The Supreme Court ruled on several cases regarding the creation of new provinces, cities, and legislative districts. Key points:
- The creation of a new province through a law requires a plebiscite where all voters in the affected province can participate, not just those in the proposed new province area. This is because the entire province is considered the "unit directly affected".
- Congress cannot delegate its power to create provinces. This power rests solely with Congress. An attempt to create a province through a regional assembly law was ruled unconstitutional.
- When a new province is created, a new legislative district is also automatically created by operation of the Constitution, as each province is entitled to at least one representative.
The Supreme Court ruled on several cases regarding the creation of new provinces, cities, and legislative districts. Key points:
- The creation of a new province through a law requires a plebiscite where all voters in the affected province can participate, not just those in the proposed new province area. This is because the entire province is considered the "unit directly affected".
- Congress cannot delegate its power to create provinces. This power rests solely with Congress. An attempt to create a province through a regional assembly law was ruled unconstitutional.
- When a new province is created, a new legislative district is also automatically created by operation of the Constitution, as each province is entitled to at least one representative.
The Supreme Court ruled on several cases regarding the creation of new provinces, cities, and legislative districts. Key points:
- The creation of a new province through a law requires a plebiscite where all voters in the affected province can participate, not just those in the proposed new province area. This is because the entire province is considered the "unit directly affected".
- Congress cannot delegate its power to create provinces. This power rests solely with Congress. An attempt to create a province through a regional assembly law was ruled unconstitutional.
- When a new province is created, a new legislative district is also automatically created by operation of the Constitution, as each province is entitled to at least one representative.
The Supreme Court ruled on several cases regarding the creation of new provinces, cities, and legislative districts. Key points:
- The creation of a new province through a law requires a plebiscite where all voters in the affected province can participate, not just those in the proposed new province area. This is because the entire province is considered the "unit directly affected".
- Congress cannot delegate its power to create provinces. This power rests solely with Congress. An attempt to create a province through a regional assembly law was ruled unconstitutional.
- When a new province is created, a new legislative district is also automatically created by operation of the Constitution, as each province is entitled to at least one representative.
COMELEC 57 bills seeking the conversion of municipalities into
G.R. No. 176970 / December 8, 2008 / Brion, J./Local component cities were filed but Congress acted only on government, administrative regions, autonomous 33 bills leaving 24 municipalities. Meanwhile, RA 9009 regions/GRACEgar became effective increasing the income requirement to qualify for conversion into a city from 20M to 100M. SUMMARY. RA No. 9371 increased CDO’s legislative district Afterwards, 16 of the 24 filed individual cityhood bills all from one to two. Bagabuyo assailed the constitutionality containing a common provision exempting them from the of the RA since according to him, a plebiscite is needed. 100M income requirement. Petitioner LCP alleges that the SC disagreed. 16 Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional for violating the DOCTRINE. The Constitution and the Local Government equal protection clause and the constitutional Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any requirement that LGUs shall have a just share in the creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of national taxes. boundary of a local government unit; No plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment or In the Nov 2008 ruling, SC (6-5 vote) declared them reapportionment provision. unconstitutional. SC then denied the 1 st MR (7-5 vote). On Apr 2009, the SC denied a 2nd MR (6-6). On Dec 2009, SC LOCGOV - 25 reversed itself and declared the laws constitutional (6-4). On Aug 2010, SC again reversed itself and granted LCP’s NAVARRO v. ERMITA (2011) MR. On Feb 2011, SC reversed itself and declared the laws constitutional. LCP thus filed this Ad Cautelam MR alleging It must be borne in mind that the central policy that the SC can no longer modify its decision since it has considerations in the creation of local government units already become final and executory. The SC denies this are economic viability, efficient administration, and and upholds the laws’ constitutionality. capability to deliver basic services to their constituents, and the criteria prescribed by the Local Government SEMA v COMELEC Code (LGC), i.e., income, population and land area, are G.R. No.177597 & 178628 / July 16 2008 / Carpio, J. (hallo, all designed to accomplish these results. In this light, this is 72 pages, I’ll try to make it short) Congress, in its collective wisdom, has debated on the relative weight of each of these three criteria, placing emphasis on which of them should enjoy preferential consideration. Without doubt, the primordial criterion in SUMMARY. Under the amended organic act of the ARMM the creation of local government units, particularly of a (RA 9054), the ARMM regional assembly had the power to province, is economic viability. This is the clear intent of the create provinces, which it invoked in enacting MMA 201 framers of the LGC. creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. COMELEC declared, through Resolution 7902, that Cotabato city was still part of the legislative district of Shariff Kabunsuan. LOCGOV - #29 Sema and Marquez argued that Cotabato city was not a League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) v COMELEC, (Feb part of said legislative district. SC ruled that the power to 2011) create provinces rests only in the legislature and could not be delegated, as such the creation of Shariff Kabunsuan Doctrine: The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an was unconstitutional. exercise by Congress of its legislative power. The LGC is a DOCTRINE. The creation of a legislative district by Congress creation of Congress through its law-making powers. does not emanate alone from Congress power to Congress has the power to alter or modify it as it did when reapportion legislative districts, but also from Congress it enacted R.A. No. 9009 and when it enacted the power to create provinces which cannot be created Cityhood Laws. Congress deemed it wiser to exempt without a legislative district. Thus, when a province is respondent municipalities from belatedly imposed created, a legislative district is created by operation of the modified income requirement in order to uphold its higher Constitution because the Constitution provides that each calling of putting flesh and blood to the very intent and province shall have at least one representative in the thrust of the LGC, which is countryside development and House of Representatives. autonomy.
Facts: LOC GOV – No. 16
Petitions for prohibition were filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines assailing the constitutionality of 16 laws Tan v. Comelec (1986) converting the municipality covered thereby into a J. Alampay component city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting When the Constitution speaks of “the unit or units plebiscites pursuant to the subject laws. affected,” it means all of the people of the province (city, municipality, or barangay) if the province (city, municipality, or barangay) is to be divided or all of the League of Cities vs. COMELEC people of two or more provinces (cities, municipalities, or GR No. 176951; April 12, 2011; Bersamin, J. barangays) if there be a merger. Congress cannot, by mere legislative fiat, diminish or restrict “the unit or units SUMMARY: affected” referred to by the Constitution to cities and municipalities comprising the new province, thereby ignoring the evident reality that there are other people Petitioner Umali asseverates that Sec. 10, Art. X of the necessarily affected. Constitution should be the basis for determining the qualified voters who will participate in the plebiscite to Background resolve the issue. Sec. 10, Art. X reads: Section 10, Article X. – No province, city, municipality, or 1. BP 885 (an act creating a new province—Negros del barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, Norte) took effect in 1985. Thereafter, petitioners (residents or its boundary substantially altered, except in of Negros Occidental) filed a petition for prohibition accordance with the criteria established in the local against respondents Comelec and Provincial Treasurer of government code and subject to approval by a majority Negros Occidental: to enjoin the former from conducting of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly the plebiscite pursuant to said BP, and to enjoin the latter affected. from disbursing the funds for said plebiscite. The BP Petitioner Umali elucidates that the phrase "political units provided that 3 cities and 8 municipalities (all in northern directly affected" necessarily encompasses not only Negros) would constitute the new province, and that the Cabanatuan City but the entire province of Nueva Ecija. territorial area of Negros del Norte would be 4,019 sq. km Hence, all the registered voters in the province are more or less. qualified to cast their votes in resolving the proposed conversion of Cabanatuan City. 2. The plebiscite was nevertheless conducted On the other hand, respondents invoke Sec. 453 of the (participated in only by a select few voters, namely the LGC to support their claim that only the City of residents of the 3 cities and 8 municipalities of the Cabanatuan should be allowed to take part in the voting. proposed new province and not by the voters of the entire Sec. 453 states: Negros Occidental province), so petitioners filed a Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status. – It supplemental petition (recognizing that their initial petition shall be the duty of the President to declare a city as highly to prohibit the conduct of plebiscite had been mooted) urbanized within thirty (30) days after it shall have met the this time to prohibit respondent Comelec from issuing the minimum requirements prescribed in the immediately official proclamation of the results of the plebiscite, and to preceding Section, upon proper application therefor and compel respondent Comelec to hold another plebiscite ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein. wherein all the voters of the entire province of Negros Respondents take the phrase "registered voters therein" in Occidental shall be allowed to participate. Sec. 453 as referring only to the registered voters in the city being converted, excluding in the process the voters in the 3. Sen. Ambrosio Padilla filed a motion that he be allowed remaining towns and cities of Nueva Ecija. to appear as amicus curiae, which was granted. In this case, the provision merely authorized the President to make a determination on whether or not the requirements under Sec. 4521 of the LGC are complied MIRANDA V. AGUIRRE with. The provision makes it ministerial for the President, G.R. No. 133064 / SEPT 16, 1999 / PUNO, J. / upon proper application, to declare a component city as LOCGOV – Plebiscite / JCFMAGSINO highly urbanized once the minimum requirements, which are based on certifiable and measurable indices under SUMMARY: RA No. 7720, which converted the municipality Sec. 452, are satisfied. The mandatory language "shall" of Santiago, Isabela into an independent component city used in the provision leaves the President with no room for was signed into law. The people of Santiago ratified it in a discretion. plebiscite. RA No. 8528 was enacted. It amended RA No. In so doing, Sec. 453, in effect, automatically calls for the 7720, it changed the status of Santiago from an conduct of a plebiscite for purposes of conversions once independent component city to a component city. the requirements are met. No further legislation is Miranda, mayor of Santiago assailed the constitutionality necessary before the city proposed to be converted of RA No. 8528 due to lack of ratification through plebiscite becomes eligible to become an HUC through ratification, pursuant to Sec. 10, Article X of the Constitution. as the basis for the delegation of the legislative authority is DOCTRINE: Sec. 10, Art. X addressed the undesirable the very LGC. practice where LGUs were created, abolished, etc. on the The plebiscite requirement under the constitutional basis of vagaries of politics and not of the people’s provision should equally apply to conversions as well. welfare. The consent of the people was required to serve While conversion to an HUC is not explicitly provided in as a checking mechanism to any exercise of legislative Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution we nevertheless observe power. It is one instance where the people in their that the conversion of a component city into an HUC is sovereign capacity decide on a matter that affects them. substantial alteration of boundaries. This is also in accord with the philosophy of the Constitution granting more autonomy to LGUs. Abbas vs. COMELEC UMALI vs. COMELEC G.R. No.89651 and 89965/ November 10 1989 / Cortes, G.R. No. 203974 J./LOCGOV-Local governments, Administrative regions, Autonomous regions/JMQAquino "Political units directly affected" defined In identifying the LGU or LGUs that should be allowed to SUMMARY. Petitioners assail the validity and take part in the plebiscite, what should primarily be constitutionality of RA6734 (Organic Act for ARMM) on the determined is whether or not the unit or units that desire to grounds that: (a) it conflicts with the Tripoli Agreement; (b) participate will be "directly affected" by the change. it unconditionally creates an autonomous region ; (c) it violates the constitutional requirement that only areas MISCELLANEOUS AND FINAL PROVISIONS – THE MMDA / which share common characteristics shall be included; (d) REDMAINES it is violative of equal protection ;(e) it violates religious freedom; (f) that the president may choose to merge SUMMARY. MMDA sought to open Neptune St. in Makati, existing regions without conducting a plebiscite contrary a private subdivision road, and to cause the demolition of to the constitution; (g) that the organization of an its perimeter walls. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., the Oversight Committee would delay the creation of an registered owner of Neptune St. and the perimeter walls, autonomous region which, according to the Constitution, filed for injunction. MMDA argues that it has authority shall take effect upon the conduct of a plebiscite because it is an agent of the State and such orders are part of its exercise of police power. LocGov #94 SC ruled that MMDA’s orders have no legal mooring. First, Arsadi M. DISOMANGCOP and Ramir M. Dimalotang, police power is vested with the legislature and MMDA has petitioners, no legislative power under its Charter, RA 7924. MMDA was vs. limited only to administrative functions. Second, MMDA Secretary of the DPWH Simeon A. DATUMANONG and the cannot invoke the powers of its precursor, MMC, because Secretary of Budget and Management Emilia T. Boncodin, in the latter’s Charter, there was an express grant to enact respondents. or approve ordinances; such grant is absent in MMDA’s (Nov. 25, 2004) Charter. Finally, there was no legislative intent to grant it with such powers and its Council, the Metropolitan Manila Doctrine: “The creation of autonomous regions Council, is limited only to administrative rules and contemplates the grant of political autonomy. It regulations. serves as a break from Congress’ control over DOCTRINE. An LGU is a “political subdivision of a nation or local government affairs.” a state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs.” MMDA is not an LGU, not even a Cordillera Broad Coalition vs. COA special metropolitan political subdivision as contemplated in Sec. 11, Art. X Const, and it is not endowed with Petition to assail constitutionality of EO 220 legislative power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the creation of an autonomous region in the Cordilleras. A MMDA v. GARIN Regional Consultative Commission shall first be created. G.R. No. 130230/ April 15 2005/ Chico-Nazario, J. The President shall then appoint the members of a /LOCGOV/ Miggy Regional Consultative Commission from a list of nominees from multi-sectoral bodies. The commission shall assist the SUMMARY. A lawyer who got his license confiscated by the Congress in preparing the organic act for the autonomous MMDA is questioning its power to do the same under Sec. region. The first Congress under the 1987 Constitution within 5(f) of RA 7294. Held: The MMDA has no police power, all eighteen months shall pass the organic act from the time its functions are administrative in nature. It may only of its organization and enactment into law. Thereafter enforce, but not enact ordinances since it is not a political there shall be held a plebiscite for the approval of the unit. It cannot summarily confiscate licenses for public organic act. Only then, after its approval in the plebiscite, safety without any other legislative enactment. Sec. 5(f) shall the autonomous region be created. mandates that the MMDA shall enforce all traffic laws and regulations. ORDILLO V. COMELEC DOCTRINE. *The implementation of MMDA Circular 4 made G.R. No. 93054 / DEC 4, 1990 / GUTIERREZ, Jr., J. / the issue moot and academic. However, MMDA is not LOCGOV – Local Governments, Administrative Regions, precluded from re-implementing the former circular, or Autonomous Regions / JCFMAGSINO any other scheme, for that matter, that would entail confiscating driver’s licenses. For the proper SUMMARY: A plebiscite was conducted for the approval implementation of its future programs, the Ct deems it of the CAR Organic Act. Only a majority from the province appropriate to make the ff observations: of Ifugao approved said Act. COMELEC issued a resolution stating that the Organic Act has been approved only by RA 7924 does NOT grant the MMDA with police power, let the province of Ifugao. The SOJ, on the other hand, issued alone legislative power, and that all its functions are a memo stating that only Ifugao – due to its majority votes, administrative in nature. Insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. approving the Organic Act, alone, legally and validly 7924 grants the MMDA the power to confiscate and constitute the CAR. Executive Secretary then issues a suspend or revoke drivers licenses without need of any memo asking the CEB and CRA to wind-up its affairs. other legislative enactment, such is an UNAUTHORIZED DOCTRINE: An autonomous region cannot be created if exercise of police power. Having been lodged primarily in only one province approved of its creation in the the National Legislature, police power cannot be plebiscite called for the purpose. exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. MMDA vs BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION Sec. 5(f) grants the MMDA with the duty to enforce existing G.R. No. 135962 / March 27, 2000 / PUNO, J./ LOCGOV – traffic regulations. Thus, where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the legislature or those agencies to whom legislative powers have been delegated, like the City of Manila, in this case, MMDA is not precluded, and is in fact duty-bound, to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’ licenses in the exercise of its mandate of transport and traffic mgt
MMDA v. Viron Transport Co., Inc.
G.R. No. 70656-57/ August 15, 2007/ Carpio-Morales, J./MMDA/GRACEgar
SUMMARY. As early as 1969, traffic was a problem in Metro
Manila. On February 10, 2003, then-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued an Executive Order (179) for the establishment of the Greater Manila Mass Transport system. It designated the MMDA as the implementing agency for a mass transport terminal facilities project, which was recommended by the MMDA as a means to alleviate Metro Manila’s traffic caused by buses and the inefficient connectivity of transportation systems. The MMDA was to prepare the master plan, coordinate land use, supervise and manage construction, execute the necessary contracts and agreements, manage the funds, enlist the assistance of other government instrumentalities, and assign and hire personnel. The project also entailed the closure of existing provincial bus terminals. The Metro Manila Council supported the project, citing bus terminals as a contributor to traffic. Provincial bus operators (Viron Transport Co., Inc. and Mencorp Transportation System, Inc.) sought declaratory relief against the project. The trial court initially found for the MMDA but reversed itself. The SC upheld the trial court’s reversal, holding that the MMDA cannot be the implementing agency for the project as its charter does not include police or legislative powers. Assuming that it has police powers, the proposed project fails the test for the valid exercise of police power. DOCTRINE. In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake the Project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of respondents’ terminals. Even the MMDA’s claimed authority under the police power must necessarily fail in consonance with the above-quoted ruling in MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., 328 SCRA 836 (2000), and this Court’s subsequent ruling in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin, 456 SCRA 176 (2005), that the MMDA is not vested with police power.