REVIEW

SOCIAL SCIENCE

Genesis of Suicide Terrorism

Scott Atran

is perceived as the common good of alle-

Contemporary suicide terrorists from the Middle East are publicly deemed crazed viating the community’s onerous political
cowards bent on senseless destruction who thrive in poverty and ignorance. Recent and social realities.
research indicates they have no appreciable psychopathology and are as educated and
economically well-off as surrounding populations. A first line of defense is to get the Recent History
communities from which suicide attackers stem to stop the attacks by learning how to Suicide attack is an ancient practice with a
minimize the receptivity of mostly ordinary people to recruiting organizations.
modern history (supporting online text). Its
use by the Jewish sect of Zealots (sicari) in
Roman-occupied Judea and by the Islamic

A
ccording to the U.S. Department of ity in selective application of the concept of Order of Assassins (hashashin) during the
State report Patterns of Global Ter- terrorism to fluctuating U.S. priorities. The early Christian Crusades are legendary ex-
rorism 2001 (1), no single definition special category of “State-sponsored terror- amples (5). The concept of “terror” as sys-
of terrorism is universally accepted; however, ism” could be invoked to handle some issues tematic use of violence to attain political
for purposes of statistical analysis and policy- (3), but the highly selective and politically ends was first codified by Maximilien
making: “The term ‘terrorism’ means pre- tendentious use of the label terrorism would Robespierre during the French Revolution.
meditated, politically motivated violence per- continue all the same. Indeed, there appears He deemed it an “emanation of virtue” that
petrated against noncombatant targets by sub- to be no principled distinction between “ter- delivers “prompt, severe, and inflexible”
national groups or clandestine agents, usually ror” as defined by the U.S. Congress and justice, as “a consequence of the general
intended to influence an audience.” Of “counterinsurgency” as allowed in U.S. principle of democracy applied to our coun-
course, one side’s “terrorists” may well be armed forces manuals (4). try’s most pressing needs.” (6 ). The Reign
another side’s “freedom fighters” (Fig. 1). Rather than attempt to produce a stipu- of Terror, during which the ruling Jacobin
For example, in this definition’s sense, the lative and all-encompassing definition of faction exterminated thousands of potential
Nazi occupiers of France rightly denounced terrorism, this arti-
the “subnational” and “clandestine” French cle restricts its focus
Resistance fighters as terrorists. During the to “suicide terror-
1980s, the International Court of Justice used ism” characterized
the U.S. Administration’s own definition of as follows: the tar-
terrorism to call for an end to U.S. support for geted use of self-de-
“terrorism” on the part of Nicaraguan Contras structing humans
opposing peace talks. against noncomba-
For the U.S. Congress, “‘act of terrorism’ tant—typically ci-
means an activity that—(A) involves a vio- vilian—populations
lent act or an act dangerous to human life that to effect political
is a violation of the criminal laws of the change. Although a
United States or any State, or that would be a suicide attack aims
criminal violation if committed within the to physically destroy
jurisdiction of the United States or of any an initial target, its
State; and (B) appears to be intended (i) to primary use is typi-
intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) cally as a weapon of
to influence the policy of a government by psychological war-
intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the fare intended to af-
conduct of a government by assassination or fect a larger public
kidnapping.” (2). When suitable, the defini- audience. The pri- Fig. 1. Chanting demonstrators in Pakistan-held Kashmir defending
Osama bin Laden’s actions and ambitions as freedom-fighting (Novem-
tion can be broadened to include states hostile mary target is not ber 2001). [AP Photo/Roshan Mugal]
to U.S. policy. those actually killed
Apparently, two official definitions of ter- or injured in the at-
rorism have existed since the early 1980s: tack, but those made to witness it. The enemies, of whatever sex, age, or condi-
that used by the Department of State “for enemy’s own information media amplify tion, lasted until Robespierre’s fall ( July
statistical and analytical purposes” and that the attack’s effects to the larger target pop- 1794). Similar justification for state-spon-
used by Congress for criminal proceedings. ulation. Through indoctrination and train- sored terror was common to 20th-century
Together, the definitions allow great flexibil- ing and under charismatic leaders, self- revolutions, as in Russia (Lenin), Cambo-
contained suicide cells canalize disparate dia (Pol Pot), and Iran (Khomeini).
religious or political sentiments of individ- Whether subnational (e.g., Russian anar-
CNRS–Institut Jean Nicod, 1 bis Avenue Lowendal,
75007 Paris, France, and Institute for Social Research,
uals into an emotionally bonded group of chists) or state-supported (e.g., Japanese ka-
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48106 –1248, fictive kin who willfully commit to die mikaze), suicide attack as a weapon of terror
USA. E-mail: satran@umich.edu spectacularly for one another and for what is usually chosen by weaker parties against

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 REVIEW
materially stronger foes when fighting meth- groups were provided opportunities to pool and Dubious Public Perceptions
ods of lesser cost seem unlikely to succeed. to unify doctrine, aims, training, equipment, Recent treatments of Homeland Security re-
Choice is often voluntary, but typically under and methods, including suicide attack. Through search concentrate on how to spend billions to
conditions of group pressure and charismatic its multifaceted association with regional protect sensitive installations from attack (14,
leadership. Thus, the kamikaze (“divine groups (by way of finance, personnel, and lo- 15). But this last line of defense is probably
wind”) first used in the battle of the Philip- gistics), Al-Qaida aims to realize flexibly its easiest to breach because of the multitude of
pines (November 1944) were young, fairly vulnerable and likely targets (in-
well educated pilots who understood that pur- cluding discotheques, restau-
suing conventional warfare would likely end rants, and malls), the abundance
in defeat. When collectively asked by Adm. of would-be attackers (need-
Takijiro Onishi to volunteer for “special at- ing little supervision once em-
tack” (tokkotai) “transcending life and barked on a mission), the rel-
death,” all stepped forward, despite assuranc- atively low costs of attack
es that refusal would carry no shame or pun- (hardware store ingredients,
ishment. In the Battle of Okinawa (April no escape needs), the difficul-
1945) some 2000 kamikaze rammed fully ty of detection (little use of
fueled fighter planes into more than 300 electronics), and the unlikeli-
ships, killing 5000 Americans in the most hood that attackers would di-
costly naval battle in U.S. history. Because of vulge sensitive information
such losses, there was support for using the (being unaware of connec-
atomic bomb to end World War II (7). tions beyond their operational
The first major contemporary suicide cells). Exhortations to put
terrorist attack in the Middle East was the duct tape on windows may as-
December 1981 destruction of the Iraqi suage (or incite) fear, but will
embassy in Beirut (27 dead, over 100 not prevent massive loss of
wounded). Its precise authors are still un- life, and public realization of
known, although it is likely that Ayatollah such paltry defense can under-
Khomeini approved its use by parties spon- mine trust. Security agencies
sored by Iranian intelligence. With the as- also attend to prior lines of
sassination of pro-Israeli Lebanese Presi- defense, such as penetrating
dent Bashir Gemayel in September 1982, agent-handling networks of
suicide bombing became a strategic politi- terrorist groups, with only in-
cal weapon. Under the pro-Iranian Leba- termittent success.
nese Party of God (Hezbollah), this strategy A first line of defense is to
soon achieved geopolitical effect with the prevent people from becoming
October 1983 truck-bomb killing of nearly terrorists. Here, success appears
300 American and French servicemen. doubtful should current govern-
American and France abandoned the mul- Fig. 2. Wreckage in Gaza after an Israeli attack that killed Salah
ment and media opinions about
tinational force policing Lebanon. By 1985, Shehadeh, Hamas military commander. It features the green why people become human
these attacks arguably led Israel to cede Hamas flag, and Arabic graffiti reads: “We are resisters, death bombs translate into policy (see
most of the gains made during its 1982 in the way of Allah is the life.” [AP Photo/Adel Hana] also supporting online text on
invasion of Lebanon. contrary academic explanations).
In Israel-Palestine, suicide terrorism be- global ambition of destroying Western domi- Suicide terrorists often are labeled crazed cow-
gan in 1993, with attacks by Hezbollah- nance through local initiatives to expel Western ards bent on senseless destruction who thrive in
trained members of the Islamic Resistance influences (11). According to Jane’s Intelli- the midst of poverty and ignorance. The obvi-
Movement (Hamas) and Palestine Islamic gence Review: “All the suicide terrorist groups ous course becomes to hunt down terrorists
Jihad (PIJ) aimed at derailing the Oslo have support infrastructures in Europe and while simultaneously transforming their sup-
Peace Accords (8). As early as 1988, how- North America.” (12). porting cultural and economic environment
ever, PIJ founder Fathi Shiqaqi established Calling the current wave of radical Is- from despair to hope. What research there is,
guidelines for “exceptional” martyrdom op- lam “fundamentalism” (in the sense of “tra- however, indicates that suicide terrorists have
erations involving human bombs. He fol- ditionalism”) is misleading, approaching an no appreciable psychopathology and are at least
lowed Hezbollah in stressing that God ex- oxymoron (supporting online text). as educated and economically well off as their
tols martyrdom but abhors suicide: “Allah Present-day radicals, whether Shi’ite (Iran, surrounding populations.
may cause to be known those who believe Hezbollah) or Sunni ( Taliban, Al-Qaida),
and may make some of you martyrs, and are much closer in spirit and action to Psychopathology: A Fundamental
Allah may purify those who believe and Europe’s post-Renaissance Counter-Refor- Attribution Error
may utterly destroy the disbelievers”; how- mation than to any traditional aspect of U.S. President George W. Bush initially
ever, “no one can die except by Allah’s Moslem history. The idea of a ruling eccle- branded 9/11 hijackers “evil cowards.” For
leave” (9, 10) (Fig. 2). siastical authority, a state or national coun- U.S. Senator John Warner, preemptive as-
The recent radicalization and networking cil of clergy, and a religious police devoted saults on terrorists and those supporting ter-
through Al-Qaida of militant Islamic groups to physically rooting out heretics and blas- rorism are justified because: “Those who
from North Africa, Arabia, and Central and phemers has its clearest historical model in would commit suicide in their assaults on the
Southeast Asia stems from the Soviet-Afghan the Holy Inquisition. The idea that religion free world are not rational and are not de-
War (1979 –1989). With financial backing from must struggle to assert control over politics terred by rational concepts” (16). In attempt-
the United States, members of these various is radically new to Islam (13). ing to counter anti-Moslem sentiment, some

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 REVIEW
groups advised their members to respond that With suicide terrorism, the attributional as wrong, radical, and/or irrational. Mutual
“terrorists are extremist maniacs who don’t problem is to understand why nonpathologi- demonization and warfare readily ensue.
represent Islam at all” (17). cal individuals respond to novel situational The problem is to stop this spiral from
Social psychologists have investigated the factors in numbers sufficient for recruiting escalating in opposing camps (Fig. 3).
“fundamental attribution error,” a tendency for organizations to implement policies. In the
people to explain behavior in terms of individ- Middle East, perceived contexts in which Poverty and Lack of Education Are
ual personality traits, even when significant sit- suicide bombers and supporters express Not Reliable Factors
uational factors in the larger society are at work. themselves include a collective sense of his- Across our society, there is wide consensus
U.S. government and media characterizations torical injustice, political subservience, and that ridding society of poverty rids it of crime
of Middle East suicide bombers as craven ho- social humiliation vis-à-vis global powers (20). According to President Bush, “We fight
micidal lunatics may suffer from a fundamental and allies, as well as countervailing religious poverty because hope is the answer to ter-
attribution error: No instances of religious or hope (supporting online text on radical Is- ror. . . . We will challenge the poverty and
political suicide terrorism stem from lone ac- lam’s historical novelty). Addressing such hopelessness and lack of education and failed
tions of cowering or unstable bombers. perceptions does not entail accepting them as governments that too often allow conditions
Psychologist Stanley Milgram found that simple reality; however, ignoring the causes that terrorists can seize” (21). At a gathering
ordinary Americans also readily obey destruc- of these perceptions risks misidentifying of Nobel Peace Prize laureates, South Afri-
tive orders under the right circumstances (18). causes and solutions for suicide bombing. ca’s Desmond Tutu and South Korea’s Kim
When told by a “teacher” to administer poten- There is also evidence that people tend Dae Jong opined, “at the bottom of terrorism
tially life-threatening electric shocks to “learn- to believe that their behavior speaks for is poverty”; Elie Wiesel and the Dalai Lama
ers” who fail to memorize word pairs, most itself, that they see the world objectively, concluded, “education is the way to eliminate
comply. Even when subjects stressfully protest and that only other people are biased and terrorism” (22).
as victims plead and scream, use of extreme misconstrue events (19). Moreover, indi- Support for this comes from research pi-
violence continues—not because of murderous viduals tend to misperceive differences be- oneered by economist Gary Becker showing
tendencies but from a sense of obligation in tween group norms as more extreme than that property crimes are predicted by poverty
situations of authority, no matter how trite. A they really are. Resulting misunderstand- and lack of education (23). In his incentive-
legitimate hypothesis is that apparently extreme ings— encouraged by religious and ideo- based model, criminals are rational individu-
behaviors may be elicited and rendered com- logical propaganda—lead antagonistic als acting on self-interest. Individuals choose
monplace by particular historical, political, so- groups to interpret each other’s views of illegal activity if rewards exceed probability
cial, and ideological contexts. events, such as terrorism/freedom-fighting, of detection and incarceration together with
expected loss of income from legal activity
(“opportunity costs”). Insofar as criminals
lack skill and education, as in much blue-
collar crime, opportunity costs may be mini-
mal; so crime pays.
Such rational-choice theories based on
economic opportunities do not reliably ac-
count for some types of violent crimes (do-
mestic homicide, hate killings). These calcu-
lations make even less sense for suicide ter-
rorism. Suicide terrorists generally are not
lacking in legitimate life opportunities rela-
tive to their general population. As the Arab
press emphasizes, if martyrs had nothing to
lose, sacrifice would be senseless (24): “He
who commits suicide kills himself for his
own benefit, he who commits martyrdom
sacrifices himself for the sake of his religion
and his nation. . . . The Mujahed is full of
hope” (25).
Research by Krueger and Maleckova sug-
Fig. 3. Demonization works gests that education may be uncorrelated, or
both ways. (A) Demonstra- even positively correlated, with supporting ter-
tor’s placard outside the rorism (26). In a December 2001 poll of 1357
Palestinian embassy in Bei- West Bank and Gaza Palestinians 18 years of
jing vilifying the United age or older, those having 12 or more years of
Nations and the United
States (April 2002). [Reu- schooling supported armed attacks by 68
ters/Andrew Wong] (B) An- points, those with up to 11 years of schooling
ti-Moslem sign outside by 63 points, and illiterates by 46 points. Only
Jacksonville, Florida, church 40% of persons with advanced degrees support-
( January 2003). [Photo ed dialogue with Israel versus 53% with college
courtesy of Florida Times- degrees and 60% with 9 years or less of school-
Union]
ing. In a comparison of Hezbollah militants
who died in action with a random sample of
Lebanese from the same age group and region,
militants were less likely to come from poor

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homes and more likely to have had secondary- simple-minded, or depressed. . . . They all gion’s role) (33). Consider data on 39 recruits
school education. seemed to be entirely normal members of to Harkat al-Ansar, a Pakistani-based ally of
Nevertheless, relative loss of economic or their families” (30). Yet “all were deeply Al-Qaida. All were unmarried males, most
social advantage by educated persons might religious,” believing their actions “sanctioned had studied the Quran. All believed that by
encourage support for terrorism. In the period by the divinely revealed religion of Islam.” sacrificing themselves they would help se-
leading to the first Intifada (1982–1988), the Leaders of sponsoring organizations com- cure the future of their “family” of fictive kin:
number of Palestinian men with 12 years or plained, “Our biggest problem is the hordes “Each [martyr] has a special place—among
more of schooling more than doubled; those of young men who beat on our doors.” them are brothers, just as there are sons and
with less schooling increased only 30%. This Psychologist Brian Barber surveyed 900 those even more dear” (34). A Singapore
coincided with a sharp increase in unemploy- Moslem adolescents during Gaza’s first In- Parliamentary report on 31 captured opera-
ment for college graduates relative to high tifada (1987–1993) (31). Results show high tives from Jemaah Islamiyah and other Al-
school graduates. Real daily wages of college levels of participation in and victimization Qaida allies in Southeast Asia underscores
graduates fell some 30%; wages for those from violence. For males, 81% reported the pattern: “These men were not ignorant,
with only secondary schooling held steady. throwing stones, 66% suffered physical as- destitute or disenfranchised. All 31 had re-
Underemployment also seems to be a factor sault, and 63% were shot at (versus 51, 38, ceived secular education. . . . Like many of
among those recruited to Al-Qaida and its and 20% for females). Involvement in vio- their counterparts in militant Islamic organi-
allies from the Arabian peninsula (27). lence was not strongly correlated with zations in the region, they held normal, re-
depression or antisocial behavior. Adoles- spectable jobs. . . . As a group, most of the
The Institutional Factor: Organizing cents most involved displayed strong indi- detainees regarded religion as their most im-
Fictive Kin vidual pride and social cohesion. This was portant personal value. . . secrecy over the
Although humiliation and despair may help reflected in activities: for males, 87% de- true knowledge of jihad, helped create a
account for susceptibility to martyrdom in livered supplies to activists, 83% visited sense of sharing and empowerment vis-à-vis
some situations, this is neither a complete martyred families, and 71% tended the others.” (35).
explanation nor one applicable to other cir- wounded (57, 46, and 37% for females). A Such sentiments characterize institutional
cumstances. Studies by psychologist Ariel follow-up during the second Intifada manipulation of emotionally driven commit-
Merari point to the importance of institu- (2000 –2002) indicates that those still un- ments that may have emerged under natural
tions in suicide terrorism (28). His team married act in ways considered personally selection’s influence to refine or override
interviewed 32 of 34 bomber families in more dangerous but socially more mean- short-term rational calculations that would
Palestine/Israel (before 1998), surviving at- ingful. Increasingly, many view martyr acts otherwise preclude achieving goals against
tackers, and captured recruiters. Suicide as most meaningful. By summer 2002, 70 long odds. Most typically, such emotionally
terrorists apparently span their population’s to 80% of Palestinians endorsed martyr driven commitments serve as survival mech-
normal distribution in terms of education, operations (32). anisms to inspire action in otherwise paralyz-
socioeconomic status, and personality type Previously, recruiters scouted mosques, ing circumstances, as when a weaker person
(introvert vs. extrovert). Mean age for schools, and refugee camps for candidates convincingly menaces a stronger person into
bombers was early twenties. Almost all deemed susceptible to intense religious in- thinking twice before attempting to take ad-
were unmarried and expressed religious be- doctrination and logistical training. During vantage. In religiously inspired suicide terror-
lief before recruitment (but no more than the second Intifada, there has been a surfeit of ism, however, these emotions are purposely
did the general population). volunteers and increasing involvement of manipulated by organizational leaders, re-
Except for being young, unattached males, secular organizations (allowing women). The cruiters, and trainers to benefit the organiza-
suicide bombers differ from members of frequency and violence of suicide attacks tion rather than the individual (supporting
violent racist organizations with whom have escalated (more bombings since Febru- online text on religion) (36).
they are often compared (29). Overall, sui- ary 2002 than during 1993–2000); planning
cide terrorists exhibit no socially dysfunc- has been less painstaking. Despite these Rational Choice Is the Sponsor’s
tional attributes (fatherless, friendless, or changes, there is little to indicate overall Prerogative, Not the Agent’s
jobless) or suicidal symptoms. They do not change in bomber profiles (mostly unmar- Little tangible benefit (in terms of rational-
vent fear of enemies or express “hopeless- ried, average socioeconomic status, moder- choice theories) accrues to the suicide bomb-
ness” or a sense of “nothing to lose” for ately religious) (28, 30). er, certainly not enough to make the likely
lack of life alternatives that would be con- In contrast to Palestinians, surveys with a gain one of maximized “expected utility.”
sistent with economic rationality. Merari control group of Bosnian Moslem adoles- Heightened social recognition occurs only
attributes primary responsibility for attacks cents from the same time period reveal mark- after death, obviating personal material ben-
to recruiting organizations, which enlist edly weaker expressions of self-esteem, hope efit. But for leaders who almost never con-
prospective candidates from this youthful for the future, and prosocial behavior (30). A sider killing themselves (despite declarations
and relatively unattached population. Char- key difference is that Palestinians routinely of readiness to die), material benefits more
ismatic trainers then intensely cultivate mu- invoke religion to invest personal trauma likely outweigh losses in martyrdom opera-
tual commitment to die within small cells with proactive social meaning that takes in- tions. Hassan cites one Palestinian official’s
of three to six members. The final step jury as a badge of honor. Bosnian Moslems prescription for a successful mission: “a will-
before a martyrdom operation is a formal typically report not considering religious af- ing young man. . . nails, gunpowder, a light
social contract, usually in the form of a filiation a significant part of personal or col- switch and a short cable, mercury (readily
video testament. lective identity until seemingly arbitrary vio- obtainable from thermometers), acetone
From 1996 to 1999 Nasra Hassan, a Pa- lence forced awareness upon them. . . . . The most expensive item is transporta-
kistani relief worker, interviewed nearly 250 Thus, a critical factor determining suicide tion to an Israeli town” (30). The total cost is
Palestinian recruiters and trainers, failed sui- terrorism behavior is arguably loyalty to in- about $150.
cide bombers, and relatives of deceased timate cohorts of peers, which recruiting or- For the sponsoring organization, suicide
bombers. Bombers were men aged 18 to 38: ganizations often promote through religious bombers are expendable assets whose losses
“None were uneducated, desperately poor, communion (supporting online text on reli- generate more assets by expanding public

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 REVIEW
support and pools of potential recruits. Short- searches cannot be very effective against peo- not achieve lasting relief from attack and can
ly after 9/11, an intelligence survey of edu- ple willing to die, although this may provide exacerbate the problem over time. On the in-
cated Saudis (ages 25 to 41) concluded that some semblance of security and hence psy- ducement side, social psychology research indi-
95% supported Al-Qaida (37). In a December chological defense against suicide terrorism’s cates that people who identify with antagonistic
2002 Pew Research Center survey on grow- psychological warfare. A middle line of de- groups use conflicting information from the oth-
ing anti-Americanism, only 6% of Egyptians fense, penetrating and destroying recruiting er group to reinforce antagonism (19). Thus,
viewed America and its “War on Terror” organizations and isolating their leaders, may simply trying to persuade others from without by
favorably (38). Money flows from those will- be successful in the near term, but even more bombarding them with more self-serving infor-
ing to let others die, easily offsetting opera- resistant organizations could emerge instead. mation may only increase hostility.
tional costs (training, supporting personnel, The first line of defense is to drastically Other research suggests that most peo-
safe houses, explosives and other arms, trans- reduce receptivity of potential recruits to re- ple have more moderate views than what
cruiting organiza- they consider their group norm to be. Incit-
tions. But how? ing and empowering moderates from within
It is important to to confront inadequacies and inconsisten-
know what probably cies in their own knowledge (of others as
will not work. Rais- evil), values (respect for life), and behavior
ing literacy rates may (support for killing), and other members of
have no effect and their group (42), can produce emotional dis-
could be counterpro- satisfaction leading to lasting change and in-
ductive should great- fluence on the part of these individuals (43).
er literacy translate Funding for civic education and debate may
into greater exposure help, also interfaith confidence-building
to terrorist propagan- through intercommunity interaction initiatives
da (in Pakistan, liter- (as Singapore’s government proposes) (35).
acy and dislike for Ethnic profiling, isolation, and preemptive at-
the United States in- tack on potential (but not yet actual) supporters
creased as the num- of terrorism probably will not help. Another
ber of religious ma- strategy is for the United States and its allies to
drasa schools in- change behavior by directly addressing and
creased from 3000 to lessening sentiments of grievance and humilia-
39,000 since 1978) tion, especially in Palestine (where images of
(27, 38). Lessening daily violence have made it the global focus of
Fig. 4. Moslem youth with Quran dressed as a Palestinian suicide bomber
demonstrating outside the United Nations office in Jakarta, Indonesia poverty may have no Moslem attention) (44) (Fig. 4). For no evi-
(April 2002). (Indonesia is the most populous Moslem nation.) [Reuters/ effect, and could be dence (historical or otherwise) indicates that
Darren Whiteside] counterproductive if support for suicide terrorism will evaporate
poverty reduction for without complicity in achieving at least some
portation, and communication). After a the entire population amounted to a down- fundamental goals that suicide bombers and
Jerusalem supermarket bombing by an 18- ward redistribution of wealth that left those supporting communities share.
year-old Palestinian female, a Saudi telethon initially better off with fewer opportunities Of course, this does not mean negotiating
raised more than $100 million for “the Al- than before. Ending occupation or reducing over all goals, such as Al-Qaida’s quest to
Quds Intifada.” perceived humiliation may help, but not if the replace the Western-inspired system of
Massive retaliation further increases population believes this to be a victory in- nation-states with a global caliphate, first in
people’s sense of victimization and readi- spired by terror (e.g., Israel’s apparently Moslem lands and then everywhere (see sup-
ness to behave according to organizational forced withdrawal from Lebanon). porting online text for history and agenda of
doctrines and policies structured to take If suicide-bombing is crucially (though not suicide-sponsoring groups). Unlike other
advantage of such feelings. In a poll of exclusively) an institution-level phenomenon, it groups, Al-Qaida publicizes no specific de-
1179 West Bank and Gaza Palestinians in may require finding the right mix of pressure and mands after martyr actions. As with an
spring 2002, 66% said army operations inducements to get the communities themselves avenging army, it seeks no compromise. But
increased their backing for suicide bomb- to abandon support for institutions that recruit most people who currently sympathize with it
ings (39). By year’s end, 73% of Lebanese suicide attackers. One way is to so damage the might.
Moslems considered suicide bombings community’s social and political fabric that any Perhaps to stop the bombing we need re-
justifiable (38). This radicalization of opin- support by the local population or authorities for search to understand which configurations of
ion increases both demand and supply for sponsors of suicide attacks collapses, as hap- psychological and cultural relationships are lur-
martyrdom operations. A December 2002 pened regarding the kamikaze as a by-product of ing and binding thousands, possibly millions, of
UN report credited volunteers with swell- the nuclear destruction of Hiroshima and Na- mostly ordinary people into the terrorist orga-
ing a reviving Al-Qaida in 40 countries gasaki. In the present world, however, such a nization’s martyr-making web. Study is needed
(40). The organization’s influence in the strategy would neither be morally justifiable nor on how terrorist institutions form and on simi-
larger society—most significantly its di- practical to implement, given the dispersed and larities and differences across organizational
recting elites—increases in turn. distributed organization of terrorist institutions structures, recruiting practices, and populations
among distantly separated populations that col- recruited. Are there reliable differences be-
Priorities for Homeland Security lectively number in the hundreds of millions. tween religious and secular groups, or between
The last line of defense against suicide ter- Likewise, retaliation in kind (“tit-for-tat”) is not ideologically driven and grievance-driven ter-
rorism—preventing bombers from reaching morally acceptable if allies are sought (41). Even rorism? Interviews with surviving Hamas
targets—may be the most expensive and least in more localized settings, such as the Israeli- bombers and captured Al-Qaida operatives sug-
likely to succeed. Random bag or body Palestinian conflict, coercive policies alone may gest that ideology and grievance are factors for

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both groups but relative weights and conse- 10. Compare this statement with that of Hamas leader frontline soldiers in an apparently hopeless battle,
quences may differ. Abd Al-’Aziz Al-Rantisi, Al-Hayat (London-Beirut), 25 there usually remains hope for survival [G. Allport, J.
April 2002. Gillespie, J. Young, J. Psychol. 25, 3 (1948)]. The
We also need to investigate any significant 11. U.S. Department of Justice, Al Qaeda Training Man- distance between no hope and some (however small)
causal relations between our society’s policies ual, online release 7 December 2001; available at is infinite, which represents the ultimate measure of
and actions and those of terrorist organizations www.usdoj.gov/ag/trainingmanual.htm. devotion that religions typically uphold as ideal.
12. “Suicide terrorism: A global threat,” Jane’s BioSecu- While commitment to die for nonkin cannot be ren-
and supporters. We may find that the global rity (2002); available at www.janes.com/security/ dered within standard theories of Expected Utility,
economic, political, and cultural agenda of our international_security/news/usscole/jir001020_1_n. there are moves theorists attempt, such as invoking
own society has a catalyzing role in moves to shtml. “infinite utility.” Using “infinite utility” to patch the-
13. B. Lewis, What Went Wrong (Oxford Univ. Press, New ories of rationality creates holes elsewhere in the
retreat from our world view (Taliban) or to York, 2002). The notion of a distinct religious author- system. Thus, expected utilities are usually weighted
create a global counterweight (Al-Qaida). ity, or clergy, was traditionally alien to Islam. The de averages, which has scant sense when one term is
Funding such research may be difficult. As with facto modern clergy recognized by Islamic suicide infinite. The deeper point is that notions of maximi-
attackers includes mullahs of Pakistan and Afghani- zation of anticipated benefits cannot account for
the somewhat tendentious and self-serving use stan, as well as the 19th-century administrative of- such behaviors, and ad hoc moves to maintain ratio-
of “terror” as a policy concept (45), to reduce fice of ayatollah in Iran and the former Ottoman nal utility at all costs result in a concept of rationality
dissonance our governments and media may office of State Attorney, or mufti (e.g., in Palestine, or utility doing little explanatory work. In sum, reli-
Syria, and Arabia). Many in this “clergy” also oppose ance on rational-choice theories may not be the best
wish to ignore these relations as legitimate top- suicide bombing. way to understand and try to stop suicide terrorism.
ics for inquiry into what terrorism is all about 14. D. Malakoff, Science 295, 254 (2002). 34. D. Rhode, A. Chivers, New York Times, 17 March 2002,
and why it exists. 15. D. Chapin et al., Science 297, 1997 (2002). p. A1.
This call for research may demand more 16. D. Von Drehle, Washington Post, 7 October 2002, p. 35. “White Paper—The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests,”
A1. Warner’s example of “rational deterrence” was (Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs, Singapore, 9
patience than any administration could politi- the Cold War doctrine MAD (mutually assured de- January 2003); available at www2.mha.gov.sg. Re-
cally tolerate during times of crisis. In the long struction). MAD’s key premise was the apparently cruitment and indoctrination into Jemaah Islam-
run, however, our society can ill afford to ig- irrational threat of guaranteeing one’s own destruc- iyah are similar in other radical Islamic groups:
tion in order to destroy the enemy. “The first stage . . . involved religious classes organ-
nore either the consequences of its own actions 17. Unitarian Universalist Association of Congregations, ised for a general mass. . . . The second stage . . .
or the causes behind the actions of others. Po- “Confronting anti-Arab or anti-Muslim sentiments,” involved identifying those who were captivated
tential costs of such ignorance are terrible to 21 September 2002; available at www.uua. enough to find out more about the plight of Mus-
org/uuawo/issues/respond/confront.html. lims in other regions. [ JI spiritual leader] Ibrahim
contemplate. The comparatively minor expense 18. S. Milgram, Obedience to Authority (Harper & Row, Maidan identified potential members from those
of research into such consequences and causes New York, 1974). who were curious enough to remain after classes
could have inestimable benefit. 19. L. Ross, C. Stillinger, Negotiation J. 7, 389 (1991). to enquire further. He engaged those students’
20. R. Clark, Crime in America (Simon & Schuster, New interest and compassion and finally invited those
York, 1970). he deemed suitable to join JI. This recruitment
References and Notes 21. White House news release, 22 March 2002; available process would usually take about 18 months. The
1. “Patterns of global terrorism” (U.S. Department of at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/ few who were selected as members were made to
State, Washington, DC, May 2002); available at 20020322-1.html. feel a strong sense of exclusivity and self esteem
www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2001/. “The U.S. Gov- 22. J. J. Jai, Christian Science Monitor, 10 December 2001, . . . a strong sense of in-group superiority.”
ernment has employed this definition of terrorism for p. 7. 36. In much the same way, the pornography, fast food, or
statistical and analytical purposes since 1983.” 23. G. Becker, Pol. Econ. 76, 169 (1968). soft drink industries manipulate innate desires for
2. U.S. Code Congress. Admin. News, 98th Congress, 24. “They are youth at the peak of their blooming, who naturally scarce commodities like sexual mates, fatty
2nd Session, v. 2, par. 3077, 98 STAT. (19 October at a certain moment decide to turn their bodies into foods, and sugar to ends that reduce personal fitness
1984). body parts. . . flowers.” Editorial, Al-Risala (Hamas but benefit the manipulating institution. [S. Atran, In
3. Until 1983, official U.S. positions on “terror” followed weekly), 7 June 2001. Gods We Trust (Oxford Univ. Press, New York, 2002)].
the term’s common meaning in use since the French 25. Sheikh Yussuf Al-Qaradhawi (a spiritual leader of the 37. E. Sciolino, New York Times, 27 January 2002, p. A8.
Revolution, referring to state-sponsored terror. For Muslim Brotherhood), Al-Ahram Al-Arabi (Cairo), 3 38. “What the world thinks in 2002: How global publics
example, under “sources relating to Operation Endur- February 2001. view: Their lives, their countries, the world, America”
ing Freedom and the struggle against terrorism,” the 26. A. Krueger, J. Maleckova, NBER Working Paper no. (Survey Rep., Pew Research Center, 4 December
U.S. Navy’s Web guide on terrorism regularly links to w9074, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cam- 2002); available at http://people-press.org/reports/
Department of Defense articles on Iraq (www. bridge, MA, July 2002; available at http://papers. display.php3?ReportID⫽165.
history.navy.mil/library/guides/terrorism.htm). nber.org/papers/W9074. 39. Reuters News Service, 11 June 2002; accessed at
4. The recent Guatemalan truth commission report sin- 27. T. Friedman, Longitudes and Attitudes (Farrar, Strauss, http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl⫽story&u⫽/
gled out the U.S. Army School of the Americas (SOA), Giroux, New York, 2002). Leaders of Al-Qaida’s in- nm/20020611/wl_nm/mideast_palestini.
now at Fort Benning, Georgia, for counterinsurgency ternational cells are often middle-class, European- 40. C. Lynch, Washington Post, 18 December 2002, p.
training that “had a significant bearing on human educated converts to radical Islam. Family histories A27.
rights violations during the armed conflict.” A 1998 indicate little religious fervor before emigration to a 41. R. Axelrod, W. Hamilton, Science 211, 1390 (1981).
human rights report released by the Guatemala Arch- solitary existence in Europe and subsequent belong- 42. M. Bazerman, M. Neale, Negotiating Rationally (Free
diocese Human Rights Office also linked SOA gradu- ing to a local prayer group or mosque (available tapes Press, New York, 1991).
ates in Guatemala’s military intelligence (D-2, G-2) preach a revolutionary end to daily, personal alien- 43. A. Eagly, S. Chaiken, The Psychology of Attitudes
to a civilian-targeted campaign of kidnappings, tor- ation through collective action to destroy perceived (Harcourt Brace, Fort Worth, TX, 1993).
ture, and murder that left tens of thousands dead. impediments to “restoring” Islam’s values and dom- 44. One possibility is to offer and guarantee a clear
References available online through Network Solidar- inance). As with other radical Islamic groups, ordinary resolution of “final status” acceptable to majorities of
ity with the People of Guatemala (NISGUA), “U.S. cell operatives are often resident Middle East bache- Israelis and Palestinians. Without clear resolution of
Army School of the Americas cited in Guatemalan lors from middle-class families. final status before implementation of “confidence
Truth Commission Report,” 17 July 2001; available 28. A. Merari, paper presented to Institute for Social building” measures, with an understanding by all
at www.nisgua.org/articles/school_of_the_americas. Research seminar series, “The Psychology of Extrem- parties of what to expect in the end, it is likely that
htm. ism,” Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, 11 February doubts about ultimate intentions will undermine any
5. B. Lewis, The Assassins (Basic, New York, 2002). 2002. interim accord—as in every case since 1948. [S.
6. M. Robespierre, “Principes de morale politique,” 29. R. Ezekiel, The Racist Mind (Viking, New York, 1995). Atran, Politics and Society 18, 481 (1990)].
speech delivered to French National Convention, 5 30. N. Hassan, The New Yorker, 19 November 2001; 45. N. Chomsky, 9-11 (Seven Stories Press, New York,
February 1794; available at http://membres.lycos.fr/ available at www.newyorker.com/fact/content/ 2001).
discours/1794.htm. ?011119fa_FACT1. 46. Thanks to D. Medin, N. Chomsky, R. Gonzalez, M.
7. A. Axell, Kamikaze (Longman, New York, 2002). 31. B. Barber, Heart and Stones (Palgrave, New York, in Bazerman, R. Nisbett, and reviewers.
8. A precipitating event was the exiling of 418 Palestin- press).
ians suspected of affiliation with Hamas (18 Decem- 32. D. Brooks, The Atlantic Monthly 289 (6), 18 ( June Supporting Online Material
ber 1992), the first mass expulsion of Arabs from 2002); available at www.theatlanticmonthly.com/ www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/299/5612/1534/
Palestine since 1948. issues/2002/06/brooks.htm. DC1
9. Quran, chapt. 3, verses 140 –146. 33. Unlike people willing to blow themselves up, for SOM Text

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