
is that which we experience in impact with the outside world,
namely, our conscious will. But what is the other inner force
against which it strives, or rather, which strives against it, for
this seems to me to be the real situation. One might say that this
is sexuality, as Freud originally assumed, provided one under-
stands not only in a broader but in the broadest sense of the
it
word. Accordingly we say in biological terms the generic in con-

trast to the individual in which case the question remains open
as to whether or not one should include the collective racial which
in Jung's meaning is a social-ethical concept. At all events we
need no external sexual prohibition, no castration trauma, as
our daily experience with children shows, to explain the struggle
of the individual ego, the conscious will, against sexuality,
against generic compulsion. The parents or others in authority
49
TRL'TH AND REALITY
represent to the child powerful wills but one can
oppose
may
perhaps
them openly or secretly, one can finally overcome them,
how-
can even free oneself from them or escape them.(Sexuality,
ever, as it awakens in the indi\-idual about
the time of puberty is
an incomparablv stronger power than aU the external authori-

ties put toeetheV. Were it not so, the world would have died out
long since.
attraction, is
This generic sexual compulsion which, as sexual
the root of the Freudian CEdipus complex,
when it is actually
boundaries
completely aroused, naturally goes beyond parental
strong and
because generally it goes beyond all bounds. It is so
de-
dominates the indi^-idual so extremely that soon he begins to
is a domina-
fend himself against its domination, just because it
tion, something that interferes dictatorially
with his own will as
individual, appearing as a new, alien and more powerful counter-
will just as the ego is strengthened by puberty. The reason the
individual defends himself so strongly against it is

because the
biological sex drive would force him again under
the rule of a
will, of the sexual wiU of the "other,"

while the ego
strange
freely out
has only just begun at this time to breathe a little
Accord-
from under the pressure of strange authoritative wills.
satisfaction of
ingly he flees of necessity to a mechanism for the
urgent sexuality that enables him to maintain the newly
won
at least a little while without subjecting himself to
an
autonomy
of
ahen sexual will. I speak of the tvpical masturbation conflict
this and also of later years which represents
nothing but the
will
powerful expression of the conflict between the indi\-idual
and generic will manifesting itself here as sex drive. This struggle
alwavs ends with the %-ictory of the indi\-idual. Although he must
since
often pay too dearly for it, nevertheless an ego victory it is,
successful at-
the very appearance of masturbation registers a
tempt to put the sexual instinct under the control of the indi-
vidual wUl.
These individuals even when they present themselves as weak
willed, falling into \-ice without resistance, are at
bottom people
their
of unusually strong wills who have merely concentrated
wills for the moment in the one direction.
They often succeed
in becoming master of the sexual urge to
such an extent that
they can suppress it through conscious effort of will,
and can
50
SELF AND IDEAL
also arouse and satisfy it that is, when the individual wills it
;
and not when sexuality wills it. Only, as Adler believes, they must
continue to prove this will power of theirs and that gives the
appearance of not being able to get free of the sex drive. This
appearance is correct too, insofar as it is based on a denial of
will power which we could here bring into the universal formula :
I do not want to will at all, but I must. In contrast to Adler,

however, I do not believe that the individual must continuously
prove his own strength of will because he feels inferior, and
therefore is really weak. I believe much more that he could never
prove his strength if he were not actually strong, if he did not
have just that powerful a will. /here again the problem is why
the individual cannot accept his own will, cannot admit it or
affirm it, but is compelled to reject and deny it, in other words,
to replace it wit h a "must?! But just this denial tendency brings
witMFseconHarilytheguilt and inferiority feeling which really
says, "I ought not to have such a strong will, or in general any
will at all." In this sense, the powerful compulsion of the bio-
logical sexual urge is raised to a representative of the will, whose
individual freedom is then justified by the generic compulsion.
Herein the psychological motive for the tie-up of the con-
lies
scious individual will with the generic sex drive, as significant as

it is fateful, also the origin of the sexual guilt feeling since the
guilt for willing falls into the sexual sphere by displacement and
at the same time is denied and justified.
The explanations that psychoanalysis and also the Adlerian
doctrine give for these phenomena of guilt and inferiority seem
to me unsatisfactory because they do not meet the real problem
at all, the denial of will from which secondarily follow
that is,
guilt and inferiority. The explanation given formerly is that

the will of the child has been so broken by the authority of
parents, that it can no longer trust itself to will, in a word, ex-
periences anxiety which was added to it from the outside. Not
only does every educational experiment contradict this, but also
experiences in the psychology of the neuroses and creative per-
sonalities testify that the factis other and deeper. Our conflicts
in general go back to much deeper causes than external social

restrictions even if we conceive them psychologically with Freud
as internal super-ego formation or with Adler as inner inferi-
51
TRUTH AND REALITY
inferior status of the
ority feeUng, springing from the externally
child. Probably in the beginning we
were bound to our milieu,
just so to a great
which, however, we are able to outgrow, and
extent we have remained bound by nature in
our sexual life. But
perhaps un-
what characterizes man or is made to by himself,
will increases to
fortunately, is just the fact that his conscious
influences and the
a power equal to the outer environmental
inner instinctual claims, and this we must take
into account m
order to understand the individual in all his
reactions. Our will
is not only able to suppress the

sex urge, but is just as able to
arouse it through conscious effort, to increase it
and to satisfy
it. Perhaps our will is able to
do this because it, itself, is a de-
will-to-live become
scendant, a representative of the biological
conscious, creating itself in self maintenance
and reproduction,
supra-individual
which in the last analysis is nothing more than
maintenance.! ^yhg^ ^his tendency to perpetual self mainte-
self
there results
nance of the species carries over to the individual,
with them guilt re-
the powerful will whose manifestations bring
the individual,
actions because they strive for an enrichment of
biologically at the cost of the species, ethically
at tlie expense
of the fellow man.

This brings us to the fundamental thought of my
whole view-
in "Der Kiinst-
point which I have already expressed in principle
ler," namely, that instinct and
inhibition, will and counter-
dualism, but in the last
will do not correspond to any original
limitation of one's
analysis always represent a kind of inner self
therefore, since everything has its roots withm,
own power and,
conception
the outer reflects more than it creates the inner. This
relates in par-
as was emphasized likewise in "Der Kunstler,"
arise not through
ticular to all kinds of sexual conflicts which
of
any kind of outer prohibition but through inner inhibition
the own wiU by the counter-will. It explains also the resistance
necessarily must meet
which Freud's'sexual theory has met and
conflict, the understanding
since it is an expression of the same
discussions which psycho-
of which leads us out of all the futile
has occasioned. Freud said: "Sexuality is the strong-
analysis
beginning of the first chapter in
1See on this point and the following, the
development of the md.v.dual
"Der KUnstler^'-as well as the material on the Page 14,.
Psychologic, Part II,
in the introductory chapter of "Genetische
52
SELF AND IDEAL
est" ; the answer was
—
"No, the will can control it to a great
degree." both sides were right. But each emphasized only
And
one side, instead of recognizing the relationship between them
and understanding the conflict in its essential meaning. Freud
has gradually yielded and in his castration and super-ego theory
recognizes the power of the factors which inhibit sexuality. But
they are for him external anxiety factors and remain so even
later,when he internalizes them in the super-ego, although they
estabhsh themselves as the court of morals which evokes the un-
controllable guilt reactions. But guilt feeling is something other
than internahzed anxiety, as it is more than fear of itself, of
the claim of instinct, just as the ethical judgments are something
more than introjected parental authority.
In order to understand what they are and how they arise, we
turn back to the struggle of ego will against race will represented
in sexuality, which actually represents a struggle of the child
against any pressure that continues within him. In the so-called
latency period as Freud has it (between early childhood and
puberty) the ego of the individual, his own will, is strengthened
and has turned, for the most part in revolutionary reactions,
against the parents and other authorities that it has not chosen
itself. In the struggle against sexuality which breaks in at that
point, the ego, as it were, calls to its aid the earlier contested
parental inhibitions and takes them as allies against the more
powerful sex drive. This introduction of the will motive makes the
mysterious process of the introjection of parental authority
comprehensible psychologically for the first time. Hitherto it
had to be forced upon the child from the outside and this force
must obviously be maintained because the child opposes the ac-
ceptance with his will, his counter-will. Moreover the child has
no occasion to make of these actual outer restrictions an inner
censor, and even if it had reasons, its counter-will would resist
the acceptance of force. The child obeys because it wins love,
avoids punishment and lessens its own inner control. But it does
not do these things of its own free will; on the contrary, pro-
hibition strengthens the impulse, as we know, just as permission
lessens the desire. In puberty, however, where the individual is
awakened on the one side to autonomy of willjindjjnjhe other

defends himself against the pressure of the facial sexurge)he has
"^
53
TRUTH AND REALITY
a strong motive for making his own these early parental
will
prohibitions and all that he has learned to know meantime in
moralistic inhibitions, in order to use them in his encounter
with
sexuahty. Here the individual forms his own super-ego because

he needs' these moral norms for his own will victory over the sex
impulse. Again it is a victory which many a time is
bought at
too dear a price and must be paid for by a life long dependency
on this moral code.
The constructive formation and creative development from
what Freud calls super-ego to what I call ideal-formation
from
the self is a highly complex process which is
accomplished in
pressure. It
the typical forms of the will conflict and under its
earlier made
consists first in the fact that the individual who
necessity, now
his own only externally, hmitations accepted of
affirms them in the service of his own will interests. This affirma-
tion of a condition already estabhshed earher under
pressure, is
a very important factor psychologically, yes, is the essential

psychological factor ; for the fate of the individual depends on
the attitude he takes to the given factors, whether these
happen
to be a part of environment, or the sexual
constitution itself.
This "I will, because I must," is, as is easily seen, the positive
opposite of the denying attitude which we formulated in the
!" The whole
sentence, "I do not "will at all, but I obey a force
difference lies in the fact that this force as external cannot
be
borne and causes the will to react negatively as denial. But if

this outer force becomes inner, then there arise two possibilities,
the one of which leads to neurotic reactions, the other to ethical
standards. If the force although inner is still perceived as force,
the will conflict manifests itself, as already pointed out, in guilt
feeling, which, as it were, represents an inner ethical compulsion
resisting the individual's will just like an alien counter-will. But
if the own will says "Yes" to this force, this
internal "must," then
the inner force becomes inner freedom in that will and counter-
will both affirm the same willing.
The process just described goes beyond the mere affirmation
of force, either outer or inner, to its constructive evaluation,
that is, positively as ethics in ideal-formation and not merely
normatively and regulatively. Therefore the individual only
takes over the overcome moral code for a protection, as it were,
54
SELF AND IDEAL
under the first violence of the sexual impulse. Soon, however, the
proud will stirs again and strives to win the battle alone without
the help of authoritative morality. Here then begins the ethical
ideal-formation in the self although the individual may turn to
external models, ideal figures from hfe or history. But these
ideals he chooses in terms of his own individuahty which, as we
know, has nothing to do with infantile authorities, least of all
the parents.^ It does not matter whether the individual succeeds
wholly in freeing himself from the traditional moral concepts
probably he never does, especially not as long as he must live
with other individuals who more or less depend on this traditional
morality. It is important, however, that for everything creative,
regardless of how it manifests itself, even in the neurosis, we
can thank this striving of the individual, of his individual will to

free himself from the traditional moral code and to build his
own from himself, ideals which are not only norma-
ethical ideals
tive for his own personality, but also include the assurance of
creative activity of any kind and the possibility of happiness.
For whole process of inner ideal formation which begins with
this
the setting up of one'sown moral norms inside is a mighty and
important attempt to transform compulsion into freedom. The
broader fate of the individual depends essentially on the suc-
cess with which this attempt is undertaken, how it is carried
through and conducted further, also how far it goes in a par-
ticular case and where and how it ends.
Certainly it is no planned and straightforward way, but a
continuous struggle against outer forces and a constant conflict
with inner ones, in which the individual must live through for
himself all stages of his evolution. That cannot be avoided and
should not be, for just this living through and fighting through
constitute the valuable, the constructive, the creative which does
not inhibit the will but strengthens and develops it. /The first step
in the Jrs eing p rocess is that the individual now wills what he
was earlier conêlled to, what externally or internally he was
forced to do, and the normal, average man perhaps never gets
beyond this level which guarantees a relatively harmonious work-
ing together of will and counter-will.\t corresponds to a willed
1Certainly not with the parents of the hettj; the man of strong will, as I
explained in the "Myth of the Birth of the Hero."
55
TRUTH AND REALITY
acceptance of the external compulsion of authority, the moral
code and the inner compulsion of the sexual instinct. Accord-
ingly it permits fewer possibilities of conflict but also fewer crea-
tive possibilities of any kind. The human being to a large ex-
tent is one with himself and with the surrounding world and feels
himself to be a part of it. He has the consciousness of indi-
viduality but at the same time also the feeling of likeness, of
unity, which makes the relation to the outer world pleasant.
The next is characterized by the feeling of division in
stage
the personality, through the disunity of will and counter-wiU,
which means a struggle (moral) against the compulsion of the
outer world as well as an inner conflict between the two wills.
The constructive person goes beyond the mere moralistic and
instinctual affirmation of the obligatory in his own ideal forma-
tion which itself having become a new ôaPseeking\£ower can
work thereafter constructively or inhibitingly. On this level there
are possibilities of neurotic or creative development not present
on the first level. And again it depends on what position the will
takes toward the moral and ethical standards originally called
in by it or self created, after they have once been called into life,
or have even achieved power. So the will is always compelled to

take attitudes anew ; first to the given, then to the self created,
and finally even to the willed. And this taking an attitude can
always turn out to be negative or positive, negative even when
it concerns something originally self willed or self created. This
negative attitude in turn can always have one of two results;

either it leads to improvement, to a higher level, to a new crea-
tivity as with the productive, or it creates itself in self criticism,
guilt and inferiority feeling, in short, under the neurotic inhibi-
tion of will. ^
The and highest level of development is characterized by
third
a unified working together of the three fulW developed powers,
the will, the counter-will and the ideaJ-foxmatlon born from the
conflict between them which itself has becomeagoal-setting,
goal-seeking, fo rce. "Here the human bcing,c^Ti?gen^>, is again
^tÔJie-'withshini&elf ; what he does, he does fuTly and completely
in harrn ony with all hisôwers'«TTrl-4Tf!r't (ffftls^ He knows no hesi-
tation, and no doubt as does the conflicted man of the second
level, even though the latter be productive. He is a man of will
36
SELF AND IDEAL
and deed in accord with himself, although as distinguished from
the type of realistic man he is not in accord with the world,
because too different from others. I do not mean that the con-
flicts of this t.ype would be more of an external nature,
played
out more in the battle with the hostile environment I merely wish
;
to emphasize here the creative side of their being, which just

through its unlikeness to reality gives to genius its peculiar
greatness. This type in its ideal formation, in its continuous re-
building or building anew, has created an autonomous inner

world so different and so much its own, that it no longer repre-
sents merely a substitute for external reality (original morality)
but is something for which reality can offer in every case only a
must seek satisfaction and
feeble substitute so that the individual
release in the creation and projection of a world of his own. In a
word, with this type, from all the accepted, the obligatory, from
all the wished for, and the willed, from all the aspirations and
the commandments is formed neither a compromise, nor merely
a summation but a newly created whole, the strong personaUty
with its autonomous will, which represents the highest creation
of the integration of will and spirit.
The first level corresponds to the type of duty-conscious, the
second to the type of guilt-conscious and the third level finally
to the type of self-conscious individual. We see at once that in
these three types, which represent a line of development, the re-
lation to reality and to the fellow man is different. The first level
is oriented to the external world, corresponds to the adaptation
of the ego to it ; in this the individual takes over the social and
sexual ideals of the majority for his own, and this is not only a
passive identification but an effort of will which certainly ends in
a submission of will. On the third ethical level there are no longer
the external demands or norms, but the own inner ideals, which
were not only created by the individual out of himself but which
the self also willingly affirms as its own commandments. The sec-
ond neurotic level represents the failure in going from the first to
the third stage the individual perceives the external commands
;
and norms as compulsion which he must continually oppose, but

cannot affirm the ideals which correspond to his own self. There-
fore he has guilt feeling toward society (or the various repre-
sentatives of it) and consciousness of guilt toward himself.
57
TRUTH AND REALITY
In other words, the first type accepts reality with its demands
and so adjusts his own individuality that he perceives and can
accept himself as part of reality. He removes the painful feeling
of difference since he feels himself one with reality. The third
type, on the contrary, accepts himself and his inner ideal forma-
tion and seeks accordingly to adjust the environment and the
fellow man to himself. This can take place violently as with
thoughtless men of action or by way of a reformative ideologj',
whether it be educational or therapeutic, in the scientific or
religious sense of the word. It can, however, also be creative and
reaches then its highest level jjêûthe individual cre aj
or hi mself
tt—B:ajiti»g_
on othersj Certainly this peculiarly creative type also strives
for recognition but it cannot, as with the therapeutic reforma-
tive personality, be through force or violence, but rather must

be the expression of a spontaneous movement of the individual
who finds in the creator something related to himself. This crea-
tive tj'pe finds recognition in himself as he also finds in himself
motivation and its approbation
The adapted type, therefore, needs the external com-
first
pulsion, the second neurotic type defends itself against every

kind of external or internal compulsion, the t hir d creative type
^],^^j2^r:^n"^'' ^"mpvl;inn_jji'"""r^ frfpHnrn Thp firsf type is^3e^
pendent on reality, the seconHêfends itself against the compul-
sion of reality, the third cre ates for itself against the co m-
pul*ieft-ft-i;£ality of its own which makes it independent, but at
the same time ena bles it to li v e in reali tjg-«4th«uLfalling_Jnto
conHict with itJJ.T\e second neurotic type is the most interesting
psychologically, because it shows that the whole problem at
bottom turns on the acceptance of the own individuality on which

the attitude toward reality primarily depends. For the neurotic
shatters not only on the incapacity to bear external pressure,
but he suffers just as much, yes, even more, from the inability
to subject himself to any pressure whether it be inside or out,
even the pressure of his own ideal formation. The essential thera-
peutic problem is not, therefore, to adjust him to reality, to teach
him to bear external pressure, but to adjust him to himself,
that is, to enable him to bear and to accept himself instead of
58
SELF AND IDEAL,
constantly defending himself against himself. If one attains this
therapeutic goal, that the individual accepts himself, that is
psychologically speaking, that he affirms instead of denies his
will, there follows thereupon spontaneously without further
effort the necessary adaptation to reality. This, however, can-

not form an equally valid scheme for all men, regardless of
whether one defines it with the concept of the CEdipus complex
like Freud, or again as social feeling like Adler, or as a collec-
tive union like Jung. Adaptation ensues with each individual in
a different, even in an individual way, from the three possibilities
we have described as types. Psychologically speaking, adapta-
tion on the basis of self acceptance may be an acceptance of
external norms which finally represents a justification of will,
but at least a generally recognized one, or the self acceptance en-
ables the individual to continue his development on the basis of
his own ideal formation and its essential difference. In each case,
however, the neurotic self denial as it follows from the denial of
will must first be overcome constructively in a therapeutic ex-
perience.
How this happens I am describing simultaneously in another
book.' Here I would only like to point out how, as a matter of
fact, the various reactions of the individual only correspond to
various attitudes to the same fundamental problem. The average
man adapted to reality finds the justification of his individual will
in the similarly adjusted wills of the majority, but accepts
therewith also the universal attempts at justification and un-
burdening, as society itself apparently uses them in its moral
norms and religious projections. The neurotic who in conse-
quence of his stronger individualization feels himself so very

different from others, can accept neither the general norms nor
the justifications, but neither can he accept his own because they
would be an expression of his own will, which he would therewith
have to accept. The creative type, on the other hand, accepts as
we have said, himself and his ideal, that is, his own individual
will, at all events in higher degree than any other type. Certainly
he also needs all kinds of external justifications but these work
destructively only in the field of intellectual production, like
philosophy and science, where they lead to theoretical denial of

1 See "Will Therapy," Books I and IL Alfred A. Knopf, 1936.
59
TRUTH AND EEALITY
will and justifications which appear under the guise of truth.
This leads us back from the problem of will to the problem of
consciousness and conscious knowledge. Where ideal formation
works constructively and creatively, it is on the basis of ac-
ceptance of the self, of the individual will, which is justified in
its own ideal, that is ethically, not morally in terms of the
average ideal as with the adapted type. In other words, in its
own ideal the originally denied will of the individual manifests
itself as ethically justified. The neurotic suffers not only from
the fact that he cannot accomplish this, but also from insight
regarding it which, according to the degree of insight, manifests
itself as consciousness of guilt or inferiority feehng. He rejects
the self because in him the self is expressed on the whole negatively
as counter-will and accordingly cannot justify itself ethically,
that is, cannot reform and revalue itself in terms of an ideal
formation. Accordingly he strives only this far, to be himself
(as so many neurotics express it) instead of striving to live in
accordance with his own ideal. Therefore while the ideal of the
average is to be as the others are, the ideal of the neurotic is to
be himself, that is, what he himself is and not as others want
him to be.iThe ideal of the creative personality finally is an actual
ideal, which leads him to become that which he himself would
like to be.j
In the sphere of consciousness we see these various levels of
development toward ideal formation comprehended in three
formulae which correspond to three difTerent ages, world views
and human types. The first is the Apollonian, know thyself; the
second the Dionysian, be thyself; the third the Critique of Rea-
son, "determine thyself from thyself" (Kant). The first rests
on likeness to others and leads in the sense of the Greek mentality
to the acceptance of the universal ideal ; it contains implicitly
the morality, consciously worked out by Socrates, which still
lies at the basis of psychoanalytic therapy: know thyself, in

order to improve thyself (in the terms of universal norms). It
is therefore not knowledge for the sake of the self, but knowl-
edge for the goal of adaptation. The second principle in con-

trast to the first repudiates likeness and the improvement based
on it, as it demands the acceptance of what one is anyway. In
contrast to the principle of the Delphic ApoUo, I have desig-
60
SELF AND IDEAL
nated it as Dionysian because, in contrast to adaptation, it leads
to ecstatic-orgiastic destruction, as not only Greek mythology

but also Ibsen shows in Peer Gynt, who on the basis of the same
principle landed in a house. The true self, if it is unchained
mad
in Dionysian fashion, not only anti-social, but also unethical
is
and therefore the human being goes to pieces on it. In this sense
the longing of the neurotic to be himself is a form of the affirma-
tion of his neurosis, perhaps the only form in which he can
affirm himself.He is, as it were, already himself, at any rate
far more than the others and has only a step to take in order
to become wholly himself, that is, insane. Here comes in the
Kantian "Determine thyself from thyself" in the sense of a true
self knowledge and simultaneously an actual self creation as the
first constructive placing of the problem. Herein lies Kant's
historical significance as epistemologist and ethicist. He is in-
debted to us for the psychology but also a part of his greatness

hes therein, for the avoidance of psychologizing has protected
him from and inter-
falling into all the denials, rationalizations
pretations which form the contents of most psychological
theories including the Freudian.
An epistemological psychology without flaw, that is, neither
moral nor religious as the Freudian system still is, must start
at the point where Kant placed the problem. How can the indi-
vidual determine himself from himself, or better, why does he
do this with such difficulty.^ Here we strike the will-guilt prob-
lem, the knowledge of which remains the indisputable psycho-
logical contribution of Schopenhauer. But he has denied the will,
while Nietzsche sought to deny the guilt feeling. Freud, finally
has seen the guilt problem, as the neurotic presented it to him
it is true, but he has tried to solve it by leading it back to a
definite content of willing, namely the sexual, while the other

analytic schools (Jung, Adler, etc.) differentiate themselves in
this, that they have put another content in place of the sexual,
and so have hidden the purely psychological will problem itself.
The Freudian content disguises itself under the occidental re-
ligious morality from which we stillsuffer and in its failure to
solve his individual problem, the modern man has finally shat-
tered in terms of the neurosis.
VI
CREATION AND GUILT
"Fate sends individuality back to its lim-
itations and destroys it if it transcends
them." —Hegel
We have traced the evolution of the will conflict in the indi-

vidual from the negative externalization of will, which leads to
denial and guilt consciousness to the positive creative power of
will, which not only affirms the obligatory instead of denying it,
but leads beyond it to a constructive "ought." This "ought" as

we have pictured it in the ideal formation of the individual,
if the will is able to affirm itself and its own activity on this
ethical level, can finally lead to creativity that alters, reforms
and builds anew the outer and inner environment as the individual
From the purely psychological act of wilUng, we have
wills it.
arrived at the moralistic problem of content, that is, what the
individual does will or ought to will. The will projection itself, as
reaction to an outer or inner counter-will, is independent of the
content of the willed. It is related to the "musts" and the "won'ts"
as such and accordingly, can have to do even with something
that the individual himself has wanted, but does not any more
when it is forced on him by a strange will or merely offered, that
is,permitted. Apparently it is generally the content itself, a defi-

nite content, which the originally denying force of will trans-
forms into a positive, constructive, and finally a creative one
with which not only the content of willing in the sense of the
own ethical ideal is justified, but also the individual will as such.
Whence comes the content of willing and what does it contain?
Just as willing itself arises as an inner, primarily negative op-
posing force against a compulsion, so the content of willing arises
primarily from rejection we want what we cannot have, that
;
which is denied us. If this first level of willing is determined more

negatively from without, so the next level is equally influenced
62
CREATION AND GUILT
from without, but which already contains a
in terms of desire
definite willing. We want at that level what
others have or want,
and this manifests itself as envy or competition in terms of the
desire for possessions. But a truly positive willing is arrived at
only when we have made this willing our own, that is, have given
^ and no longer measure our individual willing
up comparisons
by external obstacles or models, but by our own ethical ideal
formation. In other words, the will becomes positive, constructive
in the ethical justification of the ideal formation and eventually
creative from the purely inner will conflict which ensues between
the content of our wilUng and the self ideal of the "ought." If
even in this stage the wiU remains too dependent on outer like-
ness and justifications in relation to other individuals, there
result the feelings of inferiority or guilt which we have com-
prehended as the neurotic opposite for creative aflBrmation of
will on the ethical level. Before we can understand this in its own
terms as the proper subject of this chapter we must first review
again the neurotic development.
We must remember that the deeply rooted psychological turn-
ing from the affirmation of willing to the denial of the will is
closely tied up with the problem of content. All external re-
strictions and refusals meet the individual in childhood (and also
later in life) not as a universal prohibition against willing in
general, but as prohibition against willing some definite thing at
a certain moment, and are therefore determined in terms of con-
tent and eventually also in terms of time. The individual himself,
on the contrary, very early connects these particular prohibi-
tions with willing as such. Here it seems to me, as we have noted
before, the roots of the most important diiTerence and the
lie
deepest misunderstanding between the grown-up and the child.

In this sense one could say that the child is more ethical than the
grown-up average man who is able to think in moralistic con-
cepts only, that terms of content, while for the more im-
is, in
pulsive child every restriction, refusal, or prohibition affects the
whole of willing, the will as such, and on that account, as we see,
is taken so tragically. Briefly put, the momentary content has
only symbolic meaning originally, but gradually because of the

individual's tendencies to justification, takes on an ever more
1 See "Will Therapy," Book I, chap. v.
63
TRUTH AND REALITY
"real" meaning, while the universal impulse life, which is always
the essential, is mademore abstract. Thus the child deceives
ever
the adults about willing itself in terras of their own ideology by
means of a "good" acceptable content. And equally in the same
way, or much more, the adult deceives himself later about the
evil of willing itself by means of a content approved by his own
ideal or by that of his fellow men. As long as we must justify
the evil of willing in terms of its content, so long we feel ourselves
morally answerable to others and are accordingly dependent on
their praise and blame all the more, the more we are slaves to this
deception and self-deception. In the degree, however, that we be-
come conscious of the will itself in its original form of counter-
will, as the source of our conflicts with the external world and
ourselves, to the same degree do we feel the responsibility with
which our own ethical consciousness has to say "Yes" or "No" to
our individual willing. And only in this sense can we understand
what we now wish to handle as creation but also only in this
ethical sense can we comprehend the guilt indissolubly bound up
with it not as guilt feehng toward others (in the moralistic sense),
also not as consciousness of guilt toward itself (in the neurotic
sense), but as guilt in itself, in the ethical sense.
Since we conceive of the creative urge as the expression of will
by which willing itself is justified ethically and its content
morally, that is, through others, the genesis of the guilt inherent
in the creative is to be understood in the following way. The indi-
vidual seeks to justify his willing in the manner described above,
through its "good" content, hence the will branded as bad
through the moralistic critique of the content attaches itself to
the bad, illicit contents, which are identified from then on with
the forbidden will itself. This expresses itself in the child in so-
called "being bad," in the adult in the phantasies or day dreams

which according to Freud form not only the preliminary step to
the neurotic symptoms, but also to creative activity, with both,
only insofar and because thej' represent the aforesaid acts of will
which embrace various and, for the most part, forbidden con-
tents. Whether they manifest themselves neurotically or cre-
atively does not depend on content which can be the same in both
cases, and is also not to be explained in the Freudian sense by
repression, no, not even by the quality and degree of the repres-
64
CREATION AND GUILT
sion, but seems to only by the relation of the will
me determined
to the content of willing. In other words, if the good contents of
willing are shown and expressed because they imply a moral

recognition of will, but the bad are hidden and kept secret be-
cause they contain moral condemnation of willing, then their
final fate and that of the individual depends on the relation to
the will itself, independent of all contents. If the will itself, as
pointed out before, is identified with the evil contents and remains
so, then these phantasies with the forbidden will content remain
secret, that is, the will itself remains evil, condemned, forbidden,
in a word, negative counter-will which leads then to repression,
denial and rationalization. On the contrary, if the will itself is
originally very strong in the individual (as counter-will) then
the good contents are not sufficient for the justification of the
badness of the will and the individual affirms the forbidden con-
tents also, that is, the bad will itself which they represent. The
phantasies are then released from the sphere of mental will ex-
pression into the sphere of action, that is, they are no longer
kept secret as forbidden, but are transformed into deed as will
expression which in this sense is creative. It is not only affirma-
tion of the content stigmatized as evil, but of the individual will
which it represents.
The morally proscribed contents themselves are associated
originally with the bodily functions. The child must learn to eat
and to control the excretory functions, when the adults wish,
not when he wishes. His counter-will in relation to this is com-
monly designated as "bad" and "hateful," but this means re-
stricted and eventually punished. Very soon also the physical
expressions of sexuality are drawn in and then become the most
important contents of wilhng, perhaps just because these expres-
sions are so violently put under and forbidden. With regard to
the overwhelming part that the psychic plays in our love life,
which we will discuss later, the moral prohibition of the physical
expression of sex in childhood, has perhaps the biologically val-
uable effect of strengthening the physical side in its later reac-
tion so that it can stand against the psychic in general. Possibly
we have here the ground for that separation of sensuality and
tenderness which Freud has described as characteristic of the
neurotic, but which I would characterize rather as the attitude
65
TRUTH AND REALITY
of the average, at all events, as more wholesome than the indis-
soluble union of sensuality with the spiritual which seeks in love
the individual justification of sexuality. Again we see here the
separation of will from content lying at the root of these phe-
nomena. The tender expressions of love toward certain persons
are permitted to the child, are good ; the purely physical element
of the will is evil, bad.
We said before that the child with the evil forbidden content
turns to wish, to phantasy. It seems wholly in accord with my
conception that the phantasies of men (of the child as of the
adult) relate not so much to the satisfaction of actually forbid-
den bad contents as to the carrying through of will in itself. To
speak bromidically, they are overwhelmingly egoistic even when
their content is on a sexual them^They show the ego of the indi-
vidual putting through his own will successfully, victoriously
against all obstacles^ The development into the productive, the
creative, representrbnly a step further in this direction, namely
the lifting out of these expressions of will, from the sphere of
thought to action. The phantasies are objectified in work, and
thus the forbidden content is accomplished somehow, but in the
last analysis it is the will expression afforded by creativity, the
putting out, the affirmation, that constitutes the satisfying,
many times rewarding factor.
[Herein lies the essential difference between the average man
I who keeps the phantasies secret from others, the neurotic who
keeps them secret from himself (represses them), and the creative
1 type who affirms them for himself and reveals them to the world,
yes, is compelled to do just that^ This difference is explained by
the different attitudes of the individual to will itself on the one
side and to its contents, good or bad, on the other, and this also
creates the guilt problem in its various forms. The average man
who hides from others the content of the phantasies as an ex-
pression of evil will, has guilt feeling (toward the others) the ;
individual who hides them from himself, that is represses them,

tries todeny thereby not so much the evil contents as the evil
willthey represent, has consciousness of guilt (toward himself).
Finally the individual who maintains the phantasies and there-
with affirms his individual will so that he can transform it into
66
CREATION AND GUILT
positive action has guilt, makes himself guilty by the individual
nature of his doing. Actually guilt arises toward others to whom
he opposes himself through his individualization, but also there
is guilt toward himself which persists in the
justification of this
individual will expression. The creative type must constantly

make good his continuous will expression and will accomplish-
ment and he pays for this guilt toward others and himself with
work which he gives to the others and which justifies him to him-
self.Therefore he is productive, he accomplishes something be-
cause he has real guilt to pay for, not imaginary guilt hke the
neurotic, who only behaves as if he were guilty but whose con-
sciousness of guilt is only an expression of his will denial, not of
creative accomplishment of will which makes one truly guilty.
We notice here that creation and guilt in the ethical sphere
present the same contrast as truth and reality in the sphere of
knowledge, and that they belong together just as indissolubly.
The individually created, the work, is to be generally recog-
nized like truth,and guilt opposes itself to this inhibitingly but
also stimulatingly as inner reality, which is continuously over-
come by new and ever more lofty feats of will. Accordingly we
have to do here with guilt-laden creation and with creative guilt,
which in contrast to the more than individual guilt consciousness
of the neurotic type, has something specifically personal, indi-
vidual. What we have here is just the activity of the creative
type, not a sublimation of sex instinct, but, on the contrary, the
expression of individual will which is almost to be called anti-
sexual. For the authentic creative force proceeds always only
from the inner will conflict, as we have described it before, that
is,beyond the conflict between ego and sexuality, which the will
wages on that level, and with the weapons belonging to that level.
It may well be the biologically basic instinct that, in the last anal-
used as 1 have already shown in "Der Kiinstlcr," but it is
ysis, is
used. For it creates in the service of the will to its own downfall
and what it helps to create is essentially different from itself, in
the ideal case, far surpasses it. This is the mighty wrestling be-
tween nature and spirit, force and will, which Freud sought to
describe with the educational concept of sublimation without
recognizing the fundamental difference that lies between repro-
67
TRUTH AND REALITY
duction and production, begetting and creating, tool and master,
creature and creator.
We recognize therefore in the creative impulse not only the
highest form of the will affirmation of the individual, but also
the most mighty will conquest, that of the individual will over the
represented by sexuality.
will of the species A
similar victory of
the individual will over generic will, as I show elsewhere, is repre-
sented in the individual love claim,^ whose psychological mean-
ing lies in the fact that the individual can and will accept his
generic role only if this is possible in an individual personal way,
in the love experience. This represents, as it were, the creativity
of the average type who demands a definite individuality for him-
self and if necessary also creates it," an individuality that sanc-
tions and so justifies and saves his individual will. The creative
type on the contrary does not content himself with the creation
of an individual. Instead he creates a whole world in his own
image, and then needs the whole world to say "yes" to his crea-
tion, that is, to find it good and thus justify it.
In this sense, to create means to make the inner into outer,
spiritual truth into reality, the ego into the world. Biological
creating also represents an ego extension in the child, as the love
creation represents a confirmation of ego in the "other," but
above all the spiritual psychic creation is a creation by itself in
the work, the ego is opposed to the world and rules it thus in
terms of its will. This manifestation of the ego will in the creation
of the work is therefore not a substitute for sexuality and love,
but rather both of them are attempts to occupy the creative drive
reallv, attempts which with the creative type always result un-
satisfyinglv because they always represent forms of expression
of the individual creative urge limited by alien counter-wills and
accordingly insufficient. Moreover, creativity is not something
which happen* but once, it is the constant continuing expression
of the individual will accomplishment, by means of which the indi-
vidual seeks to overcome self-creatively the biological compulsion
of the sexual instinct and the psychological compulsion to emo-
tional surrender.
1 See the corresponding conclusions in Chapter V of "Will Therapy."

2 On
the projective creation of the love object compare "Verlicbheit und
Projektiou" in "Genctische Psychologic," Part II.
CREATION AND GUILT
This conception of the creative will as a victory of the indi-
vidual over the biological sexual instinct explains the guilt which
the development and affirmation of the creative personality
necessarily produces. It is this going beyond the limits set by na-
ture as manifested in the will accomplishment to which the ego
reacts with guilt. Only this guilt reaction makes completely in-
telligible the projection of the God idea by means of which the
individual again subjects himself to a higher power. For the
primitives who spiritualized the world, this was nature itself, for
heroic man triumphing over nature it was the creative God made
by himself, therefore his own will at once glorified, denied and
justified, and finally for the man of our western culture, it is the
really fateful powers of parental authority and love choice, to
which he wishes to submit voluntarily, that is, ethically.
This entire conflict complex we find represented on a grand
scale in the myth of the fall of man, which presents the level of
knowledge on which consciousness wants to control and rule
sexuality, that is, to use it for its own pleasure and satisfaction.
The hero Adam not punished because he exults in his Godlike
is
knowledge, but because he wants to use it to force the sex instinct

into the service of his individual will. It is not the father complex
that can give us understanding here, as little as can the con-
trasting Greek figure Prometheus. It is just the reverse. The
utilization of the sexual instinct in the service of the individual
will on the basis of knowledge of good and evil, that is, the af-
firmation of the evil willing, brings suffering and punishment.
The punishment consists in the loss of paradisical naivete, of
oneness with nature and her laws, and the recently won order
among them. Adam is punished for not wanting to become a
father and the punishment is the obligation to become one, that
is,subordination under the compulsion of the biological sexual

drive, in spite of knowledge of the moral problem which has
branded the pleasure will as evil, and the attempt to overcome
this morality through will affirmation.
The hero becomes thus the psychological representative of the
creative man whose negative opposite we see before us in the
neurotic type. The hero does not disown the parents in the sense
of the CEdipus complex, that is, because he wants to put himself
in the father's place, but because he is the earthly representative
69
TRUTH AXD REALITY
of God, that is, will. Accordingly he has no chil-
of the creative
dren (which he would have to in the role of father) but expresses
himself and his individual will in works, in heroic deeds. He knows
no gratitude (toward parents) and no guilt feeling (toward
others), but he has guilt which derives from creating. Not that
the fact that he wants to become the father or to be God gives
him guilt consciousness, but that he is God, that he occupies him-
self creatively, makes him guilty and this guilt can only be
atoned for through further performance and finally through
death. I believe moreover that the idea of hero formation, as ex-
plained in the material presented in the "Myth of the Birth of
the Hero" was strongly influenced by the discovery of the man's
share in procreation. At all events the conscious comprehension
of the male process of procreation seems to signify a revolution-
ary turning point in the history of mankind.
A whole area of will and guilt psychology as the present day
neuroticstill shows, seems to me to be grounded in the fact that
man on the one hand could feel himself as a creator who creates
human beings (Prometheus), on the other hand could control
this biological procreative act consciously and thus utilize sex-
uality for mere pleasure gain (Adam's knowledge?). Moreover,
the discovery of this connection gave the first real basis for the
social and psychological father concept, against whose recog-
nition the individual defends himself even in the myth of the hero
with the denial of the father and the emphasis on the maternal
role. Here is to be found perhaps a powerful motive for the fact
that God representing the individual ego-will took on fatherly
features at a certain period. The autonomous heroic individual
could not endure and use the biological dependence on an earthly
progenitor and ascribed it all the more readily to the already in-
stalled creator God who received in this way paternal features,
which give psychological expression to the hero's self creation.
Moreover the first intimation of the individual love problem
betravs itself here in the creation of the woman from the man
and in his own image. Here the woman is a product of the creative
man, who ascribes to himself this divine creative power and di-
vine knowledge —
like the Greek Prometheus. We recognize
therein the first faint beginnings of that magnificent process of

rivaling the Gods which we have understood psychologically as
70
CREATION AND GUILT
the gradual aclcnowledgment of the conscious individual will in
the human being. It appears in a glorious fashion in Greek cul-
ture with the heroes rebelHng against the Gods, and reaches the
peak of its development in Christianity with the humanizing of
God and the deifying of man. If man had first to manifest his
own creative will in the formation of God, but at the same time
had to justify it, so in the heroic period, at the other extreme,
he fell into the deification of himself, of his own individual will in
order finally to deify and worship in the individual love expe-
rience, the other individual who represents the creation and re-
demption of his own individual will. Christianity as the religion
of love and guilt unites all the conflicting elements of this will-
guilt problem shows us in the humanizing of God, the
in itself. It
continuation of "heaven" on earth. It is still in the form of uni-
versal brotherhood as it also led away from individualism, for it
created a mass hero of such great sweep that every man could
feel himself redeemed in and through him.
Our whole spiritual development is thus represented by the
three levels, the Jewish, the Greek and the Christian, which rep-
resent not only historical phases, but also psychological types,
ways of reacting and attitudes even of modern men. They cor-
respond to the difi'erent attempts to solve the will-guilt problem,
the real, the ideal and the spiritual. The biblical Jews were a
rough, warlike nation of herdsmen who needed and created a
strong willed, confident god of battle as an ego ideal. If one un-
derstands "Jahwe" as the personification of the hard and tena-
cious individual will of the wild herdsman constantly fighting
against enemies, then one recognizes in the Bible the first noble
attempt of a victorious people arrived at stability and pros-
perity to dethrone their old god of war and to perceive themselves
in his strong will. But after that, all that is accomplished and
attained is ascribed to a creative God who earlier had only been
a destructive one, and to whom the chosen people which feels itself
as completely heroic, voluntarily submits. Thus the warlike Jew-
ish people first sought their leader, embodied in the hero Moses,
in a strong willed God, as later they sought in him the justifica-
tion for all the horrors and conquests of war.
Also the Greeks originally had to fight hard for their existence
and the few fertile spots open to them as the Iliad shows. Their
71
TRUTH AND REALITY
reaction to final victory and prosperity was no late justification
through the creation of an individual God, but an increase in the
affirmation of individual self-feehng as we understand it in the
myths of the heroes. No longer do the gods cause and guide war
and the battles of heroes, but world happenings are influenced
by the super-human passions, the strong wills of the heroes, who
perish through their own passions, therefore of their own will.
Only much later there enters here as reaction to this creative
arrogance the hybrid, the creeping poison of consciousness of
guilt, which we see the tragic poets transfer to the heroes them-
selves instead of ascribing it to the gods. In this sense Greek
civilization actually ppresen^ the b irth of in diyidualityjn^jm-
ipan history. Man himSStftakes the place of GodTnThe form of
"THe"selPruling creative hero, a God whose first twilight appears
here in his passive role of spectator. Accordingly also we have
the excessive guilt feeling of the Greeks as it manifests itself par-
ticularly in tragedy as a reaction to the heroic phase. In the
Greek tragic poet the hero, as it were, makes himself fully re-
sponsible for himself and pays, atones, with death.
Here hes their difference from the Jewish nation, which could
keep and preserve the fruits of victory because they put the re-
sponsibihty for it back on God. The Greek who recognized and
acknowledged deed and guilt equally as an expression of his indi-
vidual will came to grief in the tragic recognition of the will
problem and self responsibility while the Jew converted the evil,
destroying, recognition "therapeutically" into the moral com-
pulsion of good and evil and made it concrete in a meaningful
will prohibition, the decalogue, which protected him from step-
ping over the boundaries set for the individual will. Christianity,
as an immediate reaction to Roman tyranny, representing pa-
ternal authority, presents in the symbolism of the rebelhous son,
the passive hero, who conquers, not by means of will assertion
but by means of will submission, conquers spiritually even though
corporeally, physically, he fails. Therewith the struggle is hfted
from the sphere of the real to the unreal, while Greek culture had
lifted it from the moral to the ethical. At the same time, in
Christianity God is brought from the unreal sphere to the real,
just as with the Greek heroes, only still further humanized, as it
were, made into a universal hero. In this sense Christianity is a
72
CREATION AND GUILT
reaction to and attempt at healing from the danger of individ-
ualism, as it had cuhninated in terms of will in the Roman auto-
cratic sj'stem of father rule. If, therefore, the creative God was
the strongest expression of the individual ego will, so the mild,
forgiving God of the Christian faith is the strongest expression
of the self depreciatory ego which presents itself in terms of the
Roman ideology as son, that is, as creature and not as creator.
Therewith at the same time, it tries to reprimand the father as
creator and lifts the mother principle to a spiritual significance
which it had not had formerly. Here the realization of the will
principle as we see it in the Roman father rule begins to oppose
the realization of the maternal love principle, which reaches its
height in the individual love claim and love creation of the
modern irreligious man.
Thus the hero formation emphasizes the divine in man, affirms,
glorifies the individual creative power of will while religion for-
mation seeks to deny it and shows man again as the creature who
humbly subjects himself to the higher racial will. In this sense
the Jews represent the religious the Greeks the heroic ; and
;
Christianity the human solution of the will-guilt problem. The

first is moraUstic, the second ethical, the third spiritual. This is
associated with the transformation of the guilt problem which

again is dependent on the level of consciousness. With the Jews,
God represents the will and the individual the guilt ; with the
Greeks the individual hero represents will and guilt; in Chris-
tianity God represents guilt and the individual subjects his will
to the God conquered and overcome by himself. In the same de-
gree that we see the will in the individual develop and then break,
we can substantiate an analogous displacement and denial in the
sphere of consciousness ; with the Jews recognition of the moral-
istic solution as the saving of the individual ; with the Greeks
recognition of the ethical problem as the fall of the individual;
in Christianity the recognition of the human problem as the
abrogation of the individual, as release from the compulsion of
the will and the torment of the conscious responsibility as cre-
ator. Accordingly Christianity puts the emotional experience
of love in the center and brings the female principle again into a
position of honor, in its symbolic meaning; the Greek puts the
creative principle first, which leads to guilt, and therewith brings
73
TRUTH AND REALITY
forward the individual artist, while the Jews represent the will
principle and therewith paternal compulsion. Accordingly,
force, freedom and love represent different reactions
(by Jews,
Greeks and Christians) to the will-guilt problem. Thus each of
these culture groups represents a certain level of
development
individual
of the will-guilt problem as it manifests itself in the
also the Jew, the conscious recognition of the paternal
;
com-
recogni-
pulsion principle of morality the Greek, the creative
;
tion of the heroic principle of freedom the Christian, the

;
recog-
nition of suffering, of the maternal love principle.

With this advance from divine projection to human justifica-
especially
tion of the individual will, the part of consciousness,
in the developing recognition of self
consciousness, is of decisive
importance. The first level, the projection of deity, presents as
transfer the will
yet no conscious creating, rather an attempt to
expression represented in the wish phantasy in a magic form
and
way, to a personified ego whose will and counter-will correspond
his conscious will
to the own will. In the active hero, who converts
the individual
into the deed, we glimpse the first recognition of
forming and reforming reality in accordance with his personal
desires, who, however, like CEdipus, is destroyed as soon as he
perceives his little human truth. Through increasing self con-
projection
sciousness, therefore, the whole mechanism of will
with
with simultaneous denial of willing, like will expression
simultaneous denial of knowledge, is dethroned, humanized, re-
moved from God to man, from heaven to earth. It continues,
however, on the earth, and in truth, in the love experience,
and
analysis only repre-
in the love relation, which again in the last
sents an attempt to put the responsibility for
our will and coun-
divinity and against
ter-will upon another, whom we make into a
whose will we revolt at the same time if it does not resemble our
own and bow to it. Here, in the love relationship, in the recrea-
tion of the other after our own image, we

again come up against
evaded in such
the real counter-will of the other which we have
the divine will
a cunning fashion in the creation of a God, for
represented our own will and at the same time justified
it.
not
Only in our occidental culture has God become creative,
merely conserving like the ancient Godheads who were
themselves
ancients. This
creatures, like their creators of that period, the
CREATIOX AND GUILT
creative God, as the occidental systems of religion have evolved
him, is not any longer mere projection but is himself a creative
expression of the individual will, not just a father who does not
create but only begets. This creative, omnipotent, omniscient
God is the first great manifestation of the individual will, at the
same time its denial and justification in the supra-individual
world will, nature. The creation of God ensues cosmically, not in
imitation of the dependence on parents which corresponds to a
much later interpretation on a certain level of family organiza-
tion. On the other hand, the primitive God who existed before
the creative one was dangerous and destroying, a manifestation
of the evil was ascribed
counter-will which, in the later systems,
to a negative deity, as we know
from Ahriman to the Christian
it
"devil." Against this original, destructive, hostile God, who is

still preserved in the creator Jahwe, were gradually called upon
for help, protective deities, who bore the maternal character, as

for example, the Egyptian and even Athena in the Homeric
world picture. The image of the creative God, as the highest de-
velopmental level of this ethical process, proceeds then from an
overcoming of the evil counter-will to its affirmation in creative
wiUing, but carries in addition the maternal conservative char-
acteristics of preserving and protecting that which he creates.
Only later and under the influence of our present and still per-
sistent family and social organization and in the service of its
maintenance does God take on strong paternal characteristics,
which correspond more to the external counter-will of the
stronger than to the individual creative will. In this father God,
who actually corresponds to a reduced, degenerate God of will,
the individual grown equally proud in the spheres of will and
consciousness, sets upon earth a strong real counter-will, which
shall again keep within bounds the individual who demands for
himself the divine power of will.
Perhaps the predominance of the father principle itself whose
culmination in the Roman state was broken by Christianity, is to
be understood psychologically just from the fact that the
"father" represents the strong willed man who dares to ascribe
to himself the divine prerogative and whose domination is ac-
cepted not only on the basis of force, but equally from the neces-
sity of placing other earthly bounds to the all powerful will of
75
TRUTH AND REALITY
the ego which isalways being put further back into the indi-
vidual. It would be the psychological opposite of our conception
of love as a humanizing of the self deifying tendency, since the
father principle in its proper and psychological manifestations
would correspond to a humanization of the negative side of will,
of the counter-will. Be that as it may, at all events, for us the
opposition of the mother and father principle as it has come to
expression recently in the contrast of Bachhofen's world view
to that of Haller ^ and in the various psychoanalytic interpre-
tations, corresponds to the opposition between natural right and
forced right, in other words between love and force, or psycho-
logically speaking, between the positive will (mother) and coun-
ter-will (father). In other words, the father represents, as I
have said before, only a symbol of the own actually inhibited
will, but not the creative power of will as it is presented in the
occidental God, creator of heaven and earth. Freud takes part

in this denying rationalizing attempt of guilt conscious human-
ity in his theory, where, as it were, the individual will hides itself
behind the father principle ; hides in a double sense, quite as in
the creation of God, for the father symbolizes the own will but
the individual hA-pocritically denies his own
which he ascribes
will
to the father in order to be able to subordinate himself to it. In

this humble subordination of the weak helpless creature to the
parental will, psychoanalysis is religious, in its actual domi-
nation of consciousness it is presumptuously heroic. That means
that the analyst must pay for his likeness to God in knowledge
and in creation (re-creation) of men, since he must represent the
individual as such, including himself, as an unfree, powerless
creature who, a pawn of his unconscious wishes and evil impulses,
has lapsed into guilt.
This is not intended to be an attempt to present a psycho-
analysis of Freud as, for example, Michaelis has recently under-
taken, but it is a psvchology of the creative man who must always
be denj-ing his godlike power of will in order to unburden himself
of the creative guilt. Again we see how the special and the indi-
vidual can only be understood on the grounds of the universal not
the reverse. Just as the father concept in the social sense only
1 Bachhof en Selbstbiographie und Antrittsrede iiber das Naturrecht. Edited
:
and introduced by Alfred Baumler, Halle 1927.

76
CREATION AND GUILT
represents the earthly personification of the own consciousness
of will, so also the CEdipus complex is only a special instance of
cosmic fate in which man wants to free himself from dependence
on natural forces,ând yet cannot deny his littleness and help-
lessness in the face of the universel But the ffidipus complex is
also a special case in another sense. For the child of our modern
social organization,probably the parents represent the first will
and this remains the in-
forces, as it were, his world, his cosmos,
contestable psychological meaning of the parent relation. Very
soon, however, the child grows beyond these family symbols of
the will conflict to the perception of his own inner will conflict
which soon goes beyond the external one in intensity and mean-
ing. For the primitive man, on the other hand, nature itself which
we now rule with our wills to a large extent, was the threatening
external will power against which he found himself helpless and
which he learned to fight and to rule with his will. Here is the
place to seek the origin of all threatening and terrifying Gods
and spirits who show their evil influence even deep within the
Greek heroic world and against which they called upon maternal
protective deities for aid. These, however, had a far more cosmic
than feminine significance, that is, they called to their aid the
conserving and preserving powers of nature against the evil de-
structive natural forces. For regardless of what one calls the
cosmic preserving principle, the biologically dependent child of
man understands it through the image of the mother while the
father as symbol of will power not only emerges much later, but
also belongs to a wholly difi"erent psychological plane, namely
the sphere of conscious will.
Accordingly the evolution of the God concept moves from the
personification of natural forces threatening the helpless and
defenseless individual to the conserving maternal principle, under
whose protection the individual first arrives at the strengthening
and unfolding of his own will. The self representation of the same
we see in the creative God, who represents the omnipotence of
conscious will much more than the domination of the father whose
biological procreative rule and whose social ascendancy lie as
far from childish thinking as from primitive. The next and
psychologically most interesting developmental level is charac-
terized by the guilt concept attached to the creative God idea,
n
TRUTH AND REALITY
which was lacking on the earlier because fear was then the
level,
driving force. The creative God corresponds to one side of the

self representation of the conscious will power of the indiN-idual,
but isat the same time an attempt at its denial and the throwing
off of responsibility, and leads accordingly to creative guilt,
which belongs to the will expression as such, manifested in the

creation of God himself. We
get here, from the understanding of
the creation of the creative God, a glimpse into the psychology of
a creator, of the occidental individual and his guilt problem en-
suing from the individual will. This understanding continues into
the further development of the modern individual and his rela-
tion to the concept, which concerns chiefly the guilt problem

God
from which we suffer, henceforth individually with a growing
conscious knowledge of this whole connection, so that no general
salvation but only the individual happiness of each separate per-
son seems the solution.
The psychic process of dissolution in which we now find our-
selves and as the extensive neurotic type represents it, concerns
not only the knowledge of the God creation as a projection and
justification of the individual will, but extends to the real repre-
sentatives of this will conflict, the moralistic parent authorities
in the social sphere and the releasing love objects in the sexual.
We see here again how progress in knowledge hinders experienc-
ing, in other words, howconsciousness inhibits will projec-
self
tion, for the creation of the creative God was not only a
manifestation and an expression of the creative individual will,
but made possible to the individual at the same time in its justifi-
cation tendency, creative action on earth. In truth it all hap-
pened in the service of religion, to the glory of God, but at least
it did happen. AU the creative powers of the individual, both of
an artistic and productive kind could unfold under the justif}'-

ing symbol of the creative God. This holds for the culture of the
middle ages through the church more than for the ancients, where
the hero was still the representative of divine will power on earth.
With the general humanizing of God, as Christianity initiated
it, the hero, the creative man, becomes as it were a universal type,
whose development culminates in the modern individualized man,
when actually each separate person is iiimself a God, a person-
ality stamped with a strong wiU. Now, instead of its leading to
78
CBEATIOX AND GUILT
heightened creative will activitv, as one might expect, we see this
strong individualistic will in the neurotic type directed as coun-
ter-will against itself and the fellow man and thus denying in
itself both itself and its own creative power.
The easy to see in the hght of what we have
basis for this is
just said. With the knowledge and the perception of the divine
power of creation as his own individual power of will, the indi-
vidual must also take over the responsibihty for it himself, and
this leads necessarily to the ethical guilt concept, which relates
to willing itself and not like the moralistic guilt feeUng, to any
particular content of will. The conscious knowledge of divine
creativity leads therefore beyond an heroic phase in which the
individual voluntarily takes upon himself and afBrms will and
responsibility, to a new erection of the rule of God on earth, as
we recognized it in the love principle on the one side and in the
father principle on the other. Both correspond to current at-
tempts to solve the will conflict in reality, after its magnificent
unreal solution in the God concept had been destroyed by the
knowing power of consciousness and the disintegrating force of
self consciousness. But this twilight of the God^ now approach-
ing its end is accompanied by a still more fatal and tragic
process, which one might designate as the disenthroning of the
individual himself, the result of which we have before us in the
neurotic type with its guilt and inferiority feehngs.
For the earthly attempts at justification of the individual will
also are shattered by the power of the counter-will only to end
kind of psychological "twilight of the ego," with a
finally in a
tormenting hopelessness of the individual thrown upon his own
resources. The basis for this, as has already been pointed out, is
that something is lacking in all real attempts at solution of this
will conflict which the unreal God creation, whose very faults
actually made solution possible, did not have. It is this, the fact
that the earthly representatives of the individual ego themselves
have an own will and a counter-will against which our own con-
stantly strike. The
father or the parental authority represents
not only a symbol of the child's own will, but also and probably —
equally early and strongly —
a strange counter-will, which dis-
turbs and restrains its own. In the love relation, which, as al-
ready noted, represents entirely individual creative activity, yes
79
TRUTH AND HEALITY
exactly the creative activity of the individual as such, he runs
against the same counter-will which wants to occupy itself crea-
tively on him. This makes the conflicts of the modern man so difS-
cult and deep because the inner will conflict cannot become re-
leased really through an external agent, but apparently is only
to be temporarily and partially unburdened in the more suitable
manner of unreal projection.
The neurotic human type of our time has therefore not only
exploded the God illusion itself, but perceives the real substitute
for it as we have recognized it in the parental authority and love
objects to be unsatisfying for solving or even lessening the inner
will conflict heightened through knowledge and intensified by
self consciousness. Knowledge, which we have understood as an
intellectual will experience in terms of spiritual truth, leads
therefore to taking the Gods from heaven and to the humanizing
of the omnipotent creative will. The tormenting self conscious-
ness which again leads to the denial of the individual will thus
affirmed, comes into the picture first when the will conflict is
thrown back from the real personifications of it as we recognized
them in the parent authorities and love objects, through the
counter-will,upon the individual himself and this leads to the
recognition of his own inner conflicts. However, this throwing
back does not ensue as we consciously strive for it in the thera-
peutic experience, in a constructive fashion so that the individual
can accept himself as conflicted, instead the actual conflict only
shows the individual that he cannot find salvation from the evil
"other" either. The therapeutic value of the analytic
will in the
situation as such lies in the fact that it affords the individual
an unreal solution of his will conflict corresponding to the crea-

tion of God from the own will, but at the same time lets him ex-
perience in the actual emotional relation to the analyst and
understand in this connection the real earthly parallel.
therapeutic experience is thus only to be understood from
The
the creative experience because it is itself a creative experience
and in truth a very special form of it which we describe more
fully and make intelhgible elsewhere.^ Just as for the individual
neurotic the therapeutic experience represents the last deliver-
ance from the two-fold conflict of the negative denial of will and
1 See the chapter "Love and Force" in Book I of "Will Therapy."
80
CKEATION AND GUILT
destructive self consciousness, so the creative type as such is the
last salvation of human kind from the same inevitable neurotic
conflict all work against. The creative man saves him-
which we
from the neurotic chaos of will denial and self
self first of all
consciousness since he affirms himself and his own creative wiU,
which at once protects him in the growing advance of conscious-
ness from falling into the inhibiting self consciousness. He keeps
for himself the capacity to manifest himself and his individual
will creatively instead of denying and reacting to it with guilt
consciousness. He expresses himself instead of knowing himself
consciously, wills instead of knowing or knows that he wills and
what he wills and lives it. His guilt consists in the fact of his re-
lease from common pressure, whether it be biological or moral, in
his isolation, which however he can afiBrm creatively instead of
having to deny it neurotically. His creativity cancels his guilt
while the neurotic willing makes the individual guilt-conscious
with its denial. Since he transforms the neurotic self conscious-
ness arising from the hypertrophied compulsive thinking into
creative living again, that is, into individual will aflBrmation, he
does isolate himself it is true, as an individual from his contem-
poraries who suffer from consciousness, but unites them again
with positive natural forces, thus reveahng at once the grandeur
and strength of man.
Qie creative man is thus first of all his own therapisyas which ^fc.
I have already conceived him in "Der Kunstler,"[but at the same *^
time a therapist for other sufferers] Only he solves his individual
will conflict in a universal form which does not satisfy the hyper-
individualized tjrpe of our time This t ype needs and desires no
.
"
lojlgeta common an individual one he coines to the
savior, but ;
therapist^ however, as so'ClT'HS^nd because he has broken down

in the individual therapy which the love experience affords. In
analysis he tries again the unreal and real methods of salvation
which no longer work for him because for his heightened and
hypertrophied self consciousness there is only one savior and —
that is himself! In this sense the therapeutic experience, as I
pointed out before, is to be understood only from the creative.
For a creator, and in truth al-
in the first place the therapist is
most a creative God, and not made so first by the patient. For he
creates men in the Promethean sense, men who like himself have
81
TRUTH AND REALITY
the creative but must deny it instead of being able to affirm
will,
it. And this is the second reason why the therapeutic experience
is only to be understood from the creative. For the patient is
also a creator, but a miscarried negative one and his powerful

identification with the therapist arises from this, that at bottom
he is and would like to possess creative power positively
the same
also.This therapeutic creation of men, which the patient on that
account presents as a rebirth experience, cannot ensue on the
basis of a general norm or a common ideal for which the neurotic
type is just as unsuited as is the creative, and he cannot be edu-
cated to it either. The only therapeutic possibility with our
modern individual neurotic type is to permit him to develop and
accept his own individuality, in other words, to allow the indi-
vidual to mold himself into that which he is, that is, to affirm
his own will and therewith his individuality. This can happen,
however, only in an individual personal experience of therapy,
where again we meet the guilt bound up with creation, the release
of which presents the greatest difficulty for this individual type
of therapy.
Since we are keeping these problems for presentation in "Will
Therapy," we turn in conclusion to one more universal view-
point which is important not only for individual therapy, but
also for the universal therapy of the creative type. We spoke of
different phases and levels of the formation of religion and the
creation of God, which certainly have a history, whose interest-
ing evolution and many aspects we have no intention of giving
here. These historical allusions are only a convenient help in the
presentation of these complicated processes in the individual and
serve merely to illustrate the point of view, which seems to me
essential to the understanding of the individual structure and its
reactions. We spoke of a period of evil deities, of protective gods,

of will gods, of father gods, of the deifying of love and finally of
self deification in the heroic man as well as of his negative, the self
condemnation of the hyperconscious neurotic hemmed in by guilt
feeling. All these and yet other phases, developmental levels and
reactions we find to vary in the single individual himself at differ-
ent periods of his development. I do not believe, however, that we
are able to understand the historical development in the past
through projecting backwards or drawing conclusions a pos-
82
CREATION AND GUILT
teriori from the Rather it would perhaps be possible
individual.
that the past, we should understand it from its own time, might
if
light up many an individual of the present who seems to be going

through similar phases, not only in terms of an ontogenetic
repetition of the phylogenetic as it lies at the basis of the
Jungian concept of the "collective" unconscious, but from his
own which, in contact with the outer reality of his
will conflict,
fellow men and with the inner reality of his own consciousness
and development manifests itself in similar fashion. We are con-
cerned therefore with parallel phenomena as the ancient world
picture conceived it in the opposition of microcosm and macro-
cosm, not with causal connections as they underlie the concept of

phylogenesis, whether one undertakes to explain the past from
the individual or vice versa wants to understand the individual
from the past. For the guilt is no accumulated guilt, neither his-
torical nor individualand all attempts thus to explain it repre-
sent a misuse of the natural science principle of causality in the
service of will justification. Guilt arises in and from the indi-
vidual and must continue to produce evil if the individual uses
it for the justification of his evil will,when it appears as neurotic
guilt consciousness and not as creative guilt which can be atoned
for through new creation.
83
VII
HAPPINESS AND REDEMPTION
"I drink not from mere joy in wine nor to
scoff at faith — no, only to forget myself
/for a moment, that only do I want of
I
' —
intoxication, that alone."
—Omar Khayyam
At this point we leave the historical and typological methods

of comparison which forced themselves upon us as parallel phe-
nomena in considering creation as a continuous ongoing and de-
veloping process, and return to those spiritual states which
life
always emerge in the individual as reactions to the will-guilt con-

flict as we have described it, and influence and determine its mani-
festations decisively. The longing for happiness and redemption

dwelling in all of us can only be expressed as a momentary pres-
ent life value for the individual and can only be understood from
that viewpoint. Accordingly we see the need for happiness and
redemption in humankind becoming always more individualized.
Upon the religious justification and the heroic ethical solution of
the will-guilt problem, there follows the effort to find individual
redemption in the emotional love experience, which gives this
developmental phase value not only historically-, but also indi-
vidually for the particular person with whom it characterizes
childhood, puberty and maturity. We need for the understanding
of these parallel phenomena no phylogenetic causality, but only
the will causality of the individual from which the same reactions
always follow with psychological necessity. In the course and
progress of the latter we have discovered, in addition to the prin-
ciple of will causality, another principle derived from it which
has helped determine the gradual transformation of the concepts
of happiness and redemption decisively. This is the "Realisier-
ungsprinzip" ^ which in distinction from the "reality principle"
1 This term has no suitable equivalent in English. It means a making real,
a literal "realizing" in contradistinction to the static "reality principle."
84
of Freud has a dynamic significance inasmuch as it views reality,
not as something given once and for all to which the individual
adapts himself more or less, but as something which has come
into being, yes, is continuously becoming.
We have illustrated this principle of the gradual and con-
tinuously changing realization of the unreal and the reverse
process of making the real unreal which parallels it, in the evolu-
tion of the idea of God. This develops in humanity and in
the
individual from the projection of the most real principle of all,

namely, the will, in the unreal concept of God, to the real per-
sonification of the counter-will in the father principle, and of
positive willing in the love principle. Our scientifically oriented
era, however, has driven this "Realisierungsprinzip" still further

toward its denial in the moralistic parent ideology, and the
ethical love ideology since it would make the spiritual itself real,
a last despairing attempt which we see culminate in the psycho-

analytic world view. At the same time we see the neurotic type of
our time suffering from the loss of all illusions, breaking away
from the psychoanalytic therapy which makes the will concrete
and justifies the guilt really, and striving after new spiritual
experiences, as indicated in parallel attempts toward a new

orientation of psychology in terms of total personahty and total
experience. This reaction of the spiritual against the psycho-
logical seems to me to correspond to a reaction against the whole
scientific ideology to whose practical consequences and activities
man reacts on the one side with guilt, as to all of his will conse-
quences, while on the other he flees to spiritual reality, that is, to
emotional experience in order to find there salvation from will
as well as from consciousness.

Whatever the need for happiness and salvation may have
meant to the men of an earlier age, for the hyperconscious, will-
restricted neurotic type of today they represent the attempts
to get free of the conscious will-ego temporarily or permanently,
in a word, they strive for an abrogation of the individualism
from whose isolating consequences we suffer. As always, the man
of earlier times sought to win happiness and salvation or to
imagine it, while for us, after the failure of the common attempts
tomake real or unreal as they he before us in religion and science,
there remains only the individual solution carried out in the love
85
TKUTH AND REALITY
experience, whose failure has led finally to the most individualistic
form of therapy. Already the hypertrophied self consciousness
of the neurotic type begins to recognize this latest illusion of an
individual therapy as affording neither happiness nor salvation.
This recognition, however, like all psychological knowledge, is
no creative one in terms of a pleasurable will affirmation but a
painful becoming conscious, a disillusioning awareness of all
these connections which we do not will to know for the sake of
knowledge, but which we have to know because no other course
remains open to us. In order to comprehend this process of decay
in all illusions, the unreal as well as the real, in its full bearing,
and to understand_the inherent need of iQaHnrn T7i>\n for jredprnp-
îioiijWemust examine it, especially in the three aspects which it
offers us today, namely, its relation to sexuality, to the emotional
and to the consciousness of the individual.
life,
In relation to sexuality, we find that the modern man no longer

understands and experiences the sexual purely biologically, but
as we have explained, uses it morally as the essential content of
the will and guilt problem, which inevitably contributes to the
formation of the neurotic conflict. From this it follows that he
has also attached the need for happiness and redemption to the
sexual content, insofar as it is to free him from the compulsion
of the moralistic. In other words, having utilized sexuality psy-
chologically, he now wants to use it spiritually. Originally sex-
uality had as little to do with morality as with redemption, but
its original biological meaning does not explain its modern role
and function. In itspsychological meaning as will accomplish-
ment, which it represents for both sexes, sexuality can probably
afford happiness, insofar as happiness is perception of pleasure,
that is, a brief consciousness of will accomplishment itself. How-
ever can afford no salvation that aims at the dissolution of, or
it
escape from individuality, from the conscious self, because it is

sex that emphasizes difference in the highest degree and accord-
ingly can only be pleasurable, that is, affording happiness, when
the individual, man or woman, is able to affirm his individuality
and its will. This the neurotic is not able to do and accordingly
sexuality affords him not even the happiness of a brief self for-
getting but only increases his awareness of difference, that is, in-
creases his guilt consciousness. Sexuality tends to make possible
86
HAPPINESS AND KEDEMPTION
for him a flight from consciousness instead of enjoyment of the
willachievement in consciousness, which constitutes the essence
of pleasure. Sexuality with this opposition of sex and will be-
comes the symbol of inner conflict instead of release therefrom.
For him with the freedom of will in the love
this real solution
choice and its through the "other" becomes the
justification
compulsion offracia^wiH which the "other" represents for the
individual will, anH^to'wnich, accordingly, the counter-will reacts
negatively.
The erotic emotional experience lifts these difficulties found
in the physical sex relation to a certain level in the releasing hap-
piness of love but shatters on other grounds in the final solution
of the conflict as well as in the redemption of the individual from
it.In the emotional experience the individual yields primarily
through his own emotion, so that the giving up to the other is no
subjection of the will actually, but only the consequence of his
own voluntary softening of the will. The emotional experience
represents therefore a kind of attempt at self redemption which
actually aims at independence of the other will and object and
also strives not for the other's subjection, but its own subjection.
This giving in of will holds for both sexes, exactly as the physical
sex act means for both sexes will accomplishment. The conflict
when the will opposes the yield-
re-enters in the emotional sphere
ing to the other, so that the individual who finds salvation in his
own emotional yielding finally strives after redemption from this

individual emotional compulsion as he formerly strove after re-
lease from the racial sex compulsion in the emotional love ex-
perience.
Here again we see that the need of man for happiness and re-
demption not only changes with different historical and indi-
vidual developmental phases but that, exactly as does the spirit-
ual content of truth, it varies in terms of the momentary will
and guilt picture. From what serves today as a means to salva-
tion, the individual at once, or tomorrow, wants to be saved as
soon as this form of salvation becomes compulsory. This situa-
tion is most highly comphcated in the sphere of consciousness in
which, finally, all these conflicts manifest themselves. If con-
sciousness in its original function as the instrument of will affirms
the latter's achievement, then it mediates the sensation of pleas-
87
TRUTH AND REALITY
ure, but the pleasure experience then struggles after rescue from
the quality' of consciousness, begrudging its momentariness, and
seeks to make happiness a salvation. This pleasure, which in
Nietzsche's meaning wants eternity, as it struggles loose from
time conditioned consciousness becomes pain when consciousness
does not affirm the will but denies it and so leads to guilt con-
sciousness instead of consciousness of pleasure. The longing for
redemption, then, has to do with guilt consciousness as a tor-
menting form of self consciousness which originally mediates
pleasure through affirmation of the will.
We find ourselves through this discussion in the midst of the
whole problem of redemption which, depending on circumstances,
is connected with will or consciousness, pleasure or guilt. We
notice here also that happiness and redemption, at least as we
understand them in the modern individual, actually represent op-
posites and not merely different degrees of a longing directed
toward the dissolution of individuality. F or the achievement jii
h appines sjEEie sents a peak of indi^-id ualism and itspleasurable
will affirmation throu gh persona l consciousness whilelhe long ing
for saTvationroiTlKe'con trary, st rives alter the_aFFogati on^ of
indiâdualitv ôr hkeness, unity^ neness with the all. ^ccord
-
in gly~liapp ines§_is. only to "beaK amgdTg''the~ wTII accomplis h-

,ment,JâJyat_ionj)nly in the_abrogatio n of will tjirough emo tion.
But this giving up of will, although it is also pleasurable, is only
achieved through guilt feeling from which state redemption is
then sought in turn. In this sense, the feeling of happiness re-
leases only temporarily from will compulsion, while what we seek
is the actual lasting release from tormenting guilt consciousness.
Here we come upon the time element whose quantitative aspect

is not only determining for the feeling of happiness and redemp-
tion, but in general represents the central factor of conscious-
ness itself and therewith of spiritual life as such. For all our
spiritual tendencies, from whatever standpoint one may view
them, can be understood finally hke life itself, temporally. With
all so-called psychic mechanisms, we have to do ultimately
with
the shortening or prolonging of psychic states ; to shorten to
the point of nothingness, as, for example, denial does, or to pro-
long to infinity as in^thfiJjeliefJit-iiiHaoi^tality. TfJesituation,
however, is îot~so simple as that we merely want to prolong
pleasurable conditions and shorten unpleasurable on,es we here
;
strike the paradox that the individual wants to prolong the

pleasure whose essence lies just in its temporal limitation, which
must miscarry in the same way as the shortening of pain, whose
essence lies in the prolongation of any psychic state, even one
that is pleasurable in the beginning. For pleasure is a certain
brevity of consciousness, pain a lengthening of consciousness,
at least on the level of neurotic self consciousness, where con-
sciousness disturbs experience in the form of self consciousness
and guilt consciousness and accordingly the individual wants to
be saved from it.
Therefore from the standpoint of the psychology of emotions,

consciousness shows itself as a time problem in the sense that
time represents the form of consciousness and by means of this
time factor makes the different contents pleasurable or pain-
ful. Will as the constant driving force strives accordingly to
prolong its pleasurably perceived affirmation through conscious-

ness, to make the feeling of happiness lasting, that is, redeeming.
Insofar as this prolongation succeeds, it is perceived as painful
because compulsory and thus the individual wants again to get
free of the spirits which he himself has called up. Thus sex pleas-
ure which does away with the inner will conflict pleasurably
through realization, is intended to be made lasting through the
love emotion ; this emotional dependence, however, is perceived
as compulsory and the individual strives for release through
conscious tffoit of will which leads to guilt feeling, and from
which again salvation is sought in the sphere of unconsciousness.
Here belong all ideas of salvation with eternal duration from the
Buddhistic Nirvana to the Christian immortality, which, how-
ever, only strive after a redemption from tormenting self con-
sciousness and have as little to do with actual biological death as
Freud's "death instinct." For the painful reality from which
the individual wants to get free is his own consciousness in the
form of self consciousness and release is sought in the overcoming
of the temporal form of consciousness, that is, in permanence or
eternity symbols, for which procreation and death as contents
given in the biological process have always been preferred.
Man felt himself immortal as long as he knew nothing of time,
as long as he had no time consciousness. This is the meaning of
89
TRUTH AND REALITY
the myth of the fall which represents symbolically this human
destiny generally as the guilt of knowledge while the Greek myth
attaches the transition from the immortal God to mortal man
in almost psychological formulation to the breaking in of time
consciousness. Uranos, the eternal God of heaven, is emasculated
by Kronos, a symbol of time and temporal duration which from
that point on had dominion over the world and men. If Freud had
named the basal complex here after the hero instead of the con-
tent, he would have recognized in the "Kronos complex" what is
perhaps the most important and powerful complex for the mod-
ern man. With him the time problem as a psychological deter-
minant enters into human consciousness and its development.
The eternal biological principle of procreation which the myth
represents cosmically in the love union of heaven with earth,
breaks through in human self consciousness in the form of time
consciousness. From then on human ideas of salvation take on
the character of eternity which culminates in the blessed life of
the Christian kingdom of heaven. The psychological recognition
of the time problem as the form of human consciousness, there-
fore, leads away from the brief instinct satisfaction of happiness,
to the eternal lasting peace of blessedness, that is, to redemption.
Human ideas of redemption have a development and a history
and this history, as always, has been interpreted and misin-
terpreted as long as men, in ignorance of the will-guilt problem
lying at their roots, played the one of the two factors against the
other instead of recognizing them in their essential relationship
and interaction. Redemption, according to the constellation of
this conflict can relate now to will, another time to guilt, and
finally also to consciousness. In relation to the time problem,
however, will, guilt and consciousness maintain themselves dif-
ferently, for the will, however one comprehends or interprets it,
remains a constantly operating force, while consciousness above
all is a quality, a state, and as such is passive and temporary', yes
momentary. (Th^ feeling of pain, which manifests itself psy-

chically as guilt iCelina, arises from the attempts to unite these
two incommensurable powers. In order to understand all the pos-
sibilities arising here in their historical development as well as
individually, we must insert again a bit of will psychology and
trace the opposing effect of the three factors, will, consciousness,
90
and guilt feeling upon one another. The problem is considerably
complicated, but is for the first time psychologically interesting
through the fact that the will in the different levels of develop-
ment through which it goes from the negative to the positive and
creative, reacts upon the individual himself, upon what he has
overcome and become.
In the relation of will to consciousness there is a naive phase
of development in which the two are one, as once probably the
conscious individual will was one with the biological life impulse
which it only represented and affirmed. The first developmental
phase of the individual will, as it manifests itself in counter-will,
corresponds to a "not willing," because one must ; the second
phase, that of positive will expression, corresponds to a "willing"
what one must the third creative phase, to a willing of that which
;
one wants. The first phase corresponds to consciousness that one

wills (against the compulsion of the other will) the second ;
phase to a contentual knowing of that which one wiUs (because

one must) ; the third creative phase binds the ego consciousness
to the first with the positive will expression of the second, but
corresponds in content not to a "must," but to a "self willed."
On the first level, we perceive guilt feeling as a consequence of
counter-will on the second level we have guilt consciousness be-
;
cause we deny the own will, since we interpret willing as com-

pulsion, we will, either not knowing what we will (content repres-
sion or rationalization) or that we will at all (dynamic denial).
The third level, finally, creates guilt through conscious affirma-
tionand expression of the own will and its personal content.
Thus consciousness and guilt which originally cooperate in
the ser\nce of the negative will expression and the creative will
achievement, finally place themselves inhibitingly in the way of
will itself, yes call a halt to human will as such in neurotic guilt
consciousness. All man's longing for happiness and redemption
corresponds then to a spontaneous therapeutic attempt either
to unite harmoniously once more this insoluble opposition of
will and consciousness that manifests itself as consciousness
of guilt or to separate them entirely. Both must miscarry. In
the harmonious union, in the working together of will with con-
sciousness which affirms the will, we sense, it is true, the feeling
of happiness, but this can only be brief in duration and its
91
TRUTH AND REALITY
lengthening can never be attained in continuous consciousness,
therefore redemption is sought in unconsciousness, which in-
volves a separation of the feeling of happiness from the temporal
form of consciousness. Accordingly we have ever after the ten-
dency to make-eternal which manifests itself in the different
spheres of will, consciousness and guilt, whether we would im-
mortalize pleasure in emotion, self consciousness in truth or the
ego in creative work. All these self perpetuation tendencies cor-
respond to the positive beneficent spontaneous therapies as we
trace them in religious and love emotions on the one hand, in
creative knowledge and artistic creation on the other. They do
not all lead to redemption, however, because they always depend
on the affirmation of consciousness and accordingly are limited
temporally.
The actual redemption ideas which aim at eternal duration
and a deliverance from consciousness can only be understood
through guilt feeling, to the overcoming of which belongs re-
lease from will just as much as release from consciousness be-
cause it is just from the opposing reactions of these two that
the tormenting self consciousness arises. The effect of guilt
feeling on the conscious will extends from will restraint in the
ethical sense beyond the crippling of will of the neurotic to the
denial of will as Schopenhauer above all others has described it
in all its appearances, including the destruction of will in self

murder. Both exhaustively and magnificently the same philos-
opher has handled the eternal longing of man for salvation from
this tormenting will. But Schopenhauer has been driven by em-
phasis on the guilt problem into pessimism, like Freud who finally
followed him in this, so that there is no redemption except that
of eternal nirvana, which Freud interpreted biologically as death
instinct. This solution of the will problem to which Schopen-
hauer as we know was led by the Hindu religious philosophy,
corresponded to the Hindu soul, which in the Buddhistic doctrine
constituted the highest deification of human consciousness, and
its ideal of redemption accordingly pictures a release from an
overcoming by consciousness through the all powerful will.

Schopenhauer, from the emphasis on guilt feeling, to which the
Hindus give expression in the doctrine of transmigration of
92
souls,has carried over his longing for salvation from conscious-
ness to the will. Freud finally valued consciousness at first as a
releasing source of healing against the sexual will in order finally
to strike against guilt feeling as the insuperable obstacle. Nie-
tzsche, who sought neither philosophic truth nor therapeutic
illusions, but presented himself creatively, had the advantage of
finding in the affirming will expression of self creation, the only
redemption from will. For the neurotic human type, however,
who suffers from consciousness and guilt feeling, salvation is to
be found only in will denial as he can no longer find it in the
temporary abrogation of consciousness in ecstatic states (and
such is the creative act of will also). With him then the desire
for redemption relates to the will to live in Schopenhauer's sense,
to the instinct for Hfe in Freud's meaning, speaking psycho-
cannot get free
logically, to the will itself, but only because he
from the knowledge of it and the guilt consciousness following
therefrom.
(^his leads then to the real task of individual psychotherapy,
— —
whose chief difliculty for me like that of education seems to
he in this, that both parties with their different psychologies
have correspondingly different goals^ On the level of individual
therapy this opposition is shown in the fact that therapist and
patient have a different salvation ideology. The therapist, as the
strong will type who wants to create man in his own image, hke
the educator, sees salvation in getting loose, in the freeing from
the compulsion of the evil will, whose self creative affirmation he
denies at the same time in the therapeutic ideology of helping;
the guilt springing therefrom he tries to dissipate through re-
lease from willing. The neurotic patient, on the contrary, wh
already suffers from will denial which he can no longer idealiz
through any illusion seeks not release from will but from co:
sciousness which torments him in the form of guilt consciousnes
He no longer wants to know, to know otherwise or better, bu'
not to know at all, much more needs to be brought through emo
tional experience to positive will expression and affirmation
while the therapist just the reverse seeks the release from crea
tive will in conscious knowledge. Since I reserve for another cop^
nection the further presentation and development of this con-
93
TRUTH AND REALITY
trast in the psycliology of the helper and the patient, so
important for the therapy and theory of the neuroses,^ I now
turn again to the universal spontaneous therapies as they lie
before us in the happiness and redemption ideologies of hu-
manity. For the same contrast in the psychology of both happi-
ness and redemption-seeking individuals as we discover
it in the
therapeutic situation, is maintained in the universal
artificial
therapeutic power which the sexual and love life of men has
become in the course of evolution. Here both sexes enjoy the
beneficent feeling of will accomplishment, corresponding to the
individual and sexual personality, but they find also release
from individual consciousness in the temporary ecstatic self-for-
getting of sensuous deUrium and emotional 3-ielding, and finally
free themselves from guilt through the creation of the child as a
generic function which is then transformed into an individual
creation in bringing it up.
S^his blessedness through harmonious working together of all
three spheres is found, however, onlj' in the ideal love experience,
which is not only limited in time as is all experience of happiness,

but for the most part only endures for a brief period, as it shat-
ters in the conflict of the two individual willj)) As happiness means
the consciousness of will attainment, not only brief in ac-
it is
cordance with its own nature, but also is bound to
reality, that is,
to the overcoming of an external obstacle, a resistance, while re-
demption seeks a purely inner state of equal importance, which
shall make the ego independent of the outer world. With the
attempt of the individual to make the short-lived condition of
happiness lasting, that is "saving," the pleasure quality is not
only withdrawn from it as already pointed out, but the external
resistance belonging to it is made permanent. In the individual
love experience, which owes its possibility only to a favorable
conjunction of the most diverse factors, the difficulty just pointed
out manifests itself in this way, that the strange will finally
becomes an external representative of the own counter-will in-
stead of leading to an inner dissipation of it. In other words,
the inner dualism showing itself as opposition between the racial
sexual instinct and the conscious individual will, finds in the
duality of the sexes onh' an external symbol —not the reverse.
1 See "WiU Therapy," Book II.
94
That isto say, the dualism of the self conscious individual no
longer rests on the developmental level of bisexuahty lying be-
hind it for aeons, which would let us sleep peacefully if we had
not developed in ourselves as consequence of the will-guilt con-
flict, the will to conquer the other and the longing for will sub-
jection in emotional yielding, which we then interpret from

within the wiU psychology in terms of sexual ideology as mascu-
and feminine.
line
/rhe shattering of the human longing for happiness and re-
demption even in its highest individuahstic form, in the love
experience, leads finally to a form of salvation characteristic of
the modern man, which I would Uke to designate quite generally
as "therapeutic." yTherewith it becomes clear that this salva-
tion tendency concerns guilt consciousness, for the making happy
of the other releases from guilt and thus makes the individual
himself happy. This therapeutic redemption ideology character-
izes not only the love life of our time which itself is only an
expression of it, but alone makes intelligible the meaning of
individual psychotherapy of our present cultural life. For on
the one side we see the particular person in search of salvation
shatter on this individualized Christian sacrifice ideology ; while
on the other hand the modern type of psychotherapist who
gradually succeeds the priest, has to thank the same ideology of
redemption-of-the-other for his origin and steady growth. And
while we previously found in the difference of the redemption
ideologies of patient and therapist, a difficulty for successful
treatment, here the fundamental likeness of their psychic struc-
ture, however positively and negatively expressed, proves to be
a hindrance.
The neurotic type suffers in this, that he seeks to realize his
longing for salvation only in the beatification of the other, for
that is the form adequate to the modern man, in which the in-
dividual seeks release from his guilt; just so, however, it is the
right form for the psychotherapist to seek his release from will
in helping, in sacrifice for the other. However, the gratification
which both strive for cannot be won in this way, but only through
positive will accomplishment, while salvation is attainable in
general only independently of the object. This mixture of happi-
1 Compare the introductory conclusions of Book I in "Will Therapy."
95
TRUTH AND EEALITY
ness and salvation-need, as it manifests itself clearly only in the
therapeutic situation, is the characteristic mark of modern type
who was described as neurotic. As he negates happiness, which
the individual will affirmation is, in consequence of ethical will
denial, hemust upset the individual love therapy of which he
is capable only in terms of the just described salvation
still
ideology of sacrifice for the other. In other words, he seeks

to transform the possibility of happiness which Ues in will
achievement in opposition to the other, into a moralistic justi-
fication of will through the other, on the basis of which alone
he could (for the first time) accept happiness. Thus the love
relation with the modern neurotic type has become a moralistic,

yes, if you will, a religious problem, at least in the psychological
sense of the word, as he can no longer experience directly and im-
mediately the possibility of happiness which lies in the love
experience because of ethical will conflict, but must transform
it into an individual release from moralistic compulsion. The
love emotion of the modern neurotic is not a powerful will affirma-

tion which leads to a feeling of happiness, but a therapeutic at-
tempt at sa-v-ing from the compulsion of the will-guilt conflict
with the help of the other who as a rule is himself no therapist
and hopes for the same release.
After the shattering of the universal redemption therapies, as
thev appear notably in religion with all its ramifications in art,
philosophy and science, individual salvation for which the
modern type strives, is to be found only in individual happiness,
but this cannot be accepted because of the ethical guilt conflict
of the individual. Love, whose failure as individual redemption
therapy is now eâdent, was the last attempt to transform the
individual possibility of happiness with the other into an indi-
vidual salvation through the other. While happiness can only be
found individually and then also means individual redemption, in
its essence redemption is only to be found universally because
itcomes to a climax just in the abrogation of individuality. If

individuation has advanced so far that the individual can no
longer find salvation in the universal through the universal
ideologies, but must seek them individually, then there remains
no other possibility of salvation except the release from indi-
vidual self consciousness in death. This destructive form of salva-
96
tion as manifested in the growing tendency to suicide of
it is
the modern individual, represents indeed the greatest victory of

the individual will over the life impulse and all ethical inhibitions,
but no longer works therapeutically, not even when, as in psy-
choanalytic theory, it is presented in the scientific garb of a
death instinct. For with men even the biological factors are
placed in large measure under the control of will and thus cer-
tainly are also exposed to the danger of manifesting themselves
destructively because of the guilt problem. We know just from
psychoanalytic experiences that men can sicken and die when
they will it, that, however, just as often in a miraculous fashion
—
they can escape death if they will it. It is just this conflict of
the individual will with the biological compulsive forces that con-
stitutes the essentially human problem, in its creative as in its
destructive manifestations.
If the wiU is and not negated or denied, there results
affirmed
the and happiness, like salvation, is found in life
life instinct,
and experience, in the creation and acceptance of both without

having to ask how, whither, what and why. Questions which
originate from the division of will into guilt consciousness and
self consciousness cannot be answered through any psychological
or philosophic theory for the answer is the more disillusioning,
the more correct it is. For happiness can only be found in reality,
not in truth, and redemption never in reality and from reality,
but only in itself and from itself. "?
'
COMPLETE LIST OF PUBLISHED WORKS

OF DR. OTTO RANK
IN OEDEK OF THEIR FIEST PUBLICATION
Der Kunstler, 1907

Der Mythus der Geburt des Heldens, 1909. English translation,
~^^~7''he
'
Myth of the Birth of the Hero, 1914. Italian translation,
1921
Ein Traum der Selbst deutet. Jahrbuch fur Psa II, 1910. Psy-
choanalytic Review, Vol. V, 1918
Die Lohengrin Sage, 1911
Das Inzestmotiv in Dichtung und Sage, 1912. Revised edition
1926. French translation, 1934
Die Bedeutung der Psychoanalyse fiir die Geistesiaissenschaften
(with H. Sachs), 1913. English translation, 1915. Nervous
and Mental Disease Monograph Series.
Psychoanalytische Beitrage zur Mythenforschung : Gesammelte
Studien aus den Jahren 1912— H., 1919 revised edition 1922.
;
Der Doppelgdnger, in Imago, 1914. In pamphlet form 1925.

Psychoanalytic Review, Vol. VI, 1919
Homer: Psychologische Beitrage zur Entstehungsgeschichte des
Volksepos, in Imago V, 1917
Das Volksepos: Die dichterische Phantasiehildung, in Imago V,
1917
Don Juan-Gestalt, in Imago VIII, 1922. In book form, 1924,
Psychoanalytic Review, Vol. XIII, 1926. French translation,
1932
Eine Neurosenanalyse in Trdumen, 1924
Sexualitdt und Schuldgefiihl, 1926. Translation Perversion and
:
Neurosis, International Journal of Psychoanalysis IV. 270

EntwicMungsziele der Psychoanalyse (with S. Ferenczi), 1924.
English translation, The Development of Psychoanalysis,
1925
COMPLETE LIST OF PUBLISHED WORKS
Dai Trauma der Geburt, 1934!.French translation, 1928.
English translation^ The Trauma^ Birth, 1929
Technik der PsychoanaTyseTVol. 1719267 Vol. II, 1929. Vol. Ill,
1931. English translation. Will Therapy, 1936
Grundziige einer genetischen Psychologie auf Grund der Psycho-
analyse der Ich-Struktur. Vol. I, Genetische Psychologie,
1927. (Given in lecture form in English for the New York
School of Social Work, 1926.) Translations Genesis of Geni-
:
tality, in Psychoanalytic Review XII, 1921 ; Psychoanalytic

Problems, in Psychoanalytic Review XIV, 1927. Vol. II, Ge-
staltung und Ausdruck der Personlichkeit, 1928. (Given in lec-
ture form for the New York School of Social Work and the
Pennsylvania School of Social Work, 1927.) Translations:
Introduction: Beyond Psychoanalysis, in Psychoanalytic Re-
view XVI, 1929 ; Character-formation and The Task of Edu-
cation, pamphlet. New York Committee for Mental Hygiene.
Vol. Ill, Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit, 1929. (Given in lecture
form for the Pennsylvania School of Social Work, 1929.)
English translation Truth and Reality, 1936
:
Seelenglaube und Psychologie, 1931

Modern Education, 1931
Artist, 1932
f Art and
Beyond Psychology. Posthumous, privately printed, 1941
:fA/v f>
PSYCHOLOGY
OTTO RANK
Will Therapy
Will Therapy is the full statement of Otto Rank's mature theoiies and
techniques. In it Rank analyzes the movement that takes place when the
therapist recognizes and constructively uses the potential strength of the
patient, however disguised as resistance. He discusses the handling of the
therapeutic situation as a present experience, the setting of a time limit in
advance, and the therapeutic use of the birth-trauma theory. How the
therapist makes possible the constructive use of the will is central, the key
to Rank's critique of Freudian psychoanalysis and to his unique contribu-
tion to modem psychology.
Truth and Reality

Rank's development of will psychology led him to a philosophy of the
psychological, outlined in 7"rM;/iaAk//?ea//n-. Here he explores the psycho-
logical determinants of the relationship of inner world to outer reality.
Anticipating one of the central findings of post- Freudian psychiatry, he
argues that "truth" is irrelevant to the work of therapy. He contrasts the
negative extemalization of will, which leads to denial and guilt, with the
creative power of will, tracing this conflict in both the individual and the
history of human society.
Otto Rank's Will Therapy and Truth and Reality are both published in
Norton Library paperback editions.
CowdMignbyJ J Smith ISBN 39.1 00891 1
Norton s^^^ss
WW NORTON & COMPANY INC 500 FIFTH AVE.. N.Y. 10036

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The central statement

WW NORTON & COMPANY INC

Printed in the United States of America.

All Rights Reserved

First published in the Norton Library 1978

Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud.

Wahrhtti and Wirklichkeit. EnluurfEiner Philosophi, dti Seeluchen.

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Rank, Otto, 1884-1939.

Pathological. 4. Psychiatry and religion.

BF613.R313 1978 150'.19"5 78-15067

I. THE BIRTH OF INDIVIDUALITY 1

U. WILL AND FORCE 13

COMPLETE LIST OF PUBLISHED WORKS OF

Truth and Reality is the third volume of Rank's "Grundziige

umes just described, it presents in clear, integrated form an

differ radically from the orthodox psychoanalytic approach, are

1 This volume appears as Part One of "Will Therapy."

Jesus. / am come to bear witness unto the truth.

THE BIRTH OF INDIVIDUALITY

The lines of thought comprehended in this book constitute a

International Psychoanalytic Press, Leipzig, Vienna, Zurich, 1924 (Interna-

In this sense civilized man, even if he fights the outside world,

self, to his own creation, as he finds himself mirrored, particu-

larly inmanners and customs, morahty and conventions, social

pRenomena. ThcTindication of its psychological determinants

social influences or as biological instincts and therewith are re-

the creative t3'pe nor the so-called "neurotic," who represents

chologically a creative achievement just as much as any other.J

tive" we have to recognize in the neurotic symptom formation.

corresponds to an impulse tendency which later was ascribed to

^ ^^^iCMfi ^Mh^ a^.

pears clearly in the dream phenomenon in which Freud has seen

facts and considerations would have been able to save psj'cho-

scious willing ego, if a kind of psychic compulsion, which reaches

power as I have already observed in "Der Kiinstler," while

tried to present it in "Der Kiinstler." In its mechanisms of

influencing of the super-ego formation through the self-con-

tion of inner qualities and a further developmental level of

stimulation of the individual to acting, feeling and thinking*

yes, even more, a psychology of consciousness in its various as-

instrument for the fulfilment of will before it advanced to the

chology we must protect ourselves from extending further this

danger, or at least the attempt, of again interpret-

whole development of man and the prQcess_iif-bo coming -con-

WILL AND FORCE

hurt him and he knows it; and he longs for

Mt ee-introdttction of the will concept into psychology solves

I have not brought it in as such on the contrary that I have

busied myself long and intensively in the attempt to solve certain

headed psychoanalysis has necessarily mixed up and the lack of

good (necessary, beautiful, etc.)." This kind of therapy has

tion, in teaching, man is unburdened and comforted through

ing and remains a final insoluble fact.

Hence it comes about that psychoanalytic theory represents