Index

1. Introduction
2. Background
3. Foreign policy of EU
4. The legal-institutional framework of EU foreign policy: set-up and tools
5. The EU as a multilateral player
6. The EU as a bilateral player
7. Conclusion
 1. INTRODUCTION
“Europe’s role in the world is one of the major challenges of the 21st century.”

- (EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton, July 2013)

“In spite of changes in the international landscape, China has always supported (…) a bigger role in
international affairs by a united, stable and prosperous EU.”

- (President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping, April 2014)

The European Union (EU) remains a relatively recent player on the global stage. Despite external
activities that date back to times when the European Economic Community (EEC) first entered the global
scene, the year 1993 and the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty represented arguably the major
milestone for its ascent to a foreign policy actor in its own right1. In the 20 years since then, many
parameters of the EU’s external policies have changed. On the one hand, the global context in which the
EU operates has undergone significant transformations. Where the immediate post-Cold War period had
sparked optimism about a more balanced world order in which the EU could play a major part, the globe
finds itself today in an extended phase of uncertainty about its key structuring principles. Emerging
power centres on all continents, but also many transnational actors (e.g. global financial markets,
transnational terrorist groups) challenge the role of traditionally strong foreign policy players such as the
United States, Russia, Japan or major EU Member States. On the other hand, and in parallel to these
global evolutions, the foreign policy portfolio of the European Union has ever more expanded, various
strategies (e.g. the 2003 European Security Strategy and its 2008 update) have been designed, and its
activities have become more widespread. Moreover, with the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has made an
attempt to solidify the institutional underpinnings of its foreign policy by creating a High Representative
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) who is served by the European External Action Service (EEAS).
As a result, the Union is nowadays competent and quite active in a vast array of fields, supplementing
or, at times, replacing the foreign policies of its Member States.

The European Union’s coming-of-age as a foreign policy actor has been accompanied by many
controversies, not only among politicians and diplomats, but also in academia. Where earlier debates
had concentrated on understanding the EU’s ‘presence’ and ‘actorness’ in global affairs (Can the EU be a
foreign policy actor in its own right? In what way is this actor distinct from the Member States?)2, later
research tended to focus on its capacity as an actor, with authors attempting to pinpoint what type of
global player the Union really was. Concepts such as ‘civilian power’ or ‘normative power’ have been
prominent in these debates, but the EU has also been attributed other roles: those of a ‘model’ of

1
This is not to discard the important efforts undertaken through European Political Cooperation (EPC) between the
1970s and the 1990s. For an overview of the historical evolution of the EU as a foreign policy actor, see Keukeleire,
S., and Delreux, T., The Foreign Policy of the European Union, Second edition, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke,
2014, Chapter 2.
2
Allen, D., and Smith, M., ‘Western Europe’s presence in the contemporary international arena’, Review of
International Studies, 1990, 16(1): 19–37; Sjøstedt, G., The External Role of the European Community, Saxon
House, Farnborough, 1977.
regional integration or a ‘leader’ in certain issue areas3. These debates parted from the assumption that
the EU had to be perceived as an actor à part entière on the global scene and that this actor, given its
history and by virtue of its own character as an economic giant, had something specific to contribute to
the governance of global affairs. For one, as a non-traditional (read: non-state) foreign policy actor and
multilateral entity, the EU apparently possessed the capacities to forge consensual solutions at a global
level by exporting its own example. Article 21(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) embodies this
(self-)understanding by summing up the core objectives, principles and underlying values of EU foreign
policy: ‘The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have
inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider
world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental
freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the
principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.’ What is more, given the Union’s
comparatively more limited own military capacities, many observers saw in its reliance on norms, values
and the power of example — rather than ‘hard’ power — a major distinctive trademark. The trend to
invent ever new labels for the EU was, and is, accompanied by studies examining various policy fields to
assess whether the Union really qualifies as ‘normative power’, ‘leader’ or self-declared champion of
certain values. In the face of mixed policy outcomes, however, the different images of what the EU
supposedly stands for as a foreign policy player have remained contested. In more recent times,
attention seems to therefore have shifted once again. Criticising earlier debates for their high degree of
EU centrism, the most recent research aims at a better understanding of the external context the EU
operates in, and of the ways in which the EU can best fit into this environment4.

In this context, scholars have also resorted to questioning the normative drive of EU foreign policy
activities (i.e. its desire to export its model), and highlighted the tendency toward (and need for) more
strategic action on the part of its foreign policy decision-makers5. As in previous periods, this debate
accompanies an empirical trend, namely the EU’s conscious choice for increasing the number of albeit
loosely defined ‘strategic partnerships’ with key countries and regions in the world. In this context, at a
time where global politics are changing, and where the EU’s role in the world is being re-discussed both
in substance and in its institutional manifestations, this Policy Review takes stock of the debates about
its stance as a global actor and extracts their key policy-relevant implications. This is done by drawing on
the insights of recent research conducted by projects that were financed under the EU’s sixth and
seventh framework programmes for research (FP6, 2002–06 and FP7, 2007–13). Under FP7, a specific
activity was dedicated to issues related to ‘Europe in the World’ within the Socio-Economic Sciences and
Humanities (SSH) programme. With its emphasis on ‘Europe’s role as a global actor’ as part of pillar one
of Societal Challenge 6 (‘Europe in a Changing World — Inclusive, Innovative and Reflective Societies’),

3
Allen, D., and Smith, M., ‘Western Europe’s presence in the contemporary international arena’, Review of
International Studies, 1990, 16(1): 19–37; Sjøstedt, G., The External Role of the European Community, Saxon
House, Farnborough, 1977.
4
MERCURY, EU-GRASP and EU4SEAS, The EU and Multilateralism: Nine Recommendations, EU-GRASP Policy Brief,
2011.
5
Strategy is not (only) understood in military terms here, but touches on the EU’s entire set of external activities:
Bishop, S., The Value of Power, the Power of Values: A Call for an EU Grand Strategy, Academia Press, Gent, 2009.
the Specific Programme for Horizon 2020 stipulates further research in this domain for the period 2014–
20.

Concretely, this Policy Review serves three main purposes. First, by synthesising and scrutinising findings
of significant EU-wide collaborative research projects, it asks what has been learned on the EU’s role as
a global actor over the past decade, challenging some previously held conceptions of the EU. Second, by
combining various conceptual debates with the empirical findings on EU bi- and multilateral activities on
major issue areas, this Review systematically sets findings into a broader context in search for cross-time
and cross-issue patterns. Given the vast range of issues that EU foreign policy touches upon these days,
the impressive amount of relations it maintains with countries, regional and international organisations
all over the world, but also the wide variety of projects financed under FP6/7 over the past years6, this
Review must limit itself to a set of key issues and projects. It scrutinises the EU’s activities as a bi- and
multilateral actor in central domains related to prosperity (global economic governance), livelihood
(global environmental, notably climate governance) and security (global security governance),
concentrating on relations with third parties beyond its neighbourhood. Issues such as enlargement and
neighbourhood policy (i.e. the EU as a regional actor), human rights and democracy or migration, as
important as they are, will thus not fall within the scope of this Review7. This choice is largely in line with
the focuses of the selected projects. The extraction of patterns facilitates fulfilling the third purpose
then, which consists in identifying the major policy-relevant implications of the research findings and in
formulating policy recommendations on EU foreign policy.

In short, this Review draws essentially on the insights of the following projects8.

• ATLANTIC FUTURE: Towards an Atlantic area? Mapping trends, perspectives and interregional
dynamics between Europe, Africa and the Americas (FP7, 2013–15)

6
An overview of these projects is available online
(http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/projects/search_en.cfm).
7
EU enlargement and neighbourhood policies are currently treated by several early-stage SSH projects financed
under FP7, for example MAXCAP (Maximizing the integration capacity of the European Union: Lessons and
prospects for enlargement and beyond, 2013–16), CASCADE (Exploring the Security-Democracy Nexus in the
Caucasus, 2014–17) and ISSICEU (Intra-and Inter-Societal Sources of Instability in the Caucasus and EU
Opportunities to Respond, 2014–17). The first work programme of Societal Challenge 6 for 2014/15 includes a
series of topics on EU neighbourhood/enlargement policies, especially: INT-6-2015: Re-invigorating the partnership
between the two shores of the Mediterranean; INT-8-2015: The European Union and the Eastern Partnership; INT-
9-2015: The European Union, Turkey and its wider neighbourhood: challenges and opportunities; INT-10-2015: The
European Union and integration challenges in the Balkans. Projects selected under these topics will presumably
commence in late 2015
8
These projects were selected on the basis of the following criteria: (i) they display a substantial and also practical-
political engagement with EU foreign policy; (ii) they have been running for a sufficient amount of time to have
produced a critical mass of insights; and (iii) they have something to say about the set of topics indicated above. In
practice, these projects were mostly selected from two sub-areas to Activity 4 ‘Europe in the world’: sub-areas 4.1
‘Interactions and interdependencies between world regions and their implications’ and 4.3 ‘Europe’s changing role
in the world’. Under FP7, numerous projects were also financed under sub-area 4.2 ‘Conflicts, peace and human
rights’. These cannot be dealt with here.
• CHINESEVIEWSOFEU: Disaggregating Chinese Perception of the EU and Implications for the EU’s China
Policy (FP7, 2008–11)

• EU-GRASP: Changing multilateralism: the EU as a global-regional actor in security and peace (FP7,
2009–12)

• EUROBROADMAP: European Union and the world seen from abroad (FP7, 2009–12)

• GARNET: Global Governance, Regionalisation and Regulation: The Role of the EU (FP6 Network of
Excellence, 2005–10)

• GR:EEN: Global reordering: Evolution through European networks (FP7, 2011–15)

• MERCURY: Multilateralism and the new external relations of the European Union (FP7, 2009–12)

• TRANSWORLD: Redefining the transatlantic relationship and its role in shaping global governance (FP7,
2012–15)

While these eight projects form the backbone of this Review, others are touched upon whenever this
seems of interest. Throughout this Review, projects are referenced with their acronym. Publications
emanating from projects are cited, with the project acronym added in brackets and in colour (e.g.
Damro, 2012, [MERCURY]). An overview of the projects referenced in this Review is provided in the
Annex. Besides publications from these projects, sources from the growing academic and think tank
literature on EU foreign policy are equally referred to when relevant.

The Review proceeds as follows: this introduction precedes a section in which the conceptual grounds
will be charted (Part 2). Explaining key concepts such as global governance and EU foreign policy is
quintessential for understanding the external context and situating the EU in it. Part 3 will then venture
into the details of the debates about Europe’s role as a global actor. The Union’s place in the current
global system is problematised by examining it as a multilateral and bilateral player, before reflecting on
how it is perceived by the outside, non-European world. Project findings will be widely used in this
discussion. Part 4 draws on these insights to extract policy-relevant implications. It operates with three
scenarios of potential future world orders, and identifies the EU’s options for adapting to those. Based
on these empirical insights, it is argued that uncertainty about the emerging world order is today the
main and seemingly persistent structuring feature of global politics, which puts the EU’s adaptive
capacities to the test. And the Union’s record is decidedly mixed: while it has maintained its long-
standing commitment to multilateralism, many forms of multilateralism coexist. Together with its more
recent turn toward bilateral strategies, this adds up to a rather eclectic mix of foreign policy tools. Given
both the state of uncertainty of global politics and the EU’s current record, this Review argues that the
Union requires a more comprehensive and compelling strategic narrative. Whereas this narrative should
provide the necessary guidance to its foreign policy, the Union also needs to empower itself to become
more flexible in its day-to-day operations. To adopt such a ‘liquid strategy’9, a number of adjustments

9
The term ‘liquid strategy’ is adopted here in loose analogy to the notions of ‘liquid modernity’ (Bauman, 2000)
and ‘liquid democracy’. Liquid modernity refers to the idea that we are undergoing a constant transformation of
related to its institutional set-up, but especially a more stringent use of foreign policy tools, are
suggested. A major precondition for such adjustments is a stronger willingness of EU Member States to
invest political capital into genuine EU foreign policy. So far, this willingness has not always been
apparent, undermining both credibility and effectiveness of EU foreign policy. This Review will close with
concluding remarks reflecting on the opportunities for change in the Union’s foreign policy (Part 5). It
argues that the year 2014, with its turnover in key EU institutions and new appointments to high profile
foreign policy-related positions, provides a unique chance for Member States to demonstrate stronger
support for EU foreign policy.

what Bauman calls ‘life-politics’ paired to an absence of solid structures. Contemporary global affairs could equally
be interpreted in this sense. Liquid democracy adheres to general principles of representative democracy, but
operates with different forms of delegations. One could argue that it is, at the level of democracy, to liquid
modernity what a liquid foreign policy strategy is to the changing global order: Bauman, Z., Liquid Modernity,
Polity Press, London, 2000.
 2. BACKGROUND
The European integration is based on a transnational consensus on mutual cooperation among its
Member States. A neofunctional spillover of the political integration has already opened the European
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the 50s. Although the question what the European
Common Foreign and Security Policy really means, has not been answered yet. Despite the European
Union (the EU) has already built up the institutions to coordinate a foreign policy at the European level,
this policy still remains in the hands of individual states. When we take the European foreign policy in a
wider perspective (for example, a trade liberalization and expansion), it is possible to note its partial
success. This success, however, in my opinion does not correspond with „hard politics“ of foreign
security and defense policy. The inability of the European Union to fully intervene to resolve
international conflicts, has showed disadvantages of being a "civilian power in non-civil world"
(Keukeleire, 2010)10. The adoption of the Lisbon Treaty and the current escalating conflicts (especially in
Ukraine) shift an effort to promote the EU as an actor in international relations, which is also an issue in
my work. Development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (in the sense of a neofunctionalism
and liberal international relations theory) was characterized by overcoming a position of the European
Union as "an economic giant and a political dwarf". This means a closer collaboration in the field of
political and military cooperation of the Member States and a creation of coherent strategy of foreign
and security policy, which still has not been common. However, the military and security capacity should
not be analyzed without a relation to the North-Atlantic Alliance (NATO), which since the end of World
War II has been playing an essential role of military security of Europe. The Transatlantic relationship
could be considered as the most important geopolitical and economic relationship in the international
politics. The United States of America (the USA) and the European Union are seen as major players in
the field of international politics and are also the most important partners both in terms of trade, as well
as in solving international conflicts and crises (Moravcsik, 2010). Moreover there are different views on
an extent of these relations. The aim of the article is to focus on those aspects of bilateral interactions,
which make the transatlantic relationship complicated. The article deals with an assumption that the
European Union is a relevant player in the international relations. The aim of my work will be to answer
the question how to define the Union as a foreign policy actor within the context of the foreign and
security policy. Meanwhile, in the background of the transatlantic relations I will try to impose the
argument that the EU has a marginal role in international relations in the analysis of relations between
Europe and the United States of America.

The development and shaping of European Foreign and Security Policy After the establishment of the
European Coal and Steel Community in 1950 (The ECSC Treaty), which was a French initiative (the Pleven
Plan), there was also an attempt to set up the European Defence Community. The Pleven Plan envisaged
a formation of a common army and thus had an initiative to create the European Institute of Common
Foreign and Security Policy. It reflected both geopolitical and economic context in those times. In this
respect, the escalating Cold War had resulted in a "tighter" ties between the countries of the "West",
particularly in the field of security policy. Former assumption of "spillover" policies supposed that the
European Community would also create a political and security union. Important in this case of the

10
Mgr. Patrícia Kaplánová, Department of Political Science and European Studies
Pleven Plan was an effort to delegate powers of defense policy from the national to the supranational
level, which was at that short time after the nstitutionalization of the ECSC extremely ambitious. The
political and defense integration has left long in coming and finally in May 1952 was agreed as the
European Defence Community. This plan, however, failed in the French national parliament (August
1954 due to the condition of domestic policy and changed balance inside the French Government) and
interrupted the development of a common foreign policy by shifting its solution for decades. Therefore
during this period, the security and defense policy remained as a part of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and as a national policy of every member state.

A creation of the European Economic Community (the EEC) at the end of the 50s predestined the
integration especially in the economic field, also getting a political union did not seem so unrealistic.
Therefore next years of 60s are characterized by a predominance of the intergovernmental approach
(Dinan, 2004). In December 1969, one of the conclusions of Summit in Hague was a consensus to
establish a common strategy and the development of a political union. But „the Empty chair crisis“ and
the ambition of national governments to dominate in the common European policy made the consensus
unachievable. For specific circumstances, the project of the European Political Community had to wait a
few years. The area of foreign policy was in fact characterized as "an international body of domestic
policies and problems" (Bindi and Shapiro, 2010: 34).

Military conflicts that occurred at the end of the 20th century, such as the war in Yugoslavia, Bosnia or
Kosovo, had shown that the Member States of the European Union could no longer cope with crises and
conflicts in Europe without the implementation of common rules and a decision-making in military
issues, and therefore in the field of security and defense. After 70 years of the European Political
Cooperation (established finally in October 1970), the European Council put an effort to shape the
Common European Foreign Policy. In these years there has been a number of institutional changes and
two important steps of the integration. The first was the southern enlargement of the European
Community (new members states such as Spain, Portugal and Greece), which played a major role in the
establishing of a democratic political order in this region. The second step was the adoption of the Single
European Act (SEA) in 1986. Acceptance of this treaty did not mean only a revision of the Rome Treaty,
but also the efforts to reintegrate the principle of common decision-making by majority voting in the
Council.

The international relations in the 90s had an significant impact on the European Common Foreign policy.
The geopolitical changes in international relations which made the United States of America a global
hegemony and “the winner” of the Cold War, helped the USA to ensure their position in security policy
in Europe. Moreover there had become an opportunity for former Soviet states to join the European
Community which revived the Dynamics of the integration. In the early 90s, The European Community
adopted the "Petersberg tasks" (1992) as a part of the European Security and Defence Policy. They
included humanitarian and rescue tasks, tasks relating to the maintenance of peace and tasks of combat
forces as a part of a crisis management, including peacemaking. The EU intended to create the rapid
reaction forces, which would be able to intervene in a crisis which solution would require the United
Nations and NATO mandate. The adoption of the Petersberg tasks has shown a willingness to deploy
common military unites, but the biggest problem was weak and inadequate ways and means of defense
forces of most nationalities (Cameron, 2007: 74). Bindi and Shapiro characterized this period of the
creation of common security and defence policy that: „Eventually the only result in the field of foreign
policy was the so-called CFSP, which was actually an institutional upgrade of the EPC rather than a
coherent foreign policy. The European failure to act decisively in the Balkans meant that the 1990s was
also the period in which the Europeans started talking seriously about defense. The results were
similarly relatively weak institutions (the ESDP) rather than a true common defense policy“. Foreign and
security policy indeed reached into the pillar structure of the Maastrich Treaty, but not under the
exclusive competence of the EU, but was left entirely in the competence of Member States.
 3. Foreign Policy of EU
In the early 21st century, the European Union is active in a broad range of global policy domains. It
would therefore be an undue simplification to restrict EU foreign policy to its common foreign and
security policy. CFSP and EU defence policies (CSDP) are major components of a much more
‘multifaceted’ EU foreign policy11. It involves significant areas of EU external action such as trade or
development and external dimensions of EU internal policies (e.g. on migration). What is more, EU
foreign policy extends to virtually all countries, neighbouring as well as faraway regions and key
international organisations. In total, the EU has 139 delegations in countries and with multilateral
institutions (e.g. the UN in New York) all over the world, adding to the impressive network of diplomatic
missions of its Member States (Box 1)12. Apart from that, the Union entertains relations with a plethora
of non-governmental actors and increasingly engages in public diplomacy13. EU foreign policy thus
addresses global issues and players in a very comprehensive manner. By emphasising EU foreign policy
on economic, environmental and security issues and vis-à-vis the wider world (as opposed to its
neighbourhood), this Review makes a deliberate choice to consider only a — albeit significant — subset
of these policies.

With this broad understanding of the scope of EU foreign policy in mind, foreign policy can be defined as
actors’ ‘actions (…) directed toward objectives, conditions and actors — both governmental and non-
governmental — which they want to affect and which lie beyond their territorial legitimacy’14. In other
words, foreign policy is understood as ‘directed at the external environment with the objective of
influencing that environment and the behaviour of other actors within it, in order to pursue interests,
values and goals’15. Based on this definition, two major steps in what could be termed the ‘foreign policy
cycle’ can be distinguished: foreign policymaking and foreign policy implementation. First, foreign policy
is formulated (made) by a set of actors (e.g. ministries of foreign affairs, sectoral ministries). These
actors rely on overarching (constitutional) objectives to define and construct foreign policies, whether
issue- or country-/region-specific. Foreign policy positions are then ‘not self-executing’16. Rather, a
significant step consists in defining the strategy and instruments to use in order to bring about the
desired policy outcomes. This second stage of foreign policy, its implementation, is the realm of

11
Keukeleire and Delreux, op. cit., 2014, 1.
12
Telò, M., ‘The EU: A Civilian Power’s Diplomatic Action after the Lisbon Treaty — Bridging Internal Complexity
and International Convergence’, in Telò, M., and Ponjaert, F. (eds.), The EU’s Foreign Policy: What Kind of Power
and Diplomatic Action?, Ashgate, London, 2013, 27–64 [GR:EEN]; see also online
(http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/).
13
Duke, S., The European External Action Service and Public Diplomacy, Clingendael, The Hague, 2013.
14
) Carlsnaes, W., ‘Foreign Policy’, in Carlsnaes, W., Risse, T., and Simmons, B. A. (eds.), Handbook of International
Relations, Sage, London, 2002, 331–349, 335.
15
Keukeleire/Delreux, op. cit., 2014, 1.
16
Brighi, E., and Hill, C., ‘Implementation and behaviour’, in Smith, S., Hadfield, A., and Dunne, T. (eds.), Foreign
Policy — Theories — Actors — Cases, Oxford UP, Oxford, 2008, 117–136.
diplomacy. Diplomacy can rely on various tools, which range from pure exchanges with the purpose of
persuading interlocutors to incentivising, often economic tools (carrots) and coercive instruments such
as sanctions (sticks)17. The procedures of foreign policymaking and foreign policy
implementation/diplomacy can be different: diverging sets of actors can be involved and various
procedures can be used for decision-making. The difference between the two constituencies can be
particularly pronounced (and problematic) in the EU context.

Defining European Union foreign policy is therefore also less straightforward. In conceptual terms, the
EU is often considered as a multilevel, multi-actor system of governance involving EU institutions and
Member States as constitutive units. EU foreign policy is thus more than the sum of the foreign policies
of its 28 Member States. It is also more than the foreign policy conducted by EU institutions. It
encompasses both dimensions, even if not all national foreign policy by EU Member States necessarily
qualifies as EU foreign policy. As a result, and given the broad scope of the EU’s involvement in global
affairs, how the Union presents itself varies in line with contexts: • in areas where it possesses exclusive
competences (especially trade), external interlocutors will first and foremost be confronted to the
European Commission, which in reality is of course subject to supervision by the Member States; • in
areas of shared competence, the EU can be represented by the Commission, the Member State holding
the rotating presidency of the Council, the High Representative or teams of staff from the Commission
and/or the EEAS and Member States, depending on issues; • in still other domains, where the EU’s
competence is supplementary (e.g. health) or shared, but with strong Member State involvement (e.g.
energy diplomacy), the presidency or individual Member States might represent the EU. Complicating
matters further, important differences can exist in a single issue area between EU internal policymaking
and EU foreign policy. Examples of this are climate and energy policies.

17
Holsti, K. J., International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1995.
 4. The legal-institutional framework of EU foreign policy: set-up and tools
Turning to the legal framework for EU foreign policy under the Treaty of Lisbon18, with Article 47 of the
Treaty on European Union (TEU), the Union now possesses legal personality. This implies that it can
enter into relations with third countries in all domains, regardless of its competences19. Yet, this is not to
say that the European Commission would shoulder all the work. Rather, the TEU makes a clear
distinction between the CFSP, defined as covering ‘all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to
the Union’s security’ (including defence) (Article 24.1 TEU), and other areas. This becomes particularly
clear when the Treaty indicates that the ‘High Representative (…) shall represent the Union for matters
relating to the common foreign and security policy. He shall conduct political dialogue with third parties
on the Union’s behalf and express the Union’s position in international organisations and at
international conferences’ (Article 27.2 TEU)20. The High Representative, a novelty introduced with the
Treaty, carries a double hat: he or she is Vice-President of the Commission, but also chairs the Foreign
Affairs Council (Article 27.1 TEU). In contrast to the HR’s responsibilities, the ‘Commission shall (…) with
the exception of the common foreign and security policy, and other cases provided for in the Treaties
(…) ensure the Union’s external representation’ (Article 17.1 TEU). In procedural terms, the Treaty on
the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) foresees for the negotiation of international agreements that it is
either the Commission or the HR (in cases where principally CFSP matters are concerned) who ‘shall
submit recommendations to the Council, which shall adopt a decision (…) nominating the Union
negotiator or the head of the Union’s negotiating team’ (Article 218 TFEU). The interpretation of these
rules has caused much stir following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, and the
issue is still not settled21. In practice, in many areas the task-sharing between EU foreign policy actors
relies on pragmatic ad hoc solutions or the setting forth of pre-existing arrangements.

The creation of the post of the High Representative was accompanied by another significant institutional
novelty, the European External Action Service (EEAS). The original intention behind the creation of this
body was to enable the Union to speak with ‘one voice’ on foreign and security policies. Prior to setting
up the Service, the prospect of a genuine European diplomatic corps had sparked the emergence of an

18
See also Emerson, M., Balfour, R., Corthaut, T., Wouters, J., Kaczynski, P., and Renard, T., Upgrading the EU’s
Role as Global Actor — Institutions, Law and the Restructuring of European Diplomacy, CEPS, Brussels, 2011; Telò,
op. cit., 2013 [GR:EEN].
19
Emerson et al., op. cit., 2011, 21.
20
At the level of Heads of State or Government, this representative function is not assured by the HR, but by the
President of the European Council (Article 15.6 TEU).
21
Corthaut, T., and Van Eeckhoutte, D., ‘Legal Aspects of EU Participation in Global Environmental Governance
under the UN Umbrella’, in Wouters, J., Bruyninckx, H., Basu, S., and Schunz, S. (eds.), The European Union and
Multilateral Governance: Assessing EU Participation in United Nations Human Rights and Environmental Fora,
Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2012, 145–170
important body of literature. Key questions related to the institutional structure (organogram) and to
whether the EU was in any form ‘special’, as the first entity to rely on a corps of post-national diplomats.
The discussion about the Service reached once again a peak around the time of its first Review in mid
201322. The key echo from this literature is that the EEAS, created through ‘a series of political
compromises (…) rather than (…) grand design’, represents a hybrid entity — with staff of the
Commission’s former Directorate-General for External Relations, the Council Secretariat and Member
State diplomats — which has so far not fully delivered on the hopes that had accompanied its
invention23. The EEAS itself recognised this in its 2013 review. While this report acknowledged how
difficult it was — and continues to be — to set up a pan-European diplomatic service, it also pointed out
that there ‘is clearly scope for the EEAS to use its unique position in the EU institutional framework to
promote the strategic direction of the EU’s external action’24. Yet, this report also points to the limits of
this undeniable potential. In the foreword to the report signed by Catherine Ashton, she herself made it
clear that ‘Europe’s role in the world is one of the major challenges of the 21st century. The EEAS is but
one component of Europe’s response to this global challenge’25. And indeed, in many areas in which the
EU acts as a global actor, the EEAS has so far little if any resources (Box 1). This is true for such crucial
domains as development, climate change or energy policies. In these domains, tasks are either entirely
shouldered by other services, such as the Commission’s Directorate-General for Development and
Cooperation, Directorate-General for Climate Action or Directorate-General for Energy, or by the
Member States, or they are shared between various players, mirroring the ambiguous division of labour
sketched out in the Treaty articles discussed above. As a result, the foreign policy machinery of the EU
remains de facto rather complex, and the EEAS often unable to live up to its full potential. As Carta
(GR:EEN) puts it, ‘personal factors and bureaucratic turf battles, the creation of new institutions and a
quite unstructured plan on how to reform the system added complexity to an already complicated
system’26.

22
See, for example, Telò and Ponjaert, op. cit., 2013 [GR:EEN]; European Parliament, The Organisation and
Functioning of the European External Action Service: Achievements, Challenges and Opportunities, European
Parliament, Brussels, 2013
23
Lequesne, C., ‘The European External Action Service: Can a new institution improve the coherence of the EU
foreign policy?’, in Telò, M., and Ponjaert, F. (eds.), The EU’s Foreign Policy: What Kind of Power and Diplomatic
Action?, Ashgate, London, 2013, 79–86 [GR:EEN].
24
Ashton, C., EEAS Review, European External Action Service, Brussels, 2013, 7.
25
Ibid.
26
Carta, C., ‘The EEAS and EU Executive Actors with the Foreign Policy-Cycle, in Telò, M., and Ponjaert, F. (eds.),
The EU’s Foreign Policy: What Kind of Power and Diplomatic Action?, Ashgate, London, 2013, 87–104, 102
[GR:EEN].
 27

The legal-institutional framework does not only indicate who does what, but also provides for an answer
to the question of how the EU is to implement its foreign policies. It possesses a wide range of foreign
policy tools, based on both economic incentives and diplomatic exchanges28. Economic incentives can be
positive (e.g. concluding trade, cooperation or association agreements, providing aid) or negative (e.g.
impose embargos or boycotts, delay or suspend agreements, reduce aid). Issuing démarches or
declarations and visits to other countries are forms of diplomatic action. While this classification
focusses on the mechanisms of social interaction between the EU and third parties, another
classification highlights the EU’s choice of the (number of) external actors it approaches. Here, three
choices generally exist: multilateral, bilateral or unilateral action. Where the latter is seldom an option
for an entity like the EU, multilateralism is not only an organisational form of global governance, but also
a foreign policy tool the EU regularly employs, albeit with increasing difficulties in the contemporary
global order. Bilateralism has, in more recent years, also been promoted as a tool of EU foreign policy,
especially via strategic partnerships.

27
http://www.net4society.eu/_media/AglobalActorinSearchofaStrategy.pdf
28
Smith, K. E., European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2003
 5. The EU as a multilateral player
The EU in the UN General Assembly

When assessing the EU’s role across the UN system, the UN General Assembly is of significance as the
major forum in which the United Nations take strategic decisions. The EU’s role in this forum has been
studied for decades, with a prominent focus on quantitative analyses of the voting behaviour of its
Member States. Research has demonstrated that the EU-28 voting patterns in the UN General Assembly
have generally become more coherent over time29. It has to be noted however that such purely
quantitative indicators do not necessarily account for divergences, since they do not distinguish
between salient and less crucial issues.

It is in the UNGA that the EU wanted to obtain recognition for its reinforced foreign policy capacities
after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Based on its newly gained legal personality, it first
requested an upgrade of its observer status in the General Assembly in the autumn of 2010. This
request was initially blocked by other UN members. A watered down version of a resolution granting the
Union enhanced observer status was later accepted in an UNGA resolution of May 201130. It recalls that
‘the General Assembly is an intergovernmental body whose membership is limited to States that are
Members of the United Nations’, but grants the EU slightly greater participation rights (e.g. to be
inscribed on the list of speakers, have its communications circulated as UNGA documents). However, in
light of the diplomatic incidence that the earlier rejection of its request brought with it, and given the
high initial hopes the Union had placed on this upgrade, the advances were relatively limited and
symbolic rather than substantial. The negotiation of this institutional matter illustrated, to many
observers, the EU’s deficiencies as well as its capacities in the UN system more generally. Initially, the
Union’s request was voted down by a number of (mostly) developing countries because they feared
among others a privileged position for the EU. Their reticence demonstrated also that the Union had not
explained its move well, which had been based on complex internal legal structures often hard to grasp
for non-European parties. After the rebuttal of its initiative, reinforced, concerted (among EU actors)
and targeted (at key reluctant third countries like those from CARICOM, the Caribbean Community and
Common Market) activity showed that ‘when EU institutions and Member States act in concert,
implementing the principles of consultation, solidarity and convergence grounded in the Treaty, the EU
can be an effective actor on the global scene’31.

The EU and multilateral security governance

Going beyond the focus on quantitative assessments of its members’ voting behaviour and this
particular case of EU diplomacy regarding its own institutional representation, the EUROBROADMAP
project also studied the EU’s role in the UNGA from a qualitative perspective. Based on an analysis of
the Union’s actions in the six committees of the General Assembly, Delcour comes to the conclusion that
‘the influence of the EU at the UN is at best uneven and dependent on the issues at stake’, with

29
See, for example, Luif, P., EU cohesion in the UN General Assembly, ISS Occasional Papers No 49, Institute for
Security Studies, Pair, 2003.
30
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/65/276
31
Grevi, G., From Lisbon to New York: The EU at the UN General Assembly, Policy Brief, FRIDE, Madrid, 2011, 5.
weaknesses in security matters and an often stronger performance on matters related to socioeconomic
issues32. To take the example of security policy, the EU is de facto represented on the UNGA First
Committee (Security and Disarmament), but France and the United Kingdom as the two EU members
with permanent seats on the UN Security Council regularly break ranks33. An examination of an array of
topics dealt with by this committee (e.g. nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation) concludes that the EU
has not attained a ‘high profile and (not) demonstrated a great deal of unity and consistency’34. On the
contrary, strong cleavages among EU Member States (e.g. between NATO and non-NATO members)
implied that ‘coherent EU action is frequently not within the realms of possibility’ in the security
domain35. Coordination needs among Member States slow EU reactions down, in particular in crisis
situations, with the result that the Union hardly achieves its outcomes in this arena. While the EU is
often relatively cacophonic on security matters, in other areas the quest for unity can lead to watered
down messages. Hence, a second conclusion from the analysis of the EU’s work within the UNGA is that
‘the importance of ‘speaking with one voice’ and the mechanisms put in place in order to guarantee
more unity have been detrimental to the EU’s overall level of influence. The substance of the messages
delivered in the name of the EU is often too introspective and lacking in clarity from a political point of
view’36. This observation is supported by other researchers and for other bodies in the UN system, such
as the Human Rights Council37.

The EU and multilateral economic and trade governance

When it comes to EU activities in global multilateral governance beyond the UNGA and the core UN
bodies, economic and trade issues are of central importance. Based on a review of the EU’s
representation across major global economic forums (the WTO, IMF, World Bank, G8, G20), a situation
of ‘over-representation and under-effectiveness of the European Union in international economic
relations’ has frequently been observed38. As a matter of fact, the Union is, in terms of numbers, voting
rights and monetary contribution to these institutions, very well represented. To mention only two
examples, in the WTO, the 28 EU members plus the EU as separate entity account for over 18 % of the
159 members this body had in 2013, and the four EU Member States and the Commission account for
one quarter of the entire G20 membership (Table 1). In spite of this solid representation, analysts see
the Union’s role in the G20 in decline39. Experiences with the last G20 presidency of an EU Member

32
Delcour, B., The EU at the UNGA, EUROBROADMAP Paper No 37, 2011 [EUROBROADMAP].
33
The EU is not represented per se on the Security Council.
34
Delcour, op. cit., 2011, 14
35
Rasch, M., Single Actorness Nonexistent — EU Security Policy at the UN, GARNET Working Paper 35/08, 26, 2008
[GARNET].
36
Delcour, op. cit., 2011, 37.
37
Smith, K., ‘The European Union at the Human Rights Council: speaking with one voice but having little influence’,
Journal of European Public Policy, 2010, 17(2): 224–241; Carta, C., ‘The EU in Geneva: The Diplomatic
Representation of a System of Governance’, Journal of Contemporary European Research, 2013, 9(3): 406–423
[GR:EEN]
38
Pisany-Ferry, J., ‘The accidental player: The European Union and the global economy’, in Jorgensen, K. E. (ed.),
The European Union and International Organizations, Routledge, London, 2009, 34, 21–36 [GARNET].
39
Jokela, J., Europe’s declining role in the G20, Briefing Paper 96, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs,
Helsinki, 2011.
State (France) demonstrated that the Union was internally divided on some of the French presidency’s
proposals (such as on the financial transaction tax) and that decision-making in preparation of the major
summit in November 2011 in Cannes had not functioned very well40. In more general terms, the United
States and China have mostly dominated the central debates on economic and financial governance in
the body over the past years41. While the G20 is still relatively new as a major global forum, the
medium-term challenge for the EU therefore consists in whether it can resist US and Chinese pressures
for discussing important global economic matters in a small club of big powers. Where this club scenario
would imply a stronger role for individual EU members (Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom) to
the detriment of the Union per se, the alternative option for the EU is to strive to make the G20 the new
nucleus of a more balanced global multilateral system. This would, among other things, necessitate
greater internal unity and closer ties with the emerging countries. Questions related to the future
institutional design of the forum are thus as important as the actual socioeconomic agenda items it
deals with. To effectively respond to them, the EU needs to further develop its foreign policy capacities
and strategies regarding the G20. This requires improving existing coordination mechanisms and
developing a clear vision of what role it wants this body to play in the global governance of the 21st
century. The situation in the trade domain is slightly different. The EU is a ‘trading power’ and a
multilayered EU trade diplomacy has gradually emerged over the past 50 years (Box 2). As an exclusive
competence of the EU, external trade policy has been in the hands of the Commission, under the strict
oversight of the Member States, and with increasing input from the European Parliament in recent
years. Over time, the Union has transformed from a ‘defensive neo-mercantilist GATT player to (a)
proactive, post-modern trade liberaliser in the WTO’42. Since the creation of the WTO in 1994, the EU
has indeed attempted to advance its liberalisation agenda — with clear limitations however when it
comes to the notion of ‘effective multilateralism’. These limits concern, on the one hand, the Union’s
protectionist tendencies regarding especially agricultural products. EU positions on this matter are much
to the regret of developing countries wanting to export their products to Europe. Tensions resulting
from these differences have contributed to the initial failure of the multilateral Doha Development
Round43. On the other hand, the EU is far from an unconditionally multilateral actor in the trade domain.
Since its strategic shift embodied in the 2006 Commission communication Global Europe: Competing in
the world, multiple preferential trade agreements (PTA) testify to strong bilateral reflexes and the
willingness to exploit its market power whenever this is to its advantage44. To give two examples: in

40
As an illustration, Jokela mentions the Union’s preparation for key discussions at the Cannes summit: ‘While the
Presidents of the EU institutions and the chair of the Eurogroup were involved in the decision-making, the other 11
eurozone countries were merely consulted — if consulted at all — while non-euro members were clearly left on
the decision-making periphery’ (op. cit., 2011, 8).
41
Garrett, G., ‘G2 in G20: China, the United States and the World after the Global Financial Crisis’, Global Policy,
2010, 1(1): 29–37.
42
Mortensen, J., ‘The World Trade Organization and the European Union’, in Jorgensen, K. E. (ed.), The European
Union and International Organizations, Routledge, London, 2009, 80–100, 89 [GARNET].
43
The Doha Development Round is the latest round of negotiations that started in 2001 with the aim of further
trade liberalisation under the WTO umbrella. Since 2008, talks have been stalled over disputes between developed
and emerging countries related to agriculture, services and a few other issues.
44
European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the committee of the regions — Global Europe: Competing in the
world — A Contribution to the EU’s Growth and Jobs Strategy, (COM(2006) 567), Brussels, 4 October 2006.
2011, the Union concluded a bilateral Free Trade Agreement with South Korea, while PTA talks with the
Gulf Cooperation Council have ‘been regarded as a way of ensuring access to Gulf oil and fostering
stability in the region using the EU’s market attraction as a means of exchange’45. What is more, it has
been noted that Member States pursue parallel trade policies in efforts to obtain competitive
advantages. Germany is often cited as particularly prone to adopting nationally inspired trade and
investment strategy, notably vis-à-vis China, but France, Spain, Denmark, the Netherlands and Poland
are acting in similar ways46. Nevertheless, despite growing bilateral trade activities and protectionist
reflexes, the EU remains crucial to the multilateral trade regime. Following the partial agreement
reached at the most recent round of WTO negotiations in December 2013 in Bali, the Union finds itself
in a key position to provide further impetus toward a closure of the Doha Development Round. Based on
her research in the framework of the GR:EEN project, Dee identifies several actions the EU could
undertake to further contribute to effective multilateralism in this domain47: (i) display further flexibility
on its positions regarding agriculture; (ii) promote a swift conclusion of the trade negotiations with the
United States (on the transatlantic trade and investment agreement, discussed below) and stronger
engagement of the latter in the WTO; (iii) reinforce cooperation with the emerging economies; and (iv)
use the G20 to de-block the negotiations, which implies effectively employing complementary global
economic forums to contribute to problem-solving. Altogether, by virtue of its market power, the EU is a
major and often effective biand multilateral trade diplomat, but displays clear insufficiencies when it
comes to participation in global economic governance more widely.

48

The EU and multilateral climate governance

45
Garcia, M., ‘From idealism to realism? EU preferential trade agreement policy’, Journal of Contemporary
European Research, 2013, 9(4): 521–541, 526.
46
Youngs, R., and Springford, J., ‘Europe’s trade strategy: promise or peril?’, in Fabry, E. (ed.), Think global — Act
European — Thinking Strategically about the EU’s External Action, Notre Europe, Paris, 2013, 39–49, 40–41
47
Dee, M., The European Union and the WTO Post-Bali Work Programme, Policy Brief, 2013 [GR:EEN].
48
http://www.net4society.eu/_media/AglobalActorinSearchofaStrategy.pdf
Climate change represents an evermore important case of EU multilateral activity49. The founding treaty
of today’s multilateral global climate regime, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, was negotiated in 1991–92. During that period, the EU did not yet possess a common foreign
policy worthy of that name. Nonetheless, concerted action among EU members and the Commission at
that time, based on the desire to lead global discussions on this important matter, led the Union to
adopt a rather active stance. In the negotiations that followed in the mid 1990s and resulted in the 1997
Kyoto Protocol, the Union was then — together with the United States and Japan — instrumental to the
final outcome. The Protocol stipulated binding greenhouse gas emission reductions of about 5 % over
2008–12 from the 1990 levels for the group of industrialised country parties. In 2001, when it became
clear that the United States would not ratify the Protocol, the EU engaged in exhaustive diplomatic
efforts to gather support for its ratification. Partially, as a result of this activity, Russia adopted the
Protocol in late 2004, and the treaty entered into force in 2005. Since then, multilateral negotiations
have been ongoing on a reformed climate regime. They evolve in the largely transformed world order
discussed in Section 2. Although the EU has actively tried to lead these negotiations ‘by example’, i.e. by
trying to demonstrate that emissions reductions are possible internally (especially via emissions trading)
and promoting ambitious actions vis-à-vis other partners, the global context has proven to be very
difficult. The Union is no longer one of only three major emitters, as it had been during the 1990s. The
emissions of other players, especially those of the BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India, China) are
rising steeply. As a result — and in contrast to what had been agreed at the time of the Kyoto Protocol
— the emerging world nowadays needs to be part of the solution alongside industrialised states. In this
situation, the Union’s leadership-by-example approach of the 2000s was also intended to appeal to
other parties to develop on a low-carbon path. At the 2009 conference of the parties to the UN climate
regime in Copenhagen, this strategy did not lead to the legally binding outcome enshrining ambitious
reduction targets that the EU had desired. Pointing to the principle of common, but differentiated
responsibilities, the developing world (including major emerging countries) refused to take on binding
emissions reductions. At the same time, major non-European industrialised countries, especially the
United States, were not willing to be bound by international legal rules either. Incidentally, the Union’s
negotiators — and many of those coming from the developing world — were largely sidelined during the
final stages of talks. The summit ended with a minimum common denominator deal essentially
negotiated between the BASIC countries and the United States (Copenhagen Accord). After the summit,
the Union’s approach, but also the way it had defended it, were criticised for their inflexibility50. Among
others, it had insisted on a legally binding outcome when other parties had signalled that this was no
longer possible, depriving it of potential greater leverage. Since 2010, following successful agenda-
setting from the EU in cooperation with developing countries at the 2011 summit in Durban51, South

49
On what follows, see Van Schaik, L., ‘The European Union and the climate change regime’, in Jorgensen, K. E.,
and Laatikainen, K. L. (eds.), Routledge Handbook on the European Union and International Institutions, Routledge,
London, 2013, 357–370; Schunz, S., ‘The EU in the United Nations Climate Change Regime’, in Wouters, J.,
Bruyninckx, H., Basu, S., and Schunz, S. (eds.), The European Union and Multilateral Governance: Assessing EU
Participation in United Nations Human Rights and Environmental Fora, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2012,
191–213.
50
See Van Schaik, op. cit., 2013
51
https://unfccc.int/meetings/durban_nov_2011/meeting/6245.php
Africa, the UN regime talks have been reinvigorated. The novel objective is to adopt an ‘agreed outcome
with legal force’ implicating developed and developing countries at the 2015 Paris summit, which would
then enter into force as of 2020. In the meantime, voluntary pledges are being implemented by many
global players. The EU itself has pledged 20 % reductions from 1990 levels by 2020, and is engaged in
strategic debates about its internal and external climate policy positions for the 2030/50 time horizons.
All in all, while it has long aspired to lead global efforts for an effective multilateral climate regime, and
even if it has been able to effectively impact global climate politics agendas at certain moments, EU
activities have, to date, not contributed to a durable solution of the problem of climate change through
globally concerted, legally binding action. Particularly the experience of the Copenhagen summit
demonstrated that the Union was not acting in line with its main interlocutors’ logic of action and
interests. Where the EU promoted environmental objectives, other players perceived global climate
politics as a major arena for foreign policy. If it wants to promote effective multilateral cooperation in
this crucial policy domain, the EU needs to adapt its climate diplomacy more adequately to this context.
This may imply reinforced coordination between the Commission’s Directorate-General for Climate
Action and the EEAS52. Altogether, the EU is generally a highly active multilateral player. Yet, regular
resorting to bilateralism, but also parallel bilateral activities of EU Member States, imply that ‘effective
multilateralism’ often remains, both as a means and an end, a ‘distant goal’ for the EU53. This
observation underscores a lack of EU strategy within and across multilateral forums, which may plead
for an update of the European Security Strategy or the design of a novel strategy54.

52
Torney, D., European Climate Diplomacy: Building capacity for external action, Briefing Paper 141, The Finnish
Institute of International Affair, Helsinki, 2013.
53
MERCURY project, op.cit., 2012.
54
Drieskens, E., and Van Schaik, L. (eds.), The EU and effective multilateralism: external and internal reform,
Routledge, London and New York, 2014.
 6. The EU as a bilateral actor
The EU and the United States of America

With the United States, the EU maintains bilateral relations that date back to the 1950s and were
formalised through the 1990 Transatlantic Declaration, the 1995 New Transatlantic Agenda, the 1998
Transatlantic Economic Partnership, and the creation of the Transatlantic Economic Council in 2007.
Although the EU may not be able to rival the United States in terms of military capacities, its economic
standing means that it encounters the United States on an equal footing in just about any issue area in
global affairs. And even if the turn toward the Pacific that the Obama administration displayed from its
very start indicated a decline in importance of the EU from a US perspective, the two remain
interdependent and thus closely tied. Despite this interdependence and the oft-cited ‘shared
transatlantic values’, the EU and the United States do tend to disagree on many matters, ranging from
the necessity or not to intervene militarily in states across the globe (e.g. Iraq) to the set-up of the
International Criminal Court, environmental policy, the regulation of genetically modified organisms
(GMOs) or, most recently, data protection concerns. Several of these topics merit detailed discussion.

At this point, the major and most mediatised bilateral engagement between the United States and the
EU concerns the area of trade, with the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) currently
under negotiation. Together, the EU and the United States account for more than 45 % of world GDP
and one third of world trade55. Since many trade barriers have already been removed in the past, the
two partners essentially seek a further harmonisation of their regulatory standards, which proves
difficult. An example of this difficulty is the highly mediatised refusal of some EU Member States to
grant market access to US hormone-treated beef and chlorinated chicken, but contentious issues are
much more wide-ranging. They include differences over financial services, investor protection and
fracking, and have sparked public debates about the desirability of this partnership.

EU-US relations on trade have, however, to be understood in a much broader context: ‘the myriad
challenges currently confronting the West cannot be addressed via trade deals alone’56. Rather, EU-US
relations are crucial to the shape of global governance more broadly. This is true for the economic and
financial sphere, discussed above with regard to the G20. In this area, the challenge for the EU is to
balance a possible G2 dominance of the United States and China. It is also true for the security domain,
for example, where the absence of a fully fledged European defence policy also entails that the EU
regularly counts on the United States to step in when crisis situations arise. Yet, US military resources
are finite, and are increasingly invested elsewhere than in the European neighbourhood, putting
pressure on the EU for the ‘burden-sharing’ demanded by the United States in the framework of NATO.

Climate change represents another key challenge that the two sides face, and which neither of them can
tackle alone. The EU-US relationship has long been at the heart of the global efforts to deal with this
issue. Where EU Member States and the United States were crucial to the deal struck on the UN
framework convention in 1992, the EU, the United States and Japan were essential to delivering the

55
EEAS, EU-US Summit (Brussels, 26 March 2014) and EU-US relations, Fact Sheet, EEAS, Brussels, 2.
56
Menon, A., ‘Time for Tough Love in Transatlantic Relations’, The International Spectator, 2013, 48(3): 7–14, 7
1997 Kyoto Protocol. During the Bush administration (2001–09), however, the United States largely
disengaged from climate politics, and also kept EU-US bilateral relations around climate issues to a
minimum57. Things partially changed when Barack Obama took office. Bilateral relations around climate
change and energy were stepped up again, and the creation of the EU-US Energy Council in 2009
marked a first tangible output. In spite of this cooperation, EU-US relations have not, however, positively
contributed to ‘effective multilateralism’ in the global climate regime over the past few years. In no
small measure, this has to do with deeply rooted and contrasting perceptions on the two sides of the
Atlantic of the threat that climate change poses: the European approach based on the precautionary
principle contrasts with a US confidence in technological progress allowing for cost-effective emissions
reductions58. Besides the need to conceive of them broadly in thematic terms, it is also important to
regard EU-US relations as embedded into a specific geostrategic context. One interesting recent
research strand in this regard, embodied by the ATLANTIC FUTURE project, and fuelled by political
processes to provide an alternative to the rise of the Pacific59, looks at the dynamics between the north
and south on both shores of the Atlantic. This project promises to deliver a precise mapping of the
overlapping and complementary relations between all the Atlantic parties in issue areas ranging from
economic and energy to security and environmental policies. It will also comprise a prospective exercise
where future scenarios for the Atlantic space will be outlined. This should lay the grounds on which to
decide whether pan-Atlantic political initiatives, encompassing the EU-US relations, will be a viable
component of future global governance60.

In sum, EU-US relations have remained strong in economic, especially trade, terms over the years, but
were characterised by periodic rifts and continued disagreements on value grounds regarding issues
such as security, food safety or environmental protection. While the transatlantic dialogue is open, it is
an unresolved question whether this cooperation also feeds into the second objective of strategic
partnerships, which is to forge more solid multilateral cooperation. The insights of the ongoing
TRANSWORLD project can be expected to provide further clarity on this. A key objective of this project is
to uncover the dynamics of the evolving EU-US relations in light of three competing hypotheses: (i) the
relations evolve toward a structural drift; (ii) the two parties establish a purely functional relationship;
and (iii) they form an enduring partnership. The EU’s future strategy, whether in the T-TIP negotiations
specifically or toward other major actors (especially China) and within the G20 in general, will strongly
co-determine the shape that the transatlantic relationship will take.

The EU and China

China’s ascent from being the most populous country and ‘factory of the world’ to becoming the second
largest economy on the planet has been comparatively rapid, and has come with important

57
Ellerman, D., The Shifting Locus of Global Climate Policy Leadership, TRANSWORLD Working Paper No 16, 2013
[TRANSWORLD].
58
De Cock, G., Contrasting the US’ and the EU’s Approach to Climate Security, EU-GRASP Working Paper No 17,
2010 [EU-GRASP]
59
Such as the Atlantic Basin Initiative
(http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/events/2012/Atlantic%20Basin%20Initiative/ Atlantic%20Basin%20Initiative)
60
See the website of the FP7 project ATLANTIC FUTURE on this matter (http://www.atlanticfuture.eu/).
socioecological challenges. China not only displays growing ambitions to be recognised as a regional and
global player, but has also an immense energy need to sustain its model of economic growth. Moreover,
it is building up significant military resources. All this has major repercussions for global politics. It has
also significantly contributed to making relations with China gradually move centre stage in the EU. Even
if efforts to intensify the engagement with China date back to at least the 1970s, it is really only in the
past decade that they have been stepped up. A strategic partnership was initiated in 2003, based on the
1985 EU-China trade and cooperation agreement. It gradually led to a strong institutionalisation of
bilateral relations, with political, economic and dozens of sectoral dialogues (on issues from trade to
human rights) and yearly EU-China summits61. After an initial phase of high promise for this relationship,
the late 2000s came with a number of persistent conflicts (especially around human rights, but also
trade issues) and an attempt at reinvigoration in more recent years. To explore EU-China relations, three
important domains will be briefly examined: global economic, climate and security governance. Given
the size of their respective economies, EU-China relations are crucial to the global economic and trade
system. The EU has been the most important trading partner for China since 2004. It has also played a
key role in promoting China’s accession to the WTO, using bilateral ties to integrate the country into the
multilateral trade regime. Since China’s WTO membership took effect in 2001, and especially since the
EU’s 2006 ‘Global Europe’ strategy, the bilateral dimension has been further reinforced with a view to
establishing a free trade agreement between the two parties. Despite open channels for dialogue, the
bilateral trade relations have also seen a number of conflicts in recent years.

These rifts have touched upon, among other things, ‘restrictions on foreign direct investment,
protection of intellectual property, forced technology transfer, lack of transparency regarding subsidies,
export restrictions’62. Most recently, fears of a ‘trade war’ arose around the EU’s intention to limit the
import of Chinese solar panels due to alleged dumping, which China countered with a threat to impose
restrictions on the import of wine from the EU. While this matter was settled through an ad hoc
entente, the launch of negotiations of a comprehensive EU-China investment agreement in late 2013
sparked hopes for a more general agreement on trade issues and for a gradual rebalancing of the
currently strong trade deficit to the disadvantage of the Union. The conflict cases show, however, that
the bilateral relations in the trade domain remain often arduous for the time being63. This trend is
exacerbated by the parallel trade policies of EU Member States toward China discussed in Section 3.164.
This also implies that EU efforts vis-à-vis China do not systematically result in effective multilateralism in
the WTO65.

Climate change is equally among the major topics dealt with in the EU-China Strategic Partnership. In
2005, the two sides concluded a specific climate change partnership. From the EU perspective, this was
agreed in a twofold attempt: engaging in technology cooperation to effectively help China to reduce

61
The Dialogue Architecture of the EU-China Strategic Partnership can be found online
(http://eeas.europa.eu/china/docs/ eu_china_dialogues_en.pdf).
62
Armstrong, J., The EU’s Trade Policy and China: Cooperation in the Interest of Multilateralism?, MERCURY E-
paper No 21, 2012 [MERCURY].
63
Casarini, N., The EU-China partnership: 10 years on, European Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2013.
64
Youngs and Springford, op. cit., 2013.
65
Armstrong, op. cit., 2012, 22.
emissions and starting a bilateral dialogue with China to feed into the UN negotiations on climate
change66. The outcome of these efforts is clearly ambiguous. On the one hand, the 2009 Copenhagen
climate summit and its follow-up represented a downside for EU diplomacy and EU-China relations. The
efforts that had been undertaken to rally China in the years before the summit had not fed into effective
multilateral cooperation, given continued Chinese reluctance to commit to any binding emissions
reductions on a global scale. On the contrary, a widespread perception was that China had sought to
gain as many positive advances from the cooperation with the EU as it could, but had given little in
return. Moreover, it had engaged in ‘venue-shopping’, concluding bilateral agreements with EU Member
States alongside its engagement with the EU (represented by the Commission, especially the
Directorate-General for the Environment and, later, the Directorate-General for Climate Action) per se,
thus effectively trying to take advantage from Union divisions to advance its own interests. From a
strategic perspective, and if bilateralism was meant to feed into multilateralism, the climate change
partnership has thus delivered very little up to now67. The promises made by China and the other BASIC
countries in the 2011 Durban agreement, namely to negotiate an outcome with legal force including
developed and (major) developing countries, are yet to be fulfilled. On the other hand, the bilateral
technological cooperation between China and the EU has solidified over time, for example through
agreements on practical cooperation regarding the set-up of emissions trading schemes in China or the
sustainable management of cities more broadly68. Such cooperation based on small steps may also be
the way to move forward for the bilateral relationship, given continued dissonances on the general
approach to dealing with climate change.

In the area of security, global crises that emerged in recent years, be it the military operation in Libya in
2011 or the case of Syria, demonstrated that ‘China and European countries found themselves at odds’
on a regular basis69. Dissonances result from structural problems that have to do with different
perceptions of security and how it should be pursued. As the EU-GRASP project has comprehensively
studied, the EU operates with a broad understanding of security, with a strong emphasis on non-
traditional security threats and the notion of human security70. What is more, in military terms, and
despite the objective to develop a common security and defence policy, the Union has currently no
unified defence policy apart from NATO. By contrast, China’s view on security is narrower. Its main
objective has been to protect its own sovereignty and role in the UN Security Council, and to act as a
regional power in the Asia-Pacific. At the same time, it has increased its military spending by 170 % since

66
Belis, D., and Schunz, S., ‘Global Climate Governance and the Energy Challenge: European and Chinese
Perspectives’, in Defraigne, J., Defraigne, P., de Wilde, T., and Wouters, J. (eds.), China, the EU and the
Restructuring of Global Governance, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2012, 201–214
67
Romano, G., The EU-China Partnership on Climate Change: Bilateralism Begetting Multilateralism in Promoting a
Climate Change Regime?, MERCURY E-paper No 8, 2010 [MERCURY].
68
On this, see the FP7 project URBACHINA (Sustainable Urbanisation in China — Historical and Comparative
Perspectives, Mega-trends towards 2050, 2011–15).
69
Zhemin, C., ‘The Efficacy of Post-Lisbon Treaty EU’s External Actions and China-EU Strategic Partnership’, in Telò,
M., and Ponjaert, F. (eds.), The EU’s Foreign Policy: What Kind of Power and Diplomatic Action?, Ashgate, London,
2013, 181, [GR:EEN].
70
See, for example, Lucarelli, S., Van Langenhove, L., and Wouters, J. (eds.), The EU and multilateral security
governance, Routledge, London, 2013 [EU-GRASP]
2002, occupying second place behind the United States in this regard71. Added to these divergences of
perception is the continued dissonance over the arms embargo that the EU withholds against China
since the 1989 ‘Tiananmen Square’ incidents. All this renders both bilateral security talks between the
two players and the building into multilateral security governance rather complicated.

In synthesis, the cases of trade, environmental and security governance illustrate key features of the
EU-China relations, as institutionalised in the strategic partnership, which form a pattern. This pattern
comprises a strong EU engagement with China, a multiplicity of dialogues, but also continued
misunderstandings between the two partners72. Added to this is the trend toward an asymmetrical form
of bilateralism, where EU-China and individual EU Member State-China relations coexist. If one adds
other domains (e.g. human rights) to the picture, this overall impression is further confirmed. This is not
to imply that the strategic partnership is without positive effects regarding trust- and capacity-building.
Its tangible outputs, especially in terms of a contribution to multilateralism, have, however, remained
limited so far.

The EU and other regions

On top of relations with key third countries, the Union’s bilateral activities vis-à-vis other regions merit
brief discussion. Inter- (or bi-)regionalism has become a major research topic in parallel to the Union’s
efforts to build strong and strategic partnerships with other areas of the world73. While it has long
formed part of the Union’s strategy, a proliferation of inter-regional relations has been observed since
the 1990s and interpreted as part of the ‘EU’s specific strategic response to the new global system’74.
However, the EU’s discourse surrounding them initially remained rather ‘blind to the outside world and
stubbornly self-referential’, notably by attempting to promote the Union as a model of regional
integration75. In more recent years, inter-regional relations involving the EU were expanded and can be
described as a ‘mixed bag’ both in thematic and geographical terms. For one, they have tended to be
developed around either specific issues (trade, aid) or as a more horizontal effort covering global politics
more widely76. Depending on the issues at hand, the key service in charge on the EU side is either the
EEAS or the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Trade or Directorate-General for
Development and Cooperation. What is more, the geographic outreach of these partnerships is ever
broader: there are numerous exchanges between the EU and Africa (e.g. African Union), Asia (e.g.
ASEAN) or Latin America (e.g. Mercosur), and a strategic partnership has been formed with CELAC, the
Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. This partnership covers a vast array of issues: while

71
Le Gloannec, A.-M., Irondelle, B., and Cadier, D., New and Evolving Trends in International Security,
TRANSWORLD Working Paper 13, 2013, 13–14 [TRANSWORLD]
72
Wacker, G., ‘China und die EU: Keine Strategie, keine Partnerschaft’, in Lang, K.-O., and Wacker, G. (eds.), Die EU
im Beziehungsgefüge großer Staaten, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin, 2013,
29–40.
73
This section draws on the comprehensive study by Ponjaert, F., ‘Inter-regionalism as a Coherent and Intelligible
Instrument in the EU Foreign Policy Toolbox: A Comparative Assessment’, in Telò, M., and Ponjaert, F. (eds.), The
EU’s Foreign Policy: What Kind of Power and Diplomatic Action?, Ashgate, London, 2013, 135–153 [GR:EEN].
74
Ibid., 140.
75
Ibid., 157.
76
Rignér, H., and Söderbaum, F., Mapping Inter-regionalism, EU-GRASP Working Paper No 4, 2010 [EU-GRASP]
economic relations are at its heart, it deals also with migration, human rights, education, science and
cultural issues as well as environmental policies. Research on this partnership has, especially beyond
economic relations, so far been scarce. It may gain in importance in the coming years, with reinforced
emphasis on the social and cultural dimensions of the exchange between the EU and CELAC77. As it
stands, the mixed bag of inter-regionalism as a bilateral EU foreign policy tool is ‘still lacking a
constructive and consistent narrative’78. Although it does allow for structured exchanges with partners
on all continents, the effectiveness of such cooperation in terms of policy outputs and effects on
effective multilateralism is often not evident79.

In conclusion, if the EU is thus increasingly a bilateral player via its strategic partnerships, these latter
remain ‘work in progress’ with a ‘very uneven’ output80. The key dimension of these partnerships is
regular economic exchanges, but other issues are added to the picture, depending on the EU’s
interlocutor. While the concept, its utility and implementation are contested among EU institutions and
Member States, and while the choice of additional partners appears to remain open, strategic
partnerships do seem to provide the long-term framework for structured exchanges that observers have
lauded. Whether they can systematically feed into an overarching EU strategy aimed at effective
multilateralism is far from clear, however, since ‘in interactions with strategic partners and other
regional organisations the EU also takes a mixed approach — multilateral in ambition, highly pragmatic
in practice’81. What all this means for the EU’s position in the global order is discussed in the next
section.

77
See Societal Challenge 6, ‘Europe in a Changing World: Inclusive, Innovative and Reflective Societies’, Work
Programme 2014/15.
78
Ponjaert, op. cit., 2013, 157 [GR:EEN].
79
Ibid.
80
Grevi, op. cit., 2013, 173 [GR:EEN].
81
MERCURY project, op. cit., 2012, 3.
 7. Conclusion
From the development of the European foreign policy, which I demonstrated in my work, we
can postulate several arguments. Unlike national states (eg. USA), the European Union still has
not defined clear goals of its foreign policy since the EU established the Common Foreign and
Security Policy. Another finding is the fact that the CFSP has always been reactive, not proactive
- that the competences of foreign politics were awarded following to immediate needs or
specific needs, not on the basis of a coherent strategy. Nevertheless, the EU has established a
foundation for greater use of its potential by deepening efforts for the common security and
defense policy. The European Security and Defence Policy is a result of the successful European
integration, although it is a relatively new area within the common decision-making and
creating rules on security and defense at the European level. The current form of foreign and
security policy is the result of historical progress and changes that have occurred since 1999. In
my view, a definition of the mutual relationship between the EU and NATO shapes the
European common security policy gradually, and a clear demarcation of responsibilities of each
transnational organizations are pointed to the EU's relationship to the USA. The European
Union and the United States of America are the most important global players who need each
other to successfully solve many of the world's problems. They need to learn how to work
together, where necessary; differ where is necessary to reduce differences in the same areas.
Both parts must continue to successfully cooperate in various fields. As well as the enhanced
cooperation, as well as disagreement and dissent, are part of the political, security and
economic relations between the EU and the USA. In the case of political relations, the USA and
the EU have committed to set up a regular political agenda at all levels, as well as to strengthen
their further partnership in order to promote democracy, the rule of law, respect for human
rights and individual freedoms, to ensure peace and promote international security, act
together with other nations against aggression and coercion, contribute to the resolution of
conflicts in the world and so on. The European Union alongside the NATO and the United States
of America, is becoming an increasingly relevant player in the international politics. For
example, the Ukraine crisis and the case of Palestine have showed a clear way forward to closer
cooperation in the field of security.