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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN | Tarawa Was a Brawl | Afrikakorps Logistics | German East Front Fortifications
The Strategy & Tactics of World War II #19 AUG–SEP 2011
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6 20 any aspect of military history. Contact Ty Bomba,
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The Hardest Days: Design Corner
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Turning Points in the Battle of Britain by Joseph Miranda & Tactics and World at War magazines. We value critical
In 1940 the Germans used their analysis over summaries alone. Maximum word count is 500.
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by Roger Mason
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22 Observation Post
ASSISTANT PUBLISHER
Tarawa Was a Brawl: • Military History on Money Callie Cummins
Tactical Analysis of a Pivotal Battle Too Little, Too Late
SENIOR EDITOR
The US landing on Tarawa resulted by Ty Bomba Ty Bomba
from a decade of preparatory work. • Pure Speculation
EDITOR
Success came down to the bravery of The Port Chicago Blast Joseph Miranda
Marines in the face of failed doctrine. by Andrew Hind DESIGN
by James I. Marino • Skill vs. Luck C.J. Doherty
Battle of the Komandorski Islands COPY EDITORS
34 by Ken MacFarlane Jon Cecil, Dave Kazmierczak, Tim Tow
Logistics in the Western Desert: • Movers & Shakers Senior Game Developer
1941– 42 Guy Anson Maunsell Eric Harvey
The story of the logistical struggle behind by Jon Cecil MAP GRAPHICS
the rise and fall of the Afrikakorps. Meridian Mapping
by Joseph Miranda 62 Director of Advertising
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German East Front Fortifications
The war in Russia is most often NEXT ISSUE (#20)
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Decision Games, P.O. Box 21598, Bakersfield CA 93390.
by John Butterfield
4 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011

WACHT am Rhein
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ON 16 December 1944 the “ghost front” of the First US Army in the Ardennes suddenly erupted as 20 German divisions embarked on Hitler’s
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last attack in the west. The objective was Antwerp, which provided Allied supply for the drive into Germany. Most Americans believed the
ei
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war against Germany would be over by Christmas; yet Hitler was convinced it could still be decided in his favor. The German armies destroyed
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in France were reorganized. A massive surprise against the weakly held Ardennes sector of the American front was prepared.
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WACHT am Rhein is a grand-tactical simulation of that enormous battle. The more than 2,380 counters represent every formation, at company and battalion
levels, which fought there, including US, German, British, French, Canadian and Belgian units. Infantry, armor, anti-tank, reconnaissance, engineer, assault
gun, howitzer, rocket, parachute, ranger, glider and headquarters units are all fully represented. The four maps are an accurate representation of the region.
Compiled from 1944 German staff maps and 1943– 44 1:50,000 US Army maps, they shows all roads, trails and other types of terrain, along with all the towns
and villages that became bastions of the American defense, as well as every creek and river that couldn’t be crossed by wheeled vehicles without a bridge.
PLAYERS may use single maps for six smaller scenarios. There is also a campaign game that utilizes all four sections and portrays three
weeks (50 game turns). In that one the Germans race for the Meuse, the last hurdle before the open country leading to Antwerp, in the face
of increasing concentrations of Allied infantry, armor and air power. Extensive supply, weather and air power rules are included.
THIS edition of Wacht am Rhein presents modifications to the combat, artillery and supply systems of the first edition in order to better
depict tactical and operational warfare. For example, an “exploitation mode” has been added in order to allow mechanized units to take
advantage of breakthroughs in the enemy line. Exploitation is interleaved with the opposing player’s movement, recreating the fluid situation
that existed in the first week. Other changes include the addition of “vantage points,” which function as high ground, enabling units to spot
more effectively for artillery, as well as “constricted terrain,” which represents the channeling caused by steep gullies and ravines.
THE orders of battle have also been redone to provide an accurate depiction of the armies of both sides. Units are now in the organizations
within which they fought, not the administrative formations that were discarded due to the requirements of combat.
GAME COMPONENTS
• 4 22x34” Four Color Mapsheets
• 2,380 Die-Cut Playing Pieces
• One Rule Booklet
• One Scenario Booklet
• Assorted Player Aid Charts
• Two 10-sided Dice
• Storage Bags
GAME SCALE
• Map: 1 mile per hex
• Time: 3 Game Turns per day
• Units: Infantry and Artillery units are battalions.
Armor is depicted at the company level.
• Each strength step is equal to a company.
P.O. Box 21598 | Bakersfield, CA 93390-1598 | (661) 587-9633 phone | (661) 587-5031 fax | decisiongames.com
The Hardest Days:
Turning Points in the Battle of Britain
by Roger Mason
H
itler was always circumspect If the war was several years away, and Germany. In 1939 and 1940 the wisdom
about broadly sharing his its goal was correcting nearby territorial of that approach seemed validated
true intentions for the war in disputes, military planners could con- by a year of continuous victory.
Europe. In line with that, he developed centrate on devising the strategies and Unlike those German planners,
the habit of taking aside individual weapons systems that would be appro- however, some key leaders in Britain
military leaders and ostensibly telling priate for such a situation. It seemed were under no illusions about the
his inner thoughts to them. In that logical, then, the German military potentially expansive nature of any
way he disguised his deeper intentions concentrate on developing forces not new war. The anti-appeasement crowd,
while deflecting worries about getting intended for broader-ranging strategic led by Winston Churchill, was firm
into a war Germany wasn’t prepared conflicts. There would be no need for in their belief about the potential for
to win. For example, in the late 1930s huge battle fleets or heavy bombers. a massive and far-ranging conflict.
he assured his nervous naval chief German planners therefore Men like Air Marshall Hugh Dowding
Grand Adm. Erich Raeder that there developed innovative weapons and of Fighter Command believed
would be no war until 1944. To other tactics that met the needs of the every resource available must be
commanders in the army and Luftwaffe actual early-war campaigns. The directed at preparing for an all-out
he gave assurances any war would Luftwaffe was admirably suited to and sustained attack from Germany.
be limited to dealing with territorial conduct rapid attacks supporting Depression-era resources and bud-
issues directly affecting Germany. mobile ground forces in areas close-by gets for the RAF remained tight, though,
World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011 7

even as Dowding worked on developing
The Intelligence War aircraft that would be capable of suc-
cessfully defending England. Hurricane
The five keys to intelligence gathering for the British were: the Chain Home radar and Spitfire fighters were put into
system, signals intelligence, the ability to decipher the German Enigma code, examination production. One important innovation
of downed German aircraft, and the interrogation of captured German aircrew. was adding additional machineguns
The Chain Home radar system gave the British real-time tactical intelligence that would be needed to speedily knock
that allowed them to optimize their fighter deployment. While the radar’s range was down larger aircraft like a Heinkel 111
limited, the information provided by it gave the origin of the attack, its direction or Dornier 17 bomber. The Hurricane
and approximate size, thereby also providing clues to its intended target. was a rugged and steady gun platform,
The “Y” signals intercept system was based on a series of receiving stations which was perfect for attacking bomb-
that monitored German radio traffic. Data involving aircraft and unit call signs ers. The Spitfire was fast and was a
were analyzed against other intelligence sources. Those data, along with raw match for the German Me-109 fighter.
encrypted messages, were passed to the code breakers at Bletchley Park. Even Effort was also put into to the
Fighter Command and Air Marshall Dowding weren’t initially given access to development and survivability of
Enigma intelligence, but by the end of the campaign that had changed. command and control systems. Even
Because the battle was fought over England, nearly all crashed German as the first early warning radars were
aircraft landed in what was for them enemy territory. The wrecks were carefully installed, Dowding insisted com-
examined for whatever intelligence they might yield. Likewise, German crews who munications and power lines to that
bailed out were usually captured on landing. The only exceptions being some men system’s various command and control
and aircraft that crashed in the more distant parts of the Channel and North Sea. centers all be laid underground.
The Germans had no such advantages. On their air staff, intelligence was Hitler believed his 1940 invasion of
under the Operations Staff and was known as Abteilung V. That unit’s preliminary France, while risky, would ultimately be
intelligence estimate of British air defenses was completed in July 1940: almost all successful; however, no one, not even he,
of its conclusions were faulty. It minimized the capabilities and quantity of existing could’ve predicted just how successful
RAF fighters while also greatly underestimating the rate of fighter production. The that attack would be. In six weeks the
Germans therefore expected the RAF to quickly run out of fighters. Further, the same Germans were on the Channel, while
report described the British radar system as “inflexible” and “ineffective.” the British ground force was effectively
Correspondingly, neither were the Germans able to use their Freya mobile radar toothless after the Dunkirk evacuation.
system to gather much information about the RAF. They were at times able, by collecting Both sides’ generals and admirals
“shadows” from Chain Home radar transmissions, to spot RAF squadrons as they took off. realized command of the airspace over
Only a handful of British pilots fell into German hands. The Luftwaffe had gathered some the Channel and southern England was
intelligence on Fighter Command before the war, and their airfield strikes were based on that mandatory to stop decisive intervention
information. Unfortunately for them, many squadrons had since been moved and the Germans by the British fleet against any amphibi-
therefore repeatedly bombed airfields that were only being used as emergency landing strips. ous invasion. The first step to being
The British also conducted several deception operations. Dummy radio stations were able to launch any invasion therefore
set up to transmit simulated radar transmissions and radio traffic in case a Sector Control lay in destroying the RAF. The differ-
or Chain Home station was damaged. That led to the false impression among the Germans ence between the British and German
those facilities couldn’t be destroyed by bombing. The British also placed fake battle appreciations of the situation came
damage and dynamited some empty buildings on their airfields. That fooled the Germans from the fact the latter’s successes in
into believing the bombing campaign was having a serious impact on British operations, the war up to that time had been based
and led them to the mistaken belief in early September that the RAF was finished. Overall, on tactical and operational innovations
then, the British clearly won the intelligence battle from July to September 1940. ★ related to ground warfare. The Germans
had given little thought to what a
strategic air campaign would be like.
After three weeks of assessing the
new strategic potentials inherent in the
surrender of France, Hitler was ready for
his next move. On 30 June 1940 a new
directive was issued, under the hand of
Luftwaffe chief Hermann Goering, for
an air war against Britain. That gave little
time for planning and preparation.
It was followed on 1 August by a directive
(No. 17) from Hitler himself, which
defined the mission of the Luftwaffe as
being to intensify operations against
England to the point that nation’s
ultimate defeat would be assured. Targets
would be aircraft units and their support
organizations, aircraft production facili-
A German ties and, more generally, the entire British
Enigma defense industry. Secondary targets
machine
would be shipping and ports, in order
to cut the import of food and supplies.

Those were sound strategic objec- but they were only used to watch The British quickly formed a good
tives. The problem was such a campaign for convoy traffic in the Channel. idea of what was coming. The Luftwaffe’s
would, given the tactical nature of the On 1 August the Germans conducted “Yellow Code” had been cracked in
Luftwaffe, have to be based on impro- small raids and reconnaissance flights the early spring by the cryptanalysts
visation and luck. The British had for against targets from Scotland south to at Bletchley Park (see sidebar). The
several years correctly estimated Hitler’s the Channel ports. RAF fighters remained Germans made a change to a new
deeper intentions and objectives con- scarce. The Germans also attempted to “Red Code” in April that resulted in
cerning their country. They had therefore influence public opinion by dropping a temporary decryption blackout,
prepared to defeat just such a campaign. leaflets containing Hitler’s latest speech but by late May the British were
to the Reichstag, which offered the British again reading German messages.
10 July – 7 August: terms for an armistice. That morning Dowding determined the RAF didn’t
Shadow Boxing Goering called his commanders to have to decisively beat the Luftwaffe
Amsterdam for consultations. He wanted to win the coming campaign. The
German staff officers began drawing to know what the enemy was doing: was important thing was to preserve an
up detailed plans for the invasion of withholding fighters a calculated tactic or effective fighter force that would be
England, codenamed Operation Sea were the British low on pilots and planes? available if the Germans launched
Lion. Preliminary discussions were held Goering also outlined what he called an invasion. The RAF therefore didn’t
between the navy and army. Hitler was his “bull’s eye strategy.” The Luftwaffe take the bait of the early attacks on the
told it would take a minimum of five would begin the campaign by launching Channel ports and sites in southern
weeks to collect and retrofit enough attacks against targets 90 to 125 miles England. From the German viewpoint
barges and other watercraft to move from the center of London. Each week the situation remained vague and
the required ground force across the the goal would be to destroy 100 RAF British capabilities uncertain. Goring
Channel. While the army and navy fighters, and the targeting ring would therefore decided to step up operations.
prepared, the goal of achieving air supe- also be tightened around London. As
riority was turned over to the Luftwaffe. the targeting grew closer to London, the 5 August – 6 September:
Reichsmarshall Hermann Goering British government would be compelled Destroy Fighter Command
ordered preliminary probes against the to negotiate in order to avoid what
RAF defense system. British fighters today would be called “socio-political British intelligence could see
seemed to be scarce except for patrols collapse.” At the same time, some 400 to the Germans were making invasion
over ships in the Channel. Luftwaffe 500 British fighters would be destroyed preparations. Photoreconnaissance
unit commanders were told to get during the tightening process. By then flights showed coastal craft and
their aircrews familiar with that coast the invasion force would be ready and barges being readied. Bletchley Park
and the interior of southern England Sea Lion could be launched, if indeed noted the acceleration of German radio
just beyond it. German mobile radar it were still necessary. The five-week traffic directing units to the coast.
units were moved to the French coast, plan would be started on 8 August. continued on page 12 »

Chain Home Radar & RAF Fighter Control
In the early 1930s visionaries like Hugh Dowding replied he wouldn’t support any such often portray elderly English spinsters with
Dowding recognized the RAF had no effective development until he’d seen a successful test. field glasses patiently counting German
countermeasure to use against high altitude A test was set up in which an RAF bomber was bombers as they roar overhead toward
heavy bombers. Some suggested the answer flown back and forth while being successfully London. That simplistic representation
was an H.G. Wells-type “death ray.” Early tracked by RDF. Dowding approved the new masks the true workings of the system. By
experiments soon validated the mainstream system, which was codenamed Chain Home. the start of the Battle of Britain over 30,000
belief such a weapon was impossible with the The system consisted of a series of 360-foot observers were in place and organized into
technologies then available. Those experiments fixed towers with wire strung among them. groups covering all England. They tracked
did, however, yield one interesting result: the It could determine: range, bearing, formation enemy aircraft, confirmed kills and provided
radio waves beamed at test aircraft bounced off size and altitude. Altitude remained the most post-raid information on enemy flight paths.
their surfaces and, by being continuously recol- problematic factor throughout the Battle of The OC members wore RAF overalls known
lected and analyzed, could be used to reveal Britain, in that atmospheric conditions could as “boiler suits,” and standard “soup plate”
those planes’ location, elevation and direction. alter those readings. RAF fighter pilots soon steel helmets with the letters “O.C.” stenciled
Robert Watson-Watt and his staff at the learned to always add several thousand on the front. Each observation post had a
National Physical Laboratory then began work- feet to any radar intercept vector given to telephone wired for direct contact with Fighter
ing on a dependable system for spotting aircraft them in order to be sure they didn’t arrive Command headquarters at Bentley Priory and
using radio waves. That system was called beneath the plotted enemy aircraft. the closest Sector Control. The system was
“R.D.F.” for “Radio Direction and Finding.” The Another challenge was the radar’s range. at once large, simple, robust and effective.
Germans were also working on RDF technology, The first RDF systems had a 50-mile range, When an incoming attack was detected,
but their systems were at first intended only which was then gradually increased to 120. That that Chain Home station’s tracking team
for use by warships. An early version of their allowed Fighter Command to “see” into occupied contacted Fighter Command, where the hostile
naval Wurzburg targeting radar was fortu- France and watch as the German formations contact was plotted on a large map. That
itously recovered by British intelligence from actually took off. In addition to maximum range, information was telephoned to the Fighter
the scuttled battlecruiser Graf Spee in 1939. the radar had a minimum range as well. As Group nearest the attack. The information was
The design for the first British radar aircraft crossed the English coast they became also phoned to the relevant Sector Control.
system was developed by Arnold Wilkins, who too close for Chain Home to continue to monitor. Sector Controls were individual air defense
reported his findings to Watson-Watt. He in That led to the redeployment of the Observer sectors responsible for fixed defenses like
turn advised Dowding that RDF worked. He then Corps, which had first been established to barrage balloons and anti-aircraft artillery
further requested 10,000 pounds to establish report Zeppelin raids during World War I. as well as fighter squadrons. Sector Controls
such a system to protect all of England. In that regard, popular fiction and movies coordinated local air defenses and in turn

transmitted the orders of the Group Commander.
As RAF squadrons scrambled, their
flight paths were tracked by direction finding
stations. RAF fighters carried a transponder
that identified them as RAF aircraft. That was
known as “I.F.F.” or “Identification, Friend
or Foe.” Reports from the ground observers,
RAF pilots, and direction finding stations kept
Sector Controls informed of the progress and
location of each battle as it moved inland.
That information was sent back up the chain
to the Group Commands and Fighter Command.
It was also broadcast to all sectors to help them
track the course of the battle. That allowed
other nearby sector controllers to take over if the
primary Sector Control station was destroyed
or knocked off line. As each battle progressed,
Fighter Command was always ready to order
in squadrons from neighboring groups if the
primary squadrons required reinforcement.
The Chain Home system supported by
Sector Control was never even temporarily, let
alone completely, destroyed. Faulty German
intelligence estimates had convinced Goering
the system wasn’t worth the effort to destroy it.
When attacks in August did threaten to collapse
the system, the Germans switched strategies
due to the lack of visible results. Thereafter
they simply ignored the tall towers along the
English coast. That proved a costly error. ★

» continued from page 9 Spitfires and Hurricanes to intercept. Wight escorted by several squadrons
The first significant aerial action by The Germans then withdrew. of fighters. The Germans launched
the Germans occurred on Monday, 5 August 6 and 7 were relatively quiet, three successive attacks of 100 planes.
August at 8:30 a.m. The Chain Home with only some small raids and some That afternoon a second convoy off
system detected some 50 hostile aircraft reconnaissance flights. The lull ended Bournemouth was hit by five similar
on route to the Dover area. Fighter on Thursday the 8th when an inbound attacks. Fighter Command responded by
Group 11 sortied four squadrons of merchant convoy passed the Isle of launching over 600 fighters and patrol
planes, for a total loss of 17 aircraft.
The fighting continued throughout
Tactics the week. The Germans were enduring
mounting losses, but they hadn’t
For the Battle of Britain the Germans and the British developed tactics suited to destroyed the 100 British fighters their
their respective strategies and aircraft inventories. The Germans didn’t have a heavy planners estimated were needed weekly
bomber; however, they had three medium bombers: the Junkers 88, the Heinkel 111 and to crush the RAF. The attacks on the con-
the Dornier 17. In addition they had the Ju-87 Stuka, which had been a highly effective voys had brought out Fighter Command,
tactical dive bomber against the Poles and the French during the previous year. but there seemed to be no fewer Spitfires
To protect those bombers the Germans had large numbers of Me-110 “heavy fight- and Hurricanes than when they’d
ers.” Those twin-engine aircraft carried two-man crews and were better armed than started. Goering decided it was time for
single-engine machines. The Me-110 had two 20mm cannon and four machineguns in a knockout blow, and scheduled a major
the nose as well as one rear-facing machinegun. The Germans also had the Me-109 effort for the morning of 12 August.
fighter. It was a high-performance interceptor armed with 20mm cannon. A special unit called
The initial German strategy was to use Stukas to hit pinpoint targets. The medium Erprobungsgruppe 210 (Operational
bomber formations would be protected by close-in Me-110 escorts, while the Me-109s Trials Wing 210) was readied. Me110s
conducted free-range sweeps with large formations to destroy enemy fighters. had been modified along with some
The British had two fighter types making up the bulk of their aircraft arsenal, the Me109s to carry small bomb loads.
Supermarine Spitfire and the Hawker Hurricane. The Spitfire was the faster of the two and The idea was those aircraft would
a great air superiority fighter. It could deal with German fighter escorts, thereby protecting approach at low altitude and make
the Hurricanes as they went after the bombers. The Sector Control and Chain Home radar precision strikes. Their targets were
systems meant the amount of time patrolling and watching for enemy formations was cut the British radar towers. The attackers
to a minimum. After each fight the RAF pilots could land and standby until the next attack. successfully hit several of them.
As the campaign progressed, the Me-110s fell victim in nearly every The Germans then waited to see
engagement due to their lack of speed and maneuverability. The Stukas were if the overall system would fail.
simply too slow to operate in that kind of battle environment, proving easy targets The British, however, had anticipated
for the Spitfires and the Hurricanes. The Me-109s were therefore seldom free to attacks against their radar and had pre-
conduct the massive sweeps they’d planned; they had to stay close to the bombers pared a deception plan. Dummy stations
and help fight off the combination attacks from the Hurricanes and Spitfires. capable of broadcasting simulated radar
Dowding’s strategy was to avoid all fighting that wasn’t directed at destroying German transmissions and radio traffic were
bombers. When German fighter sweeps appeared the British pulled back, leaving the M-109s standing by and immediately began
with no one to fight. Later, when the Luftwaffe concentrated on London, the British employed transmitting. To the Germans there
a tactic called the “big wing,” whereby six or more squadrons would intercept an incoming
bomber formation. The big wings were awkward to organize and employ, but they were instantly
and deeply demoralizing to Luftwaffe pilots who’d been told Fighter Command was finished.
Due to their range limits, German fighters had a maximum of 20 minutes flying time
once they crossed the British coast. Their bombers had longer range, but were slower.
Engaging in midair melees with the RAF rarely accomplished anything decisive other than
using up fuel. When the German fighter escorts turned for home, the Hurricanes attacked.
The Germans were only able to destroy a handful of British aircraft on the ground.
In Poland, France, and later in Russia, great numbers of Allied aircraft were destroyed
while parked on their airfields. The Chain Home radar system gave the British warning
of incoming attacks, and the British also built concrete revetments for their aircraft and
dispersed them around the airfields. That limited losses due to nearby explosions.
The most effective tactic the Germans came up with was to simultaneously send
small formations of bombers and fighters to many targets. Such efforts were hard
for the British to track, and reserves had to be constantly kept back in case a mas-
sive raid followed. That meant many of the smaller attacks got through.
One of the worst German tactics was forcing Me-109 fighters to
carry a single 500 lb. bomb. That reduced those planes’ comparative
performance from that of a racehorse to that of a plow horse
The tipping point came in late August, when Hitler ordered the switch from
targeting airfields to going after cities. While horrifying for the helpless civilians
who lived through the “Blitz,” that approach could never be decisive in crippling the
RAF. Fighter Command’s numbers remained stable. Dowding therefore knew the RAF
would survive and there could thus be no invasion. The fighting continued into the
new year, but the window of opportunity for the Luftwaffe had closed. ★

seemed to be no break in radar service. even though there’d been no discernable The morning of Eagle Day didn’t
Throughout the day the Germans impact from the radar station attacks. begin well for the Germans. Spotty
conducted raids of 150 to 200 aircraft Goering decided the next three days weather resulted in numerous sortie
against RAF airfields, Channel ports would see a concentrated series of cancellations. The problem was all
and convoys. The airfields at Manston attacks starting on the morning of the units didn’t receive the abort code,
and Hawkinge were heavily damaged. 13th. He designated that day as Adlertag and several attacks went ahead,
Preliminary estimates indicated the day (Eagle Day). The goal was to strike a resulting in scattered and disjointed
had been successful for the Germans decisive blow against Fighter Command. continued on page 15 »

Code Breaking at Bletchley Park
When war with Germany became imminent in a total of 150 billion possible substitutions. One of Turing’s team members, Tommy
1938, the British government purchased a 60-acre The Germans sent the encoded messages Flowers, then designed an electronic “Colossus,”
Victorian estate, Bletchley Park, in the town of between their various headquarters and units in the the world’s first programmable computer, to attack
Bletchley about 50 miles northwest of London. field by Morse code. Those dots and dashes were the even more complex Lorenz machine code. The
The site included a gabled mansion with spacious recorded at intercept locations (“Y Stations”) located Colossus was successful, by 1943 proving able to
grounds and a lake with ducks. That estate was on the British coast. The intended recipient’s Enigma handle thousands of daily intercepted messages.
to be the secret headquarters for the Government machine, set up the same way as the sender’s by (At war’s end, Churchill ordered the destruction of
Code and Cipher School (GCCS) and the Security previous arrangement, would decode the message the Colossus machines because of their top-secret
Intelligence Service (SIS). A plaque quoting back into plaintext. Such a complex system of nature. One has since been rebuilt at the Bletchley
Shakespeare (Henry V, Act II, Scene II) in the man- letter substitution appeared to be unbreakable, but Park Museum based on original design schematics.)
sion’s entrance hall cites Bletchley Park’s mission and in 1939 the Poles provided the French and British The number of persons allowed to receive Ultra
accomplishment: “The King hath note of all that they with two reconstructed Enigma machines, and intelligence was strictly limited. Those who knew
intend, by interception which they dream not of.” from that start Bletchley Park went on to become the source of the intercepts were never allowed
The Foreign Office sought mathematicians, the code breaking capitol of the Allied world. The in areas where they might be captured. When
linguists, Chess champions and crossword intelligence received through those intercepts and information was distributed, there was always
puzzle experts to become cryptanalysts. The subsequent decodings became known as Ultra. a cover story as to how it had been obtained (for
intelligence center became known as “Station The code breakers found the Enigma coding example, via high altitude fly-over photography, spot-
X,” since it was the 10th intercept station set process too complicated to solve entirely by manual ter planes, spies on the ground, etc.). The “Special
up by the British. When the cryptanalysts were methods. Such methods did, however, identify com- Liaison Unit Officers” who delivered the messages
hired, they didn’t know their mission would be to mon phrases, like “Heil Hitler” or “please respond.” to Allied commanders destroyed the sheets of
break the codes of what had been advertised as Further, the Germans often aided manual decoding paper after the recipient read them. Messages
an “unbreakable machine,” the German Enigma by sending those expressions in plaintext. weren’t allowed to be transmitted or repeated.
device. The task would be daunting: the German The code breakers called successful guesses Those who actually did the decoding were
military sent over 3,000 such signals a day. at plaintext messages “cribs.” Routine weather never allowed to see the larger picture of what
Dr. Arthur Scherbius, a German engineer, reports often provided excellent cribs, while captured they were doing (“compartmentalization”).
had invented the Enigma in 1922. (The word codebooks also provided help as the war went Similarly, they weren’t allowed to tell anyone the
“enigma” comes from the Greek ainigma, meaning on. With a probable plaintext fragment, and nature of their work, not even their families.
“to speak in riddles.”) It was first exhibited at the knowledge no letter could be enciphered Everyone in the Bletchley Park intelligence
the 1923 Congress of the International Postal as itself, the code breakers could sometimes community was required to sign the Official
Union in Bern, Switzerland, and was intended for identify a corresponding cipher text fragment. Secret’s Act, which gave their oath to never
traveling businessmen to use to provide secu- The leading cryptanalysts Alan Turing, Gordon reveal their work. Churchill later expressed pride
rity for their telegrams. As it turned out few Welchman and their team — then managed to in the success of the code breakers, lauding their
businesses were interested, but the German design an electro-mechanical device they anach- dedication and secrecy by calling them “the geese
military quickly took notice of the device’s potential. ronistically dubbed “the Bombe,” because it made that laid the golden eggs and never cackled.”
The Wehrmacht would use a total of 40,000 a ticking noise when operating. They connected Only 120 people started at Bletchley Park
Enigma machines throughout World War II. the Enigma rotor wiring to the Bombes using a in 1939. By the beginning of 1944 that number
There were many versions of the Enigma, but schematic (“menu”) based on cribs previously deter- had increased to 7,000; ultimately, by V-E Day,
the standard machine had a keyboard containing mined manually. The Bombes then disproved every 12,000 worked there. Yet, despite all those
letters in the pattern of a normal “QWERTY” incorrect setting and determined potential settings. thousands of potential security leaks, the work
typewriter but without keys for numerals or The Bombes, located in outstation locations, done at Bletchley Park remained unknown
punctuation. The machine contained a scrambler ran 24 hours a day. Almost 2,000 Women’s Royal until Frederick Winterbotham’s (authorized)
system of electrically connected revolving drums Navy Service (WRENS) personnel and over 200 publication of The Ultra Secret in 1974.
(rotors) powered by dry-cell batteries. RAF technicians staffed those locations. Allied supreme commander Gen. Dwight
That arrangement changed the 26 letters German units in the field primarily used the D. Eisenhower said Ultra was “decisive” in
of the alphabet as its operator typed each Enigma, while their higher headquarters used a winning the war. It’s since been estimated the
letter of a message on the keyboard. The original different machine, the Lorenz Cipher, to produce their work of the code breakers hastened the war’s
Enigma, with the three-rotor set up therefore coded messages. The larger Lorenz machine required end by at least two years. Throughout the war
provided (26x26x26) for 17,576 possible start a teletype — a device that allowed conversation the Germans remained unaware their Enigma
states. When a movable ring was reset on which in printed form over telephone lines — and fixed and Lorenz codes had been broken. ★
the letters A to Z were printed, and 10 cables circuits. The code breakers nicknamed the German
were also reset between the letters, there were teletype “Tunny,” and called its coded output “Fish.” — Annie Laura Smith
Bletchley Park mansion Alan Turing The working rebuilt bombe

» continued from page 13 Lots of unconnected real estate and pri- 396 Hurricanes. That was an overall
operations. The British responded vate buildings had been destroyed, along increase, with just a slight decrease
quickly, and many German aircraft with civilian casualties. Some airfields in Spitfire strength. Besides the
were destroyed or damaged. had been hit, but the damage was being material totals, losses of RAF pilots
By the afternoon the weather repaired. The RAF had lost 34 aircraft, had also been kept to a minimum.
improved. The afternoon attacks were with a majority of the pilots recovered. Fighter Command was surviving.
therefore more successful, but scattered The Luftwaffe had lost 75 aircraft with August 24 was another day of
cloud cover still made overall bombing few pilots or aircrews saved. Luftwaffe maximum effort by Luftflotte II. It sent in
results inaccurate. Two RAF airfields pilots called it “Black Thursday.” a variety of attacks using some 200 air-
were damaged. Fighter Command lost Goring responded by declaring craft. Southern airfields were hit again,
a total of 13 aircraft, but all pilots were attacks on the Channel ports and and Fighter Command was stretched
recovered. The results for the Germans convoys a “waste,” and ordered to the limit. In the intense combat 20
were therefore much less than decisive. that henceforth all efforts would be aircraft were destroyed, including two
August 15 wasn’t much better for directed against airfields and aircraft fighters lost to friendly fire. RAF airfields
them. The raiders hit some of the same factories. The news convoy attacks across southern England were pounded.
airfields in southern England and would cease was encouraging to That night a small flight of
bombed the Channel ports. Only four Dowding; however, the correspond- Heinkels followed the course of the
RAF personnel were killed, including ing decision to concentrate against Thames to bomb some oil terminals.
three pilots. The attacks on the airfields airfields was a great concern. The bombers overshot their target
were inaccurate, resulting in devasta- August 16 and 17 were relatively and instead mistakenly struck the
tion to surrounding pastures but only quiet, but the 18th became known as the London dock district, causing civilian
moderate damage to the airfields. “hardest day” for Fighter Command. casualties. The next day Churchill
An attack headed toward Edinburgh Starting at noon, hundreds of attacks and his War Cabinet met and ordered
was picked up by Fighter Command. hit RAF fields all over southern England. nighttime retaliatory attacks against
The Germans intended it to draw off The British lost 22 aircraft. Churchill sat five German cities including Berlin.
defenders from the south. The prevail- at Group 11 headquarters to watch the German losses were starting
ing wisdom was Fighter Command battle unfold. All of that group’s aircraft to climb. In August they lost 774
had its hands full trying to stop the were committed, including the reserve. aircraft and 216 pilots. Most of those
southern attacks and wouldn’t be able It was on the way home from watching losses were from fighter attacks. Pilot
to respond. Due to the extreme range, the epic battle that Churchill uttered and aircrew losses were also rising.
the 72 He-111s of KG26 were coming his now famous phrase: “Never was so Squadron commanders were reporting
unescorted from Stavanger. Dowding much owed to so few by so many.” a significant number of accidents due
had anticipated such a move, and had At the end of the day one statistic to engine failure on take off. There was
Group 12 rested and ready to meet it. stood out above all others: on 1 August growing suspicion foreign workers
The bomber force was decimated. the British had 245 Spitfires and 341 in aircraft plants in Germany were
By that evening it was clear Eagle Day Hurricanes; by the evening of the sabotaging newly made engines.
had generated greater hype than results. 18th the tally was 228 Spitfires and Another factor in the German attri-

tion rate was the type of ammunition a week was still not being met. late or out of position. What Goering
used by the RAF. The Me-109s were Attacks on the Chain Home tow- interpreted as systemic and material
well armed with 20mm cannon, but ers had caused damage and some weakness was actually a continuing
the British were using incendiary temporary loss of coverage. The struggle to achieve effective command-
ammunition in their Browning .303 Germans were therefore increasingly control. Even so, the airbases of Group
machineguns. German aircraft that able to surprise Fighter Command and 11 were becoming badly damaged and
were hit therefore tended to catch strike targets unopposed. From the barely functional. Momentum was start-
fire and were rarely able to return to German perspective, however, attacks ing to move in the Luftwaffe’s direction.
friendly airspace before crashing. on the radar system seemed to have
British loses were also climbing. no effect due to the aforementioned 7 September – 5 October:
Dowding asked that Channel convoys deception operation. Goering, though, The Blitz
be limited. The large number of aircraft put it all together to mean the British
required to defend that shipping were weakening and their radar had The affect of Bomber Command’s
invited massive air battles, and most actually been of little use from the start. retaliatory strikes against German cities
of the pilots shot down in them were For Fighter Command the biggest struck home with Hitler. In his view
lost due to drowning in the cold water. problem with the radar was estimating those raids were an important political
In battles fought over land the British the altitude of tracked attacks. Fighter development. He’d been at his home at
pilots’ survival rate was excellent, and Command had dispatched interceptors Berchtesgaden since 17 August, moni-
aircraft production for Spitfires and to nearly every attack, but the techno- toring the campaign from there. On the
Hurricanes was exceeding losses. The logical inaccuracy in determining alti- 29th he returned to Berlin, having been
German quota of 100 British fighters tude often meant the defenders arrived moved by the bombing of the German

cities to declare the time had come to facing hundreds of RAF fighters during the Blitzkrieg, but they were prepared for
finally and fully break the British. the daytime raids; however, and Fighter an air defense struggle over their home-
He selected London as the new Command remained far from defeated. land. The Fighter Command defenses
primary target: attacks would switch Dowding was distressed over the civilian were robust, with each component
from airfields and factories to that losses, but he recognized the momen- overlapping the next. That prevented
population center. To give more time tum of the fighting had again turned sudden catastrophic failure. When
for that change to work its effect, to Fighter Command’s advantage. the Germans knocked out part of the
he also moved back the invasion Attacks on airfields lessened as Chain Home radar system or a Sector
launch-date from 15 to 21 September. more and more effort was directed Control center, the rest of the system
On the morning of 7 September, at London. The high attrition rate of was able to cover the temporary loss.
Goering moved his headquarters in the German bombers dropped with The aircraft of Fighter Command
his private train to the French coast. the move to nighttime bombing, were well suited for the missions they
He wanted to be in place to personally but so did their bombing accu- were called to fly. The majority of British
direct the attack against London. racy (never great to begin). Daytime interceptors were Hurricanes. While not
From Enigma intercepts the bombing became prohibitive due the most agile fighter of World War II, it
British were informed as to what was to the heavy sustained losses. was rugged, dependable, easy to build
happening. Fighter Command knew September 27 brought a small victory and deadly against German bombers.
it would be a big day; they waited for for the Luftwaffe when a raid hit the The Spitfire was less plentiful. During
the Germans to make the first move. Supermarine factory in Southhampton, the three-month battle the total number
Mid-morning a group of 70 bombers resulting in the temporary halt of of operational Spitfires varied from
attacked two airfields in the south. At Spitfire production. Even so, by about 250 to 200. Spitfire performance
about 4:00 p.m. radar reported another the end of the month Hitler had to equaled or exceeded that of the best
large enemy contact. From 4:30 to 6:30 indefinitely postpone Operation Sea German fighter, the Me-109. Because the
p.m. over 350 bombers struck targets in Lion. Fighter Command had won. British concentrated on the production
southern England. That was followed by of those two aircraft types, the Germans
attacks on London all night. The fighting Conclusion were never able to force the RAF past the
was intense. All of Group 11 and five tipping point of irreplaceable losses.
squadrons of Group 12 were committed. After three months of combat, the The Germans weren’t prepared to
Twenty-seven RAF aircraft were lost. Battle of Britain evolved into a stalemate fight anything like the Battle of Britain.
The rest of the month saw the con- with the Luftwaffe legendarily but Their Luftwaffe generals had been told
stant night bombing of London. Fighter ineffectively night-bombing British to prepare for a limited territorial war.
Command was losing aircraft, but most cities. The RAF kept control of the They’d therefore produced aircraft
pilots were recovered and new produc- daytime airspace over England. intended for close air support of mobile
tion kept operational aircraft levels with- The first cause of that German defeat warfare near Germany. Their star plane
in acceptable limits. Civilian casualties came from the simple fact the British for close air support, the Ju-87 Stuka dive
were mounting, especially during the were prepared for the battle while the bomber, was slow and nearly defenseless
night raids, which were nearly impos- Germans weren’t. The British hadn’t pre- against fighter attack. The short range of
sible to stop. The Luftwaffe pilots were pared for the mobile ground warfare of their fighters limited escort protection

and exposed their bombers to repeated Germans ended up lurching from crews had been assured the RAF was
attack. As the Germans transitioned objective to objective, with little effort already as good as defeated at the start
to night attacks, civilian losses went given to actually analyze and evaluate of the fighting. During the daylight
up but bombing accuracy dropped. efforts against results. Just when they raids of mid-September, German
Yet another significant difference were realizing results from their attacks bomber formations were faced with
between the Luftwaffe and the RAF on the airfields, they changed tactics. over 600 RAF fighters the pilots of which
lay in the minds and intuition of That demonstrated the inability of proved both capable and determined.
their leaders. Churchill recognized Hitler and Goering to make patient and It was therefore soon clear to all the
Dowding and his Fighter Command rational decisions based on factual data. British were far from defeated. ✪
group leaders were competent and The crucial fact was the importance
prepared for battle. The prime minister Hitler placed on concentrating on Sources
therefore watched the battle unfold defeating the will of his opponents. In
Bungay, S. The Most Dangerous Enemy.
but didn’t interfere with it. He also the earlier campaigns against France, London: Aurum Press, 2000.
understood the British people were Belgium and Holland, those nations’ Churchill, W. Their Finest Hour.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949.
determined to see the conflict through. governments, high commands and Fisher, D. A Summer Bright and Terrible.
He concentrated his personal efforts on citizenry had rapidly become demoral- New York: Shoemaker & Hoard, 2005.
Lund, E. The Battle of Britain: The German Perspective.
supporting that critical morale factor. ized and then lost their will to resist. Montgomery, AL: USAF War College, 1996.
The Luftwaffe was victim to frequent The British, spared by geography Murray, W. Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe, 1933 –1945.
Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993.
intervention by Goering and Hitler, from having to fight a mobile ground Ziegler, P. London at War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995.
which often led to poor choices, like battle, hadn’t fallen into that trap.
requiring fighters to carry a 500 lb. bomb Instead of the British, then, it was
that robbed them of speed and agility. the Germans who became demoralized.
The Germans started with a workable The overall course of the Battle of
plan, but it was discarded when Hitler’s Britain was controlled by the RAF and
desire to punish the British took over. played to that service’s strengths and
Over the course of the campaign the advantages. The Luftwaffe pilots and

Design Corner
Joseph Miranda
The Hardest Days
T
his issue’s wargame is John the course of the campaign. The British given a specific rule. The player can’t
Butterfield’s The Hardest did, however, have the edge when it make decisions for the other side.
Days, a purpose-designed came to the overall intelligence war. Variable Luftwaffe decision-making
solitaire simulation. Some military One part of that edge was tactical, inso- is there insofar as certain random
situations automatically make far as they had set up radar and ground events can vary the tactical situation.
for a good solitaire game. One of observer stations in advance, which There are some unique aspects to
those is the Battle of Britain, the air gave them an adequate and timely air warfare modeled here. You have to
campaign in which the Royal Air picture of aerial intruders. Another part manage RAF squadrons: they can be
Force defeated the Luftwaffe’s bid to was strategic, from their various signals “ready,” “scrambling,” or at various
gain control of the skies over England intelligence programs. So the British altitudes. Altitude was an important
in 1940. There are two reasons the had a better view of the “big picture.” tactical consideration; so it’s in the
campaign works well in that way. That’s reflected in the game by game. There are other tactical consid-
One of those factors is “fog of war.” having the player actively command erations, such as if Luftwaffe fighters
Both the RAF and Luftwaffe high com- the Royal Air Force while the game are conducting independent sweep
mands had a difficult time fully figuring system runs the Luftwaffe. The player missions or are escorting the bombers.
out what the other was up to. That was can make decisions that model the There are also purely random
in part because of the limited military real command-control advantages the events that model the chaotic factors
intelligence available to both sides. British had in the original campaign. of air warfare. Raiders may not have
The Germans also had misconcep- Of course, it also means he has the formed up correctly, or there may
tions about the efficacy of strategic opportunity to make errors that can have been navigational errors, or the
airpower. There had been a prewar be disastrous in the course of play. enemy has more effective tactics and,
theory postulating civilian morale Another thing that facilitates this as always in air warfare, weather can
would crack under sustained bombing. solitaire design comes from the fact change quickly. The random event rule
While the Germans had dismissed many of the original actions were brings in an added dimension in that it
that concept in the 1930s, the experi- linear: Luftwaffe intruders moved along prevents the player from reducing the
ence of the campaigns of 1939 and predetermined paths to targets and situation to one that can be gotten at
1940 then seemed to give it renewed then returned home. Their actions, purely through quantitative thinking.
credence. There were Luftwaffe such as bombing and escort, are cut A couple features that give the
raids on Warsaw and Rotterdam and dried at this scale. They can be game a historical look, such as the Tote
that did much to encourage those modeled by simple game sub-systems, Board, are deliberately reminiscent
nations’ governments to capitulate. such as the process of moving them of RAF control rooms. Those features
On the other side, the British had to across the map from area to area. put players into the spirit of the situa-
deal with air raids coming from various The rules tend to be procedural as a tion. It all adds up to a tense game of
directions and an enemy who changed result. Every possibility for the enemy aerial conflict in which you can win
his targeting strategy several times over force has to be thought through and or lose the war in a few days. ✪

The Hardest Days
The Hardest Days (THD), designed by John Butterfield, is a To purchase the game that covers the battles featured in
purpose-designed solitaire wargame of intermediate complexity this issue send your name and address along with:
covering five critical days in the Battle of Britain, the five days that
saw the heaviest air action in the sky over England in the summer of $30 US Customers
1940. Each of those days is presented as its own scenario. THD puts $36 Canadian Customers
you in control of British Fighter Command, responding to air raids $38 Overseas Customers
launched by the Luftwaffe, which is controlled by the game system.
Each one-day scenario represents up to 14 hours during All prices include postage for first class or airmail shipping.
which the Luftwaffe launches raids against targets in southern CA residents add $1.98 sales tax.
England, defended by the squadrons of RAF Fighter Command.
German raids include bomber Gruppen (groups), attempting to Send to:
hit specific targets, and fighter groups protecting those bombers Decision Games
and attacking British fighter squadrons. The German goal is ATTN: WaW Game Offer
twofold: inflict damage on targets and destroy squadrons to gain PO Box 21598
air superiority in preparation for the invasion of England. Bakersfield, CA 93390
The game system controls German strategy and tactics.
You use your fighter squadrons to respond to the raids in an attempt
to destroy or turn back the raiders and prevent their effective
bombing of their targets, while minimizing your own fighter losses.
Detail of the The Hardest Days map

Tarawa Was
a Brawl:
Tactical Analysis of
a Pivotal Battle
by James I. Marino
A Marine fires on a
Japanese pillbox.

T
arawa was a deadly brawl, the Department authorized in General the bridgehead; and 6) logistics.
nastiest kind of close-quarter Order No. 241 on 8 December 1933. Each component was seen
fighting between two dedicated, That general order committed the to have unique problems within
relentless and ruthless forces. The Marines to the idea their paramount it, and each of them had to have
eventual US success in that fight made mission in wartime would be to clear-cut solutions coordinated
it appear our amphibious doctrine serve the fleet by seizing bases. between the involved naval and
was already firmly established and, By 1934 the new curriculum was landing forces. The key problem
indeed, was the underlying reason we established at the Marine Corps and solution for each component
succeeded in capturing the island. In School in Quantico. The next step was summarized as follows.
that first battle of the Central Pacific was to prepare a detailed manual Command relations required a
“atoll war,” however, it was actually for landing operations. Classes were clear chain of command within and
the training and determination of halted at Quantico on 14 November between the landing force and the
individual Marines that won through, 1934 in order for the entire staff naval support group. It had to take
despite the failures and weaknesses there to assemble that document. into consideration service rivalries
of our amphibious doctrine, and thus The result was the Tentative that might impact decision-making.
saved that doctrine from discredit. Manual for Landing Operations. Naval gunfire support had to be
The year 1933 was the crucial turn- The manual attempted to take heaviest when the actual landing
ing point for the USMC in the pre-war the most complicated and difficult operation was most vulnerable: just
era. With the end of its Nicaraguan military task, amphibious assault, before and after the first Marines
deployment, concentration was and provide practical solutions went ashore. A concise chain of
shifted to training for amphibious for all its many problems. It broke communication between ship and
warfare. Along that line, Maj. Gen. down amphibious warfare into six shore therefore had to be organized.
John H. Russell, then the assistant component parts, each representing a That was to be achieved through the
commandant, suggested a “Fleet particular feature of that type of oper- use of fire-control parties consisting
Marine Force” be created. His idea ation: 1) command relations; 2) naval of naval personnel and Marine
was accepted, and he drew up a set of gunfire support; 3) aerial support; 4) artillery personnel. A primary aim
general guidelines for it that the Navy ship-to-shore movement; 5) securing continued on page 26 »
Marines seek cover behind a sea wall on Red Beach 3, Tarawa.

» continued from page 23 Logistics, always key in any rest of the grand strategic campaign
was to coordinate naval gunfire military operation, took on special to follow. Operation Galvanic, as the
with unit movement ashore. characteristics because, the manual landing was codenamed, was there-
Aerial support’s most impor- explained: “One of the most essential fore aimed at Betio Island within the
tant function was to neutralize [logistical] conditions for successful Tarawa Atoll, because it held the larg-
strongpoints in the beach defense landing operations is the proper est airfield in the Gilbert Island group.
before they were encountered loading of the vessels carrying troops
by the landing riflemen. and their supplies.” That is, combat Theory Into Practice:
Ship-to-shore movement marked units and their supplies had to Command-Control
the beginning of the actual attack. It be loaded onto their transports
was to start as soon as the pre-inva- such that the last on were the first The 2nd Marine Division launched
sion naval gunfire lifted. The boats off during the actual landing. the invasion on 20 November 1943. At
were to be dispatched as quickly Not until the summer of 1943 the end of the first day that invasion
as possible, and troops should be did anyone know that 10 years of was in deep trouble. In fact, the
disembarked expeditiously, but theoretical work, and countless hours landing has since been described by
the overarching need was to avoid of preparation, were to be aimed at most historians (and its survivors)
breaking up the organizational Tarawa in the Gilbert Islands. Seizure as a disaster. D-Day ended with
integrity of the landing units. of the Gilbert Islands was deemed the Marines committed, but with
A “secure beachhead” was defined a necessary preliminary to the US several hundred already dead and
as having been achieved when: “a entry into the Marshalls (which was hundreds more gravely injured.
zone contiguous to the beach the in turn deemed necessary as the next Only four howitzers, four tanks
possession of which permits the in a series of island-base seizures and two halftracks had been gotten
continuous landing of troops, equip- that would eventually culminate with ashore. No major objectives had been
ment and supplies without serious decisive landings in the Japanese secured. Ammunition, food, water
interference from the enemy, and home islands). Thus the Gilberts cam- and medical supplies weren’t getting
ensures the maneuver space and the paign was instigated by Adm. Chester ashore, nor were the many wounded
terrain features requisite for a further Nimitz as the essential means of being taken off the island. Mistakes
advance” had been established. obtaining a jump off position for the in the execution of all six parts of the
Lt Alexander Bonnyman
(4th from right) and his assault
party storming a Japanese
stronghold. Bonnyman received
the Medal of Honor posthumously.

carefully thought out doctrine had that developed on Tarawa on D-Day. the effects of which were then further
accumulated to place the invasion Even had they been at Tarawa, degraded by other mistakes. That is,
close to overall defeat and failure. another problem for the kind of many Marines noticed shells fired
To begin, Adm. Nimitz, command-control called for by by the navy actually skipped across
Commander-in-Chief Pacific, doctrine came from the fact no one the island to explode harmlessly over
declared the need for “strategic sur- had thought to set aside a dedicated water on the far side. Col. Merritt
prise” limited the preliminary bom- and specially equipped command Edson, regimental chief of staff and
bardment to no more than two and a ship. Communication to and from Guadalcanal veteran, rendered the
half hours on the morning of the ini- the invasion’s high command was following assessment of the whole
tial landing. Then Maj. Gen. Holland relegated to an improvised com- bombardment: “Navy gunners make
M. “Howlin’ Mad” Smith, commander munication center on the battleship the mistake of thinking of shore
of V Amphibious Corps, announced 6th USS Maryland, which was repeatedly targets as ships. When you hit it, it
Marine Regiment would be held back knocked out from the concussion of sinks. On land, you need a direct
as floating reserve. That meant Maj. that ship’s broadsides. That meant, hit on every gun emplacement.”
Gen. Julian Smith, commander of 2nd in almost all cases, crises on Tarawa What that meant was the ships
Marine Division, would initially attack had to be resolved by on the spot had come in too close and therefore
the island with only a 2:1 superiority decisions taken before the higher had an incorrect angle of fire. Their
in troops, well below the doctrinal command had time to intervene. guns were aimed too low and flat. Had
minimum of 3:1. Those command Thus the planned communications they stood farther out and lofted their
decisions, taken out of fear and lack scheme failed almost in its entirety. shells at higher angles, there would’ve
of experience, were momentous. been much more target destruction.
Beyond that, the overall command Theory Into Practice: Beyond even all that, the
set up was so entangled and convo- Naval Gunfire Support high-explosive shells employed
luted it required the concurrence of by the bombarding ships usu-
two officers, Maj. Gen. Smith and Another mistaken assumption ally went off before penetrating
Rear Adm. Kelly Turner (commander the high command made was the into the interiors of the armored
of the amphibious force), to release preliminary bombardment by naval Japanese defense works. That made
the 6th from reserve status. Those guns and aircraft would destroy for impressive explosions, but
characteristics also extended to the fortifications on the island. often did little real damage even
the chain of command between Naval gunfire support was, accord- when direct hits were scored.
the invasion force and the air coming to doctrine, supposed to be the To compound those mistakes in
mand supporting the invasion. crucial element enabling the landing execution there was also a fateful 25
The commanders of the invasion force to reach shore and then assault minutes of near-total curtailment of
then also placed themselves in an inland. The Navy in fact committed naval gunfire during the final run in
isolated position away from the main three battleships, five cruisers and by the assault craft. That permitted
battle. Turner and Smith stayed nine destroyers to hurl over 3,000 tons the Japanese to shift their fires and
near Makin Island, 85 miles north of shells at Betio, which worked out reinforce the landing beaches.
of Tarawa — where another, much to about 10 tons of high explosives In sum, the failure of the pre-
smaller, landing took place on the per acre. Nimitz’s time limit, liminary bombardment on D-Day
same day — which meant they were however, affected the accuracy and was the most critical shortcoming
out of close touch with the disaster concentration of the bombardment, of the initial attack. Gen. Smith,
World at War 19 | AUG–SEP 2011 27

after the battle, inspected every the arrival of the carrier-based strike. close to the Japanese shore batteries.
Japanese pillbox and blockhouse on That is, the planners in the carrier air Unfortunately, some of the land-
the northern portion of the island group changed their plans, postponing ing craft were loaded, while other
and discovered only one had been their strike by 30 minutes. That was troops were still climbing down the
destroyed by naval gunfire. All the approved by Adm. Turner, but no one cargo nets, when the transports
rest had to be taken by Marines using thought to tell Adm. Hill, commander began their positional shift. As the
hand grenades and other explosives. of the amphibious force. When the landing craft followed the transports,
initial landing was held back to await matching specific boats with their
Theory Into Practice: the air strike, a second mission group, assigned teams and cargoes became
Aerial Support still timed for the original H-Hour, haphazard. The new location had the
arrived at the old time. Hill was able to landing craft loading outside the reef,
Aerial support, which might’ve get that mission to remain on station where a 10-mile trip was required.
made up for the naval gunfire until the new H-Hour, but it was then The Amphtracs (amphibious
mistakes, also failed in its mission. sent in with depleted fuel levels. tractors) and LVT (Landing Vehicles
The initial air strike began late; the Tracked), here being used for the first
seven-minute attack proved too short, Theory Into Practice: time as assault craft, could make only
and the bombs failed to penetrate the Ship-to-Shore Movement four knots. That in itself wouldn’t have
heavily protected fortifications. The been a problem, but a heavy chop
principal targets of the planes were the Even as the first Marines waded and a strong westerly current caused
coastal defense guns on Betio. The car- ashore, it was obvious the men of the the landing to finally take place at
rier-based aircraft dropped almost 200 landing force would have to seize the 9:13 a.m., which was 28 minutes after
tons of explosives on those targets, but island using little support. The arrival the already postponed H-Hour.
the enemy weapons remained intact. A of that landing force in solid, cohesive, Given the ineffective naval
planned B-24 raid never materialized. functioning units was therefore bombardment and air strike, that time
That “lost request” for the heavy imperative, but that part of the doc- gap allowed the Japanese to further
bombers was another casualty of trine also ran into problems. The trans- concentrate heavy and accurate
the convoluted chain of command. ports that were to unload the assault fire on the approaching boats. “The
Similarly, it was yet another com- troops had to relocate because they’d Americans appeared to be surprised
munication failure that had affected initially stationed themselves too and confused [by the intense fire],”
recalled Japanese Warrant Officer
Japanese Heavy Weapons on Betio Kiyoshi Ota, “many of the landing
Weapon Type Number On Hand boats collided with each other.”
LVT made up the first wave of
8-inch Coastal Defense Guns 4
the assault, and they could swim or
140mm Coastal Defense Guns 4 crawl across the reef. The follow-on
80mm Coastal Defense Guns 6 waves rode Higgins boats that needed
127mm Twin Anti-Aircraft Guns 4 four feet of water. Sadly, due to an
unexpected “dodge tide,” the reef was
70mm Twin Anti-Aircraft Guns 8
covered by only three feet of water. The
13mm Anti-Aircraft Guns 27 men in the follow-on waves therefore
13mm Twin Anti-Aircraft Guns 4 had to wade across the reef, all the
75mm Type 94 Beach Defense & Anti-Boat Guns 10 while exposed to fire. They were depos-
ited in chest-deep water and subjected
70mm Type 92 Beach Defense & Anti-Boat Guns 6 to the ordeal of a 500-yard struggle
37mm Type 94 Beach Defense & Anti-Boat Guns 9 to shore, wading through shallows
13mm Beach Defense & Anti-Boat Guns 31 lashed by Japanese bullets and shells.
Other combat arms were also
37mm Anti-Tank Guns 14
affected by the reef. Tank-loaded
LCM (Landing Craft Mechanized)
discharged Sherman tanks into
three feet of water, which drowned
out some of their engines.
In the early afternoon the tide
still refused to rise; so the incoming
battalions continued to have to wade
across the shallows under murderous
fire. Disaster loomed due to the
inadequate movement of men and
materiel from ship to shore. During
the first day and a half of battle, no
unit reached the beach intact.
The extraordinary requirement
to wade across the coral reef while
exposed to machinegun fire and
artillery salvos was faced by almost

every Marine in the division. Lt. were only four 75mm pack howitzers, ride. Just as crucial was the inadequate
Commander Robert A. McPherson, two halftracks, four Shermans and a number of LVT available. In another
a pilot flying over the atoll, later few 37mm anti-tank guns ashore. sense, however, the division had
described what he saw: “The water arrived with too many other types
never seemed clear of tiny men, their Theory Into Practice: Logistics of vehicles. It had embarked with
rifles held over their heads, slowly more than 650 vehicles and 200
wading beachward. I wanted to cry.” The Marines were poorly equipped trailers, which placed a stupendous
to deal with fortifications. They lacked requirement for square footage in
Theory Into Practice: tanks, bazookas and flamethrowers. the cargo holds of the amphibious
Securing the Beachhead When the division left New Zealand, ships, area that would’ve been much
it had been provided with a company better used to bring along more of the
The first 1,500 Marines who got of tanks and a few flamethrowers, but tanks and equipment needed by the
to the beach were mostly pinned 243 bazookas had simply missed the leading edge of the assault force.
down at the coconut-log and coral
barricade the Japanese had erected
along its inner edge. By the start
of that first evening they held only
about 10 percent of their planned
objectives in two separate enclaves.
The failure to quickly gain a secure
beachhead had two main reasons.
First, the overall 2:1 US-Japanese
manpower ratio meant there
simply wasn’t the surplus of attacking
strength needed for the Marines
to be able to move rapidly inland.
Further, 1st Battalion of 8th Marine
Regiment, though needed and
called for, remained on their
landing craft all night, in reserve,
because of yet another breakdown
in the communication system.
Second, though the Marine
commanders at all levels had known
there would be enemy pillboxes,
there had been no pre-attack pill-
box-busting practice, nor had a
communication system been set-up
between rifle and tank units.
By the end of the first night, then,
along with some 1,500 Marines, there

During the first 24 hours the in enemy waters as fast as possible, and Winning Through
Marines ashore also ran dangerously further motivated by Nimitz’s stricture
low on water, food, medical supplies to protect the fleet at all cost, made no The US doctrine of amphibious
and small arms ammunition. What effort to meet the combat needs of the warfare may have been sound on
was particularly galling was the fact land force. In sum, the lack of a secure paper, but an inadequate and insuf-
the men ashore could see some 100 beachhead and the chaos on the ficient application of each part of it
small craft, all circling aimlessly in transport ships resulted in only three brought the Marines to the verge of
the nearby lagoon. In short, what or four boats an hour unloading their defeat on Betio. All six parts of the
amounted to a general and almost supplies ashore during the first day. doctrine were rendered useless or
random unloading of the transports Faced with daunting logistical otherwise failed; yet the Marines
began early on D-Day and produced support problems, the men ashore went on to victory and a seeming
nothing more than logistical chaos. stripped the many dead of their endorsement of the doctrine therefore
That had its root cause, again, in the ammunition, canteens and first followed from their success.
convoluted command structure, which aid pouches. The situation was so At Tarawa, though, it wasn’t
had placed the unloading under the serious there seems little doubt a doctrine, equipment or strategy,
control of the naval commander rather Japanese counterattack during that but the Marines, that saved the day.
than the land force commander. first night would’ve knocked the Further, they were Marines who
Adm. Hill, guided by the general Marines off the island, and the inva- for the most part hadn’t gone to the
Navy priority of unloading transports sion would’ve failed (see sidebar). Amphibious Warfare School and
hadn’t taken part in prewar training
exercises. Robert Sherrod, a journalist
The Japanese on Tarawa embedded with them, claimed: “We
might easily have lost [on Betio], but
For the Japanese, Tarawa administratively came under the joint command of Vice for the superb courage of the Marines.”
Adm. Jinichi Kuska, Commander-in-Chief Southeast Asia, and Vice Adm. Nobutake Kondo, Gen. Smith, in his after-battle
Commander-in-Chief Fourth Fleet. Their only contribution to the actual battle, however, came analysis credited the victory to “the
from their earlier sending of land forces to the Gilberts. The construction of Betio’s defenses invincible spirit of the Marines. Only
and airstrip was the responsibility of the 111th Construction (Pioneer) Battalion. Yard for men with the highest morale and will-
yard, Tarawa was the best-fortified island the Americans would assault during the war. ingness to die rather than be defeated
In September 1943, Rear Adm. Keiji Shibasaki was sent ashore on Betio to could have captured this well-nigh
take command there. He was a veteran of Japanese amphibious landings on the impregnable chain of fortifications.”
Chinese coast, and he therefore understood the challenges facing the US Marines. Adm. Nimitz agreed when he
He made his primary goal to prevent them from getting ashore in cohesive units. wrote in 1953: “At the time we did the
He viewed the shelf-like reef surrounding the island as his first line of defense, best with what we had, and in that
concentrating his heavy weapons, from artillery to machineguns, at the coastline, all ‘best’ was the resolute courage of our
set up with interlocking fields of fire zeroed in on the channels within the reef. Marines, who in spite of all obstacles
He incorrectly anticipated the assault would come either against the western or seized the island in four days.”
south coasts. Caught off guard by the attack on the north, he then smoothly shifted his Marines fought singly, in small
men and weapons in that direction. Shibasaki was killed late on the afternoon of the first groups of twos and threes, and in
day. Indications are, had he remained alive, he intended to launch a banzai attack against ad hoc units. They created their
the shallow Marine beachhead that night. Post-war analysis has led many analysts to own methods to defeat the enemy,
argue such an effort would’ve ended the battle disastrously for the Americans. ★ which weren’t part of any doctrine.
They fell back on the fundamental,
aggressive combat doctrine instilled
in them since basic training, and
they coupled that with a willingness
to reorganize and improvise as
necessary. Col. William K. Jones,
commanding officer of 1st Battalion,
6th Marines, later summed it up:
I do not believe that heroism alone

would have sufficed — although
without it in extraordinary amounts
Tarawa would never have been
captured. What tipped the scales in
our favor was the traditional ingenuity
and flexibility Marines have called
upon many times in the past as they
will in the future. Decimated units
were regrouped into new, and efficient
fighting organizations, not on orders
of higher authority but simply through
Japanese prisoners of war the initiative of those officers and
men in the immediate vicinity.

Marines who never had their deeds those about him became casualties.” training and the spirit of comrade-
recorded or recognized by earning a Lt. Col. Howard J. Rice, executive ship, which comprises a fundamental
medal nevertheless went about the officer of the 2/2, also focused on pillar of Marine Corps life, still stand
deadly business of winning the battle. the morale factor: “Before we hit the foremost in my mind as the primary
Here and there small groups, most led beach we knew it would be grim busi- reason for victory at Tarawa.”
by privates, took patches of ground. ness. But we intended and expected Richard Wheeler, a veteran
War correspondent Richard to win, even when we held only a nar- who later also fought on Iwo Jima,
W. Johnston, who landed with the row naked beach. But, I must admit explained in his book A Special
Marines, described them in action: this confidence was based on nothing Valor, how Marine esprit emerged on
“In those hellish hours the heroism more tangible than a faith, a faith Tarawa: “They were all Marines, and
of the Marines, officers and enlisted shared by all Marines, that Marines they were in this thing together, and
alike, was beyond belief. Time always finished a job assigned.” they would do the best they could
after time they charged Japanese Lt. Col. William T. Bray, com- to uphold the Corps’ reputation and
positions, ignoring the deadly fire mander of Company A/1/2, was sustain one another. Few men talked
and refusing to halt until wounded more succinct: “The value of sound in terms of ‘death before dishonor,’
beyond human ability to carry on.”
Even the wounded made the
American corpses sprawled on the beach of Tarawa.
ultimate determination as to their
continued fitness for combat.
Johnston observed an aid station:
“Under the seawall on Beach 3 the
line of wounded stretched nearly 50
yards, and only those too badly hurt
to move were there — the ‘walking
wounded’ were still fighting.”
Motivation
The qualities that led to the

Marine victory on Betio can perhaps
best be identified by the men who
commanded them there. Col. T.
A. Culhane, Jr., the operations
officer of 2nd Marines, identified
those intangibles as follows: “More
important than all the techniques [of
amphibious doctrine], was the high
state of training and discipline of the
individual Marine, his morale, and
his confidence and determination
to continue the attack even though

but the ancient code applied.” was demonstrated by the Marines Conclusion
In sum, it was inconceivable who held the tiny strip of beach on
to most Marines on the island the first night. Henry Shaw, chief Tarawa didn’t turn out to be a
that they would be the one to let historian of the USMC Historical proving ground for amphibious
down another Marine, or that they Branch wrote of them: “There was doctrine. In fact, every subsequent
would be responsible for dimming no sense of panic in the lines as the move in the drive across the Central
the reputation of the Corps. That Marines set up for night defense.” Pacific was made with avoiding the
mistakes of Tarawa in mind. The
lessons learned and adjustments made
to doctrine helped take the Marshalls
twice as fast with half the casualties.
Total Marine casualties on Tarawa
were 990 killed and 2,391 wounded.
It took the Marines to save doctrine
from failure, men who relied on the
traditional bedrock foundations of
the Corps to win through. Without the
heroism of the Marines on Tarawa, the
course of the war in the Central Pacific
would’ve undoubtedly changed.
Tarawa thus doesn’t stand as proof of
amphibious doctrine, but as a symbol
of raw courage and Marine tradi-
tion. The bottom line for the battle
can be summed up as: individuals
advanced — doctrine followed. ✪
Marine Cemetery, Tarawa, March 1944 1st Battalion 6th

Marines insignia.
32 World at War 19 | AUG–SEP 2011

Sources
Alexander, Col. Joseph H. USMC (Ret). Across the Reef:

The Marines Assault of Tarawa —
Marines In World War II Commemorative Series.
Washington DC: Marine Corps Historical Center. 1993.
Alexander, Col. Joseph H. USMC (Ret). Utmost Savagery.
New York: Ivy Books, 1995. (paperback)
Baldwin, Hanson. Battles Lost and Won.
New York: Harper & Row, 1966.
Berry, Henry. Semper Fi, Mac. New York: Arbor House, 1982.
Costello, John. The Pacific War 1941–1945.
New York: Quill, 1981.
___________. Great Battles of World War II.
New York: Shooting Star press, 1995.
Hoyt, Edwin. Storm Over the Gilberts.
New York: Mason/Charter Publishers, 1978.
Isley, Jeter A., and Crowl, Philip A.
The U.S. Marines and Amphibious Warfare.
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1951.
Morison, Samuel Eliot. The Two-Ocean Navy.
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1963.
Potter, E.B. Nimitz. Japanese World War II Defenses on Tarawa
Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1976.
Shaw, Jr., Henry I. Tarawa: A Legend Is Born.
New York: Ballantine Books, 1968.
Sherrod, Robert. Tarawa: The Story of a Battle. Fredrickburg,
Type 95 Ha-Go
Texas: The Admiral Nimitz Foundation, 1973.
Simmons, Brigadier General Edwin H. USMC (Ret). tank ruin at Tarawa,
The United States Marines: The First Two Hundred Years, March 2010
1775 –1975. New York: Viking Press, 1985.
Spector, Ronald H. Eagle Against The Sun.
New York: The Free Press, 1985.
Steinberg, Rafael. Island Fighting.
Alexander, Virginia: Time-Life Books, 1978.
Tapert, Annette. Lines of Battle.
New York: Pocket Books, 1987.
Wheeler, Richard. A Special Valor.
Edison, New Jersey: Castle Books, 1996.
Disabled U.S. LVTs and a Japanese Type 95

light tank on Tarawa beach after the battle.

Logistical Factors in the
Western Desert: 1941– 42
by Joseph Miranda
Ed’s Note: Axis units are in italics; swept toward the Egyptian frontier in Rommel really didn’t need more
Allied units are in plaintext. mid-1941, Rommel appealed to the divisions; rather, he needed more
Axis high command for reinforcement. mechanized units (formations
Balance of Forces That presented Berlin and Rome with a moved by tracked and/or wheeled
dilemma, due to the fact there was a lack vehicles). The overarching lesson
T
he armies committed to the of suitable units. The Germans had com- of the campaign, from its very start,
Western Desert campaign were mitted most of their panzer and motor- was that foot-mobile units were of
small by European Theater of ized infantry divisions to the invasion of little value in the desert. They couldn’t
Operations (ETO) standards, less than 10 the Soviet Union, which had kicked off maneuver fast enough, and were
divisions on each side in 1941, and never on 22 June. A third division of motorized therefore easily cut off and destroyed,
growing to much more than a dozen or infantry was formed from miscellaneous as had happened to most of the ill-fated
so divisions even after both sides built formations, initially called the Afrika Italian Tenth Army during the British
up the following year. Understanding Division and later the 90th Light Afrika. offensive in the winter of 1940 – 41.
why those forces remained so small There was some consideration of The Italians, who had primary
is, in turn, critical to understanding deploying the 22nd Air Landing Division responsibility for Axis operations in
the nature of their operations. to Africa, but it was deemed unsuitable the Mediterranean, also just gener-
To give one example, as his forces because it lacked motorization. ally lacked mechanized units. In
pg. 35

1941 they committed their Ariete Eastern Command, which covered the wake of Japanese entry into the war
Armored Division, followed by the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle in December 1941, Commonwealth
Trieste and Trento Motorized Infantry East and the Persian Gulf. The British units had to be redeployed to support
Divisions. In 1942 they added the frequently found themselves having to the fighting in the Far East. Their
Littorio Armored Division. Those units move forces out of North Africa in order presence would be missed in 1942.
represented every Italian mechanized to fight campaigns elsewhere: against Nonetheless, both the Axis and Allies
division available at the time. the Italians in Ethiopia (1940 – 41), the each fielded army-sized formations for
Other Italian divisions in the Germans in Greece (March – May 1941), most of the 1941 – 42 desert war. What
desert were only partially motorized, pro-Axis rebels in Iraq (April – June) counted wasn’t so much the number of
due to the fact Italy lacked both the and Vichy forces in Syria (June – July). divisions deployed, but their combat
petroleum and the industrial resources Additionally, the British also had to effectiveness. It was in that regard
to support a mechanized army. What keep an eye on Iran, the Gulf emirates, logistics came even more fully into play.
also needs to be remembered is Sudan and even Egypt itself, the latter
Mussolini committed considerable having an anti-British nationalist Logistics — Strategic Factors
forces to fight on the eastern front, as movement. Those requirements
well as taking part in the occupation tied down several divisions. Making There were two major dilemmas
of Yugoslavia and Greece. The already the situation worse was that, in the in the Western Desert. The first was
strained Italian war economy was thus getting supplies to bases in North Africa;
simply facing too many demands. the second was moving forward that
In 1941– 42, Hitler viewed North supply from those bases to the front.
Africa as a sideshow: the war was going The British had a strategic
to be decided by defeating the Soviet advantage in logistics, given their
Union. Once the Germans had gained secure petroleum supply from the
victory there, unlimited numbers of Middle East and the US. They also had
divisions, transport, petroleum and the advantage of having begun the
industrial resources would be freed for war with a largely mechanized army.
campaigning on the Axis periphery. British units were generally motorized,
Rommel saw it differently, however, with troops and supplies transported
claiming an Axis army seizing the Suez on wheeled and tracked vehicles.
Canal would thereby gain an important Nonetheless, the British still found
strategic victory against the Allies. themselves facing restraints when trying
Both approaches had merit, but the to exploit those advantages. For most of
limit on what could be done in North the campaign the Allies couldn’t use the
Africa was actually set by logistics. Mediterranean as a shipping route to
The British faced similar challenges North Africa, owing to its interdiction by
reinforcing North Africa. The Western Axis air and naval forces. Allied convoys
Desert was only one part of their Middle had to sail around the Horn of Africa.

The need to go around Africa meant an enormous amount and their convoys could sail from ports in the southern part
of shipping was tied up in the Atlantic Ocean-Indian Ocean- of their country. Owing to the short sailing time, an Axis
Red Sea “pipeline” simply to get men and equipment to the cargo ship could be “turned around” and used more often
Middle East. The longer the sea voyage, the more those ships than a similar Allied vessel, effectively providing an efficiency
were unavailable to carry cargoes on other routes. There multiple of the tonnage transported. To be sure, those
was also the issue of the return voyage: a cargo ship might convoys had to run the gauntlet of Allied aero-naval attack,
be sent fully loaded to Suez, but usually returned empty. especially from the British island-base of Malta; however,
All that contributed to a global Allied shipping most of the supplies and manpower made it through.
shortage that was then further exacerbated by the In addition to naval convoys, the Axis also made use
expansion of the war into the Pacific when the Japanese of transport aircraft to move supplies. Based in southern
entered. Even more, that occurred at a time when the Europe, those aircraft could rapidly move men and supplies
German U-boat campaign was taking a heavy toll of to North Africa. While aircraft deliveries weren’t as efficient as
merchant ships. The shortage wasn’t ended until later in ship-borne operations, requiring higher ratios of fuel to car-
the war, after the North African campaign was over. go, they nonetheless provided additional tonnage, especially
As noted, the British also committed many divisions to in emergency situations. When Allied ULTRA intelligence
their vast Middle East Command. Those units came from pinpointed Italian tankers for sinking, Axis fuel shortages
across the British Empire, as well as including contingents could be made up, at least in the short term, by flying in more
from overrun Allied nations made up of volunteers who’d POL (petrol, oil, lubricants) from Europe directly to Africa.
escaped Nazi-occupied Europe. The influx of those units Thus, despite the usual picture of Allied forces having
meant Middle East Command had to create what amounted a logistical advantage in the Western Desert campaign, the
to an entire modern infrastructure to support them. Training reality was the strategic lines of communication were much
bases, ports, airfields, railroads, roads, telephone lines, ware- shorter for the Axis. A comparison of tonnages offloaded
houses, hospitals and post offices: all such facilities had to by each side at ports in North Africa shows Axis bases were
be either expanded or, more usually, built up from nothing. often receiving more supplies than those of the Allies.
On the Axis side, strategic lines of communication were Since that was the case, the perception the Afrikakorps
several times shorter than those of the Allies, having only to was beset by supply shortages while Eighth Army was
transit the Mediterranean. The Italians were largely respon- operating at a surplus needs to be more deeply examined.
sible for the shipping support to Axis forces in North Africa,
Logistics — Operational Factors
Axis forces in North Africa required 60,000 to 72,000 tons

of supply a month to function at full combat effectiveness.
That was to support both ground and air operations during
periods of major activity. For most of the desert campaign,
Axis (as well as British) forces were usually involved in build-
up and training phases that required only a fraction of those
tonnages. For light combat operations, supply requirements
would be reduced by about half from those peak numbers.
For periods of inactivity, they could be as low as 25 percent
of peak needs. Lulls between offensives could therefore be
used to create supply surpluses that could later be utilized
in major offensives. As the chart below indicates, sufficient
supplies were delivered to Rommel to create such surpluses.
Given those figures, it can readily be seen the main
reason for Rommel’s supply problems occurred in-theater.

Railroads, the usual means of moving troops and supplies to mechanical breakdown or enemy air attack repaired.
in Europe, weren’t generally available in the Western Desert. One expedient was the use of tank transports, flatbed
In fact, the rail situation in North Africa was abysmal. trucks, to move them over large distances across friendly
In all of Libya there were only 38 miles of rail line. territory. They saved wear on the tracked vehicles, but the
The British had a rail system in the Nile delta and transports in turn had their own logistical requirements.
along the Suez Canal. One line from it ran west along All that created a vicious cycle for both sides, as the
the coast, terminating around Mersa Matruh (it would large numbers of trucks required their own fuel and
later be extended farther west). The British made use of maintenance to operate, which in turn put additional
that railroad to move supplies, but once they reached demands on the already strained logistical system. Moreover,
the end of the line everything had to be trucked. those demands were then effectively doubled by the
To give an example, a German panzer division fact the trucks had to return to bases in the rear to pick
consumed 10,000 tons of supplies in a month of sustained up more men and supplies. A tanker truck carrying
combat. Therefore, for an Afrikakorps panzer division gasoline might have to expend 10 percent of its own load
to engage in battle, 10,000 tons of supplies would have to keep itself fueled, and there were additional cargo
to be landed at a port or airfield and then moved via losses due to spillage, evaporation and enemy action.
truck to the unit. That also presumes the right types The dilemma didn’t lie simply in moving forward men
of supplies were landed and there were no losses in and materiel. There was also always movement to the rear
transit due to enemy action, pilferage or accidents. of vehicles sent to depots for overhaul, soldiers evacuated
It was that combination of supply and transport for medical reasons, prisoners to be interred in camps, mail
requirements that put a limit on reinforcements that posted back to Europe (vital for morale), and so forth.
could be deployed in the Western Desert. Each potential Again, an initial advantage the Axis had was in their
reinforcement division meant additional increments of fleet of transport aircraft. They amounted to some 260
supply would have to be delivered to North Africa to support planes based in Europe and Africa, and they were useful for
it, and additional trucks would have to be available for the
transport of that additional supply. All that was in addition
to the trucks and other vehicles that would then be needed
to actually move the supplied division’s men, weapons
and equipment. On top of all that, the division would then
require even more men, vehicles and equipment shipped
in and moved forward to replace losses due to combat,
disease and the inescapable wear and tear of warfare.
To give a smaller-scale example, a German replace-
ment tank that landed at Tripoli or Benghazi, destined
for an armored unit fighting at Tobruk, would have to be
driven over several hundred miles of roads and desert
tracks. Along the way the tank would have to be kept
fueled, its crew fed, and any incidental damage owing
Tons of Supply Delivered to North

Africa in Selected Months of 1942
Month Axis British

June 32,327 75,790
July 91,491 74,461
August 51,655 72,192
September 77,226 27,072
Note: Axis figures don’t include additional shipments via air. British figures
are only for supply from the United Kingdom, not counting Lend-Lease.

movement in-theater. They couldn’t shipping: moving supplies by light both sides, taken altogether, meant
move much in the way of heavy craft between North African ports. any offensive had to be preceded
equipment, however; and aircraft Such vessels, though, could provide by a considerable period of passive
based in North Africa again created only a limited amount of lift and build-up. The usual practice was to
their own logistical requirements in they were often vulnerable to create chains of logistical depots where
terms of fuel and maintenance. enemy air and naval attack. ammunition, POL, water, rations,
Another alternative was coastal Those limits on transport for replacement parts, medical items and
everything else could be stockpiled, and
semi-permanent facilities such as com-
munication centers, repair shops and
hospitals, could be built. Those depots
would then, in effect, be expended in
support of combat operations or, if
farther back, they would eventually be
consumed to support the rear echelon.
Consequently, an army that
advanced too far would go beyond
the distance at which depots could
support it, while a retreating foe would
be falling back toward his source of
support. That led to the pattern in the
desert war in which an offensive would
coast to a halt while its spearheads
waited for their logistics to catch up;
meanwhile, the other side could launch
a counterattack and seize victory
from the proverbial jaws of defeat.
That’s why ports such as Benghazi
and Tobruk were critical objectives.
They were so not simply for their use in
landing supplies, but for bringing them
Railroads, Distance & Logistics
Railroads were the primary means to move supplies, equipment and personnel in Europe during World War II.
Compared to trucks, railroad engines require a low ratio of manpower and fuel for the tonnage they move.
A standard German supply train of 25 to 40 rail cars could move an average of 450 tons, depending on cargo type, up to 185 miles per day.
In comparison, a German motorized supply column of 15 to 20 trucks could move 60 tons 125 miles per day.
In Europe, trains ran from industrial centers and depots to railheads where they would debark their passengers and cargoes.
They would then make their way to units via truck or wagon transport, or by the time-honored method of walking.
The distance from the railhead to the front determined much of the efficiency of an army’s logistical system.

in at points forward enough to support those special maintenance require- been fully destroyed by an anti-tank
forces in the field without too much ments was the need to repair vehicles round, at least until it was repaired.
more transport having to be involved. that had been damaged in combat. If tanks were critical, then so
Possession of a forward port cut several Combat effectiveness in the desert were trucks. Without trucks an
hundred miles of trucking from bases proved, in large part, to be a function army couldn’t move nor could it be
farther to the rear. Tobruk therefore of the number of motor vehicles an supplied. Desert conditions meant
became the major objective of the army could deploy in working order, trucks were used up quickly. Rommel
campaigns in 1940 – 42 because it was what the men called “runners.” A found that during rapid advances up
in a good position to provide logistical tank out of action for a thrown track to 35 percent of his trucks were daily
support to the entire Western Desert. was just as useless as one that had inoperable for mechanical reasons.
Runners
The transportation situation

was only the start of the logistical
challenges inherent in the desert
war. Motor vehicles require routine
maintenance simply to function. Those
requirements were exacerbated by the
desert, with its extreme temperatures
overheating engines, sandstorms
blowing dust into moving parts, the
lack of decent roads playing havoc
with tires and tracks, and a general
scarcity of water to cool engines and
clean out the grit. Engines needed to be
replaced more often than in temperate
climates. Vehicles had to have special
desert-compatible components, such
as filters that would keep out the fine
dust always blowing about. Added to
During the 1940 campaign in France, German railheads were 10 to 45 miles behind the lead troops.
During the opening stages of the 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union, the front ranged from 85 to 110 miles forward of the railheads, and that was
often enough to cause operations to come to a halt. Distances in the Western Desert made those distances seem trivial in comparison. From Tripoli to
El Agheila was 375 miles; driving to Benghazi added another 185, and to make it to Tobruk meant another 250; Tobruk to Alexandria was a final 375.
The diagram shows the German rail supply system as it was supposed to function. Of course, what made it mostly useless in North Africa
was the fact there was no usable rail line in Libya west of the Egyptian frontier. The result was everything had to be trucked from Axis army-level
bases (Tripoli, Benghazi, Tobruk), through what would otherwise have been corps-level and division-level railheads had there been railroads. When
Rommel overran western Egypt in the summer of 1942, he made some use of the captured rail line along the coast. The Axis could move up to 9,000
tons per month on it but, obviously, supplies coming from Tobruk, Benghazi or Tripoli still had to be moved by truck to reach the railhead. ★

As a further example of the impor-
tance of trucks, an Afrikakorps panzer
division in 1941 had 150 to 220 tanks
of various types, 120 other armored
fighting vehicles (AFV, mainly halftracks,
armored cars and self-propelled guns),
140 halftrack prime-movers, over 1,600
trucks and another 1,000 or so miscella-
neous vehicles (autos and motorcycles).
The overall operational mobility of the
division was thus a function not just of
tracked vehicles but of wheeled ones.
Even that wasn’t all: every German
mobile division required another 1,200
trucks at non-divisional echelons in
order to move forward its supplies.
Much of that requirement could’ve been
eliminated had their been a function-
ing railway in the Western Desert.
Consequently, obtaining more
trucks became a major issue for
desert logisticians. At one time in 1942,
Rommel requested 8,000 trucks from
the Axis high command — at a time
when the Wehrmacht’s motor vehicle
inventory was already overstretched by
the requirements of the Russian front.
Some trucks could be gotten from the
Vichy French, but with vehicle shortages
everywhere in the Reich the requirement
could never be fully met. One expedient
was in trading-off trucks otherwise
assigned within units. For example,
in 1941 the Italian Trento Division,
originally a motorized formation, had
its trucks taken from it when it landed
in Africa. They were used to support the
logistics of the rest of the Axis force.
British forces were, in theory, com-
pletely motorized. In practice, however,
there were different levels of vehicle
assignment, depending on unit type.
All infantry battalions in an armored
division were supposed to have their
own vehicles, but those in an infantry
division might have to draw vehicles
from higher echelon truck pools.
Again, while units might be listed as
fully motorized “on paper,” the number
of vehicles actually on hand would
be dependent on their operability.
There was an ace in the hole for the
Allies: US Lend-Lease provided large
numbers of trucks, thereby allowing
them to maintain a lead in that
critical regard. Indeed, by late 1942
Deliveries of Tanks & Other Vehicles to Eighth Army in Selected Months of 1942
Month Tanks (from the United Kingdom) Vehicles (from the United Kingdom) Tanks (from North America) Vehicles (from North America)
June 179 3810 3 7694
July 114 4573 33 4618
August 254 3289 132 3371
September 34 1512 407 2016

US truck deliveries to Eighth Army with wounded soldiers, disease and Planning
exceeded those from Britain. That hygiene. The British had an advantage
did as much as anything else to in the morale department, as their The campaign in the Western
win the desert war for the Allies. troops could be rotated for leave in Desert can be divided into a series of
All the armies in North Africa major Egyptian cities to take advantage discrete operations. They all followed
made use of captured equipment. of the distractions they offered. a distinct cycle of build-up, offensive,
Overrunning a depot would mean Operations in North Africa, counteroffensive and mutual exhaus-
access to vehicles, weapons, POL therefore, can be seen as a function of tion. The entire time both armies
and assorted amenities. During the efficiency of an army’s logistical spent in sustained combat operations
Rommel’s 1942 drive into Egypt, much organization. One of Montgomery’s amounted to less than 10 weeks in 1941
of Panzerarmee Afrika was lifted on unsung talents came from the fact he and another 16 to 20 weeks in 1942
Allied trucks, 2,000 of which had been paid more attention to logistics than did (depending on how you count pursuits).
seized when he took Tobruk in June. Rommel. Of course, he had a better situ- As shown below, the desert armies
Holding a battlefield at the end ation with which to start when he took spent much of their time in build-up.
of a fight, aside from any tactical command of Eighth Army in August Indeed, between Operations Battleaxe
advantage, also allowed for the salvage 1942. The British were making their and Crusader there was a period of
of damaged or otherwise immobilized stand at El Alamein, just in front of their five months in which no major combat
equipment. The Germans had a good main Middle East base area in the Nile actions took place. To launch a major
tank recovery organization that pulled delta. Rommel had advanced to the end offensive an army had to accomplish
damaged friendly and enemy vehicles of a logistical tightrope. Montgomery a number of things: move forward
off the battlefield, repaired them, exploited his position to build up its logistical system and establish
and quickly turned them around into sufficient support to ensure victory for depots, absorb replacements into
combat. That was a “force multiplier” Eighth Army. El Alamein was funda- existing formations, train units, build
that wasn’t apparent from a simple mentally different than prior actions airfields, perform reconnaissance
examination of the Axis order of battle. in that it was a battle of position rather and intelligence operations, draw
Using captured equipment had a than maneuver, one in which material up battle plans and rehearse the
downside, though, in that it meant the support was key from start to finish. expected attack. Additionally, long
capturing side had to have maintenance As Eighth Army pursued the periods of time were spent reorganiz-
crews trained to keep such equipment shattered Panzerarmee Afrika back ing depleted units and assimilating
running, along with the proper spare across Egypt and into Libya in late the lessons of the last campaign.
parts and ammunition to utilize them. 1942, Montgomery ensured the desert Once an offensive kicked off,
There were yet other aspects of railroad was refurbished and extended operations usually became a matter of
logistics that can be only summarized west. That time around the British maneuver and counter-maneuver. The
here. Pay and mail were big parts of didn’t fall into the trap as they had in conditions of desert warfare — poor
troop morale: their neglect could early 1941, when logistical shortfalls communications, sandstorms, the
adversely affect combat performance. not only stopped their advance but danger of being cut off from logistical
Medical care was also vital in dealing also set them up for Rommel’s riposte. support — caused units to loose cohe-
Axis Sealift of Supplies to North Africa
Monthly Average Major Military Activity in North Africa

Tonnage Delivered to Axis offensives in italics, Allied in plaintext.
Axis Ports in Africa
February – June 89,560 30 March – 10 April: Rommel’s first offensive in Cyrenaica, launched from
1941 the El Agheila position; Axis forces reach Tobruk, which they besiege.
15-17 May: Operation Brevity, unsuccessful British reconnaissance
in force on the Egyptian-Libyan frontier.
15-17 June: Operation Battleaxe, main British summer offensive, defeated by Axis forces.
July – December 59,380 14-15 September: Operation Midsummer’s Night Dream,
1941 Afrikakorps raids across the Egyptian frontier.
18 November – 31 December: Operation Crusader, Tobruk relieved,
British retake Cyrenaica, Rommel back at El Agheila.
January – June 73,650 21 January – 6 February: Rommel’s’ second offensive reaches Gazala.
1942 26 May –21 June: Operations Theseus (sometimes called Venezia),
Rommel defeats British at Gazala, Axis forces take Tobruk.
22 – 28 June: Operation Aida, Rommel pursues into Egypt, defeats British at Mersa Matruh.
July – December 52,210 1 – 26 July: Rommel continues pursuit, stopped at El Alamein.
1942 20 August – 7 September: Rommel launches offensive at El Alamein
planning to break through to Alexandria, but is repulsed.
23 October – 3 November: Montgomery launches second Battle of El Alamein, defeats
Axis forces. Rommel orders withdrawal, doesn’t stop until he reaches Tunisia.

sion quickly. Battles degenerated from maintained control of the battlefield. seen as a masterpiece of leadership,
division-level affairs down through One reason the British failed to exploit if for no other reason than, despite
brigade-regiment-battalion, and finally their Crusader offensive was they lacked all those factors, Panzerarmee Afrika
into small-unit actions. An advantage an on-hand reserve of tanks to replace made it to the gates of Alexandria and
the Germans had throughout most of the losses they’d taken, thereby giving could still fight when it got there.
the campaign was their units had better Rommel the opportunity to recover.
cohesion than did those of the British. Losing a battle, though, was never What If?
Their officers tended to lead from only a matter of attrition. Mass panics
“up front,” where they could respond weren’t uncommon, when the loss of A reasonable “what if” would’ve
more quickly to opportunities, but that unit cohesion and the threat of being had Mussolini making a greater effort
in turn increased casualties among cut-off could cause units to fall back pre- to build up the Libyan infrastructure
commanders. Still, German units could cipitously. One British after action report prior to Italy entering the war. If
hold together longer than their Italian following the retreat of their 7th Armored nothing else, a functioning railroad
counterparts or Allied foes. Of course, Division during the Battle of Gazala system from Tripoli through Benghazi
the overarching Axis dilemma came (May 1942) referred to an “unneces- and on to Tobruk would’ve overcome
from the fact there were never enough sarily rapid movement” to the rear. many of the logistical difficulties
German divisions in the Western Desert. The pursuit phase of an operation Rommel faced in 1941 and 1942.
Despite all the planning and maneu- also created its own logistical dif- Similarly, port facilities might also
ver, battles could also become contests ficulties, since it was far too easy to have been expanded in preparation for
of attrition, especially of tanks, due to advance past the distance at which war. Of course, that might’ve worked
combat, breakdowns and assorted fog of one’s depots could provide support. both ways, since the British could’ve
war effects. It wasn’t unusual for a major Another risk was advancing too far exploited such rails and ports during
operation to result in the loss of 80 meant operating beyond the radius at their 1940 – 41 Compass offensive.
percent or more of the tanks involved on which airpower could cover advancing Interestingly, in 1942 Mussolini
both sides, though most of them could columns. Rommel’s drive into Egypt advocated to Hitler that Germany find
be recovered and repaired if an army during the summer of 1942 has to be some way to end its war with the Soviet
Union so as to be able to deal with the
growing Anglo-American threat in the
Port Capacity west. While it’s hard to imagine Stalin
negotiating a peace while Axis armies
Assuming Axis supply convoys sailing from Italian ports to North Africa arrived safely were still inside the USSR, Mussolini
at their destinations, their cargoes had to be offloaded. The main Italian port was Tripoli. It understood the growing Allied threat
could handle up to 45,000 tons of supply a month. Tripoli could be supplemented by Benghazi to Italy and the Axis southern flank was
and Tobruk if they were in Axis hands. Both had theoretical monthly capacities of at least going to have to be addressed — and
30,000 tons. While on paper those totals should’ve been sufficient to offload all Axis supply soon. Had the Italians committed the air
ships, it didn’t work that way in reality. Allied air raids reduced those capacities to less than and land forces they sent to fight in the
40 percent, in part due to damage, in part due to dockworkers refusing to report to duty for USSR to the Mediterranean instead, per-
fear of being killed by bombs. Moreover, Italian convoys were frequently routed away from haps they could’ve attained a decision.
Benghazi and Tobruk, owing to the risk of interception from British air and naval attack. Another possible “what if” would’ve
There were several smaller ports, such as Derna, Bardia and Mersa Matruh, but they had seen each side committing fewer
limited capacities with often only a single dock and no heavy cranes. The Axis negotiated with divisions to North Africa, but providing
the Vichy French to open the port of Bizerta in Tunisia, which would’ve allowed for another those divisions they did send with
20,000 tons to be offloaded, but that resulted in little that was useful. Bizerta would only
have added several hundred more miles to the already over-extended Axis supply lines. ★

higher levels of support. For example, Sources
the Italians might’ve deployed a smaller
Van Creveld, Martin.
number of infantry divisions while at Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton.
the same time using their on-hand London: Cambridge Univ., 1977.
Dear, I.C.B., ed. The Oxford Companion to World War II.
trucks to mechanize the army they Oxford: Oxford Univ., 1995.
already had in Africa. Similarly, the Greene, Jack & Alessandro Massignani.
Rommel’s North African Campaign.
Germans might’ve shipped more Cambridge: Da Capo, 1994.
replacement AFV to North Africa, Griffith, Paddy. World War II Desert Tactics.
Oxford: Osprey, 2008.
thereby ensuring the two Afrikakorps Joslen, Lt. Col. H. F. Orders of Battle Second World War.
panzer divisions had sufficient London: HMSO, 1990.
reserves to survive the attrition of
desert battles. Such a move wouldn’t
have created additional logistical
requirements, as did adding extra
divisions to the overall order of battle.
On the Allied side the British
might’ve maintained concentration
on the Western Desert and avoided
pulling out units to fight elsewhere. A
fully supported Western Desert Force
could’ve conceivably reached Tripoli
in early 1941, before the Afrikakorps
was in place, thereby avoiding (in
retrospect) two more years of fighting in
North Africa and perhaps hastening the
political fall of Mussolini. Of course, that
would’ve meant accepting Axis victories
elsewhere, but the Greek campaign
turned into a Dunkirk-sized debacle
for the British anyway, with the loss of
several divisions for no good effect.
What all that goes to indicate is
winning and losing battles in the
Western Desert wasn’t simply a matter
of tactical skill or weapon quality. It was
in large part due to strategic factors that
extended beyond the theater of opera-
tions, and to the capacity to support
modern warfare in North Africa. The
final British victory should be seen as a
function of their having been better able
to exploit both those factors. Therein
lies the lesson of the campaign. ✪

German East Front
Fortifications by J.E. Kaufmann
I
n the last third of the 19th century, fortified line consists largely of positions individual fortified positions and/or by
warfare changed significantly with of a permanent nature that normally obstacles, and that same space could
the advent of massive conscript require civilian labor and technicians also serve as an assembly and maneuver
armies, automatic weapons, breech- to build. Their construction entails the area for friendly mobile forces.
loading artillery and high-explosive use of a great deal of material, such Several of those rings remained
shells. At the same time, new forti- as concrete, which in turn requires in use during World War II in Europe,
fications were developed that were the use of specialized equipment and including on the eastern front, even
intended to defend large sections of the machinery. A line of fieldworks consists though many of them had not been
frontier (or front) rather than simply mostly of emplacements of a temporary modernized between the wars. The
be clustered at key points along it. nature, few of which require civilian most notable of the rings that were
Those newly developed fortified labor. (Construction of both types of fully or partially in use during World
lines shouldn’t be confused with defenses is usually labor intensive.) War II were those of Antwerp, Liege
“fieldworks,” such as trenches and Early in the 20th century, modern and Namur in Belgium, and Maubeuge
obstacle belts, which have been in large-scale fortifications appeared and Verdun in France. On the eastern
use for a long time, mostly in siege along the frontiers of many European frontier of Germany in 1914 there were
warfare. During the American Civil countries in the form of “fortified rings” Koenigsberg, Marienburg, Graudenz,
War, for example, trenches were used or “ring-stands,” which consisted of Thorn, Kustrin, Posen, Glogau and
extensively to secure the Confederate several forts encircling a key town Breslau, all of which the Germans put
front from Richmond to Petersburg. or city with intermediate positions back into service in 1944 – 45. Some
Though fieldworks and fortified among them. The spaces between and forts from the old Austro-Hungarian
lines are often confused, there are within the rings could be defended ring at Krakow, and the Russian posi-
significant differences between them. A with weapons firing from inside tions at Warsaw and other locations,
Rows of dragons teeth and a heavily eroded anti-tank ditch within the OWB

also returned to service during World inside the OWB. By the time it was halt- turret emplacements for 105mm and
War II. The most modern pre-World ed in 1938, it included 20 miles of galler- 150mm howitzers. As things turned out,
War I positions, known as Feste, can ies at depths of up to 44 yards below the work was begun only on one battery.
be attributed to the Germans, who surface. The final entrances, which were Hitler, motivated by his own experi-
built them at Muetzig (linked to the to have been located 1.25 miles to the ence with gas warfare during the Great
Strasbourg ring), Metz and Thionville in rear, were never built. The underground War, issued instructions requiring the
Alsace-Lorraine. In 1940 and 1944 both galleries were to serve as a logistical engineers include anti-gas features
the French and the Germans made use support area for all the Werkgruppen in in all new fortifications. The system
of those fortifications (respectively). the OWB and were to be linked to each they developed consisted of airtight
After the First World War, when of them by a tunnel. A regimental-sized doors, hand-operated ventilators with
Germany was stripped of much of its unit of about 4,000 men was to serve the filters and, in most blockhouses, a
former borderlands, it was forced to underground facilities, which included decontamination area near the entrance
cede the fortifications in Alsace-Lorraine a railroad, barracks, magazines, that included a shower. The Germans
and western Poland to its erstwhile powerhouses and medical facilities. The later incorporated a similar system
enemies. Only much older fortifications plans also called for the construction in almost every concrete bunker they
then remained under its control. of fortified battery positions behind built during the war. The entranceway
Though Germany had fewer restrictions the Werkgruppen, and included was L-shaped to keep the interior
on its eastern frontier, its early attempts individual blockhouses with single- continued on page 47 »
to create new fortifications there in
the 1920s were stopped by Allied
protests. In the 1930s, Hitler’s Third
Reich started work on the first major
German fortified line begun since the
previous war. It became known as the
“East Wall,” and it consisted of three
main sections: the Oder-Warthe River
Bend Line (OWB), the Pomeranian
Line, and the Oder Defenses.
The heaviest fortified area, the
OWB, was the central part of the overall
eastern defense structure and was
formed by the Oder and Warthe Rivers.
In the early 1930s it consisted mainly
of water defenses with small dams that
controlled flooding in the area. In the
mid-1930s the Germans began building
heavy fortifications, which included a
number of Werkgruppen, forts consist-
ing of several dispersed positions usually
linked by tunnels. Those fortifications,
which were among the largest the
Germans would build before or during
the war, were partially modeled on the
older Feste but they lacked artillery.
They generally consisted of up to
three combat blockhouses, though
sometimes there were more. As little
as possible of the blockhouses was
exposed at the surface. Though the
majority of them had a small entrance
on an exposed wall covered by its
own weapons embrasures, some had
no exposed walls at all. On the roofs
there were often positions for an
automatic mortar and housing for the
nozzle of a flamethrower. A shaft in each
blockhouse connected them to a tunnel
system that linked all of them. The bar-
racks, munitions areas and other facili-
ties were below ground, leaving little
Photo courtesy of Alex Goss
exposed at the surface, unlike the older

Feste. Generators supplied the power
necessary to operate each position.
In the 1930s secret construction also
began on an extensive tunnel system Inside view of a German bunker near St. Petersburg (Leningrad)

Organizing for Construction
Building fortifications of concrete and steel was a task During the pre-war years the RAD was associated with
beyond the normal capabilities of most armies in World War II. draining marshes, agricultural projects, roadwork and other
The German Army normally provided its own specialized staff such tasks. Many of its battalions were assigned to work on
of engineers who planned and supervised the civilian contract the East and West Walls, where they performed some of the
work involved. In Germany that role was assigned to the Festung less specialized work such as the creation of obstacles.
Pioneer Stab (Fortress Engineer Staff), which was organized at a When the war began many RAD battalions were converted into
regimental level but consisted mostly of just staff personnel. army construction battalions. The army hadn’t maintained such units
The small pre-war army didn’t have the technicians to before the war, though in the First World War it had construction
operate the heavy cranes and other equipment required units with the capability of building ferroconcrete bunkers.
for building large works. Before the war that work was During the war both the OT and the RAD were involved in
contracted to civilian companies. Eventually the Organization fortification building on all fronts. Beyond that, it wasn’t uncommon
Todt (OT) took over handling those contractors. for civilians and prisoners to be involuntarily involved in the
The OT, formed in 1933 by the early Nazi supporter Fritz Todt, construction of trenches and anti-tank ditches on the eastern
evolved into a kind of paramilitary organization by the time it front. The construction battalions were more often engaged in
built the autobahns. Eventually it undertook other tasks, such bridgework or similar projects, but they also sometimes participated
as the construction of fortifications, beginning with the West in the preparation of fortifications. The pioneer (combat engineer)
Wall in 1938. The OT was organized into Einsatzgruppen or task battalions of the infantry and armored divisions often also did
forces (not to be confused with the infamous SS formations of such work. They were equipped with explosives, flamethrowers
the same name), which operated on each major front in Europe. and other equipment for use in their primary functions, which
Two Einsatzgruppen worked on the Atlantic Wall while several included opposed river crossings and assaults on enemy
others were responsible for maintaining lines of communication. fortifications as well as emplacing minefields and barbed wire.
Later they also assumed responsibility for the construction Concrete bunkers, be they for a machinegun position or a U-boat
of the fortifications on the eastern front. When Todt died in a shelter, require specially manufactured metal components like doors,
plane crash early in 1942 he was replaced by Albert Speer. embrasures and turrets. Emplacement requires heavy equipment,
The Reicharbeitsdienst (RAD or Reich Labor Service) and the installation of most of the parts entails work by a variety
was an organization created in 1934 that remained under of technicians. The Germans kept a standardized catalogue of
the direction of Konstantin Hierl until the end of the war. It armored components and plans (referred to as Regelbau) for their
included a section for men and one for women. Before entering bunkers, casemates, munitions stores and troop shelters. ★
the military, most young men were required to serve in the RAD
for at least six months. Though it wasn’t officially categorized
as a military organization, its members carried weapons once
the war began. The RAD performed less specialized tasks than
the OT, and it was organized into battalion-sized formations.
above
A photo of the
Reichsarbeitsdienst
Translation:
« Our whole life
should be a big labor
service in Germany. »
far left
A German soldier
in front of the Todt
compound
left
Fritz Todt, founder of
Organization Todt

» continued from page 45 blockhouses linked by an underground filter room, a machine shop, a munitions
armored door out of the direct line of gallery. By 1938, three additional combat room, a rest area for the garrison, a
enemy fire, and included an embrasure blockhouses had been added, and latrine and storage areas. A com-
for covering the outer access door. obstacles on the surface were divided munications room served to connect
Another important feature of into three sections. The largest position it to other Werkgruppen. The barracks
most German fortifications, from the at Ludendorff was the entrance block- and other facilities were located in
smallest to the largest, was they could house (Panzer Werke 865), which wasn’t the tunnel system below the blocks.
be manned with either some small duplicated in any other Werkgruppe. Twelve additional one-to-five-block
number of specialized personnel or, A military road of concrete plates Werkgruppen were built in the OWB.
often, using no specialists at all. Basic led from the main road to the entrance Most consisted of three or four blocks,
instructions were painted on the interior of Ludendorff. Like most large Panzer for a total of 83. They were all classified
walls for the benefit of soldiers new Werke (PzW), it consisted of two levels as B-Werke based on the thickness of
to the facility. All eventualities were and had standard features including their concrete walls and armor, which
covered, including a reminder in the emergency exits that were normally could resist a single 300mm round or a
latrine to shut the cover to prevent light kept blocked with sand, which then had hit by a 1,000 lb. bomb. Type B concrete
escaping and alerting the enemy. to be drained in case of need. PzW 865 thickness ranged from 60 to 79 inches
On his final visit to the OWB, Hitler mounted a large six-embrasure turret while that of their armor was 10 inches.
became enraged when he learned the for machineguns. A smaller position, The various thicknesses for concrete
expensive works completed up to that PzW 687, had a three-embrasure turret and steel were rated from A (11.5 feet)
time couldn’t hold any weapon larger for a single machinegun. That type of to D (one foot). Type A was the heaviest
than a machinegun or field mortar. turret didn’t project far above ground; type, and was equal to the thickest walls
He immediately put an end to all work it was embedded with only a little more of French Maginot Line forts; however,
on the East Wall, including the linking than half its top section exposed. it was only intended for the three-gun
tunnel system and planned batteries. PzW 866 was a large one-level work artillery positions that were never
By that time he’d changed the main whose only exposed positions were completed. In 1938, on Hitler’s insis-
construction effort to the West Wall, its three-embrasure half-turret and a tence, mortars and flamethrowers were
which included few large positions, gunroom for a 37mm Festungs-PAK added to those positions. The heavy
none of which was as ambitious (fortress anti-tank gun), with a steel roof fortress flamethrowers had a nozzle
those for the East Wall. Plans for large and a steel plate on its exposed façade. protruding through the block roofs
Werkgruppen similar to the forts of Except for its emergency exit, its only that could cover 360 degrees, spraying
the French Maginot Line and the East access was through the tunnel system. the surface of the block, and beyond
Wall were scrapped. From that time The largest single-floor position was if needed, to repel an enemy assault.
on the Germans concentrated on PzW 864, with two standard entrances Werkgruppe Scharnhorst in the OWB
the construction of smaller bunkers for troops, an observation turret with characterized most of the fortifications
and obstacles — including mines small embrasures and a periscope, in its sector. It consisted of three
and anti-tank obstacles — aimed at and a mortar turret that was flush with completed B-Werke and a fourth that
creating lines of impenetrable depth. the surface of the roof and had an was planned but not built. One block
The East Wall’s Pomeranian automatic 50mm mortar. Its exposed included two entrance doors; the
Line included several Werkgruppen façade included two entrances covered others had none, but all were linked to
similar to those of the OWB, but by a machinegun position. The larger a barracks by an underground gallery
with no tunnel complex. The blockhouses included a ventilator and connected to the tunnel system. The
southeast part of the East Wall, the
Oder Defenses, consisted mainly of
unlinked bunkers along the river.
OWB Werkgruppen
Most weapons, equipment and

fortification designs were first tested
at Hillersleben, west of Magdeburg.
Since building a complete Werkgruppe
at that site wasn’t practical, the
Germans decided to use the OWB
as their test ground. Thus the
prototype of the new Werkgruppe, the
Ludendorff Group, was built there.
Construction of the OWB
Werkgruppen had begun before
Ludendorff was completed. As a result, a
number of changes were implemented
on those Werkgruppen while they were
still under construction. Between 1935
and 1936 the Ludendorff position
came to consist of a large entrance
blockhouse and two small combat Armored air vent and automatic mortar turret with a mortar shell placed on its roof for scale

East Walls Old & New
In the late summer of 1943, Hitler gave permission for the The Soviets then simply bypassed the German strongpoints and
construction of fortified lines on the eastern front. The plan was “fortress cities” such as Warsaw and Graudenz. Before the end of the
to build a new East Wall from the Baltic to the Black Sea to hold month they stood before the old East Wall. The Germans meanwhile
off the Red Army. The section referred to as the Panther Line, clung to Hitler’s fortress cities of Breslau, Glogau, Kustrin and Danzig.
which contained subsidiary back up lines within it, ran through the East Prussia was soon isolated and fighting there raged around
sectors of Army Groups North and Center. As it turned out, those “Fortress Koenigsberg.” At the end of March, Kustrin was eliminated,
forces had until June 1944 to work on it. The other section, the allowing the Soviets to establish a bridgehead over the Oder and
Wotan (Odin) Line, ran along the Dnepr River to the Black Sea. prepare for the drive on Berlin. During January, when Hitler had the
Before significant work could be completed in the south, however, opportunity to transfer divisions from the failed Ardennes offensive to
the Soviets overran large parts of the Wotan Line during October stabilize the situation along the Oder, he instead sent them to Hungary.
1943 (in the sectors of Army Groups South and A). By December The heavily propagandized “Alpine Fortress” was actually
1943 the Soviets had taken Kiev and had almost completely cleared almost non-existent, except for positions in the south and southeast
Army Group South from the Dnepr south of the Pripet Marsh. By that used sections of old Italian fortifications to form the Ingrid
mid-April 1944, Soviet forces were on the Rumanian frontier after Line along the Yugoslav border; however, the weapons originally
having overrun the nascent Gneisenau Line in the Crimea, and in place there had mostly been removed earlier in the war. Even if
they were moving directly on Sevastopol. By June 1944 the only the Alpine Fortress had been better fortified, it would’ve been of
fortifications of any significance on the eastern front consisted little value, since it couldn’t support large forces once the economic
of the Panther Line. The renamed Army Group North Ukraine and base on the German plain to the north had been lost. ★
South Ukraine hastily attempted to establish new defensive lines.
On 22 June 1944 a massive Soviet offensive struck Army Group
Center, shattering it and the Panther Line. The remnants of that army
group were unable to stop the Red advance. Before long, Army Group
North faced isolation in the Baltic States as the Soviets advanced past
it on its southern flank. In July, Soviet forces shattered the front of
Army Group North Ukraine north of the Carpathians. By September the
Soviets established a major bridgehead over the Vistula at Baranów, as
the forces that had destroyed Army Group Center approached Warsaw.
In late July, Gen. Heinz Guderian, who’d become chief of staff,
tried to create new defensive lines and restore old ones roughly
along the 1940 eastern border of the Reich. He also ran out of
time, however, as the Soviets advanced, pushing back the Germans
on a line from the border of East Prussia to the Vistula at Modlin,
then along that river until they came to a halt when the Poles in
Warsaw rose against the Germans. The Soviets chose not to break
through to Warsaw at that time, thereby giving the Germans time to
crush the uprising and stabilize their front. Taking advantage of the
respite, the Germans worked feverishly on their new Government
General Line, which ran through the heart of Polish territory.
Guderian had new positions added to the old East Wall, mostly
various types of concrete bunkers and ring-stands. When he called
for volunteers, thousands of Germans of all ages responded and
began to work on building trenches, obstacles and anti-tank ditches.
Guderian soon formed over 100 fortress infantry battalions by
using men otherwise unfit for field duty. He also established other
specialized fortress units to man the defenses, but 80 percent of them
then ended up being sent to the western front. He also wasn’t sent any
weapons larger than 50mm for the new defenses. As he pointed out
in his memoirs, it did little good to prepare new defense lines without
also having the troops and weapons needed to properly man them.
Guderian, based on his discussions with front line commanders,
wanted to form the main line of resistance 12.5 miles behind
the forward defensive line. That would allow the troops to pull
back when the Soviet preliminary bombardment for their next
major offensive began, leaving behind only a rear guard and thus
Photo courtesy of Alex Goss
negating the effect of the enemy’s normally massive barrages.

Hitler, however, refused to tactically sacrifice so much territory;
he only agreed to allow the main line of resistance to be about
1.85 miles to the rear. Thus the defenders, outnumbered by
as much as 11:1 in the main Soviet attack zones, were easily Present-day Russian historical re-enactors atop a
overrun when that new offensive began on 12 January 1945. German bunker near St. Petersburg (Leningrad)

crews for each of the three blocks there was no shortage of such positions, There was thus initially no question
ranged from 30 to 50 men. Scharnhorst’s their firing chambers were only able of building fortified positions in the
largest weapons consisted of 50mm to accommodate weapons that had east. Of course, even before 1941 drew
automatic mortars and machineguns. become obsolete early in the war. to its close, it had become clear the
In the summer of 1939 older troops The only major fortified line under situation wasn’t developing as he had
occupied the positions of the OWB, construction in the east between planned. During that first winter the
since the stretch of front that covered October 1939 and June 1941 was a German armies needed to create their
the eastern approach to Berlin was Soviet position along their new border, own fieldworks, not only to defend
to remain static while the Germans which was dubbed the Molotov Line. against counterattacks but also for
attacked along the northern and The Red Army abandoned the Stalin shelter against the fierce weather.
southern fronts. Some of those positions Line along the former border and
included not only wire obstacles but began to concentrate on creating new 1942 & 1943
also concrete dragons teeth and wooden works, including ferroconcrete artillery
posts, despite the fact the Poles had casemates and infantry blockhouses. In 1942 the Germans returned to
few tanks. (Some sources claim the The Molotov Line covered a smaller the strategic offensive in the east. At
dragons teeth were only added in 1944.) area than had the Stalin Line, running that time, from the Gulf of Finland to
In February 1940 a group of foreign from the border with East Prussia to west of Moscow a largely static front
military attachés was taken on an official the foothills of the Carpathians. It was formed as the Germans dug in to keep
tour of Werkgruppe Ludendorff. The longer than the German West Wall, how- Leningrad under siege and to stabilize
American attaché made a full report ever, and the Germans couldn’t match the fronts of Army Groups North and
that included a diagram drawn from it because they’d just begun major Center. Army Group South had also been
memory. By showing those men the construction projects along the Atlantic hard-pressed by the expanded Soviet
fortifications in the east, the Germans coast in the west, including massive winter offensive that continued through
hoped to circulate the idea their West submarine pens and artillery casemates. March. Hitler refused, however, to allow
Wall was equally well fortified. The German plan for the invasion the construction of fortifications except
There’s no evidence the Germans of the USSR was unlike the initial one in logistically critical urban areas for
employed minefields on a large scale for the 1940 campaign in the west, local control and for protection of lines
along the East Wall. The Germans were, where Hitler had calculated his armies of communication against partisans.
however, the first to mass-produce would advance into northwest France The summer offensive of 1942 into
anti-personnel mines, making it pos- and then stop and take defensive the Caucasus and to Stalingrad ended
sible to create large minefields. Before positions while preparing for the in disaster for the Germans. The forces
the mass production of anti-personnel next and final move. His plan for the that escaped destruction during that
mines, anti-tank mines were generally east called for rapid advances deep debacle fell back and tried to hold
deployed only along routes that could into the European portion of the new positions with hastily erected
be used by heavy vehicles, whereas Soviet Union to take Leningrad and fieldworks. The summer of 1943 saw
anti-personnel mines had been mostly the Ukraine before coming to a halt. one last major offensive in the east
handmade booby traps usually planted That strategy was intended to bring around Kursk, which coincided with
among wire entanglements. Even the complete and final victory by causing the Allied landings in Sicily. It wasn’t
French employed their anti-personnel the overall collapse of the Soviet Union until September 1943, after the defeat
mines like booby traps early in the via economic and psychological shock. at Kursk and the transfer of units to the
war. The Germans were careful to
record the location of all their own
mines, not only to mark safe paths
through them for their troops, but
to avoid accidental explosions when
the time came to remove them.
1939 –1941
After the occupation of Poland in

October 1939 the East Wall no longer
served a useful purpose, and the West
Wall lost its relevance when France fell
the following summer. As a result the
Germans removed much of the equip-
ment installed in those fortifications.
In the west, meanwhile, many anti-
tank bunkers only had a firing chamber
for a machinegun and a storage space
for a 37mm anti-tank gun that was to
be rolled out and moved to a firing
position just above and in front of the
bunker. Those bunker designs on the
West Wall posed a serious problem for
the Germans in 1944 because, though Armored air vent and six-embrasure turret with circular openings for optical equipment

west, that Hitler grudgingly allowed his such as ring-stands and tank turrets lines stretched along the Luga River.
eastern forces to build fortifications. mounted in concrete, most of the posi- It was anchored in the northwest at
He believed such fortifications, tions were log-lined dugouts and bun- the fortified town of Kingisepp. In the
once built, served as magnets that kers, a far cry from formal fortified lines. south lay a similar position at Luga.
invariably drew nearby units into them, When 18th and 16th Armies pulled
thereby guaranteeing the quick loss of Panther & Wotan back to the Narva River and sections
all territory in front of them. Similarly he of the Panther Line early in 1944, the
feared, once any portion of such lines Between 1942 and 1944 the most Organization Todt (see first sidebar) had
had been broken, that knowledge would important position on the front near already prepared positions for them.
quickly spread along the entire defense, Leningrad and around Lake Ilmen was Since building concrete structures
thereby setting off a panic that wouldn’t the Rollbahn (Highway) Line. Beyond it, during the frigid winter was practically
stop until those forces had retreated toward Lake Ladoga, was the Mga Line, impossible, most of those bunkers were
into the next such fortified line. where the Germans created numbers made of wood. Even so, in the difficult
Nonetheless, once given the go- of strongpoints, often by adding field terrain of the Army Group North front
ahead, troops and impressed civilian fortifications to existing stone structures the Panther Line proved to be one of
laborers feverishly excavated anti-tank in the towns. Some of the positions were the strongest positions built in Soviet
ditches and trenches, while engineer further reinforced with concrete, such territory. That was because the OT had
units deployed barbed wire obstacles as machinegun bunkers, ring-stands from the fall of 1943 until the spring
and laid minefields. Even so, the con- (“Tobruks”) and troop shelters. of 1944 to work on it. The Panther
struction and proper “curing” of con- Elsewhere in the sector of Army Line was anchored at Narva in the
crete bunkers required time; time the Group North, other positions extended northwest, and it followed the river to
Germans didn’t have. Though the new between the Gulf of Finland and Lake Lake Peipus and then along the lakes
lines included a few concrete positions, Ilmen. One of the strongest of those and rivers south of Pskov and Ostrov.

A complicating factor in the AGN to heavily fortify it, it actually consisted Last Stands
sector came from the fact much of its of little more than fieldworks that relied
area of operations was low-lying and on the river for defensive strength. By mid-1944 the Germans had
swampy. In many places you were By the end of 1943 the Soviets had begun to fall back into the defensive
beneath the water table as soon as crossed a large part of the Dnepr, lines inside their pre-1941 borders.
you stuck a spade into the ground. thereby overrunning much of the They threw up new defensive lines
That often meant entrenching to uncompleted Wotan Line. By May 1944 and worked on the old East Wall,
any degree had to be accompanied they had pushed the Germans almost restoring old fortifications and
by drainage work, or else the entire completely out of the Ukraine. The creating new ones. In addition to
effort had to be kept above ground. Germans therefore had to race to build trenches and obstacles they built many
The southern part of the Panther additional defensive lines before the small concrete positions, including
Line in the sector of Army Group Center next blow fell. Army Group Center was ring-stands. Concrete bunkers also
wasn’t as strong, even though it included smashed, along with the Panther Line, appeared, some using new designs that
concrete ring-stands, machinegun by the massive Soviet summer offensive included retractable radio antennas.
bunkers and some positions mounting in June. Within a matter of weeks the During the last months of 1944, as
old tank turrets (mostly Panzer IIs Soviets surged across the old Polish Soviet forces advanced onto the Polish
with 20mm guns). The Panther Line border toward East Prussia, eventually plain, the Germans added a system of
ran through the sector of AGC east isolating Army Group North in Courland. trenches, positions for 47mm anti-tank
of the Dnepr River to a point in the
vicinity of the northeast corner of the
Pripet Marsh. Just a few miles behind
it was the Bear Line. Details about that
line are few and in many cases not
reliable. Both lines consisted mainly
of fieldworks ranging from trenches to
wooden bunkers with the usual scat-
tered assortment of concrete structures.
Barbed wire and mines were used
whenever they were available, which
meant in some areas the defenses were
skimpy as almost all those items were
at the time being sent to try to hurriedly
build up the Atlantic Wall in the west.
A few prefabricated four-ton porta-
ble steel machinegun positions, known
as Panzer Nesten (armored nests), were
used in the Panther and Bear Lines.
They could be quickly installed or
removed for relocation if time permit-
ted. They included a machinegun, two
periscopes, an air filter and a pedal-
operated ventilation fan. Those nests,
which came to be used in most German
defensive lines, were never available
in large numbers. In 1944 a one-man
concrete bunker was developed and
it may have been used in occupied
Soviet territory; it was certainly
incorporated in the defenses in Poland.
The Germans also occupied aban-
doned Soviet bunkers, but it’s not known
precisely where and on what scale
they did so. In one case they used old
Soviet machinegun bunkers to defend
a railway line in the Mozry Fortified
Region southeast of Minsk. “Fortress
Borisov,” located between the Panther
Line and Minsk, included a number
of ring-stands with tank turrets and
Panzer Nesten. It‘s likely other “fortress”
positions had similar defenses.
South of the Panther Line was the
Wotan (Odin) Line, which ran mainly
along the Dnepr River through the
Ukraine. Since the Germans had no time Photos from opposing angles of a fortified sluice within the OWB, built in 1936 at “A Strength”

guns, about 200 ring-stands and other hauled into position. Trenches, anti-tank the Germans held only bridgeheads at
positions on the OWB and in front of ditches and other fieldworks were also Kustrin and Frankfurt-am-Oder. The
and along the Pomeranian Line. The prepared. In spite of those efforts, those old fortress town of Kustrin was the
concrete ring-stands came in several positions failed to withstand the Soviet last barrier on the road to Berlin. That
types for machineguns and mortars, offensive that began on 12 January 1945. town then had to do what the entire rest
and they were used throughout what After that Soviet offensive broke of the OWB had failed to do; however,
remained of German-occupied Europe. through the Vistula Line and other after a two-month siege 5th Shock Army
Koch Bunkers, named after the Nazi positions beyond it, their 1st Guards leveled Kustrin. Only about 1,000 of
Party leader of East Prussia, were one- Tank Army penetrated the OWB on its garrison of about 18,000 escaped.
man concrete tubular positions made 29 January. Three days after first The positions in the Pomeranian
in prefabricated sections. Some models engaging those Soviet troops, the Line fared somewhat better. The central
included a roof section, and they could German garrison destroyed Werkgruppe portion of that line was attacked by 2nd
be used for observation or machine- Ludendorff and retreated from it. Other Guards Tank Army on 24 January 1945.
guns. Thousands were produced and garrisons also abandoned the remain- Most of the southern part of the line
they appeared in East Prussia, Poland, ing Werkgruppen, since they didn’t had fallen by the 30th, while its central
southern France and the West Wall have the weapons to neutralize Soviet sector held until 13 February. The 1st
in 1944. In addition, mass-produced tanks and artillery. Before long Soviet Polish Army attacked the northern
one-man concrete bunkers were also forces reached the Oder River, while part of the line early in February, but
pg. 50

it wasn’t until 3 March that 3rd Guards
Tank Corps smashed through the last
German positions to reach the Baltic
coast. With most of the East Wall in their
hands, the Soviets had thus secured their
flanks against counterattack and were
poised for the final assault on Berlin.
Conclusion
To summarize, the situation

concerning fortifications on the eastern
front became a classic case of “too little
too late” when Hitler belatedly autho-
rized their construction in mid-1943.
Further Soviet offensives then pushed
the Germans toward the pre-invasion
Photo courtesy of Valery Tadra

border of 1941, still with little in the way
of fortified positions behind them to
aid in stopping the Red Army. Hitler’s
attempts to declare as “fortresses” towns
and cities that lacked actual heavy forti-
fications merely worked to suck in more
troops that were then lost to the defense
of the Fatherland. The original East Wall
within Germany proper, though hur-
riedly reinforced in 1944, consisted of
Werkgruppen inadequate for post-1940
warfare. The Atlantic Wall soaked up
most of the resources that otherwise
could’ve been used for the construction
of a massive fortified line in the east.
In 1945, Hitler committed even
more troops to holding his declared
“fortresses” such as Breslau and
Konigsberg, thereby leaving tens of
thousands of men encircled in those
places and further reducing the
number available to hold the Oder
Line covering Berlin. The result was a
massive collapse on that main front and
the Soviet assault into Berlin leading
to the end of the Third Reich. ✪
Sources
Burk, Kurt. Die Deutschen Landebefestigungen Im Osten,

1919 –1945. Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1993.
Fleischer, Wolfgang.
Feldbefestigungen Des Deutschen Heeres 1939 –1945. top — A German bunker just outside Minsk
Ein Typenkatalog. Germany: Podzun Pallas, 1998.
Glantz, David. The Siege of Leningrad 1941 –1944.
above — One of the many machinegun bunkers of the Oder Line viewed from the rear
London: Brown Partworks Ltd., 2001.
Guderian, Heinz. Panzer Leader. bottom-left — Guard post within the tunnel system of the OWB
New York: DaCapo Press, 1996. bottom-right — Unusual tepee-shaped concrete German guard post and machinegun bunker in Minsk
Kaufmann, J.E. & H.W. Kaufmann. Fortress Third Reich.
Cambridge, MA: DaCapo, 2007.
Kedryna, Anna & Robert Jurga.
Grupa Warowna Werkgruppe “Ludendorff.”
Poland: Donjon, circa 1996.
_______. Grupa Warowna Werkgruppe “Scharnhorst.”
Poland: Donjon, 1996.
Miniewicz, Janusz & Boguslaw Perzyk.
Miedzyrecki Rejon Umocniony 1934 –1945.
Warsaw: ME-GiSp. Cyw, 1993.
_______. Wal Pomorski.
Warsaw: Militaria Bogusalwa Perzyka, 1997.
Rolf, Rudi. Die Entwicklung Des Deutschen Festungssytems
Photo courtesy of Valery Tadra
Seite 1870.
Zuiderdiep, Netherlands: Fortress Books, 2000.

Game Preview
Rhineland ‘36
T
he Rhineland War, 1936-37 (RW), pick crisis chits depending on the number
designed by Joseph Miranda, of crisis hexes (printed on the map) they WaW Upcoming
is a strategic-level simulation control. The more such hexes they control, Features
of intermediate complexity that the greater the chances they have of gain-
covers an alternative World War II ing more allies. At the same time, grabbing #
20: Gross Deutschland Panzer
in Europe, one that began in 1936. too much territory can lead to political #
21: Rhineland ‘36
The assumption is, when Hitler collapse at home, as domestic foes work #
22: Minsk 1944
ordered his army to march into the to undermine your power before the #
23: Guadalcanal
Rhineland, the Allied powers, instead conflict explodes into a wider war. #
24: Sedan 1940
of appeasing him, ordered their armed Rhineland War is a two-player
Visit STRATEGYandTACTICSpress.com
forces to resist. The ensuing chain game. One player commands the Axis,
for previews of these issues.
of events leads to the war expanding controlling Germany and the countries
throughout Europe. A war fought at that choose to align with Berlin. The
that time would’ve found all European other is the Allied player, who controls
militaries woefully unprepared. the anti-German forces. Each hex on the
Central to the play of the game are map represents 62 miles (100 km) from
its “crisis chits.” They represent various side to opposite side. Each full game
diplomatic and military events that could turn represents one month. Units of
bring other powers into the war. Players maneuver are corps and armies. ✪

Observation Post
Military History on Money
Too Little, Too Late
T
his 500 Franc note was issued by the French Bank of West Africa in 1950, which was then the monetary authority
for all their still-vast colonial holdings in that part of the continent. Its front commemorates the region’s manpower
contribution — in this particular case in the form of naval infantry — to the Free French cause in World War II. (At the
same time, though, note the white officer in the center of the illustration.) On the bill’s obverse is an African “Marianne,”
a black version of the French republic’s white female “national icon.” Chalk it all up to too little, too late. (Shown at 100%)
PLE
AM
S
PLE
AM

S World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011 55
Observation Post
Pure Speculation Then, on 17 July 1944, the fires of hell for the sake of haste. That conclusion
were unleashed. At 10: 20 p.m., though remains the official verdict on the event.
The Port Chicago Blast darkness had descended, Port Chicago Peter Vogel is one man who ques-
remained a hive of activity as men tions that official explanation. He
N
umerous mysteries have labored under the glare of artificial lights believed the eyewitness testimonies of
come out of World War II, to load a pair of merchant ships, the SS the event sounded eerily like a nuclear
most of them the result of E.A. Bryan and SS Quinault Victory. explosion, and he embarked on a
the inescapable and eternal “fog of Without any warning a cataclysmic two-decade quest to prove the blast was
war,” secrecy over national security blast wiped out the entire facility. The in fact caused by an atomic bomb. He
matters, or revisionist history. One of E.A. Bryan and a train on a nearby pier subsequently published the results of
the most enduring mysteries occurred were vaporized, while the Quinault his findings in an online e-book, The
not on some distant battlefield, Victory was left a hulk. The blast was Last Wave from Port Chicago, which
but here in the United States: the so powerful it made a crater 22 yards summarizes his findings. In his mind,
explosion that destroyed Port deep and 219 yards across. Body parts and in that of others won over by his
Chicago. That is: was it actually a of victims were found up to a mile argument, there’s evidence to suggest
nuclear blast, the result of a planned away. Buildings in Port Chicago town, Port Chicago was no accident, but rather
trial to determine the effects of that two miles distant, suffered severe a test of nuclear capability orchestrated
untested weapon on infrastructure? structural damage, and windows by Manhattan Project scientists.
Conventional wisdom says that’s were broken in buildings in adjacent There’s no doubt Los Alamos
a preposterous assertion, while con- counties. Tremors measuring 3.5 on scientists took interest in the Port
spiracy theorists bring out “evidence” the Richter scale were recorded as Chicago blast. We know, for example,
in support of a massive cover-up. Sixty- far away as Nevada, leading many to that then-Capt. William Parsons, who
seven years after the tragedy, it’s perhaps initially believe it was an earthquake. later served on the Enola Gay during its
time to reexamine the controversy. In the days immediately after, bombing mission over Hiroshima and
As war clouds darkened the horizon newspapers quoted eyewitnesses who still later, as a rear admiral, oversaw the
in 1941, Port Chicago was built from reported a “mushroom-like cloud” nuclear tests on Bikini Atoll, submit-
scratch 35 miles north of San Francisco. rising in the aftermath of the explosion. ted a report on the disaster within a
As tensions with Japan worsened, Lending credence to those reports was week. It’s possible that was merely
the US military had recognized the the official statement made by an Army the result of professional curiosity,
logistical requirements of any future pilot before a Navy Court of Inquiry. The but there may have been more to it.
war in the Pacific would be beyond pilot was clear in his recollection of hav- Supporting that assertion is a report
the capacities of existing seaports. A ing seen a white flash, a smoke ring, and written later in 1944 by the director of
new port, one dedicated for military a “ball of fire” that reached to 12,000 feet. the Manhattan Project, James Conant.
use, was clearly needed. Port Chicago The Navy inquiry, though, found In it, Conant suggested foregoing
was built to serve that need. there was nothing particularly unusual development of the earliest A-bomb
During the war, Port Chicago served about the tragic incident. After 39 prototypes, small tactical weapons
as a major nexus for shipping ammuni- days of eyewitness testimony and called “gun bombs,” in favor of larger
tion and ordnance to US forces fighting deliberation, the investigation con- models. He cited an unidentified test
across the expanse of the Pacific. Every cluded the explosion occurred because a in July 1944 — the same month as the
day, thousands of tons of bullets, “supersensitive element was detonated Port Chicago blast — as evidence the
bombs, mines, grenades and other in the course of rough handling by larger bombs would be more destructive
explosive and combustible materials an individual or individuals.” and of greater value in ending the war.
were transferred from trains to ships and The explosion, experts claimed, History records no such atomic test at
then shipped across to the war zones. started on a pier loaded with several the Los Alamos facility at that time.
The loading of such deadly materials, thousand tons of diesel fuel and 429 Even more curiously, officials at
at a frenzied pace that at times saw tons of ammunition, and then engulfed Los Alamos ordered destroyed the
safety measures overlooked for the sake the E.A. Bryan, which at the time content records for two of the boxcars
of expediency, meant Port Chicago held 4,600 tons of munitions, half of that had been at Port Chicago on 17
always balanced on the knife edge it high-explosive artillery shells. July. Of course, what suggests itself
of disaster. Just a simple slip-up, the Other factors contributing to the is they contained an atomic bomb
smallest of mistakes, could lead to death explosion were said to include bad that, accidentally or otherwise,
and destruction. Yet for several years the loading procedures, defective muni- was responsible for the disaster.
dockyard operated without incident. tions, and a neglect of safety procedures There is evidence to suggest just that.

The transport E.A. Bryan was bound there would’ve risked tipping off the explosives experts agree the 5,000 tons
for Tinian, in the Marianas Islands, an enemy. The possibility of the blast being of conventional munitions present
important staging base for B-29 bomb- witnessed by civilians was also real. If on the docks and ships would’ve
ers raiding the Japanese home islands. In the “true” story then somehow came been capable of producing the effects
fact, it would be from Tinian the Enola out, what then if the American populace recalled by the eyewitnesses. While
Gay would take off in 1945. As well, Port was so horrified they put pressure on the rare, there have been instances when
Chicago lies in a county that, even today, government not to wield such destruc- conventional explosions occurred large
has one of the highest cancer rates tive power? Finally, from an atomic enough to produce effects comparable
in the US. That might be the result of researcher’s point of view, exploding an to nuclear blasts, the most famous of
contamination by an A-bomb explosion. atomic bomb at Port Chicago would’ve which was the Halifax Harbor munitions
As with all “conspiracy theories,” had only diluted value, because explosion of 1917, which was every
there are counter-arguments historians the mass of follow-on explosions bit as violent and destructive as that
and others have used to undermine the would’ve distorted the assessment which occurred at Port Chicago.
idea of a nuclear blast at Port Chicago. of the effects of the original blast. The most damning evidence of all,
It’s been pointed out, for example, the At the same time, though, the the one that seems to drive the final
unusual cancer rate among people greatest amount of evidence for the nail into the coffin of the atomic bomb
near Port Chicago may actually be Port Chicago atomic blast theory, and theory, is there are no traces of radiation
the result of the nearby presence of its original foundation, remains based or fission-related products detectable at
the Concord Naval Weapons Station, on the eyewitness testimony. What the blast site. They are the fingerprints
where ships exposed to the Pacific those survivors saw and experienced of every atomic explosion, and can still
atomic test blasts in the 1940s and were: a mushroom cloud, devastation be detected everywhere on the planet
1950s were cleaned of contamina- on a massive scale, and earthquake-like an atomic explosion has taken place.
tion and later decommissioned. after shocks. Certainly those are all Taken in sum, then, it seems
Further, it’s important to remember characteristics of nuclear explosions, improbable anyone knowingly and
there was an all-out war going on at the though they aren’t exclusive to them. willfully exploded an atomic bomb at
time of the blast. Even as war-weariness A conventional blast of sufficient Port Chicago. It was more than likely
was growing at home, US forces were size will produce the same effects. exactly what the Navy Board of Inquiry
making vigorous attacks against the Estimates of the size of the explosion concluded: a massive but accidental
Japanese Empire. They advanced on at Port Chicago range from 1.5 to 2.2 explosion of conventional munitions.
two main fronts, with Gen. Douglas kilotons (compared to 12 kilotons
MacArthur pushing north into the for the Hiroshima bomb). Many — Andrew Hind
Philippines as the Navy “island hopped”
across the Central Pacific. At the
Port Chicago shortly after the July 17, 1944 explosion (looking north). Source states,
same time, we were also materially “[Showing] the wreckage of Building A-7 in the center and ship pier beyond .. Bulldozer
supporting a third front in China and and damaged automobiles in the foreground, railway crane at left, and scattered pilings.”
Southeast Asia. Those three massive
efforts required ammunition and stores
in previously unheard of quantities,
and any logistical let-up would cause
those advances to slow or pause. The
resulting lull would give the Japanese
an opportunity to revive their defense,
thus prolonging the war and causing
more US and Allied casualties. Viewed
in that regard, it’s difficult to imagine
anyone in the US would knowingly
destroy a vital ammunition hub during
some of the fiercest fighting in the
war. It makes no strategic sense.
In addition, with Port Chicago
located on the seaboard, where Japanese
submarines and spies were known
to lurk, exploding a secret weapon

Observation Post
Skill vs. Luck bases that would allow them to project heading north, and the Japanese Fifth
retribution against the enemy. The FDR Fleet, commanded by Adm. Boshiro
Battle of the Komandorski Islands administration was also eager to liber- Hosogaya, awaiting the arrival of a
ate the only US national territory occu- slower merchant ship and destroyer.
Unique among the sea battles pied by the Axis. (The Komandorskis The Japanese, when they sighted masts
fought in the Pacific during World were territory of the Soviet Union.) to the south, happily assumed their
War II, the Battle of the Komandorski Signals intelligence had gleaned own slow ships had arrived. When
Islands (at the western extreme of that two supply convoys had been the Americans sighted masts on the
the Aleutians) was fought as a purely dispatched from Japan to reinforce the horizon they at first congratulated
daylight surface action without the garrison on Attu. There was also a sub- themselves on having found the help-
participation of submarines or stantial naval escort of two heavy cruis- less transports. During the time it took
combat airpower. For four hours on 26 ers, two light cruisers and four destroy- the six US ships to concentrate into a
March 1943, Japanese and American ers. Unfortunately the intelligence battle line from a 30-mile wide scouting
seamen fought the kind of traditional effort missed the sailing of the escort line, the Americans’ changed from
naval engagement for which they’d group; so the American commander, hunter to hunted. As the situation clari-
trained for decades. Cruisers of both Rear Adm. Charles McMorris, was to be fied, Hosogaya believed he was on the
sides expended large percentages of unpleasantly surprised by encountering verge of a great victory, finding himself
their main gun ammunition in an a much stronger enemy force than between the Americans and their home
effort to secure control of the North he’d been led to believe was involved. base with a 2:1 superiority in firepower.
Pacific wastes and their dominance Initially in command of the old light McMorris made the only reasonable
of the Aleutian Island chain. cruiser Richmond and the destroyers choice in such a circumstance: he
The Aleutian Island chain attracted Bailey and Coghlan, McMorris went turned tail. He ordered his cruisers
the attention of both Japanese and US on patrol south of Attu, where he to launch floatplanes, but it was too
strategists, who perceived them as a then rendezvoused with the heavy late to fuel and prepare them for flight
potential military highway pointing cruiser Salt Lake City and the destroyers before shooting began. At 8:40 a.m.
toward the northernmost Japanese Dale and Monaghan on 22 March. the Japanese heavy cruisers Nachi and
home island of Hokkaido. The Japanese A major storm broke over the next Maya opened fire on the Richmond at
sought to cut that highway and simul- few days as the ships stood watch a range of 21,000 yards. The opening
taneously anchor the north end of their southwest of Attu, causing moderate salvo came in concentrated and a
empire by taking the islands of Attu and damage and stressing the crews. mere 1,000 yards short. It did, however,
Kiska during their otherwise disastrous The morning of 26 March found destroy one of Nachi’s floatplanes,
Midway campaign. The Americans saw the American task force cruising which caught fire from the muzzle blast
in the Aleutians a chain of island air- south of the Komandorskis while and had to be jettisoned. Nachi, the
Japanese flagship, was also hampered
by cold boilers that had to be warmed
in order to give her full speed. (Not
expecting a fight, most of the ships
had half their boilers off-line, and it
took time to prepare them for battle.)
As the US ships closed up and
turned northwest, the two battle lines
The cruiser USS Salt Lake City, damaged by Japanese cruiser gunfire, starts losing speed prior to
closed range to the point the opposing
going dead in the water during the battle under a smoke screen laid by accompanying destroyers. destroyers were able to exchange
gunfire. For several minutes both
sides’ main guns thundered at one
another as the Americans continued
to turn to port until they were heading
southwest, toward the Japanese home
island bases only 500 miles away.
Besides being struck by several
destroyer shells, causing minor dam-
age, the Nachi received three hits
from the Salt Lake City: one hit the

bridge and killed several signalmen; heavy shell hits that almost sank her. UK. In 1917 he was commissioned an
one severed part of the mainmast, and Fearing an attack by American officer with the Royal Engineers, served
one destroyed the starboard catapult bombers based farther east in the in France, then returned to England to
and torpedo room. At 8:42 a.m. the Aleutians, Hosogaya believed he’d work on ship construction methods.
Japanese launched eight torpedoes, but pressed his luck far enough. Attu there- In 1919, Maunsell submitted his
all missed because they were set too fore remained without supplies, making idea for a cross-Channel connection
deep and passed under the American the US assault on the island in May less between Britain and France, but
cruisers. A total of 42 torpedoes were costly. The damaged US ships retired the Ministry of Transport shelved
launched by the Japanese during the to the west coast for repairs, where the plan. The idea was realized as
battle, but not one found its mark. many hull-plates were found to have the Channel Tunnel in 1994.
The only aircraft to participate been damaged by near misses. All three The 1920s and 30s were a difficult
was a spotter floatplane catapulted heavy cruisers expended 64 percent time in Maunsell’s career due to the
from the Nachi at 8:54 a.m. It could’ve or more of their 8-inch ammunition. Great Depression, but he eventually
potentially provided vital information While the Japanese shooting had been established his own consulting firm.
for the Japanese gunners to adjust considered accurate by their potential By nature he lived for his work, was
their fire, but it was repeatedly driven victims at the time, the American temperamental, prickly, and didn’t
off by anti-aircraft fire that eventually captains had been even more skillful in suffer fools gladly. His ideas were
damaged the plane and caused it to maneuvering their ships to dodge the always straightforward, practical,
have to fly to Attu for repair. Thus the salvoes — and they’d all been lucky. functional and cost-effective.
battle retained a purely traditional In October 1940 the harbormaster
surface-naval-only character. — Ken MacFarlane for the Port of London contacted
The hits on the Nachi also damaged Maunsell to ask his advice about
her gun directors, silencing her fire Movers & Shakers protecting the world’s busiest port
until repairs were completed at 9:25 from the German threat. Maunsell
a.m. (The gun directors’ function was to Guy Anson Maunsell prepared a paper outlining his views
find the range and coordinate the fire of on coastal fortifications. Shortly
the main turrets.) Meanwhile the other Guy Anson Maunsell was born in thereafter he met with Royal Navy
Japanese cruisers kept up their fire, Srinagar, India, in 1884, the second Capt. John Hughes-Hallett (1901–72,
but they also failed to make any hits. child of Edward Henry and Rosalie later vice admiral) concerning the
Near misses on the Salt Lake City Harriet Maunsell (née Anson). His construction of “four twin tower Navy
damaged her gun directors; so her father served with the Indian Army for forts for the [Thames] estuary.”
accuracy also suffered. Eventually 37 years, retiring as a lieutenant colonel Within a month Maunsell
one Japanese salvo landed next to in 1897. Young Guy was sent home to completed the design work, but
her and she lost rudder control, be educated in Britain, as was common some members of the Admiralty
followed by an insignificant hit at at the time. He excelled academically initially balked, declaring the structures
10:10 a.m. The US destroyers were and graduated with honors in 1906. “unstable.” Maunsell overcame those
then ordered to drop back to make He gained technical experience in objections, and construction on the
a smoke screen to cover the cruiser, structural engineering while working in forts was started soon thereafter.
and that created a lull in the battle. a variety of positions in Europe and the Two types of fort were ultimately
At 10:59 a.m. Salt Lake City was hit
in her mid-ship catapults, wrecking
those aircraft. At 11:03 a.m. another
shell hit a propeller shaft and started
flooding in the engine room. As the ship
lost power, McMorris ordered three of
the destroyers to make a risky torpedo
attack to discourage the Japanese
from pressing their advantage. Though
only five torpedoes were launched,
Hosogaya turned away his fleet and
gathered his transports to head back
to Japan. The destroyer Bailey paid
for leading the attack, receiving two

Observation Post
constructed, one for the Navy and seven interlocking steel platforms, technologically challenging pieces
one for the Army. Both designs were they looked something like the Arc of military architecture made during
prefabricated at a Gravesend dry dock de Triomphe sitting in water. Heavy World War II. Nothing quite like them
and then towed on concrete barges to anti-aircraft artillery was mounted had been attempted before, and the
their permanent locations in the estu- on five of the towers, which were fact their pre-stressed concrete technol-
ary. Once in position they were lowered arranged in a circular fashion around ogy is still in use today is testament to
onto the seabed in a controlled sinking. the central control tower, with a single Maunsell’s remarkable engineering
The forts for the Navy were capable seventh tower located away from the skill. While not decisive to the overall
of housing up to 120 men inside the others to serve as a searchlight base. British war effort, the forts were credited
leg of their structure. Each leg was Each second-generation tower with the destruction of 22 aircraft, 30
26 feet in diameter and seven stories was crewed by 265 men, which served V-1 flying bombs and one E-Boat.
tall. Their armament included two four weeks on followed by 10 days After V-E Day the Thames estuary
6-inch (150mm) gun emplacements ashore. Altogether three Maunsell Army forts became the responsibility
along with two 3.7-inch anti-aircraft artillery installations were built of the Anti-Aircraft Fort Maintenance
guns, along with 40mm Bofors guns for the Thames estuary. Each was Detachment. Their radar systems were
on top. They were supplied so as to constructed approximately 10 miles upgraded because of Cold War fears
be self-sufficient for over a month. from shore and six miles from the of attack from Warsaw Pact bombers;
Four forts were constructed in the next-nearest fort. The 1st Anti-Aircraft however, in 1956 the Army declared
following order: Fort Roughs Tower (U1, Fort Regiment Royal Artillery (Thames) them obsolete and dismantled
codenamed Uncle One) in February manned the forts named Great Nore their heavy guns and radars.
1942; Fort Sunk Head (U2) and Fort (U5), Red Sands (U6), and Shivering The Thames Estuary Special Defense
Tongue Sands (U3) in June; and Fort Sands (U7). All forts were in place Unit serviced the Navy forts. Two
Knock John (U4) in August. A fifth Navy and operational by the end of 1943. were subsequently used as postwar
fort was contemplated but never built. Concurrent with his design of the light ships. By the mid-1960s private
Tours of duty were of six weeks forts, Maunsell also began work on the “pirate radio stations” had taken over
duration followed by 10 days leave, after artificial harbors that became known the forts because they were located
four days training ashore. Men could as Mulberries and were used in the outside the three-mile territorial limit.
spend up to 18 hours below sea level in cross-Channel attack into Normandy One fort, Roughs Tower, is occupied
their artificially lighted living quarters. in 1944. Lessons learned from the failed to this day by the family of a former
The isolated conditions and cramped 1942 Dieppe raid had convinced the British Army officer who declared
quarters were made as comfortable as Allied high command a harbor was it the “Micronation of Sealand.”
possible within the limits of wartime needed at the very start of an invasion. The three Army forts deployed in
austerity, but it was still a tough tour Maunsell only later received official the Liverpool estuary never saw any
of duty for the men working in the credit for the original highly classified action. They were demolished in 1946.
underwater portion of the concrete legs. floating harbor concept. In addition, he Red Sands (U6) is now a candidate
After completion of the Navy forts, also designed concrete floating docks. for historical preservation due to
Maunsell was commissioned to design One anecdote from that episode its importance as one of the best
Army forts to be located in the Thames illustrated his famous temper. Told surviving examples of a rare World War
and Mersey (Liverpool) estuaries. That his design wouldn’t work by some II design. Fundraising has begun to
second-generation design was used members of the Admiralty, he retorted: restore it and create a museum on it.
for anti-aircraft defense. Comprising “Gentlemen, as you know, I live on a Maunsell went on to an even more
dairy farm. When I leave the office, I
go home and the first thing I do is go
into the field where my cows are and
discuss my day with them. I must say,
I get more bloody sense from them
than I ever get from talking to you!”
The objections were overturned
and Maunsell completed designs
for three 406-ton reinforced
concrete floating dry docks.
Maunsell’s fort designs are argu-
ably one of the most innovative and

successful postwar international engi-
neering career. Though he was never
lauded with honorary titles or public
recognition for his wartime accomplish-
ments, the fact remains he was an
outstanding individual in the engineer-
ing profession of the 20th century. One
of his most significant legacies is the
platform technology used in the offshore
oil and gas platforms in the North Sea.
While not the inventor of reinforced
or pre-stressed concrete, his vision
pushed the envelope in his creation of
the sea forts, artificial harbors, floating
concrete dry docks and other important
infrastructure projects. Maunsell retired
in 1959 and passed away two years later.
— Jon Cecil
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11 enemy submarines and received Bormann, Hitler’s factotum in charge of

over 2,000 personal decorations. all his cars, chauffeurs and daily office
If the role of the CG is little routine. The Todt Organization began
remembered, even more obscure is the project in 1937 and handed it over as
that of the Coast Guard Auxiliaries. a gift from the Nazi Party to its Fuehrer
That story of the home front was the on his 50th birthday in 1939. Ironically,
most intriguing part of the book. The he feared becoming stuck in its solid
all-volunteer Auxiliaries filled a number brass elevator and only visited the
of important roles to free Coast Guard expensive structure with its magnificent
personnel for duty elsewhere. There Alpine views a total of 14 times, the last
was the Volunteer Port Security Force, in October 1940. He worried about the
for example, which protected from the prominent place being easily bombed
sabotage the countless warehouses, by the Allies, or serving as an easy
piers and other facilities that kept the locale for assassins. RAF Lancasters
American shipping industry in business. did bomb the Berghof on 25 April
In the Osprey tradition, the book 1945, destroying the homes of Hitler,
is brought to life with numerous Goering and Bormann, but the teahouse
photographs and color drawings. remained unscathed and is in pristine
If I had a quibble with the book condition today as a tourist destination.
it would be that a broad topic is This fascinating work is
The US Coast Guard in World War Two, covered in a slender volume, and well-illustrated, researched and
by Alejandro De Quesada the most fascinating sections detailed, complete with architectural
(Osprey Publishing, 2010). were those briefest on detail. renderings, construction costs,
Reviewed by Andrew Hind It’s a great read and at least mini-biographies of the major figures
partly fills an important niche in involved, and pictures of Hitler and
T
he participation of the US Coast the literature of World War II. his mistress Eva Braun on-site. ✪
Guard in World War II is generally
overlooked. In addition to History of the Eagle’s Nest,
fulfilling its traditional life-saving and by Florian M. Beierl
law enforcement duties, it effectively (Anton Plenk Verlag, 2008).
became America’s fifth armed service. Reviewed by Blaine Taylor.
During the course of the war the Coast
Guard took on a number of invaluable There have been several German-
duties, including escorting convoys published books in English on the
in the Atlantic, securing ports and ever popular topic of Adolf Hitler’s
beaches, and operating landing craft mountain chalet, the Berghof, atop
at the Normandy invasion and in the Obersazlberg at Berchtesgaden
amphibious assaults across the Pacific. in Bavaria, but there has never been
After Pearl Harbor the Coast Guard one like this on the Fuehrer’s second
experienced a dramatic increase in teahouse building on Kehlstein
size: by war’s end it operated 800 Mountain overlooking the Berghof.
cutters, 351 other naval vessels, 288 The first teahouse was on the
ships for the army, and thousands of Mooslahnerkopf, to which Hitler and
smaller craft including amphibious his inner circle of aides, secretaries and
landing craft. The Coast Guard special guests walked daily when he was
rescued more than 1,500 survivors of in residence. Construction of the more
torpedo attacks in the Atlantic, sank famous second one was begun by Martin

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Saipan was a ME SERIE
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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN | Tarawa Was a Brawl | Afrikakorps Logistics | German East Front Fortifications

The Strategy & Tactics of World War II #19 AUG–SEP 2011

#270 SEP–OCT 2011

Going beyond the usual

American Revolution tables and pictures.

Each issue is packed full of:

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We welcome interesting and concise stories about virtually

4 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011

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8 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011

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10 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011

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12 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011

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Bletchley Park mansion Alan Turing The working rebuilt bombe

14 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011

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16 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011

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18 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011

The Hardest Days

20 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011

Detail of the The Hardest Days map

22 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011

Marines seek cover behind a sea wall on Red Beach 3, Tarawa.

World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011 23

26 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011

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28 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011

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I do not believe that heroism alone

30 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011

The qualities that led to the

World at War 19 | AUG–SEP 2011 31

Marine Cemetery, Tarawa, March 1944 1st Battalion 6th

32 World at War 19 | AUG–SEP 2011

Alexander, Col. Joseph H. USMC (Ret). Across the Reef:

Disabled U.S. LVTs and a Japanese Type 95

World at War 19 | AUG–SEP 2011 33

34 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011

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Axis forces in North Africa required 60,000 to 72,000 tons

36 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011

Tons of Supply Delivered to North

Month Axis British

World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011 37

Railroads, Distance & Logistics

38 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011

The transportation situation

World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011 39

40 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011

Axis Sealift of Supplies to North Africa

Monthly Average Major Military Activity in North Africa

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42 World at War 19 | aug–sep 2011

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