Bungcayao v. Fort Ilocandia, G.R. No.

170483, April 19, 2010 Petitioner alleged that his son, Manuel Bungcayao, Jr., who attended the
meeting, manifested that he still had to consult his parents about the offer but
Facts: upon the undue pressure exerted by Atty. Marcos, he accepted the payment
petition for review and signed the Deed of Assignment, Release, Waiver and Quitclaim in favor of
respondent.
Manuel C. Bungcayao, Sr. (petitioner) claimed to be one of the two
entrepreneurs who introduced improvements on the foreshore area of Calayab
Beach in 1978 when Fort Ilocandia Hotel started its construction in the Petitioner then filed an action for declaration of nullity of contract before the
area. Thereafter, other entrepreneurs began setting up their own stalls in the
Regional Trial Court of Laoag, City, Branch 13 (trial court), docketed as Civil
foreshore area. They later formed themselves into the D’Sierto Beach Resort
Owner’s Association, Inc. (D’Sierto). Case Nos. 12891-13, against respondent. Petitioner alleged that his son had no
authority to represent him and that the deed was void and not binding upon
In July 1980, six parcels of land in Barrio Balacad (now Calayad) were him.
transferred, ceded, and conveyed to the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA)
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1704. Fort Ilocandia Resort Hotel was Petitioner and respondent agreed to consider the case submitted for resolution
erected on the area. In 1992, petitioner and other D’Sierto members applied on summary judgment. Thus, in its Order[8] dated 28 November 2003, the trial
for a foreshore lease with the Community Environment and Natural Resources court considered the case submitted for resolution. Petitioner filed a motion
Office (CENRO) and was granted a provisional permit. On 31 January 2002, Fort for reconsideration, alleging that he manifested in open court that he was
Ilocandia Property Holdings and Development Corporation (respondent) filed withdrawing his earlier manifestation submitting the case for
a foreshore application over a 14-hectare area abutting the Fort Ilocandia resolution. Respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.
Property, including the 5-hectare portion applied for by D’Sierto members. The
foreshore applications became the subject matter of a conflict case, docketed The trial court ruled that the only issue raised by petitioner was his claim for
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Case No. 5473, damages while respondent’s issue was only his claim for possession of the
between respondent and D’Sierto members. In an undated Order, DENR property occupied by petitioner and damages. The trial court noted that the
Regional Executive Director Victor J. Ancheta denied the foreshore lease parties already stipulated on the issues and admissions had been made by both
applications of the D’Sierto members, including petitioner, on the ground that parties. The trial court ruled that summary judgment could be rendered on
the subject area applied for fell either within the titled property or within the the case.
foreshore areas applied for by respondent. The D’Sierto members appealed The trial court ruled that the alleged pressure on petitioner’s sons could not
the denial of their applications. In a Resolution dated 21 August 2003, then constitute force, violence or intimidation that could vitiate consent. As
DENR Secretary Elisea G. Gozun denied the appeal on the ground that the area regards respondent’s counterclaim, the trial court ruled that based on the
applied for encroached on the titled property of respondent based on the final pleadings and admissions made, it was established that the property occupied
verification plan. by petitioner was within the titled property of respondent.
The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court in resorting to summary Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in
order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless
judgment as a valid procedural device for the prompt disposition of actions in delays. When the pleadings on file show that there are no
which the pleadings raise only a legal issue and not a genuine issue as to any genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules allow a party to
material fact. The Court of Appeals ruled that in this case, the facts are not in obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment, that is,
when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to
dispute and the only issue to be resolved is whether the subject property was decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material
within the titled property of respondent. Hence, summary judgment was facts. Conversely, where the pleadings tender a genuine issue,
properly rendered by the trial court. summary judgment is not proper. A “genuine issue” is such
issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as
distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false
The Court of Appeals ruled that the counterclaims raised by respondent were claim. Section 3 of the said rule provides two (2) requisites for
compulsory in nature, as they arose out of or were connected with the summary judgment to be proper: (1) there must be no genuine
issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of
transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing damages; and (2) the party presenting the motion for summary
party’s claim and did not require for its adjudication the presence of third judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A
summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine
parties of whom the court could not acquire jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals
issue as to any material fact and a moving party is entitled to a
ruled that respondent was the rightful owner of the subject property and as judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment is proper if,
such, it had the right to recover its possession from any other person to whom while the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, the
affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the
the owner has not transmitted the property, including petitioner.
moving party show that such issues are not genuine.
Since we have limited the issues to the damages claimed by the parties,
Issue:
summary judgment has been properly rendered in this case.
Whether summary judgment is appropriate in this case.

Held:
A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or any relief, which a
Section 1, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
defending party may have against an opposing party, which at the time of suit
arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the same transaction or
Section 1. Summary Judgment for claimant. - A party
seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiffs complaint.
or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the  does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties
pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with
 will be barred in the future if not set up in the answer
supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary
judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.  test of compulsoriness: if there should exist a logical relationship
between the main claim and the counterclaim. here exists such a
Summary judgment has been explained as follows: relationship when conducting separate trials of the respective claims of
the parties would entail substantial duplication of time and effort by
the parties and the court
(a) Are issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim court in relation to the second counterclaim is considered null and void without
largely the same? prejudice to a separate action which respondent may file against petitioner.
(b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claim, absent the
compulsory rule? (PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIM)
(c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim
as well as defendants counterclaim? G.R. No. 158090, October 04, 2010
(d) Is there any logical relations between the claim and the GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), PETITIONER, VS. HEIRS
counterclaim? OF FERNANDO F. CABALLERO
positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is
compulsory. FACTS:
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
C@B Fernando and his wife, Sylvia Caballero, secured a mortgage secured by their
Respondent filed three counterclaims. residential lot from petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) in
the amount of P20,000.00. However, Fernando defaulted on the payment of
 only counterclaim that remained was for the recovery of possession of his loan with the GSIS. GSIS wrote a letter to Fernando, informing him of the
the subject property. consolidation of title in its favor, and requesting payment of monthly rental in
 hile this counterclaim was an offshoot of the same basic controversy view of Fernando's continued occupancy of the subject property. Negotiation
between the parties, it is very clear that it will not be barred if not set as to repurchase also takes place.
up in the answer to the complaint in the same case. Respondents
second counterclaim, contrary to the findings of the trial court and the GSIS scheduled the subject property for a 2nd public bidding after a failed
Court of Appeals, is only a permissive counterclaim. It is not a negotiation with Fernando to buy back his property. In this bidding, Jocelyn
compulsory counterclaim. It is capable of proceeding independently of Caballero, Fernando’s daughter submitted a bid but unfortunately defeated by
the main case. CMTC. With this, Fernando, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Kabacan, Cotabato a Complaint against CMTC, the GSIS and its responsible
The rule in permissive counterclaim is that for the trial court to acquire officers Fernando prayed, among others, that judgment be rendered: declaring
jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. GSIS Board of Trustees Resolution No. 199, dated May 16, 1989, null and void
Any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck for the irregularities in the conduct of the bidding.
down at any time, even on appeal before this Court. In this case, respondent
did not dispute the non-payment of docket fees. Respondent only insisted that GSIS and its officers filed their Answer with Affirmative Defenses and
its claims were all compulsory counterclaims. As such, the judgment by the trial Counterclaim. GSIS alleged that Fernando owed of P130,365.81, representing
back rentals, including additional interests from January 1973 to February
1987, and the additional amount of P249,800.00. Caballero, on the other hand, the following tests: (a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by
alleged that GSIS's counterclaim is permissive and its failure to pay the the counterclaim largely the same? (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent
prescribed docket fees results into the dismissal of its claim. suit on defendant's claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will
substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff's claim as well as the
After trial, the RTC, in its Decision, 1994, ruled in favor of GSIS and dismissed defendant's counterclaim? and (d) Is there any logical relation between the
the complaint. In the same decision, the trial court granted GSIS's counterclaim claim and the counterclaim? A positive answer to all four questions would
and directed Fernando to pay GSIS the rentals paid by CMTC in the amount of indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory.
P249,800.00.
Tested against the above-mentioned criteria, the SC agreed with the CA's
he CA, in its Decision dated December 17, 2002, affirmed the decision of the view that GSIS's counterclaim for the recovery of the amount representing
RTC with the modification that the portion of the judgment ordering Fernando rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC is permissive. The evidence
to pay rentals in the amount of P249,800.00, in favor of petitioner, be deleted. needed by Fernando to cause the annulment of the bid award, deed of
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in a absolute sale and TCT is different from that required to establish GSIS's claim
Resolution dated April 29, 2003. Hence, the instant petition. for the recovery of rentals.

ISSUE: The issue in the main action, i.e., the nullity or validity of the bid award, deed
of absolute sale and TCT in favor of CMTC, is entirely different from the issue in
Whether or not the CA committed an error of law in holding that GSIS’s the counterclaim, i.e., whether GSIS is entitled to receive the CMTC's rent
counterclaim of rentals collected by the Caballero’s against CMTC is in the payments over the subject property when it (GSIS) became the owner of the
nature of a permissive counterclaim which required the payment of GSIS of subject property by virtue of the consolidation of ownership of the property in
docket fees before the Trial Court can acquire jurisdiction over the said its favor.
counterclaim.
The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court to acquire
Respondents, on the other hand, alleged that petitioner's counterclaim is jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees.
permissive and its failure to pay the prescribed docket fees results into the This, GSIS did not do, because it asserted that its claim for the collection of
dismissal of its claim. rental payments was a compulsory counterclaim. Since petitioner failed to pay
the docket fees, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over its permissive
HELD counterclaim. The judgment rendered by the RTC, insofar as it ordered
Fernando to pay GSIS the rentals which he collected from CMTC, is considered
YES. The test was also established by the Supreme Court in this case to null and void. Any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and
determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not. The Court has devised may be struck down at any time, even on appeal before this Court.
Court ruled that the provision in the Charter of the GSIS, i.e., Section 39 of
Republic Act No. 8291, which exempts it from all taxes, assessments, fees,
charges or duties of all kinds, cannot operate to exempt it from the payment of
legal fees. Supreme Court now has the sole authority to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts.

Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Judge Asuncion: Where the trial court acquires
jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment
of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not
specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for
determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a
lien on the judgment.

Petitioner's claim for payment of rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC
did not arise after the filing of the complaint; hence, the rule laid down in Sun
Insurance finds no application in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.